[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 19 (Thursday, February 13, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1374-S1377]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I want to give the other side of exactly
the issue the Senator from New Mexico has just spent some time
describing. I say this not because I believe my side is right and
therefore he is here doing something untoward. That is not the case. I
think we have a disagreement here about this issue that is very
substantial, and it is very important. I do not suggest that someone
who does not agree with me on this position is out here deciding to
play games or to take a position for anything other than a noble
purpose. But, by the same token, I feel so strongly that the discussion
I just heard is wrong, I feel compelled to correct it, at least from my
perspective.
Let me describe what we have. We have a proposal to change the
Constitution of the United States. Some refer to it repeatedly as a
proposal to balance the budget. It will not do that, and no one who
understands the difference between a statute and a constitutional
change should refer to it as balancing the budget. You can change the
Constitution 2 minutes from now, and 3 minutes from now you will not
have altered by one penny the Federal debt or the Federal deficit, and
there is not anyone in here who would stand up and contest that, I
would judge. So this is not about balancing the budget. It is about
altering the Constitution.
I am prepared to alter the Constitution under certain circumstances,
but I will not--repeat, not--support an approach that changes the
Constitution of the United States in a manner that I think will create
more problems than it solves.
We have, and will vote for, a constitutional amendment to balance the
budget. We will all be required to vote on a couple of versions of
that, one, the version proposed by the majority, one, a version that I
will introduce as a substitute amendment. So we will have an
opportunity to vote on a constitutional amendment to balance the
budget. The version proposed by the majority says this. It says that
revenues and expenditures in future years must be relatively equal so
that you are not running a deficit. And that includes counting all of
the revenues and all of the expenditures. Period. End of description--I
think a fair description of what the majority is proposing.
The problem with that is this. We have a separate program in
Government, one of the largest programs, called the Social Security
system. It has been a very successful program. But we have a
demographic problem with our Social Security system. We have a group of
babies born who represented the largest group of babies born in our
history, and when they hit the retirement rolls, we are going to have a
significant strain on that system. And so, a decision was made some
years ago to save for that purpose, and therefore this year, and last
year, and next year, to run a surplus, a very significant budget
surplus in the Social Security accounts, only in those accounts, in
order to have that available to save for the future.
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The amendment that is being offered by the majority is an amendment
that would say: Let's not distinguish between one dollar and another
dollar. Yes, we're running a surplus in Social Security, but it doesn't
matter. We can use the surplus of Social Security to just pay for other
spending elsewhere.
Well, I do not think that is the way we say to those with whom we
have decided that we are going to provide for their future and have a
Social Security trust fund, I do not think that is the way for us to
say to them we are meeting our responsibilities. That is not meeting
our responsibilities. What that is doing is allowing us to say we have
balanced the budget when we have not. We have taken trust funds that we
said would be used for only one purpose and brought it to say, now we
have balanced the budget.
I am waiting--and I will ask the question again; there is only one
other Member on the floor--but I would ask the question again, and I
have not yet heard an answer: If under this constitutional amendment
and a budget plan that is proposed to meet this constitutional
amendment of balancing the budget, if in the year in which they claim
they have balanced the budget the Federal debt limit must be increased
by $130 billion, how do you claim you have balanced the budget?
If you have balanced your family budget, do you have to borrow more
money? I would not think so. If you have balanced your business budget,
would you have to borrow more money? I do not think so. Why, in this
plan, in the year in which they say they balance the budget, does the
Congressional Budget Office tell us in that very year they have to
increase the Federal debt limit by $130 billion? Why? Can anybody tell
me? They have not told me for a couple weeks because there is not an
answer to that. There is not an answer.
The answer, if everyone here were honest, would be that this is not
truly balancing the budget. The budget will be called in balance, they
will describe it as in balance, and the Federal debt will continue to
increase. So the folks who moved the Federal debt clock around that
shows how the Federal debt is increasing will still have a clock that
keeps ticking. The Federal debt will keep rising. I do not understand
that.
I would like us to balance the Federal budget. I think there is a
compelling reason for us to balance the Federal budget. In fact, the
budget deficit is down 60 percent in the last 4 years in part because
some of us have had the courage to cast hard votes, votes that were not
popular. I am glad I did it. They were not very popular votes, but we
cast the votes to bring the budget deficit down.
But the job is not done. The job is half done. We need to finish the
job. We can alter the Constitution, but that will not finish the job.
The only way this job gets finished is if individual men and women in
the U.S. Senate make spending and taxing decisions that say we want to
balance the budget. When they say to their constituents, ``We've
balanced the budget,'' and then must confess to their bankers back
home, ``But, yes, we increased the Federal debt by $130 billion,'' no
one here can claim that with a straight face, unless they have no sense
of humor, that they have done what they promised back home they are
doing.
That is the point I am making. If we are going to alter the
Constitution, let us make those changes in the Constitution in a
careful, measured way that does not create more problems than it
solves.
My time is up. I will be on the floor for a few minutes and perhaps
have some other discussion. I know another Senator is waiting to
discuss this. But, Mr. President, this is an important issue. We are
finally talking about what we ought to talk about. And I hope we can
have some exchange of views in the coming days on this very subject
because this is not a nuisance issue. This is not a nettlesome issue or
some tiny, little issue. This is a trillion-dollar issue that deals
with people who earn paychecks and pay taxes, expecting certain results
from them, and a trillion-dollar issue that deals with senior citizens
on Social Security who expect something from that program as well.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in
morning business for up to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Hutchinson pertaining to the introduction of S.
328 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
The Chemical Weapons Convention
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on an issue of great
importance to our national security: the Chemical Weapons Convention.
This convention, which is commonly known as the CWC, has been a high
priority for the past three administrations, and is a perfect example
of a bipartisan foreign and security policy issue. It was negotiated
beginning under President Reagan, it was signed under President Bush,
and the Clinton administration is now seeking Senate advice and consent
to its ratification.
The United States has always taken the lead on negotiating the CWC,
and we should soon have before us an opportunity to improve the
security of our Nation and of the world by ratifying this convention.
Some 160 countries have already signed the CWC, and more than 65 have
ratified it--including all our major NATO allies and China. It will
enter into force on April 29 of this year, whether or not we ratify it.
But our ratification will make a big difference in the effect the
treaty has on us and on the effectiveness of the treaty worldwide.
Mr. President, let me summarize what the Chemical Weapons Convention
will do: it will drastically reduce the stockpiles of chemical weapons;
require the destruction of chemical weapon production facilities;
provide for the most intrusive verification procedures ever
negotiated--including challenge on-site inspections; improve our
intelligence of foreign chemical weapon activities; require domestic
laws that will permit nations to investigate and prosecute chemical
weapon activities; and, perhaps most importantly, make it much more
difficult for rogue nations or terrorists to make or acquire chemical
weapons.
As the Defense Department leadership and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have testified on numerous occasions over several years: this
convention is in our national security interest, and we should ratify
it as soon as possible.
Mr. President, on January 22 the Senate Armed Services Committee held
a nomination hearing for our former colleague, Senator Bill Cohen, to
be the Secretary of Defense. That afternoon the Senate voted
unanimously to confirm him by a vote of 99-0. He is now the new
Secretary of Defense, and I am looking forward to working with him on
the many important and challenging national security issues that will
come before the Armed Services Committee and before the Senate.
I want to share with my colleagues the comments of then Secretary-
designate Cohen about the CWC, because it is important that we consider
the views of the President's chief defense adviser.
At his nomination hearing, Senator Cohen made three important points
about the CWC.
First, he told the Committee ``whether we ratify it or not, we are
engaged in the unilateral disarmament of chemical weapons. We are
eliminating all our stocks of chemical weapons, and they will be
completely gone by the year 2004. That was initiated under the
administration of Ronald Reagan. So, whether we sign it or not, we are
getting rid of ours.''
Second, he told us that whether we sign it or not, the convention
will go into effect. Given that fact, it makes sense for us to ratify
the treaty and to take part in making the rules by which it will be
implemented, as well as having our own inspectors on the inspection
teams.
Third, he told the Committee that the American chemical industry
stands to lose up to $600 million in sales if we do not ratify because
of sanctions which were intended for rogue nations but which will apply
to our industry and prevent it from selling precursor chemicals to
signatory nations.
Secretary-designate Cohen concluded that it is in our national
interest to ratify the CWC because we are already getting rid of our
chemical weapons, and by ratifying we can help assure that other
countries which ratify the CWC will get rid of theirs. Those are
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three points I hope our colleagues will keep in mind as the Senate
considers the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Prior to his confirmation hearing before the Armed Services
Committee, Secretary-designate Cohen had an opportunity to provide a
more comprehensive explanation of his support for the CWC. I would like
to share those views with our colleagues because they clearly enumerate
why the CWC is in our national security interests.
Here is the committee's question and Senator Cohen's answer:
Question. The President has made ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention a very high priority for early
Senate action. The Convention will enter into force on April
29, 1997, and ratification must occur prior to that date for
the U.S. to be an original party.
Do you agree that ratification of the CWC is very much in
our national security interest and do you support the goal of
ratification prior to the April 29 deadline?
Answer. Yes. The CWC, as both a disarmament and
nonproliferation treaty, is very much in our national
security interests because it establishes an international
mandate for the destruction of chemical weapons (CW)
stockpiles. Congress has mandated that the Army, as executive
agent for CW destruction, eliminate its unitary CW, which
constitute the bulk of its CW stockpile, by 31 December 2004.
That destruction process is well under way at the CW
destruction facilities at Johnston Atoll and Tooele, UT. The
CWC mandates that state parties destroy, under a strict
verification regime, their entire CW stockpiles within 10
years after the Convention enters into force (April 2007).
Given that the U.S. does not need CW for its security, and
given that we are currently legally committed to eliminating
unilaterally the vast majority of our CW stockpile, common
sense suggests that it would be preferable to secure a
commitment from other nations to do the same; prohibits the
development, retention, storage, preparations for use, and
use of CW. These expansive prohibitions establish a broadly
accepted international norm that will form a basis for
international action against those states parties that
violate the CWC. Unlike the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which only
bans the use of CW in war, the CWC: includes a verification
regime; restricts the export of certain dual-use CW precursor
chemicals to non-state parties; prohibits assisting other
states, organizations, or personnel in acquiring CW; and
requires state parties to implement legislation prohibiting
its citizens and organizations from engaging in activities
prohibited by the Convention. The CWC also contains
mechanisms for recommending multilateral sanctions, including
recourse to the UN Security Council; increases the
probability of detecting militarily significant violations of
the CWC. While no treaty is 100% verifiable, the CWC contains
complementary and overlapping declaration and inspection
requirements. These requirements increase the probability of
detecting militarily significant violations of the
Convention. While detecting illicit production of small
quantities of CW will be extremely difficult, it is easier to
detect large scale production, filling and stockpiling of
chemical weapons. Over time, through declaration, routine
inspections, fact-finding, consultation, and challenge
inspection mechanisms, the CWC's verification regime should
prove effective in providing information on significant CW
programs that would not otherwise be available; hinders the
development of clandestine CW stockpiles. Through systematic
on-site verification, routine declarations and trade
restrictions, the Convention makes it more difficult for
would-be proliferators to acquire, from CWC state parties
precursor chemicals required for developing chemical weapons.
The mutually supportive trade restrictions and verification
provisions of the Convention increase the transparency of CW-
relevant activities. These provisions will provide the U.S.
with otherwise unavailable information that will facilitate
U.S. detection and monitoring of illicit CW activities.
I strongly support the Chemical Weapons Convention and
the goal of U.S. ratification of the Convention by 29
April 1997, and I understand that the Department of
Defense shares that view. U.S. ratification of the CWC
prior to this date will ensure that the U.S. receives one
of the 41 seats on the Executive Council of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW), the international organization that will oversee
CWC implementation. Early ratification will also ensure
that U.S. citizens will fill key positions within the OPCW
and act as inspectors for the Organization. Direct U.S.
involvement and leadership will ensure the efficacy and
efficiency of the OPCW during the critical early stages of
the Convention's implementation. The U.S., upon
ratification and implementation of the CWC, will also
receive CW-related information from other state parties.
As a state party and a member of the Executive Council,
the U.S. will be in the best position to assure the
effective implementation of the Convention's verification
provisions.
Mr. President, this is a very strong and persuasive statement of
support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. I urge my colleagues to
consider Secretary Cohen's views. We should take up the CWC for advice
and consent to ratification without delay.
Mr. President, I want to provide an additional item for the record,
and will ask unanimous consent at the conclusion of my remarks that it
be printed in the Record.
The additional item is a letter from Dr. Lori Esposito Murray,
Special Adviser to the President and ACDA Director on the Chemical
Weapons Convention, to this Senator dated January 14, 1997. This letter
provided a review of a number of issues concerning the CWC where there
was some confusion during our consideration last September. I think
this letter is a useful contribution to the Senate debate.
Mr. President, I hope the Senate will take up the Chemical Weapons
Convention early enough to permit ratification before the April 29
deadline. I hope the Senate leadership can make sure the Senate has an
opportunity to exercise its unique constitutional responsibility for
advice and consent to treaty ratification.
I ask unanimous consent that the item I referred to previously be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Arms Control and,
Disarmament Agency,
Washington, DC, January 14, 1997.
Dear Senator Levin: We understand that the Center for
Security Policy recently recirculated to you a letter on the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) dated September 6, 1996
that had originally been sent to Majority Leader Lott. The
letter urges Senator Lott to reject ratification of the CWC
``unless it is made genuinely global, effective, and
verifiable.'' Since the letter contains significant
misinformation about the Convention, we thought the following
information might be helpful as you assess this vital treaty.
Misstatement: ``The CWC is not effective because it does
not ban or control possession of all chemicals that could be
used for lethal purposes. For example, it does not prohibit
two chemical agents that were employed with deadly effect in
World War I--phosgene and hydrogen cyanide.''
Fact: Phosgene and hydrogen cyanide are covered by the
Convention and are explicitly listed on the Schedule of
Chemicals (Schedule 3). Moreover, the CWC definition of a
chemical weapon covers all toxic chemicals and their
precursors ``except where intended for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and
quantities are consistent with such purposes.'' Furthermore,
the CWC also includes provisions to expand the lists of
chemicals subject to declaration and verification as new CW
agents are identified and to improve verification procedures
and equipment as technology and experience improve.
Misstatement: ``The CWC is not global since many dangerous
nations (for example, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya)
have not agreed to join the treaty regime.''
Fact: Of the approximately twenty countries believed to
have or to be seeking a CW program, more than two thirds
already have signed the CWC. It is unlikely that those
outside the regime would join if the United States also
remained outside, giving them political cover. Additionally,
the CWC goes further than any other multilateral agreement to
date in applying pressure on nonsignatories to join the
regime.
Along with the political and diplomatic muscle that a
multilateral arms control agreement provides against rogue
states, the CWC explicitly applies trade restrictions to
states that are not Parties to the CWC. The Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which relied solely on diplomatic pressure to
encourage states to join, went from 43 State Parties in 1970
to 184 in 1997. The CWC already has 67 State Parties and 160
signatories, Iran among them. Most recently, China's
Parliament approved the CWC and the Russian Duma passed its
CW destruction plan. Without the CWC, these rogue states
would proceed, business as usual, in their efforts to acquire
chemical weapons. With the CWC, not only will we know more
about what they are doing, but it will be harder for them to
do it, and it will cost them--even if they hold off on
joining.
Misstatement: ``The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S.
intelligence community has repeatedly acknowledged in
congressional testimony.''
Fact: The Clinton Administration has determined that the
CWC is effectively verifiable because, among other things, it
will facilitate the ability of our Intelligence Community to
detect significant violations in a timely manner. The
Intelligence Community has emphasized in its testimony that
the CWC provides additional tools to do a job we would have
to do anyway with or without the CWC--track and control the
spread of chemical weapons worldwide.
Misstatement: ``. . . governments tend to look the other
way at evidence of non-compliance rather than jeopardize a
treaty regime.''
Fact: Our recent experience with the North Korean nuclear
program demonstrates that
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governments can and will respond to evidence of non-
compliance and rally to uphold the integrity of an arms
control agreement, in this case the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Indeed, the very existence of multilateral arms control
agreements provides a legal and political basis for taking
action against proliferators.
Misstatement: ``The CWC will create a massive new, UN-style
international inspection bureaucracy (which will help the
total cost of this treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as much
as $200 million per year).''
Fact: The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the
costs to the U.S. taxpayer to comply with the declaration,
inspection, and verification procedures of the CWC would
average $33 million per year, not $200 million. These
activities would include paying our $25 million assessment to
the CWC implementing organization. The United States has
worked diligently to ensure that the organization contains
only those elements essential to the completion of the task.
This contribution is certainly worth the investment in
reducing the risk that our troops will face poison gas on the
battlefield.
Misstatement: ``The CWC will jeopardize U.S. citizens'
constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. Government to
permit searches without either warrants or probable cause.''
Fact: The Administration expects that access to private
facilities will be granted voluntarily for the vast majority
of inspections under the CWC. If this is not the case, the
United States Government will obtain a search warrant prior
to an inspection in order to ensure that there will be no
trampling of constitutional rights.
Misstatement: ``As many as 8,000 companies across the
country may be subjected to new reporting requirements
entailing uncompensated annual costs between thousands to
hundreds of thousands of dollars per year to comply.''
Fact: The CWC will affect approximately 2,000 not 8,000
companies. Approximately 1,800 of these companies will not
have to do anything more than check a box regarding
production range. They will not even be required to specify
which chemicals they produce. No information will be required
regarding imports, exports, or domestic shipments. The CWC
provisions covering commercial facilities were developed with
the active participation of industry representatives. The
chemical industry has long supported the CWC. In fact, the
biggest expense to industry could come as the result of the
United States not ratifying the CWC. The CWC's trade
restrictions for non-Parties will apply to the United States
if we have not ratified the Convention by entry into force in
April 1997. According to the Chemical Manufacturer's
Association, these trade restrictions could place at risk
$600 million in export sales.
The Chemical Weapons Convention will enhance U.S. security.
No one disputes that the spread of weapons of mass
destruction to rogue states and terrorists is among the
gravest security challenges we face in the post Cold War era.
We will need every available tool to respond to it
successfully. The CWC is just such a tool. As Secretary of
Defense Perry and Attorney General Reno have stated, ``To
increase the battlefield safety of our troops and to fight
terror here and around the globe, the Senate should ratify
the Chemical Weapons Convention now.'' General Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has also testified,
``The non-proliferation aspect of the Convention will retard
the spread of chemical weapons and in so doing reduce the
probability that U.S. forces may encounter chemical weapons
in a regional conflict.''
The Chemical Weapons Convention is mainly about other
countries' chemical weapons, not our own. The United States
has already made the decision to get out of the chemical
weapons business. In fact, we are currently destroying the
vase majority of our chemical weapons stockpile, and the
Chemical Weapons Convention will require other countries to
do the same.
As noted above, the Chemical Weapons Convention has the
strong support of industry. The impact on small business, in
particular, will be negligible. But should the United States
fail to ratify the CWC, trade restrictions originally
intended to put pressure on rogue states would be imposed on
U.S. chemical companies.
The United States has been a consistent and strong world
leader in the 25-year effort to ban these horrific and
indiscriminate weapons. This effort, which culminated in
President Bush's success in concluding the CWC, has had
strong bipartisan support over the years.
I urge your support for this Convention and hope the Senate
will act promptly and favorably so that the United States can
be among the original parties to the Convention when it comes
into force on April 29, 1997.
Sincerely,
Lori Esposito Murray,
Special Adviser to the President.
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