[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 4 (Tuesday, January 21, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S565-S567]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SENATE RESOLUTION 17--RELATIVE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION
Mr. LUGAR submitted the following resolution; which was referred to
the Committee on Foreign Relations:
S. Res. 17
Resolved, That (a) the Senate hereby expresses its
intention to give its advice and consent to the ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention at the appropriate time
after the Senate has proceeded to the consideration of the
Convention, subject to the conditions of subsection (b) and
the declarations of subsection (c):
(b) Conditions.--It is the sense of the Senate that the
advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the
Convention should be subject to the following conditions,
which would be binding upon the President:
(1) Amendment conferences.--The United States will be
present and participate fully in all Amendment Conferences
and will cast its vote, either affirmatively or negatively,
on all proposed amendments made at such conferences, to
ensure that--
(A) the United States has an opportunity to consider any
and all amendments in accordance with its Constitutional
processes; and
(B) no amendment to the Convention enters into force
without the approval of the United States.
(2) Presidential certification on data declarations.--(A)
Not later than 10 days after the Convention enters into
force, or not later than 10 days after the deposit of the
Russian instrument of ratification of the Convention,
whichever is later, the President shall either--
(i) certify to the Senate that Russia has complied
satisfactorily with the data declaration requirements of the
Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding; or
(ii) submit to the Senate a report on apparent
discrepancies in Russia's data under the Wyoming Memorandum
of Understanding and the results of any bilateral discussions
regarding those discrepancies.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``Wyoming
Memorandum of Understanding'' means the Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and
Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons,
signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989,
(3) Presidential certification on the bilateral destruction
agreement.--Before the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification of the Convention, the President
shall certify in writing to the Senate that--
(A) a United States-Russian agreement on implementation of
the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has been or will shortly
be concluded, and that the verification procedures under that
agreement will meet or exceed those mandated by the
Convention, or
(B) the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will be prepared, when the
Convention enters into force, to submit a plan for meeting
the Organization's full monitoring responsibilities that will
include United States and Russian facilities as well as those
of other parties to the Convention.
(4) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that a
party to the Convention is in violation of the Convention and
that the actions of such party threaten the national security
interests of the United States, the President shall--
(A) consult with, and promptly submit a report to, the
Senate detailing the effect of such actions on the
Convention;
(B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (in this resolution referred to as the
``Organization'') and the noncompliant party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
(C) in the event that a party to the Convention is
determined not to be in compliance with the Convention,
request consultations with the Organization on whether to--
(i) restrict or suspend the noncompliant party's rights and
privileges under the Convention until the party complies with
its obligations;
(ii) recommend collective measures in conformity with
international law; or
(iii) bring the issue to the attention of the United
Nations General Assembly and Security Council; and
(D) in the event that noncompliance continues, determine
whether or not continued adherence to the Convention is in
the national security interests of the United States and so
inform the Senate.
(5) Financing implementation.--The United States
understands that in order to ensure the commitment of Russia
to destroy its chemical stockpiles, in the event that Russia
ratifies the Convention, Russia must maintain a substantial
stake in financing the implementation of the Convention. The
costs of implementing the Convention should be borne by all
parties to the Convention. The deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification of the Convention shall not be
contingent upon the United States providing financial
guarantees to pay for implementation of commitments by Russia
or any other party to the Convention.
(6) Implementation arrangements.--If the Convention does
not enter into force or if the Convention comes into force
with the United States having ratified the Convention but
with Russia having taken no action to ratify or accede to the
Convention, then the President shall, if he plans to
implement reductions of United States chemical forces as a
matter of national policy or in a manner consistent with the
Convention--
(A) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such
reductions on the national security of the United States; and
(B) take no action to reduce the United States chemical
stockpile at a pace faster than that currently planned and
consistent with the Convention until the President submits to
the Senate his determination that
[[Page S566]]
such reductions are in the national security interests of the
United States.
(7) Presidential certification and report on national
technical means.--Not later than 90 days after the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification of the
Convention, the President shall certify that the United
States National Technical Means and the provisions of the
Convention on verification of compliance, when viewed
together, are sufficient to ensure effective verification of
compliance with the provisions of the Convention. This
certification shall be accompanied by a report, which may be
supplemented by a classified annex, indicating how the United
States National Technical Means, including collection,
processing and analytic resources, will be marshalled,
together with the Convention's verification provisions, to
ensure effective verification of compliance. Such
certification and report shall be submitted to the Committee
on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
(c) Declarations.--It is the sense of the Senate that the
advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the
Convention should be subject to the following declarations,
which would express the intent of the Senate:
(1) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the
applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based
principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition
(1) of the Resolution of Ratification with respect to the INF
Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988. For purposes
of this declaration, the term ``INF Treaty'' refers to the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with
the related memorandum of understanding and protocols,
approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
(2) Further arms reduction obligations.--The Senate
declares its intention to consider for approval international
agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or
limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a
militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty
power set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution.
(3) Retaliatory policy.--The Senate declares that the
United States should strongly reiterate its retaliatory
policy that the use of chemical weapons against United States
military forces or civilians would result in an overwhelming
and devastating response, which may include the whole range
of available weaponry.
(4) Chemical defense program.--The Senate declares that
ratification of the Convention will not obviate the need for
a robust, adequately funded chemical defense program,
together with improved national intelligence capabilities in
the nonproliferation area, maintenance of an effective
deterrent through capable conventional forces, trade-enabling
export controls, and other capabilities. In giving its advice
and consent to ratification of the Convention, the Senate
does so with full appreciation that the entry into force of
the Convention enhances the responsibility of the Senate to
ensure that the United States continues an effective and
adequately funded chemical defense program. The Senate
further declares that the United States should continue to
develop theater missile defense to intercept ballistic
missiles that might carry chemical weapons and should enhance
defenses of the United States Armed Forces against the use of
chemical weapons in the field.
(5) Enforcement policy.--The Senate urges the President to
pursue compliance questions under the Convention vigorously
and to seek international sanctions if a party to the
Convention does not comply with the Convention, including the
``obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate
its compliance with this Convention'', pursuant to paragraph
11 of Article IX. It should not be necessary to prove the
noncompliance of a party to the Convention before the United
States raises issues bilaterally or in appropriate
international fora and takes appropriate actions.
(6) Approval of inspectors.--The Senate expects that the
United States will exercise its right to reject a proposed
inspector or inspection assistant when the facts indicate
that this person is likely to seek information to which the
inspection team is not entitled or to mishandle information
that the team obtains.
(7) Assistance to russia.--The Senate declares that, if the
United States provides limited financial assistance for the
destruction of Russian chemical weapons, the United States
should, in exchange for such assistance, require Russia to
destroy its chemical weapons stocks at a proportional rate to
the destruction of United States chemical weapons stocks, and
to take the action before the Convention deadline. In
addition, the Senate urges the President to request Russia to
allow inspections of former military facilities that have
been converted to commercial production, given the
possibility that these plants could one day be reconverted to
military use, and that any United States assistance for the
destruction of the Russian chemical stockpile be apportioned
according to Russia's openness to these broad based
inspections.
(8) Expanding chemical arsenals in countries not party to
the chemical weapons convention.--It is the sense of the
Senate that, if during the time the Convention remains in
force the President determines that there has been an
expansion of the chemical weapons arsenals of any country not
a party to the Convention so as to jeopardize the supreme
national interests of the United States, then the President
should consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to
determine whether adherence to the Convention remains in the
national interest of the United States.
(9) Compliance.--Concerned by the clear pattern of Soviet
noncompliance with arms control agreements and continued
cases of noncompliance by Russia, the Senate declares the
following:
(A) The Convention is in the interest of the United States
only if the both the United States and Russia, among others,
are in strict compliance with the terms of the Convention as
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification, such compliance being measured by performance
and not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to comply.
(B)(i) Given its concern about compliance issues, the
Senate expects the President to offer regular briefings, but
not less than several times a year, to the Committees on
Foreign Relations and Armed Services and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate on compliance issues related to
the Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of
all United States efforts in diplomatic channels and
bilateral as well as the multilateral Organization fora to
resolve the compliance issues and shall include, but would
not necessarily be limited to a description of--
(I) any compliance issues, other than those requiring
challenge inspections, that the United States plans to raise
with the Organization; and
(II) any compliance issues raised at the Organization,
within 30 days.
(ii) Any Presidential determination that Russia is in
noncompliance with the Convention shall be transmitted to the
committees specified in clause (i) within 30 days of such a
determination, together with a written report, including an
unclassified summary, explaining why it is in the national
security interests of the United States to continue as a
party to the Convention.
(10) Submission of future agreements as treaties.--The
Senate declares that after the Senate gives its advice and
consent to ratification of the Convention, any agreement or
understanding which in any material way modifies, amends, or
reinterprets United States and Russian obligations, or those
of any other country, under the Convention, including the
time frame for implementation of the Convention, should be
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification.
(11) Riot control agents.--(A) The Senate, recognizing that
the Convention's prohibition on the use of riot control
agents as a ``method of warfare'' precludes the use of such
agents against combatants, including use for humanitarian
purposes where combatants and noncombatants intermingled,
urges the President--
(i) to give high priority to continuing efforts to develop
effective nonchemical, nonlethal alternatives to riot control
agents for use in situations where combatants and
noncombatants are intermingled; and
(ii) to ensure that the United States actively participates
with other parties to the Convention in any reassessment of
the appropriateness of the prohibition as it might apply to
such situations as the rescue of drowned air crews and
passengers and escaping prisoners or in situations in which
civilians are being used to mask or screen attacks.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``riot control
agents'' is used within the meaning of Article II(4) of the
Convention.
(d) Definition.--For purposes of this resolution, the term
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and the term ``Convention''
refer to the Convention on the Prohibition of Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction, opened for signature and signed by the
United States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the
following annexes and associated documents, all such
documents being integral parts of and collectively referred
to in this resolution as the ``Convention'' (contained in
Treaty Document 103-21):
(1) The Annex on Chemicals.
(2) The Annex on Implementation and Verification (also
known as the ``Verification Annex'').
(3) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information
(also known as the ``Confidentiality Annex'').
(4) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission
for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
(5) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory
Commission.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, On April 29, 1997 the multilateral Chemical
Weapons Convention [CWC] that bans the development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, use, and direct or indirect transfer of
chemical weapons to anyone will enter into force whether or not the
Senate acts and the President ratifies the Convention.
Thus over the next three months it will be necessary for the Senate
to consider the Convention and to fashion a
[[Page S567]]
corresponding resolution of ratification if the United States is to
benefit from the provisions of the agreement and the U.S. chemical
industry is not to suffer from the disadvantages imposed on chemical
firms of non-Parties.
The Senate was on the verge of taking up the CWC on the floor through
consideration of a resolution of ratification that I co-authored and
which was reported out of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by
a vote of 13-5 on April 30, 1996.
Given the arrival of new members to the Senate and the need for all
members to inform themselves in the near term on the benefits and costs
to the United States of full participation in the Convention, I am
submitting in the form of a Sense of the Senate resolution the
resolution of ratification that was to have served as the vehicle for
debate in the Senate during the 104th Congress.
It is my hope that this will be helpful to all Senators and can serve
as an important benchmark for a more constructive exchange during the
105th Congress on the subject of ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
____________________