[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 19 (Thursday, February 13, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1374-S1377]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I want to give the other side of exactly 
the issue the Senator from New Mexico has just spent some time 
describing. I say this not because I believe my side is right and 
therefore he is here doing something untoward. That is not the case. I 
think we have a disagreement here about this issue that is very 
substantial, and it is very important. I do not suggest that someone 
who does not agree with me on this position is out here deciding to 
play games or to take a position for anything other than a noble 
purpose. But, by the same token, I feel so strongly that the discussion 
I just heard is wrong, I feel compelled to correct it, at least from my 
perspective.
  Let me describe what we have. We have a proposal to change the 
Constitution of the United States. Some refer to it repeatedly as a 
proposal to balance the budget. It will not do that, and no one who 
understands the difference between a statute and a constitutional 
change should refer to it as balancing the budget. You can change the 
Constitution 2 minutes from now, and 3 minutes from now you will not 
have altered by one penny the Federal debt or the Federal deficit, and 
there is not anyone in here who would stand up and contest that, I 
would judge. So this is not about balancing the budget. It is about 
altering the Constitution.
  I am prepared to alter the Constitution under certain circumstances, 
but I will not--repeat, not--support an approach that changes the 
Constitution of the United States in a manner that I think will create 
more problems than it solves.
  We have, and will vote for, a constitutional amendment to balance the 
budget. We will all be required to vote on a couple of versions of 
that, one, the version proposed by the majority, one, a version that I 
will introduce as a substitute amendment. So we will have an 
opportunity to vote on a constitutional amendment to balance the 
budget. The version proposed by the majority says this. It says that 
revenues and expenditures in future years must be relatively equal so 
that you are not running a deficit. And that includes counting all of 
the revenues and all of the expenditures. Period. End of description--I 
think a fair description of what the majority is proposing.
  The problem with that is this. We have a separate program in 
Government, one of the largest programs, called the Social Security 
system. It has been a very successful program. But we have a 
demographic problem with our Social Security system. We have a group of 
babies born who represented the largest group of babies born in our 
history, and when they hit the retirement rolls, we are going to have a 
significant strain on that system. And so, a decision was made some 
years ago to save for that purpose, and therefore this year, and last 
year, and next year, to run a surplus, a very significant budget 
surplus in the Social Security accounts, only in those accounts, in 
order to have that available to save for the future.

[[Page S1375]]

  The amendment that is being offered by the majority is an amendment 
that would say: Let's not distinguish between one dollar and another 
dollar. Yes, we're running a surplus in Social Security, but it doesn't 
matter. We can use the surplus of Social Security to just pay for other 
spending elsewhere.
  Well, I do not think that is the way we say to those with whom we 
have decided that we are going to provide for their future and have a 
Social Security trust fund, I do not think that is the way for us to 
say to them we are meeting our responsibilities. That is not meeting 
our responsibilities. What that is doing is allowing us to say we have 
balanced the budget when we have not. We have taken trust funds that we 
said would be used for only one purpose and brought it to say, now we 
have balanced the budget.
  I am waiting--and I will ask the question again; there is only one 
other Member on the floor--but I would ask the question again, and I 
have not yet heard an answer: If under this constitutional amendment 
and a budget plan that is proposed to meet this constitutional 
amendment of balancing the budget, if in the year in which they claim 
they have balanced the budget the Federal debt limit must be increased 
by $130 billion, how do you claim you have balanced the budget?
  If you have balanced your family budget, do you have to borrow more 
money? I would not think so. If you have balanced your business budget, 
would you have to borrow more money? I do not think so. Why, in this 
plan, in the year in which they say they balance the budget, does the 
Congressional Budget Office tell us in that very year they have to 
increase the Federal debt limit by $130 billion? Why? Can anybody tell 
me? They have not told me for a couple weeks because there is not an 
answer to that. There is not an answer.
  The answer, if everyone here were honest, would be that this is not 
truly balancing the budget. The budget will be called in balance, they 
will describe it as in balance, and the Federal debt will continue to 
increase. So the folks who moved the Federal debt clock around that 
shows how the Federal debt is increasing will still have a clock that 
keeps ticking. The Federal debt will keep rising. I do not understand 
that.
  I would like us to balance the Federal budget. I think there is a 
compelling reason for us to balance the Federal budget. In fact, the 
budget deficit is down 60 percent in the last 4 years in part because 
some of us have had the courage to cast hard votes, votes that were not 
popular. I am glad I did it. They were not very popular votes, but we 
cast the votes to bring the budget deficit down.
  But the job is not done. The job is half done. We need to finish the 
job. We can alter the Constitution, but that will not finish the job. 
The only way this job gets finished is if individual men and women in 
the U.S. Senate make spending and taxing decisions that say we want to 
balance the budget. When they say to their constituents, ``We've 
balanced the budget,'' and then must confess to their bankers back 
home, ``But, yes, we increased the Federal debt by $130 billion,'' no 
one here can claim that with a straight face, unless they have no sense 
of humor, that they have done what they promised back home they are 
doing.
  That is the point I am making. If we are going to alter the 
Constitution, let us make those changes in the Constitution in a 
careful, measured way that does not create more problems than it 
solves.
  My time is up. I will be on the floor for a few minutes and perhaps 
have some other discussion. I know another Senator is waiting to 
discuss this. But, Mr. President, this is an important issue. We are 
finally talking about what we ought to talk about. And I hope we can 
have some exchange of views in the coming days on this very subject 
because this is not a nuisance issue. This is not a nettlesome issue or 
some tiny, little issue. This is a trillion-dollar issue that deals 
with people who earn paychecks and pay taxes, expecting certain results 
from them, and a trillion-dollar issue that deals with senior citizens 
on Social Security who expect something from that program as well.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for up to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Hutchinson pertaining to the introduction of S. 
328 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced 
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')


                    The Chemical Weapons Convention

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on an issue of great 
importance to our national security: the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  This convention, which is commonly known as the CWC, has been a high 
priority for the past three administrations, and is a perfect example 
of a bipartisan foreign and security policy issue. It was negotiated 
beginning under President Reagan, it was signed under President Bush, 
and the Clinton administration is now seeking Senate advice and consent 
to its ratification.
  The United States has always taken the lead on negotiating the CWC, 
and we should soon have before us an opportunity to improve the 
security of our Nation and of the world by ratifying this convention. 
Some 160 countries have already signed the CWC, and more than 65 have 
ratified it--including all our major NATO allies and China. It will 
enter into force on April 29 of this year, whether or not we ratify it. 
But our ratification will make a big difference in the effect the 
treaty has on us and on the effectiveness of the treaty worldwide.
  Mr. President, let me summarize what the Chemical Weapons Convention 
will do: it will drastically reduce the stockpiles of chemical weapons; 
require the destruction of chemical weapon production facilities; 
provide for the most intrusive verification procedures ever 
negotiated--including challenge on-site inspections; improve our 
intelligence of foreign chemical weapon activities; require domestic 
laws that will permit nations to investigate and prosecute chemical 
weapon activities; and, perhaps most importantly, make it much more 
difficult for rogue nations or terrorists to make or acquire chemical 
weapons.
  As the Defense Department leadership and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
have testified on numerous occasions over several years: this 
convention is in our national security interest, and we should ratify 
it as soon as possible.
  Mr. President, on January 22 the Senate Armed Services Committee held 
a nomination hearing for our former colleague, Senator Bill Cohen, to 
be the Secretary of Defense. That afternoon the Senate voted 
unanimously to confirm him by a vote of 99-0. He is now the new 
Secretary of Defense, and I am looking forward to working with him on 
the many important and challenging national security issues that will 
come before the Armed Services Committee and before the Senate.
  I want to share with my colleagues the comments of then Secretary-
designate Cohen about the CWC, because it is important that we consider 
the views of the President's chief defense adviser.
  At his nomination hearing, Senator Cohen made three important points 
about the CWC.
  First, he told the Committee ``whether we ratify it or not, we are 
engaged in the unilateral disarmament of chemical weapons. We are 
eliminating all our stocks of chemical weapons, and they will be 
completely gone by the year 2004. That was initiated under the 
administration of Ronald Reagan. So, whether we sign it or not, we are 
getting rid of ours.''
  Second, he told us that whether we sign it or not, the convention 
will go into effect. Given that fact, it makes sense for us to ratify 
the treaty and to take part in making the rules by which it will be 
implemented, as well as having our own inspectors on the inspection 
teams.
  Third, he told the Committee that the American chemical industry 
stands to lose up to $600 million in sales if we do not ratify because 
of sanctions which were intended for rogue nations but which will apply 
to our industry and prevent it from selling precursor chemicals to 
signatory nations.
  Secretary-designate Cohen concluded that it is in our national 
interest to ratify the CWC because we are already getting rid of our 
chemical weapons, and by ratifying we can help assure that other 
countries which ratify the CWC will get rid of theirs. Those are

[[Page S1376]]

three points I hope our colleagues will keep in mind as the Senate 
considers the Chemical Weapons Convention.

  Prior to his confirmation hearing before the Armed Services 
Committee, Secretary-designate Cohen had an opportunity to provide a 
more comprehensive explanation of his support for the CWC. I would like 
to share those views with our colleagues because they clearly enumerate 
why the CWC is in our national security interests.
  Here is the committee's question and Senator Cohen's answer:

       Question. The President has made ratification of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention a very high priority for early 
     Senate action. The Convention will enter into force on April 
     29, 1997, and ratification must occur prior to that date for 
     the U.S. to be an original party.
       Do you agree that ratification of the CWC is very much in 
     our national security interest and do you support the goal of 
     ratification prior to the April 29 deadline?
       Answer. Yes. The CWC, as both a disarmament and 
     nonproliferation treaty, is very much in our national 
     security interests because it establishes an international 
     mandate for the destruction of chemical weapons (CW) 
     stockpiles. Congress has mandated that the Army, as executive 
     agent for CW destruction, eliminate its unitary CW, which 
     constitute the bulk of its CW stockpile, by 31 December 2004. 
     That destruction process is well under way at the CW 
     destruction facilities at Johnston Atoll and Tooele, UT. The 
     CWC mandates that state parties destroy, under a strict 
     verification regime, their entire CW stockpiles within 10 
     years after the Convention enters into force (April 2007). 
     Given that the U.S. does not need CW for its security, and 
     given that we are currently legally committed to eliminating 
     unilaterally the vast majority of our CW stockpile, common 
     sense suggests that it would be preferable to secure a 
     commitment from other nations to do the same; prohibits the 
     development, retention, storage, preparations for use, and 
     use of CW. These expansive prohibitions establish a broadly 
     accepted international norm that will form a basis for 
     international action against those states parties that 
     violate the CWC. Unlike the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which only 
     bans the use of CW in war, the CWC: includes a verification 
     regime; restricts the export of certain dual-use CW precursor 
     chemicals to non-state parties; prohibits assisting other 
     states, organizations, or personnel in acquiring CW; and 
     requires state parties to implement legislation prohibiting 
     its citizens and organizations from engaging in activities 
     prohibited by the Convention. The CWC also contains 
     mechanisms for recommending multilateral sanctions, including 
     recourse to the UN Security Council; increases the 
     probability of detecting militarily significant violations of 
     the CWC. While no treaty is 100% verifiable, the CWC contains 
     complementary and overlapping declaration and inspection 
     requirements. These requirements increase the probability of 
     detecting militarily significant violations of the 
     Convention. While detecting illicit production of small 
     quantities of CW will be extremely difficult, it is easier to 
     detect large scale production, filling and stockpiling of 
     chemical weapons. Over time, through declaration, routine 
     inspections, fact-finding, consultation, and challenge 
     inspection mechanisms, the CWC's verification regime should 
     prove effective in providing information on significant CW 
     programs that would not otherwise be available; hinders the 
     development of clandestine CW stockpiles. Through systematic 
     on-site verification, routine declarations and trade 
     restrictions, the Convention makes it more difficult for 
     would-be proliferators to acquire, from CWC state parties 
     precursor chemicals required for developing chemical weapons. 
     The mutually supportive trade restrictions and verification 
     provisions of the Convention increase the transparency of CW-
     relevant activities. These provisions will provide the U.S. 
     with otherwise unavailable information that will facilitate 
     U.S. detection and monitoring of illicit CW activities.
       I strongly support the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
     the goal of U.S. ratification of the Convention by 29 
     April 1997, and I understand that the Department of 
     Defense shares that view. U.S. ratification of the CWC 
     prior to this date will ensure that the U.S. receives one 
     of the 41 seats on the Executive Council of the 
     Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
     (OPCW), the international organization that will oversee 
     CWC implementation. Early ratification will also ensure 
     that U.S. citizens will fill key positions within the OPCW 
     and act as inspectors for the Organization. Direct U.S. 
     involvement and leadership will ensure the efficacy and 
     efficiency of the OPCW during the critical early stages of 
     the Convention's implementation. The U.S., upon 
     ratification and implementation of the CWC, will also 
     receive CW-related information from other state parties. 
     As a state party and a member of the Executive Council, 
     the U.S. will be in the best position to assure the 
     effective implementation of the Convention's verification 
     provisions.

  Mr. President, this is a very strong and persuasive statement of 
support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. I urge my colleagues to 
consider Secretary Cohen's views. We should take up the CWC for advice 
and consent to ratification without delay.
  Mr. President, I want to provide an additional item for the record, 
and will ask unanimous consent at the conclusion of my remarks that it 
be printed in the Record.
  The additional item is a letter from Dr. Lori Esposito Murray, 
Special Adviser to the President and ACDA Director on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, to this Senator dated January 14, 1997. This letter 
provided a review of a number of issues concerning the CWC where there 
was some confusion during our consideration last September. I think 
this letter is a useful contribution to the Senate debate.
  Mr. President, I hope the Senate will take up the Chemical Weapons 
Convention early enough to permit ratification before the April 29 
deadline. I hope the Senate leadership can make sure the Senate has an 
opportunity to exercise its unique constitutional responsibility for 
advice and consent to treaty ratification.
  I ask unanimous consent that the item I referred to previously be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                            U.S. Arms Control and,


                                           Disarmament Agency,

                                 Washington, DC, January 14, 1997.
       Dear Senator Levin: We understand that the Center for 
     Security Policy recently recirculated to you a letter on the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) dated September 6, 1996 
     that had originally been sent to Majority Leader Lott. The 
     letter urges Senator Lott to reject ratification of the CWC 
     ``unless it is made genuinely global, effective, and 
     verifiable.'' Since the letter contains significant 
     misinformation about the Convention, we thought the following 
     information might be helpful as you assess this vital treaty.
       Misstatement: ``The CWC is not effective because it does 
     not ban or control possession of all chemicals that could be 
     used for lethal purposes. For example, it does not prohibit 
     two chemical agents that were employed with deadly effect in 
     World War I--phosgene and hydrogen cyanide.''
       Fact: Phosgene and hydrogen cyanide are covered by the 
     Convention and are explicitly listed on the Schedule of 
     Chemicals (Schedule 3). Moreover, the CWC definition of a 
     chemical weapon covers all toxic chemicals and their 
     precursors ``except where intended for purposes not 
     prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and 
     quantities are consistent with such purposes.'' Furthermore, 
     the CWC also includes provisions to expand the lists of 
     chemicals subject to declaration and verification as new CW 
     agents are identified and to improve verification procedures 
     and equipment as technology and experience improve.
       Misstatement: ``The CWC is not global since many dangerous 
     nations (for example, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) 
     have not agreed to join the treaty regime.''
       Fact: Of the approximately twenty countries believed to 
     have or to be seeking a CW program, more than two thirds 
     already have signed the CWC. It is unlikely that those 
     outside the regime would join if the United States also 
     remained outside, giving them political cover. Additionally, 
     the CWC goes further than any other multilateral agreement to 
     date in applying pressure on nonsignatories to join the 
     regime.
       Along with the political and diplomatic muscle that a 
     multilateral arms control agreement provides against rogue 
     states, the CWC explicitly applies trade restrictions to 
     states that are not Parties to the CWC. The Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty, which relied solely on diplomatic pressure to 
     encourage states to join, went from 43 State Parties in 1970 
     to 184 in 1997. The CWC already has 67 State Parties and 160 
     signatories, Iran among them. Most recently, China's 
     Parliament approved the CWC and the Russian Duma passed its 
     CW destruction plan. Without the CWC, these rogue states 
     would proceed, business as usual, in their efforts to acquire 
     chemical weapons. With the CWC, not only will we know more 
     about what they are doing, but it will be harder for them to 
     do it, and it will cost them--even if they hold off on 
     joining.
       Misstatement: ``The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. 
     intelligence community has repeatedly acknowledged in 
     congressional testimony.''
       Fact: The Clinton Administration has determined that the 
     CWC is effectively verifiable because, among other things, it 
     will facilitate the ability of our Intelligence Community to 
     detect significant violations in a timely manner. The 
     Intelligence Community has emphasized in its testimony that 
     the CWC provides additional tools to do a job we would have 
     to do anyway with or without the CWC--track and control the 
     spread of chemical weapons worldwide.
       Misstatement: ``. . . governments tend to look the other 
     way at evidence of non-compliance rather than jeopardize a 
     treaty regime.''
       Fact: Our recent experience with the North Korean nuclear 
     program demonstrates that

[[Page S1377]]

     governments can and will respond to evidence of non-
     compliance and rally to uphold the integrity of an arms 
     control agreement, in this case the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
     Indeed, the very existence of multilateral arms control 
     agreements provides a legal and political basis for taking 
     action against proliferators.
       Misstatement: ``The CWC will create a massive new, UN-style 
     international inspection bureaucracy (which will help the 
     total cost of this treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as much 
     as $200 million per year).''
       Fact: The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the 
     costs to the U.S. taxpayer to comply with the declaration, 
     inspection, and verification procedures of the CWC would 
     average $33 million per year, not $200 million. These 
     activities would include paying our $25 million assessment to 
     the CWC implementing organization. The United States has 
     worked diligently to ensure that the organization contains 
     only those elements essential to the completion of the task. 
     This contribution is certainly worth the investment in 
     reducing the risk that our troops will face poison gas on the 
     battlefield.
       Misstatement: ``The CWC will jeopardize U.S. citizens' 
     constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. Government to 
     permit searches without either warrants or probable cause.''
       Fact: The Administration expects that access to private 
     facilities will be granted voluntarily for the vast majority 
     of inspections under the CWC. If this is not the case, the 
     United States Government will obtain a search warrant prior 
     to an inspection in order to ensure that there will be no 
     trampling of constitutional rights.
       Misstatement: ``As many as 8,000 companies across the 
     country may be subjected to new reporting requirements 
     entailing uncompensated annual costs between thousands to 
     hundreds of thousands of dollars per year to comply.''
       Fact: The CWC will affect approximately 2,000 not 8,000 
     companies. Approximately 1,800 of these companies will not 
     have to do anything more than check a box regarding 
     production range. They will not even be required to specify 
     which chemicals they produce. No information will be required 
     regarding imports, exports, or domestic shipments. The CWC 
     provisions covering commercial facilities were developed with 
     the active participation of industry representatives. The 
     chemical industry has long supported the CWC. In fact, the 
     biggest expense to industry could come as the result of the 
     United States not ratifying the CWC. The CWC's trade 
     restrictions for non-Parties will apply to the United States 
     if we have not ratified the Convention by entry into force in 
     April 1997. According to the Chemical Manufacturer's 
     Association, these trade restrictions could place at risk 
     $600 million in export sales.
       The Chemical Weapons Convention will enhance U.S. security. 
     No one disputes that the spread of weapons of mass 
     destruction to rogue states and terrorists is among the 
     gravest security challenges we face in the post Cold War era. 
     We will need every available tool to respond to it 
     successfully. The CWC is just such a tool. As Secretary of 
     Defense Perry and Attorney General Reno have stated, ``To 
     increase the battlefield safety of our troops and to fight 
     terror here and around the globe, the Senate should ratify 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention now.'' General Shalikashvili, 
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has also testified, 
     ``The non-proliferation aspect of the Convention will retard 
     the spread of chemical weapons and in so doing reduce the 
     probability that U.S. forces may encounter chemical weapons 
     in a regional conflict.''
       The Chemical Weapons Convention is mainly about other 
     countries' chemical weapons, not our own. The United States 
     has already made the decision to get out of the chemical 
     weapons business. In fact, we are currently destroying the 
     vase majority of our chemical weapons stockpile, and the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention will require other countries to 
     do the same.
       As noted above, the Chemical Weapons Convention has the 
     strong support of industry. The impact on small business, in 
     particular, will be negligible. But should the United States 
     fail to ratify the CWC, trade restrictions originally 
     intended to put pressure on rogue states would be imposed on 
     U.S. chemical companies.
       The United States has been a consistent and strong world 
     leader in the 25-year effort to ban these horrific and 
     indiscriminate weapons. This effort, which culminated in 
     President Bush's success in concluding the CWC, has had 
     strong bipartisan support over the years.
       I urge your support for this Convention and hope the Senate 
     will act promptly and favorably so that the United States can 
     be among the original parties to the Convention when it comes 
     into force on April 29, 1997.
           Sincerely,
                                             Lori Esposito Murray,
     Special Adviser to the President.

                          ____________________