[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 10 (Thursday, January 30, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S833-S835]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the emerging relationship between the United 
States and China is one of immense opportunity for both nations, and 
deserves the steady attention of the highest levels of both 
governments. Both nations need to make every effort to broaden the area 
of common ground in our dealings and understandings, and to engage in 
an open and honest dialogue on those issues, such as weapons 
proliferation and human rights matters, on which we have serious 
differences. There is a rising tide of commentary on our bilateral 
relationship, and it is not particularly easy to arrive at the kind of 
balanced approach which is both clear-eyed regarding present realities, 
and at the same time visionary on future prospects. One of the most 
thoughtful recent attempts to paint the salient highlights of this 
complicated picture was made last week by the recently retired Senator 
from the State of Georgia, Sam Nunn.
  On the occasion of his selection as the 1997 recipient of the Paul 
Nitze Award for Distinguished Public Service, Mr. Nunn described the 
current state of consensus in the United States on U.S.-China policy as 
``very, very fragile.'' If that consensus were to break down, and the 
relationship with China were to turn sour, a historic opportunity of 
profound importance could be lost. Both sides need to work hard to 
avoid that possibility.
  The consensus within the United States that Senator Nunn describes 
includes the healthy notion that our support for the modernization of 
China's legal and banking and judicial, civil service and other 
institutions will pay long-range dividends for our overall 
relationship, and for progress in China, but that modernization will 
not emerge magically. Sustained efforts at cooperation in both public- 
and private-sector activities must be ongoing.
  In his remarks, Senator Nunn rightly flags the importance of the 
circumstances accompanying the turnover of Hong Kong to China on July 1 
of this year. How well China adheres to the commitment that she has 
made to the people of Hong Kong to preserve Hong Kong's distinct 
social, political and economic identity for the next 50 years will be 
vital. Senator Nunn states that China's ``credibility is on the line,'' 
in that China has given its word, and extended a solemn promise. A very 
disquieting note has just been raised by the annual report by the State 
Department on human rights performance around the world according to 
the New York Times. The report says, ``Hong Kong's civil liberties and 
political institutions were threatened by restrictive measures taken by 
the Chinese government in anticipation of Hong Kong's reversion to 
Chinese sovereignty'' in July. If China does not honor its obligations 
to Hong Kong, her relationship with the world, as Senator Nunn points 
out, will be ``dealt a severe blow.'' Keeping her word will be a key 
indicator of China's general willingness to adhere to the terms of 
other international obligations that the United States might support, 
such as membership in the World Trade Organization. Hong Kong will, in 
July, become an integral part of China and it will take some dexterity 
and work on the part of the Chinese government to fulfill its promise 
to honor Hong Kong's unique institutions. In this, as in many other 
aspects of our growing relationship, patience, calmness, understanding 
and open dialogue will be important keys to success. The United States 
would be mistaken to judge too quickly or to criticize too easily. We 
should be cognizant that the more our interrelationships develop across 
the board, the more likely it will be that the warm breezes of open 
democracy will have its effects on Chinese society.
  It will take a special effort on both sides to continue to propel our 
relationship along constructive channels, and to do so will require 
sustained effort, frequent interchanges and constant communication.
  I commend Senator Nunn for his contribution to this dialogue on our 
China policy and recommend a reading of his address to my colleagues. I 
hope that his remarks will receive wide distribution.
  I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the remarks of Senator 
Nunn to which I have just alluded be printed in the Record at this 
point.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             United States-China Policy--Seeking a Balance

                             (By Sam Nunn)

       It is a great honor for me to accept this award which bears 
     the name of one of our Nation's greatest statesmen--Paul 
     Nitze has dedicated his life to advancing our national 
     interests--as a Governmental official--as a private citizen--
     in war and in peace. Paul is a public servant without peer--
     from NSC-68 and the wise men--to the Marshall plan and NATO--
     Paul has led with vision. From the Committee on present 
     Danger and Nuclear Weapons Strategy--to charting a course in 
     the post cold war era--Paul Nitze has had the courage of his 
     vision and has demonstrated that one man can truly make a 
     difference.
       Paul--by your example--you have defined the true meaning of 
     statesmanship. As an admirer--a student--and a friend--it is 
     a great honor for me to accept the Paul Nitze Award.
       I am grateful to Bob Murray and CNA's board of trustees for 
     this special honor and for CNA's contributions to our 
     Nation's security.
       These are just a few examples of the great return the 
     taxpayers get by investing in CNA. Bob, to you and your 
     team--keep up the good work!
       There is only one catch to this wonderful evening with Paul 
     Nitze--the awardee must delivery a lecture on a matter 
     important to our national security--so any hope that you may 
     have that I will say a quick thank you and sit down--is 
     dashed on the rocks of this obligation.
       If Paul were presenting a paper this evening, he would 
     cover NATO expansion, peace prospects in the Middle East, the 
     effect of Islamic fundamentalism on U.S. interests, the quest 
     for eliminating nuclear weapons from the globe--as well as 
     the emergence of China--all in clear, succinct and persuasive 
     form. Being a mere mortal, I will confine myself to only the 
     last subject--the emergence of China. I believe that this is 
     an important subject on the eve of the 25th anniversary of 
     President Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China and at a time 
     when many Americans are questioning the policy we have 
     pursued under both Democratic and Republican Presidents since 
     that time.
       There are many think tanks in Washington--but CNA is 
     unique--the only one whose scientists regularly deploy in war 
     and in peace with our operational forces.
       Those of us in the Congress dealing with national security 
     are keenly aware of your reputation for excellence and 
     objectivity--but most of all--we are aware of your effect on 
     policy.
       In the gulf war, one of our missiles misfired and killed 
     our own people--CNA figured out why and prevented it from 
     happening again.
       The Defense Department has to become more efficient if we 
     are to have the funding to modernize--CNA identified billions 
     in infrastructure savings which have been adopted by the 
     Navy.
       One of our most effective weapons is the Tomahawk Missile--
     CNA's recommendations have significantly improved its 
     performance.
       The growing importance of China in world affairs demands a 
     purposeful, coherent and consistent American policy. History 
     is littered with the uninformed and ineffective responses of 
     an established power towards a rising power, and vice versa.
       Established powers must provide consistent and credible 
     signals about their expectations and set forth reasonable 
     terms on which they are willing to incorporate the rising 
     power into the international system.
       We are now watching the rise of China against the backdrop 
     of Asia's rapid industrialization. China is a nuclear power 
     with the world's largest army and a permanent member of the 
     United Nations Security Council. China also is a nation with 
     1.2 billion people, an economy growing at nearly 10 percent a 
     year over the last decade--and as we too often forget--a 
     distinctive civilization of great antiquity.

[[Page S834]]

       China is in the midst of four major transitions:
       From a planned economy to a state guided market economy.
       From rule by the long march revolutionaries to rule by 
     bureaucrats, technocrats, and military professionals.
       From an agricultural society to an industrial society.
       From a largely self-sufficient, isolated economy to one 
     that is increasingly dependent upon the international 
     economy.
       China's transition is likely to be protracted. Uncertainty 
     is a permanent quality of modern China. Even if China embarks 
     upon a process of democratization, the development will be a 
     lengthy one. History shows it takes a long time to create a 
     legal system--guarantees for private property--a 
     parliamentary system--a free press--and the political culture 
     that can sustain a pluralistic and tolerant civil society.
       We must engage China and its current leaders now rather 
     than remain aloof from this vast, complex, and proud 
     civilization until it becomes to our liking.
       This can only be done if the leaders and peoples of both 
     our countries are convinced that their national interests 
     will be well served through greater U.S.-China cooperation. 
     Let's consider a few examples:


               first: arms control and non-proliferation

       Preventing the proflieration of weapons of mass 
     destruction--and their means of delivery--and reducing 
     stockpiles of these weapons are American interests of the 
     highest priority.
       As a nuclear power and a permanent member of the Security 
     Council, China can either assist or torpedo efforts to stop 
     the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--its role is 
     critical--China's attitude toward various arms control 
     measures has certainly improved in the past decade--its 
     recent commitment to cease nuclear testing and to support the 
     comprehensive test ban treaty is an encouraging development. 
     China seems to recognize its interest in reducing the dangers 
     of nuclear proliferation globally and especially in East 
     Asia.
       But China also has been indifferent to the destabilizing 
     consequences of its transfer of advanced technology and sale 
     of materials related to strategic weapons in South Asia and 
     the Middle East. Aspects of its military and technology 
     relations with Pakistan and Iran are deeply troubling to the 
     United States.
       In our dialogue with the Chinese at high levels we should 
     point out that as a growing importer of oil from the Middle 
     East, China has an increasing stake in the tranquility of the 
     Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf--its pattern of arms 
     sales does not seem to take this into account--we should also 
     emphasize to Beijing that the U.S. Navy protects the waters 
     through which oil tankers bring petroleum to China. China 
     benefits from the stability our naval presence brings to the 
     high seas.


                second: the collapse of the soviet union

       Both the United States and China must respond to the 
     consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the 
     Russian threat now greatly diminished, the security 
     frameworks erected in the cold war era must take into account 
     new realities. Plans are underway to extend NATO eastward (a 
     move I remain very skeptical about--but that is the subject 
     of another speech), and we are adjusting our treaties with 
     Japan and Korea. These changes must be undertaken in ways 
     that do not raise new and deep security concerns in Russia 
     about its western flank or in China about its eastern flank, 
     lest we inadvertently stimulate the two to begin a strategic 
     relationship that neither prefers and which threatens 
     stability.
       Russia's new situation also has offered China opportunities 
     to improve its relations with Moscow. This is a welcome 
     development. Previous Soviet-Chinese rivalry and military 
     confrontation brought tension to the entire region. Improved 
     Sino-Russian relations help promote regional stability. But 
     economic considerations on the Russian side and opportunism 
     on the Chinese side could prompt an undisciplined flood of 
     weapons and military technology to China, provoking an effort 
     by the Asian Nations to balance China's growing strength, 
     resulting in a destabilizing arms race.
       In Central Asia, Mongolia, and the Russian Far East, China 
     faces some serious questions:
       Will the new Central Asian Nations stimulate separatist 
     impulses among China's Islamic peoples?
       Where is the Russian Far East headed, in light of Moscow's 
     ebbing economic and political grasp over the region?
       Will the migration of Chinese to Siberia continue and 
     become a new source of tension between Russia and China?
       How will the resources of the Russian Far East be developed 
     in the next century?
       We should discuss these broad strategic issues with 
     Beijing. How to ease Russia's political and economic 
     transformation; how to create a framework of stability for 
     the states of the former Soviet Empire; and how to continue 
     the current favorable alignment among the major powers of 
     Asia. For the first time in a century, China, Russia, Japan, 
     and the United States have good relations with one another, 
     constant dialogue among China, Russia, Japan, and the United 
     States is required to consolidate this relationship.


                   third: regional security interests

       In addition to its global strategic interests, the United 
     States has enduring regional security concerns.
       No region is more important to the United States than the 
     Asia-Pacific Region, where America has fought three costly 
     wars in this century and where rapidly growing economies 
     offer the United States our greatest expanding markets. 
     Needless to say, China also has a keen interest in 
     maintaining stability in this region--our overlapping 
     interests have enabled China and the United States to 
     cooperate in sustaining peace in Korea and ending nearly 40 
     years of war on the Indochina Peninsula.
       Our treaties with Japan and South Korea and the specific 
     arrangements developed under them--the status or forces 
     agreements, the basing arrangements and force structures--
     took shape in the cold-war era. Much has happened in the 
     subsequent years. Japan and South Korea have emerged as 
     prosperous, full democracies. Through consultations, the 
     United States and China must forge an understanding that 
     adjustments to these treaties are not aimed at China but are 
     intended to ensure that the alliances remain a cornerstone of 
     regional stability.


                fourth: international economic interests

       The United States has a major interest in maintaining 
     steady international economic growth, uninterrupted by 
     financial crises or disruptions in the international monetary 
     system. We seek access to the markets of other countries and 
     we believe that the growth of imports into the United States 
     should occur in an orderly fashion. We seek a level playing 
     field--too frequently, foreign countries exploit their open 
     access to American markets while limiting access to their 
     markets or discriminating against American firms.
       Sanctions should be employed with great care, but any 
     American Government that ignores the American peoples' strong 
     desire for a fair playing field in world trade will have 
     great difficulty conducting a sensible trade policy or 
     foreign policy.
       With one of the world's largest economies, its rapid 
     increase in foreign trade, its substantial foreign currency 
     reserves (nearly $100 billion), and its external indebtedness 
     (over $100 billion), China's economic performance clearly 
     affects American interests. China has created a better 
     institutional and legal environment to welcome foreign direct 
     investment than most other countries in East Asia. It has 
     taken measures to facilitate repatriation of profits. Its 
     sovereign offerings are deemed credit worthy by international 
     rating agencies.
       Yet even though roughly 40 percent of China's exports are 
     ultimately consumed in the United States, its Government 
     appears reluctant to address its growing trade deficit with 
     the United States through increased purchases from American 
     vendors. While decrying American linkage of trade and 
     politics, China is practicing its own form of linkage. Too 
     often China has discriminated against American vendors on 
     political grounds, even though China enjoys easier access to 
     the American market than to markets of other developed 
     countries.
       Further--China's laws governing commerce remain 
     underdeveloped, and corruption is a growing problem. Many 
     non-tariff barriers still exist that restrict access to the 
     China market.
       As Bob Zoellick recently observed, we are likely to be more 
     successful in pursuing our trade grievances if we seek an 
     international coalition to promote and enforce international 
     standards and if we stress China's self-interest in adhering 
     to the rules.


                   fifth: problems of interdependence

       The United States has a major interest in reducing a wide 
     range of problems that transcend national boundaries: 
     Environmental degradation; international terrorism; illegal 
     population migration; narcotics trafficking; the spread of 
     communicable diseases; pressure on world food supplies; and 
     rapid population growth. These problems threaten the survival 
     of vast portions of the world's peoples and introduce global 
     instability.
       Chinese-American cooperation cannot assure success in 
     addressing these most fundamental problems that threaten all 
     humankind. But Chinese-American animosity would surely make 
     it more difficult to cope with these issues. Acting together, 
     the United States and China can accomplish much. in 
     confrontation, both of us will suffer.


                   sixth: democracy and human rights

       The United States must give expression to the values on 
     which the Nation was founded and that draw Americans together 
     as one people. These beliefs have universal appeal. They are 
     a source of American strength.
       Yet the authoritarian leaders of China believe that many 
     political values that Americans espouse do not apply to 
     China. their obstinate resistance to democratization and 
     human rights is driven by complex reasons. I believe that 
     China's leaders jeopardize their nation's economic progress 
     and domestic stability by not moving more rapidly toward the 
     rule of law and expanding the opportunities of their populace 
     to participate meaningfully in their own governance. China 
     cannot expect United States and world acquiescence or silence 
     in response to flagrant abuses of human rights. This is 
     particularly true in terms of China's treatment of the 
     citizens of Hong Kong.
       In assessing China's behavior, however, I believe that we 
     must broaden our own definition of human rights. Professor 
     Harry Harding has recently written that:
       ``While the individual political and civil freedoms 
     enshrined in the American Constitution are indispensable to 
     human rights

[[Page S835]]

     as we know them, human rights also encompass such social and 
     economic rights as the rights to subsistence, to development, 
     to employment, to education, and the special rights of women 
     and children and the elderly. Political and civil freedoms 
     are not the only things that people value in their political 
     lives. Other political goals, including stability, effective 
     governance,and absence of corruption, are also worthy of 
     pursuit.''
       As we shape our strategy, we need to keep these words of 
     wisdom in mind. If we do, our justifiable criticisms of 
     abuses are likely to have more credibility and more effect 
     not only in China but also with our friends throughout Asia.
       This review of America's foreign policy interests reveals 
     that a thick web of partly convergent and partly divergent 
     interests now binds the United States and China. In 
     recognition of this reality, I believe that a new fragile 
     consensus on China policy is slowly emerging in Washington 
     and among the American people.
       This fragile consensus rejects the extremes of rigid 
     hostility or unconditional friendship with China. It seeks 
     cooperation with China while realistically accepting 
     disagreement where our values and interests diverge. If 
     strengthened, this consensus has the potential to embrace 
     several fundamental concepts.
       First, Sino-American relations merit high level sustained 
     attention of the United States Government. Management of this 
     relationship cannot be relegated in chaotic fashion to the 
     lower levels of each department in the executive branch, but 
     must be coordinated at the highest levels of Government, 
     including the Congress. The exchange of Presidential visits 
     is a strong step in the right direction.
       Second, the United States has an interest in a prosperous, 
     stable and unified mainland that is effectively and humanely 
     governed, not a weak, divided or isolated China which would 
     surely threatened the region's peace and prosperity.
       Third, the United States should seek to work constructively 
     with China to facilitate its entry into the international 
     regimes that regulate and order world affairs. China will be 
     more likely to adhere to international norms that it has 
     helped to shape. But China's entry must not be permitted on 
     terms that jeopardize the purpose of those regimes.
       Fourth, the United States should continue to adhere to our 
     one China policy based on the Shanghai Communique, the 
     normalization agreement, and the 1982 joint communique. We do 
     not seek to detach Taiwan from the mainland permanently, but 
     neither can we accept Taiwan's forcible reunification with 
     the Mainland. Taiwan deserves a status in world affairs 
     commensurate with its economic and political attainment. But 
     realistically, Taiwan can best secure a greater international 
     voice and stature through cooperation with Beijing and not 
     through provocation.
       Fifth, to attain all these objectives, the United States 
     must retain a robust military presence in the Western 
     Pacific. Until multilateral security arrangements are firmly 
     in place and well rooted in East Asia--there will be no 
     substitute for the Japanese-American and Korean-American 
     security treaties--which are not directed against China.
       Sixth, the United States--especially the private sector--
     should cooperate with China in its efforts to develop 
     institutions necessary for its continued modernization: A 
     legal system and the rule of law; a strengthened judiciary; 
     an effective banking and revenue system; a civil service 
     system; representative assemblies; and effective civilian 
     control over the public security and military forces.
       Finally, because of the attention that will be focused on 
     the turnover of Hong Kong to China on July 1 of this year, 
     Hong Kong will provide the prism through which Americans will 
     view China. This 1997 view may affect the American people's 
     perception of China for years to come, and may turn out to be 
     the bellwether for the international community in judging 
     Beijing's intent and approach to the world.
       Will China carry out its solemn commitment to Britain and 
     the people of Hong Kong to allow Hong Kong its own distinct 
     social, political and economic identity for the next 50 
     years? If so, this example will lead to a positive view of 
     China throughout the world, including the people of Taiwan. 
     If not, China's relationship to the world will be dealt a 
     severe blow and its relations with the people of Taiwan will 
     be set back 50 years.
       It is far from clear that the leaders of China are prepared 
     to meet this responsibility by allowing Hong Kong to retain 
     the qualities that are key to its success--such as a 
     professional civil service, the rule of law, an independent 
     judiciary, and freedom to receive and disseminate 
     information.
       Considering the large stakes, I believe that our own 
     country must strive for balance in our assessment and our 
     actions.
       We should remember that Hong Kong was seized by force from 
     a weak China and that the British subsequently ruled it as a 
     British colony--not a democracy. Hong Kong and Macau are the 
     last Western colonies in Asia, and represent the end of an 
     era.
       China should be told clearly and firmly that their 
     credibility is on the line and that their behavior toward 
     Hong Kong will have a major effect on their standing in the 
     international community--in short, they must keep their 
     world--our measuring stick of Chinese behavior should be 
     based on their own solemn commitments--not on our dream of a 
     Jeffersonian transformation.
       It is essential that we not rush to a final verdict based 
     on the first thing that goes wrong. This will be a long 
     uneven process with many rough spots and mistakes. The 
     transfer of power is a British and Chinese agreement, and the 
     United States should not get drawn into a self-appointed role 
     as the arbiter of the details.
       The United States should not become the sole critic when 
     China deviates from its commitment to Hong Kong. This will 
     turn Hong Kong into a U.S.-China confrontation and will not 
     be effective with a Chinese leadership that fears the 
     perception in their own country that they are yielding to 
     American pressure. While we have a huge stake in a prosperous 
     Hong Kong and a China which keeps its commitments--so do our 
     allies in Europe and Asia. We, of course, must lead--but we 
     must lead the international community.
       In the final analysis, after July 1, Hong Kong will again 
     be part of China and its long term future will be determined 
     by events in China itself. As the eyes of America and the 
     world focus on the important trees of Hong Kong, we must not 
     lose sight of the forest itself--China.
       In our country the emerging consensus of U.S.-China policy 
     is very, very fragile. The Presidential visits, the recent 
     stabilization of Chinese-American relations and the prospects 
     for improvement in the months ahead are particularly 
     vulnerable to disruption by possible Chinese actions.
       Many observers caution that for deeper reasons, the new 
     consensus cannot be sustained, citing the historical ``love-
     hate'' relationship between these two great countries.
       Some analysts claim that two civilizations as different as 
     that of China and the United States simply cannot sustain 
     constructive relations.
       Other analysts assert that political and ideological 
     differences preclude a close, cooperative relationship 
     between Washington and Beijing.
       Yet others claim that accommodations between the United 
     States and China will necessarily prove to be temporary 
     because of our differences in wealth and power and because 
     the United States is a defender of an international system 
     that we helped to create and that advances our interests.
       Let us acknowledge and accept the dangers these observers 
     offer. They remind us of the enormous challenges in fostering 
     cooperative Sino-American relations. They caution us neither 
     to harbor illusion nor to allow expectations to soar. But in 
     the final analysis, what should we do with their warnings? 
     Should our policy become fatalistic, devoid of hope that the 
     United States and China can be partners in the building of a 
     more stable and secure world? Should the United States look 
     upon China as an enemy and therefore seek to weaken or divide 
     it, thereby creating a reality we seek to avoid?
       I believe the clear answer is no. To move in this direction 
     would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Forewarned of the 
     difficulties, the leaders of China and the United States must 
     persist in forging cooperative bonds between our two nations.
       One conclusion is clear--in no small measure, the future 
     well-being of the American and Chinese people depends on the 
     ability of our two nations to cooperate. I remain hopeful 
     that enlightened self-interest will prevail, as it has in the 
     25 years since President Nixon and Chairman Mao shook hands.
       Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you, CNA. And thank 
     you and God bless you. Paul Nitze.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Bumpers pertaining to the introduction of S. 237 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.

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