[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 18 (Wednesday, February 12, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1271-S1296]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the joint resolution.


                            Amendment No. 4

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of the Dodd amendment No. 4, with the time between 
now and 5:30 p.m. divided with 107 minutes to Senator Hatch and 95 
minutes to Senator Dodd.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment I have 
offered here this afternoon. We have several hours of debate. It may 
not be necessary to consume all of that time. I will notify my 
colleagues. Others may want to come over and address the issue. 
Although we have set a time of 5:30 p.m. for a vote, we may find 
ourselves having exhausted all of the brilliance on both sides of this 
amendment and able to move to a vote earlier than that. It would take 
unanimous consent to vote earlier, but that may happen at some time 
here this afternoon.
  In the meantime, Mr. President, let me state once again what this 
amendment does. I urge my colleagues and others to pay attention. I 
will put aside the debate of whether or not we ought to have a 
constitutional amendment to balance the budget. That matter has been 
debated and will be debated over the next several days.
  The amendment that I raise, Mr. President, does not address the 
underlying question of whether or not we ought to have a constitutional 
amendment to balance the budget. But it addresses section 5, and 
section 5 only, of the proposed amendment. It raises what I believe to 
be a very legitimate issue in dealing with the national security of 
this country.
  This is an amendment that I offer which you could support and do no 
damage--in fact, I would think strengthen--the argument in support of 
the constitutional amendment for a balanced budget. I myself have 
serious underlying problems with the constitutional amendment. I do not 
want my colleagues to have any illusions about that. But I am going to 
put aside that debate and ask my colleagues to draw their attention to 
section 5 and an amendment that I will offer that I think addresses a 
legitimate concern.
  My amendment corrects two serious flaws in this section. Let me read 
this section, if I can. Section 5 of the proposed amendment, not my 
amendment, the proposed constitutional amendment, says:

       The Congress may waive the provisions of this article 
     for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in 
     effect. The provisions of this article may be waived for 
     any fiscal year in which the United States is engaged in 
     military conflict which causes an imminent and serious 
     military threat to national security and is so declared by 
     a joint resolution adopted by a majority of the whole 
     number of each House which becomes law.

  First of all, this most important section currently contains 
language, in my view, that would seriously undermine--the distinguished 
Presiding Officer is a former Attorney General, and someone who has had 
a serious amount of experience in judicial matters will appreciate that 
every word in the constitutional amendment is not a casual word. These 
words must be selected very, very carefully. So I do not treat this 
lightly at all.
  ``A declaration of war''--these are the words that are most of 
concern to me--and ``the United States is engaged in a military 
conflict which causes an imminent and serious military threat to 
national security . . .''
  The provisions of the balanced budget are waived only if war is 
declared, or if the United States is ``engaged.'' The balanced budget 
amendment is quite clear in specifying that our Nation must be engaged 
in military conflict before a waiver can be granted.
  The problem, as I see it, is that prudent foreign policy often 
requires responding to serious threats before we actually become 
involved in military conflict. Yet, the language of this amendment is 
``engaged''--not ``might be engaged or there is a threat of 
engagement''--but rather is ``engaged'' in military conflict.
  Throughout our history this Nation has often found itself necessarily 
engaged in conflict but yet in situations where immediate action was 
essential. The gulf war is one example that immediately comes to mind. 
I will discuss that example and others in the debate shortly.
  My amendment removes this section 5 and would lift the provisions of 
the balanced budget amendment under a declaration of war or if the 
United States faces an imminent and serious military threat to national 
security. The requirement of being engaged is dropped.
  The amendment that I offer would also clearly define the role of 
Congress in certifying the existence of an imminent and serious 
military threat. Under the current language, in section 5 the courts 
could conceivably be

[[Page S1272]]

called on to determine whether or not an imminent and serious military 
threat to national security exists.
  My amendment--the amendment that I offer and is at the desk--makes 
clear that a resolution passed by Congress is the sole requirement for 
certifying that such a threat exists.
  Finally, the amendment that I have offered restores a reasonable 
standard for voting. The balanced budget amendment creates a 
cumbersome, I believe, standard for passing the resolution certifying 
that a military threat exists. It says a ``majority of the whole number 
of each House'' must pass the resolution. In the case of the U.S. 
Senate, this means that 51 Senators would have to vote in favor of the 
resolution, no matter how many Senators were present and voting. This 
could be absolutely critical, particularly in a time of national 
crisis. When not all Senators are able to reach Washington on short 
notice, for instance, we could be prevented by our own Constitution 
from quickly and properly responding to an international emergency.
  Furthermore, the ``whole number'' standard leaves open the question, 
I point out, of whether or not the Vice President would be allowed to 
cast a vote should we arrive at a tie of 50-50. My amendment alleviates 
this problem by requiring a simple majority of those present and voting 
for passage of the waiver resolution.
  Mr. President, I am well aware of the heartfelt support, as I 
mentioned at the outset, of these remarks on the part of my colleagues 
who are squarely for a constitutional amendment to balance the budget.
  I also know that many of us--myself included, clearly--have 
underlying problems with the whole balanced budget amendment. But I 
think we should all be able to agree, regardless of where we are 
positioned on the issue of a constitutional amendment to balance the 
budget, we should all be able to agree that any amendment to the 
Constitution should in no way shackle our country in time of an 
emergency.
  The amendment that I offer, Mr. President, I think helps ensure that 
the Nation remains prepared and able to respond in time of an 
international crisis.
  For these reasons, I hope that it will enjoy the support of a broad 
majority of my colleagues.
  Mr. President, I want to cite the language of the amendment that we 
are offering.
  Let me recite the copy of the amendment that I am offering:

       On page 3, line 7, strike beginning with ``is'' through 
     line 11 and insert, ``faces an imminent and serious military 
     threat to national security as declared by a joint 
     resolution.''

  The point being here, if you are not actually engaged, or you don't 
have a declaration of war and the Nation, in preparation for such a 
conflict, wants to exceed the balanced budget requirements, we should 
be able to do that.
  I do not know of anyone who would believe that, as important as this 
amendment is, it should have a higher priority than the national 
security interests of the country. Yet, my fear is based on the exact 
language of section 5--that that is the problem we have posed before 
us. If it requires a declaration of war, or requires, as the language 
reads, ``is engaged in a conflict,'' it seems to me that we would have 
to wait for one of those two conditions to be met in order to waive any 
constitutional requirements prohibiting deficit financing.
  And so I would urge the adoption of this amendment which says, 
``faces an imminent and serious military threat to national security as 
declared by a joint resolution,'' so that we do not allow the courts to 
decide. You can imagine a debate going on here about whether or not an 
imminent and serious threat existed, someone runs to the Federal courts 
and says, ``I don't think it is an imminent and serious military 
threat,'' and we have a panel of judges deciding whether or not that 
threat exists. I do not think any of us want to see that happen. So the 
joint resolution allows that a simple majority of Senators would be 
able to declare the threat in order to waive the provisions of the 
balanced budget amendment.
  I mentioned earlier, Mr. President, that there are historical 
examples for this that I think point out the problem. They are 
historical and they may be 100 years old or 20 years old. None of us 
can say with any certainty what we may face tomorrow or next week or 
next year or the next century. But I will cite five examples to point 
out the problems.
  Imagine, if you will, that this section in a constitutional amendment 
to balance the budget were in place at the time we faced these five 
crises. Ask yourself how would we have responded, what would have been 
the implications, putting aside whether or not you were for or against 
the particular issue at hand.
  The gulf war is one; lend-lease, back in the late 1930's, early 
1940's, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Panama crisis back under 
the Bush administration, and the defense buildup during the Reagan 
administration.
  Let me cite, first of all, the gulf war example. Saddam Hussein, as 
many in this Chamber will recall and, invaded Kuwait on August 1, 1990. 
We were running a deficit, I would point out, Mr. President, at that 
time of $221 billion, on August 1, 1990, putting us in gross violation 
requirements of the balanced budget amendment. There were only 2 months 
left in the fiscal year, no time to adjust spending or to raise taxes, 
I might point out. We were not certain ourselves how we were going to 
respond to that situation, but an invasion of Kuwait clearly had 
happened. Saddam Hussein was threatening not only Kuwait where he had 
invaded but Saudi Arabia, and clearly our security I think. By 
controlling Saudi Arabia, of course, he would have become a dominant 
force in the gulf, and the obvious implications of that for the United 
States and the West are clear.
  We had to deploy troops to protect our allies and our security, and 
the President did so. But we were not engaged in a conflict, and we had 
not gone through the lengthy process of making a declaration of war. It 
was merely a question of whether or not we were going to be able to 
place those troops immediately in the Middle East in anticipation 
because an imminent threat certainly occurred, but we were not engaged. 
It was not until January 16, 1991 that we began the air war. The 
initial deployment to defend Saudi Arabia, Desert Shield as it was 
called, was 100,000 troops. The eventual deployment to prepare to 
invade Kuwait was 500,000 troops. The total cost was $71 billion. The 
deficit, as I pointed out, was $221 billion.
  Our action, I would argue, could not have happened under a balanced 
budget amendment under section 5 because we were not engaged in 
military conflict. A resolution allowing military action to force out 
Hussein passed the Senate in January 52 to 47, after a lengthy debate 
about whether or not we ought to use military force immediately.
  My colleague from Utah certainly was here and remembers that debate. 
My colleagues on both sides of the aisle who supported the action in 
the gulf ought to remember this and remember what happened.
  If the balanced budget amendment had been in effect in 1990, a 
minority of Senators could have blocked those Senators who supported 
action and we would not have been able to have the waiver. I do not 
know what the implications would have been.
  In 20-20 hindsight, we say, look, it was clear. As things worked out, 
there was an imminent threat. There was a debate here, heated debate in 
the country about what our action should be. You can imagine in 
addition to the complicated questions of whether or not we ought to 
respond, we would have had to go through and waive constitutional 
amendment requirements. This would have been with all of the people in 
this country divided, as many were, over whether or not we ought to be 
involved in the Middle East, putting United States servicemen and women 
at risk. With all the questions, we then either would have had to go 
through a process of declaring war, which we have not done in 55 years, 
or go through a process of waiting for an actual engagement to occur. 
As section 5 says, engaged--not likely to be engaged, not might be 
engaged, not a threat of engagement. It says you must be engaged.
  So my amendment, as I pointed out earlier, which talks about the 
imminent threat, facing an imminent and serious military threat to 
national security, is a far better standard and test, it seems to me, 
in order for us to respond to those situations.

[[Page S1273]]

  Let me cite the example, if I can, of lend-lease. There is no one in 
this Chamber who was serving at the time. Our colleague from South 
Carolina, Senator Thurmond, of course, remembers this debate, I am 
sure, very vividly, as someone who served in World War II, I believe 
the only remaining colleague of ours who served in World War II.
  Britain was in a crisis. We were highly divided in this country in 
the late 1930's as to whether or not the United States ought to be 
involved. In fact, I think surveys at the time indicated most Americans 
were opposed to the United States being involved in a European 
conflict. We had in fact America First groups. Charles Lindbergh, I 
recall, was a leading proponent of the United States staying out of 
World War II. The conflict in Europe was raging. So we had a 
significant debate in this country over whether or not we ought to be 
involved.
  I do not know of anyone today who would argue that the leadership of 
Franklin Roosevelt, putting together the creative lend-lease program, 
providing the military assistance Britain needed in its great hour of 
crisis, did not make all the difference in the world. And but for the 
lend-lease program, the map of Europe might look substantially 
different, not to mention what might have occurred elsewhere had we not 
taken that action.
  We were not engaged in the conflict, under the standard asked to be 
met in this balanced budget amendment. You were not likely to get a 
declaration of war in 1939 given the divisions in the country. And yet 
we had a deficit. Now, it was not a huge deficit. It was, in March of 
that year, 1941, $4.9 billion. It sounds pretty small by today's 
standards, but as a percentage of the budget it was probably not 
substantially different than today. And even with someone with the 
prowess of Franklin Roosevelt, can you imagine if we had to go then 
through the waiver process in order to get the kind of resources 
necessary. I do not want to dwell on this particular instance but 
nonetheless I think the point is quite clear. We would have required a 
waiver. We were highly divided as a country. As it turned out, lend-
lease got a lot of support. In the vote that occurred, actually a 
majority, a substantial majority here supported lend-lease. But 
certainly those who are students of history recall the great division 
in the country on this issue complicating the problem, and the 
difficulty that Franklin Roosevelt would have had in responding to that 
situation.
  The Cuban missile crisis, in 1962. Again, we were not engaged. There 
was clearly a threat, in my view, to the security of the United States. 
We were not going to declare war at that particular point at all. The 
President had to respond to that situation. We had a deficit of $7.1 
billion in 1962. But under the standards as laid out in the balanced 
budget amendment, the proposed language in section 5, the buildup that 
President Kennedy initiated to respond to that would have required us 
to go through all these difficulties of requiring waivers. Or you would 
have had to have the courts decide if in fact it met the standard of an 
imminent and serious military threat.
  The invasion of Panama, again, another example. The deficit in 1989 
was $153 billion. The cost of the operation was $163 million. Clearly 
we would have had to go through this process as well.
  And the Reagan years of the buildup in defense. Again, you could 
argue--certainly everyone would have, I think--that there was an 
imminent danger of conflict with the Soviet Union. We were not going to 
declare war against them. We were not engaged in a military conflict 
against them. We had sizable deficits, and we increased defense 
spending between 1980 and 1988 from $134 billion to $290 billion. Of 
course, we were accumulating $1.5 trillion in debt at the same time. 
The amendment says: Declaration of war, engaged in a conflict. Many 
argue today the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union was a direct 
result of our buildup at that time; that it was the Soviets' inability 
to meet that buildup, although they tried, that caused the kind of 
economic collapse that resulted in the downfall of the Soviet Union. 
Yet, we would have gone through this process, and you can only imagine 
the debate--and there was a significant one, by the way, over whether 
or not we ought to support that buildup or not--you can imagine what 
would have been heard around these Chambers about the constitutional 
amendment to balance the budget and whether or not we ought to be doing 
this. It could have complicated that process seriously.

  I think you could have met the test in 1980 through 1988, of saying 
the Soviet Union posed an imminent and serious military threat to 
national security, and then had a joint resolution passed, as my 
amendment that I am offering today would have allowed us to do, that 
would have gotten you through the process. That is why I am offering 
the amendment. I am not just striking section 5, I am offering new 
language as an alternative.
  So the Reagan buildup, I think, is another good example of what could 
have occurred. I am not arguing for or against it, where people were on 
that issue, but just imagine the kind of debate that would have ensued.
  Let me also point up another argument here that I think deserves 
mention. One of the difficulties in preparing, of course, is you do not 
want to give your potential adversary any additional opportunities to 
take advantage of what is inherently a process that is slow in this 
country, our legislative form of government, our democracy. If a 
potential opponent knows that we have this balanced budget amendment, 
with section 5, that requires a declaration of war, that we have to be 
engaged, that we need waivers with a whole House voting, 218 House 
Members, 51 Senators, that is a pretty significant advantage to give. 
That is one more set of hurdles that we have to go over in order to 
respond.
  I do not think that is engaging in hyperbole, Mr. President. Why 
would we in any way try to make it more cumbersome for the Commander in 
Chief of this country--not necessarily this one, because this amendment 
will not go into effect until long after this President has left 
office, but some future Chief Executive of our Nation--to be able to 
respond to those situations? I am not saying they ought to be able to 
do it without any check by the Congress, but I think stating the 
country needs only to face an imminent threat and then get a joint 
resolution ought to be enough to get a waiver of this amendment. To 
insist upon a declaration of war or actual engagement seems to me to be 
setting far too high a standard when the national security interests of 
this country could be in jeopardy. Yet, that is exactly what we are 
doing with this amendment.
  So, for those reasons I hope my colleagues will look favorably upon 
this amendment, even if you are for the underlying amendment. I think 
this improves the underlying amendment. Some have suggested we should 
not have offered this amendment because, for those of us who have 
serious doubts about setting fiscal policy in the Constitution, the 
adoption of this amendment certainly takes away one of, I think, the 
most significant arguments against the balanced budget amendment. That 
is that we place the language of this amendment in a higher priority, 
in a higher standard, than the national security interests of the 
country.
  I see my colleague from Michigan is here. I have some more comments I 
would like to make in a few moments, but unless my colleague from Utah, 
who may want to be heard at this particular moment, so desires--I have 
just been informed, by the way, I made the mistake of saying ``Senator 
Thurmond,'' and I have quickly been informed by several offices, Mr. 
President, here--not the senior Senator from Utah, but Senator Bumpers, 
Senator Chafee, Senator Warner, Senator Inouye, Senator Akaka, and 
Senator Hollings, Glenn, Helms, Roth, and Stevens have been ringing up 
the phones here. I apologize to my colleagues. I thought they were much 
younger than that, and assumed they were. How am I doing here? Am I 
recovering from that faux pas?

  However you want to do this. I will yield the floor at this point, 
and, obviously, the Senator from Utah has priority.
  Mr. HATCH. I understand the distinguished Senator from Michigan would 
like to make his remarks. I have some remarks I would like to make 
immediately thereafter, so I ask unanimous consent I defer to him so he 
can make his remarks in support of the amendment of the distinguished 
Senator from

[[Page S1274]]

Connecticut, and then I would like to proceed immediately thereafter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. How much time does the Senator request?
  Mr. HATCH. I ask how much time the distinguished Senator from 
Michigan needs.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask for 8 minutes.
  Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous consent he be permitted to speak for 8 
minutes and then the floor return to me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair, and I thank my friend from Utah.
  Mr. President, I support the Dodd amendment because it would simplify 
the national security exception to the balanced budget amendment before 
us, and it would do so in a common-sense way that I would think both 
supporters and opponents of the balanced budget amendment should be 
able to support.
  As currently drafted, the balanced budget amendment before us would 
limit the national security exception to cases in which the United 
States is already ``engaged in military conflict.'' This language would 
seriously limit our defense options by precluding the use of the 
exception to prepare for imminent military conflict.
  The way the amendment before us is written, our troops must actually 
be engaged in battle in order for the exception to apply. The Dodd 
amendment addresses this problem by extending the waiver authority to 
any case in which the United States ``faces an imminent and serious 
military threat to national security, as declared by a joint resolution 
of Congress,'' even if we are not yet engaged in military conflict.
  Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry opposed the balanced budget 
amendment largely because, in his words, of ``the total lack of 
flexibility we would have in dealing with contingencies.''
  Here is what Secretary Perry said:
       Even if threats to America's global interests were 
     increasing or our forces deteriorating, the BBA could lead to 
     deep defense cuts. . . .
       The fact that these consequences could be avoided with 
     three-fifths approval of each house of Congress is no 
     safeguard. Preservation of an adequate defense posture would 
     become dependent on exceptional political efforts. . . . Even 
     when a three-fifths majority minus one in either house 
     believed that BBA cuts were unjustified, the minority view 
     would prevail. Not exactly ideal for the world's most 
     powerful democracy and best hope for future peace and 
     stability.

  This is not an academic issue--the security of our country could be 
at stake in a very real way. As former Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger testified at the same hearing, ``we would have had great 
difficult winning World War II'' without significant deficit spending 
in the years before we entered the conflict. Dr. Schlesinger explained 
as follows:

       You will recall that the turning point in the Pacific war 
     was the Battle of Midway. The ships, the carriers that won 
     the Battle of Midway were built as a result of deficit 
     spending during the latter part of the 1930's. It was the 
     consequence of legislation on naval construction under 
     conditions of severe deficit that were embodied in the 
     Vinson-Trammell legislation.
       At Midway the battle was won by the Yorktown, launched in 
     1937 after that legislation, the Enterprise, launched in 
     1938, and the Hornet in 1941. Those ships would not have been 
     available under strict interpretation of this amendment. Even 
     the battle of the Coral Sea might have been lost in the 
     Pacific war. . . . [A]lmost all of the capital ships of the 
     U.S. Navy had been laid down before the end of 1941, all of 
     our battleships and virtually all of our carriers, the Iowa 
     class, most of the Essex class, and the like.
       . . . I point this out because this Nation was not at war 
     until December 8, 1941, and the relief that was provided in 
     this amendment would not have been applicable until December 
     8, 1941.

  Mr. President, the appropriations bills that funded the construction 
of the ships that won the Second World War were all enacted at a time 
when we were running record peacetime deficits, and I say record 
deficits. The Senator from Connecticut made reference to some of these 
deficits, and they sound small by current standards, but by any kind of 
apples-and-apples comparison, they are very large.
  In 1939, the deficit was $2.8 billion, which was over 30 percent of 
our total outlays. The deficit now, as a percentage of our outlays, is 
something like 7 percent. But in 1939, the $2.8 billion deficit was a 
significant percentage of our outlays, over 30 percent.
  In 1940, the deficit was $2.9 billion, over 30 percent of our 
outlays. In 1941, the deficit was $4.9 billion, as the Senator from 
Connecticut said, and that was about 36 percent of our outlays. Our 
deficit now, as a percentage of outlays, is only about 7 percent. 
Plenty large, but still a lot less than it was in those years.
  So we would have been in a situation in those years where 60 percent, 
or three-fifths of the votes, would have been required in order to do 
deficit financing for those classes of ships which won those battles 
which won World War II. And that is why Dr. Schlesinger's comments 
about the outcome of World War II are so significant. These are real-
world battles which are determined by those votes.
  The Naval Act of 1938, which authorized construction of every 
category of warships--3 battleships, 2 carriers, 9 cruisers, 23 
destroyers and 9 submarines--passed the Senate on May 3, 1938, with 56 
votes. Now, that is two votes short of the three-fifths majority that 
would have been required by the balanced budget amendment, had it been 
in effect at that time.
  So the stakes involved in the Dodd amendment are very significant.
  I wonder if the Senator will yield me 2 additional minutes, if that 
will be all right with the Senator from Utah.
  Mr. DODD. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, those two votes, which determined whether 
we would build those ships, had a huge effect on the outcome of this 
war. There is no reason, if we are serious about protecting our 
national security, why we should require that we actually be engaged in 
a conflict. If a joint resolution of the Congress says that conflict is 
imminent, which it was in 1938 and 1939 and 1940, surely that ought to 
be enough to allow us to act by majority vote in order to save this 
country.
  Finally, as the Senator from Connecticut has pointed out, the same 
kind of issues could have been raised during the gulf war that were 
raised by Dr. Schlesinger relative to World War II.
  If I still have time left, I want to finish with one other point that 
the Dodd amendment corrects. How much time does this Senator have 
remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. One more minute.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  The Dodd amendment addresses a second problem with the text of the 
balanced budget amendment. The joint resolution, as currently drafted, 
requires that the United States be engaged in military conflict which 
``causes an imminent and serious military threat to national security 
and is so declared'' by Congress.
  That word ``and'' in the current language creates two requirements: 
First, that there be a declaration by Congress and, second, that there 
be an imminent and serious threat to national security. In other words, 
the word ``and,'' creates a second requirement--the actual existence of 
a threat--which opens this up to judicial review and creates a real 
problem which is corrected by the Dodd amendment.
  The last thing that we need at a time when our Nation faces an 
imminent and serious threat is to place in question the legitimacy of 
Federal spending to meet that threat. When our national security is at 
stake, we cannot afford to wait for the courts to give a stamp of 
approval to emergency spending programs. The Dodd amendment would 
address this problem by making it clear that a congressional 
declaration that an imminent and serious threat to the national 
security would alone be sufficient to trigger the exception.
  Mr. President, most of us hopefully want to bring the budget back 
into balance, but we must achieve that goal without undermining our 
ability to defend our vital national interests in the face of imminent 
threats or danger. Regardless whether we support the balanced budget 
amendment or oppose it, I would hope that we could all support the Dodd 
amendment and ensure that we have the flexibility we need to protect 
our national security where we face an imminent and serious threat.
  Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I did not realize the distinguished 
Senator from Connecticut had not finished his remarks. I will be happy 
to allow him to finish.

[[Page S1275]]

  Mr. DODD. No, go ahead.
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I will proceed then on our time. I have 
to oppose this amendment proposed by the Senator from Connecticut, and 
I hope all of my colleagues will do the same.
  Senator Dodd has offered an amendment to section 5 of the balanced 
budget amendment. I might add, section 5 is a very important part of 
Senate Joint Resolution 1, the balanced budget amendment. We realize 
that protecting the security of the Nation is the most important 
responsibility that we have. Indeed, it is the most important duty for 
any government. Thus, we have dealt with that problem in section 5 of 
the balanced budget amendment. In that provision, we allow the 
requirements of this amendment to be waived in two circumstances. One 
is ``any year in which a declaration of war is in effect.'' The other 
is when the Nation is ``engaged in a military conflict which causes an 
imminent and serious military threat to national security and is so 
declared by a joint resolution adopted by a majority of the whole 
number of each House, which becomes law.''
  Those are two very important protections. They protect us from all 
that the distinguished Senator has been talking about, and, frankly, 
his amendment, I think, gums this up pretty badly.
  The balanced budget amendment, therefore, deals with the two 
situations in the modern era in which the Nation faces a challenge to 
its ability to survive, situations in which there is a declared war 
between this Nation and another country and situations in which there 
is a military conflict that is unaccompanied by a declaration of war, 
but that nonetheless causes an imminent and serious military threat to 
national security.
  In those circumstances the authors of the balanced budget amendment 
believe that the Nation may need greater flexibility than the amendment 
otherwise allows. At the same time, the carefully balanced text of that 
provision makes sure that the circumstances in which such a waiver can 
be more easily accomplished are limited only to those situations in 
which such a waiver is necessary.
  I have the greatest respect for my colleague from Connecticut, 
Senator Dodd. We are very close friends, but his amendment would upset 
the balance that we have achieved in section 5.
  Senator Dodd's amendment would permit a waiver of the balanced budget 
amendment whenever we face a serious military threat by a simple joint 
resolution, but he explicitly removes the requirement that the 
resolution become law. That is troublesome in this context. Ordinarily, 
being silent about such a matter would be of no consequence. After all, 
any Member of this Chamber, like any Member of the House of 
Representatives, can introduce a joint resolution or can submit a 
resolution on this matter. The real work comes in getting a bill or a 
resolution passed. But here, by removing the requirement from section 5 
of the BBA, [the balanced budget amendment], that the joint resolution 
``become law,'' Senator Dodd's amendment could be read by an activist 
court as eliminating the requirement that the resolution actually 
become law.
  Thus, in order to waive the balanced budget amendment under the Dodd 
amendment, the President would not have to sign the resolution, would 
not have to put himself on the line, or herself on the line, and 
neither House of Congress would have to pass or even vote on the 
resolution. No committee would have to mark up the resolution. No 
hearings need be held. Apparently, all that it would require is that 
any Member of either body merely introduce a joint resolution declaring 
that the United States faces a serious military threat.
  That sole action would apparently suffice to waive the balanced 
budget rule for the entire fiscal year under the Dodd amendment. 
Clearly, that would be a bizarre state of affairs. I would be much more 
impressed with this amendment if it was sponsored by those who 
literally have been long-time supporters of a balanced budget 
amendment. Literally, this is an amendment that looks as though it is 
making every attempt to gut the balanced budget amendment.
  Madam President, both the balanced budget amendment waiver for 
national security and the Dodd amendment use the threshold phrase of 
``an imminent and serious military threat to national security'' as 
being a situation in which the balanced budget amendment requirements 
could be waived. Even though both the balanced budget amendment and the 
Dodd amendment used that phrase, there are two critical differences 
between the two.
  The first critical difference is the following: Unlike the Dodd 
amendment, this amendment that is currently pending, the balanced 
budget amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 1, that we want to pass, also 
requires that the United States actually be ``engaged in military 
conflict'' in order to waive the balanced budget rule by less than a 
three-fifths vote. By contrast, the Dodd amendment does not require 
that this Nation be engaged in such military conflict. In fact, the 
Dodd amendment would delete the term ``military conflict'' from the 
final balanced budget amendment.

  That alone is a significant difference between Senate Joint 
Resolution 1 and the amendment offered by our distinguished Senator 
from Connecticut. I understand what a military conflict is. It involves 
shooting, combat, or the like. By contrast, the term ``threat'' is far 
more expansive and far more pliable. That term embraces a broad range 
of situations that could fall far short of the type of circumstance in 
which section 5 of Senate Joint Resolution 1 as presently written would 
allow the balanced budget amendment's requirements to be waived.
  It is easy to imagine various events that could occur that would 
trigger the waiver provisions of the permissive Dodd amendment. For 
example, last year China fired several missiles in the vicinity of 
Taiwan, a valuable friend of the United States, as is China. That could 
have triggered the provisions of the Dodd amendment if somebody merely 
filed a resolution, pursuant to the Dodd amendment. The United States 
also has been witness to oil embargoes which also could trigger the 
Dodd amendment in the future. These events and others--you can go down 
a long list--would have allowed the Congress to easily waive the 
requirements of the balanced budget amendment if the Dodd amendment 
became part of the final, passed balanced budget amendment.
  Indeed, ever since the advent and proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
it could be cogently argued that the United States has ``faced an 
imminent and serious military threat to national security.'' You can 
argue that every year in a sense. And that threat would be presented 
not just by the republics of the former Soviet Union or by China, which 
are nuclear powers, but also by other countries that may be on the cusp 
of developing nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, 
and so forth, by terrorist nations, to say nothing of any other weapons 
that may come along. So anyone who sought refuge or seeks refuge from 
the tough choices necessary to balance the budget could invoke this 
threat and waive the balanced budget rule. So it would never be 
effective, that is, if the Dodd amendment is adopted. That is just as 
clear as the amendment.
  The second difference between the balanced budget amendment, Senate 
Joint Resolution 1, the amendment we are trying to pass as written, and 
the Dodd amendment is closely related to the first. The balanced budget 
amendment requires that the military conflict cause the imminent and 
serious military threat to national security. That would be the only 
circumstance under which the balanced budget amendment's requirements 
could be waived. The existence of a military conflict, therefore, is 
not sufficient by itself to allow Congress to escape the requirements 
of the balanced budget amendment. No. That military conflict also must 
have a particular effect; namely an imminent and serious military 
threat to national security.
  These two requirements in Senate Joint Resolution 1, Madam President, 
which the distinguished Senator from Connecticut would like to amend 
with this permissive language, are two important requirements. As much 
as we pray that these events do not occur, we must face the reality 
that there may be times when our Nation is at war. We also must face 
the reality that there may be times when our Nation is embroiled in a 
military conflict imminently threatening national security

[[Page S1276]]

but unaccompanied by a formal declaration of war, such as occurred 
during the gulf war. When either such event occurs, the Nation and the 
Congress may need greater flexibility than the balanced budget 
amendment would allow. I am sure we all agree that protecting the 
survival and safety of our Nation is our most pressing responsibility.
  Senator Dodd's proposal does not serve these goals. His amendment is 
not designed to allow the military to deal with threats to national 
security that do not rise to the level already discussed by me. Nor is 
his amendment limited to permitting the military to increase spending 
to respond to such a threat. No. His amendment would waive all the 
requirements of the balanced budget amendment even though Congress has 
not declared war and even though the President has not committed our 
Armed Forces to a military conflict. His amendment provides an escape 
hatch for all other--for all other--situations.

  In short, Madam President, the Dodd amendment is a gigantic loophole. 
Its effect is to weaken and confuse the standard by which the balanced 
budget amendment may be waived and thus weakens the balanced budget 
amendment itself. In this age, it is well established that nations with 
greater economic power stand a much better chance of prevailing in 
sustained military conflicts. There is nothing that would be better for 
our economic strength than to pass Senate Joint Resolution 1, the 
balanced budget amendment.
  If we pass this loophole offered by the Senator from Connecticut, it 
will be abused and thus allow our debt to continue to increase. In 
years when we should be in balance, the debt will continue to pile up. 
Our children will be saddled with even more debt, and we will be 
woefully unprepared as a nation if it is ever necessary to defend our 
liberty in the future.
  By the terms of the President's proposed budget, we would spend 
nearly as much on net interest in the debt next year as we will on the 
defense needs of our Nation--just to pay the interest on the debt. That 
makes the need for the balanced budget amendment about as clear as it 
can be.
  If we continue to allow this debt to skyrocket, if we put loopholes 
such as this into the balanced budget amendment, if we do not stop this 
fiscal insanity that currently pervades our Nation, we will simply not 
have the economic strength to stand on our own militarily or to protect 
our interests in times of threat. There is nothing better for our 
Nation's defense than to adopt Senate Joint Resolution 1, the balanced 
budget amendment, and be certain that we will have the economics 
necessary to keep our military the best equipped, best trained force in 
the world.
  Indeed, the Dodd amendment could be abused in a way that hurts our 
military preparedness. Congress could purposely underfund the military 
at the beginning of the fiscal year to use the extra funds for other 
programs.
  In fact, I suspect that is what is really deep down behind this. If 
we can waive the balanced budget for almost any reason that we call a 
threat to our national security, without the constraints that we have 
written in section 5, which is what the Dodd amendment would do, then 
those who want that to happen and want that loophole so that we can 
waive it any time we want to under almost any circumstances could spend 
more on liberal spending programs rather than really doing for the 
military what needs to be done.
  Our amendment requires them to do what is right for the national 
security interests of this country, if this matter is going to be 
waived. It requires the President and the Congress to take some 
responsibility in that matter, and it does not just waive all these 
obligations that we think have to be there.
  But under the Dodd amendment, they could underfund the military, 
knowing that during the course of the year they could take any 
international conflict and use it as a justification to waive the 
balanced budget amendment.
  In effect, if we pass this amendment by the Senator from Connecticut, 
those who support it would generate their own crisis by having 
purposefully underfunded the military. I mean, if we in fact abuse the 
way the balanced budget amendment would be used, that is what it would 
amount to under the Dodd amendment.
  Madam President, this sort of gaming of the system shows that the 
Dodd amendment is a risky gimmick that will endanger both our military 
readiness and our economic strength.
  I might add that the amendment that will come later on Social 
Security is even a more risky gimmick that will endanger Social 
Security for all of our senior citizens because they would take it off 
the budget so that it does not have to be dealt with not just in times 
of surplus, but in times of tremendous default and in times when there 
are not enough moneys there to run it. We have to keep it on budget to 
keep the pressure on everybody to do what is right to keep Social 
Security going for our seniors.
  Let me just take a few moments and elaborate on the military 
readiness issues.
  The Dodd amendment is too vague. It merely acknowledges the status 
quo--that there exists national security threats that are routinely 
handled by the readiness components of our defense budget. Its adoption 
could actually undermine our ability to provide a responsive surge to 
escalating threats to our vital interests.
  The amendment of the Senator from Connecticut does not acknowledge 
the differences of national security interests, nor does it tell us 
what is at stake. It is too broad, and by consequence so vague as to 
allow exceptions to the balanced budget amendment based on the status 
quo, day-to-day operation of our defense policy.
  To quote from former Secretary of Defense William Perry:

       Vital U.S. interests can be at risk when the United States 
     or an ally is threatened by conventional military force, 
     economic force, by economic strangulation, or weapons of mass 
     destruction. These threats to vital interests are most likely 
     to arise in a regional conflict and, by definition, may 
     require military intervention.

  Madam President, as you can see, the Dodd amendment would allow the 
waiver of the balanced budget amendment at almost any time in our 
country's history where there is any kind of military threat that fits 
within the broad language that the then Secretary of Defense, in 
contrast, as seen from the statement, says that vital interests can be 
placed at risk by threat. And he continues, such threats by our vital 
interests ``may require military intervention.''
  Senate Joint Resolution 1 complies with current defense thinking. It 
says that when the President takes a step beyond the normal acts of 
protecting national security interests and places our forces in harm's 
way, then should Congress, and only then should Congress, consider by 
majority vote suspending the balanced budget amendment restraints on 
defense spending.
  My next objection is that military spending is not and was never 
intended to be the only way to meet national security threats. In fewer 
words, still, Madam President, the amendment does not acknowledge 
either the multiple military and nonmilitary strategies that meet our 
national security requirements, nor does it appear to realize that we 
employ a military strategy only when diplomatic and other foreign 
policy remedies fail.
  Finally, the Dodd amendment contradicts and challenges some basic 
readiness, budgeting and programming concepts that both the President 
and the Congress support. The Secretary of Defense says, ``The number 
one priority of the Defense Department is maintaining the readiness and 
sustainability of U.S. forces.''
  The concerns of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut are 
adequately covered by the program-budget process. This is explained by 
the Secretary of Defense as follows:

       The U.S. national military strategy outlines a broad 
     spectrum of commitments, specifically that U.S. forces must 
     be prepared to fight and win the nation's wars, deter 
     aggression and prevent conflict, and conduct peacetime 
     engagement.

  The same report goes on to say that ``U.S. forces are ready to meet 
these missions.''
  Now, Madam President, the day-to-day national security risks that the 
Dodd amendment worries about are, as we can see, already inventoried 
and covered in our defense budget.
  Let me return to another statement of the former Secretary of 
Defense, William Perry:


[[Page S1277]]


       [The] challenge is to make sure the Department of Defense 
     has the right resources allocated to the right purposes in 
     support of readiness.

  Here, the Secretary emphasizes the need for the types of priority-
making that the amendment before us would eviscerate since, again, 
everything under the DOD amendment becomes a priority.
  But, to balance this debate, let me turn to Secretary Perry, who 
wisely cautioned:

       Even with a solid foundation of readiness funds in the DOD 
     budget, the costs of unbudgeted contingency operations can 
     reduce resources to carry out training, maintenance, and 
     other readiness-related activities.

  We share with Secretary Perry the need to stress readiness and the 
corresponding need to be able to respond to exceptional or contingency 
threats.

  In summary, Madam President, the balanced budget amendment as drafted 
offers a level of support to current defense planning that strengthens 
our defense policy. In stark contrast, the amendment of my friend from 
Connecticut would place our national security interests at a level of 
great risk by undermining the sound budget formulation, priority-
making, and management practices that Congress and the President have 
worked out over the past decade.
  Now, I do not think I need to say anything more about the Dodd 
amendment. I hope that all my colleagues will vote it down because this 
amendment would just be another way of eviscerating or doing away with 
the effectiveness of Senate Joint Resolution 1, once passed by us and 
ratified by three-quarters of the States. We have adequately protected 
our national security interests the way article 5 is written, and we do 
it in a way that does not allow phony loopholes so the people can spend 
more on liberal projects. I guarantee you, if we adopt the Dodd 
amendment that will cause the amendment to be waived over for almost 
any reason. And all the moneys raised will probably not be for the 
military over the year the amendment is thrown out. Those moneys will 
be spent on liberal social programs, precisely what we want to 
emphasize. If we do waive the balanced budget amendment and we provide 
a means to do that during serious crises, if we do waive it then, we 
have to stand up and vote to do so and we do it because we have to 
bolster our military, and it can be done only under very rare 
circumstances where it really needs to be done. Under the Dodd 
amendment, it can be done under almost any circumstance, almost any 
time anybody files a resolution to do so. That would just plain do away 
with the effects of the balanced budget amendment.
  I think that is enough for me to say about the Dodd amendment. I take 
a few minutes now, because I think it is important to do so, to pay 
respect to my dear colleague and friend who spoke earlier on the floor, 
the distinguished Senator from West Virginia.
  Everybody knows the esteem that all of us have for the distinguished 
Senator from West Virginia. The Senate means as much to him as anybody 
who has ever sat in the Senate. This country means a great deal to him. 
He feels very deeply about his positions, and he argues them forcibly 
and eloquently. I really do, indeed, after having thought for quite a 
while about what he said this morning and early afternoon--he spoke for 
about an hour and 40 minutes, as I recall--I thought I should at least 
speak a little bit about that here today if I can.
  The balanced budget amendment is appropriate in its subject matter 
and approach to be included in the Constitution. It establishes a 
process-based control on the part of the Federal Government's spending 
abilities, specifically, on its ability to borrow. Inasmuch as 
borrowing affects all future Americans, our children and grandchildren, 
it is appropriate to place rules on the Federal Government to protect 
those Americans who will be affected but are not now represented in 
this political process.
  Now, Madam President, I call myself a student of the Constitution, 
and I do not undertake to amend it lightly. However, our history 
clearly shows the need for a balanced budget constitutional amendment 
if we are ever going to balance the budget. Although the text of Senate 
Joint Resolution 1 is modest in length, it is very significant. Its 
language has been worked out by Members of both parties over many, many 
years of fine tuning, and that language has now reached the point where 
it is a bipartisan, bicameral approach.
  Since constitutional amendments are of such importance, I will take a 
few minutes to walk through the provisions of the balanced budget 
amendment and discuss how they will cure us of our addiction to debt. 
Since the distinguished Senator from West Virginia did walk through 
these, I would like to maybe do the same. I will have more to say on 
this later.
  Mr. DODD. Will the Senator yield, to respond to a couple of issues 
raised by the pending amendment?
  Mr. HATCH. Yes, I yield if I do not lose my right to the floor.
  Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague for that. I want to respond to a 
couple of provisions. The amendment we have before us, the amendment 
that I offered here, requires that we face an imminent and serious 
military threat to national security as declared by joint resolution. I 
was informed ``as declared by joint resolution'' does not mean someone 
really introducing a resolution, but that a joint resolution would have 
to pass both Houses. But I am fully prepared to offer an amendment. It 
would take unanimous consent to clarify any ambiguity about my 
intention here. This is not a declaration by an individual Member, but 
a decision by both Houses that an imminent and dangerous situation 
exists. I will modify my amendment so as to remove any question of my 
intention here and what the legislative office, in drafting this, 
informed this Senator that the language ``declared by joint 
resolution'' certainly means. If there is any doubt in anybody's mind, 
I'll do that. The last thing I want to do is have any one Senator able 
to offer a resolution that would trigger a waiver of the balanced 
budget amendment.

  Second, I think it is important because the Secretary's name has been 
raised by my friend from Utah on numerous occasions. Allow me, for the 
benefit of my colleagues, to read from prepared testimony from the 
Secretary of Defense:

       We are here today not to give you a comprehensive 
     discussion of the balanced budget amendment, but rather to 
     discuss specifically one very important aspect, which is the 
     effect it would have [the balanced budget amendment] on our 
     national security and particularly the effect it would have 
     on our defense programs. Almost any reasonable assumption of 
     how the balanced budget amendment would be implemented in 
     spinning budgets and in specific programs would affect the 
     defense programs in a fundamental way and I believe would 
     fundamentally undermine the security of the Nation.

  Let me emphasize that and repeat it:

       . . . I believe it would fundamentally undermine the 
     security of the Nation. In addition to that, the balanced 
     budget amendment would threaten frequent interruptions of 
     many long-term processes that are essential to maintaining a 
     prudent defense posture.

  The statement goes on longer, but those particular words certainly 
don't leave any doubt as to where the Secretary of Defense stands on 
this issue.
  Third--and then I will allow my colleague from Utah to pick up where 
he wanted to--I urge my colleagues to read the report language in 
section 5 of the Judiciary Committee on this amendment, as it gives an 
explanation of what section 5 means. On page 22, Madam President, I am 
quoting, and it is dated February 3, 1997:

       This section, as amended, guarantees that Congress will 
     retain maximum flexibility in responding to clear national 
     security crises, such as in declared war or imminent military 
     threat to national security.

  Now, if that is what it did, I would not offer this amendment. But it 
does not. It should take into consideration the declaration of war or 
imminent military threat to national security. But that is not what the 
amendment says. The amendment says in section 5, which is before us:

       . . . the United States is engaged in military conflict, 
     which causes an imminent and serious military threat to 
     national security.

  It is the ``engaged'' part that I have such difficulty with here, 
because if it just said ``imminent military threat to national 
security,'' then you could say, fine, I understand that. We have a 
threat out there; we are not engaged yet, but we have a threat. So we 
ought to be able to pass a joint resolution here that declares that 
threat to exist, and the waiver then would apply. But

[[Page S1278]]

this is not flexible. My colleagues ought to understand that. It is not 
flexible. You must have a declaration of war and/or this Nation must be 
engaged in military conflict, and it requires all 218 House Members and 
all 51 Senators--not 49 to 48, but 51--to then waive the provisions.
  I think that is so restrictive. As important as my colleagues believe 
this amendment is in dealing with the fiscal matters of this country--
and I am not here to argue that point today, Madam President, because 
that is an ongoing debate. I accept the sincerity of those who propose 
this amendment. But I hope no one would suggest that, as important as 
the fiscal matters of this country are, we would make it so restrictive 
for the Nation to respond to a military crisis that we would require a 
declaration of war or actual engagement in a conflict before we could 
decide to waive these provisions in order to respond to them. I think 
that is threatening.

  This is a dangerous section, as written, regardless of how one feels 
about the constitutional amendment. This is dangerous. This is clearly 
dangerous. I ask my colleagues--this is not report language now. We are 
talking about the actual words included in the organic law of our 
country, the organic law. Every word, every letter is important. It is 
not insignificant. These are not casual words. To require a declaration 
of war or to be actually engaged in military conflict before you can 
waive the provisions of this constitutional amendment, I think, is 
dangerous indeed. I am offering an amendment which does not strike it 
altogether but which says ``faces an imminent and serious military 
threat to national security as declared by a joint resolution.'' That 
way, if there is an imminent threat to our national security, a 
majority of us here and in the other body can pass a resolution that 
declares that to be the case, and then we ought to be able to waive the 
provisions and respond to them.
  My colleagues know as many examples as I do where we have not met the 
threshold of a declaration of war or been engaged in a military 
conflict. Examples where we, the overwhelming majority, I suspect, 
would have assumed there was enough of an imminent threat out there 
that we should have responded. We also see a highly divisive country 
when we see that. I do not offer this lightly, as others have 
suggested, as somehow a back-door approach for liberal spending 
programs. This goes right to the heart of our Nation's response to a 
crisis and whether or not we elevate the importance of fiscal prudence 
here to such a status that it exceeds the ability of the Nation to 
respond under its primary, essential function, and that is to protect 
the security of our Nation.
  I suggest, Madam President--in fact, I will read this. On page 22, 
the last section--they define, by the way, in these sections what each 
word means. The bottom of page 22 of the report.

       . . . is engaged in military conflict.

  Here is how the report defines those words:

       ``. . . is engaged in military conflict,'' is intended to 
     limit the applicability of this waiver to situations 
     involving the actual use of military force which nonetheless 
     do not rise to the level of a formal declaration of war.

  This isn't my language. This is the report language. I am not 
interpreting this language. It must involve the actual use of military 
force before they meet the threshold of imminent danger.
  There are just hundreds of cases where something that does not 
involve actual use of force can meet the threshold of imminent danger. 
Yet, the authors of the section, very clearly --and you can imagine a 
Federal court, some day in the next century, reading this language as 
to what the words mean, and it doesn't say likely use of force or maybe 
a use of force, but actual use of force. We have the awkward situation, 
to put it mildly, of this Nation responding to its primary function--
that is, to protect its citizenry when placed under threat.
  Again, I will offer at the appropriate moment--I don't know why I 
need to, but if certain people think I have drafted this in a way to 
suggest that any one Member can offer a resolution and that is going to 
trigger a waiver--again, I submitted my language to the legislative 
offices here to prepare this, and they tell me that the ``declared by a 
joint resolution'' meets that standard of what the intent is here--
clearly, not just any one Member offering a resolution, but obviously 
both Houses passing it. I haven't gotten to the language in the 
amendment about the whole House, in terms of having 51 people. We have 
seen situations where Members don't get back, for whatever reason, 
where some crisis faces the Nation and Members can't get here. What a 
ridiculous situation to place this body in. I know we're not living in 
the horse-and-buggy age here, when Members couldn't get here and where 
they sat around and waited for enough Members to arrive which would 
allow a majority of both Houses to respond. But we sat here and 
determined that somehow meets purity, and insisted upon the whole of 
both Houses, and then, of course, I believe we excluded the Vice 
President from casting a vote in a tie. You have to have 51 votes of 
the Members, and the Vice President while the Presiding Officer is not 
a Member of this body. And I think that is a shortcoming as well. It is 
minor compared to the actual language here that requires a declaration 
of war, or as the report language defines is engaged in military 
conflict, it must involve the actual use of military force. I think 
that standard is way too high for us to be able to waive the provisions 
of this balanced budget amendment to respond to a security crisis in 
this country.

  You can vote for my amendment, and you can be for the balanced budget 
amendment. It does not threaten the underlying purpose of a balanced 
budget amendment. I believe it is a lot wiser to be cautious on all 
issues of national security. This is not some secondary or collateral 
issue. This is the primary function of any government. The primary 
function is to protect the security of the people. We have set a 
standard here that I think places that primary responsibility in some 
jeopardy.
  So for those reasons, I urge my colleagues to accept this amendment. 
And I will be glad to yield the floor at this point. I will raise a 
couple of additional issues in a few minutes. But let me yield the 
floor.
  Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, of course the underlying amendment of the 
Senator from Connecticut threatens the very purpose of the balanced 
budget amendment. Even if he does make this small change of adding 
language that makes the resolution became law, this certainly would 
improve his amendment. That is a small matter. The reason he would have 
to do that, if his intention is that the resolution be passed by both 
bodies and signed by the President, is because he has deleted 
specifically our requirement that any resolution become law, meaning it 
passes both Houses and it is signed by the President.
  So there is no other way the court would construe it other than the 
way I have suggested it. But that is a small matter because Senator 
Dodd's new amendment, assuming that he modifies his current amendment, 
clarifies his intent in one regard. He would make it clear that a joint 
resolution must become law. That would be an improvement.
  But my other criticisms remain. There would be too many instances in 
which Senate Joint Resolution 1's requirements could be waived. Today, 
any action by a foreign nation can pose an imminent and serious 
military threat to our Nation. Under Senator Dodd's amendment, any such 
action would allow Congress to engage in increased social spending, and 
waive this balanced budget amendment.
  To me that is ridiculous. It isn't a protection. It is just another 
way to continue business as usual. I frankly am not for that, and I do 
not think most others will be either.
  Look closely at the Dodd amendment that allows all spending to 
increase--not just military spending. The ostensible purpose is to 
protect us militarily and our national security. But it waives the 
budget for all spending. It makes one wonder why. And it allows 
virtually any action by any country--certainly countries like Russia or 
China--to justify increased social spending.
  I have to admit that my colleagues are ingenious at wanting to keep 
the status quo going, and that is their

[[Page S1279]]

right to unbalance the budget and spend and spend and spend so they can 
go home and claim, ``Look at what we are doing for you.'' They are 
putting us into bankruptcy. And all of us are doing it, both parties, 
without any restraint. Now they want to remove this restraint. To be 
honest with you, I think basically what people want to do is just keep 
business as usual.
  Secretary Perry in accepting the Dodd amendment would admit that the 
readiness principles are wrong that he articulated. For example, he 
would be saying that current threats are not covered. The Dodd 
amendment has no plan for a contingency. National security is always a 
justifiable budget buster regardless of the crisis of the moment.
  Let us just read the language that the Senator would change. The way 
the original amendment, the underlying amendment, Senate Joint 
Resolution 1 reads, section 5 says, ``Congress may waive the provisions 
of this article for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in 
effect.'' That is the same. ``The provisions of this article may be 
waived for any fiscal year in which the United States is engaged in 
military conflict which causes an imminent and serious military threat 
to national security and is so declared by a joint resolution adopted 
by a majority of the whole number of each House which becomes law.'' 
That is what the current amendment says. That is a tremendous 
protection. Declaration of war or waiver by a joint resolution passed 
by the whole number, a majority of the whole number of both Houses, 
meaning a constitutional majority, which becomes law and signed by the 
President. Under those circumstances this balanced budget amendment can 
be waived.
  There are those who are strong supporters of the balanced budget 
amendment which didn't want this language in here. Senator Heflin and a 
number of us worked this out so that both sides would feel that they 
are adequately taken care of. But it is no secret. There are a lot of 
people who do not want this section at all because they believe that a 
patriotic group of Senators and Congresspeople would naturally waive 
the balanced budget amendment by a higher vote, by the three-fifths 
vote necessary to do it to put us into more debt to pay for it. But we 
have made it a much lesser standard. It will be a constitutional 
majority required by both Houses.
  Look at the way the distinguished Senator from Connecticut would have 
this read. ``The Congress may waive the provisions of this article for 
any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in effect.'' ``The 
provisions of this article may be waived for any fiscal year in which 
the United States is engaged in military conflict which causes'' but in 
which the United States ``faces an imminent and serious military threat 
to national security.'' And then he strikes ``and is so,'' and then 
just says ``as declared by a joint resolution,'' period. I imagine he 
is willing to modify his amendment and add ``which becomes law.'' The 
``which becomes law'' would make this amendment a little bit better. 
But, frankly, it doesn't solve the problem of the easy ability anybody 
would have for anything that can be called ``facing an imminent and 
serious military threat to our national security'' which can include 
almost anything. That would be the easiest way to waive this amendment 
at any time any social spending becomes the desire of the people and 
the Congress. And, by the way, that is what is causing our problems for 
28 straight years now--social spending.
  I am so afraid I am going to knock these over sometime and squash 
somebody, and they would squash somebody. It would probably break 
somebody's leg. I have been told by a number of Senators that we are 
violating OSHA. Too bad OSHA doesn't have control over this separated 
power. But there is no other way to show to the American people just 
how really bad it is--28 straight years of unbalanced budgets. And now 
we are going to put changes in this amendment that would allow us to go 
to 29, 30, right up to 68 years, or more. We will never get it under 
control, if we have amendments like this. So we have to stand up and do 
what is right.
  Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield for a question or so?
  Mr. HATCH. Yes.
  Mr. DODD. First of all, I raised the issue about the Vice President 
because it is unclear.
  Mr. HATCH. The Vice President would not have a right to vote here, 
but he doesn't have a right to vote for this amendment either.

  Mr. DODD. Let me ask my question. Under section 5, as drafted in the 
proposed constitutional amendment, then the vote by the whole of both 
Houses would exclude the vote by the Vice President. Is that correct?
  Mr. HATCH. That is correct, just like a vote for this constitutional 
amendment excludes the Vice President, and countless other votes 
exclude the Vice President.
  Mr. DODD. We are talking about a waiver issue here.
  Mr. HATCH. In any event, he would be excluded.
  Mr. DODD. Is there any other situation which my colleague from Utah 
can cite in which we have excluded the vote of the Vice President in a 
tie vote?
  Mr. HATCH. Every constitutional amendment that has ever been passed.
  Mr. DODD. I am talking about a matter that would come before this 
body.
  Mr. HATCH. Sure. On cloture votes; all cloture votes. You will have 
to have 60 votes.
  Mr. DODD. That is a procedural vote.
  Mr. HATCH. Procedural or not, that is what this vote would be.
  Mr. DODD. To waive.
  Mr. HATCH. Sure. That would be both procedural and substantive. 
Cloture votes are substantive and procedural.
  Mr. DODD. A cloture vote is not a tie vote. There you have to have a 
number of votes.
  Mr. HATCH. Neither would they be. In other words, what we are doing--
--
  Mr. DODD. You don't get cloture 50-50.
  Mr. HATCH. No, you get cloture at 60----
  Mr. DODD. Right. On matters that require a simple majority, will my 
colleague cite a single example where a simple majority is required in 
this body where the vote of the Vice President would be excluded?
  Mr. HATCH. Yes. Every vote where it is not 50-50.
  Mr. DODD. I am saying where the vote is 50-50.
  Mr. HATCH. Well, where the vote is 50-50, where that is required, 
yes, but we are talking about a constitutional amendment.
  Mr. DODD. I am not talking about the amendment. I am talking about a 
provision----
  Mr. HATCH. Let me finish.
  Mr. DODD. That requires that this body act, and that is the provision 
of the constitutional amendment, requires that the whole House of both 
Chambers vote.
  Mr. HATCH. That is right.
  Mr. DODD. And it requires 51.
  Mr. HATCH. Right.
  Mr. DODD. My question is, can my colleague from Utah cite a single 
example where a supermajority is not required, where there is a 50-50 
tie, that the vote of the Vice President would be excluded in that 
situation?
  Mr. HATCH. Yes. In every vote in the House of Representatives.
  Mr. DODD. No, in the Senate.
  Mr. HATCH. Let me finish. I cannot cite a single example in the 
Senate, but that is irrelevant. The fact is the reason we are writing 
the constitutional amendment is to provide a means whereby you have to 
have a constitutional majority, without worrying about the Vice 
President, who is not a Member of this body other than to preside, if 
he wants to, and break majority vote ties. We are saying that we need a 
constitutional majority of at least 51 Senators to resolve this 
problem, and at least 218 Members of the House. And since it is a 
constitutional amendment, we would be changing the current method of 
budgeting to require higher majority votes in order to waive the 
balanced budget amendment requirements. That is what we are doing.
  Mr. DODD. Let me ask my colleague a couple other questions.
  Mr. HATCH. Sure.
  Mr. DODD. Under the language of this amendment, would the decision to 
send 100,000 troops to the gulf----
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DODD. Certainly.
  Mr. HATCH. Because I do think I just need to make a couple more 
comments on the Vice President.
  Mr. DODD. I am sorry.
  Mr. HATCH. Just to make the record. The question does arise, as the 
Senator

[[Page S1280]]

phrased, as to how Senate Joint Resolution 1 affects the obligations of 
the Vice President, as President of the Senate, to vote in case of a 
tie vote in the Senate. The answer is that a balanced budget amendment 
does not change the Constitution's basic reliance on simple majority 
votes or the Vice President's role in casting a vote in those cases 
where Senators are equally divided.
  Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides that ``The Vice 
President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but 
shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.''
  By the plain meaning of this provision, the Vice President is not a 
member of the Senate. He is merely the Presiding Officer, the President 
of the Senate, a neutral empire, and thus cannot vote or take part in 
the deliberations of the Senate. And even though our current Vice 
President is a former member of the Senate, he is no longer a member of 
the Senate. He is a member of the executive branch. But he does have 
that function.
  The only exception to this is where there exists a tie vote. In that 
case to ``secure at all times the possibility of a definitive 
resolution of the body, it is necessary that the Vice President should 
have only a casting vote.''
  That was taken from Federalist Paper No. 68 written by Hamilton.
  But the situation where the Vice President can break a tie vote only 
applies to a simple majority vote, the run-of-the-mill ordinary vote of 
the Senate. It very seldom happens but it can happen under those 
circumstances. Where the Constitution, however, provides for a 
supermajority vote, in situations where the Framers of the Constitution 
feared the passions of the majority rule would retard reasoned 
deliberation, there really is no occasion for a tie vote, and therefore 
the Vice President may not vote.
  These include the two-thirds requirement of each House to override a 
veto. When the President formally rejects legislation passed by both 
Houses of Congress, the drafters of the Constitution contemplated the 
simple democratic majoritarian rule does not serve the best interests 
of this country. A constitutional majority will not even do in that 
instance. Congress may override the President's veto only by a 
supermajority vote.
  The two-thirds vote requirement of the Senate to give its advice and 
consent to treaties and the two-thirds vote requirement of the Senate 
to convict on impeachment are other examples where the Vice President 
has absolutely no vote whatsoever.
  I add the votes on cloture. You are going to have at least 60 votes 
in order to invoke cloture. You could go on I think.
  In each of these cases the Vice President has no role in casting a 
deciding vote.
  The balanced budget amendment supermajority provisions, whether the 
three-fifths number of the whole number of each House of Congress--that 
section 1 waiver to allow outlays to exceed receipts; section 2 waiver 
to increase the limit on the debt, or the constitutional majority 
provisions--a majority of the whole number of each House--section 4 
requirement to raise revenue, section 5 requirement to waive amendment 
when the United States is involved in military action that is a threat 
to national security--would work the same way as the Constitution's 
other supermajority provisions.
  Because these supermajority provisions require a majority vote of the 
whole number of each House of Congress, and it is clear that the Vice 
President is not a Member of either House, these provisions, like the 
two-thirds vote in the Senate for treaties, is an exception to the 
simple majority vote general rule that the Vice President may vote in 
cases of a tie in the Senate.
  Moreover, with a supermajority requirement, a tie vote is 
meaningless. For instance, 60 votes in the Senate would be required to 
raise the debt ceiling, where a three-fifths vote is required under 
section 2 of this amendment, and 51 votes would be needed to raise 
taxes as required by section 4. A 40 to 40 vote or even a 50 to 50 vote 
does not meet that requirement. Therefore, the Vice President would 
have no role in casting a deciding vote. But that does not in any way 
diminish his constitutional authority.
  Madam President, what we are debating here is very important. What 
the balanced budget amendment does is establish a constitutional 
requirement that Congress live within its means, that we quit doing 
this to America, as represented by these 28 years in a row of 
unbalanced budgets since 1969. All the supermajority requirements are 
saying is that if Congress wants to waive the Constitution, a simple 
majority will not do. You have to have a true majority--in the case of 
the section 4 requirement to raise revenue and section 5 requirement to 
waive the amendment when the United States is involved in a military 
action that is a threat to national security--or a supermajority in the 
case of the section 1 waiver of the balanced budget requirement or the 
section 2 waiver of the debt limit. And every Senator and every 
Congressman must be on record and thereby accountable to his or her 
constituency.

  Now, I have at least 3 or 4 hours more that I could go on on this 
subject.
  Mr. DODD. I am not going to press my colleague. The point I wanted to 
make, if my colleague will yield further, is that we are creating an 
unprecedented exception. The waiver provision--put aside the 
constitutional amendment. I am not debating that. I am debating this 
one section.
  Mr. HATCH. All right.
  Mr. DODD. Under this one section we are carving out a unique 
exception for the first time in the history of this country. Section 5 
says adopted by a majority of the whole House and its Members. We 
exclude the Vice President in a 50-50 tie.
  Mr. HATCH. Right.
  Mr. DODD. In casting a vote.
  Mr. HATCH. That's right.
  Mr. DODD. We do not do that under any other circumstance in the 208-
year-old history of this Republic----
  Mr. HATCH. Other than the ones I have listed.
  Mr. DODD. I say to my colleague. It is not a supermajority here. It 
is a dangerous precedent in my view. So on a 50 to 50 vote on whether 
we met the other standards would fail and the President of the United 
States would not be able to act.
  Let me ask my colleague from Utah just a couple quick questions. I 
cited examples earlier, putting aside whether you agreed or disagreed 
with the action taken. In August 1990, when President Bush sent 100,000 
troops to the Middle East, were we in actual--to quote the language of 
this section 5, were we engaged, in the Senator's opinion, in military 
conflict at that point?
  Mr. HATCH. Sure.
  Mr. DODD. Were we engaged at that point in August 1990 for the United 
States----
  Mr. HATCH. When we sent troops to Saudi Arabia?
  Mr. DODD. Yes. By the way, the interpretation of engaged is actual 
use of military force.
  Mr. HATCH. Well, we already had had attacks by the Iraqis and we were 
there to protect our people. I would say that.
  Mr. DODD. How about lend-lease, under President Roosevelt?
  Mr. HATCH. One thing about lend-lease that I felt was very important 
is that during that period of time if we had any deficits at all, they 
were very minor.
  Mr. DODD. They were large. They were 36 percent of the overall 
budget, much larger than they are today.
  Mr. HATCH. Before that they were minor in comparison to what we have 
today.
  Mr. DODD. The point I am trying to get at here is the question of 
actual--the language here of section 5 is ``is engaged in military 
conflict.'' I make a strong case to the Senator here that in those 
situations we were not engaged in military conflict.
  Mr. HATCH. Sure, we were.
  Mr. DODD. We ultimately became engaged.
  Mr. HATCH. They were moving forces and materiel and----
  Mr. DODD. That's not engagement.
  Mr. HATCH. It may not be, until we shot the first shot, but the fact 
is that is what happened, and when it did happen, I cannot imagine 
either House of Congress not voting to provide a constitutional 
authority to provide whatever help the military needed.
  Mr. DODD. Doesn't it make more sense to leave out your declaration of

[[Page S1281]]

war language here and then have the threshold as an imminent threat? We 
all have to vote here. It's not as if it happens by one person. But at 
least you could respond without a court. Because I could imagine you 
might take the position in the Persian Gulf that that could have been 
the outcome. Let us say I disagreed with you. I run to Federal court. I 
read the language there and I cite the report language and the report 
language says, under this section, ``is engaged in military conflict 
involving the actual use of military force.''
  My point to the court would be that is not actual use of military 
force. Therefore you cannot waive this provision.
  Mr. HATCH. You don't think moving billions of dollars worth of 
military force into the Persian Gulf----
  Mr. DODD. I think actual use of military force is my interpretation. 
I don't understand----
  Mr. HATCH. That might be an argument in this body. If it is, then 
those who want to increase military spending or waive this budget, all 
they have to do is get a constitutional majority to do so. We are just 
saying it should not be easy to waive the constitutional amendment.
  Mr. DODD. I don't think this is easy, as you are suggesting it is. 
But you are putting a straitjacket, in my view----
  Mr. HATCH. Hardly.
  Mr. DODD. Putting a straitjacket on the ability of this country in 
future years to respond to a threat to national security by insisting 
on a declaration of war and actual conflict--actual conflict.
  Mr. HATCH. Hardly. What we are saying is if it's an actual conflict 
and something that deserves the United States of America risking its 
soldiers and its young men and women, then the President ought to 
declare a war or come up here and say, ``I want a constitutional vote 
to support me.''
  Mr. DODD. My colleague knows how mischievous people can be in 
utilizing things like this.
  Mr. HATCH. Not when it comes to our young men and women. Give me a 
break.
  Mr. DODD. If you are short of a conflict and try to get ready for it 
and try to get the votes to prepare for it, we have seen the debates 
that rage here.
  Mr. HATCH. True, and those debates----
  Mr. DODD. And you are offering, I suggest, to a potential enemy a 
wonderful arrow, an additional arrow in their quiver, where they can 
sit there and say, ``They are at the end of the fiscal year. These 
people have difficulties. They'd have to rearrange their budget. It is 
going to require votes of the whole House. People could not show up.'' 
I see this as an advantage. You are subjugating, I say with all due 
respect to my wonderful friend, you are subjugating national security 
interests to the fiscal concerns you raise in this budget. Your 
priorities are switched. As important as fiscal matters are, to place 
in jeopardy the ability of the United States to respond quickly and 
efficiently to an imminent threat to its national security, for the 
life of me, I don't understand why we would be risking that.
  Mr. HATCH. If I could regain my control of the floor?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. We are saying precisely the opposite. We are saying to 
keep this country secure, to have this country remain the greatest 
country in the world, quit spending it into bankruptcy and put some 
fiscal mechanism in the Constitution that requires us to quit spending 
it into bankruptcy. If we want to have a strong military, then, by 
gosh, let us be willing to stand up and vote for it.

  I have to tell you, this Senator for 21 years has been a strong 
supporter of a strong national security. I voted for virtually 
everything that would help this country and protect our young men and 
women. I think, in a time of imminent threat to this country, I have 
never seen a case since I have been here where liberals, moderates and 
conservatives alike would reject protecting our young men and women. We 
are not going to see it in that case.
  But I will tell you this, there is no justification whatsoever to put 
into this amendment the changes that the distinguished Senator from 
Connecticut wants, which would allow the amendment to be waived for 
almost any circumstances and, frankly, waived for what? Because they 
are going to spend more money on the military? Give me a break. It is 
going to be so they can continue spending the way they always have, so 
they can continue to build this mountain of paper, of national debt 
that we have had for 28 straight years, and out of the last 66 years, 
58 years of debt.
  That is what we are trying to stop. If we want a strong military, if 
we want strong national security, if we want to protect ourselves from 
imminent threats, if we want to protect ourselves from war, if we want 
to protect ourselves from being invaded, if we want to protect 
ourselves and our allies, then by gosh we better get spending under 
control. And this balanced budget amendment is about the only thing the 
vast majority of us in Congress right now can think of that will help 
us to do it.
  Mr. DODD. If my colleague will yield?
  Mr. HATCH. What the amendment of the distinguished Senator from 
Connecticut would do is it would just plain make it so anybody could 
waive the balanced budget amendment for any reason at any time. And I 
guarantee it will not be waived to increase military spending.
  Mr. DODD. If my colleague will yield, my colleague had read this 
amendment. My colleague is getting a bit emotional. If he would read 
the amendment----
  Mr. HATCH. I am not getting emotional.
  Mr. DODD. ``Faces an imminent and serious military threat to national 
security as declared by joint resolution.''
  Mr. HATCH. I read that.
  Mr. DODD. Is my colleague suggesting, that the majority would go 
along willy-nilly with this resolution because they wanted to spend 
more on the program. Are we not faced with the perverse situation of 
having Presidents declare war in order to meet the standard of some 
imminent threat here?
  Mr. HATCH. I don't think so.
  Mr. DODD. This language is very clear. It is pointed at a very 
important situation that would be before us. And to suggest somehow 
this is a back-door attempt to fund spending programs on domestic 
issues, does my colleague really believe the majority in the Senate 
here today would vote for a back-door domestic spending increase----
  Mr. HATCH. No, I don't think it would.
  Mr. DODD. On the grounds there was imminent threat to our national 
security?
  Mr. HATCH. I don't think a majority would vote to do that. But I am 
saying that is what this amendment would allow a majority to do, a 
simple majority. We are saying that is wrong. We have provided enough 
of a safety hatch to protect the country the way the amendment is 
written. If we adopt the amendment of the distinguished Senator from 
Connecticut, my goodness gracious, we could have the balanced budget 
amendment waived for a year any time we want to and it would just 
nullify the effectiveness of the balanced budget amendment.

  I do not see anything wrong with the President either declaring war 
or coming up here to make a case he needs more money for the military, 
but he or she ought to come up here----
  Mr. DODD. If my colleague will yield, that is what the amendment 
says.
  Mr. HATCH. No, I am not yielding here. I want to finish my comments.
  Mr. DODD. I thought the debate was kind of healthy.
  Mr. HATCH. I will yield to my colleague, but I would like to be able 
to at least finish a sentence now and then, or at least once in a 
while.
  I think it is very important that Presidents make their case, and I 
think Presidents can make their case, whoever the future Presidents 
would be. I think we would be very loathe to reject a President's case 
that the national security is being threatened. I cannot imagine the 
Congress doing that, to be honest with you, since the Second World War. 
Up to then we kind of blithely went along, acting like nothing is ever 
going to happen because we are way over here. This is now a very small 
world, and our country knows we have to back keeping ourselves strong 
because we are, frankly, the bulwark for freedom all over the world.
  One thing I really don't think we should do, and I think a vast 
majority

[[Page S1282]]

in this body will also not think we should do, is to make it possible 
to waive this amendment at the mere majority vote of some future 
Congress, just because somebody alleges, through a resolution, that 
there is some imminent threats.
  I yield to my colleague from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. I thank the chairman for yielding.
  Mr. President, the Dodd amendment is more loophole than law.
  Whatever the Senator's intentions, this amendment actually would put 
a two-step loophole in the balanced budget amendment and in the 
Constitution:
  Step one: Declare a military threat with a simple majority;
  Step two: Deficit spend as much as you want, on whatever you want.
  That's it. The plain words of this amendment actually do nothing to 
help military preparedness.
  The relevant wording of the amendment, as it would be amended by 
Senator Dodd's words are as follows:

       The provisions of this article may be waived for any year 
     in which the United States faces an imminent and serious 
     military threat to national security as declared by a joint 
     resolution.

  Nothing in the Dodd amendment requires its deficit spending to be 
dedicated to defense. Nothing in the Dodd amendment requires its 
deficit spending to be dedicated to meeting the ``imminent and serious 
military threat.'' After declaring a military threat, Congress could 
then vote to cut defense spending--maybe with the argument that a 
gesture of peace and good will would defuse that imminent military 
threat. Then Congress could vote, by simple majority, for unlimited 
deficit spending for any and all non-military spending programs. Would 
Congress use this loophole cynically as an excuse to deficit spend? I'm 
reminded of the movie, ``Field of Dreams,'' in which the lead character 
was told, ``If you build the ball field, they (the players) will 
come.'' When it comes to the hard choices of balancing the budget, you 
could say, ``If you build the loophole, they will borrow and spend.''
  The Dodd amendment still follows that old, status quo, borrow-and-
spend mentality. There are those who really cannot conceive of a world 
without deficit spending.
  They believe the American people want to have their cake, eat it too, 
and send a big credit card bill to the next generation. They believe 
you can have everything, if only you keep deficit spending. The trouble 
is, if we don't stop deficit spending, we will lose everything: our 
prosperity, millions of jobs, economic security for our senior 
citizens, and the American Dream of a better life for our children.
  I suggest we really can have an adequately prepared defense and 
regularly balanced budgets, too.
  In fact, the more we balance our budgets, the more we will have to 
spend on defense--and every other priority--because of a healthy, 
growing economy, because we'll stop devoting about 15 percent of our 
annual budget just to net interest payments.
  And, in fact, at the very height of the cold war, during the 15\1/2\ 
years of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, we still managed to 
balance the budget 7 times before spending on domestic social programs 
really took off in the 1960's.
  The debt is the threat to defense. Escalating interest payments crowd 
out all other priorities. In 1976, 7.2 percent of the Federal budget 
went to make interest payments on the Federal debt. In 1996, net 
interest consumed 15.5 percent of the budget. As a result, Defense and 
other programs have already felt the budget knife.
  According to the report of the National Entitlement Commission 
chaired by our colleague Senator Kerrey of Nebraska, and our former 
colleague Senator Danforth:

       By 2012, unless appropriate policy changes are made in the 
     interim, projected outlays for entitlements and interest on 
     the national debt will consume all tax revenues collected by 
     the federal government.

  That means no money left for defense--or capital investment, 
education, the environment, national forests and parks, law 
enforcement, science, or other domestic discretionary programs.
  The balanced budget amendment is the best friend our national defense 
could have. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that moving 
toward a balanced budget during fiscal year 1998-2002 will reduce 
Federal debt service costs over that period by $36 billion and improve 
economic performance enough to produce a ``fiscal dividend'' of another 
$77 billion in revenues and interest rate savings, making more money 
available over the long-term for priorities within a balanced budget.
  Committing to a balanced budget--and it's not a convincing commitment 
without this constitutional amendment--actually helps pay for itself.
  The balanced budget amendment places trust in the people--the Dodd 
amendment distrusts the people. I am willing to risk my priorities 
under a balanced budget. That's the whole point of balancing the 
budget--it requires us to set priorities.
  When former Senator Simon used to join us on this floor in sponsoring 
the Balanced Budget Amendment, he was quite clear in his priorities 
under a balanced budget:
  Raise taxes, cut defense, increase social programs. And I have been 
quite clear in my priorities under a balanced budget: Restrain the 
overall growth of spending; cut wasteful domestic social programs; 
safeguard our national defense; and cut taxes to be fairer to families 
and spur economic growth, if possible.
  But Paul Simon and I both felt it was so imperative that we require 
balanced budgets, that we were both willing to risk our individual 
priorities for the greater good--the economic survival of our Nation 
and the security of our children. If we balance budget, we take the 
risk that our individual priorities may or may not prosper. If we don't 
balance the budget--if we don't pass this amendment--we risk the future 
of our Nation and our children. I trust the American people to have the 
right priorities--and to elect Senators and Representatives who reflect 
those priorities, at last, in a series of balanced budgets.
  The balanced budget amendment--Senate Joint Resolution 1 unamended--
already takes national security into consideration. Look back at our 
history.
  Traditionally, our Nation ran deficits during wars and paid back its 
debts during peacetime. Senate Joint Resolution 1 would restore exactly 
that norm of behavior. Only in the last few decades has the Government 
borrowed and spent in good times and bad, in war, peace, and cold wars.
  Senate Joint Resolution 1 is careful and precise: A waiver may be had 
by a simple majority in the case of a declared war. There are serious 
consequences--both to the people here at home and in terms of 
international law--when you declare war. It is an act of survival, an 
act of the highest urgency.
  Next, Senate Joint Resolution 1 requires a vote by a ``majority of 
the whole number''--a constitutional majority--to deficit spend if we 
are actually in a military emergency and engage our armed forces. This 
is a slightly higher threshold--added by former Senator Heflin, who was 
both a deficit hawk and a defense hawk--and it is appropriate, since we 
are talking about a conflict here that is still legally not a declared 
war.
  Finally, in all other cases, we require a three-fifths vote to 
deficit spend because deficit spending has become a cancer on our 
economy and it should be hard to run up ever-higher debt.
  Mr. President, what the amendment does, and I think the Senator from 
Connecticut is well aware, is it returns us to the traditional pattern 
of defense spending. We used to, in times of war and national 
emergency, deficit spend only to pay it off afterward because we 
believed in the fiscal solvency and the fiscal importance of a balanced 
budget. Somehow, about three decades ago, we went screaming away from 
that idea. We borrowed through World War I and then we paid it back. We 
borrowed through World War II, and we worked every effort to pay it 
back. That is exactly what the constitutional amendment does. In 
neither of those cases did we find ourself in imminent danger, other 
than our own philosophy as a nation.
  But, when it came to rally to the cause of human freedom for this 
country, we deficit spent. But we paid it back afterward. The tragedy 
of today is that we fail to recognize that form of fiscal 
responsibility.
  Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield?

[[Page S1283]]

  Mr. HATCH. I will be happy to yield for a question, but could I yield 
on your time?
  Mr. DODD. Please. I am not suggesting here--let us put aside the 
underlying debate on the constitutional amendment to balance the 
budget. Even if my amendment were to be adopted, I say to my colleague 
from Utah, he knows I have serious reservations with the underlying 
amendment. I merely wanted to address this one section here.
  Mr. HATCH. I understand.
  Mr. DODD. The language--I urge again my colleague to read it--I am 
not making the language up and writing the report language--says, ``in 
which a declaration of war is in effect,'' and, also, ``The provisions 
of this article may be waived for any fiscal year in which the United 
States is engaged in a military conflict.''
  Put aside the issue of how we vote here. The language says ``is 
engaged in a military conflict.'' I turn to the report language that 
defines those words. On page 22, it says it must involve the actual use 
of military force.
  I just know my colleagues can think of numerous examples--not phony 
ones, not insignificant ones--where there was imminent threat, the 
national security of this country was in jeopardy, we were not engaged, 
we were not actually using military force, but we would have wanted to 
waive the provisions of this particular section in order to respond to 
it.
  Whether you are for or against the constitutional amendment, it seems 
to me is a collateral issue at this point. The question I raise is: 
This language is so restrictive, it requires a declaration of war or 
actual engagement. Courts will interpret every word of this language in 
the constitutional amendment.

  My suggestion is not to get rid of this altogether. Keep in the 
declaration of war, but add or replace the language ``engaged'' and 
talk about the imminent threat to the national security and require a 
resolution to be adopted by both Houses so that it isn't just one 
person's interpretation, but that a majority of those present and 
voting in both Houses.
  That is not a slight hurdle to overcome, particularly when it amounts 
to waiving the provisions of a balanced budget amendment. I presume my 
colleagues will take that seriously. But we ought to be able to do it 
short of actual engagement in a conflict, and if we don't, I think we 
restrict this Nation's ability to respond to future conflicts that 
could jeopardize our national security and the people of this country.
  We do not take our jobs lightly. We would have to meet that 
threshold. We would understand by doing so, we would waive the 
provisions of the Constitution. That is a very serious matter to 
undertake. It is not just a casual resolution. But it seems to me we 
ought to be able to do so in preparation for something that may involve 
the engagement of our men and women, our forces, and prepare them for 
it and prepare the Nation for it. We cannot do that under section five 
as presently written.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER [Mr. Faircloth]. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, my colleague, as I can see, feels very 
deeply about his position. I am not casting aspersions on him. I know 
he is very sincere in what he is doing here today, but all we are 
saying is unless the President declares a war, which he has in his 
amendment, that this article can't be waived for a fiscal year, for any 
fiscal year unless the United States is ``engaged in military conflict 
which causes an imminent and serious military threat to national 
security and is so declared by a joint resolution adopted by a majority 
of the whole number of each House, which becomes law.''
  If we take what the distinguished Senator from Connecticut wants, 
then it would be a tremendous loophole. It would allow people who are 
not as sincere as he is to come in here and waive, on simple majority 
vote, the whole balanced budget amendment for almost any reason at all 
it will ruin our chance for fiscal responsibility.
  The Senator from Connecticut is confusing the question of 
congressional authorization of military action with spending measures. 
The balanced budget amendment has no effect on the ability of Congress 
to approve actions like Panama. It has no effect at all. What the 
balanced budget amendment does require is that when it comes to paying 
for those actions, that we act responsibly and only waive the amendment 
in the case of a declaration of war or if we have a three-fifths vote 
of both bodies to do so. It is just that simple.
  Or, if we actually are ``engaged in a military conflict which causes 
an imminent and serious military threat to national security and is so 
declared by a joint resolution adopted by a majority of the whole 
number of each House,'' in other words, by a constitutional majority, 
that is all this amendment does.
  I think to a degree, the distinguished Senator from Connecticut is 
mixing the President's Commander in Chief authority to act with 
congressional authority to provide resources. The Commander in Chief 
can act. There is nothing that stops the Commander in Chief from 
acting, and if the moneys are there, he can act in ways that utilize 
more money. But the fact of the matter is, if the moneys are not there, 
he or she is going to have to come up here and make a case, and I can't 
imagine where there is an imminent and serious military threat to 
national security that the Congress will not provide the necessary 
votes. We do not challenge the President's authority. Rather, the 
balanced budget amendment opponents resist congressional control over 
all spending, including defense, and that is really what is the thrust 
of this amendment, in the eyes of many.
  I respect my colleague from Connecticut. Yes, I get a little excited 
about these kind of amendments, too. The whole purpose of a balanced 
budget amendment is to give us some mechanism to try and stop this 
charade, and, frankly, I think most people in America, if they really 
look at it, become very cynical about Congress, because they see this 
charade that's been caused over 28 straight years now. They see us 
trying to find every way we can to spend more and more. Some are so 
cynical that they believe people around here spend so they can keep 
themselves in office and go home, beat their breasts, and say, ``Look 
what I have done for you.'' They never say ``with your own money, your 
own borrowed money.''
  We are trying to stop this charade. We are trying to at least put 
some dents in it, and the balanced budget amendment might do that.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I think that Senator Dodd has put his 
finger on a very serious flaw in the language of the proposed 
constitutional amendment.
  Section 5 of the proposed amendment requires the United States to be 
engaged in military conflict before a waiver may be obtained. The 
military conflict must be one that causes an imminent and serious 
military threat to national security. Moreover, the Senate report's 
section-by-section on this language compounds the problem by indicating 
that only certain kinds of military conflict may qualify. Only military 
conflict that involve the actual use of military force may serve as a 
basis for this waiver.
  I hope that this is not what the authors, sponsors and proponents of 
this constitutional amendment truly intend. If it is, they are creating 
constitutional circumstances that make military spending and 
preparations easier only when military force is actually used and 
military conflict ensues. Arming to deter aggression would no longer be 
the preferred course, aiding allies in a conflict rather than 
dispatching U.S. military forces would no longer be as viable and 
alternative and rebuilding our military capabilities after a conflict 
would no longer be possible without a supermajority vote of three-
fifths of the Congress. I cannot believe that anyone in the Congress 
would propose such restrictive measures.
  I have spent much of my time in the Senate working with Republican 
and Democratic administrations to avoid the actual use of military 
force. This amendment is written in such a way that it serves to 
encourage such use. Nothing that would serve to place our men and women 
in harm's way more quickly or leaves them less well equipped or 
prepared should garner the support of this Senate. I hope that all 
Senators will consider favorably Senator Dodd's important amendment. I

[[Page S1284]]

 urge the manager and the sponsors of the resolution to abandon their 
     no-amendments strategy and consider the merits of the Dodd 
     amendment.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I think maybe we spent enough time on this. 
I would like to spend a few minutes replying to Senator Byrd, who I 
respect deeply and who is one of the people I most admire in this body. 
He spoke for about an hour and a half, an hour and 40 minutes this 
morning in a very intelligent and eloquent way, but I think there are a 
number of things about his remarks that do need to be clarified.
  Like I say, the text of section 1 of this amendment before the body 
is modest in length. It is very significant. It is language that has 
been worked out over many years in a bipartisan, bicameral way. 
Constitutional amendments are of great importance, and I would like to 
just take a few minutes to walk through the provisions of the balanced 
budget amendment and discuss how they would cure our so-called 
addiction to debt.
  The core provision of Senate Joint Resolution 1 is contained in 
section 1, which establishes, as a fiscal norm, the concept of a 
balanced budget amendment. That section mandates that:

       Total outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total 
     receipts for that year, unless three-fifths of the whole 
     number of each House of Congress shall provide by law for a 
     specific excess of outlays over receipts by a rollcall vote.

  This section does not require a particular process the Congress must 
follow in order to achieve a balanced budget. There are many equitable 
means of reaching that goal. Each program will have to compete on its 
own for the resources available. Thus, the balanced budget amendment, 
Senate Joint Resolution 1, does not dictate any particular fiscal 
strategy upon Congress.
  Section 1 also provides reasonable flexibility by providing for a 
waiver of the balanced budget amendment. In order to invoke this 
waiver, both Houses of Congress must provide by law for a specific 
default which must pass by a three-fifths rollcall vote. This careful 
balancing of incentives creates enough flexibility for Congress to deal 
with economic or other emergencies. However, the waiver will not be 
easy when a future Congress is simply trying to avoid the tough choices 
necessary to balance the budget. Many supporters of the balanced budget 
amendment have suggested that in the future it might be in the Nation's 
interest to plan to run a reasonable surplus to ensure easier 
compliance with its terms and to be able to begin to pay down the debt 
with any surplus funds.
  Another important aspect of this section is that in a year that the 
Congress chooses to waive the balanced budget rule, it must do so ``for 
a specific excess of outlays over receipts . . .'' That means that the 
maximum amount of deficit spending to be allowed must be clearly 
identified. By forcing Congress to identify and confront a particular 
deficit, this clause will prevent a waiver for a specific purpose, such 
as an economic downturn, from opening the door to a whole range of 
deficit-funded spending.
  Another key feature of section 1 is that it requires any waiver to be 
by rollcall vote. A rollcall vote will be required to ensure the 
required three-fifths vote has been recorded so that the American 
people will be able to see who stood for fiscal responsibility and who 
for adding more debt on our children's and grandchildren's heads. The 
balanced budget amendment will increase accountability in Government. 
Gone will be the days of late-night unrecorded voice votes to spend 
away America's future. If there is to be a deficit, the American people 
will know who wanted it and why they wanted it. They can make their own 
judgment as to who has the right priorities.
  Section 2 provides that:

       The limit on the debt of the United States held by the 
     public shall not be increased, unless three-fifths of the 
     whole number of each House shall provide by law for such an 
     increase by a rollcall vote.

  So that is pretty clear. Section 2 works in tandem with section 1 to 
enforce the balanced budget amendment. Section 2 focuses public 
attention on the magnitude of Government indebtedness.
  To run a deficit, the Federal Government must borrow funds to cover 
its obligations. If borrowing will go beyond a previously enacted 
statutory limit, the balanced budget amendment will require a three-
fifths vote in order to raise that limit.
  This section acts as an incentive to not only balance the budget in 
good times, but to start paying down the existing debt that is so high 
now that it is mind-boggling. By doing so, Congress will provide more 
flexibility for itself by opening more breathing room between the 
actual debt and the debt limit. This is, in truth, what we should have 
been doing for years.
  We hear so much about the recent and temporary decline in the annual 
deficit. It is amazing to me that some people consider a smaller 
increase in the debt a reason to celebrate. I do not think it is. The 
debt is still increasing. We must balance the budget. It is over $100 
billion this year, that deficit.
  We must balance the budget and stop increasing the debt at all. 
Indeed, our goal should be to run a surplus during prosperous times so 
that we can start paying down the debt and meet threats to our national 
security.
  I wonder how a credit card company would respond if I told them that 
although my debt was more than three times my annual income, I 
overspent by less this year than I did last year. They would sure as 
heck cut me off, as they would any of us.
  Section 3 provides:

       Prior to each fiscal year, the President shall transmit to 
     the Congress a proposed budget for the United States 
     Government for that fiscal year, in which total outlays do 
     not exceed total receipts.

  That is important. While this may not seem important to some people, 
consider how long it has been since we had a balanced budget--28 solid 
years now. These are all unbalanced budgets for 28 years. That is why 
this stack of books next to me is so high.
  The President's budget does not balance this year either. He claims 
it will get us to balance by 2002. I hope we can work with him to do 
that. But without a balanced budget amendment, I fear it is not going 
to happen. If you look at his budget, 75 percent of the cuts are in the 
last 2 years, when he is out of office. So it is pretty clear to me 
that it is not as sincere an attempt as I would like to see it. The 
President understands this game. His budget, like I say, saved 75 
percent of the cuts for only after he leaves office--another plan to 
leave it to the future and let the next guy pay the bill.
  It is time for us to break our habit of deficit by default. People 
propose deficit spending in Washington without a second thought. I 
believe that by the simple action of having the President propose a 
budget that balances in that fiscal year, we will go a long way towards 
changing the debt-happy attitudes in this town and that, in turn, will 
help us stay in balance after we reach it.
  Section 4 requires approval by a majority of the whole number of each 
House by a rollcall vote for any bill to increase revenue. This will 
provide a responsible and balanced amount of tax limitation and improve 
congressional accountability for revenue measures. It is important to 
stop borrowing, but to unduly borrow burdens hard-working Americans and 
would also be deleterious to the Nation and to its citizens.
  Section 4 will help us to curb spending and taxing by requiring a 
majority of the whole Congress, not just those voting at a given time, 
and by forcing Members of Congress to go on record with a rollcall 
vote. These reforms are a crucial part of putting our fiscal house in 
order.
  Section 5 guarantees--and I will not read it; we have been reading 
that--but it guarantees that Congress will retain maximum flexibility 
in responding to clear national security crises such as a declared war 
or imminent military threat to national security.
  This section provides a balance between the need for flexibility to 
react to a military threat to the Nation and the need to keep the 
balanced budget amendment strong. Clearly, if the United States is 
involved in a declared war, the situation is serious and the waiver of 
the balanced budget rule should not be overly difficult. Unless clear 
situations, but still in instances of military conflict, the threshold 
is slightly higher.

  In order to waive the balanced budget rule Congress must pass the 
waiver by a majority of the whole number of both Houses and it must 
become law, must

[[Page S1285]]

be signed by the President. This prevents the balanced budget amendment 
from being too easily waived.
  Thus, taken together, section 5 allows the country to defend itself 
but also protects against a waiver that is borne more of a desire to 
avoid the tough choices needed to balance the budget than of military 
need.
  Section 6 states:

       The Congress shall enforce and implement this article by 
     appropriate legislation, which may rely on estimates of 
     outlays and receipts.

  This section makes explicit what is implicit. The Congress has a 
positive obligation to fashion legislation to enforce this article. 
Section 6 underscores Congress' continuing role in implementing the 
balanced budget requirement. This provision precludes any 
interpretation of the amendment that would result in a shift in the 
balance of powers among branches of Government.
  We have heard from time to time claims by opponents of the balanced 
budget constitutional amendment that the President or the courts will 
become unduly involved in enforcing the amendment. This section, 
together with the plethora of legal precedent and documents, shows that 
such claims are misplaced.
  This provision also gives Congress appropriate flexibility with which 
to fashion the implementing legislation by permitting reliance on 
estimates. Since obviously no one can predict the future with absolute 
certainty, we must rely on estimates when we plan budgets. This 
provision recognizes that we must rely on estimates to make the 
constitutional amendment workable.
  Section 7 defines ``receipts,'' ``outlays.''
  Section 7 defines receipts and outlays. Receipts do not include money 
from borrowing--it is high time we stopped thinking of borrowing as a 
normal source of income. Outlays do not include money used to repay 
debt principle. This will further encourage future Congresses to start 
to pay down our mammoth debt.
  Perhaps more than any other section, opponents try to change this one 
most often. By altering the definitions of receipts and outlays they 
know they could tear a giant loophole in the balanced budget amendment. 
So they come forth with a parade of exemptions, for every interest 
under the sun, and each would provide those who are addicted to debt a 
way to get their fiscal fix. We must not allow it. The supporters of 
honest, fiscal responsibility should not be distracted from their goal 
of balancing the budget in spite of the desires to respond to all 
manner of sympathetic political causes.
  Finally, section 8 states that the amendment will take effect in 2002 
or 2 years after it is adopted, whichever is later. This will allow 
Congress a period to consider and adopt the necessary procedures to 
implement the amendment, and to begin the process of balancing the 
budget.
  In conclusion, Mr. President, let me reiterate that the balanced 
budget amendment is the only way we are going to be able to balance the 
budget. We have tried statutes, they don't work. We have tried 
mustering the political will, it hasn't worked. And we have tried just 
letting the debt grow, that can't work. We need to end our cycle of 
debt with a hard and fast rule, that cannot be easily discarded when it 
becomes inconvenient. We need the balanced budget amendment.
  Mr. President, let me respond to a few charges which have been 
leveled against the amendment.
  Some suggest a conflict between the general requirement of balance 
and the allowance for a waiver.
  Allowing for a waiver by vote is not inconsistent with the purpose of 
Senate Joint Resolution 1, which is to make it harder to borrow as a 
general matter, yet provide flexibility to borrow in case of need 
demonstrated by the appropriate consensus.
  Section 6 of Senate Joint Resolution 1 provides that ``Congress shall 
enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation, which 
may rely on estimates of outlays and receipts.'' To be sure, reliance 
on good faith estimates is necessary to make the balanced budget 
amendment workable. No budget cannot be balanced to the penny; 
particularly the $1.6 trillion Federal budget.
  Opponents of the balanced budget amendment contend that this reliance 
on estimates is improper because CBO budgetary estimates are not always 
precisely accurate, specifically if you compare the estimates for the 
beginning of the fiscal year with what the actual numbers are at the 
end of the fiscal year. It seems to me that by definition an estimate 
is not necessarily going to match up to the exact figures at the end of 
the year. But that is no reason to stop using estimates. They are a 
reasonable and logical way to approach the uncertainty inherent in 
trying to predict the future.
  The balanced budget amendment will still function smoothly even given 
this lack of absolute certainty at the beginning of the year. If, over 
the course of the fiscal year outlays exceed receipts in a way not 
previously anticipated, we have two choices. We can either pass a 
reconciliation bill to bring the budget back into balance, or, if 
necessary, we can waive the balanced budget rule for that year as 
provided for in the text of the amendment.
  Further, under the Budget Act, both OMB--for the President's budget 
estimate--and CBO by law must provide for three budgetary estimates: 
one at the beginning of the fiscal year, the second as a mid-course 
correction, and the last before the end of the fiscal year. Thus, there 
exists a statutory fine-tuning process that assures a degree of 
accuracy--not perfect accuracy--but one that provides for workable 
budgetary estimates. If we see during the course of the year that our 
estimates are going to be off, we have time to make the necessary 
corrections.

  I believe that reliance on estimates is both reasonable and sound. If 
we did not permit a reliance on estimates, I have little doubt that 
someone on the other side would be on the Senate floor arguing that the 
balanced budget amendment would be unworkable because it does not let 
us rely on estimates.
  The bottom line is that at the beginning of the year, we have no 
crystal ball, only reasonable estimates to work from. The balanced 
budget amendment accepts that plain truth and accordingly provides for 
the use of estimates. We use budget estimates in Congress every day. 
The President just sent a budget that he claims will balance by 2002. 
That is an estimate. We will pass a budget resolution here in the 
Senate, and that will rely on estimates. The balanced budget amendment 
merely continues this time-honored, logical, and reasonable practice.
  If the opponents of the balanced budget amendment succeed, we will be 
condemning our children to even higher debt, even higher taxes, and 
even lower wages, by any estimate. I hope that everyone in the Senate 
will keep that in mind as this debate continues.
  The Senator raises two points that were discussed in the committee 
report that accompanied Senate Joint Resolution 1. While I understand 
the concerns, I believe that they are based on a misreading of the 
report.
  The report allows that, ``Congress could decide that a deficit caused 
by a temporary, self-correcting drop in receipts or increase in outlays 
during the fiscal year would not violate the article.'' This does not 
mean that the budget will be out of balance at the end of the year. It 
simply states that the budget need not be in perfect balance every 
second of the year. And there is nothing in the text of the balanced 
budget amendment to indicate that it should. However, the temporary 
condition described in the committee report must be self-correcting by 
the conclusion of the fiscal year, in order to avoid a three-fifths 
vote. I see no harm in allowing this flexibility during the course of 
the year.
  Additionally, the report states that Congress could permit negligible 
deviations be made up in the next year. Again, this is not nearly as 
remarkable as some have made it out to be. We all know that sometimes 
the very last few outlays and receipts of the year are not known until 
after the fiscal year is over. The balanced budget amendment neither 
requires nor envisions that this logistical truth become a problem. In 
such an event, the Congress could provide itself with the flexibility 
to make up any negligible deficits to be made up the next year. What is 
crucial is that the funds must be made up, thus keeping us in balance. 
It simply would not make any sense to bring the Government to a halt 
over a 4-cent deficit.

[[Page S1286]]

And the balanced budget amendment does not require that we do. That is 
all that this statement in the committee report is saying.
  Some opponents claim that the BBA is too inflexible. It has been 
repeatedly referred to as a ``straightjacket.'' On the other hand, we 
also hear that the BBA is not stringent enough. In fact, the balanced 
budget amendment strikes just the right balance between strict 
provisions to counter the strong incentives in Congress to deficit 
spend and the reasonable flexibility necessary for the amendment to 
function in the real world.
  What we need to do is focus on the problem--our national debt is over 
$5.3 trillion and climbing. Only the balanced budget amendment will put 
us in a position to end that climb.
  Meeting the requirements of the balanced budget will require a 
heightened vigilance of Congress; it will require that the Federal 
Government be more aware of and concerned about our borrowing and 
spending habits. No, it will not be as easy as simply spending and then 
borrowing if we did not plan well. It will require that we plan better 
and be better stewards over that plan. I think that is appropriate, 
given the importance of the problem, and of our duty.
  The point has also been raised that Congress will not know precisely 
if we are in balance of the size of the deficit to the dollar before 
the end of the year. That is why we have the workable flexibility of 
relying on estimates, yet we will need to plan and administer the 
process with care.
  Congress may and should shoot for a small surplus to avoid a last 
minute unforseen deficit, and if the estimates near the end of the year 
suggest we will run a deficit, we can approve a deficit at the high end 
of the estimates. If we approve an estimate that is slightly larger 
than we needed, it is not like we actually spent the money.
  While some may say that relying on estimates creates a loophole, I 
submit that the risks of this provision are substantially less than our 
current process of simply spending and borrowing as a matter of course.


                      debt ceiling super majority

  Concerns have also been raised that under section 2 it will be too 
hard to get the three-fifths currently required and that a minority in 
Congress will be able to hold us hostage with the threat of forcing a 
default. For one thing, threatening default is not likely.
  This Nation has never defaulted on its debt. And let me tell you, if 
this country ever reached a point where there were 41 Senators, nearly 
the entire current Democratic membership of the Senate, who were so 
militantly disillusioned with this Nation that they were truly willing 
to let us default on our debt, the 60-vote requirement to raise the 
debt ceiling would be the least of our problems.
  Now, the opponents of the three-fifths requirement cite the budget 
battles of last Congress as evidence that it is sometimes difficult to 
raise the debt limit. But Mr. David Malpass, an expert on financial 
markets who testified at the Judiciary Committee's hearings, showed 
that those very budget battles--where the word ``default'' was being 
bandied about with regularity--were seen by the markets as a very 
positive step. Indeed, he noted that ``The U.S. bond market had a very 
strong rally from August 1995 through January 1996, with yields falling 
from 6.9 percent to 6.0 percent.'' He termed this as a very significant 
positive development for the economy.
  Through all the tumult and uncertainty of those budget battles, 
American investors were excited and encouraged that Congress was 
finally moving towards a balanced budget. That encouragement manifested 
itself in lower interest rates, which in turn is the kind of market 
conditions that can help us balance the budget and strengthen the 
economy.
  Mr. Malpass was prescient enough to foresee this very objection to 
the balanced budget amendment when he wrote:

       Financial markets are practical. [T]he threat of a default 
     would not be taken seriously as long as both the 
     Administration and Congress expressed the intention not to 
     default. The requirement of a super-majority would not affect 
     this calculation.

  A step toward fiscal discipline like passing a solid balanced budget 
amendment would similarly be viewed positively by the markets. Enacting 
a weakened one, one like the proposal before us contemplates, with no 
real debt limit restraint, would undermine the amendment's credibility 
and its effectiveness.

  We have a choice--we can either continue on the downward spiral of 
more debt, higher interest rates, higher taxes, and lower incomes, or 
we can move ahead with the balanced budget amendment and lower interest 
rates, lower taxes, with greater job growth and a stronger overall 
economy.
  Mr. President, we already have several supermajority requirements in 
the Constitution. Some were in the original text, some have been added 
by amendment. The one thing they have in common is that they were all 
meant to come into play in unusual circumstances. That is what we 
expect of the balanced budget amendment, that the vote to raise the 
debt of this Nation be an unusual circumstance.
  Those who believe the supermajority vote will be the rule rather than 
the exception betray their mental habit of thinking in terms of deficit 
spending. We must break this habit and make deficit spending the 
exception instead of the rule. The balanced budget amendment does not 
require a supermajority to pass a budget--only a budget that is out of 
balance. The balanced budget amendment creates a positive incentive for 
current majorities to avoid borrowing to avoid supermajority votes and 
risking the kind of intrigue opponents say could happen when 
supermajorities are required. This is wholly appropriate and reasonable 
to break Congress of its borrowing habit.
  The debt ceiling has sometimes been raised by supermajorities and 
often it has been raised by simple majorities. What is important is 
that we have never defaulted. When we have had to have the votes, the 
necessary votes have always been there. When votes are tallied, it is 
easy for Members to vote against raising the debt ceiling, knowing that 
the ceiling will be raised. I expect when we are living under the 
balanced budget amendment, once again, the necessary votes will be 
there, but not many more than necessary, because Members may wish to 
vote against it knowing the necessary votes are there.
  Let me conclude with some comments on the objections to 
supermajorities in Senate Joint Resolution 1.
  According to Prof. Harvey Mansfield, Jr. of Harvard, in his scholarly 
book ``The Taming of the Prince,'' the real genius of our Constitution 
is that having placed all power in the hands of its citizenry, the 
American people consented to restraints on that power. Understanding 
that direct or pure democracies in history were inherently unstable and 
fickle, the Framers placed restraints on popular rule and congressional 
power--what we now call supermajority requirements.
  Let me mention some of them: Article I, section 3, the Senate may 
convict on an impeachment with a two-thirds vote; article I, section 5, 
each House may expel a Member with a two-thirds vote; article I, 
section 7, a Presidential veto is overridden by a two-thirds vote of 
each House; article II, section 2, the Senate advises and consents to 
treaties with a two-thirds vote; article V, a constitutional amendment 
requires two-thirds of each House or a constitutional convention can be 
called by two-thirds of the State legislatures, and three-quarters of 
the State legislatures must ratify; article VII, the Constitution 
itself required ratification of 9 of the 13 States; the 12th amendment 
requires a quorum of two-thirds of the States in the House to choose a 
President and a majority of States is required to elect the President, 
the same requirements exist for the Senate choosing the Vice-President; 
the 25th amendment, dealing with the President's competency and 
removal, requires that if Congress is not in session within 21 days 
after Congress is required to assemble, it must determine by two-thirds 
vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the 
duties of his office.

  The Constitution requires that a supermajority approve a 
constitutional amendment. To pass the balanced budget amendment, we 
must have 67 Senators vote for it. Is this inappropriate? Or should we 
allow some number between 26 and 51, or 50 with the Vice-

[[Page S1287]]

President casting the tie-breaking vote to approve the balanced budget 
amendment? The Constitution requires that three fourths of the States 
ratify the balanced budget amendment. Perhaps our majoritarian friends 
would prefer that some number of States between 26 and 51 ratify the 
amendment, with the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, or Guam casting 
a tie-breaking vote if the States are evenly divided.
  Mr. President, if majority rule were the fundamental principle of our 
Government, as I have heard some in this debate say, we would not have 
the Government we do. We would have a unicameral parliamentary system 
without judicial review, and indeed without the Bill of Rights or a 
written Constitution, because each of those features of our Government 
is an intrusion into the principle of majority rule. And they are 
certainly not the only examples.
  The first amendment does not say Congress shall not abridge free 
speech unless a fletting majority wants to. It does not say that 
Congress shall not interfere with the free exercise of religion or 
establish a religion, unless a majority of those present and voting 
want to. The first amendment takes those options away from even 
supermajorities of Congress, except through constitutional amendment. 
Shall we tear up the Bill of Rights and the Constitution because they 
contain checks on the power of transient majorities? I do not think so.
  As I have said, as Thomas Jefferson said, as even Professor Tribe has 
said, the power of transient majorities to saddle minorities or future 
majorities with debt is the kind of infringement on fundamental rights 
that deserves constitutional protection. The Framers wished to protect 
life, liberty, and property; they reacted harshly against taxation 
without representation. As I have pointed out throughout this debate, 
our deficit spending taxes generations which are not now represented; 
it takes their property and their economic liberty. It is wholly 
appropriate that we at least increase the consensus of those currently 
represented to allow them to shackle those who are not--future 
generations--with the debt, the taxes, and the economic servitude that 
go with citizenship in a country with high national debt.
  Mr. President, opponents of the balanced budget amendment charge that 
supermajority requirements will create some new kind of sinister 
bargaining among factions to gain advantage in return for supporting 
the necessary consensus. This objection strikes me as strange because 
that kind of negotiation is as old as the legislative process. It 
happens now in the search for a majority.
  Mr. President, under the balanced budget amendment, majorities will 
continue to set budget priorities from year to year. Only if the 
majority attempts to borrow money from future generations to pay for 
its priorities would there have to be a supermajority vote. This allows 
a minority to play the conscience of the Nation and protect future 
generations from the type of borrowing sprees we have seen in recent 
decades.
  I would note, Mr. President, that those who believe the supermajority 
vote will be the rule rather than the exception betray their mental 
habit of thinking in terms of deficit spending. We must break this 
habit and make deficit spending the exception instead of the rule. The 
balanced budget amendment does not require a supermajority to pass a 
budget--only a budget that is out of balance. The balanced budget 
amendment creates a positive incentive for current majorities to avoid 
borrowing to avoid supermajority votes and risking the kind of intrigue 
opponents say could happen when supermajorities are required. This is 
wholly appropriate and reasonable to break Congress of its borrowing 
habit.
  Mr. President, it is absolutely clear that to restore the 
constitutional concept of limited government and its protection of 
liberty--as well as to restore fiscal and economic sanity--we must pass 
this balanced budget amendment. We need the supermajority provisions of 
Senate Joint Resolution 1--a modern day ``auxiliary precaution'' in 
Madison's words--to put teeth into the balanced budget amendment--to be 
a force to end business as usual here in Congress--and most important, 
to foster the liberty of limited government that the Framers believed 
to be essential.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, would the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. HATCH. I would on the Senator's time. I think our time is running 
down. I know some others want to speak. I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. BYRD. How much time do I have?
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, how much time is remaining for both sides?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-three minutes for Senator Hatch and 40 
minutes for Senator Dodd.
  Mr. HATCH. I will yield on that basis, that this----
  Mr. BYRD. Be attributed to the Democratic side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. He might prefer to finish before entertaining questions----
  Mr. HATCH. I would like to. Listen, my friend from West Virginia, I 
am happy to accommodate him any time I can. I know how sincere he is. I 
know the efforts that he put forth this morning in making his eloquent 
statement. I am happy to yield, if he desires me to, at this time.
  Mr. BYRD. Is the Senator undertaking to----
  Mr. HATCH. Under those circumstances.
  Mr. BYRD. Is the Senator addressing the concerns I expressed this 
morning, as I went down the amendment section by section, or is he 
merely reading the various sections?
  Mr. HATCH. I am undertaking to explain some of them. I believe that I 
will do so some more tomorrow or when we get back from recess. But I am 
making an effort to do some explanation here today. And, hopefully, I 
am explaining away some of the difficulties that the distinguished 
Senator has raised.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HATCH. I will say that I will make more specific responses later.
  Mr. BYRD. Would the Senator explain to me why the Judiciary 
Committee, in its analysis of section 6, took the pains to explain that 
```estimates,''' for example, ``means good faith, responsible, and 
reasonable estimates made with honest intent to implement section 1,'' 
without also indicating in the committee report the definition of what 
is meant by ``good faith,'' what is meant by the word ``responsible,'' 
what is meant by the word ``reasonable'' in connection with the word 
``estimates''?
  Mr. HATCH. I believe any reasonable interpretation of section 6 knows 
that there is no way--and the distinguished Senator was right when he 
made the comment earlier in the day--that there is no way of absolutely 
being accurate on estimates. We have to do the best we can to estimate 
the outlays and receipts at the beginning or at some time during each 
year for the next succeeding year. There is just no question about it, 
because there is no way we can absolutely predict what will happen in 
the future. But I think through implementing legislation we can resolve 
the budgetary problems with regard to estimating outlays and receipts 
in a way that would be workable. And we would have to do so under this 
amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HATCH. Under the same terms I would, on the Senator's time.
  Mr. BYRD. May I ask the distinguished Senator, who is going to be the 
judge of whether an estimate has been rendered in good faith, whether 
it is a responsible estimate, or whether there is a reasonable 
estimate?
  Mr. HATCH. I think the terms of the committee report should be given 
the ordinary dictionary meaning. I think that is the way we would have 
to do it. But Members of Congress would be responsible. Members would 
define them.
  Mr. BYRD. Members of the Congress will be the judge as to whether an 
estimate is responsible?
  Mr. HATCH. We are today, of all of the estimates. We will have to be.
  Mr. BYRD. If the Senator will allow me to use a chart, this chart 
shows the estimated revenues annually from 1980 to 1996. If the Senator 
will notice, in each of these years, keeping in mind that the green 
line means that the estimate was right on target----
  Mr. HATCH. Or above target?
  Mr. BYRD. No. The green line means the estimate was, indeed, right on 
target. It was not above or below the line. It was not too high. It was 
not too low.

[[Page S1288]]

  Would the Senator agree with me that based on this chart, in every 
year from 1980 to 1996, the estimate was wrong? It was off. It was not 
correct. In some years the revenues were more than estimated and in 
some years they were less than estimated. The point of the chart being 
to show that the estimates have never been absolutely correct. In many 
instances they have varied; in one instance here, $78 billion. The 
estimate was off $78 billion. In another instance, the estimate was off 
$65 billion.
  This is the record. This is not a Member's estimate here of what 
should have been in each of those particular years. This is the record. 
These bars indicate what went wrong, by how much the estimate was off 
for each year. Would the Senator tend to believe that in the future the 
estimates are going to be better than they have been on this chart, 
which represents 17 years of experience?
  Mr. HATCH. Let me answer the first question. Here are 28 years of 
similar inaccurate estimates. Wait, wait, let me make my point. Here 
are 28 years of missed estimates. We have been wrong every time in 28 
years and we have been wrong because these are all unbalanced budgets.
  I agree with the Senator on the second question. Yes, from 1980 to 
1996 we have been wrong every time on estimates. On a couple of 
occasions not very wrong, but during all of that period, the whole 28 
years since 1968 and during all of the period between 1980 and 1996 we 
did not function pursuant to a balanced budget amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. What makes the Senator believe----
  Mr. HATCH. If I could finish my remarks.
  Under the Budget Act, CBO and OMB give estimates each year. CBO is 
the Congressional Budget Office; OMB is the Office of Management and 
Budget. They correct the estimates twice during the year as they 
acquire new data. Congress ultimately has to decide how you balance the 
differences.
  Now, we should plan to get above balance, as the usual course. Most 
years we should try to stay above balance with regard to estimates and 
try to stay on the course by amended estimates through the year. That 
is what we will have to do. I think the implementing legislation will 
do that.
  Let me make another comment, and I will turn back to my dear 
colleague. Meeting the requirements of the balanced budget amendment 
will require a heightened vigilance of Congress. It is apparent it will 
make us get tough on budgets. During those years we had five different 
statutory balanced budget approaches that led us to that morass and 
this morass. What we are saying is that the balanced budget amendment 
will require us to have a heightened vigilance in the Congress. It will 
require that the Federal Government be more aware of and concerned 
about borrowing and spending habits. No, it will not be as easy as 
simply spending and then borrowing if we do not plan. It will require 
that we plan better and that we use better standards in that planning. 
I think it is appropriate, given the importance of this problem and the 
duty we owe to our country.
  Now, I think what I am saying is, I agree with my colleague. He makes 
a very compelling point here that we have not been very accurate in 
estimating receipts, in estimating outlays and receipts through the 16 
years, although I say through 28 years, or 58 of the last 66 years, we 
have run unbalanced budgets. One reason is we have relied on statutory 
schemes that have been circumvented in every one of those years, none 
of which have really worked. The distinguished Senator, by the way, to 
his credit, pointed out that some of those statutory schemes at the 
time would not work. I believe some of the rest of us felt that way as 
well.

  What we are saying is from 1997 on, or whenever this amendment is 
ratified and becomes law and part of the Constitution, by the year 2002 
on, and really before that if we can get it ratified before then, we 
are going to no longer have the luxury of these inaccurate estimates. 
We will have to do a better job. We will have to be more vigilant. We 
are going to have to heighten that vigilance, and we will have to meet 
the requirement of a balanced budget or face the music of having to 
stand up and vote for higher deficits or more spending by supermajority 
votes.
  I think comparing this time and saying, because we have been 
inaccurate during times when statutory methods have not worked, with 
post-balanced-budget-amendment-enactment times where we will have to be 
more vigilant and we will have to come up with a way of being accurate 
during the year--right, OMB and CBO now only check that twice. We are 
going to have to do a much better job.
  Now, can we be absolutely accurate? Everybody knows we cannot.
  Mr. BYRD. That is the point.
  Mr. HATCH. There is no way you can. I do not want to keep going with 
this system and then this system when we have an alternative that 
really would put some fiscal discipline in the Constitution that makes 
us get serious.
  Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HATCH. I yield under the same set of circumstances.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator does not want to continue with this system. He 
refers to this system as a statutory system. And yet--and yet--the 
amendment itself tells us who will enforce this amendment once it is in 
the Constitution.
  I will read it from section 6:

       The Congress shall enforce and implement this article by 
     appropriate legislation.

  So we are going to continue to enforce it. We are going to continue 
to operate under a statutory system. That is what I am saying. We have 
been operating under a statutory system. This amendment says we will 
continue to operate under a statutory system because it says that the 
Congress will enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation.
  What makes the Senator feel that under the new statutory system, that 
the estimates will be any better than they have been under the old 
statutory system when both systems are going to be the work of the 
Congress?
  Mr. HATCH. You mean under the new constitutional system if this 
becomes----
  Mr. BYRD. There will not be any different system because the Congress 
itself will enforce that amendment by appropriate legislation.
  Mr. HATCH. Let me answer that question. You have raised a point that 
Congress will not know precisely if we are in balance or a deficit to 
the exact dollar before the end of each year. That is why we have the 
workable flexibility of relying on estimates. Yet we will need a plan 
to administer that process with care.
  Now, Congress may, and I think this would become the norm, instead of 
now just planning on deficits, Congress may and should plan for a small 
surplus to avoid a last-minute, unforeseen deficit. If the estimates 
near the end of the year suggest we will run a deficit, we can approve 
a deficit at the high end of the estimates. If we approve an estimate 
that is slightly larger than is needed, it is not like actually 
spending the money. While some may say relying on estimates creates a 
loophole, I submit that the risks are substantially less than our 
current process of spending and borrowing, and that is exhibited by 
these 28 years of unbalanced budgets. That has been the matter of 
course. I think we have to change course, and I think the normalcy--I 
think the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, if I know him as 
well as I think I do, would be leading the fight to have at least small 
surpluses each year to take care of any fluctuations that might occur. 
I don't think he would permit us to get into this mess, which neither 
he nor I have been able to prevent under the current statutory scheme. 
But under a balanced budget amendment, we are going to have to be real.

  Mr. BYRD. This is not going to be real--section 6. It is not real. It 
talks about estimates. Now we are going to switch from section 1, which 
says total outlays shall not exceed total receipts in any fiscal year. 
In the first place, how do we know whether the outlays have exceeded 
the receipts before the end of the fiscal year, or even two or three 
weeks subsequent to the end of the fiscal year? That is number one. 
Number two, then, we switch to estimates. Why do you proponents of the 
amendment purport to do two things--one, in the first section, balance 
outlays with receipts--no ifs, ands, or buts--to the exact dollar. But 
in section 6, they say, well, just forget about section 1 and balance 
the estimates. We have all seen how the estimates run.

[[Page S1289]]

 The estimating is going to be done by the very same people, under the 
amendment, as have been doing the estimating prior to the adoption of 
the amendment.
  The proponents are promising, absolutely pledging to the people of 
the United States, that this amendment will balance the budget. That is 
what they are promising. The Senator just said that. We cannot possibly 
get the estimates right. The Senator just said that. We can't possibly 
get the estimates right.
  Well, then, may I ask the Senator, are we not misleading the American 
people with these elaborate claims that we are going to balance the 
budget when what we are really going to balance is the estimates? Then 
the Senator admits that we can't be accurate in these estimates. We 
never have been, and we never will be. There won't be any computers 
made that will come up with the correct estimates.
  Mr. HATCH. This amendment does not mandate a balanced budget as the 
only option. This amendment requires us to move toward a balanced 
budgets, because it requires a balanced budget or supermajority votes 
if we are going to run deficits. So the pressures----
  Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield on that?
  Mr. HATCH. If I could be allowed to finish. So the pressures will be 
on us to try to have surpluses rather than continue to spend, because 
sooner or later we have to face the music. Let me make this point. The 
accuracy of estimates is self-correcting, because OMB and CBO must, by 
law, correct their estimates twice a year, under current practices. 
Usually, the original estimates are always off by OMB and CBO. Under 
the current system, there is not nearly as much pressure to be accurate 
as there will be under the constitutional amendment system, if we pass 
this by the requisite two-thirds vote of both Houses and it is ratified 
by three-quarters of the States. So what if CBO and OMB correct it? The 
balanced budget amendment does nothing to correct that procedure. It 
puts pressure on them to, maybe, do more than twice a year corrections.
  The balanced budget amendment actually will further budgetary 
discipline. Congress is the one that must always enforce the system. 
Every one of us take an oath to uphold the Constitution. If this 
becomes part of the Constitution, we will have to live up to that oath. 
We will have to devise a system that really does it. We will still 
operate under a statutory system of implementing the constitutional 
rule. We can't order perfection; not even we can order perfection. But 
the balanced budget amendment will put the appropriate amount of 
pressure on Congress, which is not there now, as easily can be seen by 
the Senator's very important chart. It will put the pressure on 
Congress to ensure truthfulness.
  Public reactions will punish those who act cowardly. Everybody will 
know because we will always have to vote. We can't do it on voice votes 
anymore, or hide it in the dead of the night, which I know Senator Byrd 
understands well and does not approve of, as I don't. We would all have 
to stand up and vote, and the public will know who has voted which way. 
They are going to expect us to do a far better job than that which has 
done and than these 28 years of unbalanced budgets.

  Let us be honest. There is no way anybody can absolutely, accurately 
tell what the outlays and receipts are going to be in advance. When we 
say ``total outlays of any fiscal year shall not exceed,'' it has to be 
written that way because that is the force that says, Congress, your 
estimates better be good, a lot better than these statutory estimates 
we have had in the past, because then we will be under a constraint to 
balance the budget, or vote by a supermajority vote not to balance it. 
That is the difference.
  Mr. BYRD. If the Senator will yield, Mr. President, permit me to say 
that I have the utmost admiration for the distinguished Senator from 
Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. And vice versa.
  Mr. BYRD. I marvel at his equanimity, his characteristic, and his 
never-failing courtesy. This is the way he has always been with me. But 
I must say that, notwithstanding that, I am amazed to hear the 
distinguished Senator stand on the floor this afternoon and admit that 
this amendment doesn't require a balanced budget.
  Mr. HATCH. It doesn't--it's not the only option.
  Mr. BYRD. What about that, he said it again. It doesn't.
  Mr. HATCH. It doesn't. We can do whatever we want to. We just have to 
vote to have an unbalanced budget by the required supermajority or 
margin.
  Mr. BYRD. What about all the Senators coming to the floor and saying 
the sky is falling, debt is bad, interest on the debt is bad, deficits 
are bad, and we have to do something about it and take the burden off 
our children, and vote for a balanced budget amendment?
  The Senator has been perfectly honest. He says this amendment doesn't 
require a balanced budget. Well, let's quit saying, then, that it 
requires a balanced budget. He is saying that the estimates here are 
wrong. He may be implying that the people who make the estimates, once 
the constitutional amendment is adopted, will have greater expertise 
than those, who are the best in the world right now, who made these 
estimates.
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield on that point?
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator has the floor, so I am glad to.
  Mr. HATCH. I appreciate that, to make a comment. I believe there is 
no question that they would do a better job, because there won't be the 
same number of games played on budget matters if everybody knows that 
we have the constraint of either balancing the budget, or voting on a 
supermajority not to balance it. We all have to face our electorate. 
Right now, we do a lot of these things for by voice votes and other 
shenanigans that help to cause these things. When I say ``we,'' I would 
rather say ``they,'' because I try not to, and I know the Senator tries 
not to. But it's apparent in that our current system isn't working. I 
think your chart makes one of the best arguments for the balanced 
budget amendment of any chart we have had up here in this whole debate, 
because it shows that what we are doing right now, and what we have 
done for 28 solid years, doesn't work.
  Mr. BYRD. Well then, why are we going to wait 5 years to do something 
better if the Senator has something better?
  Mr. HATCH. We are not. If we pass this through the Senate--hopefully, 
within the next week or so--by the requisite two-thirds vote, and it 
passes through the House by the requisite two-thirds vote, that is a 
notice to everybody in these two bodies that we better start hustling 
to get a real balanced budget by 2002, where all of us know that the 
only part of the President's budget that really counts is next year's 
budget.
  It is not the budget as extrapolated out to 2002, especially since 75 
percent of it is balanced in the last 2 years after he leaves office. 
No, it is this next year, and each year thereafter. If we passed this 
and it is submitted to the States, I can't predict what the States 
would do. I believe they would ratify this amendment if we have the 
guts to pass it through both Houses of Congress. And if they ratify 
this amendment, then, by gosh, I have to tell you that I think the game 
will be over. We will not be able to do this anymore. There will have 
to be rollcall votes under the same terms.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HATCH. Certainly.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senator speaks of guts. It doesn't take 
guts to vote for this thing. It takes guts to vote against it.
  Mr. HATCH. I think it takes guts both ways.
  Mr. BYRD. It takes guts to vote against it because the great majority 
of the American people have been bamboozled about this amendment. They 
support this, and they are very much in favor of it. So it takes guts 
to vote against it.
  Why does the distinguished Senator think, No. 1, that we are going to 
be any better at our estimates once this amendment is adopted than we 
have been in the past? That is No. 1.
  Then he talks about--he said something to the effect that once we get 
this amendment in place, as I understood he was saying to the effect 
that we will not be able to find ways around it, or some such.
  Mr. HATCH. We will not be able to get around these things with voice 
votes. We will have to stand up and vote by rollcall.

[[Page S1290]]

  Mr. BYRD. We can vote now by rollcall vote.
  Mr. HATCH. But we don't, and there is nothing that requires us to do 
so, necessarily.
  Mr. BYRD. Except the Constitution, if one-fifth indicate that they 
want to vote. That doesn't happen often. That is very seldom on raising 
the debt limit. That is very seldom on passing the final budget here.
  Mr. HATCH. Let me answer the distinguished Senator's question. It is 
a good question.
  The reason that I think we will be more accurate afterwards is 
because the incentives will switch. The incentives will switch because 
unless we balance the budget year after year and start working toward 
surpluses and not working on deficits, we are going to be in real 
trouble constitutionally, and we all know that. There will no longer be 
the game that occurred during the 1980 and 1996 years, as shown by the 
Senator's very interesting chart. I think that makes one of the best 
cases I have ever seen for the balanced budget amendment, because the 
current system is not working.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HATCH. Always.
  Mr. BYRD. I think the committee report language that was prepared by 
the committee, of which the distinguished Senator from Utah is 
chairman, makes one of the best cases against this amendment. He says 
there won't be any more games played. Take a look at this report. It 
tells you what games to play.
  Let me read it. Talking about the estimates of outlays and receipts, 
it says, ``Estimates means good faith, responsible, and reasonable 
estimates made with honest intent to implement section 1, and not evade 
it. This provision gives Congress an appropriate degree of 
flexibility.''
  We have got more and more ways to play games.
  It ``gives Congress an appropriate degree of flexibility in 
fashioning necessary implementing legislation. For example, Congress 
could use estimates of receipts or outlays at the beginning of the 
fiscal year to determine what the balanced budget requirement of 
section 1 would be so long as the estimates are reasonable and made in 
good faith.''
  Now we are going to play games about who is reasonable, what is 
reasonable, and what isn't.
  ``In addition, Congress could decide that a deficit caused by a 
temporary self-correcting drop in receipts or increase in outlays 
during the fiscal year would not violate the article. Similarly, 
Congress could state that very small or negligible deviations from a 
balanced budget would not represent a violation of section 1.''
  Will the distinguished Senator indicate to me what would be 
considered ``negligible,'' what would be considered ``small,'' and what 
would be considered ``not small,'' and ``not negligible''? We have a 
budget now of $1.7 trillion. Let us say it is off by $50 billion. Would 
that be ``negligible''? Would that be ``small,'' $50 billion?
  Mr. HATCH. I think the Senator is very logical. But he also has to 
allow the logic to take into account that Congress may, as I said 
before, and should shoot for a small surplus--the incentives will be to 
have surpluses to avoid a last-minute unforeseen deficit. And if the 
estimates near the end of the year suggest that we are going to run a 
deficit, then it would be a simple matter for us to approve a deficit 
at the high end of the estimates. If we approve an estimated deficit 
that is slightly larger than we need, it is not like we actually spent 
the money.
  Again, I will say some may say that relying on estimates creates a 
loophole. But there is no other workable way to do it. I submit that 
the risks that might arise from those provisions in the constitutional 
amendment are substantially less than our current process, which is 
clearly not working, of simply spending and borrowing with no 
restraints whatsoever.
  I go back to my point. The distinguished Senator may be right in this 
regard. Perhaps Senators should not come out here and say, ``This is 
going to always make us balance the budget.'' I think, more accurately, 
it should be said that the incentives will be toward balancing the 
budget, because you will have supermajority votes of three-fifths in 
order to run deficits, or you will have to have constitutional 
majorities to increase taxes, which means at least 51 Senators would 
have to vote for it, and at least 218 Members of the House. That puts 
pressure on Members of both parties to be accurate, and it puts 
pressure on them to try to get surpluses rather than deficits. It puts 
pressure on them in writing implementing legislation to make sure you 
have legislation that really does work rather than the five failed 
plans that we have had since 1978, none of which have worked. My friend 
and colleague knows that. I don't know of anybody more intelligent and 
more concerned about these matters than the distinguished Senator from 
West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HATCH. If I could just finish this one sentence, but I have to 
say that his chart makes my case better than I have made it. I 
congratulate him for it, and I am grateful that he has put the chart 
up, because I don't know how anybody can argue for the current system 
when you look at that chart.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HATCH. Of course.
  Mr. BYRD. Let's take a look at this chart. The green line, the 
horizontal line, means that the estimated revenues were right on 
target. They were not overestimated. They were not underestimated. The 
revenues were exactly estimated to be exactly on target.
  Note the chart which the Senator says makes his case. The chart says 
that in only one year, 1987, did the estimates even come close to being 
on target. They were off just $2 billion. So the chart makes my case.
  The committee says you can do it by estimates. ``Estimates of outlays 
shall not exceed estimates of receipts in any given fiscal year.'' The 
chart shows that you cannot depend upon the estimates, that the people 
who have the most expertise of any in the world cannot be accurate in 
their estimates. Why? Because we cannot foresee what the unemployment 
rate is going to be, we cannot foresee what the rate of national 
economic growth is going to be, and we cannot see what interest rates 
are going to be in a year or more down the road. That is why people 
cannot be accurate in their estimates.
  So this committee language makes my case--makes my case when it turns 
to the use of words like ``estimates,'' and then defines the word 
``estimates'' as meaning ``good faith, responsible, and reasonable 
estimates made with honest intent to implement section 1.''
  Let me ask the question of my dear friend, who will be making up 
these estimates?
  The Congress will make the estimates. The Congress will enforce the 
amendment. So what assurance is there that the Congress is going to 
make estimates that are correct?
  What encouragement does that give to the American people to believe 
that this amendment, which the distinguished Senator from Utah says 
does not say we are going to balance the budget, what assurance can the 
American people have when it is even worse than that by saying that the 
estimates of outlays will not exceed the estimate of receipts?
  Mr. HATCH. Frankly, I think if you have the incentives to produce 
more accurate estimates of receipts and outlays, there will be an 
incentive to have the top line have the bars going up every time, where 
right now we do not have that incentive. We have every incentive to 
just spend today. There is no restraint on spending whatsoever. The 
balanced budget amendment would not mandate that you balance the budget 
if a supermajority is willing to vote not to, but it does change the 
incentive so that literally you will not want to go into deficit 
because sooner or later you are going to have to pay the piper under 
that amendment. Again, I think the Senator's chart makes my case.
  Mr. BYRD. What makes the Senator----
  Mr. HATCH. I do not think I need the Senator's chart to make the case 
that our country is in trouble, that we are not doing what is right, 
that we are continuing to spend us into bankruptcy. And even though 
there are arguments made that we are only going to have a $107 billion 
deficit in 1997, that is still a deficit of over $100 billion.

[[Page S1291]]

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, what makes the 
distinguished Senator believe, when we have a constitutional amendment, 
Senators are going to have any more backbone than they have now?
  Mr. HATCH. Because I believe Senators will live up to the 
constitutional mandate and the oath of office that they take to do what 
is right, where at this particular point there is no constitutional 
mandate to live within budgetary constraints, and it is apparent.
  Mr. BYRD. They did not live up to it last year.
  Mr. HATCH. Well, there was not----
  Mr. BYRD. When they voted for the conference report on the line-item 
veto. They voted to shift the power of the purse away from the 
legislative branch to the executive. What makes the Senator believe 
that they will live up to the Constitution anymore nearly and dearly 
once this language is in it?
  Mr. HATCH. Although I tend to share the Senator's view on the line-
item veto, I think the Senator would have to admit there is a question 
whether that is going to be judged constitutional or not. If we pass a 
balanced budget amendment, it will become an official part of the 
Constitution, which is a considerably different situation.
  Mr. BYRD. Will Senators be more inclined to vote to increase taxes 
once this is part of the Constitution than they are now?
  Mr. HATCH. Senator Simon thinks so. One reason why he----
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. Simon isn't a Senator anymore.
  Mr. HATCH. I understand. What Senator Simon argued last year as the 
leading proponent of this amendment was that he felt there would be a 
greater propensity to increase taxes to solve these problems. I have to 
say that I do not believe that is so, but that is what he felt. I do 
not think that is so. I think it would be very difficult to get 
constitutional majorities to increase taxes except where they are 
clearly needed to be increased, and that is why we put in a 
constitutional majority. Now, it is no secret, and my friend knows 
this, that there are those on my side who do not think that is 
adequate.
  Mr. BYRD. Do not think what?
  Mr. HATCH. Do not think that is adequate. They want a three-fifths 
majority before you can increase taxes. But the reason we have a 
constitutional majority is because my friends on the Democratic side 
would not agree with the three-fifths majority.
  Mr. BYRD. Would not what?
  Mr. HATCH. Would not agree that it should be a three-fifths majority 
to increase taxes. I happen to believe that this has to be a bipartisan 
amendment. It is even though there are, as a percentage, less Democrats 
supporting it than Republicans. But Democrats have helped to formulate 
this amendment, and I have to give credit to those who are standing 
here with us. I think they have guts to stand up under the 
circumstances and vote for this amendment, as they should.

  Now, that does not mean that those who vote against it do not have 
guts, too, because there is a price that will be paid for voting 
against this amendment. We all understand that. And let me just say 
this. I happen to believe that the distinguished Senator from West 
Virginia has never lacked intestinal fortitude. In fact, I have been 
through a lot of experiences here that prove that as a matter of fact 
to me. I could not have more respect for anybody than I do for him as a 
U.S. Senator.
  But again, I think he makes our case. I think these 28 unbalanced 
budget volumes make our case. I think it is apparent our system is not 
working. I think if we keep going this way, our children and 
grandchildren's futures are gone. I know the distinguished Senator is a 
great family man. I know that he loves his children and grandchildren, 
as I do mine. We are expecting our 16th and 17th grandchildren within 2 
weeks, Elaine and I. I want them to have a future as we have had. But 
right now with what is happening in accordance with the chart of the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia, it is pretty apparent their 
future is being bartered away because we are unwilling to make the 
tough choices. I would lots rather have the balanced budget amendment 
helping us to estimate receipts and outlays than to have this system 
estimate them, I will tell you that right now. And it is a better 
system to have a balanced budget amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Well, the Senator is very disarming when he talks about how 
I love my family and my children and grandchildren.
  Mr. HATCH. You do.
  Mr. BYRD. He is correct about it. But he still has not answered my 
question as to why the committee and the proponents of the amendment 
felt after saying in section 1 that total outlays shall not exceed 
total receipts in any fiscal year, which is pretty straightforward 
language, which says that the budget has to be balanced every year, it 
says that the budget has to be balanced every year, why do we take an 
approach which says, on the one hand, the budget must be balanced--and 
that is what I have been hearing from the speakers who are proponents 
of this legislation--why did they say in the first section that the 
budget will have to be balanced every year and then in section 6 say, 
as it were, ``Well, you do not really have to believe that first 
section? We are not going to hold you to it. We know it will be 
difficult, if not impossible some years, to hold you to that. So we are 
not going to require you to equal the outlays with the receipts. But 
what we are going to do is this. We are going to let you get by by just 
balancing the estimates.''
  Who makes the estimates? Cannot the estimates be cooked? The 
administration cooked the numbers when they were sending up budgets in 
the early part of the Reagan administration. They cooked the numbers. 
These numbers can be cooked once this constitutional amendment becomes 
a part of the Constitution. They can be cooked. The estimates can be 
cooked. When can the American people believe us and believe that we 
mean what we say?
  That is all I have been saying here. I have been saying that we do 
not mean what we say in this amendment. We do not mean what we say in 
section 1. So what are the American people to believe?
  I compliment the distinguished Senator for coming to the floor. He is 
a man after my own kidney, as Shakespeare would say. He is a man after 
my kidney. He came to the floor. And I had suggested that someone 
should come and give us an analysis of these sections and explain how 
they are going to work and what are we expected to do to make them 
work.
  Well, he came to the floor, and he has been reading the sections of 
the amendment one by one, which was not exactly what I asked for. I do 
not have any more faith in the amendment now than I had to begin with. 
I can read the sections.
  I read the sections a number of times. And the distinguished Senator 
has prepared a chart here so that we can read them over and over again. 
I want somebody to explain to me how they will work and what is there 
about that amendment that can assure those people who are looking 
through the electronic eye that this budget is going to be balanced if 
this amendment is adopted--the budget is going to be balanced.
  Mr. HATCH. Well, I have to ask the distinguished Senator from West 
Virginia, if this balanced budget amendment passes, as much as he 
wishes that it would not, and it is ratified by the States, would the 
Senator from West Virginia, once it is placed in the Constitution, not 
do his level best to comply with the constitutional requirement, if the 
amendment is adopted, to meet these estimates that are in there, as he 
suggested that I would do my duty under the Constitution? I think what 
I am saying is this: Both charts that the Senator has put up, show that 
the current system is not working.
  Mr. BYRD. Is the Senator--
  Mr. HATCH. The reason I point out the current system is not working 
is because there are not the same pressures to make it work that there 
would be under a balanced budget amendment.
  Second, if we have these wild fluctuations under the balanced budget 
amendment, there is going to be an awful lot of heck to pay to our 
voting populace, because they are going to hold us responsible for 
these wild fluctuations.
  Mr. BYRD. You bet they are. They are going to hold you responsible.
  Mr. HATCH. They are not doing it now because they do not know who is

[[Page S1292]]

responsible for them. If we have to stand up and vote and make 
supermajority votes to spend and borrow more, then they will know who 
is doing it to them. If we have to make a constitutional majority to 
increase taxes, they will know who is doing it to them.
  I have to say, if we do not, as a congressional body, have our CBO do 
better numbers, and the OMB as the executive body do better numbers, 
then there are going to be changes that will get them to where they 
have to do better numbers.
  Will they always be accurate? There is no way we will always be 
completely and absolutely accurate.
  Mr. BYRD. I have a couple of things to say to what the Senator has 
said, Mr. President, if the Senator will yield?
  Mr. HATCH. Sure, under the same circumstances.
  Mr. BYRD. Is he asking me whether or not I will do everything I can, 
everything in my power, to help to balance the budget? Was that the 
force of his question?
  Mr. HATCH. I am sorry, I missed the question. Excuse me.
  Mr. BYRD. Was he asking me that, if this amendment becomes a part of 
the Constitution, will the Senator from West Virginia do everything he 
can do to help to balance the budget and get the deficit down? Is that 
what he was asking me?
  Mr. HATCH. Well, let me put it this way. I don't have to ask that 
question. I know the distinguished Senator from West Virginia would. 
But I asked it rhetorically because I know that the distinguished 
Senator from West Virginia would do all in his power to live up to the 
Constitution, even though he disagreed with the provision of it, once 
it is part of the Constitution. As would I.
  And, frankly, I think that he is not alone. I think there are as many 
as 535 others in Congress who would, likewise, try to live up to the 
constitutional amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield and let me answer his 
question?
  Mr. HATCH. Sure. I will be happy to.
  Mr. BYRD. I have proved that I will do everything I can to balance 
the budget. But not only this Senator. They are standing in rows on 
this side of the aisle.
  In 1993, they voted to lower the deficits by almost $500 billion. 
Working with the President, we had a package to reduce the deficits. I 
voted for that package. The Senator from Connecticut voted for that 
package. Many other Senators on this side of the aisle voted for that 
package. Not one--not one--Senator on the other side voted for that 
package, to bring down the deficits.
  So we do not need a constitutional amendment. We just need the 
courage to vote for it. I do not know what there is in this 
constitutional amendment that will give us any more courage and 
backbone than we already have. I do not know how many will figure that 
out.

  Mr. HATCH. Let me just respond to that. Even, in spite of the 
reductions in deficit that have occurred over the last 4 years after 
the enactment of one of the largest tax increases in history--some on 
our side say the largest tax increase in history; it is debatable, but 
it is one of the two largest tax increases in history, both of which, I 
think, were motivated by Members on the other side of the aisle--we are 
still in hundred-plus billion dollar deficits, going up to $188 billion 
and on up beyond that by the year 2002.
  The fact of the matter is, if it was up to the distinguished Senator 
from West Virginia and the Senator from Utah, we would have the will.
  Mr. BYRD. If it were up to the Senator from West Virginia, we would 
not have any tax cuts this year.
  Mr. HATCH. I was saying, if it was up to the Senator from West 
Virginia and the Senator from Utah, I believe we would have the will to 
do what is right.
  Mr. BYRD. Would the Senator vote with me to increase taxes?
  Mr. HATCH. Let me just finish. But the problem is, it is not up to 
just the two of us. It has been up to everybody in Congress for 28 
years of unbalanced budgets. I know that people do not like these two 
stacks because they are embarrassing. It is embarrassing to me to have 
to point to these and say for the 21 years I have been here, these have 
been unbalanced. For all of those 21 years I fought for a balanced 
budget amendment. But I have to say, we do not have the will. It is 
apparent and we are not going to have the will unless we do something 
about it constitutionally, where everybody will have to face the music.
  Right now they do not. And where some on our side love more defense 
spending and some of the Democrat side love more social spending in 
ways that may be irresponsible, under the balanced budget amendment I 
think we are going to all have to be more responsible.
  I just wish--this is an erstwhile wish, I understand--but I wish my 
colleague from West Virginia were on our side on this, because I think 
it would be a much easier amendment to pass.
  But I understand why he is not, and I know how sincere he is. But, 
like Paul of old--
  Mr. BYRD. Like who?
  Mr. HATCH. Like Paul of old, who held the coats--
  Mr. BYRD. A great Apostle.
  Mr. HATCH. The man who held the coats of the men who stoned the first 
Christian martyr, he is sincerely wrong.
  Mr. BYRD. Paul was?
  Mr. HATCH. Paul was, yes, for holding the coats of those who stoned 
the first Christian martyr, Stephen. Paul was sincere. He meant what he 
said. He really was sincere. But he was wrong.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, we are getting off the track.
  Mr. HATCH. I don't think so. Sometimes going back in history is a 
very good thing to do.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senator from Utah wishes I were on his 
side?
  Mr. HATCH. I do. I would feel much better.
  Mr. BYRD. I am on the Constitution's side.
  Mr. HATCH. So am I.
  Mr. BYRD. I am on the Constitution's side. And I do not want to see 
that Constitution prostituted by an amendment that is nothing more than 
a bookkeeping manual on accounting principles. It has no place in the 
Constitution. It is not going to give this Senator or any other Senator 
any more backbone than the good Lord gave to me in the beginning to 
stand up and vote the tough votes.
  I do not want to see the faith of the American people in this book--
forget the stack of books there, ever so high. This is the book. I do 
not want to see the faith of the American people in this Constitution 
undermined. And it is going to be undermined when we write that 
language into it and the budgets do not balance.
  Let me at least thank the Senator for being honest to the point that 
he says that this amendment is not going to balance the budget.
  Mr. HATCH. No, I didn't say that. I said the amendment does not 
mandate a balanced budget. I think this amendment will lead us to a 
balanced budget.
  Mr. BYRD. It does not mandate it.
  Mr. HATCH. But let me say this. I happen to believe that this little 
booklet that contains the Constitution of the United States, without 
the balanced budget amendment, will hopefully have a balanced budget 
amendment in it. Because, if we do--and I know that sincerely dedicated 
people like my friend from West Virginia will be voting for more fiscal 
responsibility and restraint than we do now. And he will have more 
leverage on not only his side, but our side, to get people to stand up 
and do what is right.
  I do not think that these comments, ``Let's just do it''--I have 
heard that now for 21 years. ``Let's just do it. Let's just have the 
will to do it.''
  Here is the will of the Congress of the United States. Mr. President, 
28 years of unbalanced budgets. I think these volumes speak worlds of 
information for us, of how ineffective we have been in doing what is 
right. The Constitution provides, in article V, for ways of amending it 
when it becomes necessary in the public interest to do so. I cannot 
imagine anything more necessary in the public interest than a balanced 
budget amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 1, if you will, a bipartisan 
amendment, bicameral bipartisan amendment, that literally, literally 
puts some screws to Congress and some restraints on Congress and makes 
Congress have to face the music.
  Right now, we don't face any music. Let's have the will? Give me a 
break,

[[Page S1293]]

we haven't had the will in almost 66 years, but certainly not in the 
last 28 years, as represented by these huge stacks of unbalanced 
budgets of the United States of America.
  I have to pay respect to my colleague, because I care for him so 
much. He is sincere, he is eloquent, and he is a great advocate, and I 
respect him. In fact, it could be said I love him. The fact of the 
matter is, I think he is wrong. He thinks I am wrong. But I think his 
charts are very, very good reasons why, and these books are very good 
reasons why something has to be done. We cannot just keep frittering 
away our children's future and the future of our grandchildren. I know 
he shares that view with me, and I just wish we could do more together 
to protect their future. I am doing everything I can with this 
amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. You are being honest about it, too----
  Mr. HATCH. I am being honest.
  Mr. BYRD. Saying it doesn't promise a balanced budget.
  Mr. HATCH. I think it promises a balanced budget, I don't think it 
mandates one. It gives us the flexibility to do whatever we want to do, 
as long as we comply its requirements.
  Mr. BYRD. To cook the estimates.
  Mr. HATCH. No, no, it gives us the flexibility to do whatever we want 
to do, but we have to stand up and vote to do it by supermajority 
votes. If you want to increase the deficits, you have to stand up and 
vote by a supermajority to do it. If you want to increase taxes, you 
can do it, but you have to vote on a constitutional majority of both 
Houses, to do it. That is a considerably different situation from what 
we have today where there are no constraints and, in many cases, or 
some cases that are very important, at least over the last 21 years, no 
votes. It has been done in the dead of the night, to use a metaphor, a 
metaphor that is all too real. These budget volumes are real. These are 
not mirages. These volumes are actually real. They represent 28 years 
of unbalanced budgets, 8 years longer than I have been here, and I see 
many, many more in the future if we don't pass this balanced budget 
amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, here is the mirage, right here. This is the 
mirage, this amendment to the Constitution. The Senator says that we 
should write two or three more supermajority requirements into the 
Constitution. It already requires eight, including the three 
amendments--five in the original Constitution and three amendments, 12, 
14 and 25. Now we are going to write some more in. This is going to 
head us more and more in the direction of minority control--minority 
control. This is a republic, which uses democratic processes. This is a 
representative democracy, a republic for which it stands. A republic.
  I just close by saying this amendment is a real gimmick--a real 
gimmick. It is not going to cause us to balance this budget any more 
than if we didn't have it; may even make it more difficult to balance 
the budget.
  Moses struck the rock at Kadesh with his rod. He smote the rock twice 
and water gushed forth and the people's thirst and the thirst of the 
beasts of the people were quenched. This amendment is not the rock of 
Kadesh. You won't be able to smite that amendment. The waters of a 
balanced budget are not going to flow from that piece of junk. I say 
that with all due respect to my friend. But that will not work. That's 
the long and the short of it, and it is misleading the people. It is 
misleading the people. The amendment doesn't require us to balance the 
budget, it only requires us to balance the estimates. So there we go 
again. There is a wheel, and we seem to be on it, around and around. 
Balance the estimates. We have seen the estimates.
  So we can see by looking at this chart where the estimates have been 
wrong--always wrong--in the past, and we should know by that lamp that 
they are going to be wrong in the future.
  So what faith can we have in this kind of an amendment? The Senator 
says we would be under greater pressure to balance the budget. Why not 
start now? Why wait 5 years, at least 5 years, perhaps even longer 
under that amendment? Why wait for pressure? The pressure is just as 
great today and we will be even deeper into the hole by 2002 than we 
are now.

  Mr. HATCH. Let me just say this, Moses also struck the rock at 
Meribah and gave water and was forbidden from entering the promised 
land after 40 years of traveling in the wilderness.
  Mr. BYRD. Struck the rock at Horeb.
  Mr. HATCH. That's right, Horeb. The fact of the matter is that he was 
following, in a sense, the same pattern, but without God's will. And I 
am tired of following the same pattern which I cannot believe is God's 
will. I am sorry that we have 28 years of unbalanced budgets in a row, 
and we are looking at 28 more because we are unwilling to do what is 
right.
  Now, look, the balanced budget amendment moves us toward a balanced 
budget by requiring supermajority votes if we want to unbalance the 
budget or increase the taxes to balance it. It requires a balanced 
budget unless there are emergencies in which we need a three-fifths 
majority to waive balanced budget requirements.
  In all due respect, my friend from West Virginia is actually arguing 
that one should oppose the balanced budget amendment because it doesn't 
require utopia, because we can rely on estimates. Well, utopia, means 
``nowhere.'' But relying on good faith estimates, as the report does 
say, is ``somewhere,'' rather than ``nowhere.'' And it will lead us to 
balanced budgets.
  The first Congress and the States ratified the Bill of Rights. If we 
took the Senator's line, one should have opposed them, let's say, the 
first amendment, for instance, free speech, because it did not define 
free speech or show how free speech was going to be enforced. But we 
all know that's ridiculous, and I believe it's ridiculous, but I 
believe we should be better equipped to deal with estimates of outlays 
and receipts with a balanced budget amendment in the Constitution that 
all of us are sworn to uphold.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HATCH. Sure.
  Mr. BYRD. Senator Dodd needs to speak on his amendment a bit more, so 
I am going to leave the floor for now.
  Mr. HATCH. Well, I will miss my colleague.
  Mr. BYRD. I beg your pardon.
  Mr. HATCH. This has been a good colloquy. I will miss my colleague, 
and he teaches me a lot every time he comes to the floor.
  Mr. BYRD. I would like to hear the distinguished Senator explain how 
the States balance their budgets and how they operate, not only on a 
budget that provides for the operating expenses of Government from day-
to-day, but also on the capital budget, and why under this amendment 
the Federal Government will not be able to have a capital budget.
  Why does not someone explain that the States operate on two budgets? 
Not only an operating budget, but also a capital budget. And then why 
do we continue to say that the Federal Government should balance its 
budget like the States do, without the explanation that there are 
capital budgets in States?
  Mr. HATCH. I will not go into that very much right now, but I think 
the Senator makes a very good point.
  One reason is the States do not print the money. No. 2 is some States 
cannot do much in the capital way because they do not have the money 
and they do not balance their budgets the way they should. No. 3 is 
that there are rating systems that make it possible for States to 
borrow on bonds, and they discipline the use of bonds by the States. 
There would be no similar system for the Federal Government. No. 4 is 
that, frankly, the Federal Government can create surpluses that should 
work. No. 5 is that the States, at least 44 of them, have balanced 
budget amendments. If they did not have their balanced budget 
amendments, many of them would not be balancing their budgets either, 
even with the capital budget. And they have done better than the 
Federal Government at restraining their borrowing.
  So there is no real comparison between the Federal Government and the 
States. There is nobody to keep the Federal Government in line without 
a balanced budget amendment. I think that is what this balanced budget 
amendment is all about. I appreciate my colleague. We have had a good 
debate. He certainly always raises very interesting issues and very 
pertinent issues and I think adds to the quality of the debate around 
here every time

[[Page S1294]]

he comes on the floor. So I personally appreciate it.
  With regard to capital budgets, let me say OMB, CBO and GAO, among 
others, have opined that debt-financed capital budgets are not a good 
idea for the Federal Government. All of them have said that. See, for 
example, President Clinton's fiscal 1998 proposed budget. The 
Analytical Perspectives volume, I think on page 136, there are some 
remarks on this.
  The Clinton administration said, ``The rationale for borrowing to 
finance investment is not persuasive'' and that a ``capital budget is 
not a justification to relax current and proposed budget constraints.'' 
I agree.
  Besides the fact that the U.S. Government does not need to borrow to 
finance its investment, it is not subject to the constraints that 
families, business and States face.
  Families and businesses are disciplined by markets. States are 
disciplined by bond ratings. A Federal capital budget is bound to be 
abused. Future Congresses could redefine many kinds of spending as 
capital. It would be a monstrous loophole in the balanced budget 
amendment.
  Let me just say that I do agree with OMB, CBO, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Congressional Budget Office, the General 
Accounting Office, that a Federal capital budget is not a good idea. 
Especially, I think, in the context of a constitutional amendment. So 
that is all I will say about it today. But I hope that is enough 
because a capital budget is really not the way to go constitutionally. 
But this amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 1, is the right way to go. 
It will help us to make some dents in what has been going on for the 
last 28 years at least, or should I say 58 of the last 66 years where 
we have had unbalanced budgets.
  Could I ask the Chair, how much time remains on both sides?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Abraham). The Senator from Utah has 14 
minutes, 25 seconds, the Senator from Connecticut has 1 minute, 32 
seconds.
  Mr. DODD. Can I get 6 or 7 minutes?
  Mr. HATCH. Go ahead.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Would the Senator yield some time? Two minutes?
  Mr. HATCH. Could I yield to the budget----
  Mr. DOMENICI. Go to him first.
  Mr. DODD. I would like to make some concluding remarks on my pending 
amendment. So if the Senator from New Mexico wants to take a couple 
minutes to do that, and then I would like to wrap up on my amendment 
before the vote at 5:30.
  Mr. HATCH. I yield such time as he needs.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Two minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I might say to the distinguished senior Senator from 
West Virginia, Senator Byrd, I did not hear your entire argument with 
reference to estimates, but I would suggest that in due course--I have 
difficulty getting time on this floor because when there is time I 
cannot be here and then when I get here, eminent Senators are using all 
the time. I am not complaining.
  But I would like tomorrow to explain a bit about estimating. I would 
just suggest that we need not use the estimating that has taken place 
to produce that chart. There is another way to estimate it. You can 
estimate right up close to the end of the period of time, and you get 
estimates that are pretty close.
  I would also suggest that whether it is red or whether it is black--
--
  Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield? But there, they are still 
estimates.
  Mr. DOMENICI. That is correct.
  I will talk about it tomorrow. And everything about us, the 
Government, is built on estimates. We rely on it very, very much.
  Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DOMENICI. Yes.
  Mr. BYRD. We rely on it and the charts show how much we fall short.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Half that red and half that black is not estimates at 
all. Half or more is based upon programs that cost more than you 
estimate. Frankly, that has nothing to do with economic estimates. It 
has to do with us not doing a good enough job figuring what programs 
are going to cost. That could be fixed. In fact, we are doing much 
better at it already in terms of that.
  But my last observation has to do with a thought you had as you 
captured the notion that this would make this budget so unreliable that 
you called it all a gimmick.
  Frankly, I want to make sure that everybody knows that the best use 
of the word gimmick for anything going on on this floor has to do with 
the gimmick that some on that side of the aisle are using when they 
speak of taking Social Security off budget so you will assure Social 
Security's solvency and the checks. That is a gimmick of the highest 
order. For you do that, and there is no assurance that Congress will 
not spend the trust fund surpluses for anything they want. It is no 
longer subject to any budget discipline. It is out there all by itself.
  Second, there is no assurance that programs for senior citizens that 
are not Social Security would not be moved there, and that that trust 
fund becomes more vulnerable then when it is subject to the discipline 
of the give-and-take of a budget. And on that I am certain.
  And last, some Senators today got up and said that the Congressional 
Research Service had given them all they needed because it had 
apparently said that you risked Social Security in the outyears. Well, 
that did not sound right to any of us. We called them up and they have 
issued a correction. It could not conceivably be what they said and 
what was implied from it. They are now saying--and I quote:

       We are not concluding that the Trust Funds surpluses could 
     not be drawn down to pay beneficiaries. The [balanced budget 
     amendment] would not require that result.

  So it does not stand for the proposition that was used. They made a 
mistake in the translation, in the way they interpreted and we can 
debate that a little tomorrow. But I just thought we ought to make sure 
that we understood that.
  Now, I know that my friend from West Virginia is a proponent of the 
Constitution. And when you speak of amending it, he stands on it. But 
let us face it, you cannot stand on it when you are talking about 
amending it. Because that would have meant none of the amendments that 
were added to it would be there. You would have held up the old 
Constitution when it was first drawn with no amendments and said, I 
stand on it.
  Mr. BYRD. Oh, no, no, no, no.
  Mr. DOMENICI. You could.
  Mr. BYRD. No, no, no. The Senator was quite right he was not here to 
hear my statement.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I do not have any additional time.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the memorandum from the 
Congressional Research Service be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                               Congressional Research Service,

                                      The Library of Congress,

                                Washington, DC, February 12, 1997.

     To: Hon. Pete V. Domenici; Attention: Jim Capretta.
     From: American Law Division.
     Subject: Treatment of Outlays from Social Security Surpluses 
       under BBA.

       This memorandum is in response to your inquiry with respect 
     to the effect on the Social Security Trust Funds of the 
     pending Balanced Budget Amendment (BBA). Under S.J. Res. 1 as 
     it is now before the Senate Sec. 1 would mandate that 
     ``[t]otal outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total 
     receipts for the fiscal year. . . .'' Outlays and receipts 
     are defined in Sec. 7 as practically all inclusive, with two 
     exceptions that are irrelevant here.
       At some point, the receipts into the Social Security Trust 
     Funds will not balance the outlays from those Funds. Under 
     present law, then, the surpluses being built up in the Funds, 
     at least as an accounting practice, will be utilized to pay 
     benefits to the extent receipts for each year do not equal 
     the outlays in that year. Simply stated, the federal 
     securities held by the Trust Funds will be drawn down to 
     cover the Social Security deficit in that year, and the 
     Treasury will have to make good on those securities with 
     whatever moneys it has available.
       However, Sec. 1 of the pending BBA requires that total 
     outlays for any fiscal year not exceed total receipts for 
     that fiscal year. Thus, the amount drawn from the Social 
     Security Trust Funds could not be counted in the calculation 
     of the balance between total federal outlays and receipts. We 
     are not concluding that the Trust Funds surpluses could not 
     be drawn down to pay beneficiaries. The BBA would not require 
     that result. What it would mandate is that, inasmuch as the 
     United States has a unified budget, other receipts into the 
     Treasury would have to be counted to balance the outlays from 
     the Trust Funds and those receipts would not be otherwise

[[Page S1295]]

     available to the Government for that year. Only if no other 
     receipts in any particular year could be found would the 
     possibility of a limitation on drawing down the Trust Funds 
     arise. Even in this eventuality, however, Congress would 
     retain authority under the BBA to raise revenues or to reduce 
     expenditures to obtain the necessary moneys to make good on 
     the liquidation of securities from the Social Security Trust 
     Funds.

                                            Johnny H. Killian,

                                       Senior Specialist, American
                                               Constitutional Law.

  Mr. DOMENICI. I yield back to the chairman. I will be glad to come 
down and discuss this in more detail.
  Mr. BYRD. I will be happy to join the Senator.
  Mr. DODD. I wanted to yield to my colleague from West Virginia, who 
wanted to make a comment on the pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah has 9 minutes and 21 
seconds remaining, and the Senator from Connecticut has 1 minute and 32 
seconds.
  Mr. HATCH. How much time does the Senator need?
  Mr. BYRD. Three minutes.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes of my time to the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia, and then I have the Senator 
from Nebraska waiting to speak.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Utah 
for his courtesy in yielding time.
  Mr. President, I commend the distinguished senior Senator from 
Connecticut for his amendment, and for his very thorough explanation of 
it. There is, as he has said, no higher duty than this body has than to 
safeguard the security and liberties of the American people. This is 
the height of pernicious legislative mischief to provide the ready and 
robust forces when the Nation faces a serious threat to our national 
security. Can we define the specific nature of such threats that might 
face us? Of course not. Do we need the flexibility to react in time, in 
advance, and with sufficient credibility so as to show down all such 
conceivable threats to our security? Of course, we should.
  The Constitution should not be used as a straitjacket which has the 
effect of throwing into doubt our ability to perform this most basic of 
our duties. Thus, the Dodd amendment is a very useful one, as essential 
improvement to the constitutional proposal which is before the body. 
The definition of ``imminent and serious military threat to national 
security,'' as a test for waiving the requirements of the balanced 
budget, as proposed by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut is a 
valuable improvement to the amendment offered by the Senator from Utah, 
and I strongly encourage my colleagues to support it.
  I again thank my friend from Utah, who is my friend, who is a fine 
Christian gentleman, who is always fair and courteous. I salute him for 
that, and I thank my colleague from Connecticut.
  Mr. HATCH. How much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah has 6 minutes and 42 
seconds
  Mr. HATCH. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.


                      Amendment No. 4, as Modified

  Mr. DODD. Pursuant to a discussion earlier, I ask unanimous consent 
to send to the desk a modification of my amendment along the lines we 
discussed earlier. I ask unanimous consent my amendment be allowed to 
be modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 4), as modified, is as follows:
       On page 3, line 7, strike beginning with ``is'' through 
     line 11 and insert ``faces an imminent and serious military 
     threat to national security as declared by a joint 
     resolution,''. which becomes law.''

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, let me briefly sum up, if I can, this 
amendment. I think the handwriting is on the wall. It is one of those 
moments, the wave is moving here, and I deeply regret it.
  I have the feeling my colleagues have just not read section 5 as 
carefully as we should. I emphasize again and draw their attention to 
this not based on the argument that I asked them to not support the 
constitutional amendment to balance the budget, but merely that we 
improve this section to reflect, I think, what ought to be the 
priorities of a nation; that is, to be able to respond to an imminent 
threat to our national security and be allowed to do that in a way that 
would permit us to waive the restrictions of this amendment. The 
priority of responding, I think, is a higher one than the issue of the 
constitutional amendment to balance the budget.
  I draw the attention of my colleagues to some pivotal words in this 
section, ``a declaration of war,'' or the United States must be 
``engaged in military conflict,'' particularly that latter one, Mr. 
President. It does not talk about imminent danger. We must actually be 
engaged.
  It is ironic in many ways that we can have a declaration of war which 
can be reached by a simple majority here. A simple majority of Senators 
present and voting can declare war. You do not require that all Members 
be here to declare war. No vote we ever cast could ever be more 
profound than to commit our Nation to war. Yet, to waive the budget 
requirement of this amendment requires a special parliamentary 
proceeding which excludes the vote of the Vice President, and requires 
a majority of all Members regardless of who is present in order to 
waive the restrictions of this so we can respond to a conflict. How 
ironic that in the very same section you have a declaration of war that 
can be reached by a simple majority of Members present and voting, and 
yet to waive the restrictions of this amendment requires a ``super'' 
number, if you will, beyond that which is necessary to commit this 
Nation.
  So I urge my colleagues to look at this amendment that will be at the 
desk when you come to vote in a few minutes. We replace this language 
by saying that the Nation faces an imminent and serious military threat 
to national security as declared by a joint resolution that is passed 
into law. We must vote that we are facing that imminent threat. If we 
vote accordingly, that we are facing an imminent threat, then it seems 
to me that to waive the restrictions here is the only sensible thing to 
do. To require today that we have a declaration of war, the perverse 
idea that a President and Congress, in a future time may declare war 
just to avoid the restrictions of this amendment, or to actually be 
engaged in a conflict and not allow our Nation to prepare for a likely 
conflict, concerns me deeply.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues, and I thank my colleague from 
West Virginia for his support of this amendment, but I urge my 
colleagues to please read this amendment and read this section and 
realize what great harm and danger we could be creating for our Nation 
if we adopt this amendment with this section as written, which I think 
places this Nation in an unrealistic and dangerous straitjacket.
  I thank my colleague from Utah for yielding the time.
  Mr. HATCH. Let me take 1 minute of my remaining time, and that is to 
say that this amendment will have a loophole in the balanced budget 
amendment second to none, and a loophole for any kind of spending--not 
military spending, any kind of spending. It means more of the 28 years 
of unbalanced budgets. I hope my colleagues will vote down this 
amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. DODD. I yield back my time.
  Mr. HATCH. I move to table, and I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
lay on the table the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from 
Connecticut.
  On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk 
will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced-- yeas 64, nays 36, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 10 Leg.]

                                YEAS--64

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel

[[Page S1296]]


     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Moseley-Braun
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith, Bob
     Smith, Gordon
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--36

     Akaka
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Cleland
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
  The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 4), as modified, 
was agreed to.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NICKLES. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

                          ____________________