[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 14 (Thursday, February 6, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1052-S1056]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  TRIBUTE TO PAMELA CHURCHILL HARRIMAN

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to pay tribute 
to a very distinguished citizen of the world, Pamela Churchill 
Harriman, whose untimely death occurred yesterday in Paris, France, 
while she was performing her very distinguished duties as United States 
Ambassador to France.
  Ambassador Harriman had an illustrious career. She has graced Europe, 
she has graced the United States, and has capped an extraordinary life 
with very distinguished service for the past 4 years as our Ambassador 
to France, dealing, in fact, with some of the most difficult problems 
of the world, as we have tensions between the United States and France 
and the problems of NATO and a great many other issues.
  During the past several years, I have had the privilege to come to 
know Ambassador Harriman personally. I traveled to Paris in connection 
with my duties as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and 
found her knowledge, experience, and wisdom in that field to be very 
extensive and, candidly, it was somewhat of a surprise to find such 
depth and knowledge and understanding on the complicated matters which 
involve intelligence.
  She truly had an extraordinary life. Married to Randolph Churchill, 
the son of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, she was privy to some of 
the really fascinating and great events of the era.
  During the course of conversations with her, I was struck to hear her 
tell of being at Checkers, the home of the Prime Minister, one Sunday 
evening when the dinner was interrupted by a telephone call from 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. And she told the story about Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill telling the story of President Roosevelt 
telling to Churchill the United States was now in it with Great 
Britain, because the attack on Pearl Harbor had just occurred.
  And then her reminiscences about the events during the war. The 
Churchills had a basement at No. 10 Downing Street for when the air 
raids came on. They had tiered bunkers. They were not set up in very 
elaborate fashion. She slept in the lower bunk, pregnant at the time, 
and Sir Winston Churchill would come in, she recounted, at 2 a.m. and 
snore loudly, awakening everybody in the compound.
  When I heard of the news 2 days ago, I called Charge d'Affaires 
Donald Bandler to find out what her condition was. She finished an 
arduous day, was on her way for a swim in the Ritz Hotel and, before 
going into the water, had suffered a seizure.

[[Page S1053]]

  I had a chance to talk briefly with her son, Winston Churchill, who 
said at that point it was apparent that his mother would not survive.
  While talking with her about the events of being an ambassador, I was 
struck with the difficulties that Ambassadors of the United States are 
having around the world and took some of the information and made a 
statement on the Senate floor praising the work she was doing, 
illustrative of ambassadors generally, commenting about the need to 
support the State Department and the activities which ambassadors were 
performing.
  While there, I had an opportunity to stay in the Benjamin Franklin 
Room, a room of special significance to this Senator, Franklin being a 
Philadelphian really, not a Bostonian, and had an opportunity to get 
some of the memorabilia from the Ben Franklin Institute to send to 
Ambassador Harriman to furnish the Franklin Room in the style she 
wanted it to be.
  We have lost a really great world citizen with the passing of 
Ambassador Harriman. There is much more that could be said about her, 
in terms of her illustrious life. Many Senators knew her; most of 
Washington knew her. She was a great citizen of Great Britain, she was, 
in a sense, a citizen of France but, most of all, a great citizen of 
America.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HOLLINGS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I had the opportunity at the NATO 
conference in November, as the ranking member and former chairman of 
State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations, to spend an entire morning 
with Ambassador Harriman going over her particular needs, her budget. I 
was really impressed with the overall view she had of the needs of the 
Department of State, particularly her grasp of bringing the Department 
up to date in the area of communications, upgrading its computers, and 
other technological issues.
  I could tell that she understood, after we had some time together, 
that the lack of real financial support for the Department of State has 
been at the executive branch, not here in the Congress. I have fought 
for many, many years to try to get the needed increases for the 
endeavors of the State Department. And now with the fall of the wall, 
defense is not our first line of defense. The State Department is.
  We are trying to sell capitalism. We are trying to sell democracy and 
individual rights the world around. And that is the province of our 
Department of State, which has been cut back. We have been closing 
consulates and closing embassies.
  The record will show that the distinguished Ambassador had really 
been to the President on these issues, and for the first time President 
Clinton has made a substantial request for an increase for the 
Department of State. There will be many kudos, well deserved, for 
Ambassador Harriman, but I think she was the one who finally got the 
message to the executive branch as to what was needed at the State 
Department.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a Brookings Institute 
Council on Foreign Relations study recently published on the needs of 
the State Department and the diplomacy of the U.S. Government be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   Financing American Leadership: Protecting American Interests and 
                       Promoting American Values

(Statement of the Task Force on Resources for International Affairs of 
    the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations)


                      i. introduction and summary

       Relative to the average of the 1980s, spending on 
     international affairs has fallen nearly 20 percent in real 
     terms, and it would decline by as much as another 30 percent 
     under the plans proposed by the President and the Congress 
     for balancing the federal budget by 2002.
       Noting this trend in foreign affairs spending, the Council 
     on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, while 
     taking no positions on the question as organizations, 
     convened an independent Task Force of distinguished private 
     citizens with a strong commitment to foreign affairs to 
     examine its consequences and to make such recommendations as 
     it might see fit.
       The Task Force concludes that the cuts already made in the 
     international affairs discretionary account have adversely 
     affected, to a significant degree, the ability of the United 
     States to protect and promote its economic, diplomatic and 
     strategic agendas abroad. Unless this trend is reversed, 
     American vital interests will be jeopardized.
       The Task Force calls on the President and the Secretary of 
     State to exert the strong and sustained leadership that will 
     be necessary to secure the understanding of the American 
     people and the bipartisan support of the Congress to provide 
     the funds necessary to finance American global leadership. 
     This effort must be accompanied by a thorough review of the 
     foreign affairs agencies with an eye toward a structure and 
     to processes that will be more efficient and effective in 
     terms of today's requirements.
       The Task Force recommends that the President call for an 
     increase in international affairs spending from its 1997 
     level of $19 billion to $21 billion in 1998, with annual 
     adjustments through the year 2002 to offset projected 
     inflation.\1\ In addition, this report calls for the creation 
     of a bipartisan commission to consider possible reforms in 
     the State Department and the other foreign affairs agencies 
     and identifies nearly one billion dollars in achievable 
     reforms and economies. The amount of the net increase the 
     Task Force proposes represents only about one-tenth of one 
     percent of the entire FY 1997 federal budget and less than 
     four-tenths of one percent for the total discretionary 
     budget. Although these amounts are small in absolute terms, 
     the potential consequences of not having them are quite 
     large.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ The corresponding amount of budget authority would be 
     roughly $22 billion in 1998, due to the fact that increases 
     in actual spending always lag increases in the authorization 
     to spend. The amounts are similar to, but for technical 
     reasons somewhat greater than, spending and budget authority 
     for the ``150 (foreign affairs) account.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                   ii. the challenge and opportunity

       With the Cold War over, it is natural that the United 
     States should focus more on domestic concerns. Reducing the 
     federal budget deficit must be a high priority. Ensuring that 
     government programs are efficient and effective is an 
     obligation owed to American taxpayers. However, domestic 
     renewal must not blind us to the world's continuing dangers 
     and the requirements of America's essential leadership role.
       The end of the Cold War has transformed the nature of the 
     challenges we face. Ethnic strife, regional instability, 
     crime, narcotics, terrorism, famine, environmental 
     degradation, fanaticism and rogue regimes with mass 
     destruction capabilities have taken the place of the global 
     communist threat on our agenda. The United States cannot 
     effectively protect its interests in these areas and provide 
     leadership for those who would work with us unless we are 
     prepared to spend the amount necessary to protect our 
     interests and promote our values.
       Moreover, by strengthening friendly forces and by calming 
     and defusing potentially explosive situations, our diplomats 
     can reduce the demands upon our military forces, avoiding 
     unnecessary troop deployments and saving much more money in 
     the defense account than would be spent from the much smaller 
     foreign affairs account. With such objectives in mind, our 
     diplomatic arm for example, has reinforced in recent years 
     our basic Asia-Pacific alliances with Japan, Korea, 
     Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. In both Asia and 
     Europe, new concepts of regional security and economic 
     cooperation have been advocated, including dialogues among 
     former adversaries. Timely spending for conflict resolution 
     can help to obviate the need for costly disaster relief, 
     refugee resettlement and possible military deployments.
       The U.S. economy is increasingly interdependent with the 
     rest of the world--a world that is increasingly competitive. 
     Most recent increases in our nation's manufacturing 
     employment have come from increased export volume which has 
     produced jobs with higher than average wages and helped to 
     drive the continuous growth of our economy. Our ability to 
     sustain that growth depends, in part, on our willingness and 
     ability to employ the traditional instruments of foreign 
     policy to promote exports, protect our products and ensure 
     open trade. These are complex undertakings that include tasks 
     ranging from sustainable development and basic institution 
     building (e.g. establishing commercial codes where none have 
     existed) to multilateral trade negotiations such as in the 
     World Trade Organization. We know how to do these things; we 
     must establish the priorities and be prepared to spend the 
     money to deploy the assets, people and institutions required 
     to achieve them.
       Managing today's international, political, economic and 
     security problems and seizing the opportunities before us 
     requires American leadership. Exercising that leadership is 
     difficult. It demands sustained official and public 
     diplomacy, an array of economic and military sticks and 
     carrots, and preventive measures where they can be effective. 
     And it will require money.
       Senator Richard Lugar in a recent admonition to the 
     country's policy makers summarized the view of the Task 
     Force: ``Too many leaders in both political parties have 
     bowed to political expedience and embraced the fiction that 
     international spending does not benefit Americans and 
     therefore can be cut with impunity. As important as balancing 
     the budget is, it will not happen if American

[[Page S1054]]

     disengagement from the world results in nuclear terrorism, an 
     international trade war, an international energy crisis, a 
     major regional conflict requiring U.S. intervention, or some 
     other preventable disaster that undermines our security and 
     prosperity.''
       Americans want the United States to remain a world leader. 
     Polling by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations reveals 
     that two-thirds of the public wants the United States to 
     remain actively engaged in world affairs. This number is 
     actually higher than during many parts of the 1970s and early 
     1980s, when we were in the winter of the Cold War. Other poll 
     data strongly support the belief that the public is willing 
     to pay for continued global engagement.


                      III. Projected Expenditures

       What resources is our government currently devoting to 
     meeting these global challenges and opportunities?
       In FY 1997, the United States will spend about $19 billion 
     for its diplomatic and foreign assistance. That amount is 
     slightly more than one percent of the overall federal budget. 
     It is less in real or inflation-adjusted terms than 
     international discretionary spending in any year since 1979, 
     and nearly 20 percent below the average since then.
       International affairs is the only major category of federal 
     spending that has undergone a real reduction since 1980. 
     Along with funding for the Pentagon, international spending 
     is one of only two major components of the federal budget to 
     have been reduced since 1990.
       As problematic as spending cuts have been to date, those 
     now planned are much worse. The President's last fiscal plan, 
     of early 1996, anticipated that real funding for 
     international affairs would decline from $19 billion to $16.5 
     billion by 2002. If he agrees--as he may do--to use 
     Congressional Budget Office assumptions, the President would 
     need to cut significantly more. Under the Congressional 
     budget-balancing resolution of April, 1996, international 
     spending would drop to $13 billion, or 30 percent below its 
     current level and 45 percent below its 1980-1995 average in 
     constant 1997 dollars. That would be less than at any time 
     since 1955.
       In contrast with the defense and intelligence budgets, the 
     international affairs account is not at all protected in the 
     deficit-elimination process. In the three year budget 
     agreement concluded between President Bush and the 
     Democratic-led Congress in 1990 (the ``Andrews Air Force Base 
     Agreement'') the international affairs function as well as 
     the national defense function of the budget were fenced off 
     and protected from diversion to alternative spending. By 
     contrast, at the conclusion of the January, 1996 budget 
     negotiations, there was political agreement to put a floor 
     under the national defense budget, but international affairs 
     was grouped with all other non-defense discretionary 
     expenditures and targeted by OMB for straight-line 
     reductions. Subsequent pleas from the State Department for 
     the protection of foreign affairs within a more expansive 
     ``national security'' category were to no avail.


                            IV. Consequences

       The State Department and its 260-plus overseas posts 
     constitute the basic and indispensable infrastructure upon 
     which all US civilian--and many military--elements rely to 
     protect and promote American interests around the world. The 
     Task Force found unmistakable evidence that the readiness of 
     this infrastructure has been seriously eroded. Some 30 posts 
     have been closed in the past three years for lack of 
     operating funds. Many of the remaining posts are shabby, 
     unsafe and ill-equipped. All are handicapped by obsolete 
     information technology. Staffing is highly uneven. The 
     Department's cadre of language and area specialists has been 
     depleted and resources for public diplomacy are fast 
     disappearing. Yet the demands upon our missions continue to 
     grow. Reports circulate that budget cuts may force the 
     Department to close more posts abroad and that the Department 
     is being advised to sell off its assets in order to meet 
     operating expenses. Taken together, these developments 
     contribute to an image of decline and withdrawal which 
     disheartens our friends and allies and undermines our 
     effectiveness abroad, as do the actual cuts out of our 
     diplomatic muscle.
       More subtle is the extent to which the Executive's options 
     have been severely limited for lack of readily available, 
     flexible resources with which to avert or respond to foreign 
     crises. Future chief executives, regardless of party, will 
     find this every bit as vexing as has the present incumbent.
       In the recent past our government has been forced to 
     choose, sometimes arbitrarily, which situations it will 
     engage in and which it will ignore. Here are some recent 
     examples: To stabilize Haiti, the decision had to be made to 
     reduce economic support for Turkey despite its critical 
     relationship to our Middle East interests; the decision to 
     provide aid to shore up the West Bank and Gaza was made at 
     the expense of funds originally intended to help demobilize 
     the armed forces of the parties to a Central American peace 
     agreement which the United States had spent years 
     negotiating; providing our share of the financing package 
     assembled for Cambodia's first free election required 
     deferring, for more than a year, support for smaller 
     initiatives in a dozen or so other countries; responding to 
     the refugee crisis in Rwanda meant taking funds for 
     democratic institution-building from the rest of Africa at a 
     moment when positive trends were emerging elsewhere on the 
     continent; and when the United States needed $2 million to 
     monitor a cease-fire between the Kurdish factions in northern 
     Iraq, ready money was not immediately available, the 
     situation deteriorated, and Saddam Hussein was afforded a 
     pretext to send forces into northern Iraq--a move which 
     culminated in US military action costing multiples of the 
     originally needed sum.
       US investment in economic development, either through our 
     bilateral programs or international financial institutions 
     (IFIs) like the World Bank, has declined to $8.5 billion from 
     the $12 billion average of the earlier 1990's. It is 
     projected to fall every year under both the President's and 
     the Congressional out-year plans. The consequences of not 
     investing in development are impossible to quantify, but the 
     evidence of the benefits that development has brought to over 
     one-half of the world's population is impressive. In the 
     purely human dimension, US bilateral leadership has been 
     critical to recent worldwide advances in agricultural and 
     medical research and basic human needs including primary 
     education, family planning, child nutrition and immunization 
     programs.
       Our own political and economic self-interest also benefit 
     from the activities of the IFIs. But as we fall behind in 
     meeting our commitments, we risk losing our ability to shape 
     their agendas in support of our objectives. In the past, this 
     influence has enabled us to mobilize multilateral funding to 
     supplement our own increasingly limited bilateral funds for 
     reconstruction in Bosnia, Haiti, the West Bank/Gaza, to 
     stabilize the Mexican peso, and to reinforce the transitions 
     to democracy in Central Europe and the countries of the 
     former Soviet Union. At home, US exporters expect to feel the 
     effects if our support for the IFIs continues to decline. 
     Nearly one half of US exports go to Asia, Latin America and 
     Africa, where close to 80 percent of the world's population 
     lives. IFI lending drives critical segments of development 
     which, in turn, determine the future market potential of 
     these countries.
       United States' arrearages to the United Nations present a 
     more complicated and troublesome case. An independent Council 
     on Foreign Relations-sponsored Task Force chaired by George 
     Soros recently concluded that where the United States had 
     taken clear and firm positions, the United Nations ``has 
     served US interests well.'' The report noted further that its 
     judgments of the UN's utility ``have been shared by both the 
     Bush and Clinton administrations.'' But the UN will not 
     continue to work for us, particularly after we succeeded in 
     imposing our will on the issue of a new Secretary General, if 
     we are not prepared to meet our financial obligations. Nor 
     will our efforts toward reform of the UN system gain momentum 
     if it appears that the United States is unlikely to settle 
     its arrearages, which now amount to $300 million for the 
     regular budget and $700 million for peacekeeping operations.
       The damaging implications of the planned, progressive 
     reduction in the international affairs budget are immediately 
     evident upon examination of the limited options for their 
     implementation. The most obvious strategy would be to take 
     most of the cut out of one or the other of its largest 
     components--development assistance and the Israel/Egypt 
     programs. Either would be virtually eliminated if it were 
     targeted. The alternative would be to cut each component 
     proportionately. Under this scenario, the State Department 
     could not avoid closing nearly 100 additional posts and 
     funding for ``new global issues''--including crime, 
     corruption, narcotics and the environment--would be at risk.
       The magnitude of the cuts proposed through the year 2002 
     would make it impossible to avoid significant cuts in support 
     for the Middle East peace process and development aid, 
     regardless of the strength and persuasiveness of their 
     advocates within the US political process. Those programs are 
     where the money is, and if total cuts of a cumulative 
     magnitude of nearly 50 percent are made, they simply cannot 
     be spared.
       Advocates of sharp reductions in international spending 
     frequently do not spell out how their recommendations should 
     be implemented. They may be prepared to see one activity or 
     another savaged, but would probably find at least one of the 
     above-mentioned consequences of drastic cuts unacceptable.
       None of this is meant to imply that there is no room for 
     selective reductions in foreign aid or no need for a tighter 
     focus on administering its distribution. Insufficient funding 
     is by no means the only problem with our foreign affairs 
     programs. However, any changes should be made with a scalpel 
     rather than an ax. The Task Force has identified several 
     specific areas where savings could be made in order to 
     enhance effectiveness and to offset partially the increases 
     it proposes.


                           v. recommendations

       To reverse the destructive funding trend of the last few 
     years, the President must take the initiative to ask for 
     adequate funding for international affairs and to work 
     together with the Congress to ensure that our foreign affairs 
     structure is organized to meet today's requirements with 
     maximum efficiency and effectiveness. He must take 
     responsibility for doing what only he can do--explain to the 
     American people why we need to devote resources to promoting 
     our interests abroad. At the same time, he must make clear to 
     the foreign affairs bureaucracy that ``business as usual'' is 
     unacceptable. All the poll data show that the American people 
     support constructive engagement and recognize the dangers and 
     opportunities abroad. They know

[[Page S1055]]

     leadership does not come cheaply and they will support the 
     President once he makes clear what is needed and that he is 
     prepared to push for reform.
       Next, the Executive and the Congress must reestablish the 
     bipartisan and bicameral cooperation necessary to ensure that 
     adequate funds are provided. Otherwise, American interests 
     will be increasingly at risk in a rapidly changing and 
     turbulent world. To the extent that agreement can be reached 
     between the President and Congress on restructuring the 
     foreign affairs agencies, it would be highly desirable to 
     agree on basic terms in time for any necessary legislative 
     action to be completed during the coming session of 
     Congress.
       Specifically, in FY 1998, federal discretionary spending on 
     international affairs should rise to $21 billion from its 
     1997 level of $19 billion, with annual adjustments through 
     the year 2002 to offset inflation. The recommended figure is 
     still well below the average of the 1980-1995 time period but 
     considerably more than current projections.
       The Task Force was acutely aware of the continuing budget 
     pressures and searched for ways to cut existing costs. We 
     present these reforms before outlining the increases that are 
     recommended:
       Saving in the development assistance account can be 
     realized by dropping the Title I PL 480 food program and 
     through the amalgamation of the Agency for International 
     Development's extensive administrative support operations as 
     discussed below.
       Continuing administrative reforms in UN organizations and 
     the international financial organizations should produce 
     savings for the US of $100 million per year by the year 2002.
       Amalgamation and re-engineering of the administrative 
     support services of the foreign affairs agencies need not 
     await the larger structural review recommended and therefore 
     should be initiated immediately. This reform would be a 
     logical follow-on to the newly agreed upon collaborative 
     arrangements for financing overseas administrative support. 
     The foreign affairs agencies should be directed to move 
     without further delay to eliminate overlap and duplication of 
     policy and program functions among themselves, as directed by 
     the Vice President in 1995. These actions should produce 
     savings of $100 million to $200 million by the end of the 
     decade.
       A mission-by-mission review of all agencies' overseas 
     staffing should be considered as a means of sharpening focus 
     and realigning resources with policy priorities. Such a 
     review could achieve additional savings in accounts other 
     than 150.
       We are persuaded that some restructuring of the foreign 
     affairs agencies is needed and that this would produce 
     additional savings--although less than some advocates have 
     suggested. Restructuring the foreign affairs agencies is a 
     task assigned by the Constitution and by practical necessity 
     to both political branches of the government and requires the 
     cooperation of leaders on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. 
     We urge the President and Congressional leaders to come 
     together on a mechanism--a bipartisan commission appointed 
     jointly by Congressional leaders and the President is one 
     time-honored method--to develop a solution which all can 
     support and which will improve the formation and 
     implementation of policy.
       Disagreement over organization must not be permitted to be 
     the cause or the excuse for failure to reach agreement on the 
     funding increases that will be necessary--whatever structural 
     reforms are agreed upon. The following summaries our 
     recommendations for increases relative to FY 1997 spending 
     levels (all numbers are annual unless otherwise indicated, 
     should be maintained at this level in real terms for the next 
     five years, and are expressed in constant 1997 dollars):
       $600 million should be available in accounts which the 
     President can draw upon to take prompt, concrete actions to 
     fix problems of urgent and particular concern to the United 
     States. Uses would include economic and security support, 
     military education and training, foreign military financing, 
     conflict prevention and resolution, democratic institution-
     building, non-proliferation, counter-narcotics * * *.

                           *   *   *   *   *



                             vi. conclusion

       The President has spoken very clearly about the imperatives 
     of global leadership and its price. In Detroit last October 
     he declared: ``The burden of American leadership and the 
     importance of it--indeed, the essential character of American 
     leadership--is one of the great lessons of the 20th century. 
     It will be an even more powerful reality in the 21st 
     century.''
       What remains now is for the President to recognize that 
     without adequate resources it will not be possible to provide 
     the international leadership that our national interests 
     require. There are three aspects to this challenge:
       First, the President must include in his 1998 budget 
     request an amount adequate to fund American leadership and he 
     must also reverse the out-year projections which threaten our 
     posture abroad. Second, the President must take the 
     international affairs resource issue to the American people. 
     The President, more than any other individual or institution 
     of our system, bears the responsibility for the success or 
     failure of American foreign policy. Better than anyone else, 
     he can make clear what it means not to have the resources 
     required to protect and promote American values and 
     interests. As Commander-in-Chief, the President can 
     underscore the vital link between diplomacy and deterrence. 
     Secretary of State Warren Christopher described the nature of 
     this connection very clearly when he addressed the Corps of 
     Cadets at West Point last October 25: ``We will serve the 
     American people best of all if we can prevent the conflicts 
     and emergencies that call for a military response from ever 
     arising. . . . If we hold that line around the world, we are 
     much less likely to have to send you and the troops you will 
     command into harm's way sometime in the future.''
       Third, once the President has done these two things he will 
     be in a position to reach out to the leadership of the 
     Congress to establish understanding about international 
     affairs financing. This must be a collaborative, non-partisan 
     undertaking and the President must commit, at the outset, to 
     a review of the structure and coordination of the foreign 
     policy agencies as recommended above. The initial move in 
     this regard must be the President's and it must be 
     accompanied by a clear indication of his willingness to take 
     the resource issue to the American people. He must then be 
     joined by the Congress, which deserves nothing less than a 
     full understanding, a full voice in decisions, and a full 
     measure of responsibility.
       The American people do not want to swap a budget deficit 
     for a security deficit. We suspect most Americans would be 
     alarmed if these proposed budget cuts go through only to 
     discover that America faces an influence gap in world affairs 
     as we enter the twenty-first century.
       We can afford to do more. We cannot afford to do less.


                              signatories

       Signatories include members of the Task Force, regional 
     participants who met in Boston and Seattle, and those who 
     have since endorsed this Statement.
       David M. Abshire, Center for Strategic and International 
     Studies.
       Clark C. Abt, Abt Associates, Inc.
       Graham T. Allison, Jr., Harvard University.
       Robert J. Art, Brandeis University.
       Steven K. Berry, Holland & Knight.
       Derek Bok, Harvard University.
       Salih Booker, Council on Foreign Relations.
       Terrence L. Bracy, Bracy Williams & Company.
       Zbigniew Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International 
     Studies.
       John A. Burgess, Hale and Dorr.
       George Burrill, Business Alliance for International 
     Economic Development.
       Richard R. Burt, International Equity Partners.
       John C. Campbell, Senior Fellow, Emeritus, at the Council 
     on Foreign Relations.
       Frank C. Carlucci, The Carlyle Group.
       Charles E. Cobb, Jr., Pan Am Corporation.
       W. Bowman Cutter, Warburg, Pincus.
       Patricia Davis, Washington Council on International Trade, 
     Seattle.
       Brewster C. Denny, University of Washington.
       Mark D.W. Edington, Doedalus.
       Mickey Edwards, Harvard University.
       Robert F. Ellsworth, Robert Ellsworth & Co., Inc.
       Ainslie T. Embree, Columbia University.
       Dante B. Fascell, Holland & Knight.
       Richard A. Falkenrath, Harvard University.
       Richard W. Fisher, Fisher Capital Management.
       Bart Friedman, Cahill Gordon & Reindel.
       Jeffrey E. Garten, Yale School of Management.
       William E. Griffith, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
       Adam R. Grissom. Harvard University.
       Peter Grose, Harvard University.
       Richard N. Haass, Brookings Institution.
       General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (Ret.), Worldwide 
     Associates, Inc.
       Morton H. Halperin, Council on Foreign Relations.
       William C. Harrop, Association for Diplomatic Studies and 
     Training.
       Alan K. Henrikson, Tufts University.
       Jessica Hobart, Center for Science and International 
     Affairs.
       Patricia L. Irvin, Cooper, Liebowitz, Royster & Wright.
       Paula C. Jacobson, Harvard University.
       Kempton B. Jenkins, APCO Associates Inc.
       Willard R. Johnson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
       Max M. Kampelman, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and 
     Jacobson.
       Arnold Kanter, Forum for International Policy.
       Lawrence J. Korb, The Brookings Institution.
       Lane Kirkland, President Emeritus, AFL-CIO.
       Carol J. Lancaster, Georgetown University.
       Sally Lilienthal, Ploughshares Fund.
       Franklin A. Lindsay, retired Chairman of Itek Corp. and 
     former Chairman of the National Bureau for Economic Research.
       Sarah K. Lischer, Harvard University.
       M. Peter McPherson, Michigan State University.
       Major General David C. Meade (Ret.), United States Army.
       Robert F. Meagher, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 
     Tufts University.
       Robert H. Michel, Hogan & Hartson.
       Richard M. Moose, Council on Foreign Relations.
       Kenneth P. Morse, MIT Entrepreneurship Center.
       Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute.

[[Page S1056]]

       Ted M. Natt, The Daily News.
       David Nemtzow, The Alliance to Save Energy.
       Richard A. Nenneman, The Christian Science Monitor (Ret.).
       Augustus Richard Norton, Boston University.
       Gordon W. Perkin, Path Program for Appropriate Technology 
     in Health.
       Richard E. Pipes, Harvard University (Ret.).
       Brent Scowcroft, Forum for International Policy.
       Sarah B. Sewall, Harvard Law School.
       John W. Sewell, Overseas Development Council.
       George P. Schultz, Stanford University.
       Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Massachusetts Institute of 
     Technology.
       Stephen J. Solarz, APCO Associates Inc.
       Theodore C. Sorensen, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & 
     Garrison.
       Claude A. Soudah, Bank of America NT&SA dba Seafirst Bank--
     Seattle.
       Deborah L. Spar, Harvard Business School.
       Dick Thornburgh, Kirkpatrick & Lockart LLP.
       Robert J.C. Van Leeuwen, World Affairs Council.
       Abelardo Lopez Valdz, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey.
       Cyrus R. Vance, Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett.
       Paul A. Volcker, Wolfensohn & Co., Inc.
       Raymond J. Waldmann, The Boeing Company.
       Louis T. Wells, Harvard Business School.
       Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, Council on Foreign Relations.
       John C. Whitehead, AEA Investors Inc.,
       Eden Y. Woon, Washington State China Relations Council.
       Dorothy S. Zinberg, Harvard University.

  Mr. HOLLINGS. The report is endorsed by former Secretaries of State 
and those in the know both, in a bipartisan fashion. I thank the Chair.

                          ____________________