[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 10 (Thursday, January 30, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S844-S846]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           CHINA: THE FUTURE

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have 
printed in the Record a speech that this Senator made to the Asia 
Society yesterday morning entitled, ``China: The Future.''
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                           China: The Future

                     (By Senator Dianne Feinstein)

       As a Californian, I have been surprised to discover how 
     Washington, and the whole East Coast foreign policy 
     establishment tends to look primarily across the Atlantic to 
     Europe, and how little it looks to Asia and the Pacific.
       But the fact is that U.S. interests are no longer primarily 
     in Europe. You've heard the phrase ``the dawning of the 
     Pacific Century'' many times. Well, the Pacific Century is 
     here.
       Consider these facts: The Pacific trading theater has long 
     since overtaken the Atlantic. Overall trade with Asia stands 
     at $570 billion. With Europe it is $270 billion. Trade with 
     Asia accounts for more than 30 percent of U.S. exports and 
     close to 40 percent of U.S. imports. And today, more than 60 
     percent of the world's population lives on both sides of the 
     Pacific Ocean.
       All of this illustrates what Secretary of State John Hay 
     meant when he said nearly a century ago: ``The Mediterranean 
     is the ocean of the past; the Atlantic, the ocean of the 
     present; and the Pacific, the ocean of the future.'' That 
     future is now.


                           china's importance

       The single most important question facing the future of 
     peace and prosperity in Asia is how China develops.
       And there is no more important challenge facing U.S. 
     foreign policy than the question of how to peacefully engage 
     China in the international community.
       China's influence is felt in so many ways: China's 
     population of 1.25 billion, is nearly one quarter of the 
     world's inhabitants; China's sheer size--her geographical 
     reach includes common borders with such key nations as 
     Russia, Japan, Korea, and India, and includes vast quantities 
     of untapped natural resources; China's expanding military 
     prowess, including a 3 million-man army, and her status as 
     one of the five declared nuclear powers in the world today; 
     China's permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council; and 
     China's remarkable economic growth of roughly 10 percent a 
     year, which has vaulted it to the position of the world's 
     11th largest exporter--China is where Japan was in 1980, but 
     growing much faster.
       For all of these reasons, the U.S. relationship with China 
     is probably our single most important undeveloped bilateral 
     relationship in the world today.
       In 1997, Sino-American relations are entering a crucial new 
     phase, ripe with both danger and opportunity.
       Events in the next year, and how they are handled by 
     Washington and Beijing, will determine for some time to come 
     the nature of the relationship between our two countries.
       I was very pleased to hear our new Secretary of State, 
     Madeleine Albright, articulate the Administration's policy in 
     clear terms during her confirmation hearing before the 
     Foreign Relations Committee. She said: ``Our goal is to 
     expand areas of cooperation, reduce the potential for 
     misunderstandings and encourage China's full emergence as a 
     responsible member of the international community.''
       And, while she recognized that our two nations have 
     important differences, the Secretary also stressed that we 
     have a multifaceted relationship with China.
       I want to make some comments this morning on what I believe 
     to be the central issues in the U.S.-China relationship 
     today: the question of engagement versus containment; the 
     China-Taiwan relationship; nuclear proliferation; human 
     rights; the trade imbalance; trade issues such as Most-
     Favored Nation status, Intellectual Property Rights, and 
     China's accession to the WTO; and the transition of Hong 
     Kong.


               The ``Engagement vs. Containment'' Debate

       This question should be settled by now, but unfortunately 
     it is not. There are still those who see China as an enemy, 
     and who want the U.S.-China relationship to be modeled on 
     Cold War strategies of the past, Containment is their mantra. 
     But there are two problems with this approach:
       First, it has not and will not work. No other country will 
     join us in trying to contain the largest country and one of 
     the fastest growing economies in the world.
       Second, containment is not in the interest of the United 
     States. We have far too many mutual interests with China--
     interests which far outweigh our differences, including: 
     preserving stability, and preventing arms races in Northeast 
     and Southeast Asia; a peaceful, non-nuclear Korean Peninsula; 
     preventing nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan; 
     preventing the introduction of nuclear or other destabilizing 
     technology into the Persian Gulf; keeping sea lanes open for 
     international commerce; maintaining the prosperity of Hong 
     Kong and Taiwan; and curbing the trafficking of narcotics.
       Attempting to influence these critically important issues 
     by isolating China is a fruitless and very dangerous course 
     of action. The only way we can make progress on these issues 
     is through active engagement.
       I have been saying for the past four years that I have been 
     in the Senate that the U.S. needs to develop a long-term, 
     strategic framework for building a relationship with China, 
     based on our many mutual interests.

[[Page S845]]

       No single issue should be a litmus test for the entire 
     U.S.-China relationship.
       Managing and developing a positive relationship with China 
     does not mean we must ignore the importance of key issues of 
     concern with China--such as human rights, the transition of 
     Hong Kong, or the issue of Taiwan. It does, however, mean 
     that we should not allow our entire relationship to be called 
     into question each time an incident occurs.
       The United States must develop a long-range, strategic plan 
     for our relationship with China.
       The US must engage China. This engagement must be ongoing, 
     it must be consistent, and it must be formed at the highest 
     levels.
       To date, interaction at the Presidential, Vice 
     Presidential, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense 
     level has not been frequent or deep enough. There is no ``red 
     telephone'', no ability for the two Presidents to talk and 
     work with each other during a crisis.
       We cannot engage China solely at a second-tier level. Talks 
     at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level are not sufficient, 
     and, in the absence of regular higher level contacts, are 
     probably counter-productive in the message it sends to 
     China's leaders.
       Secretary Albright will be meeting soon with Foreign 
     Minister Qian Qichen, and she is committed to regular contact 
     with her counterparts in Beijing. Vice President Gore will be 
     traveling to Beijing this spring, setting the stage for an 
     exchange of presidential visits this fall and next year.
       These are positive steps that I hope will lead to 
     development of sustained communication at the very highest 
     levels.
       President Clinton has an opportunity to shape the future 
     course of Sino-American relations by developing a positive 
     working relationship with Chinese President Jiang Zemin and 
     other leaders, I hope he will seize this opportunity.
       Congress also has an important role to play in this 
     process.
       It is critical that more members of Congress travel to 
     China, meet with those in the Chinese leadership and others, 
     and develop a working dialogue with those who are creating 
     the China of the 21st century.


                     the china-taiwan relationship

       Taiwan remains the one issue with the greatest potential to 
     seriously disrupt efforts to stabilize the U.S.-China 
     relationship. It is impossible to overstate the depth of 
     Chinese feelings about Taiwan's role in the U.S.-China 
     relationship. They are real, visceral, and deep.
       During my trip this past November, Chinese officials and 
     citizens made it clear: If the Taiwan issue is handled well, 
     everything is possible in Sino-American relations; if it is 
     mishandled, it will continue to shock, and possibly derail, 
     U.S.-China relations.
       The United States should, I believe, consistently and 
     authoritatively reaffirm, both to Beijing and to Taipei, its 
     commitment to the long-standing and bipartisan ``One China'' 
     policy, as outlined in the three Joint Communiques.
       It must be remembered that the status quo has been 
     beneficial to all three parties, allowing Taiwan to become 
     prosperous and democratic, and the U.S. and China to develop 
     normalized relations befitting two world powers.
       So Taiwan must understand that its efforts to assert itself 
     internationally cannot be a guise for moving towards 
     independence.
       For its part, China should consistently make clear that 
     reunification would take place only through peaceful means, 
     and should refrain from any aggressive military actions and 
     rhetoric.
       Any impression that China might try to settle the Taiwan 
     issue by the use of force presents a challenge not just to 
     Taiwan but also, under the Taiwan Relations Act, to the 
     United States as well. We could not stand idly by and 
     countenance a military attack.
       At the same time, Washington must make clear to Beijing 
     that U.S. interests require continued robust--albeit 
     unofficial--ties with Taipei, which are consistent with the 
     ``One China'' policy.
       Such unofficial access, however, should not be confused in 
     either Beijing or Taipei as an invitation for official 
     recognition by the U.S. We must not allow another incident 
     such as the issuance of a visa to President Lee Teng-hui two 
     years ago to needlessly provoke a crisis.
       The United States should encourage Taiwan and China to 
     resume the Cross-Straits Initiative that was conducted by 
     China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits 
     and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, which showed such 
     promise until it was derailed a year and a half ago.


                            nonproliferation

       One of the most important areas of concern in our 
     relationship with China is nuclear nonproliferation.
       Clearly China's record on nonproliferation is mixed. China 
     has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention--something the 
     U.S. Senate has not yet done--and signed the Comprehensive 
     Test Ban Treaty, as well as cooperated in efforts to extend 
     the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely.
       China has made important commitments, such as abiding by 
     the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
     (MTCR) and not providing assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear 
     facilities.
       Nevertheless, we continue to have concerns about nuclear 
     and missile technology that China has provided to Pakistan, 
     and the possibility of similar sales to Iran.
       It is vital that China be engaged in a new security 
     partnership, one that is cooperative rather than 
     confrontational. As I said earlier, isolating a nation of 
     China's growing power and influence makes little sense.
       China has recognized our mutual interest in preventing 
     nuclear proliferation in North Korea. It is also clearly in 
     the interests of both China and the United States to ensure 
     that tensions are de-escalated in South Asia, where both 
     India and Pakistan have the ability to launch nuclear devices 
     in a matter of days.
       We should encourage China to join us in the development of 
     a coherent nuclear non-proliferation strategy, as a co-
     guarantor of stability and security in these regions.
       We must try to convince China that arms control regimes 
     should be adhered to not for ideological or legalistic 
     purposes, but because they are in China's own best interest.
       If China is willing to become an active and responsible 
     party to international treaties and regimes, China should be 
     granted an equal say in setting the ``rules of the game.'' 
     China must, of course, then agree to abide by those rules 
     along with every other nation.
       A partnership between China and the United States toward 
     nuclear non-proliferation and stability is the key to success 
     in these regions.


                              human rights

       As I said earlier, no issue should be a litmus test in our 
     relationship with China. But at times, human rights has been 
     just that.
       The U.S. has tried lecturing China on human rights; We have 
     expressed outrage, and our relationship has zigged and zagged 
     with each arrest, newly reported case of torture, or other 
     egregious happening; And we have tried linking human rights 
     to Most Favored Nation trading status.
       These efforts have clearly been unsuccessful.
       Let me speak about the negatives first.
       I am remain deeply concerned by China's treatment of 
     dissidents and its constant persecution of Tibetans in Tibet. 
     I have talked with Tibetan refugees personally--some in Napal 
     this past November--and I believe their stories to be true.
       I believe there has been a tightening by the Chinese 
     government on human rights in the last year.
       For those of us who watch China closely, there are a number 
     of signs. There has been a recent crackdown on religious 
     liberties.
       In Jiangxi province in November, 80 Catholics were 
     arbitrarily arrested without warrants, beaten, and jailed.
       There have been many recent arrests of leading dissidents, 
     often resulting in disproportionately long sentences. Fro 
     example: Wei Jingsheng was sentenced for 14 years; Chen Xi 
     was sentenced for 10 years; Wang Dan was sentenced for 11 
     years in prison plus two years deprivation of political 
     rights.
       I cannot conceive of a reason why it is in China's 
     interests to do these things. But whatever the reason, it is 
     very disturbing, and it portends real danger for Hong Kong, 
     which is a very religious Chinese community.
       But let me also mention the positive side.
       It must be recognized that progress is taking place in 
     China. For example, the National People's Congress just 
     enacted legislation intended to: help protect individuals 
     from arbitrary punishment by police and government agencies; 
     limit the practice ``administrative detention'' to thirty 
     days; and require the State Council to secure the approval of 
     the National People's Congress before declaring martial law.
       As one who has traveled to China dozens of times over the 
     last 20 years, it is clear to me that there have been 
     remarkable changes: an increasing standard of living, 
     increased wages, and savings, and improved education of the 
     people; greater mobility and a freer lifestyle for the 
     average Chinese; local and provincial governments that are 
     more independent from Beijing--with over 300 million Chinese 
     participating in direct local and provincial elections; a 
     growing web of private property ownership in the provinces, 
     and greater legal protection for the owners and investors in 
     private enterprises; a more accessible court system for 
     Chinese citizens to contest government actions that infringe 
     on their freedoms and property.
       To appreciate the scope of these changes one only needs to 
     look back a mere 35 years to the Cultural Revolution and 
     Great Leap Forward, during which millions of Chinese lost 
     their lives in unprecedented brutality.
       Yes, these changes are in their infancy compared to Western 
     standards, but it is important to understand that China is a 
     $5,000 year old nation--a nation governed by the rule of man 
     for most of its history. It will not transition to the rule 
     of law overnight--no matter how much pressure is applied from 
     outside forces.
       It was interesting for me to read an article by Henry Rowen 
     entitled ``The Short March,'' in which he describes 
     conducting a Lexis-Nexis search on China and human rights in 
     five major U.S. publications.
       For the period January 1991 through June 1996 he found ``on 
     the one hand, 356 stories on abuses of various kinds, and on 
     the other hand, 3 on local elections, 16 on efforts to 
     introduce a rule of law, and 10 on the liberalizing of the 
     mass media: in short, an overall ratio of 12 to 1.''
       So clearly, the bad gets reported and the good does not.
       I believe that China will not change its ways merely to 
     please America. The real key to change is convincing China 
     that it in China's interests to change. And I believe that 
     this can be done.

[[Page S846]]

       Most importantly, the U.S. should work with China to 
     develop a modern legal system with an independent judiciary, 
     due process of law and a modern penal and civil codes. China 
     is receptive to our help in this area.
       Through engagement and assistance such as this we can do 
     more to advance the cause of human rights in China in the 
     long run than through constant castigation, or isolation.
       I would like to make a proposal that may be acceptable to 
     both sides. I would propose a presidential human rights 
     commission or forum. This commission would be appointed by 
     both presidents, with the mission of charting the evolution 
     of human rights in both countries over the last 20 to 30 
     years.
       In reports to be delivered to both presidents, the 
     commission would point out the successes and failures--both 
     Tiananmen Square and Kent State--and make recommendations for 
     goals for the future.


                      The Growing Trade Imbalance

       Another area of increasing concern is the growing trade gap 
     with China.
       What is essentially a trade problem today will become an 
     acute political problem in the U.S.-China relationship if it 
     is left unaddressed.
       I have communicated my concern about this issue to the 
     Chinese leadership. They agree that this is a potential 
     problem, but they dispute the size of the trade imbalance.
       The United States calculates the imbalance at about $38 
     billion, while the Chinese figure is closer to $10 billion.
       When I was in China in November I proposed to Zhu Rongji, 
     the Executive Vice Premier, who is in effect China's economic 
     czar, that the United States and China establish a joint 
     working group to sit down and establish once and for all a 
     common method of calculating the trade imbalance, especially 
     after Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese rule. Zhu Rongji told 
     me he would support such a proposal.


                       Most Favored Nation Status

       Another constant flashpoint is the annual battle over 
     China's Most Favored Nation Trading status.
       Every summer Congress and the Administration go through a 
     sort of ritual dance over the extension of MFN status to 
     China. Congress had never overridden a President's decision 
     to extend MFN for China, but we have often voted on it 
     anyway.
       Last year, the House, by a resounding vote of 286-141, 
     rejected an attempt to deny or condition China's MFN status. 
     It would be helpful to have that vote settle it once and for 
     all, but, unfortunately, we are less than five months away 
     from the next go around, which I suspect may not be any less 
     rancorous.
       The political implications of revoking MFN for China are 
     great. For a country such as China, where face and respect 
     are such central issues, the debate over revoking MFN is seen 
     as tantamount to the United States telling China that we are 
     still unsure whether to accept them as a member of the family 
     of nations.
       Denying MFN would seriously impair our ability to work with 
     China on just about any issue.
       Clearly, linking human rights with MFN has been a failure. 
     I hope we do not make the same mistake twice by linking it to 
     something else, like the negotiations on China's accession to 
     the WTO.
       MFN is our standard trading status, and it is granted to 
     all but seven rogue states.
       It is time to put an end to this destructive debate year 
     after year. I support making MFN for China permanent.


                               HONG KONG

       In the short run, the transition of Hong Kong is seen by 
     some as a bellwether for China's willingness to act as a 
     responsible great power.
       It is key and critical that ``one country, two systems'' be 
     carried out. The world is clearly watching to see whether in 
     fact it is possible to have within China an autonomous region 
     that charts its own domestic policy.
       The Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law 
     provide the foundation for the transfer, and for the future 
     governance and economic life of Hong Kong.
       I am troubled by the legislation submitted last week to the 
     National People's Congress that would undo the Hong Kong bill 
     of rights. Lu Ping, the Chinese official in charge of the 
     Hong Kong transition, told me directly in Beijing in November 
     that the question of public protest and assembly was a matter 
     for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), and if 
     SAR law permitted public expressions of dissent, China would 
     have no objection.
       If the central government of China reverses Hong Kong's 
     Bill of Rights, and other civil liberties, it would be a blow 
     to the credibility of ``one country, two systems.''
       Additionally, I would hope that the provisional legislature 
     meeting this week in Shenzhen is sensitive to the pledge of 
     domestic autonomy for Hong Kong.
       I strongly agree with Secretary Albright when she said that 
     the way events play out in Hong Kong will have an important 
     effect on the overall U.S.-China relationship.


                               CONCLUSION

       With this new Congress, and an Administration now seasoned 
     in its second term, we now have the opportunity to move 
     beyond some of the events that have soured Sino-American 
     relations in the past several years.
       President Clinton and Secretary Albright must immerse 
     themselves fully in the details of this most delicate and 
     critical of American relations.
       In the final analysis, the goal of American policy must be 
     to encourage China toward a full and active relationship with 
     the West and to work together toward a China that is able to 
     take its role as a stable leader of Asia and a guarantor of 
     peace and security in the world.

                          ____________________