[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 4 (Tuesday, January 21, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S565-S567]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



     SENATE RESOLUTION 17--RELATIVE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
     CONVENTION
  Mr. LUGAR submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                               S. Res. 17

       Resolved, That (a) the Senate hereby expresses its 
     intention to give its advice and consent to the ratification 
     of the Chemical Weapons Convention at the appropriate time 
     after the Senate has proceeded to the consideration of the 
     Convention, subject to the conditions of subsection (b) and 
     the declarations of subsection (c):
       (b) Conditions.--It is the sense of the Senate that the 
     advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the 
     Convention should be subject to the following conditions, 
     which would be binding upon the President:
       (1) Amendment conferences.--The United States will be 
     present and participate fully in all Amendment Conferences 
     and will cast its vote, either affirmatively or negatively, 
     on all proposed amendments made at such conferences, to 
     ensure that--
       (A) the United States has an opportunity to consider any 
     and all amendments in accordance with its Constitutional 
     processes; and
       (B) no amendment to the Convention enters into force 
     without the approval of the United States.
       (2) Presidential certification on data declarations.--(A) 
     Not later than 10 days after the Convention enters into 
     force, or not later than 10 days after the deposit of the 
     Russian instrument of ratification of the Convention, 
     whichever is later, the President shall either--
       (i) certify to the Senate that Russia has complied 
     satisfactorily with the data declaration requirements of the 
     Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding; or
       (ii) submit to the Senate a report on apparent 
     discrepancies in Russia's data under the Wyoming Memorandum 
     of Understanding and the results of any bilateral discussions 
     regarding those discrepancies.
       (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``Wyoming 
     Memorandum of Understanding'' means the Memorandum of 
     Understanding Between the Government of the United States of 
     America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
     Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and 
     Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, 
     signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989,
       (3) Presidential certification on the bilateral destruction 
     agreement.--Before the deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification of the Convention, the President 
     shall certify in writing to the Senate that--
       (A) a United States-Russian agreement on implementation of 
     the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has been or will shortly 
     be concluded, and that the verification procedures under that 
     agreement will meet or exceed those mandated by the 
     Convention, or
       (B) the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the 
     Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will be prepared, when the 
     Convention enters into force, to submit a plan for meeting 
     the Organization's full monitoring responsibilities that will 
     include United States and Russian facilities as well as those 
     of other parties to the Convention.
       (4) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that a 
     party to the Convention is in violation of the Convention and 
     that the actions of such party threaten the national security 
     interests of the United States, the President shall--
       (A) consult with, and promptly submit a report to, the 
     Senate detailing the effect of such actions on the 
     Convention;
       (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest 
     diplomatic level with the Organization for the Prohibition of 
     Chemical Weapons (in this resolution referred to as the 
     ``Organization'') and the noncompliant party with the 
     objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
       (C) in the event that a party to the Convention is 
     determined not to be in compliance with the Convention, 
     request consultations with the Organization on whether to--
       (i) restrict or suspend the noncompliant party's rights and 
     privileges under the Convention until the party complies with 
     its obligations;
       (ii) recommend collective measures in conformity with 
     international law; or
       (iii) bring the issue to the attention of the United 
     Nations General Assembly and Security Council; and
       (D) in the event that noncompliance continues, determine 
     whether or not continued adherence to the Convention is in 
     the national security interests of the United States and so 
     inform the Senate.
       (5) Financing implementation.--The United States 
     understands that in order to ensure the commitment of Russia 
     to destroy its chemical stockpiles, in the event that Russia 
     ratifies the Convention, Russia must maintain a substantial 
     stake in financing the implementation of the Convention. The 
     costs of implementing the Convention should be borne by all 
     parties to the Convention. The deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification of the Convention shall not be 
     contingent upon the United States providing financial 
     guarantees to pay for implementation of commitments by Russia 
     or any other party to the Convention.
       (6) Implementation arrangements.--If the Convention does 
     not enter into force or if the Convention comes into force 
     with the United States having ratified the Convention but 
     with Russia having taken no action to ratify or accede to the 
     Convention, then the President shall, if he plans to 
     implement reductions of United States chemical forces as a 
     matter of national policy or in a manner consistent with the 
     Convention--
       (A) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such 
     reductions on the national security of the United States; and
       (B) take no action to reduce the United States chemical 
     stockpile at a pace faster than that currently planned and 
     consistent with the Convention until the President submits to 
     the Senate his determination that

[[Page S566]]

     such reductions are in the national security interests of the 
     United States.
       (7) Presidential certification and report on national 
     technical means.--Not later than 90 days after the deposit of 
     the United States instrument of ratification of the 
     Convention, the President shall certify that the United 
     States National Technical Means and the provisions of the 
     Convention on verification of compliance, when viewed 
     together, are sufficient to ensure effective verification of 
     compliance with the provisions of the Convention. This 
     certification shall be accompanied by a report, which may be 
     supplemented by a classified annex, indicating how the United 
     States National Technical Means, including collection, 
     processing and analytic resources, will be marshalled, 
     together with the Convention's verification provisions, to 
     ensure effective verification of compliance. Such 
     certification and report shall be submitted to the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the 
     Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate.
       (c) Declarations.--It is the sense of the Senate that the 
     advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the 
     Convention should be subject to the following declarations, 
     which would express the intent of the Senate:
       (1) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
     applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based 
     principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition 
     (1) of the Resolution of Ratification with respect to the INF 
     Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988. For purposes 
     of this declaration, the term ``INF Treaty'' refers to the 
     Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of 
     Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their 
     Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with 
     the related memorandum of understanding and protocols, 
     approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
       (2) Further arms reduction obligations.--The Senate 
     declares its intention to consider for approval international 
     agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or 
     limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a 
     militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty 
     power set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the 
     Constitution.
       (3) Retaliatory policy.--The Senate declares that the 
     United States should strongly reiterate its retaliatory 
     policy that the use of chemical weapons against United States 
     military forces or civilians would result in an overwhelming 
     and devastating response, which may include the whole range 
     of available weaponry.
       (4) Chemical defense program.--The Senate declares that 
     ratification of the Convention will not obviate the need for 
     a robust, adequately funded chemical defense program, 
     together with improved national intelligence capabilities in 
     the nonproliferation area, maintenance of an effective 
     deterrent through capable conventional forces, trade-enabling 
     export controls, and other capabilities. In giving its advice 
     and consent to ratification of the Convention, the Senate 
     does so with full appreciation that the entry into force of 
     the Convention enhances the responsibility of the Senate to 
     ensure that the United States continues an effective and 
     adequately funded chemical defense program. The Senate 
     further declares that the United States should continue to 
     develop theater missile defense to intercept ballistic 
     missiles that might carry chemical weapons and should enhance 
     defenses of the United States Armed Forces against the use of 
     chemical weapons in the field.
       (5) Enforcement policy.--The Senate urges the President to 
     pursue compliance questions under the Convention vigorously 
     and to seek international sanctions if a party to the 
     Convention does not comply with the Convention, including the 
     ``obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate 
     its compliance with this Convention'', pursuant to paragraph 
     11 of Article IX. It should not be necessary to prove the 
     noncompliance of a party to the Convention before the United 
     States raises issues bilaterally or in appropriate 
     international fora and takes appropriate actions.
       (6) Approval of inspectors.--The Senate expects that the 
     United States will exercise its right to reject a proposed 
     inspector or inspection assistant when the facts indicate 
     that this person is likely to seek information to which the 
     inspection team is not entitled or to mishandle information 
     that the team obtains.
       (7) Assistance to russia.--The Senate declares that, if the 
     United States provides limited financial assistance for the 
     destruction of Russian chemical weapons, the United States 
     should, in exchange for such assistance, require Russia to 
     destroy its chemical weapons stocks at a proportional rate to 
     the destruction of United States chemical weapons stocks, and 
     to take the action before the Convention deadline. In 
     addition, the Senate urges the President to request Russia to 
     allow inspections of former military facilities that have 
     been converted to commercial production, given the 
     possibility that these plants could one day be reconverted to 
     military use, and that any United States assistance for the 
     destruction of the Russian chemical stockpile be apportioned 
     according to Russia's openness to these broad based 
     inspections.
       (8) Expanding chemical arsenals in countries not party to 
     the chemical weapons convention.--It is the sense of the 
     Senate that, if during the time the Convention remains in 
     force the President determines that there has been an 
     expansion of the chemical weapons arsenals of any country not 
     a party to the Convention so as to jeopardize the supreme 
     national interests of the United States, then the President 
     should consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to 
     determine whether adherence to the Convention remains in the 
     national interest of the United States.
       (9) Compliance.--Concerned by the clear pattern of Soviet 
     noncompliance with arms control agreements and continued 
     cases of noncompliance by Russia, the Senate declares the 
     following:
       (A) The Convention is in the interest of the United States 
     only if the both the United States and Russia, among others, 
     are in strict compliance with the terms of the Convention as 
     submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
     ratification, such compliance being measured by performance 
     and not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to comply.
       (B)(i) Given its concern about compliance issues, the 
     Senate expects the President to offer regular briefings, but 
     not less than several times a year, to the Committees on 
     Foreign Relations and Armed Services and the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate on compliance issues related to 
     the Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of 
     all United States efforts in diplomatic channels and 
     bilateral as well as the multilateral Organization fora to 
     resolve the compliance issues and shall include, but would 
     not necessarily be limited to a description of--
       (I) any compliance issues, other than those requiring 
     challenge inspections, that the United States plans to raise 
     with the Organization; and
       (II) any compliance issues raised at the Organization, 
     within 30 days.
       (ii) Any Presidential determination that Russia is in 
     noncompliance with the Convention shall be transmitted to the 
     committees specified in clause (i) within 30 days of such a 
     determination, together with a written report, including an 
     unclassified summary, explaining why it is in the national 
     security interests of the United States to continue as a 
     party to the Convention.
       (10) Submission of future agreements as treaties.--The 
     Senate declares that after the Senate gives its advice and 
     consent to ratification of the Convention, any agreement or 
     understanding which in any material way modifies, amends, or 
     reinterprets United States and Russian obligations, or those 
     of any other country, under the Convention, including the 
     time frame for implementation of the Convention, should be 
     submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
     ratification.
       (11) Riot control agents.--(A) The Senate, recognizing that 
     the Convention's prohibition on the use of riot control 
     agents as a ``method of warfare'' precludes the use of such 
     agents against combatants, including use for humanitarian 
     purposes where combatants and noncombatants intermingled, 
     urges the President--
       (i) to give high priority to continuing efforts to develop 
     effective nonchemical, nonlethal alternatives to riot control 
     agents for use in situations where combatants and 
     noncombatants are intermingled; and
       (ii) to ensure that the United States actively participates 
     with other parties to the Convention in any reassessment of 
     the appropriateness of the prohibition as it might apply to 
     such situations as the rescue of drowned air crews and 
     passengers and escaping prisoners or in situations in which 
     civilians are being used to mask or screen attacks.
       (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``riot control 
     agents'' is used within the meaning of Article II(4) of the 
     Convention.
       (d) Definition.--For purposes of this resolution, the term 
     ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and the term ``Convention'' 
     refer to the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, 
     Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
     their Destruction, opened for signature and signed by the 
     United States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the 
     following annexes and associated documents, all such 
     documents being integral parts of and collectively referred 
     to in this resolution as the ``Convention'' (contained in 
     Treaty Document 103-21):
       (1) The Annex on Chemicals.
       (2) The Annex on Implementation and Verification (also 
     known as the ``Verification Annex'').
       (3) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information 
     (also known as the ``Confidentiality Annex'').
       (4) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission 
     for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
       (5) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
     Commission.

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, On April 29, 1997 the multilateral Chemical 
Weapons Convention [CWC] that bans the development, production, 
acquisition, stockpiling, use, and direct or indirect transfer of 
chemical weapons to anyone will enter into force whether or not the 
Senate acts and the President ratifies the Convention.
  Thus over the next three months it will be necessary for the Senate 
to consider the Convention and to fashion a

[[Page S567]]

corresponding resolution of ratification if the United States is to 
benefit from the provisions of the agreement and the U.S. chemical 
industry is not to suffer from the disadvantages imposed on chemical 
firms of non-Parties.
  The Senate was on the verge of taking up the CWC on the floor through 
consideration of a resolution of ratification that I co-authored and 
which was reported out of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by 
a vote of 13-5 on April 30, 1996.
  Given the arrival of new members to the Senate and the need for all 
members to inform themselves in the near term on the benefits and costs 
to the United States of full participation in the Convention, I am 
submitting in the form of a Sense of the Senate resolution the 
resolution of ratification that was to have served as the vehicle for 
debate in the Senate during the 104th Congress.
  It is my hope that this will be helpful to all Senators and can serve 
as an important benchmark for a more constructive exchange during the 
105th Congress on the subject of ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.

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