[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 20 (Monday, February 24, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1483-S1485]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        NARCOTICS CERTIFICATION

 Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I wish to discuss an important 
decision facing the President this week in the fight against drug 
trafficking: Whether to certify that Mexico and Colombia have taken 
sufficient steps in the past year in combating the narcotics trade. The 
choice is important not merely because it affects our bilateral 
relations with these countries, but also because it will send a broader 
signal about our seriousness of purpose in the war on drugs.
  Of course, there will be other nations whose performance on 
counternarcotics will be assessed by the President this week. But when 
it comes to the narcotics trade, Mexico and Colombia are in a league by 
themselves--Colombia, as the leading source country for cocaine, and a 
major source of heroin, and Mexico, as the leading transit country for 
cocaine, and as a significant source for heroin, methamphetamines, and 
marijuana. And it is because of their predominance in the narcotics 
trade that the President's decision becomes a barometer of the U.S. 
commitment to this effort.
  Before discussing my specific views on the Colombian and Mexican 
cases, however, I want to briefly offer some general observations about 
the drug certification process.
  Just over 10 years ago, in the 1986 omnibus drug bill, the United 
States began a process of annually certifying the performance of 
countries which were either a major source of narcotics, or a major 
transit route for narcotics trafficking. Decertification does not 
merely carry a stamp of political disapproval. By law, nations 
decertified are ineligible for most U.S. foreign aid, and the United 
States is required to vote against loans for such nations in 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank.
  The President has three choices: First, he can certify that a country 
is fully cooperating with the United States, or is taking adequate 
steps on its own, to combat the narcotics trade. Second, he can 
decertify a country--a statement that it has not met that standard. 
Finally, he can provide a national interest waiver--a statement that 
the country has not met the standards of the law, but that the U.S. 
national interest lies in continuing the assistance programs.
  Not surprisingly, the nations subject to the scrutiny of the 
decertification process have not been thrilled with the honor. Indeed, 
many nations have protested that the United States has no right to 
challenge their performance on counternarcotics--given that the large 
demand in this country helps to generate the supply. Other nations 
perceive the certification process as an effort to shift the blame for 
our drug problem.
  I firmly reject such arguments.
  First, while I concede that the demand in the United States for 
narcotics has contributed to the explosive growth of the drug trade in 
Latin America in the last two decades, the dramatic increase in the 
power of the narcotics cartels--particularly in Colombia and Mexico--
cannot be blamed upon the United States alone. The nations themselves 
must bear responsibility for their own neglect--for failing to take 
effective action against vast criminal enterprises which arose before 
their eyes.
  Of course, the United States must do its part to combat the drug 
problem. Over the past decade, we have. For example, we have steadily 
increased both our financial resources and our political commitment to 
combating the narcotics trade. We now spend $16 billion annually on our 
national drug program, as compared to $4.7 billion a decade ago. We 
have devised a national

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strategy, written by a drug czar who coordinates national policy from 
the White House. We have increased sentences at the Federal level for 
narcotics traffickers. We have strengthened controls on money 
laundering and the trade in precursor chemicals. There is more to be 
done. But by any objective measure, the United States continues to do 
its part.
  Second, I strongly disagree with the suggestion that the United 
States has no business assessing the performance of other nations in 
the drug war. The decision by the United States to maintain a 
partnership with another government--any government--must be based on 
an assessment of whether the cooperation between the two sides advances 
American interests. This is hardly a radical concept; rather, it is the 
daily practice of diplomacy.
  The people of the United States should expect nothing less. How else 
can we justify providing the full benefits of partnership--including 
foreign assistance and special trade preferences--unless we are 
satisfied that the other nation is doing its part on issues of great 
concern to us?
  After a decade of experience with the certification law, we can reach 
a conclusion about its utility--and whether it is worth preserving. I 
believe a strong case can be made that it should be.
  In the first few years after enactment of the law, the certification 
process, it is fair to say, was less than effective. It was the custom 
of the Reagan and Bush administrations to only decertify those nations 
with which our relations were already badly damaged. In other words, 
the primary focus was not on narcotics performance but on geopolitics.
  Thus, in the late 1980's, the nations regularly decertified were 
Syria and Iran--both on the list of state sponsors of terrorism; 
Afghanistan, then a satellite of the Soviet Union; and Panama, then 
under the control of General Noriega. In the Bush administration, after 
the U.S invasion ousted Noriega, Panama again was certified, and the 
nation of Burma--by then under the control of despotic generals--was 
added to this list of usual suspects. But not once did either President 
Reagan or Bush decertify a democratic ally.
  The message of this action was clear: Maintaining normal diplomatic 
relations took precedence over our anti-narcotics interests. As a 
result, most nations that were major drug trafficking centers came to 
expect that certification would be the norm--and that for all the talk 
and supposed pressure from Washington, they would not pay a price if 
they failed to meet our expectations.
  Under President Clinton, that approach has changed for the better--
and for that change much credit must go not only to the President, but 
also to the previous Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. Most 
significantly, last year President Clinton decertified Colombia--a 
democratic nation which had, for much of the 1990's, been a close 
partner in the war on drugs. But when it became clear that the 
President of Colombia had taken campaign contributions from drug 
dealers--a matter that I will discuss shortly--and that his government 
lacked the political will to confront the drug trade, President Clinton 
stated plainly that Colombia had not met the standard of the law.
  That decision has profound implications elsewhere. Nations everywhere 
took notice--and are now on notice that the United States would make 
its decision on certification based on the standards of the law, not on 
the dictates of diplomacy. That, in turn, has greatly empowered the 
State Department and the law enforcement agencies--which now have 
greater leverage in holding our foreign partners to their 
counternarcotics commitments.
  In sum, because of the ``truth-in-certification'' which we now 
practice, I believe that the process has become a useful tool in our 
ongoing effort to procure the assistance of other nations in the war on 
drugs. Any effort to repeal the law or alter it significantly would be 
misguided.
  That is not to say the law is perfect--few laws are. During 
consideration of the foreign assistance legislation in the Foreign 
Relations Committee, I will be open to exploring ways of improving the 
certification process--to assure that the law advances our common 
objective: of ensuring that all nations join us in fighting the scourge 
of drugs.

  But that question is for another day. Today our primary attention 
must be devoted to the issue at hand: whether to certify that Colombia 
and Mexico have met the standard of the law. I renew my call--which I 
also made last year--to decertify Colombia and to not fully certify 
Mexico, but instead grant a national interest waiver.
  As has been widely reported, credible evidence suggests that 
Colombian President Ernesto Samper accepted millions of dollars in 
campaign contributions from the Cali cartel during the 1994 
Presidential campaign. An investigation by the Colombian Congress--an 
investigation which our State Department has described as a ``patently 
flawed process''--absolved Samper. But the conclusion of the Congress 
is not surprising, because many members of that body are also under 
investigation for accepting bribes from the cartel.
  President Samper might have overcome the stain of these allegations 
by taking concrete action to combat the drug trade. In fact, Samper had 
pledged such action in a letter to many members of this body in July 
1994. But Samper's pledge proved to be, in large part, an empty 
gesture.
  For example, long-promised reform of the sentencing system--which 
provides inadequate penalties for drug trafficking--has not been 
enacted, although the Colombian Congress is just now taking up the 
issue. The inadequacy of the current system was amply demonstrated last 
month, when two noted leaders of the Cali cartel were sentenced to 
relatively light sentences--10\1/2\ years in one case, 9 years in 
another. They were fined just $2 million. None of their assets were 
forfeited. Under the sentencing system in effect, the actual time 
served may be reduced by half. Worse still, the evidence is strong that 
they continue to operate their empires from prison--operations which 
the Colombian Government has done little to prevent.
  Other measures, such as reconsideration of extradition or 
strengthening the Colombian money laundering statute, might have 
permitted the certification of Colombia. But extradition is not on the 
table; and the money laundering statute is only now being considered in 
a special session--a transparent last-ditch effort to head off 
decertification.
  I say all this in full knowledge that there are thousands of 
dedicated officials in the Colombian National Police, and millions of 
ordinary Colombian citizens, who abhor the destructive nature of the 
drug trade on their own society, and are fully committed to combating 
it. I admire their courage and determination to fight on, despite the 
dangers of confronting the drug lords, who have no respect for human 
life.
  But how can we be assured of the Government's commitment against drug 
trafficking when the President of the country himself almost surely 
benefited from the drug trade?
  This must be an essential consideration in any certification 
decision: whether there exists corruption at high levels of government. 
We cannot demand perfection in implementation of policy. We cannot 
impose impossibly high burdens. But we can demand that the highest 
levels of government remain free from suspicion.
  Colombia has failed that test. Stated plainly, the corruption at the 
top in Bogota is the single most glaring failure in Colombia's 
performance--and the overriding reason that I recommend 
decertification.
  Mr. President, there is no joy in this conclusion. But we cannot 
overlook the corruption involving President Samper and the Congress, 
and we cannot avoid the conclusion that Colombia has not done enough to 
combat the drug trade.
  The story for Mexico is different than Colombia's. The key difference 
is the commitment of the President of Mexico, who I believe is 
steadfast in his determination to root out corruption in the Mexican 
police system. Unfortunately, his personal commitment has, thus far, 
been insufficient to cleanse a police system that is rotten to the 
core.

  The examples of police corruption in Mexico abound. The most 
troubling example was revealed just last week. A veteran general of the 
Mexican Army, a man hired just 3 months ago to head

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Mexico's antinarcotics agency--precisely because he was believed to be 
incorruptible--was fired after being accused of taking payments from 
one of Mexico's leading drug barons.
  The arrest of General Gutierrez raises several important questions 
about the United States-Mexican relationship in fighting the drug war. 
First, why did Mexico fail to alert us when it first suspected General 
Gutierrez some 2 weeks before his arrest? As a consequence, how much 
intelligence did the United States share in that 2-week period with 
Mexico that has now been compromised? Additionally, why did our 
intelligence assets fail to learn that the general had been placed 
under investigation? Finally, will we be able, in the short term, to 
continue cooperative law enforcement efforts--or will we have to step 
back and reassess the level and scope of our joint programs?
  Mr. President, we must have answers to these questions--both from our 
Government and from the Mexican Government.
  But until we get those answers, and until we see follow through by 
the Mexican Government on certain promises, I do not believe that we 
should certify that Mexico has provided full cooperation in the war on 
drugs. Instead, however, I do believe that the President would be 
justified in granting Mexico a vital national interest waiver. That 
decision--less than full certification--would send a strong political 
signal to the Mexican Government that its performance last year was 
inadequate, without causing a total disruption in our joint efforts.
  In making this recommendation, I should note that Mexico has made 
some progress in its effort to combat the narcotics trade. Last year, 
at our urging, it enacted several important anticrime laws--an 
organized crime law, a money laundering statute, and a chemical 
diversion statute. It has agreed to extradite, under exceptional 
circumstances, Mexican nationals. It has agreed to set up organized 
crime task forces in key locations in northern and western Mexico.
  All this is important. But, as the saying goes, the proof is in the 
pudding. We have seen only a handful of extraditions. We await 
implementation of the new anticrime laws. And we await full funding and 
adequate support for the task forces.
  Most important, we must see institutional changes to root out 
corruption--for that remains the largest obstacle to combating the drug 
cartels. All the laws, all the promises, all the task forces will be 
insufficient if Mexico cannot rectify the systemic corruption in its 
law enforcement agencies. Mexico's efforts to confront corruption, 
ultimately, will be the test of whether it is serious in combating the 
narcotics trade.
  Let me reiterate that I believe that, in contrast to the case of 
Colombia, Mexico has a President who is on our side. President Zedillo 
has demonstrated great courage in advancing an agenda of institutional 
reform and in trying to weed out corrupt actors in his government. We 
must stand with him in this effort. But we must also be honest about 
the situation as we now see it --and honesty compels the conclusion 
that Mexico should not be fully certified.
  But I do not believe that we should take the step of decertifying 
Mexico. President Zedillo's demonstrated leadership amid the growing 
drug threat is the fundamental reason I propose a national interest 
waiver for Mexico. A full decertification of Mexico could have long-
lasting, damaging repercussions that we cannot now predict. At a 
minimum, it could inhibit the political space that President 
Zedillo has to press forward with his agenda of reform. And if we 
destroy the President's political ability resolve to combat the drug 
traffickers, we will have achieved nothing--and we may well lose the 
gains that we have recently achieved.

  Even as I recommend decertification for Colombia, and a national 
interest waiver for Mexico, I should emphasize that this issue can--
under the law--be revisited during the coming year as to Colombia. The 
law permits the President to provide a national interest waiver during 
the course of the year provided there has been a fundamental change in 
government, or a fundamental change in the conditions that led to not 
providing a full certification in the first instance.
  In this regard, I encourage the Clinton Administration to spell out 
benchmarks for Colombia to achieve in the coming months --benchmarks 
that, if achieved, would permit the President to move forward with a 
national interest waiver.
  Mr. President, I do not underestimate the difficulties facing 
Colombia and Mexico in combating the power of the drug barons. But the 
difficulty of the challenge cannot be an excuse for insufficient 
action. Given the massive scourge of drugs confronting us, we must 
continue to raise the level of expectations and attention given to the 
drug trade by our southern neighbors. This is what the certification 
process calls for, and this is what our nation must do.

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