[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 10 (Thursday, January 30, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S833-S835]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the emerging relationship between the United
States and China is one of immense opportunity for both nations, and
deserves the steady attention of the highest levels of both
governments. Both nations need to make every effort to broaden the area
of common ground in our dealings and understandings, and to engage in
an open and honest dialogue on those issues, such as weapons
proliferation and human rights matters, on which we have serious
differences. There is a rising tide of commentary on our bilateral
relationship, and it is not particularly easy to arrive at the kind of
balanced approach which is both clear-eyed regarding present realities,
and at the same time visionary on future prospects. One of the most
thoughtful recent attempts to paint the salient highlights of this
complicated picture was made last week by the recently retired Senator
from the State of Georgia, Sam Nunn.
On the occasion of his selection as the 1997 recipient of the Paul
Nitze Award for Distinguished Public Service, Mr. Nunn described the
current state of consensus in the United States on U.S.-China policy as
``very, very fragile.'' If that consensus were to break down, and the
relationship with China were to turn sour, a historic opportunity of
profound importance could be lost. Both sides need to work hard to
avoid that possibility.
The consensus within the United States that Senator Nunn describes
includes the healthy notion that our support for the modernization of
China's legal and banking and judicial, civil service and other
institutions will pay long-range dividends for our overall
relationship, and for progress in China, but that modernization will
not emerge magically. Sustained efforts at cooperation in both public-
and private-sector activities must be ongoing.
In his remarks, Senator Nunn rightly flags the importance of the
circumstances accompanying the turnover of Hong Kong to China on July 1
of this year. How well China adheres to the commitment that she has
made to the people of Hong Kong to preserve Hong Kong's distinct
social, political and economic identity for the next 50 years will be
vital. Senator Nunn states that China's ``credibility is on the line,''
in that China has given its word, and extended a solemn promise. A very
disquieting note has just been raised by the annual report by the State
Department on human rights performance around the world according to
the New York Times. The report says, ``Hong Kong's civil liberties and
political institutions were threatened by restrictive measures taken by
the Chinese government in anticipation of Hong Kong's reversion to
Chinese sovereignty'' in July. If China does not honor its obligations
to Hong Kong, her relationship with the world, as Senator Nunn points
out, will be ``dealt a severe blow.'' Keeping her word will be a key
indicator of China's general willingness to adhere to the terms of
other international obligations that the United States might support,
such as membership in the World Trade Organization. Hong Kong will, in
July, become an integral part of China and it will take some dexterity
and work on the part of the Chinese government to fulfill its promise
to honor Hong Kong's unique institutions. In this, as in many other
aspects of our growing relationship, patience, calmness, understanding
and open dialogue will be important keys to success. The United States
would be mistaken to judge too quickly or to criticize too easily. We
should be cognizant that the more our interrelationships develop across
the board, the more likely it will be that the warm breezes of open
democracy will have its effects on Chinese society.
It will take a special effort on both sides to continue to propel our
relationship along constructive channels, and to do so will require
sustained effort, frequent interchanges and constant communication.
I commend Senator Nunn for his contribution to this dialogue on our
China policy and recommend a reading of his address to my colleagues. I
hope that his remarks will receive wide distribution.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the remarks of Senator
Nunn to which I have just alluded be printed in the Record at this
point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
United States-China Policy--Seeking a Balance
(By Sam Nunn)
It is a great honor for me to accept this award which bears
the name of one of our Nation's greatest statesmen--Paul
Nitze has dedicated his life to advancing our national
interests--as a Governmental official--as a private citizen--
in war and in peace. Paul is a public servant without peer--
from NSC-68 and the wise men--to the Marshall plan and NATO--
Paul has led with vision. From the Committee on present
Danger and Nuclear Weapons Strategy--to charting a course in
the post cold war era--Paul Nitze has had the courage of his
vision and has demonstrated that one man can truly make a
difference.
Paul--by your example--you have defined the true meaning of
statesmanship. As an admirer--a student--and a friend--it is
a great honor for me to accept the Paul Nitze Award.
I am grateful to Bob Murray and CNA's board of trustees for
this special honor and for CNA's contributions to our
Nation's security.
These are just a few examples of the great return the
taxpayers get by investing in CNA. Bob, to you and your
team--keep up the good work!
There is only one catch to this wonderful evening with Paul
Nitze--the awardee must delivery a lecture on a matter
important to our national security--so any hope that you may
have that I will say a quick thank you and sit down--is
dashed on the rocks of this obligation.
If Paul were presenting a paper this evening, he would
cover NATO expansion, peace prospects in the Middle East, the
effect of Islamic fundamentalism on U.S. interests, the quest
for eliminating nuclear weapons from the globe--as well as
the emergence of China--all in clear, succinct and persuasive
form. Being a mere mortal, I will confine myself to only the
last subject--the emergence of China. I believe that this is
an important subject on the eve of the 25th anniversary of
President Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China and at a time
when many Americans are questioning the policy we have
pursued under both Democratic and Republican Presidents since
that time.
There are many think tanks in Washington--but CNA is
unique--the only one whose scientists regularly deploy in war
and in peace with our operational forces.
Those of us in the Congress dealing with national security
are keenly aware of your reputation for excellence and
objectivity--but most of all--we are aware of your effect on
policy.
In the gulf war, one of our missiles misfired and killed
our own people--CNA figured out why and prevented it from
happening again.
The Defense Department has to become more efficient if we
are to have the funding to modernize--CNA identified billions
in infrastructure savings which have been adopted by the
Navy.
One of our most effective weapons is the Tomahawk Missile--
CNA's recommendations have significantly improved its
performance.
The growing importance of China in world affairs demands a
purposeful, coherent and consistent American policy. History
is littered with the uninformed and ineffective responses of
an established power towards a rising power, and vice versa.
Established powers must provide consistent and credible
signals about their expectations and set forth reasonable
terms on which they are willing to incorporate the rising
power into the international system.
We are now watching the rise of China against the backdrop
of Asia's rapid industrialization. China is a nuclear power
with the world's largest army and a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council. China also is a nation with
1.2 billion people, an economy growing at nearly 10 percent a
year over the last decade--and as we too often forget--a
distinctive civilization of great antiquity.
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China is in the midst of four major transitions:
From a planned economy to a state guided market economy.
From rule by the long march revolutionaries to rule by
bureaucrats, technocrats, and military professionals.
From an agricultural society to an industrial society.
From a largely self-sufficient, isolated economy to one
that is increasingly dependent upon the international
economy.
China's transition is likely to be protracted. Uncertainty
is a permanent quality of modern China. Even if China embarks
upon a process of democratization, the development will be a
lengthy one. History shows it takes a long time to create a
legal system--guarantees for private property--a
parliamentary system--a free press--and the political culture
that can sustain a pluralistic and tolerant civil society.
We must engage China and its current leaders now rather
than remain aloof from this vast, complex, and proud
civilization until it becomes to our liking.
This can only be done if the leaders and peoples of both
our countries are convinced that their national interests
will be well served through greater U.S.-China cooperation.
Let's consider a few examples:
first: arms control and non-proliferation
Preventing the proflieration of weapons of mass
destruction--and their means of delivery--and reducing
stockpiles of these weapons are American interests of the
highest priority.
As a nuclear power and a permanent member of the Security
Council, China can either assist or torpedo efforts to stop
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--its role is
critical--China's attitude toward various arms control
measures has certainly improved in the past decade--its
recent commitment to cease nuclear testing and to support the
comprehensive test ban treaty is an encouraging development.
China seems to recognize its interest in reducing the dangers
of nuclear proliferation globally and especially in East
Asia.
But China also has been indifferent to the destabilizing
consequences of its transfer of advanced technology and sale
of materials related to strategic weapons in South Asia and
the Middle East. Aspects of its military and technology
relations with Pakistan and Iran are deeply troubling to the
United States.
In our dialogue with the Chinese at high levels we should
point out that as a growing importer of oil from the Middle
East, China has an increasing stake in the tranquility of the
Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf--its pattern of arms
sales does not seem to take this into account--we should also
emphasize to Beijing that the U.S. Navy protects the waters
through which oil tankers bring petroleum to China. China
benefits from the stability our naval presence brings to the
high seas.
second: the collapse of the soviet union
Both the United States and China must respond to the
consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the
Russian threat now greatly diminished, the security
frameworks erected in the cold war era must take into account
new realities. Plans are underway to extend NATO eastward (a
move I remain very skeptical about--but that is the subject
of another speech), and we are adjusting our treaties with
Japan and Korea. These changes must be undertaken in ways
that do not raise new and deep security concerns in Russia
about its western flank or in China about its eastern flank,
lest we inadvertently stimulate the two to begin a strategic
relationship that neither prefers and which threatens
stability.
Russia's new situation also has offered China opportunities
to improve its relations with Moscow. This is a welcome
development. Previous Soviet-Chinese rivalry and military
confrontation brought tension to the entire region. Improved
Sino-Russian relations help promote regional stability. But
economic considerations on the Russian side and opportunism
on the Chinese side could prompt an undisciplined flood of
weapons and military technology to China, provoking an effort
by the Asian Nations to balance China's growing strength,
resulting in a destabilizing arms race.
In Central Asia, Mongolia, and the Russian Far East, China
faces some serious questions:
Will the new Central Asian Nations stimulate separatist
impulses among China's Islamic peoples?
Where is the Russian Far East headed, in light of Moscow's
ebbing economic and political grasp over the region?
Will the migration of Chinese to Siberia continue and
become a new source of tension between Russia and China?
How will the resources of the Russian Far East be developed
in the next century?
We should discuss these broad strategic issues with
Beijing. How to ease Russia's political and economic
transformation; how to create a framework of stability for
the states of the former Soviet Empire; and how to continue
the current favorable alignment among the major powers of
Asia. For the first time in a century, China, Russia, Japan,
and the United States have good relations with one another,
constant dialogue among China, Russia, Japan, and the United
States is required to consolidate this relationship.
third: regional security interests
In addition to its global strategic interests, the United
States has enduring regional security concerns.
No region is more important to the United States than the
Asia-Pacific Region, where America has fought three costly
wars in this century and where rapidly growing economies
offer the United States our greatest expanding markets.
Needless to say, China also has a keen interest in
maintaining stability in this region--our overlapping
interests have enabled China and the United States to
cooperate in sustaining peace in Korea and ending nearly 40
years of war on the Indochina Peninsula.
Our treaties with Japan and South Korea and the specific
arrangements developed under them--the status or forces
agreements, the basing arrangements and force structures--
took shape in the cold-war era. Much has happened in the
subsequent years. Japan and South Korea have emerged as
prosperous, full democracies. Through consultations, the
United States and China must forge an understanding that
adjustments to these treaties are not aimed at China but are
intended to ensure that the alliances remain a cornerstone of
regional stability.
fourth: international economic interests
The United States has a major interest in maintaining
steady international economic growth, uninterrupted by
financial crises or disruptions in the international monetary
system. We seek access to the markets of other countries and
we believe that the growth of imports into the United States
should occur in an orderly fashion. We seek a level playing
field--too frequently, foreign countries exploit their open
access to American markets while limiting access to their
markets or discriminating against American firms.
Sanctions should be employed with great care, but any
American Government that ignores the American peoples' strong
desire for a fair playing field in world trade will have
great difficulty conducting a sensible trade policy or
foreign policy.
With one of the world's largest economies, its rapid
increase in foreign trade, its substantial foreign currency
reserves (nearly $100 billion), and its external indebtedness
(over $100 billion), China's economic performance clearly
affects American interests. China has created a better
institutional and legal environment to welcome foreign direct
investment than most other countries in East Asia. It has
taken measures to facilitate repatriation of profits. Its
sovereign offerings are deemed credit worthy by international
rating agencies.
Yet even though roughly 40 percent of China's exports are
ultimately consumed in the United States, its Government
appears reluctant to address its growing trade deficit with
the United States through increased purchases from American
vendors. While decrying American linkage of trade and
politics, China is practicing its own form of linkage. Too
often China has discriminated against American vendors on
political grounds, even though China enjoys easier access to
the American market than to markets of other developed
countries.
Further--China's laws governing commerce remain
underdeveloped, and corruption is a growing problem. Many
non-tariff barriers still exist that restrict access to the
China market.
As Bob Zoellick recently observed, we are likely to be more
successful in pursuing our trade grievances if we seek an
international coalition to promote and enforce international
standards and if we stress China's self-interest in adhering
to the rules.
fifth: problems of interdependence
The United States has a major interest in reducing a wide
range of problems that transcend national boundaries:
Environmental degradation; international terrorism; illegal
population migration; narcotics trafficking; the spread of
communicable diseases; pressure on world food supplies; and
rapid population growth. These problems threaten the survival
of vast portions of the world's peoples and introduce global
instability.
Chinese-American cooperation cannot assure success in
addressing these most fundamental problems that threaten all
humankind. But Chinese-American animosity would surely make
it more difficult to cope with these issues. Acting together,
the United States and China can accomplish much. in
confrontation, both of us will suffer.
sixth: democracy and human rights
The United States must give expression to the values on
which the Nation was founded and that draw Americans together
as one people. These beliefs have universal appeal. They are
a source of American strength.
Yet the authoritarian leaders of China believe that many
political values that Americans espouse do not apply to
China. their obstinate resistance to democratization and
human rights is driven by complex reasons. I believe that
China's leaders jeopardize their nation's economic progress
and domestic stability by not moving more rapidly toward the
rule of law and expanding the opportunities of their populace
to participate meaningfully in their own governance. China
cannot expect United States and world acquiescence or silence
in response to flagrant abuses of human rights. This is
particularly true in terms of China's treatment of the
citizens of Hong Kong.
In assessing China's behavior, however, I believe that we
must broaden our own definition of human rights. Professor
Harry Harding has recently written that:
``While the individual political and civil freedoms
enshrined in the American Constitution are indispensable to
human rights
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as we know them, human rights also encompass such social and
economic rights as the rights to subsistence, to development,
to employment, to education, and the special rights of women
and children and the elderly. Political and civil freedoms
are not the only things that people value in their political
lives. Other political goals, including stability, effective
governance,and absence of corruption, are also worthy of
pursuit.''
As we shape our strategy, we need to keep these words of
wisdom in mind. If we do, our justifiable criticisms of
abuses are likely to have more credibility and more effect
not only in China but also with our friends throughout Asia.
This review of America's foreign policy interests reveals
that a thick web of partly convergent and partly divergent
interests now binds the United States and China. In
recognition of this reality, I believe that a new fragile
consensus on China policy is slowly emerging in Washington
and among the American people.
This fragile consensus rejects the extremes of rigid
hostility or unconditional friendship with China. It seeks
cooperation with China while realistically accepting
disagreement where our values and interests diverge. If
strengthened, this consensus has the potential to embrace
several fundamental concepts.
First, Sino-American relations merit high level sustained
attention of the United States Government. Management of this
relationship cannot be relegated in chaotic fashion to the
lower levels of each department in the executive branch, but
must be coordinated at the highest levels of Government,
including the Congress. The exchange of Presidential visits
is a strong step in the right direction.
Second, the United States has an interest in a prosperous,
stable and unified mainland that is effectively and humanely
governed, not a weak, divided or isolated China which would
surely threatened the region's peace and prosperity.
Third, the United States should seek to work constructively
with China to facilitate its entry into the international
regimes that regulate and order world affairs. China will be
more likely to adhere to international norms that it has
helped to shape. But China's entry must not be permitted on
terms that jeopardize the purpose of those regimes.
Fourth, the United States should continue to adhere to our
one China policy based on the Shanghai Communique, the
normalization agreement, and the 1982 joint communique. We do
not seek to detach Taiwan from the mainland permanently, but
neither can we accept Taiwan's forcible reunification with
the Mainland. Taiwan deserves a status in world affairs
commensurate with its economic and political attainment. But
realistically, Taiwan can best secure a greater international
voice and stature through cooperation with Beijing and not
through provocation.
Fifth, to attain all these objectives, the United States
must retain a robust military presence in the Western
Pacific. Until multilateral security arrangements are firmly
in place and well rooted in East Asia--there will be no
substitute for the Japanese-American and Korean-American
security treaties--which are not directed against China.
Sixth, the United States--especially the private sector--
should cooperate with China in its efforts to develop
institutions necessary for its continued modernization: A
legal system and the rule of law; a strengthened judiciary;
an effective banking and revenue system; a civil service
system; representative assemblies; and effective civilian
control over the public security and military forces.
Finally, because of the attention that will be focused on
the turnover of Hong Kong to China on July 1 of this year,
Hong Kong will provide the prism through which Americans will
view China. This 1997 view may affect the American people's
perception of China for years to come, and may turn out to be
the bellwether for the international community in judging
Beijing's intent and approach to the world.
Will China carry out its solemn commitment to Britain and
the people of Hong Kong to allow Hong Kong its own distinct
social, political and economic identity for the next 50
years? If so, this example will lead to a positive view of
China throughout the world, including the people of Taiwan.
If not, China's relationship to the world will be dealt a
severe blow and its relations with the people of Taiwan will
be set back 50 years.
It is far from clear that the leaders of China are prepared
to meet this responsibility by allowing Hong Kong to retain
the qualities that are key to its success--such as a
professional civil service, the rule of law, an independent
judiciary, and freedom to receive and disseminate
information.
Considering the large stakes, I believe that our own
country must strive for balance in our assessment and our
actions.
We should remember that Hong Kong was seized by force from
a weak China and that the British subsequently ruled it as a
British colony--not a democracy. Hong Kong and Macau are the
last Western colonies in Asia, and represent the end of an
era.
China should be told clearly and firmly that their
credibility is on the line and that their behavior toward
Hong Kong will have a major effect on their standing in the
international community--in short, they must keep their
world--our measuring stick of Chinese behavior should be
based on their own solemn commitments--not on our dream of a
Jeffersonian transformation.
It is essential that we not rush to a final verdict based
on the first thing that goes wrong. This will be a long
uneven process with many rough spots and mistakes. The
transfer of power is a British and Chinese agreement, and the
United States should not get drawn into a self-appointed role
as the arbiter of the details.
The United States should not become the sole critic when
China deviates from its commitment to Hong Kong. This will
turn Hong Kong into a U.S.-China confrontation and will not
be effective with a Chinese leadership that fears the
perception in their own country that they are yielding to
American pressure. While we have a huge stake in a prosperous
Hong Kong and a China which keeps its commitments--so do our
allies in Europe and Asia. We, of course, must lead--but we
must lead the international community.
In the final analysis, after July 1, Hong Kong will again
be part of China and its long term future will be determined
by events in China itself. As the eyes of America and the
world focus on the important trees of Hong Kong, we must not
lose sight of the forest itself--China.
In our country the emerging consensus of U.S.-China policy
is very, very fragile. The Presidential visits, the recent
stabilization of Chinese-American relations and the prospects
for improvement in the months ahead are particularly
vulnerable to disruption by possible Chinese actions.
Many observers caution that for deeper reasons, the new
consensus cannot be sustained, citing the historical ``love-
hate'' relationship between these two great countries.
Some analysts claim that two civilizations as different as
that of China and the United States simply cannot sustain
constructive relations.
Other analysts assert that political and ideological
differences preclude a close, cooperative relationship
between Washington and Beijing.
Yet others claim that accommodations between the United
States and China will necessarily prove to be temporary
because of our differences in wealth and power and because
the United States is a defender of an international system
that we helped to create and that advances our interests.
Let us acknowledge and accept the dangers these observers
offer. They remind us of the enormous challenges in fostering
cooperative Sino-American relations. They caution us neither
to harbor illusion nor to allow expectations to soar. But in
the final analysis, what should we do with their warnings?
Should our policy become fatalistic, devoid of hope that the
United States and China can be partners in the building of a
more stable and secure world? Should the United States look
upon China as an enemy and therefore seek to weaken or divide
it, thereby creating a reality we seek to avoid?
I believe the clear answer is no. To move in this direction
would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Forewarned of the
difficulties, the leaders of China and the United States must
persist in forging cooperative bonds between our two nations.
One conclusion is clear--in no small measure, the future
well-being of the American and Chinese people depends on the
ability of our two nations to cooperate. I remain hopeful
that enlightened self-interest will prevail, as it has in the
25 years since President Nixon and Chairman Mao shook hands.
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you, CNA. And thank
you and God bless you. Paul Nitze.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Bumpers pertaining to the introduction of S. 237
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
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