[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 21 (Tuesday, February 25, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1583-S1588]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  THE URGENT NEED TO OUTLAW POISON GAS

 Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I intend to address one of the 
most important matters that should come before the Senate in the next 
several weeks: the Chemical Weapons Convention. This convention--
negotiated under Presidents Reagan and Bush--would outlaw poison gas 
weapons.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention represents a significant step forward 
in our efforts to contend with the greatest immediate threat to our 
national security--the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention will make it illegal under 
international and domestic laws for a country to use, develop, produce, 
transfer, or stockpile chemical weapons.
  The CWC will help protect our citizens from the use of poison gas 
weapons by terrorist groups. It will benefit our military by requiring 
other nations to follow our lead and destroy their chemical weapons. It 
will improve the ability of our intelligence agencies to monitor 
chemical weapons threats to our Armed Forces and our Nation. The 
convention has the strong support of the American chemical industry, 
which was centrally involved in the negotiation of the CWC. It also 
takes into account all of the protections afforded Americans under our 
Constitution.
  This is a bipartisan treaty, initiated and negotiated under President 
Reagan, further negotiated, finalized, and signed under President Bush, 
and strongly endorsed and submitted for the Senate's advice and consent 
to ratification by President Clinton.
  The costs of the CWC are small, but its benefits are potentially 
enormous.
  At present, international law permits the Libyas and the North Koreas 
of the world to produce limitless quantities of chemical weapons. That 
will change when the CWC enters into force.
  The CWC will make pariahs out of states that refuse to abide by its 
provisions. Through the sanctions required by the convention, it will 
make it more difficult for those pariah states to obtain the precursor 
chemicals they need to manufacture poison gas. It will create 
international pressure on these states to sign and ratify the CWC and 
to abide by its provisions. The CWC will create a standard for good 
international citizens to meet. It will brand as outlaws those 
countries that choose to remain outside this regime.
  The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will mark a 
major milestone in our efforts to enlist greater international support 
for the important American objective of containing and penalizing rogue 
states that seek to acquire or transfer weapons of mass destruction.
  Ironically, should the Senate fail to give its advice and consent, 
this milestone will pass with the U.S. On the same side as the rogue 
states.


                        Consequences of inaction

  Mr. President, with just over 2 months remaining until entry-into-
force, we have reached the eleventh hour.
  The convention has been signed by 161 countries and ratified by 68. 
It will enter into force on April 29 of this year, with or without the 
participation of the United States. While the United States led the 
effort to achieve the CWC, the Senate, which received the convention 
from President Clinton in 1993, has not yet given its advice and 
consent to ratification.
  Our failure to ratify this convention before April 29 will have 
direct and serious consequences for the security of this country.
  First, the CWC mandates trade restrictions that could have a 
deleterious impact upon the American chemical industry. If the United 
States has not ratified, American companies will have to supply end-
user certificates to purchase certain classes of chemicals from CWC 
members. After 3 years we will be subject to trade sanctions that will 
harm American exports and jobs.
  Second, an overall governing body known as the Conference of States 
Parties will meet soon after April 29 to draw up rules governing the 
implementation of the convention. If we are not a party to the CWC, we 
will not be a member of that conference. This body with no American 
input could make rules that have a serious negative impact on the 
United States.
  Third, there will be a standing executive council of 41 members, on 
which we are assured of a permanent seat from the start because of the 
size of our chemical industry--that is, if we have ratified the 
convention by April 29. If we ratify after the council is already 
constituted, then a decision on whether to order a requested surprise 
inspection of an American facility may be taken without an American 
representative evaluating the validity of the request and looking out 
for the facility's interests.
  Fourth, there will be a technical secretariat with about 150 
inspectors, many of whom would be American because of the size and 
sophistication of our chemical industry. If we fail to ratify this 
convention in the next 2 months, there will be no American inspectors.
  Finally, and most importantly in the long term, by failing to ratify 
we would align ourselves with those rogue actors who have chosen to 
defy the CWC. This would do irreparable harm to our global leadership 
on critical arms control and non-proliferation concerns.
  Mr. President, I would now like to address some of the benefits we 
will derive by joining the CWC.


                               Terrorism

  One clear benefit of the CWC is that it will help protect us against 
the threat of terrorist groups acquiring poison gas and using it 
against our citizens at home or our troops abroad. Imagine for a moment 
if those responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing or last year's 
attack on our troops in Saudi Arabia had used poison gas instead of 
conventional devices. How many more Americans would have been killed?
  The CWC will make it more difficult for terrorists to get their hands 
on chemicals that would allow them to blackmail us with the threat of 
killing thousands of Americans with a single device. This convention 
will require countries to destroy their stockpiles of chemical weapons, 
eliminating the risk that these weapons could fall into the wrong 
hands. It also will control the transfer of those chemicals that can be 
used to make chemical weapons, thus restricting and improving the 
monitoring of chemicals that terrorists need to manufacture weapons.
  Most importantly, parties to the convention will be required to pass 
implementing legislation to place the same prohibitions on persons 
under their jurisdiction that states themselves accept under the 
convention. This will mean that states will control strictly all toxic 
chemicals and their precursors. Any prohibited activity under the 
convention will be criminalized.
  That was not the case with the 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway in 
which lethal sarin gas caused thousands of casualties. At that time, 
there was no Japanese law against the manufacture and possession of 
chemical weapons. Following that horrible incident, Japan moved swiftly 
to enact legislation to criminalize chemical weapons activities of the 
sort banned by the convention. Under the CWC, all parties must do the 
same.
  In conjunction with the legislation we will introduce in our Congress 
to implement the CWC, the convention will provide American law 
enforcement officers the tools they need to investigate terrorist 
groups that are trying to acquire chemical weapons and improve the 
prospects for early detection and prosecution.
  In short, while it cannot entirely eliminate the threat of chemical 
terrorism--and I would submit that no treaty can--the CWC will make it 
much harder for terrorists to obtain poison gas and to use it against 
Americans.

[[Page S1584]]

                                Military

  The CWC also has benefits for our Armed Forces.
  Let me make two facts absolutely clear. First, the U.S. has foresworn 
the use of chemical weapons once the CWC enters into force. Second, the 
Defense Department is required by law to destroy nearly all U.S. 
chemical weapons by 2004. Failure to ratify the CWC will not change 
these two facts.
  However, the CWC will require other nations to follow our lead and 
destroy their chemical weapons.
  As the gulf war demonstrated, we do not need chemical weapons to 
deter potential adversaries like Iraq and Libya from using chemical 
weapons against our troops. The threat of overwhelming and devastating 
nonchemical retaliation will serve as a sufficient deterrent. Thus, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention will enhance, not damage, the capabilities 
of the U.S. military to carry out its mission.
  Several current and former distinguished military officers have 
spoken to the benefits of this convention.
  Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf in his recent testimony before the Senate 
Veterans' Affairs Committee stated:

       We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future 
     warfares. And frankly, by not rarifying that treaty we align 
     ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea and I'd 
     just as soon not be associated with those thugs in this 
     particular matter.

  Gen. John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has 
stated before the Foreign Relations Committee : ``From a military 
perspective, the Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly in our 
interest.''
  Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations, wrote last month 
in the Washington Post:

       This treaty is entirely about eliminating other people's 
     weapons--weapons that may some day be used against Americans. 
     For the American military, U.S. ratification is high gain and 
     low or no pain. In that light, I find it astonishing that any 
     American opposes ratification.

  In addition, several prominent veterans and military groups, 
including the V.F.W. and the R.O.A., have endorsed the CWC. I will ask 
that Admiral Zumwalt's op-ed and statements by these groups be printed 
in the Record.
  The CWC does not diminish our ability and duty to provide our troops 
with defenses against those that would contemplate the use of chemical 
weapons against us. Indeed, the administration plans to maintain a 
robust program of upgrading defenses against chemical weapons. Should 
chemical weapons be used against us after the CWC is in force, we will 
be ready.
  Furthermore, the CWC will place the weight of world opinion behind us 
to take whatever action is necessary to respond to or prevent an 
adversary using chemical weapons.
  I emphasize again that the most important aspect of the CWC from a 
military perspective is that it will place most of the world in the 
same situation we are in--not relying upon chemical weapons as a part 
of military doctrine. This can only be considered a positive 
development for our military.


                              Verification

  Another great benefit of the Chemical Weapons Convention is that it 
increases our ability to detect production of poison gas.
  Regardless of whether we ratify this convention, regardless of 
whether another country has ratified this convention, our intelligence 
agencies will be monitoring the capabilities of other countries to 
produce and deploy chemical weapons. The CWC will not change that 
responsibility.
  What this convention does, however, is give our intelligence agencies 
some additional tools to carry out this task. In short, it will make 
their job easier.
  In addition to on-site inspections, the CWC provides a mechanism to 
track the movement of sensitive chemicals around the world, increasing 
the likelihood of detection. This mechanism consists of data 
declarations that require chemical companies to report production of 
those precursor chemicals needed to produce chemical weapons. This 
information will make it easier for the intelligence community to 
monitor these chemicals and to learn when a country has chemical 
weapons capability.
  In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1994, 
R. James Woolsey, then Director of Central Intelligence, stated: ``In 
sum, what the Chemical Weapons Convention provides the intelligence 
community is a new tool to add to our collection tool kit.''
  Recently, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, re-
emphasized this point before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence. Mr. Tenet stated: ``There are tools in this treaty that 
as intelligence professionals we believe we need to monitor the 
proliferation of chemical weapons around the world. . . . I think as 
intelligence professionals we can only gain.''
  No one has ever asserted that this convention is 100 percent 
verifiable. It simply is not possible with this or any other treaty to 
detect every case of cheating. But I would respectfully submit that 
this is not the standard by which we should judge the convention. 
Instead, we should recognize that the CWC will enhance our ability to 
detect clandestine chemical weapons programs. The intelligence 
community has said that we are better off with the CWC than without 
it--that is the standard by which to judge the CWC.
  Mr. President, having discussed some of the clear benefits of joining 
the CWC, I now would like to address some of the costs associated with 
not joining, as well as some of the objections that have been raised to 
the convention.


                                Industry

  Perhaps no single aspect of this debate has seen more misinformation 
than that having to do with the affect the CWC would have on the U.S. 
chemical industry.
  Mr. President, the chemical industry plays a larger role in the 
economy of the State of Delaware than it does in any other State. Over 
half of Delaware's industrial output comes from our 47 chemical plants. 
Their sales represent more than 10 percent of our State's economic 
output. The chemical industry employs tens of thousands of Delawareans.
  The people who own, manage, and work at chemical plants know they 
have no greater friend than this Senator. If I for one moment thought 
that the convention would harm the American chemical industry, as some 
have alleged, I would raise this issue. But the fact of the matter is 
that the only thing about the Chemical Weapons Convention that would 
hurt the American chemical industry would be the Senate's failure to 
give its advice and consent.
  In 1995, the American chemical industry exported $60 billion around 
the world, accounting for fully 10 percent of all American exports and 
making it the single largest exporting industry. More than 1 million 
Americans are employed by the U.S. chemical industry.
  Should we fail to ratify the CWC, we will put a portion of these 
exports and these good-paying jobs at risk by leaving our chemical 
manufacturers open to sanctions, the very sanctions that American 
negotiators insisted should be a part of this convention as a way to 
pressure rogue states. In fact, the Chemical Manufacturers Association 
estimates that failure to ratify the CWC could jeopardize $600 million 
of our chemical exports.
  The charge that the CWC will harm American business appears all the 
more preposterous when one considers the fact that the convention was 
negotiated with the unprecedented input of the U.S. chemical industry.
  Thanks to their help, the convention contains thresholds and 
exemptions that protect businesses, small and large alike, from bearing 
an undue burden. The American chemical industry helped develop the 
ground rules under which inspections will occur, including provisions 
for protecting confidential business information. Chemical company 
representatives also helped design the brief, three-page form that 
represents the only reporting obligation for 90 percent of the 
approximately 2,000 companies that will have obligations under the CWC.
  I will ask that a statement by Mr. Fred Webber, the president of the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association, be printed in the Record.
  To quote from another statement of Mr. Webber's:

       The U.S. Chemical Industry worked hard to help Government 
     negotiators craft a CWC that provides strong protections 
     against future uses of chemical weapons, at a minimum burden 
     and intrusion on commercial chemical facilities. The 
     protection our industry achieved in the CWC can only be 
     realized if the Senate acts quickly to ratify the convention.


[[Page S1585]]


  U.S. chemical companies recognize that while they produce goods 
intended for peaceful uses, their products and inputs could be misused 
for nefarious purposes. That is why they so actively have supported 
this convention. Their involvement in the CWC has been a model of good 
corporate citizenship.
  Unfortunately, we will reward this responsible behavior with a slap 
in the face if we fail to ratify the CWC and subject the U.S. chemical 
industry to international sanctions.


                           Constitutionality

  One of the issues that should not be contentious, and I hope will not 
continue to be a focus of attention, is whether the convention, and 
particularly its inspection regime, is constitutional.
  Every scholar that has published on the subject, and virtually every 
scholar that has considered the issue, has concluded that nothing in 
the convention conflicts in any way with the fourth amendment or any 
other provision of the U.S. Constitution.
  Indeed, to accommodate our special constitutional concerns, the 
United States insisted that when parties to the convention provide 
access to international inspection teams, the Government may ``[take] 
into account any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to 
proprietary rights or searches and seizures.''
  In plain English, this means that inspectors enforcing the chemical 
weapons Convention must comply with our constitution when conducting 
inspections on U.S. soil.
  It also means that the United States will not be in violation of its 
treaty obligations if it refuses to provide inspectors access to a 
particular site for legitimate constitutional reasons.
  In light of this specific text, inserted at the insistence of U.S. 
negotiators, I am hard pressed to understand how anyone can seriously 
contend that the convention conflicts with the constitution.
  There is nothing in the convention that would require the United 
States to permit a warrantless search or to issue a warrant without 
probable cause. Nor does the convention give any international body the 
power to compel the U.S. to permit an inspection or issue a warrant.
  This is the overwhelming consensus among international law scholars 
that have studied the convention, two of whom have written to me 
expressing their opinion that the convention is constitutional. I ask 
unanimous consent that the letters of Harvard Law Professor Abram 
Chayes and Columbia Law Professor Louis Henkin be included in the 
Record following my statement.
  So let me make this point absolutely clear, despite what opponents of 
the convention have said, there will be no involuntary warrantless 
searches of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors under this 
convention.
  In light of this, I hope that the constitutionality of this 
convention will not become an issue in this debate.


                          American leadership

  Mr. President, let me stress that the CWC will go into effect with or 
without us on April 29. The only way we can ensure fully effective 
American leadership is to ratify this convention before that date. We 
will needlessly pay a price if we ratify after that date.
  Let us remember that this is not a partisan issue before us. After 
more than 8 years of negotiation under two Republican administrations, 
President Bush signed the final version of the CWC in January 1993.
  To demonstrate the bipartisan support for the CWC, I ask unanimous 
consent to insert in the Record a statement made earlier this month by 
former President Bush in which he re-stated his strong support for 
ratification of the CWC.
  I also ask unanimous consent to insert into the Record a recent op-ed 
by former Secretary of State James Baker.
  Many of the strongest supporters of this convention are Republicans. 
The distinguished senior Senator from Indiana, Senator Lugar, has led 
the effort to ratify the CWC. All of us, Republicans and Democrats 
alike, need to recognize that this convention is a matter of our 
national interest.
  Mr. President, I fear that our status as the world's non-
proliferation leader would be irreversibly compromised by our 
unwillingness to ratify the CWC.
  Already, all of our G-7 partners have ratified the CWC.
  What will be their reaction when we try to enlist their support for 
proliferation initiatives targeting rogue states if we cannot even take 
the simple step of joining a regime that we led the way in creating?
  Make no mistake. If we fail to ratify the CWC, we will forfeit the 
high ground on global proliferation matters. And that is not something 
to be taken lightly, for the result will be a far more dangerous world.


                               Conclusion

  Mr. President, in conclusion, the burdens of the chemical weapons 
convention are small, but its benefits are great.
  The American chemical industry strongly supports this convention.
  Our military is already committed to destroying our poison gas 
stockpile, and the convention will require the same of every other CWC 
member state.
  The CWC will improve our ability to monitor the chemical weapons 
capabilities of other states.
  In short, Mr. President, the CWC will improve the security of 
Americans.
  The CWC may not be perfect--and no treaty is--but it is considerably 
better than the alternative of doing nothing. Ultimately, the question 
we will have to ask is--are we better off with the CWC or without it? I 
hope that I have demonstrated today why we would be far better off 
joining a treaty regime that we created, rather than turning our backs 
in favor of the status quo or worse.
  We need to disregard arguments that are superfluous to the core 
reality of what this convention will accomplish: It bans poison gas, 
period.
  This convention is the best means available to ensure that there will 
be no more victims of poison gas like the soldiers in the trenches of 
World War I or the innocent victims of a murderous Iraqi regime.
  I understand that a task force of Republican Senators has been 
working with the White House to address concerns raised by some of our 
colleagues. I hope that this process soon will yield a resolution of 
ratification that merits strong bipartisan support.
  But I cannot emphasize enough the importance of this convention to 
our national security. We have a very real deadline hanging over our 
heads.
  I would urge my colleagues to learn more about this convention in the 
next few weeks so that they can make an informed decision about its 
necessity for our national security. Please contact me or my staff if 
you have questions about the cwc and what it will and will not do.
  If we bring this convention to the floor and engage in a full, frank, 
and open debate on its merits, I am confident that two-thirds of the 
Senate will be convinced that the Chemical Weapons Convention is good 
for American business, good for the American military, and good for the 
American people. Mr. President, we owe it to them to have this debate 
at the earliest possible time.
  I ask that the material to which I referred be printed in the Record.
  The material follows:

                [From the Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1997]

                    A Needless Risk for U.S. Troops

                         (By E.R. Zumwalt, Jr.)

       It has been more than 80 years since poison gas was first 
     used in modern warfare--in April 1915 during the first year 
     of World War I. It is long past time to do something about 
     such weapons.
       I am not a dove. As a young naval officer in 1945, I 
     supported the use of nuclear weapons against Japan. As chief 
     of naval operations two decades ago, I pressed for 
     substantially higher military spending than the nation's 
     political leadership was willing to grant. After retiring 
     from the Navy, I helped lead the opposition to the SALT II 
     treaty because I was convinced it would give the Soviet Union 
     a strategic advantage.
       Now the Senate is considering whether to approve the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention. This is a worldwide treaty, 
     negotiated by the Reagan administration and signed by the 
     Bush administration. It bans the development, production, 
     possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Senate 
     opposition to ratification is led by some with whom I often 
     agree. But in this case, I believe they do a grave disservice 
     to America's men and women in uniform.
       To a Third World leader indifferent to the health of his 
     own troops and seeking to cause large-scale pain and death 
     for its own sake, chemical weapons have a certain attraction. 
     They don't require the advanced

[[Page S1586]]

     technology needed to build nuclear weapons. Nor do they 
     require the educated populace needed to create a modern 
     conventional military. But they cannot give an inferior force 
     a war-winning capability. In the Persian Gulf war, the threat 
     of our uncompromising retaliation with conventional weapons 
     deterred Saddam Hussein from using his chemical arsenal 
     against us.
       Next time, our adversary may be more berserk than Saddam, 
     and deterrence may fail. If that happens, our retaliation 
     will be decisive, devastating--and no help to the young 
     American men and women coming home dead or bearing grievous 
     chemical injuries. What will help is a treaty removing huge 
     quantities of chemical weapons that could otherwise be used 
     against us.
       ``Militarily, this treaty will make us stronger. During the 
     Bush administration, our nation's military and political 
     leadership decided to retire our chemical weapons. This wise 
     move was not made because of treaties. Rather, it was based 
     on the fact that chemical weapons are not useful for us.
       Politically and diplomatically, the barriers against their 
     use by a First World country are massive. Militarily, they 
     are risky and unpredictable to use, difficult and dangerous 
     to store. They serve no purpose that can't be met by our 
     overwhelming conventional forces.
       So the United States has no deployed chemical weapons today 
     and will have none in the future. But the same is not true of 
     our potential adversaries. More than a score of nations now 
     seeks or possesses chemical weapons. Some are rogue states 
     with which we may some day clash.
       This treaty is entirely about eliminating other people's 
     weapons--weapons that may some day be used against Americans. 
     For the American military, U.S. ratification of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention is high gain and low or no pain. In that 
     light, I find it astonishing that any American opposes 
     ratification.
       Opponents argue that the treaty isn't perfect: Verification 
     isn't absolute, forms must be filled out, not every nation 
     will join at first and so forth. This is unpersuasive. 
     Nothing in the real world is perfect. If the U.S. Navy had 
     refused to buy any weapon unless it worked perfectly every 
     time, we would have bought nothing and now would be disarmed. 
     The question is not how this treaty compares with perfection. 
     The question is how U.S. ratification compares with its 
     absence.
       If we refuse to ratify, some governments will use our 
     refusal as an excuse to keep their chemical weapons. 
     Worldwide availability of chemical weapons will be higher, 
     and we will know less about other countries' chemical 
     activities. The diplomatic credibility of our threat of 
     retaliation against anyone who uses chemical weapons on our 
     troops will be undermined by our lack of ``clean hands.'' At 
     the bottom line, our failure to ratify will substantially 
     increase the risk of a chemical attack against American 
     service personnel.
       If such an attack occurs, the news reports of its victims 
     in our military hospitals will of course produce rapid 
     ratification of the treaty and rapid replacement of senators 
     who enabled the horror by opposing ratification. But for the 
     victims, it will be too late.
       Every man and woman who puts on a U.S. military uniform 
     faces possible injury or death in the national interest. They 
     don't complain; risk is part of their job description. But it 
     is also part of the job description of every U.S. senator to 
     see that this risk not be increased unnecessarily.
                                  ____


        [Chemical Weapons Convention News Alert, Feb. 20, 1997]

                 Veterans, Military Groups Endorse CWC

       Veterans organizations and military associations 
     representing millions of Americans who have served in this 
     nation's armed forces have endorsed the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.
       The Veterans of Foreign Wars Commander in Chief James E. 
     Nier said:
       ``The treaty will reduce world stockpiles of such weapons 
     and will hopefully prevent our troops from being exposed to 
     poison gases. . . . As combat veterans we support this treaty 
     . . .''
       The Vietnam Veterans of America included in its priorities:
       ``Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention to take a 
     substantive step toward preventing chemical weapons exposure 
     problems for veterans in the future similar to those 
     experienced by Persian Gulf War veterans and the veterans of 
     prior wars.''
       The Reserved Officers Association of the United States in a 
     Resolution declared:
       ``. . . failure to ratify the CWC will place us among the 
     great outlaw states of the world, including Libya, Iran, and 
     North Korea . . .
       ``. . . United States ratification of the CWC will enable 
     us to play a major role in the development and implementation 
     of CWC policy, as well as providing strong moral leverage to 
     help convince Russia of the desirability of ratifying. . .
       ``. . . the Reserve Officers Association of the United 
     States, chartered by Congress, urge the Senate to quickly 
     ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.''
       American Ex-Prisoners of War National Commander William E. 
     ``Sonny'' Mottern said:
       ``. . . I wish to express my support for the ratification 
     of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This is an important step 
     in reducing the price that Americans who serve their country 
     on the field of battle must pay in defense of our freedom.
       ``. . . America must play a leadership role in 
     international efforts to reduce this price to the extent 
     possible.''
       Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A. National Commander Bob 
     Zweiman said:
       ``There are meaningful provisions in the CWC which will 
     afford an opportunity to impose economic restrictions and 
     sanctions against those who develop chemical weapons. . . .
       ``. . . We are honor bound to protect our Nation and our 
     troops by minimizing the chances from all obvious or hidden 
     means of chemical attack in the future.''
                                  ____


          [Chemical Manufacturers Association, Jan. 13, 1997]

                 Ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention

                  (By Fred Webber, President and CEO)

       Today marks the fourth anniversary of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, an international treaty outlawing poison gas. The 
     treaty is the brainchild of the United States. Since the 
     treaty was opened for signature in Paris, 67 nations have 
     ratified the treaty (China is poised to become the 68th 
     member of the club). The United States is not among the 67. 
     Now, with the Convention poised to become international law 
     on April 29, our nation's continuing absence from a treaty of 
     its making is fast becoming a source of international 
     embarrassment. The Senate should act quickly to rectify this 
     situation by ratifying the treaty at the earliest 
     opportunity.
       Opposition to the Convention, led by conservative think 
     tanks, is rooted in long-standing suspicions of arms control 
     agreements. But the critics have taken to embellishing this 
     argument by also claiming the Convention will have a 
     devastating impact on American businesses, large and small.
       The critics are simply wrong. The members of our 
     association, large and small, produce over 90 percent of the 
     nation's industrial chemicals and they strongly support the 
     Convention. Ratifying it is the right thing to do.
       No American business makes chemical weapons. Chemical 
     companies do, however, make products which can, in the wrong 
     hands, be processed into weapons agents. Some poison gases 
     for example, can be made in part from chemicals designed to 
     treat cancer patients and prevent fires.
       Chemical manufacturers have a responsibility to make sure 
     that their products are safely produced and properly used. 
     That's why we support the Chemical Weapons Convention. It's 
     the best way to reduce the threat of future poison gas 
     attacks.
       Some advocacy groups, and their allies on Capitol Hill, are 
     trying to scare the business community into opposing the 
     Convention. It's time to answer the critics and set the 
     record straight.
       Here's how the chemical industry answers three commonly-
     heard criticisms of the treaty:
       The treaty will impose a ``massive new regulatory burden'' 
     on more than 25,000 American businesses, most of which are 
     not chemical companies. The terms of the treaty place most of 
     the private-sector reporting requirements squarely on the 
     shoulders of chemical manufacturers. No more than 2,000 
     facilities here in the U.S. face treaty obligations. Nearly 
     all are chemical makers, not their customers. And most 
     regulated businesses will be required to do more than fill 
     out a two-page form, once a year.
       The treaty threatens vital industry trade secrets by 
     allowing international inspectors free access to 
     manufacturing sites. The chemical industry worked with treaty 
     negotiators for more than a decade to help devise inspection 
     procedures. We tested these procedures during trial 
     inspections held at our commercial facilities. Our top 
     priority was to protect legitimate commercial secrets. The 
     treaty does just that--it does not permit unlimited inspector 
     access to any facility.
       The treaty tramples on the U.S. Constitution by voiding 
     Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches 
     and seizures. This argument does not pass the red-face test. 
     A simple reading of the Convention reveals that the treaty 
     respects all constitutional protections.
       The chemical industry spent years examining this treaty. We 
     have opened our plants to trial inspections. We have put the 
     treaty to the test--over and over again. Honest businesses 
     have nothing to fear from this treaty. Its benefits far 
     outweigh the costs.
       What the critics fail to mention is the price to pay for 
     failing to ratify the Convention. The treaty imposes trade 
     sanctions on countries which don't participate. The price of 
     U.S. non-participation will be paid by the chemical industry 
     and by American workers, for it is our products, and our 
     businesses, that will be hurt. Treaty opponents purport to 
     represent American business interests in the Convention, but 
     they aren't telling business the true story.
       The Senate's vote on the treaty will send a powerful signal 
     to the rest of the world. A vote against the treaty will 
     surely be perceived as a vote for chemical weapons.
       Those who oppose this treaty have yet to offer a credible 
     alternative. Chemical weapons are a serious threat to world 
     security. The Chemical Weapons Convention is a serious 
     response to that threat. The treaty's merits have been 
     debated for years. It's time

[[Page S1587]]

     to stop talking and take action. It's time for the U.S. to 
     ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention before it goes into 
     effect in April 1997.
                                  ____



                                           Harvard Law School,

                                  Cambridge MA, September 9, 1996.
     Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
     Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee,
     Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington DC.
       Dear Senator Biden: You have asked me to comment on the 
     suggestion that the Chemical Weapons Convention (the 
     Convention), now before the Senate for its advice and 
     consent, conflicts with the provisions of the Fourth 
     Amendment of the Constitution prohibiting unreasonable 
     searches and seizures. In my view, the suggestion is 
     completely without merit.
       The Convention expressly provides that:
       ``In meeting the requirement to provide access . . . the 
     inspected State Party shall be under the obligation to allow 
     the greatest degree of access taking into account any 
     constitutional obligations it may have with regard to  
     proprietary rights or searches and seizures.'' (Verification 
     Annex, Part X, par. 41) (emphasis supplied).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ The Verification Annex is, of course, an integral part of 
     the convention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       As you know, this provision of the Convention was inserted 
     at the insistence of the United States after earlier drafts, 
     which provided insufficient protection in regard to 
     unreasonable searches and seizures, had been criticized by a 
     number of U.S. scholars. The plain meaning of these words, 
     which seems too clear for argument, is that the United States 
     would have no obligation under the Convention to permit 
     access to facilities subject to its jurisdiction in violation 
     of the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. It was the clear 
     understanding of the negotiators that the purpose of the 
     provision was to obviate any possibility of conflict between 
     the obligations of the United States under the Convention and 
     the mandate of the Fourth Amendment. The Convention in its 
     final form is thus fully consistent with U.S. constitutional 
     requirements.
       Inspections required by the Convention will be conducted 
     pursuant to implementing legislation to be adopted by 
     Congress that will define the terms, conditions and scope of 
     the inspections to be conducted in the United States by 
     the Technical Staff of the Organization for the 
     Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) established by the 
     Convention. I understand that draft implementing 
     legislation entitled the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     Implementation Act, now before the Congress, specifies the 
     procedures that will be followed in the case of both 
     routine and challenge inspections carried out pursuant to 
     the Convention. The Act requires, at a minimum, an 
     administrative search warrant before an inspection can be 
     conducted, and has elaborate provisions for notice and 
     other protections to the owner of the premises to be 
     searched. These provisions of the Act are modeled on 
     similar administrative inspection regimes already 
     authorized by Acts of Congress such as the Toxic 
     Substances Control Act and upheld by the courts. However, 
     if Congress is concerned that these provisions are 
     constitutionally insufficient, it is free under the 
     Convention to revise the Act to include more stringent 
     requirements that conform to constitutional limitations. 
     Finally, a person subject to inspection may challenge the 
     inspection in a U.S. court, which in turn will be bound to 
     invalidate any inspection that fails to comply with 
     constitutional requirements. In view of the provisions of 
     the Verification Annex quoted above, the United States 
     would not be in violation of any international obligation 
     in such an eventually.
       For these reasons I conclude that there is no 
     constitutional objection to the Convention, and that the 
     rights of individuals under the Fourth Amendment will be 
     fully protected under the Convention and implementing 
     legislation of the character presently contemplated.
       In addition, I have been involved in the field of arms 
     control as a scholar and practitioner for many years, going 
     back to the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, in connection 
     with which I appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee as Legal Adviser of the State Department. I have 
     also closely followed the negotiations for the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention. The United States has been a prime mover 
     in the development of the Convention under both Republican 
     and Democratic administrations. I am convinced that the 
     prompt ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is 
     overwhelmingly in the security interest of the United States 
     and should not be derailed by constitutional objections that 
     are so plainly without substance.
           Sincerely,
     Abram Chayes.
                                  ____

                                              Columbia University,


                                                School of Law,

                                 New York, NY, September 11, 1996.
       Dear Senator Biden: As requested, I have considered 
     whether, if the United States adhered to the Convention on 
     Chemical Weapons, the inspection provisions of the Convention 
     would raise serious issues under the United States 
     Constitution. I have concluded that those provisions would 
     not present important obstacles to U.S. adherence to the 
     Convention.
       Like domestic laws, treaties of the United States are 
     subject to constitutional restraints. The Fourth Amendment to 
     the United States constitution provides: ``The right of the 
     people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
     effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
     not be violated . . .'' Constitutional jurisprudence has 
     established that the right to be secure applies also to 
     industrial and commercial facilities and to business records, 
     papers and effects.
       The Constitution, however, protects the rights of private 
     persons; it does not protect governmental bodies, public 
     officials, public facilities or public papers. As to private 
     persons, the Fourth Amendment protects only against searches 
     and seizures that are ``unreasonable.'' Inspection 
     arrangements, negotiated and approved by the President and 
     consented to by the Senate, designed to give effect to a 
     treaty of major importance to the United States, carry a 
     strong presumption that they are not unreasonable.
       The Chemical Convention itself anticipated the 
     constitutional needs of the United States. Part X of the 
     Convention, ``Challenge Inspection pursuant to Article IX,'' 
     provides:
       ``41. In meeting the requirement to provide access as 
     specified in paragraph 38, the inspected State party shall be 
     under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of access 
     taking into account any constitutional obligation it may have 
     with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures.''
       As applied to the United States, that provision is properly 
     interpreted to mean that the United States must provide 
     access required by the Convention, but if the Constitution 
     precludes some access in some circumstances, the United 
     States must provide access to the extent the Constitution 
     permits. And if, because of constitutional limitations, the 
     United States cannot provide full access required by the 
     Convention, the United States is required ``to make every 
     reasonable effort to provide alternative means to clarify the 
     possible noncompliance concern that generated the challenge 
     inspection.'' (Art. 42.)
       The United States would be required also to adopt measures 
     to overcome any constitutional obstacles to any inspection or 
     interrogation required by the Convention. If it were 
     determined to be necessary, the United States could satisfy 
     the requirements of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by 
     arranging for administrative search warrants, by enacting 
     statutes granting immunity from prosecution for crimes 
     revealed by compelled testimony, by providing just 
     compensation for any ``taking'' involved.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Louis Henkin,
     University Professor Emeritus.
                                  ____


               Statement of Former President George Bush

       President Bush. Welcome. Let me just say that we've had a 
     most enjoyable breakfast. Barbara and I are very flattered 
     that the Secretary of State, in what is obviously a busy 
     schedule, took time to come and have breakfast with us.
       I told Secretary Albright that she would have my 
     enthusiastic support in her quest for bipartisanship and 
     foreign policy. I think Jim Baker, my esteemed friend and 
     former colleague, told her the same thing, so it's for real 
     from us and I know she feels strongly about that.
       I told her I would strongly support her efforts to get this 
     Chemical Weapons Treaty approved. This should be beyond 
     partisanship. I have a certain fatherhood feeling about that. 
     But leaving that out, I think it is vitally important for the 
     United States to be out front, not to be dragged, kicking and 
     screaming to the finish line on that question. We don't need 
     chemical weapons, and we ought to get out front and make 
     clear that we are opposed to others having them. So that's 
     important.
       The funding for the State Department: When I heard 
     Madeleine telling me some of the problems that she might 
     face--hopefully, she won't, but she might face--it was deja 
     vu because I remember Jim Baker coming to me, as President, 
     and saying ``We must keep adequate funding levels for 
     State.'' I couldn't agree more. There is a stupid feeling in 
     some quarters that we don't have any more concerns on foreign 
     policy, that we don't have any more threat in the world. The 
     Secretary knows so well that we do.
       So I hope that Congress will do what's right on a 
     bipartisan basis in terms of proper levels of funding. She 
     can determine what those levels should be. But all I know is, 
     these arguments that we ought to cut back on spending for 
     foreign affairs--I think it's very shortsighted. We do that 
     at our own risk for generations to come, too.
       We talked about several others. But, Madeleine, welcome, 
     and I'm so pleased you came to Houston.
                                  ____


                            Our Best Defense

                         (By James A. Baker 3d)

       Houston.--The Chemical Weapons Convention -- an 
     international treaty that commits member nations to destroy 
     their chemical weapons and to forswear future production, 
     acquisition or use of them--is before the Senate for 
     approval. Despite the fact that the treaty was negotiated 
     under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, a number of 
     Republicans have expressed reservations about it. I respect 
     their motives, but their concerns are misplaced.
       For instance, some have argued that we shouldn't commit to 
     the treaty because rogue states like Libya, Iraq and North

[[Page S1588]]

     Korea, which have not signed it, will still be able to 
     continue their efforts to acquire chemical weapons. This is 
     obviously true. But the convention, which has been endorsed 
     by 68 countries and will go into effect in April whether or 
     not we have ratified it, will make it more difficult for 
     these states to do so by prohibiting the sale of materials to 
     nonmembers that can be used to make chemical weapons.
       In an ideal world, rogue states and terrorist groups would 
     simply give up the use of chemical weapons. But ours is not 
     an ideal world. The Chemical Weapons Convention recognizes 
     that, and so should its opponents. It makes no sense to argue 
     that because a few pariah states refuse to join the 
     convention the United States should line up with them rather 
     than with the rest of the world.
       Others have argued that if we ratify the treaty, we will 
     not be able to verify that all members will abide by it. No 
     international agreement, of course, is perfectly verifiable--
     just as no domestic law is perfectly enforceable. But the 
     treaty sets up a verification system, including international 
     inspections on short notice, that will be far more effective 
     than what we possess today. Moreover, the treaty would 
     strengthen information-sharing among member states. It would 
     increase, not diminish, our understanding of chemical weapons 
     threats.
       Some opponents of the treaty claim that it would create yet 
     another costly international bureaucracy and place an onerous 
     regulatory burden on American business. Both assertions are 
     overstated. Our share for administering the treaty would be 
     about $25 million a year, a truly modest amount in a Federal 
     budget of about $1.7 trillion. Only about 140 companies would 
     have significant reporting requirements, while some 2,000 
     others would be asked to fill out a short form.
       Moreover, failure to ratify the treaty would actually cost 
     the American chemical industry hundreds of millions of 
     dollars in sales by making United States exporters subject to 
     trade restrictions by convention members. Our joining the 
     convention could help American business--which is why the 
     chemical industry supports ratification.
       Other critics assert that the treaty would somehow infringe 
     on our national sovereignty--in particular, the Fourth 
     Amendment ban on unreasonable search and seizure. In fact, it 
     explicitly permits members to abide by their constitutional 
     requirements when providing access to international 
     inspectors. Under the treaty, involuntary inspection of 
     American manufacturing and storage sites would still require 
     legally acquired search warrants. The idea that ratifying the 
     treaty would repeal part of our Bill of Rights is simply 
     wrong.
       But by far the most important argument against the treaty 
     is that ratification would somehow undermine our national 
     security.
       Nothing could be further from the truth. Let me be blunt: 
     The idea that Ronald Reagan and George Bush would negotiate a 
     treaty detrimental to this nation's security is grotesque.
       The United States does not need chemical weapons as a 
     deterrent. Any nation or group contemplating a chemical 
     attack against us must reckon with our overwhelming 
     conventional force and vast nuclear arsenal. Each is more 
     than sufficient to deter a chemical attack.
       Chemical weapons are relatively easy to develop and cheap 
     to manufacture, so it is no coincidence that the rogue 
     nations now seeking to build chemical arsenals are 
     economically impoverished and technologically backward. 
     Unlike Iraq or Libya, we don't need such weapons to project 
     our influence. In fact, we are already committed--under a law 
     signed in 1985 by President Reagan--to destroy our existing 
     chemical weapons stockpile by 2004. We will do this whether 
     or not we ratify the treaty.
       What we need is a way to limit the risk that American 
     troops or civilians may someday face a chemical weapons 
     attack. The convention can help do precisely this by 
     controlling the flow of illicit trade materials and by making 
     it easier to marshal international support for the political, 
     diplomatic and economic isolation of countries that refuse to 
     ratify it.
       If we fail to ratify the convention, we will not only forgo 
     any influence in the continuing effort against chemical 
     weapons, we will also risk postponing indefinitely any 
     progress on an international ban on the equally dire threat 
     of biological weapons. More generally, we will imperil our 
     leadership in the entire area of nonproliferation perhaps the 
     most vital security issue of the post-cold-war era.
       Today we face a monumental choice requiring a bipartisan 
     consensus, just as we did in ratifying the North American 
     Free Trade Act in 1993. Failure to ratify the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention would send a message of American retreat 
     from engagement in the world. For this reason--and because 
     our national interest is better served by joining the 
     convention than by lining up with pariah states outside it--I 
     support the treaty and urge my fellow Republicans to do the 
     same.

                          ____________________