[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 12 (Tuesday, February 4, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E154-E155]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS: ONE OF OUR BEST NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTMENTS

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. JOHN M. McHUGH

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 4, 1997

  Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Speaker, I call your attention to an issue of great 
importance to the defense posture of the United States which takes on 
an even greater significance as the Department of Defense undertakes a 
study of the military of the future.
  An August 1996 Congressional Budget Office report, ``Reducing the 
Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options,'' and specifically section [DEF-
17] entitled ``Reduce the Number of Light Infantry Divisions,'' is 
seriously flawed in both its analysis and conclusions.
  I believe it is imperative that the facts be known as to why we 
cannot afford to eliminate one light infantry division. I am also 
compelled to set the record straight regarding CBO's assertions about 
the 10th Mountain Division's role in Somalia. To let CBO's assumptions 
go unchallenged would be a disservice to our Nation and those men and 
women in uniform who risk their lives to defend it.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe the facts presented in the following January 
16 letter to the Director of the CBO will provide a solid basis for 
future consideration of such important issues. I am especially pleased 
that in her response, which also follows, the Director has pledged to 
``be more explicit about the advantages and merits attributable to 
light infantry divisions'' in future editions of the report.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit the exchange of correspondence for your 
interest and commend it to our colleagues for their thoughtful review.
                                                     U.S. Congress


                                     House of Representatives,

                                 Washington, DC, January 16, 1997.
     Ms. June E. O'Neill, Director,
     Congressional Budget Office,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Ms. O'Neill: I call to your attention the August 1996 
     CBO report, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue 
     Options and specifically the section (DEF-17) entitled 
     ``Reduce the Number of Army Light Divisions.'' At the onset, 
     I want to thank you for your response to my August letter in 
     which I asked for the data supporting the conclusion that the 
     number of divisions be reduced.
       DEF-17 asserted that the Department of Defense could save 
     over $16 billion in six years by eliminating one light 
     infantry division (LID) and an airborne division by 
     consolidating the airborne and air assault divisions into one 
     division. The remaining light infantry divisions would 
     consist of one light infantry division and one airborne 
     division of two air assault brigades and one airborne 
     brigade.
       Having reviewed the matter carefully, I must emphatically 
     disagree with CBO's conclusions. I have found many of the 
     assertions contained in DEF-17 to be faulty and without 
     merit. As a Member of the National Security Committee, I well 
     understand the need to spend every defense dollar wisely. It 
     is in that context that I believe our light infantry 
     divisions are one of our best national security investments. 
     They have enabled us to meet the ever-increasing demands on 
     the United States in this post-Cold War era. That having been 
     said, I feel compelled to provide you with facts as to why we 
     cannot afford to eliminate one light infantry division. I 
     also believe it imperative that I set the record straight 
     regarding the 10th Mountain Division's role in Somalia. To 
     let DEF-17 go unchallenged would be a disservice to our men 
     and women in uniform.
       One of the primary lessons of military history is that to 
     accurately predict the timing and location of future 
     conflicts is nearly impossible. It is, therefore, essential 
     to have military forces capable of being tailored for a 
     variety of scenarios. Even in the mid-1980s military planners 
     visualized a need for forces to protect our national interest 
     in other than the European theater, forces that must be 
     prepared to conduct low- to mid-intensity conflicts. Heavy 
     units need lighter forces to operate between and among them 
     on terrain not suitable for heavy vehicles: forests, 
     mountains, urban and other areas. The Army needs traditional 
     general-purpose light infantry utilizing light infantry 
     tactics: forces that could be used in a wide variety of 
     environments and provide the National Military Strategy with 
     its rapid and mobile strategic punch or show of force to 
     deter or compel potential adversaries. Light infantry 
     divisions can be lifted into any region in the world with 
     just 500 sorties of C-141s vs. over 2,300 for the Army's 
     mechanized divisions (first units are loaded in 18 hours).
       In the paragraphs which follow, I challenge the CBO 
     assertions with the facts.
       CBO Assertion: Recent history indicates that the United 
     States may not need those divisions. Between 1945 and 1991, 
     about 120 incidents--excluding major conflicts such as those 
     in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq--required commitment of U.S. 
     ground forces. Of those, the Army was involved in about a 
     third and, even then, generally not in large numbers.
       Fact: I have found your assertion that light infantry 
     forces were used very little from 1945 to 1991 to be a 
     misleading statement. The infantry units in question were 
     created in the mid-1980s, covering only six years of the CBO 
     study. According to an October 1996 study by Science 
     Applications International Corporation (SAIC), light infantry 
     units have been deployed in battalion or larger force a total 
     of 13 times in the last 15 years. During five of these 
     deployments, a division or larger light infantry force was 
     used (URGENT FURY--Grenada 83; JUST CAUSE--Panama 89; DESERT 
     SHIELD/STORN--SWA 90; RESTORE/CONTINUE HOPE--Somalia 92; 
     RESTORE/UPHOLD DEMOCRACY--Haiti 94)
       CBO Assertion: The light infantry divisions have limited 
     firepower and tactical mobility once deployed.
       Fact: Light infantry divisions, by their very nature do not 
     have the firepower or mobility existing in the U.S. 
     mechanized divisions because they are, in fact, tailored for 
     other missions. Light infantry divisions must be offensive, 
     capable of using stealth and attacking by infiltration, air 
     assault, ambush and raids. These forces, by virtue of the 
     terrain in which they are required to operate, do not have 
     the capability to carry high caliber weapons. To offset a 
     lack of firepower the LID dismounted company size is near 
     double the size of a mechanized dismounted company force; 
     around 120 in light company and about 68 in a mechanized 
     company. A recent study by SAIC for the 21st Century 
     concludes that, in the future, more conflicts will be fought 
     in densely populated, urban environments. Heavy forces are 
     not as well designed to combat infantry in urban environments 
     where it takes time and manpower to clear buildings and 
     blocks. These capabilities together with its strategic 
     projection capability offer excellent balance to the full 
     spectrum Army.
       CBO Assertion: The Defense Department made a strong 
     statement about the utility of the LIDs in combat when it 
     failed to use any light infantry forces during Operation 
     Desert Storm.
       Fact: Your report states that the Department of Defense 
     failed to use any light infantry forces during Operation 
     Desert Storm (ODS). This is totally an inaccurate statement. 
     Both the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne (AASLT) were 
     deployed in ODS. Although the 82nd Airborne Division did not 
     parachute into the area of operations, it was the first U.S. 
     ground force rapidly projected to Saudi Arabia to show U.S. 
     military commitment and resolve to the region. The highest 
     demonstration of U.S. resolve to defend Saudi Arabia from 
     Saddam Hussein was to put soldiers on the ground as quickly 
     as possible. The 82nd Airborne was on the ground within 24 
     hours. This action drew the line in the sand and allowed time 
     for the heavier units to arrive in the Area of Responsibility 
     (AOR). The 101st was utilized not only in Desert Storm by air 
     assaulting 153 miles into the enemy rear and securing key 
     tactical objectives along the Euphrates River, but also early 
     in Desert Shield as a covering force in defense of Saudi 
     Arabia. It should also be

[[Page E155]]

     noted that the light infantry divisions remained in the 
     continental U.S. to provide the U.S. with a strategic reserve 
     to react to any threats seeking to capitalize on the U.S. 
     deployment.
       CBO Assertion: The 10th Mountain Division's firepower and 
     protection proved to be inadequate against even the 
     unsophisticated and poorly equipped troops in Somalia.
       Fact: The 10th Mountain Division deployed to Somalia in 
     1992 with the mission of providing protection to the relief 
     workers as they distributed food to the hungry. During the 
     entire time the 10th Mountain Division was deployed to 
     Somalia it accomplished its mission of protection and food 
     distribution without any soldiers losing their lives. Mission 
     creep (an evolving escalating requirement) redefined the U.S. 
     role in Somalia and the forces were not re-tailored. As a 
     result of this mission creep, Special Operating Forces (SOF) 
     were deployed to key objectives to disrupt enemy command and 
     control nodes. During one of the operations, the SOF 
     operating in a different AOR required immediate support and 
     regrettably none was available. After this operation it 
     became apparent that the mobility and protection that armor 
     forces have were necessary in the region if the U.S. was to 
     pursue its redefined mission.
       CBO Assertion: There have been no division size parachute 
     assaults involving an entire division since World War II. 
     Additionally, paratroop-qualified units exist in the special 
     forces branch of the Army, and it is not obvious that the 
     Army needs an entire division designed to be dropped by 
     parachute.
       FACT: While CBO correctly stated that there has been no 
     division level airborne insertions since 1944, the capability 
     for an airborne division insertion still exists. Special 
     Operating Forces, in this case the Rangers, are required to 
     have the capability for initial forced entry. The only 
     reinforcement we have to expand lodgment is to assault 
     airland; to insert vertically; of if tactically feasible to 
     air assault. Assault airlanding places vulnerable Air Force 
     Strategic lift assets on the ground and can be accomplished 
     only if the insertion unit can secure an airfield and if the 
     airfield is not damaged. In fact, many plans require airborne 
     engineer units to build an airstrip to establish an aerial 
     port of debarkation. Airborne insertion is by far the fastest 
     way to mass combat power for initial entry. The standard 
     airborne force package requires a brigade task force. In 
     order to maintain a brigade on two hour notice and capable of 
     deploying in 18 hours to any AOR, the division must rotate 
     the duty among two other brigades. The necessitates three 
     airborne brigade task forces.
       The balance of the current Army force structure is based 
     upon the commitment of the U.S. around the world and the 
     requirement to execute the National Military Strategy. The 
     Army has four divisions which are strategically fixed; two in 
     Germany for our NATO commitments, one in Korea for deterrence 
     by treaty arrangement, and one in the Pacific to support 
     USCINCPAC requirements. The Army must also be prepared to 
     commit two corps of at least three divisions to Major 
     Regional Conflicts (MRCs) in the East and West. Accepting 
     that, at least one division will be forward deployed in the 
     region and the Army must deploy five additional divisions for 
     a total of ten divisions. The light infantry divisions offer 
     the capability of rapid strategic mobility and a balance to 
     the Army's total force. They are designed to be utilized in 
     low- to mid-intensity conflicts with limited support; to 
     integrate with armor forces in high-intensity conflicts, and 
     to fight where armor cannot.
       I believe the above analysis clearly indicates that DEF-17 
     is faulty in its assertions. Surely this is not 
     characteristic of the type of thoughtful work we have come to 
     expect from the Congressional Budget Office. In the future, I 
     hope that your military analysts will be more careful in 
     their study of such important issues.
           Sincerely yours.
                                                   John M. McHugh,
     Member of Congress.
                                                                    ____

                                                    U.S. Congress,


                                  Congressional Budget Office,

                                 Washington, DC, January 29, 1997.
     Hon. John M. McHugh,
     U.S. House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman: Thank you for your letter of January 16, 
     1997 outlining your objections to CBO's option concerning the 
     Army's light divisions in our August 1996 edition of Reducing 
     the Deficit. We appreciate your taking the time to inform us 
     of your concerns. In future editions of Reducing the Deficit, 
     we plan to be more explicit about the advantages and merits 
     attributable to light infantry divisions, and also to clarify 
     some statements that may have been misinterpreted.
       I would ask you to please keep in mind, however, the fact 
     that each of the entries included in Reducing the Deficit: 
     Spending and Revenue Options is just that, an option to be 
     considered as a means to reduce the deficit. CBO does not 
     endorse any of those options and draws no conclusions 
     regarding their merit.
           Sincerely,
     June E. O'Neill, Director.

                          ____________________