[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 8 (Tuesday, January 28, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S720-S722]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




[[Page S720]]



                        THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I recently returned from a trip to NATO 
headquarters, to the headquarters of the United States European 
command, in Stuttgart, and Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island joined me 
for a trip to the former Yugoslavia. While in Bosnia we visited 
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Simin Han, Hajvazi, and Mostar. We also visited Zagreb 
in Croatia and Belgrade in Serbia. I want to share the impressions and 
conclusions that I gained during the course of this trip.
  The situation within Bosnia is relatively stable. The forces of the 
NATO-led Implementation Force that ended its deployment in December 
1996, accomplished its mission of separating the forces of the former 
warring factions, overseeing the placing of heavy military equipment in 
cantonment areas, and generally creating an environment in which 
civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement could be carried out. 
The NATO-led stabilization force, which is scheduled to remain in 
Bosnia for 18 months from December 1996, is essentially continuing the 
mission of keeping the peace and creating a secure environment.
  I was heartened that some institutions of the Government of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina have been formed. In our separate meetings with the 
three Presidents and two Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I 
was struck by their avowed intention of working together to implement 
the Dayton agreement. There will, of course, be problems and 
frustrations as they seek to work together, but I believe that these 
day-to-day problems can be overcome if the immediate and middle term 
challenges I am about to discuss can be satisfactorily addressed.


                          immediate challenges

  The next year is going to see many significant challenges to peace in 
Bosnia, and here are two:
  First of all, a ruling of the international arbitration tribunal 
provided for in the Dayton agreement is due to be handed down on 
February 14, this year, concerning the disputed portion of the Inter-
Entity Boundary Line in the Brcko area. Brcko was the scene of ethnic 
cleansing by the Bosnia Serbs of Bosnian Moslems, who were the majority 
there prior to the war. Brcko is located in the narrowest area of the 
Posavina corridor that separates the Serb Republic from the territory 
of the Bosniac-Croat Federation and which essentially also divides the 
eastern and western portions of the Serb Republic. In view of Brcko's 
strategic location, Bosnian Serb Premier Gojko Klickovic recently told 
reporters that Serbian forces were prepared to launch a Bosnia-wide war 
if the Serbs lost control of the city in the arbitration process.

  Brcko is located in the United States sector of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Having visited with Maj. Gen. Montgomery Meigs and his 
troops, I know that they are prepared to handle any military 
contingency that might arise. It would be suicidal for the Bosnian 
Serbs to resort to force in view of the overwhelming advantage that the 
SFOR forces have, but emotions run very high over this issue. Even if 
the Bosnian Serbs did not resort to force, the lack of cooperation that 
would surely result from an adverse arbitration ruling would complicate 
further the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton 
agreement.
  A second immediate challenge relates to Eastern Slavonia, a strip of 
land in easternmost Croatia that borders on Serbia and northern Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.
  A United Nations peacekeeping force has been administering Eastern 
Slavonia as it transitions back to the full control of the Government 
of Croatia. The mandate of the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in Eastern Slavonia ends on July 15, 1997. There are 
presently about 120,000 Croatian Serbs in Eastern Slavonia, half of 
whom were driven out of their homes in other parts of Croatia, 
particularly the Krajina. If the Croatian Serbs determine that they are 
unable to live in peace in Eastern Slavonia, their only alternatives 
are to go to Bosnia or Serbia. Neither place has the resources to 
absorb the Croatian Serbs and their departure, forced or voluntary, to 
either place would be highly unsettling.
  It is important for the international community to clearly notify the 
Croatians that they must reassure the Croatian Serbs that their rights 
will be respected so they will remain in Croatia. It must be made clear 
to the Croatian Government that its relationship to the West and its 
access to western institutions will depend upon its treatment of the 
Serb minority within its borders.


                         Middle Term Challenges

  Mr. President, our visit to Bosnia and the region have convinced me 
that there will be a need for an outside armed force in Bosnia beyond 
the 18 months mission of the stabilization force.
  That is the most important, significant conclusion that I reached, 
which is that at the end of this 18-month period there still will be a 
need for an outside armed force in Bosnia. I base that conclusion on 
the following factors:


                        resettlement of refugees

  The Dayton agreement provides for the early return of all refugees 
and displaced persons to their homes. There are an estimated 1.2 
million refugees and displaced persons in Bosnia and another 900,000 
elsewhere, primarily Western Europe. There are an estimated 330,000 
refugees, mostly Bosnian Moslems, in Germany alone.
  The homes that these approximately 2.1 million people have the right 
to return to are either destroyed or are presently occupied by other 
refugees or displaced persons. As reconstruction lags, the problem 
remains acute.
  Additionally, the animosities that gave rise to the war and the 
horrible atrocities committed against civilians have not disappeared 
and serve to discourage people from returning to their homes of origin.
  These obstacles to resettlement were dramatically brought home to me 
during a visit to U.S. Observation Post Rock located in the vicinity of 
the former Bosnian Muslim town of Hajvazi that is now just within the 
Serb area of Bosnia. Across the ravine from the observation post one 
can see a house occupied by the Bosnian Serb police. The police are 
determined first to prevent Bosnian Muslims from returning and second 
to bring Bosnian Serbs in to occupy the houses in the town. The Muslim 
mosque lies in rubble.
  Most dramatic of all, however, is the interior of the observation 
post itself. A pillar in the middle of the observation post contains 
the bloody handprint of a young child and the cement floor of the 
structure had to be covered with wood flooring because the blood stains 
were so ingrained they could not be cleaned. The United States 
commander described the building as a slaughter house where Muslims 
were put to death. It is difficult to imagine Muslims and Serbs living 
peacefully side-by-side in the shadow of such recent atrocities, even 
putting aside their previous history.
  We also visited Mostar, a city in which both Bosnian Muslims and 
Bosnian Croats have lived since pre-war days. Mostar was the site of 
heavy fighting between Muslims and Croats prior to the so-called 
Washington Agreement which brought an end to Muslim-Croat fighting and 
enabled them to join forces against the Bosnian Serbs. Subsequent to 
the Washington Agreement, Mostar sustained heavy damage from punitive 
shelling by the Bosnian Serbs who controlled the high ground 
surrounding the city. Despite extensive construction efforts funded by 
the European Union which sought to make a model of Mostar for Muslim-
Croat cooperation, the terrible scars of the fighting are still visible 
in Mostar, particularly in the Muslim section of the city which 
sustained most of the damage, bearing witness to the cruel shelling and 
small arms fire that indiscriminately targeted civilians there.
  Another complicating factor as to why it is going to be impossible to 
leave without some kind of a follow-on force after 18 months from last 
December, has to do with war criminals.


                             war criminals

  Article IX of the General Framework Agreement, which with its several 
annexes make up the Dayton Agreement, specifically recites ``the 
obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and 
prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international 
humanitarian law.'' The authorities of the Serb Republic have refused 
to hand over former President Radovan Karadzic and former military 
chief General Ratko Mladic, both of whom

[[Page S721]]

have been indicted by the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia at the Hague. In a January 2, 1997, letter to new U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Anan, Serbian Republic President Biljana Plavsic 
challenged the legal foundation of the international tribunal and 
stated that ``It is our firm belief that if we were to hand over Dr. 
Karadzic and Gen. Mladic for trial, this would, in fact, threaten the 
existing peace.''
  NATO policy established first for the implementation force and 
continued for the stabilization force is not to search for indicted war 
criminals and to apprehend them only if they are encountered by the 
NATO-led force as it carries out its duties and only if apprehending 
them would not put the SFOR troops at significant risk. This policy 
decision is influenced no doubt by the lesson the international 
community learned during the U.N. operation in Somalia when United 
States and allied troops conducted a manhunt for General Aideed with 
disastrous results.
  The United Nations has distributed posters with the photos of the 
indicted war criminals so that the stabilization force troops will be 
in a position to apprehend them if they are foolish enough to attempt 
to pass through a checkpoint or otherwise come in contact with those 
forces. In early January, one such indicted war criminal, a Bosnian 
Croat who was the former police chief in Vitez and has been indicted 
for overseeing the inhumane treatment of Bosnian Muslim civilians, did 
encounter an SFOR patrol. He was not apprehended because the patrol 
members were not carrying a U.N. poster and were unsure that he was a 
suspect, although they thought he might well be. They should have 
detained him until they were able to make sure whether he was or was 
not a suspect but they did not.

  It should be noted that General Mladic, an indicted war criminal, 
while at large still is not really a free man. His location, where he 
is surrounded by heavily armed loyal troops, is known and his movement 
is restricted because of his fear of making contact with our troops. He 
is in a sense already in prison. Nevertheless, Mladic and former 
President Karadzic have not been turned over to the international 
tribunal and there are no signs that they will be turned over during 
the 18-month timeframe in which SFOR is operating.
  In an attempt to address the problem of apprehending war criminals, 
former Secretary of Defense Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff General Shalikashvili proposed the creation of a special 
paramilitary police force to our NATO allies in December. The proposal 
reportedly did not resonate well with our allies.
  The next complicating factor for why the 18-month period is not going 
to prove sufficient for the Dayton accords to be fully implemented is 
the lack of reconciliation.


                             reconciliation

  With dim prospects for the return of refugees and displaced persons 
to their homes, with the refusal of the Serb Republic authorities to 
hand over Karadzic and Mladic, the most prominent of the indicted war 
criminals, with the ever visible physical scars and undoubtedly even 
more long lasting internal scars of this terrible conflict, and with 
the absence of a free and independent media, as I will discuss a little 
later, I am convinced that reconciliation of Muslims, Croats, and Serbs 
will not occur sufficiently during the 18-month mandate of the 
stabilization force and that the Dayton accords will not be fully 
implemented during that period. A final complicating factor was to do 
with police forces.


                             police forces

  The NATO-led forces have been extraordinarily successful in 
implementing the military aspects of the Dayton agreement. The 
subregional arms control agreements, although poorly respected by the 
Bosnian Serbs, coupled with the American organized equip and train 
program for the Bosniac-Croat Federation, will result in rough military 
parity between the Federation and Bosnian Serb armies. Many of the 
former military troops have been demobilized and returned to civilian 
life and those who remain in uniform are tired of war. The police 
forces of the three entities are, however, not subject to the military 
aspects of the Dayton agreement and thus not expressly controlled by 
the stabilization force.
  In Annex 11 to the Dayton agreement, the parties expressly requested 
the U.N. Security Council to establish a U.N. International Police Task 
Force [IPTF]. The IPTF, a force of approximately 1,600 unarmed 
officers, unlike the NATO-led force, was not granted enforcement 
authority and was and is limited to functions such as monitoring, 
observing, inspecting, advising, and the like. These functions were 
based upon the reasonable expectation that the police forces of the 
parties would possess limited capabilities. Unfortunately, many Bosnian 
police elements are relatively heavily armed and are trained and 
equipped to operate as small military units. Based upon their 
suspicions of their counterparts, they are reported to have secretly 
stockpiled huge amounts of weapons and ammunition. In November, joint 
surprise inspections of police stations by implementation force troops 
and the IPTF resulted in the confiscation and destruction of a large 
number of unauthorized weapons, mainly small arms and ammunition 
although numerous mines and light mortars were also discovered. Since 
that time, the New York Times reports that local police units have 
hidden their military equipment.
  For the many reasons cited, and others, I am convinced that there 
will be a need for an armed outside force in Bosnia as a follow-on 
force after SFOR's 18-month mandate expires. Before I discuss such a 
follow-on force further, I want to address other pressures that bear on 
Bosnia.


                            Other Pressures

  Mr. President, the parties to the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the long title of the Dayton 
agreement, include the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic 
of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia--hereafter referred 
to as Serbia. The Governments of Croatia and Serbia were wisely 
included because of the influence they have over the three factions in 
Bosnia and because events within their territories could have a 
spillover effect in Bosnia.


                                 serbia

  While in Belgrade, we were able to witness first hand the daily 
demonstrations being mounted by the students and the opposition 
coalition named ``Together.'' The specific catalyst for the 
demonstrations in Belgrade and the democratic demonstrations in other 
cities throughout Serbia was Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's 
attempt to deny the opposition the victories they achieved in municipal 
elections in Belgrade and 13 other Serbian cities last November. But 
the demonstrations are fueled also by dissatisfaction over an economy 
wrecked by mismanagement, corruption, and international sanctions, by 
distortions and lack of reporting of events by the government 
controlled television stations, and by the recognition that Milosevic's 
supernationalism was the major cause of the war that helped unravel 
Yugoslavia. Milosevic is doing all that he can to buy time but he is 
likely to be devoured by the nationalistic tiger he unleashed. 
Accordingly, for better or worse, Milosevic specifically and events in 
Serbia generally do not have the influence or impact that they 
previously had on Bosnia.


                                Croatia

  President Franjo Tudjman's poor health and the accompanying 
succession puzzle are distracting Croatia over virtually all other 
concerns. Additionally, Croatian authorities realize that they must 
have Western approval if Croatia is to have any chance of economic 
assistance and trade. These factors hopefully will prevent Croatia from 
using a heavy hand in its dealings with the Croatian Serbs in Eastern 
Slavonia. I remain cautiously optimistic that common sense will prevail 
and Croatian policies will not cause a mass exodus of Croatian Serbs 
when the U.N. mandate expires there on July 15.


                               The Media

  As in Serbia, the government controlled media, particularly 
television, in Bosnia continuously presents a drumbeat of propaganda 
that fuel ethnic stereotyping and hatred. While this is most vitriolic 
in the Bosnian Serb stronghold in Pale, it is unfortunately echoed in 
Sarajevo and Mostar.
  A free and independent media, especially television modeled after CNN 
and the British Sky News, along with

[[Page S722]]

good entertaining programs and objective, fair news presentations, 
would be very helpful. Only a small minority of people who have 
satellite dishes receive objective news. It is only through a free and 
independent media that Muslims, Croats and Serbs can understand the 
atrocities that were committed. Such an understanding would be the 
first step towards reconciliation and ultimate survival of a multi-
ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina.


                   Accomplishments of NATO-led Force

  Mr. President, as I have already noted, the NATO-led implementation 
force and its successor, the stabilization force, have been 
extraordinarily successful in implementing the military tasks of the 
Dayton agreement. This first ever NATO peace enforcement mission is an 
unqualified success so far. It is a particularly important achievement 
because it also involves the forces of non-NATO nations.
  During our stay at Multinational Division North, the United States 
sector headquarters in Tuzla, we were able to travel to Simin Han where 
the Russian airborne battalion is located. It was wonderful to observe 
the excellent relationship between the U.S. commander, Maj. Gen. Monty 
Meigs, and his Russian counterpart. The Russian commander, his 
subordinate officers and troops were extremely proud of their role in 
the U.S. sector. I spoke to a number of U.S. soldiers who have been 
conducting joint patrols with the Russian troops and they were 
unanimously upbeat about the Russians whom they described as excellent 
soldiers.
  In our visit to the French sector headquarters of the Multinational 
Division Southeast in Mostar, we were briefed by the French Commander, 
his German Chief of Staff, and his Spanish, French, Italian, and German 
staff officers. It was encouraging to see how easily these NATO allies 
work together. It was one of the best military briefings I have ever 
received and the graphics they used were among the best I have seen. 
The ability of our European NATO allies to work together so 
professionally, in this case under a French commander, gives me hope 
for the success of NATO's European Security and Defense Identity 
initiative, particularly once France returns to NATO's integrated 
military structure.
  The participation of the forces of members of NATO's Partnership for 
Peace and their smooth integration into the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR 
mission are testament to the success of Partnership for Peace. Despite 
early criticisms of that program as a stalling tactic to gain time 
while NATO enlargement could be worked out, Partnership for Peace, with 
its emphasis on peacekeeping, has been a major success in leading the 
way to the participation of a host of nations in international peace 
operations.
  The success of the NATO-led multinational peace enforcement mission, 
both during IFOR and now SFOR, is extraordinarily important for the 
future. The United States cannot be the world's policeman but the world 
needs a trained, equipped, and ready force to respond at the early 
stages of a crisis that threatens international peace and security. 
Events might have been very different in former Yugoslavia if such a 
force could have been deployed to Croatia in the summer of 1991 when 
the fighting between the Croatian Army and the Croatian Serbs backed by 
the Yugoslav People's Army first began. Such a deployment could have 
served to nip the crisis in the bud, saved tens of thousands of lives, 
and set the stage for a negotiated settlement before nationalist 
fervors were fanned beyond control.


                       Follow-on Force for Bosnia

  Mr. President, I am convinced that the SFOR mission duration of 18 
months will not be sufficient for peace to gain a firm enough foothold 
in Bosnia and I fear that, in the absence of an outside armed force, 
the conflict will reignite.
  I believe that the participation of United States combat troops on 
the ground in Bosnia should terminate with the end of SFOR's 18 month 
mandate. The United States is the only nation in the world with global 
commitments and the capability to meet those commitments. Only the 
United States can defeat aggression in the Persian Gulf or on the 
Korean peninsula or wherever it might threaten our vital interests. But 
the United States cannot afford to have its forces tied down 
indefinitely in Bosnia where our interests are real but not as vital as 
for the Europeans. The United States had to take the lead in 
negotiating and implementing the Dayton peace agreement because our 
European allies and friends were not ready to do so. Our participation 
in IFOR and now SFOR will have given our European allies 2\1/2\ years 
to become ready. It is time for them to start preparations now to 
fulfill that role to ensure that peace does not unravel in their 
neighborhood after SFOR's mandate ends 18 months after December 1996. 
The United States can and should still remain involved with logistic, 
intelligence, and other support activities.
  Fortuitously, NATO is now developing a European Security and Defense 
Identity [ESDI] within the Alliance to permit the European NATO 
nations, with NATO consent, to carry out operations under the political 
control and strategic direction of the Western European Union [WEU] 
using NATO assets and capabilities. This initiative is tailor-made for 
a follow-on force to SFOR. And there is no reason why the Partnership 
for Peace nations should not be included as they have been in IFOR and 
SFOR. It will not happen, however, without firm pressure from the U.S. 
Congress and the administration and notice of our intent now to give 
our European friends plenty of time to prepare to take over leadership 
of the follow-on force to SFOR after 18 months, should such a force be 
needed as I predict it will be.


                               Conclusion

  Mr. President, the end of the cold war has unleashed the forces of 
nationalism, ethnic hatred, and religious fanaticism. In Bosnia, this 
has led to the death of approximately 210,000 people, including about 
150,000 civilians. More than 2.5 million Bosnians out of a prewar 
population of 4.4 million were forced to flee their homes, 2.1 million 
Bosnians are still refugees or displaced persons.
  The NATO-led IFOR and SFOR have done and are doing an extraordinary 
job in implementing the military tasks of the Dayton peace agreement. 
Civilian implementation and reconstruction lag behind, however. While 
there are encouraging signs with the formation of central government 
institutions, they are still fragile and reconciliation among the 
Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs has barely begun.
  There will be a need for a follow-on outside armed force in Bosnia 
once SFOR's 18-month mandate is finished. United States combat forces 
should not remain on the ground in Bosnia beyond that time. The 
European Security and Defense Identity initiative within NATO provides 
a mechanism for a follow-on force to sustain the peace there. Our 
European NATO allies and European friends, particularly those 
participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, need to begin 
planning now to provide the follow-on force.
  IFOR and SFOR have been extremely successful multinational peace 
enforcement missions. The international community needs to be able to 
field trained, equipped, and ready forces to nip crises in the bud. 
Hopefully, IFOR and SFOR and a Western European Union follow-on force 
for Bosnia can provide the model for the international community in 
other regions of the world.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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