[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 10 (Thursday, January 30, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S844-S846]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CHINA: THE FUTURE
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the Record a speech that this Senator made to the Asia
Society yesterday morning entitled, ``China: The Future.''
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
China: The Future
(By Senator Dianne Feinstein)
As a Californian, I have been surprised to discover how
Washington, and the whole East Coast foreign policy
establishment tends to look primarily across the Atlantic to
Europe, and how little it looks to Asia and the Pacific.
But the fact is that U.S. interests are no longer primarily
in Europe. You've heard the phrase ``the dawning of the
Pacific Century'' many times. Well, the Pacific Century is
here.
Consider these facts: The Pacific trading theater has long
since overtaken the Atlantic. Overall trade with Asia stands
at $570 billion. With Europe it is $270 billion. Trade with
Asia accounts for more than 30 percent of U.S. exports and
close to 40 percent of U.S. imports. And today, more than 60
percent of the world's population lives on both sides of the
Pacific Ocean.
All of this illustrates what Secretary of State John Hay
meant when he said nearly a century ago: ``The Mediterranean
is the ocean of the past; the Atlantic, the ocean of the
present; and the Pacific, the ocean of the future.'' That
future is now.
china's importance
The single most important question facing the future of
peace and prosperity in Asia is how China develops.
And there is no more important challenge facing U.S.
foreign policy than the question of how to peacefully engage
China in the international community.
China's influence is felt in so many ways: China's
population of 1.25 billion, is nearly one quarter of the
world's inhabitants; China's sheer size--her geographical
reach includes common borders with such key nations as
Russia, Japan, Korea, and India, and includes vast quantities
of untapped natural resources; China's expanding military
prowess, including a 3 million-man army, and her status as
one of the five declared nuclear powers in the world today;
China's permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council; and
China's remarkable economic growth of roughly 10 percent a
year, which has vaulted it to the position of the world's
11th largest exporter--China is where Japan was in 1980, but
growing much faster.
For all of these reasons, the U.S. relationship with China
is probably our single most important undeveloped bilateral
relationship in the world today.
In 1997, Sino-American relations are entering a crucial new
phase, ripe with both danger and opportunity.
Events in the next year, and how they are handled by
Washington and Beijing, will determine for some time to come
the nature of the relationship between our two countries.
I was very pleased to hear our new Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright, articulate the Administration's policy in
clear terms during her confirmation hearing before the
Foreign Relations Committee. She said: ``Our goal is to
expand areas of cooperation, reduce the potential for
misunderstandings and encourage China's full emergence as a
responsible member of the international community.''
And, while she recognized that our two nations have
important differences, the Secretary also stressed that we
have a multifaceted relationship with China.
I want to make some comments this morning on what I believe
to be the central issues in the U.S.-China relationship
today: the question of engagement versus containment; the
China-Taiwan relationship; nuclear proliferation; human
rights; the trade imbalance; trade issues such as Most-
Favored Nation status, Intellectual Property Rights, and
China's accession to the WTO; and the transition of Hong
Kong.
The ``Engagement vs. Containment'' Debate
This question should be settled by now, but unfortunately
it is not. There are still those who see China as an enemy,
and who want the U.S.-China relationship to be modeled on
Cold War strategies of the past, Containment is their mantra.
But there are two problems with this approach:
First, it has not and will not work. No other country will
join us in trying to contain the largest country and one of
the fastest growing economies in the world.
Second, containment is not in the interest of the United
States. We have far too many mutual interests with China--
interests which far outweigh our differences, including:
preserving stability, and preventing arms races in Northeast
and Southeast Asia; a peaceful, non-nuclear Korean Peninsula;
preventing nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan;
preventing the introduction of nuclear or other destabilizing
technology into the Persian Gulf; keeping sea lanes open for
international commerce; maintaining the prosperity of Hong
Kong and Taiwan; and curbing the trafficking of narcotics.
Attempting to influence these critically important issues
by isolating China is a fruitless and very dangerous course
of action. The only way we can make progress on these issues
is through active engagement.
I have been saying for the past four years that I have been
in the Senate that the U.S. needs to develop a long-term,
strategic framework for building a relationship with China,
based on our many mutual interests.
[[Page S845]]
No single issue should be a litmus test for the entire
U.S.-China relationship.
Managing and developing a positive relationship with China
does not mean we must ignore the importance of key issues of
concern with China--such as human rights, the transition of
Hong Kong, or the issue of Taiwan. It does, however, mean
that we should not allow our entire relationship to be called
into question each time an incident occurs.
The United States must develop a long-range, strategic plan
for our relationship with China.
The US must engage China. This engagement must be ongoing,
it must be consistent, and it must be formed at the highest
levels.
To date, interaction at the Presidential, Vice
Presidential, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense
level has not been frequent or deep enough. There is no ``red
telephone'', no ability for the two Presidents to talk and
work with each other during a crisis.
We cannot engage China solely at a second-tier level. Talks
at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level are not sufficient,
and, in the absence of regular higher level contacts, are
probably counter-productive in the message it sends to
China's leaders.
Secretary Albright will be meeting soon with Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen, and she is committed to regular contact
with her counterparts in Beijing. Vice President Gore will be
traveling to Beijing this spring, setting the stage for an
exchange of presidential visits this fall and next year.
These are positive steps that I hope will lead to
development of sustained communication at the very highest
levels.
President Clinton has an opportunity to shape the future
course of Sino-American relations by developing a positive
working relationship with Chinese President Jiang Zemin and
other leaders, I hope he will seize this opportunity.
Congress also has an important role to play in this
process.
It is critical that more members of Congress travel to
China, meet with those in the Chinese leadership and others,
and develop a working dialogue with those who are creating
the China of the 21st century.
the china-taiwan relationship
Taiwan remains the one issue with the greatest potential to
seriously disrupt efforts to stabilize the U.S.-China
relationship. It is impossible to overstate the depth of
Chinese feelings about Taiwan's role in the U.S.-China
relationship. They are real, visceral, and deep.
During my trip this past November, Chinese officials and
citizens made it clear: If the Taiwan issue is handled well,
everything is possible in Sino-American relations; if it is
mishandled, it will continue to shock, and possibly derail,
U.S.-China relations.
The United States should, I believe, consistently and
authoritatively reaffirm, both to Beijing and to Taipei, its
commitment to the long-standing and bipartisan ``One China''
policy, as outlined in the three Joint Communiques.
It must be remembered that the status quo has been
beneficial to all three parties, allowing Taiwan to become
prosperous and democratic, and the U.S. and China to develop
normalized relations befitting two world powers.
So Taiwan must understand that its efforts to assert itself
internationally cannot be a guise for moving towards
independence.
For its part, China should consistently make clear that
reunification would take place only through peaceful means,
and should refrain from any aggressive military actions and
rhetoric.
Any impression that China might try to settle the Taiwan
issue by the use of force presents a challenge not just to
Taiwan but also, under the Taiwan Relations Act, to the
United States as well. We could not stand idly by and
countenance a military attack.
At the same time, Washington must make clear to Beijing
that U.S. interests require continued robust--albeit
unofficial--ties with Taipei, which are consistent with the
``One China'' policy.
Such unofficial access, however, should not be confused in
either Beijing or Taipei as an invitation for official
recognition by the U.S. We must not allow another incident
such as the issuance of a visa to President Lee Teng-hui two
years ago to needlessly provoke a crisis.
The United States should encourage Taiwan and China to
resume the Cross-Straits Initiative that was conducted by
China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, which showed such
promise until it was derailed a year and a half ago.
nonproliferation
One of the most important areas of concern in our
relationship with China is nuclear nonproliferation.
Clearly China's record on nonproliferation is mixed. China
has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention--something the
U.S. Senate has not yet done--and signed the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, as well as cooperated in efforts to extend
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely.
China has made important commitments, such as abiding by
the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) and not providing assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities.
Nevertheless, we continue to have concerns about nuclear
and missile technology that China has provided to Pakistan,
and the possibility of similar sales to Iran.
It is vital that China be engaged in a new security
partnership, one that is cooperative rather than
confrontational. As I said earlier, isolating a nation of
China's growing power and influence makes little sense.
China has recognized our mutual interest in preventing
nuclear proliferation in North Korea. It is also clearly in
the interests of both China and the United States to ensure
that tensions are de-escalated in South Asia, where both
India and Pakistan have the ability to launch nuclear devices
in a matter of days.
We should encourage China to join us in the development of
a coherent nuclear non-proliferation strategy, as a co-
guarantor of stability and security in these regions.
We must try to convince China that arms control regimes
should be adhered to not for ideological or legalistic
purposes, but because they are in China's own best interest.
If China is willing to become an active and responsible
party to international treaties and regimes, China should be
granted an equal say in setting the ``rules of the game.''
China must, of course, then agree to abide by those rules
along with every other nation.
A partnership between China and the United States toward
nuclear non-proliferation and stability is the key to success
in these regions.
human rights
As I said earlier, no issue should be a litmus test in our
relationship with China. But at times, human rights has been
just that.
The U.S. has tried lecturing China on human rights; We have
expressed outrage, and our relationship has zigged and zagged
with each arrest, newly reported case of torture, or other
egregious happening; And we have tried linking human rights
to Most Favored Nation trading status.
These efforts have clearly been unsuccessful.
Let me speak about the negatives first.
I am remain deeply concerned by China's treatment of
dissidents and its constant persecution of Tibetans in Tibet.
I have talked with Tibetan refugees personally--some in Napal
this past November--and I believe their stories to be true.
I believe there has been a tightening by the Chinese
government on human rights in the last year.
For those of us who watch China closely, there are a number
of signs. There has been a recent crackdown on religious
liberties.
In Jiangxi province in November, 80 Catholics were
arbitrarily arrested without warrants, beaten, and jailed.
There have been many recent arrests of leading dissidents,
often resulting in disproportionately long sentences. Fro
example: Wei Jingsheng was sentenced for 14 years; Chen Xi
was sentenced for 10 years; Wang Dan was sentenced for 11
years in prison plus two years deprivation of political
rights.
I cannot conceive of a reason why it is in China's
interests to do these things. But whatever the reason, it is
very disturbing, and it portends real danger for Hong Kong,
which is a very religious Chinese community.
But let me also mention the positive side.
It must be recognized that progress is taking place in
China. For example, the National People's Congress just
enacted legislation intended to: help protect individuals
from arbitrary punishment by police and government agencies;
limit the practice ``administrative detention'' to thirty
days; and require the State Council to secure the approval of
the National People's Congress before declaring martial law.
As one who has traveled to China dozens of times over the
last 20 years, it is clear to me that there have been
remarkable changes: an increasing standard of living,
increased wages, and savings, and improved education of the
people; greater mobility and a freer lifestyle for the
average Chinese; local and provincial governments that are
more independent from Beijing--with over 300 million Chinese
participating in direct local and provincial elections; a
growing web of private property ownership in the provinces,
and greater legal protection for the owners and investors in
private enterprises; a more accessible court system for
Chinese citizens to contest government actions that infringe
on their freedoms and property.
To appreciate the scope of these changes one only needs to
look back a mere 35 years to the Cultural Revolution and
Great Leap Forward, during which millions of Chinese lost
their lives in unprecedented brutality.
Yes, these changes are in their infancy compared to Western
standards, but it is important to understand that China is a
$5,000 year old nation--a nation governed by the rule of man
for most of its history. It will not transition to the rule
of law overnight--no matter how much pressure is applied from
outside forces.
It was interesting for me to read an article by Henry Rowen
entitled ``The Short March,'' in which he describes
conducting a Lexis-Nexis search on China and human rights in
five major U.S. publications.
For the period January 1991 through June 1996 he found ``on
the one hand, 356 stories on abuses of various kinds, and on
the other hand, 3 on local elections, 16 on efforts to
introduce a rule of law, and 10 on the liberalizing of the
mass media: in short, an overall ratio of 12 to 1.''
So clearly, the bad gets reported and the good does not.
I believe that China will not change its ways merely to
please America. The real key to change is convincing China
that it in China's interests to change. And I believe that
this can be done.
[[Page S846]]
Most importantly, the U.S. should work with China to
develop a modern legal system with an independent judiciary,
due process of law and a modern penal and civil codes. China
is receptive to our help in this area.
Through engagement and assistance such as this we can do
more to advance the cause of human rights in China in the
long run than through constant castigation, or isolation.
I would like to make a proposal that may be acceptable to
both sides. I would propose a presidential human rights
commission or forum. This commission would be appointed by
both presidents, with the mission of charting the evolution
of human rights in both countries over the last 20 to 30
years.
In reports to be delivered to both presidents, the
commission would point out the successes and failures--both
Tiananmen Square and Kent State--and make recommendations for
goals for the future.
The Growing Trade Imbalance
Another area of increasing concern is the growing trade gap
with China.
What is essentially a trade problem today will become an
acute political problem in the U.S.-China relationship if it
is left unaddressed.
I have communicated my concern about this issue to the
Chinese leadership. They agree that this is a potential
problem, but they dispute the size of the trade imbalance.
The United States calculates the imbalance at about $38
billion, while the Chinese figure is closer to $10 billion.
When I was in China in November I proposed to Zhu Rongji,
the Executive Vice Premier, who is in effect China's economic
czar, that the United States and China establish a joint
working group to sit down and establish once and for all a
common method of calculating the trade imbalance, especially
after Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese rule. Zhu Rongji told
me he would support such a proposal.
Most Favored Nation Status
Another constant flashpoint is the annual battle over
China's Most Favored Nation Trading status.
Every summer Congress and the Administration go through a
sort of ritual dance over the extension of MFN status to
China. Congress had never overridden a President's decision
to extend MFN for China, but we have often voted on it
anyway.
Last year, the House, by a resounding vote of 286-141,
rejected an attempt to deny or condition China's MFN status.
It would be helpful to have that vote settle it once and for
all, but, unfortunately, we are less than five months away
from the next go around, which I suspect may not be any less
rancorous.
The political implications of revoking MFN for China are
great. For a country such as China, where face and respect
are such central issues, the debate over revoking MFN is seen
as tantamount to the United States telling China that we are
still unsure whether to accept them as a member of the family
of nations.
Denying MFN would seriously impair our ability to work with
China on just about any issue.
Clearly, linking human rights with MFN has been a failure.
I hope we do not make the same mistake twice by linking it to
something else, like the negotiations on China's accession to
the WTO.
MFN is our standard trading status, and it is granted to
all but seven rogue states.
It is time to put an end to this destructive debate year
after year. I support making MFN for China permanent.
HONG KONG
In the short run, the transition of Hong Kong is seen by
some as a bellwether for China's willingness to act as a
responsible great power.
It is key and critical that ``one country, two systems'' be
carried out. The world is clearly watching to see whether in
fact it is possible to have within China an autonomous region
that charts its own domestic policy.
The Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
provide the foundation for the transfer, and for the future
governance and economic life of Hong Kong.
I am troubled by the legislation submitted last week to the
National People's Congress that would undo the Hong Kong bill
of rights. Lu Ping, the Chinese official in charge of the
Hong Kong transition, told me directly in Beijing in November
that the question of public protest and assembly was a matter
for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), and if
SAR law permitted public expressions of dissent, China would
have no objection.
If the central government of China reverses Hong Kong's
Bill of Rights, and other civil liberties, it would be a blow
to the credibility of ``one country, two systems.''
Additionally, I would hope that the provisional legislature
meeting this week in Shenzhen is sensitive to the pledge of
domestic autonomy for Hong Kong.
I strongly agree with Secretary Albright when she said that
the way events play out in Hong Kong will have an important
effect on the overall U.S.-China relationship.
CONCLUSION
With this new Congress, and an Administration now seasoned
in its second term, we now have the opportunity to move
beyond some of the events that have soured Sino-American
relations in the past several years.
President Clinton and Secretary Albright must immerse
themselves fully in the details of this most delicate and
critical of American relations.
In the final analysis, the goal of American policy must be
to encourage China toward a full and active relationship with
the West and to work together toward a China that is able to
take its role as a stable leader of Asia and a guarantor of
peace and security in the world.
____________________