[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 19 (Thursday, February 13, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1369-S1372]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to talk about an issue of enormous 
importance to our national security and express my hope that during the 
course of the next week, while the U.S. Senate is out of session, 
Senators will focus on and think hard about our responsibilities with 
respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention. More than 100 years of 
international efforts to ban chemical weapons, 100 years of effort, 
culminated January 13, 1993, in the final days of the Bush 
administration when the United States of America signed the Chemical 
Weapons Convention as one of the original signatories.
  I hope my colleagues on the other side of the aisle will focus 
closely on the efforts of former President Bush, former National 
Security Adviser General Scowcroft, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Powell, and so many other people whose bona fides with 
respect to issues of national security I do not believe have ever been 
at issue. They all worked hard and fought hard to bring this Convention 
to a successful conclusion.
  Since the time the United States signed it as one of the original 
signatories, 160 other nations have joined in signing it. That is 161, 
I might say, out of a total of 190 independent states that compose the 
world community of nations.
  Immediately after the signing, the process of ratification by the 
signatories began. The convention was submitted to the U.S. Senate for 
its advice and consent in November 1993, and multiple hearings have 
been held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services 
Committee, the Intelligence Committee, and the Judiciary Committee 
during both the 103d and the 104th Congresses. As of January 27, 1997, 
68 nations have already ratified the Convention, but not the United 
States of America that helped lead the effort of its creation.
  This Convention provides that it will take force and its provisions 
will become applicable to party nations 180 days following its 
ratification by the 65th nation. The 65th ratification occurred late 
last year, so the clock is now ticking toward the date on which it 
enters into force. The Convention will enter into force on April 29 of 
this year, just a little more than 2 months after we return from the 
recess period that begins later today.
  It is important to understand the provisions of the Convention, 
especially when measured against that date. The Convention bans the 
development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by 
its signatories. It also requires the destruction of virtually all 
chemical weapons and production facilities.
  This treaty also provides the most extensive, most intrusive 
verification regime of any arms control treaty yet negotiated, 
extending its coverage not only to governmental and military but also 
to civilian facilities.
  The fact is that this verification package provides, in the end, 
increased security to the United States. That verification package 
includes instrument monitoring, both routine and random inspections, 
and challenge inspections for sites that are suspected of chemical 
weapons storage or production. The Convention also requires export 
controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as 
warfare agents and their precursors.
  In order to implement its provisions and to administer them on an 
ongoing basis, the Convention establishes the Organization for 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or the OPCW. This organization is 
permanently charged with ensuring compliance with the Convention's 
requirements and with monitoring the chemical industry and the chemical 
production throughout the world. The Convention's preparatory 
commission, which is located in The Hague, is currently determining 
precisely how the permanent organization is going to be structured and 
how the Convention is going to be implemented.

  Every State that ratifies that Convention has to complete the 
destruction of chemical weapons agents, munitions and production 
facilities within 10 years of the Convention's entry into force, or its 
date of ratification, whichever comes earlier.
  I would like to describe what the treaty accomplishes in terms of 
control of chemicals and their precursors and monitoring and tracking 
of those chemicals and precursors.
  The Convention establishes three lists, or schedules as they are 
called, of chemical warfare agents and their precursor chemicals. These 
are arranged in the order of their importance to chemical weapons 
production and the extent of their legitimate peaceful or commercial 
uses.
  The OPCW Technical Secretariat will update those schedules as needed 
and as circumstances change. And the production, the use, or the 
transfer of any chemicals on these schedules above set minimal amounts 
must be projected prospectively by the manufacturers and subsequently 
reported annually to the OPCW.
  Any facility that makes use of or is capable of producing scheduled 
chemicals has to register with the OPCW, as do facilities that produce 
over 30 metric tons annually of a discrete chemical containing 
phosphorous, sulphur or fluorine.

[[Page S1370]]

  So, Mr. President, what we gain here is a mechanism for knowing 
globally who produces what chemicals, how much they produce, and where 
these chemicals are going.
  The inspections of chemical facilities provided by the Convention 
will vary according to the nature of the chemicals. Those declared as 
producing, storing, or destroying chemical weapons are subject to 
systematic on-site inspection and continuous instrument monitoring. 
Those chemical facilities declared as nonchemical weapons facilities 
are subject to routine or random inspections, depending on the schedule 
or schedules on which the chemicals they produce or handle are listed. 
All other facilities that produce or handle or are suspected of 
producing or handling chemicals are subject to on-site challenge 
inspections upon the request of a signatory nation.
  So, I reiterate, under the terms of the Convention we will achieve 
for the first time the ability to know who is producing what chemicals, 
how much they produce, and where these chemicals are moving, and we 
obtain the ability to inspect any of those chemical production or 
handling entities.
  Signatory nations agree not to export the most troublesome chemicals, 
those listed in schedule 1, to any nonsignatory nation. Schedule 2 
chemicals may be traded with nonsignatory nations for only 3 years 
after the Convention enters into force, and schedule 3 chemicals, which 
are the least troublesome and most widely used commercially, can be 
freely traded for 5 years after the Convention comes into force so long 
as end-use certification is provided. Five years after the Convention 
comes into force, additional controls will be considered and may be 
required.
  Now, Mr. President, one might reasonably expect that all those in 
this institution would by their study of history be aware of the 
occasions when chemical weapons have been used in conflicts and the 
horrifying effects that they can have and have had on both combatants 
and noncombatants, and one would think those with such an awareness 
would warmly embrace and applaud the successful negotiation and 
apparent widespread acceptance of this Convention among the nations of 
the world. The images, both visual and verbal, of the effects of 
chemical weapons have seared themselves into our minds.
  We know the effects of mustard gas in the trenches of Europe in World 
War I. We know of the terrible effect of chemicals employed in the 
Iran-Iraq War. Americans have witnessed the anguish of those who served 
in the gulf war who are suffering from maladies that may have resulted 
from some exposure to chemical weapons amassed by Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq. Civilized people everywhere have been repelled by the effects of 
these horrible weapons. Indeed, that is what propelled us under a 
Republican administration to negotiate and then to sign this 
Convention.
  One might reasonably anticipate, therefore, that the United States, 
which led the way for so many years in seeking allies among the 
community of nations in the effort to outlaw these weapons and their 
use, and which was the driving force behind the negotiations that 
produced the Chemical Weapons Convention, would see virtually universal 
support for the ratification of this critical treaty. But that is not 
the case, as my colleagues know.
  Most unfortunately, a small group of Senators, primarily within one 
segment of the Republican Party, and nourished by a group of committed 
cold warriors whose reflexive behavior is to see catastrophe for the 
United States in any arms control agreement, has dedicated itself to 
preventing the Senate from approving ratification of this Convention. 
They have found shadows behind the trees, and express great fear that 
United States participation could somehow weaken our Nation militarily 
and leave us vulnerable to a reemergent Russia or to some rogue nation 
that refuses to abide by the Convention's requirements.
  I want to emphasize that while I believe those conclusions are 
entirely unwarranted, I take no issue with anybody who wants to proceed 
cautiously here. I take no issue with anybody who asserts that 
conceivably there is some downside to the Convention, and it is 
appropriate for us to have legitimate debate about that. But legitimate 
debate and legitimate expressions of caution are different from 
standing in the way of the U.S. Senate being able to resolve this issue 
in a vote on the floor of the Senate and allowing the Senate to perform 
its critical constitutional responsibilities of advise and consent.
  I agree it would be a mistake for this Nation to blindly assume that 
simply as a result of the disappearance of the Soviet Union we will 
never again face a serious threat from Russia or from some other nation 
whose interests conflict with our own. That, of course, is why we spend 
$250-plus billion on defense every year.
  But the vehemence with which these Senators oppose the Convention, 
and their rationales for so doing, persuade me that the principal 
problem is not the Convention itself or its terms, but the fact that it 
is simply not a perfect treaty, that it is not 100 percent leakproof or 
100 percent verifiable.
  We cannot establish such a standard, Mr. President, for by so doing, 
we effectively would say that no arms control treaty could ever be in 
our national interest.
  Mr. President, I reject the notion that there is no such thing as a 
good arms control treaty, a treaty that advances the interests of the 
United States effectively. I specifically reject the notion that the 
Chemical Weapons Convention does anything to diminish the national 
security of our Nation, or that it is not in our national interest. To 
the contrary, I believe that our Nation and our people will be safer 
and more secure and, in fact, will be the entire world community of 
nations, if the United States joins the other nations which have 
ratified it.
  More importantly, Mr. President, that is not just my belief. It is 
the belief of former Presidents of the United States. It is the belief 
of the Chairman and Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the belief of 
the current and immediate past Directors of Central Intelligence, the 
current and immediate past Secretaries of Defense, Gen. Norman 
Schwarzkopf and a host of others whose credentials as national security 
experts are sterling.
  So let us address the specific concerns that are raised by those who 
would rather see the United States not participate in this convention, 
and who would deprive the Senate of the opportunity to debate the 
convention on the floor and vote on the resolution of ratification as 
the American people should be able to expect.
  The opponents claim that the Chemical Weapons Convention will not be 
effective because it fails to ban or control possession of all 
chemicals that could be used for lethal purposes, specifically 
including two agents used with deadly effect in World War I, phosgene 
and hydrogen cyanide. The reality is that the CWC does cover all toxic 
chemicals and their precursors ``except where intended for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention * * *'' Phosgene and hydrogen cyanide 
are explicitly listed in schedule 3 of the convention.
  The convention also contains a provision to expand the list of 
chemicals subject to declaration and verification as new CW agents are 
developed and identified.
  The opponents claim that the CWC is not global, since many dangerous 
nations--for example, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya--have not 
agreed to join the treaty regime. The reality, however, is that of the 
approximately 20 nations believed to have or to be seeking a chemical 
weapons program, more than two-thirds have already signed the 
convention. The failure of the United States to ratify the treaty is 
unlikely to spur these countries to become signatories and relinquish 
any determination they may have to develop chemical weapons. And, 
indeed, our failure to ratify will actually give to those recalcitrant 
countries political cover for their failure to join.
  If the United States does not join, why should they care about it? If 
the United States, which initially sought it and long worked for it, 
now finds something wrong with the convention, then they have 
justification to also assert something is wrong with it. Further, 
several of the Convention's key provisions are targeted directly at 
nonparticipating nations. Some of the most threatening chemicals cannot 
be sold to nonparticipating nations by signatories and chemical trade 
with the nonsignatories will be impeded in other ways. In this 
important respect the treaty is, indeed, global in its reach.

[[Page S1371]]

  In effect, those who claim to be defending the interests of the 
United States are, I believe, unwittingly--and I know not 
purposefully--aiding those countries that would continue to be 
rebellious nonparticipants in the work of removing chemical weapons 
from the earth.
  If the opponents mean to point out that all convention provisions do 
not apply to all nations, OK, they are correct. Not all provisions 
apply to those 30 or fewer nations that have not yet signed the 
convention and may choose never to sign or ratify. But there is no way 
that one sovereign nation can force another to enter into a treaty. But 
you can, through a treaty, isolate those nations that choose not to 
sign, and, indeed, make it extraordinarily difficult for them to pursue 
their nefarious objectives.
  This treaty will, very definitely, according to the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the intelligence community, and many others in our defense 
establishment whose judgment and expertise I respect in their 
specialties, have significant constraining effects even on 
nonsignatories. It will be far more difficult for a nonsignatory to 
proceed to develop a chemical weapons program and to produce chemical 
weapons, and it will be much more likely--not 100 percent certain but 
much more likely--that we will know if they do so.
  The opponents claim that the CWC is not verifiable, Mr. President. 
Well, the reality is that the intelligence community and the Department 
of Defense have testified that the convention, while not being 
perfectly verifiable to be sure, will facilitate the ability of our 
intelligence agencies to detect significant violations in a timely 
manner, because it provides additional tools to do the job of tracking 
the spread of chemical weapons--a job that we would have to do anyway, 
with or without the Chemical Weapons Convention and its tools.
  In fact, it is the acknowledged difficulty of detecting chemical 
weapons and their production, frankly, that makes the CWC all the more 
important. Our intelligence community needs all the additional tools 
and advantages it can get to make it more likely that such weapons and 
production will be identified, and identified as early as possible. The 
CWC provides critical tools and advantages, and the intelligence 
community and Defense Department have urged the Senate to approve its 
ratification.
  The opponents claim that the convention will be toothless in 
application and that violations, once identified, will go unsanctioned. 
This, of course, is totally conjectural, and nothing in the verbiage of 
any treaty can absolutely guarantee that every provision will be 
enforced or every violation effectively sanctioned. But recent 
experience with the North Korean nuclear program demonstrates that 
governments can and will respond to evidence of noncompliance and will 
act to uphold the integrity of an arms control agreement--in this case, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  I am of the opinion, personally, that violations of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention will result in a strong reaction by the community of 
nations that is participating in it--but that is my opinion. The only 
demonstrable fact, in response to the fear expressed by opponents, is 
that with the Chemical Weapons Convention, there is a multilateral 
mechanism to define objectionable actions and the basis on which to 
organize an international response. Those are both advantages that do 
not exist today.
  The opponents claim that the Chemical Weapons Convention will create 
a massive new United Nations-type international inspection bureaucracy, 
which will result in costs to our taxpayers of as much as $200 million 
per year. The reality is that the nonpartisan Congressional Budget 
Office has estimated the U.S. costs to comply with declaration, 
inspection, and verification procedures of the CWC will average $33 
million per year, an amount which includes our annual assessment to the 
OPCW of $25 million. That is considerably less than $200 million.
  The active involvement of our negotiators in developing the treaty 
requirements applying to the OPCW ensures that it will undertake only 
essential tasks, and will do so efficiently. After the trillions of 
dollars our taxpayers spent defending our Nation during the cold war, 
and in the face of the terrible threats of chemical weapons, I 
believe--and this is shared by the President, the intelligence 
community, and the defense community--that an expenditure of $33 
million a year for U.S. costs of participating in the CWC, and for 
guaranteeing for the first time intrusive tracking of chemical agents 
and precursors, is a very, very good buy for the taxpayers.
  The opponents claim that the Convention will jeopardize our citizens' 
constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. Government to permit 
searches without either warrants or probable cause. Mr. President, that 
is not true. The reality is that most firms that will be subjected to 
CWC inspections will voluntarily grant access for that purpose. And it 
is important to note here that the vast majority of the chemical 
industry of the United States is supportive of this treaty. The strong 
support of that industry and its active involvement during the CWC 
negotiations strengthen the belief that, in fact, most of the firms 
subject to inspection will not object to the inspections. But if a firm 
does exercise its constitutional right to object, then, Mr. President, 
the U.S. Government is committed to fully complying with our 
constitutional requirements. In such a case the Government will obtain 
a search warrant prior to an inspection to ensure that the 
constitutional rights of any citizen are fully protected.
  The opponents claim that the Convention will subject as many as 8,000 
companies across the Nation to new reporting requirements, entailing 
uncompensated annual compliance costs that could reach hundreds of 
thousands of dollars for each. The reality is that it will not affect 
8,000, it will affect only about 2,000 companies. Approximately 1,800 
of those 2,000 companies will not have to do anything more onerous than 
check a box on a form regarding production range. They will not even be 
required to specify which chemicals they produce. Most of the firms for 
which compliance activities will be more extensive are supporters of 
the treaty, and directly, or through their industry association, were 
consulted as the CWC provisions affecting commercial facilities were 
negotiated. The Convention's opponents generally fail to mention the 
fact that the biggest cost to the U.S. chemical industry is likely to 
come as a result of the United States failing to ratify the Convention. 
According to the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the trade 
restrictions on export of chemicals that will apply to nonparticipating 
nations will place at risk $600 million in annual export sales for U.S. 
companies.
  It is a very material fact that the Chemical Weapons Convention is 
primarily about increasing the safety of the United States, of our 
troops, and our citizens from the chemical weapons of other nations.
  During the Bush administration, the decision was made for the United 
States to leave the chemical weapons business and to destroy the vast 
majority of our stockpile of chemical weapons--all those that the CWC 
would require to be destroyed. It is very important that we understand 
this. The Bush administration has already embarked this Nation on a 
course that will result in the destruction of our stockpile of chemical 
weapons. That process already is underway, and it will continue whether 
or not we ratify the Convention.
  Does it not make sense, then, if we are stripping ourselves of these 
weapons anyway, for us to take steps to increase the likelihood that 
other nations will do the same, and that we will know if some nations 
choose to manufacture and stockpile such weapons?
  There certainly is no reason for the United States to refuse to 
ratify the CWC because it in some way would impede the maintenance or 
production of weapons deemed important to our national security. The 
decision to destroy our chemical weapons was made years ago, during the 
Bush administration. It is not a decision that any of our defense 
leadership suggests should be reversed.
  Last fall, after the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had favorably 
reported the resolution of ratification for the convention on a strong 
bipartisan vote, the convention was caught up, most unfortunately, in 
Presidential politics. Mr. President, as the ranking

[[Page S1372]]

member of a subcommittee with jurisdiction over other matters that 
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Helms had linked to action on the 
Convention, I had worked hard with Senator Helms and others to get an 
agreement to bring the ratification resolution to the floor. While he 
was majority leader, Senator Dole agreed that we should have a vote on 
that resolution, and we secured a unanimous consent agreement that 
ensured the Senate would consider and vote on the resolution of 
ratification before the end of the 105th Congress. But then, in the 
heat of Presidential politics, although President Clinton strongly 
supported ratification of the convention, Senator Dole, as the 
Republican nominee for President, suddenly announced opposition to the 
CWC. That called into question whether the necessary two-thirds 
majority vote for ratification could be secured. So we delayed action 
on the resolution.
  Mr. President, the time for action on this convention has arrived. It 
is now. We are beyond the complications of a Presidential election. We 
have held the hearings, many hearings, in four separate Senate 
committees. We know the facts. The support of the defense and 
intelligence communities and leaders is strong and clear.
  And now there is one more very important reason for expeditious 
action to approve the resolution of ratification. If the United States 
has not ratified this convention by the time it takes effect on April 
29, by its terms U.S. citizens will be ineligible for appointment to 
the OPCW administrative staff and corps of international inspectors, 
and, therefore, we will forfeit the opportunity to influence its 
decisions, its budget, and inspection practices that our negotiators 
led the way to secure. To be sure, if the United States later ratifies, 
Mr. President, American citizens will become eligible for such posts 
but only as they become vacant at some point in the future. Our Nation 
will have irrevocably lost out in the vitally important initial 
formative policy making and procedure development.
  As scores of newspaper editorials around the country have said, those 
who believe the threat of chemical weapons is real, and who realize 
that our intelligence and defense organizations need all the help they 
can get to identify where chemical weapons are being manufactured and 
stockpiled, must not let a small group of Senators prevent the U.S. 
Senate from acting on this important treaty.
  I urge the majority leader to act in the interest of our country and 
our people and, in the interest of our institution and its 
constitutional right and duty to advise and consent to treaties, to 
permit the Senate to act on this treaty, which I believe a significant 
majority of this body supports.
  We cannot permit the perfect to become the enemy of the good. We must 
not permit those who make that mistake to prevent us from acting in the 
best interests of our Nation and its people. And we cannot allow some 
cloudy objections to obviate the facts and prevent this institution 
from discharging its responsibilities.
  I believe it would be a grave mistake to deprive our Nation, our 
Armed Forces, and our citizens of the additional protections from the 
threat of chemical weapons that the Chemical Weapons Convention offers. 
And I think it would be foolish for the United States to relinquish the 
influence it will gain in implementing this critical treaty if it fails 
to ratify the Convention by April 29.

  Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from New Mexico for 
his forbearance.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from New 
Mexico is recognized for up to 30 minutes.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, first let me ask. Is my 30 minutes the 
last business before the Senate today?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 15 minutes reserved for the Senator 
from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Might I say, as much as I would like to use my 30 
minutes, I do not want to delay the Senate indefinitely tonight. If 
Senator Kerrey intends to use time, let me suggest I could probably 
finish in 15 minutes.

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