[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 4 (Tuesday, January 21, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S557-S563]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition today to join 
with Senator Hollings in introducing a joint resolution providing for 
an amendment to the United States Constitution which would provide 
authority to the Congress to regulate Federal election spending and to 
the States to regulate spending in State and local elections.
  This joint resolution is very similar to S.J. Res. 48, which I 
introduced in the 104th Congress on January 26, 1996, 3 days before the 
20th anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley versus 
Valeo. It is also very similar to constitutional amendments which 
Senator Hollings and I have proposed since 1989.
  Now, more than ever, the time has come for meaningful election law 
reform--reform which necessitates overturning the Buckley decision.
  The unprecedented spending levels during 1996 Presidential and 
Congressional campaigns should serve as the impetus for approving this 
consitutional amendment. Presidential candidates spent a total of $237 
million in the 1996 primary campaigns, of which $56 million represented 
publicly funded matching payments. Public financing of the general 
election added $153 million to the total. One primary candidate decided 
not to take Federal matching funds and used $37 million of his own 
resources to fund a campaign in which he was not restricted from the 
same state-by-state and overall limits as other candidates.
  The 1996 Congressional campaign cycle was similarly grim for all but 
television station advertising managers and political consultants. 
There were record levels of spending including $220.8 million by Senate 
candidates and $405.6 million by House candidates. This spending, much 
of which went to negative television commercials, did little to restore 
the public's confidence in the electoral process, much less our 
institution.
  The Supreme Court has made this proposed amendment even more urgent

[[Page S558]]

through its June, 1996 decision in Colorado Republicans Federal 
Campaign Committee versus Federal Election Commission. In that case, 
the Court cut an enormous hole in the remaining Federal campaign 
spending limits by striking down a restriction on party spending when 
the parties are acting independently of the candidates they support. 
Justice Breyer's plurality opinion stated that the ``independent 
expression of a political party's views is core 1st Amendment 
activity'' entitled to full protection. Until the Colorado decision, 
Federal election law limited how much the parties themselves could 
spend on House and Senate races. Now, it's a multi-million dollar free-
for-all, with a prospect of subsequent litigation over the 
``independence'' of such expenditures and a rash of complaints filed 
against candidates in future election cycles.
  If nothing else, the vast sums of money spent in this recent 
election, coupled with the June Supreme Court decision, have raised the 
profile of the Buckley decision even further. I am pleased to note that 
the view that Buckley should be overturned is shared by a group of 
prominent constitutional scholars who recently began a campaign to 
overturn the Buckley decision. According to a November 10, 1996 New 
York Times article, 26 scholars have signed a statement urging the 
Supreme Court to reconsider and reverse its 1976 decision, which has 
essentially allowed an unlimited amount of money to flow into campaign 
war chests. Among the scholars signing the statement are Bruce Ackerman 
(Yale Law School), Ronald Dworkin (New York University Law School), 
Peter Arenella (University of California at Los Angeles Law School), 
and Robert Aronson (University of Washington Law School). Such a 
concerted effort by legal scholars, when coupled with Congressional 
efforts and the public's revulsion at the amount of money in politics, 
should lead to a new day for campaign finance in which rational, 
reasonable limits bring sanity back into the political process.
  Overturning the Buckley decision has long been a priority of mine. In 
fact, the Buckley decision had a very significant impact on this 
Senator, because at that time in 1976, I was running for the U.S. 
Senate. I had announced my candidacy on November 17, 1975, for the seat 
being vacated by a very distinguished Senator, Hugh Scott. Under the 
1974 federal election law, there was a limited amount a candidate for 
the Senate could spend of his or her own money, based on population. 
For a State the size of Pennsylvania, it was $35,000. That was about 
the limit of the means which I had at that time, having been 
extensively involved in public service as district attorney of 
Philadelphia and for a relatively short period of time in the private 
practice of law.
  However, I had decided to run for the office of U.S. Senate against a 
very distinguished American who later became a U.S. Senator, John 
Heinz, who had more financial resources than I did. I should note that 
after my eventual election in 1980, he and I formed a very close 
working partnership and very close friendship.
  In the middle of that campaign, on January 29, 1976, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Buckley v.Valeo and said a candidate can spend any amount 
of his own money. John Heinz was in a position to do so and did just 
that. That made an indelible impression upon me, so much so that when 
the decision came down on January 29, I petitioned for leave to 
intervene as amicus and filed a set of legal appeals, all of which were 
denied. John Heinz subsequently won the primary and general elections 
and served with great distinction until his tragic death.
  As I noted at the outset, this is not a new issue for me to bring 
before my colleagues. I have sponsored and cosponsored legislation for 
7 years and, during the 101st Congress, testified in support of such a 
Constitutional amendment before the Senate Subcommittee on the 
Constitution on February 28, 1990.
  I gained significant new insight, however, on the subject of campaign 
spending from my experiences as a candidate for the Republican 
nomination for the Presidency during 1994 and 1995. During my travels 
to 30 States as a Presidential candidate, I was once again impressed 
with how important fundraising is and how disproportionate it is to the 
undertaking of a political candidacy.
  My concept of running for elective office, Mr. President, is a matter 
of issues, a matter of tenacity, a matter of integrity, and how you 
conduct a campaign. However, money has become the dominant issue in the 
Presidential campaign. And the media focus on it to the virtual 
exclusion of the many issues of substantive matters which are really 
involved in a campaign for the Presidency.
  It has seemed to me since my experiences in 1976, as I have watched 
enormous expenditures in campaign financing by individuals, that the 
Buckley decision was based on unsound constitutional interpretation and 
certainly created unsound public policy. There is nothing in the 
Constitution, in my legal judgment, which guarantees freedom of speech 
on any reasonable, realistic, logical constitutional interpretation 
which says you ought to be able to spend as much money as you have to 
win an elective office. I think it is high time for the Congress of the 
United States and the 50 States to reexamine that in a constitutional 
amendment, which is the purpose of the joint resolution we are 
introducing today.
  Simply put, Congress should have the authority to establish a 
spending limit in Federal elections without regard to the first 
amendment limitation which was applied by the Supreme Court in Buckley. 
In approaching this matter, Mr. President, I am very concerned about 
amending the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which covers the 
freedoms of speech, religion, press, and assembly. But, the 
constitutional amendment we are proposing really does not go to any of 
these core first amendment values. This is not a matter affecting 
religion. It is not a matter really affecting speech.
  I think it was a very far stretch when a divided U.S. Supreme Court 
said that a campaign contribution from an individual was not a matter 
of freedom of speech, but spending one's own money in a campaign is 
protected speech. At that time, the Supreme Court did not affect the 
limitation on spending where an individual could contribute only $1,000 
in the primary and $1,000 in the general, except for contributions by 
political action committees, which could receive $5,000.
  I would note that in 1976, my brother had considerably more financial 
means than I did and would have been very much interested in helping 
his younger brother, but the limitation on my brother in that primary 
was $1,000. It seemed to me then and it seems to me now that if a 
candidate has the right to spend as much of his or her money as he or 
she chooses, then why should not any other citizen have the same right 
under the first amendment to express himself or herself by political 
contributions. That distinction by the Buckley court still seems 
unfounded 20 years later.
  There have been many, many examples of multimillion-dollar 
expenditures in this body, the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and in State government, and in 1992 and 1996 we have 
witnessed such expenditures by two men running for President of the 
United States. The fact of life is, if you advertise enough on 
television, if you sell candidacies like you sell soap, the sky is the 
limit. Even the White House of the United States of America, the Office 
of the President, may be, in fact, up for sale if someone is willing to 
start off by announcing a willingness to spend $25 million. If you have 
$400 million, $25 million is not an enormous sum; you still have $375 
million left after your campaign. As I have said before, most people 
can get by on $375 million. Given some of the personal fortunes out 
there, it is conceivable that someone could spend $50 million or even 
$75 million to promote a candidacy, both to articulate a positive view 
and then, perhaps even more effectively, to fund negative television 
advertisements aimed at opponents.
  A constitutional amendment is also a direct way to deal with campaign 
finance reform without having a further burden on the Treasury of the 
United States. We have debated campaign finance reform repeatedly in a 
variety of contexts. Most proposals come down to a proposition to have 
Federal subsidies for candidates and then to call upon the candidates 
to relinquish their

[[Page S559]]

rights under Buckley versus Valeo in order to qualify for Federal 
funding. I have opposed such Federal funding because I think it is 
unwise to further burden the Treasury by having campaigns paid for by 
the U.S. Treasury.
  During the 103d Congress, the Senate went on record on this very 
issue, adopting an amendment to S.3, the campaign finance reform bill, 
that stated that it was the sense of the Senate that Congress should 
adopt a joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment 
empowering Congress and the States to set reasonable limits on campaign 
expenditures. The amendment was approved by a 52-43 vote on May 27, 
1993. However, in the 104th Congress, the Senate went backwards in my 
view. It had the opportunity to adopt this proposal as an amendment to 
the Balanced Budget Amendment, but it was defeated on a procedural 
motion by 52-45.
  I am hopeful that the vote in 1995 was an aberration and that a 
majority of my colleagues will, at long last, agree with me and Senator 
Hollings, among others, that it is high time we amend the Constitution 
to overturn the Buckley decision.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the New York Times article 
of November 10, 1996, be included in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

           [From the New York Times National, Nov. 10, 1996]

 After the Election: Readjusting and Reconsidering--Campaign Finance--
   Scholars Ask Court to Backtrack, Shutting Floodgates on Political 
                                Spending

                           (By Leslie Wayne)

       Washington, Nov. 6--A group of prominent constitutional 
     scholars has begun a campaign to get the Supreme Court to 
     overturn a 20-year-old landmark decision that has allowed 
     unlimited amounts of money to flow into political races.
       The group is seeking to overturn Buckley v. Valeo, a 1976 
     decision that struck down some of the Watergate-era campaign 
     finance changes that Congress had enacted in 1974. In doing 
     so, the Court removed any limits on campaign spending.
       In Buckley, the Court said that any infringement on 
     campaign spending was an infringement on free speech and, by 
     that action, legal scholars say, opened the floodgates to the 
     high-cost campaigns of today.
       ``This was a bad decision,'' said Prof. Ronald Dworkin of 
     the New York University Law School, who is involved in the 
     scholars' campaign. ``Public opinion is now becoming revolted 
     at the amount of money in politics. And that may provoke the 
     Court into reconsidering this decision. The Buckley decision 
     appears to try to represent an ideal of democracy, but it is 
     an incomplete ideal.''
       Professor Dworkin and 25 other scholars have signed a 
     statement calling on the Court to reconsider and reverse the 
     decision. The effort is being coordinated by the Brennan 
     Center for Justice at New York University, a nonprofit 
     organization named for former Supreme Court Justice William 
     J. Brennan Jr.
       The Brennan Center plans to hold a conference on the 
     subject and is also planning to have Federal judges hold mock 
     Supreme Court arguments on this case.
       The legal scholars are also speaking out. In an article in 
     a recent issue of The New York Review of Books, Professor 
     Dworkin said: ``The case for overruling Buckley is a strong 
     one, and we should feel no compunction in declaring the 
     decision a mistake. The decision misunderstood not only what 
     free speech really is, but what it really means for free 
     people to govern themselves.''
       Among the scholars signing the statement are Bruce 
     Ackerman, a professor at Yale Law School; Peter Arenella, a 
     professor at the law school of the University of California 
     at Los Angeles; John Rawls, a professor emeritus of law at 
     Harvard University; Milton S. Gwirtzman, a member of the 
     senior advisory board at the John F. Kennedy School of 
     Government at Harvard, and Robert Aronson, a professor of the 
     University of Washington law school.
       Prof. Erwin Chemerinsky of the University of Southern 
     California law school, who is among the signers, said: ``My 
     hope is that if I and other scholars speak long enough and 
     are persuasive enough, it might swing the Court. Having 
     experts in constitutional law speak out might make a 
     difference. I believe the Court was wrong with Buckley.''
       Yet, even these scholars believe their efforts may be a 
     long shot, given a recent Court decision and many lower-court 
     decisions that have been moving in the opposite direction of 
     overturning Buckley and have, instead, allowed money to be 
     spent even more freely on behalf of candidates for Federal 
     office.
       Congress passed legislation in 1974 to curb the excesses of 
     the Watergate scandal, limiting both the amount of money that 
     could be raised and the amount that could be spent in a 
     political campaign.
       The Buckley decision had, as its central element, the 
     elimination of restrictions that Congress had imposed on 
     campaign spending but, in what critics say was odd, it left 
     in place restrictions on contributions.
       This, over time, had the effect of allowing candidates to 
     spend as much money as they want--something the Court said 
     was protected by the First Amendment guarantee of free 
     speech. But it forced candidates to come up with creative 
     fund-raising strategies to skirt restrictions that capped 
     campaign donations at $1,000 from individuals and $5,000 from 
     political action committees.
       ``The Court struck down one-half of the 1974 law and left 
     the other half in effect, and we ended up with a law that was 
     the worst of all,'' said Burton Neuborne, a New York 
     University law professor and head of the Brennan Center. 
     ``This created a schizophrenic market where the supply of 
     money was limited, but the demand for it was not.''
       ``The worst part of all,'' Professor Neuborne added, ``is 
     that as a result of Buckley, the campaign finance laws are 
     shot with loopholes because candidates have to drive through 
     all of them in order to get money.''
       Since the Buckley decision, candidates and the political 
     parties have become masters at exploiting all loopholes to 
     meet the demand for campaign money. This year's biggest 
     development is the growth in the use of ``soft money''--funds 
     that can be raised by political parties in unlimited amounts 
     and spent by them in behalf of candidates for Federal office. 
     Donations to the parties avoid the tight $1,000-per-candidate 
     cap.
       Moreover, in a subsequent ruling handed down last June, the 
     Court upheld a decision in a Colorado case that allows 
     political parties to spend unlimited amounts on ``independent 
     ads''--advertisements that are on behalf of candidates but 
     are not designed in coordination with them. That decision was 
     seen by many campaign finance critics as eliminating the last 
     barrier against any restrictions on spending by political 
     parties and promoting the back-door financing of Federal 
     campaigns.
       ``It's not only Buckley v. Valeo, but how it is being 
     interpreted by the Court,'' said Norman J. Ornstein, a 
     resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute who 
     opposes the Buckley decision but did not sign the statement. 
     ``The Colorado decision had the bizarre conclusion that 
     political parties can act independent of their own 
     candidates. And that's what really helped open the flood-
     gates even more this year.''
       In addition, the Buckley decision has been continually 
     cited by lower courts in fending off efforts to regulate 
     ``issue advocacy'' advertisements. This type of advertising 
     is paid for by activist groups like the Christian Coalition 
     or environmental groups; they may not say ``vote for'' or 
     ``vote against'' specific candidates, but they still clearly 
     support one candidate or another.
       In nearly a dozen lower-court decisions, these 
     advertisements have been ruled to be protected by the First 
     Amendment guarantee of free speech, as outlined in the 
     Buckley decision, and cannot be regulated by the Government. 
     That means such spending cannot be restricted.
       Kenneth Gross, an election law specialist in Washington, 
     said it was highly doubtful that the scholars' group would be 
     successful.
       ``Overturning Buckley is wishful thinking,'' he said. 
     ``Every time the Supreme Court gets hold of a case that 
     involves the ideas in Buckley, they reaffirm them. The Court 
     hasn't shown any inclination in turning away from Buckley.''
       Still, the group hopes that its perseverance will pay off. 
     ``They are many examples in past history of the Supreme Court 
     reconsidering landmark cases after sustained public outcry 
     and scholarly criticism,'' said E. Joshua Rosenkrantz, 
     executive director of the Brennan Center. ``That is what we 
     are trying to generate. Buckley has got to be one of the most 
     unpopular opinions existing today, and it is viewed by 
     reformers of campaign finance as the big oak tree that 
     occupies the field, forcing everyone to play around it.''
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. THURMOND:
  S.J. Res. 3. A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States relating to voluntary school prayer; 
to the Committee on the Judiciary.


            voluntary school prayer constitutional amendment

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, today, I am introducing the voluntary 
school prayer constitutional amendment. This bill is identical to 
Senate Joint Resolution 73 which I introduced in the 98th Congress at 
the request of then President Reagan and reintroduced every Congress 
since.
  This proposal has received strong support from our colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle and is of vital importance to our Nation. It would 
restore the right to pray voluntarily in public schools--a right which 
was freely exercised under our Constitution until the 1960's, when the 
Supreme Court ruled to the contrary.
  Also, in 1985, the Supreme Court ruled an Alabama statute 
unconstitutional which authorized teachers in public schools to provide 
``a period of silence * * * for meditation or voluntary prayer'' at the 
beginning of each school day. As I stated when that opinion was issued 
and repeat again--

[[Page S560]]

the Supreme Court has too broadly interpreted the establishment clause 
of the first amendment and, in doing so, has incorrectly infringed on 
the rights of those children--and their parents--who wish to observe a 
moment of silence for religious or other purposes.
  Until the Supreme Court ruled in the Engel and Abington School 
District decisions, the establishment clause of the first amendment was 
generally understood to prohibit the Federal Government from officially 
approving, or holding in special favor, any particular religious faith 
or denomination. In crafting that clause, our Founding Fathers sought 
to prevent what has originally caused many colonial Americans to 
emigrate to this country--an official, State religion. At the same 
time, they sought, through the free exercise clause, to guarantee to 
all Americans the freedom to worship God without government 
interference or restraint. In their wisdom, they recognized that true 
religious liberty precludes the government from both forcing and 
preventing worship.
  As Supreme Court Justice William Douglas once stated: ``We are a 
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.'' 
Nearly every President since George Washington has proclaimed a day of 
public prayer. Moreover, we, as a nation, continue to recognize the 
Deity in our Pledge of Allegiance by affirming that we are a Nation 
``under God.'' Our currency is inscribed with the motto, ``In God We 
Trust''. In this body, we open the Senate and begin our workday with 
the comfort and stimulus of voluntary group prayers--such a practice 
has been recently upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court. It is 
unreasonable that the opportunity for the same beneficial experience is 
denied to the boys and girls who attend public schools. This situation 
simply does not comport with the intentions of the Framers of the 
Constitution and is, in fact, antithetical to the rights of our 
youngest citizens to freely exercise their respective religions. It 
should be changed, without further delay.
  The Congress should swiftly pass this resolution and send it to the 
States for ratification. This amendment to the Constitution would 
clarify that it does not prohibit vocal, voluntary prayer in the public 
school and other public institutions. It emphatically states that no 
person may be required to participate in any prayer. The government 
would be precluded from drafting school prayers. This well-crafted 
amendment enjoys the support of an overwhelming number of Americans.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to support prompt consideration and 
approval of this bill during this Congress.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. ROTH (for himself and Mr. Moynihan):
  S.J. Res. 5. A joint resolution waiving certain provisions of the 
Trade Act of 1974 relating to the appointment of the United States 
Trade Representative; to the Committee on Finance.


                 u.s. trade representative legislation

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, today I, along with my colleague Senator 
Moynihan, introduce a joint resolution that will waive certain 
provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 relating to the administration's 
nomination of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky to the position of U.S. 
Trade Representative [USTR].
  Specifically, the resolution will provide a waiver for Ambassador 
Barshefsky from the application of section 141(b)(3) of the Trade Act 
of 1974, as amended by section 21 of the Lobbying Disclosure Act. This 
provision prohibits the appointment of any person to serve as USTR or 
Deputy USTR, who has directly represented, aided, or advised or foreign 
government or foreign political party in a trade dispute or trade 
negotiation with the United States.
  The administration has sought the waiver because of questions 
surrounding Barshefsky's work for the Government of Canada while 
practicing law in the private sector. Ambassador Barshefsky was already 
serving as Deputy USTR when the law went into effect.
  When the Finance Committee acts on her nomination. I will ask it to 
mark up the joint resolution waiving, in her case, the application of 
the prohibition to eliminate any questions about her eligibility to 
serve. Ambassador Barshefsky now enjoys an exemption from this 
prohibition as Deputy USTR, and I believe that the extension of this 
exemption by waiver is appropriate. Because this waiver will have the 
force of law, it must be passed by both the Senate and the House and 
then presented to the President for signature.
  In past statements, I have expressed my strong support for Charlene 
Barshefsky's nomination as USTR. She is a very capable public servant, 
and I fully expect she will distinguish herself as USTR much as she did 
in her service as Deputy USTR.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. KYL (for himself and Mrs. Feinstein):
  S.J. Res. 6. A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States to protect the rights of crime 
victims; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


              the victims' rights constitutional amendment

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, to ensure that crime victims are treated with 
fairness, dignity, and respect, I rise to introduce, along with Senator 
Feinstein, a resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to 
establish and protect the rights of crime victims.
  This resolution is the product of extended discussions with Chairman 
Henry Hyde, Senators Hatch and Biden, the Department of Justice, the 
White House, law enforcement officials, major victims' rights groups, 
and such diverse scholars as Professors Larry Tribe and Paul Cassell. 
As a result of these discussions, the core values in the original 
amendment remain unchanged, but the language has been refined to better 
protect the interest of all parties.
  Each year, about 40 million Americans are victimized, first by 
criminals and a second time by a government that affords them no 
constitutional rights. The Victims' Rights Amendment is a 
constitutional amendment that will bring balance to the system by 
giving crime victims the rights to be informed, present, and heard at 
critical stages throughout their ordeal--the least the system owes to 
those it failed to protect.


  Need to protect crime victims' rights--scales of justice imbalanced

  Last Congress, the amendment was cosponsored by 29 Senators. Both the 
Republican and Democratic Party platforms called for a victims' rights 
amendment, as did Senator Dole and President Clinton in a Rose Garden 
ceremony in June 1996 and in his acceptance speech at the Democratic 
convention.
  This strong bipartisan support makes clear that the Victims' Rights 
Amendment is not a partisan issue, or some election-year gimmick. The 
idea stems from a 1982 President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 
which concluded that ``the criminal justice system has lost its 
essential balance,'' and that constitutional protection of victims' 
rights was the only way to guarantee fair treatment of crime victims. 
Since then, grass-roots citizens' organizations around the country have 
pushed for amendments to their State constitutions. A majority of 
States have responded to the unjust treatment crime victims face, and 
have enacted constitutional amendments. But this patchwork of State 
constitutional amendments is inadequate. A Federal amendment would 
establish a basic floor of crime victims's rights--a floor below which 
States could not go.
  Victims of serious crimes need a constitutional amendment to protect 
their rights and restore balance to our justice system. Those accused 
of crime have many constitutionally protected rights: They have the 
right to due process; right to confront witnesses; right against self-
incrimination; right to a jury trial; right to a speedy trial; right to 
a public trial; right to counsel; right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.
  Yet, despite rights for the accused, the U.S. Constitution, our 
highest law, has no protection for crime victims. The recognized symbol 
of justice is a figure holding a balanced set of scales, but in reality 
the scales are heavily weighted on the side of the accused. Our 
proposal will not deny or infringe any constitutional right of any 
person accused or convicted of a crime. But it will add to the body of 
rights we all enjoy as Americans.

  Crime victims have no constitutional rights. They are often treated 
as mere inconveniences, forced to view the process from the sidelines. 
Defendants

[[Page S561]]

can be present through their entire trial because they have a 
constitutional right to be there. But in many trials, crime victims are 
ordered to leave the courtroom. Victims often are not informed of 
critical proceedings, such as hearings to consider releasing a 
defendant on bail or allowing him to plea bargain to a reduced charge. 
Even when crime victims find out about these proceedings, they 
frequently have no opportunity to speak.


                        rights in the amendment

  The amendment gives crime victims the rights:
  To be notified of the proceedings;
  To be heard at certain crucial stages in the process;
  To be notified of the offender's release or escape;
  To proceedings free from unreasonable delay;
  To an order of restitution;
  To have the safety of the victim considered in determining a release 
from custody; and
  To be notified of these rights.


                               statistics

  As I noted earlier, each year about 40 million Americans are victims 
of serious crime. During 1995 there were 9.9 million crimes of 
violence, 6.4 million simple assaults, 2.0 million aggravated assaults, 
1.3 million robberies, and 355,000 rapes or other types of sexual 
assault, according to the most recent statistics from the Department of 
Justice.
  The breakdown of social order and the crisis of crime which accompany 
it have swelled the ranks of criminals, and those who suffer at their 
hands, to proportions that astonish us, that break our hearts, and that 
demand collective action. And the process of detecting, prosecuting, 
and punishing criminals continues, in too many places in America, to 
ignore the rights of crime victims to fundamental justice.


     strong public support--twenty-nine states have constitutional 
                               amendments

  Since 1982 when the need for a constitutional amendment was first 
recognized by a President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 29 states 
have passed similar measures--by an average popular vote of almost 80 
percent.
  In 1996, eight states approved constitutional amendments--all by 
landslides. Connecticut: 78 percent. Indiana: 89 percent. Nevada: 74 
percent. North Carolina: 78 percent. Oklahoma: 91 percent. Oregon: 57 
percent. South Carolina: 89 percent. Virginia: 84 percent.


      Amending the Constitution is a big step, but a necessary one

  Amending the constitution is, of course, a big step--one which I do 
not take lightly--but, on this issue, it is a necessary one. As Thomas 
Jefferson once said: ``I am not an advocate for frequent changes in 
laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand 
with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, 
more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered 
and manners and options change, with the change of circumstances, 
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times.''
  Who would be comfortable now if the right to free speech, or a free 
press, or to peaceably assemble, or any of our other rights were 
subject to the whims of changing legislative or court majorities: When 
the rights to vote were extended to all regardless of race, and to 
women, were they simply put into a statute? Who would dare stand before 
a crowd of people anywhere in our country and say that a defendant's 
rights to a lawyer, a speedy public trial, due process, to be informed 
of the charges, to confront witnesses, to remain silent, or any of the 
other constitutional protections are important, but don't need to be in 
the Constitution?
  Such a position would not stand. Yet that is precisely what critics 
of the Victims' Bill of Rights would tell crime victims. Victims of 
crime will never be treated fairly by a system that permits the 
defendant's constitutional rights always to trump the protections given 
to victims. Such a system forever would make victims second-class 
citizens. It is precisely because the Constitution is hard to change 
that basic rights for victims need to be protected in it.


                                Support

  The amendment is supported by major national victims' rights groups: 
Parents of Murdered Children, Mothers Against Drunk Driving [MADD], the 
National Organization for Victim Assistance, the National Victim 
Center, and the National Victims' Constitutional Amendment Network, the 
Victim Assistance Legal Organization, the Doris Tate Crime Victims 
Bureau, Citizens for Law and Order, the National Coalition Against 
Sexual Assault, and the Law Enforcement Alliance of America.


                               Conclusion

  In closing, I would like to thank Senator Dianne Feinstein for her 
hard work on this amendment and for her tireless efforts on behalf of 
crime victims.
  Mr. President, for far too long, the criminal justice system has 
ignored crime victims who deserve to be treated with fairness, dignity, 
and respect. Our criminal justice system will never be truly just as 
long as criminals have rights and victims have none. We need a new 
definition of justice--one that includes the victim.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the 
resolution be printed in the Record at the end of my statement.
  THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1)
  There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                              S.J. Res. 6

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of 
     each House concurring therein, That the following article is 
     proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States, which shall be valid for all intents and purposes as 
     part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of 
     three-fourths of the several States within seven years from 
     the date of its submission by the Congress:

                               Article --

       Section 1. Each victim of a crime of violence, and other 
     crimes that Congress may define by law, shall have the rights 
     to notice of, and not to be excluded from, all public 
     proceedings relating to the crime--
       to be heard, if present, and to submit a written statement 
     at a public pretrial or trial proceeding to determine a 
     release from custody, an acceptance of a negotiated plea, or 
     a sentence;
       to the rights described in the preceding portions of this 
     section at a public parole proceeding, or at a non-public 
     parole proceeding to the extent they are afforded to the 
     convicted offender;
       to notice of a release pursuant to a public or parole 
     proceeding or an escape;
       to a final disposition of the proceedings relating to the 
     crime free from unreasonable delay;
       to an order of restitution from the convicted offender;
       to consideration for the safety of the victim in 
     determining any release from custody; and
       to notice of the rights established by this article; 
     however, the rights to notice under this section are not 
     violated if the proper authorities make a reasonable effort, 
     but are unable to provide the notice, or if the failure of 
     the victim to make a reasonable effort to make those 
     authorities aware of the victim's whereabouts prevents that 
     notice.
       Section 2. The victim shall have standing to assert the 
     rights established by this article. However, nothing this 
     article shall provide grounds for the victim to challenge a 
     charging decision or a conviction; to obtain a stay of trail; 
     or to compel a new trial. Nothing in this article shall give 
     rise to a claim for damages against the United States, a 
     State, a political subdivision, or a public official, nor 
     provide grounds for the accused or convicted offender to 
     obtain any form of relief.
       Section 3. The Congress and the States shall have the power 
     to enforce this article within their respective jurisdictions 
     by appropriate legislation, including the power to enact 
     exceptions when required for compelling reasons of public 
     safety or for judicial efficiency in mass victim cases.
       Section 4. The rights established by this article shall 
     apply to all proceedings that begin on or after the 180th day 
     after the ratification of this article.
       Section 5. The rights established by this article shall 
     apply in all Federal and State proceedings, including 
     military proceedings to the extent that Congress may provide 
     by law, juvenile justice proceedings, and collateral 
     proceedings such as habeas corpus, and including proceedings 
     in any district or territory of the United States not within 
     a State.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. KYL:
  S.J. Res. 8. A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United Stats to provide that expenditures for a 
fiscal year shall exceed neither revenues for such fiscal year nor 19 
per centum of the Nation's gross domestic product for the last calendar 
year ending before the beginning of such fiscal year; to the Committee 
on the Judiciary.

[[Page S562]]

    the balanced budget/spending limitation constitutional amendment

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Balanced 
Budget/Spending Limitation Amendment, a resolution to amend the 
Constitution of the United States to require a balanced federal budget 
and to limit spending to 19 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
  Mr. President, few people realize it, but for the last 40 years, 
revenues to the U.S. Treasury have remained relatively steady as a 
share of national income. No matter whether economic times were good or 
bad, whether the nation was at peace or engaged in military conflict, 
or whether income tax rates were as high as 90 percent or as low as 28 
percent, the total amount of revenue flowing to the U.S. Treasury has 
always amounted to about 19 percent of the nation's income.
  That is really quite remarkable. With history as a guide, it means 
that higher tax rates will not produce more revenue for the government 
proportionate to the size of the economy. Such rate increases merely 
slow down the rate of economic growth, and that is why tax increases 
never produce as much revenue as anticipated.
  At the family level, it means some people will work fewer hours to 
avoid being pushed into a higher tax bracket. Others will invest less, 
or invest in less productive ventures, in order to minimize their tax 
burdens. Still others, when hit by higher taxes, cut back on the goods 
or services they buy, and that means less work--and less taxable 
income--for someone else.
  In other words, changes in the tax code affect people's behavior. 
Lower tax rates stimulate the economy, resulting in more taxable income 
and transactions, and, in turn, more revenue to the Treasury. Higher 
taxes discourage work, production, savings, and investment, so revenues 
are always less than initially projected. Although tax cuts and tax 
rate increases may create temporary declines and surges in revenue, 
history proves that revenues always adjust at roughly the same 
percentage of GDP as people adjust their behavior to the new tax code.
  It is important for us to understand this phenomenon because it means 
that Congress cannot balance the federal budget by raising tax rates. 
If the goal is to balance the budget--and that is what a balanced 
budget amendment will require--the only way to succeed is to limit 
federal spending to the level of revenue that the economy is willing to 
bear. That happens to be 19 percent of GDP. That is what the Balanced 
Budget/Spending Limitation Act seeks to do in a very explicit way.
  Other versions of the balanced budget amendment would achieve the 
same objective, including the version of the amendment that is most 
likely to pass in the next few weeks. The problem is, without 
explicitly limiting spending and precluding tax rate increases, 
Congress might try to balance the budget by raising taxes. And as I 
have illustrated in prior remarks, that would not only be ineffective, 
it would be harmful to the economy.
  Higher taxes would mean that fewer jobs would be created; some people 
would lose their jobs. Wages would not grow as fast. Output would fall, 
or would grow only slowly. And in the end, spending would probably 
still outpace revenue, requiring another round of deficit reduction to 
meet the requirements of the balanced budget amendment. If balance were 
actually achieved, it could probably not be sustained for very long 
because high tax rates would slow the economy, resulting in lower 
revenues in future years.
  The advantage of the Balanced Budget/Spending Limitation Amendment is 
that it keeps our eye on the ball. It tells Congress to limit spending. 
And by linking spending to economic growth, it gives Congress a 
positive incentive to enact pro-growth economic policies. Only a 
healthy and growing economy--measured by GDP--would increase the dollar 
amount that Congress is allowed to spend, although always proportionate 
to the size of the economy.
  In other words, 19 percent of a larger GDP represents more revenue to 
the Treasury than 19 percent of a smaller GDP.
  I urge my colleagues to consider the advantages of the Balanced 
Budget/Spending Limitation Amendment and to join me as cosponsors of 
the initiative. In the event that a different version of the balanced 
budget amendment passes, I suggest we will have to consider a free-
standing spending limitation amendment in the future if we are 
interested in promoting both fiscal responsibility and economic growth 
and opportunity for all Americans.
  Mr. President, I ask that the text of the amendment be reprinted in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                              S.J. Res. 8

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of 
     each House concurring therein), That the following article is 
     proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as 
     part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of 
     three-fourths of the several States within seven years after 
     the date of its submission for ratification:

                              ``Article--

       ``Section 1. Except as provided in this article, outlays of 
     the United States Government for any fiscal year may not 
     exceed its receipts for that fiscal year.
       ``Sec. 2. Except as provided in this article, the outlays 
     of the United States Government for a fiscal year may not 
     exceed 19 per centum of the Nation's gross domestic product 
     for the last calendar year ending before the beginning of 
     such fiscal year.
       ``Sec. 3. The Congress may, by law, provide for suspension 
     of the effect of sections 1 or 2 of this article for any 
     fiscal year for which three-fifths of the whole number of 
     each House shall provide, by a roll call vote, for a specific 
     excess of outlays over receipts or over 19 per centum of the 
     Nation's gross domestic product for the last calendar year 
     ending before the beginning of such fiscal year.
       ``Sec. 4. Total receipts shall include all receipts of the 
     United States Government except those derived from borrowing. 
     Total outlays shall include all outlays of the United States 
     Government except those for the repayment of debt principal.
       ``Sec. 5. This article shall apply to the second fiscal 
     year beginning after its ratification and to subsequent 
     fiscal years, but not to fiscal years beginning before 
     October 1, 2001.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. KYL (for himself, Mr. Abraham, Mr. Brownback, Mr. 
        Coverdell, Mr. Craig, Mr. Faircloth, Mr. Grams, Mr. Hagel, Mr. 
        Helms, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. McCain, 
        Mr. Santorum, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Smith, and Mr. 
        Thompson):
  S.J. Res. 9. A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States to require two-thirds majorities for 
increasing taxes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


              THE TAX LIMITATION CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today on behalf of myself and 17 of my 
Senate colleagues to introduce the Tax Limitation Amendment, a proposed 
amendment to the Constitution to require a two-thirds vote of the House 
and Senate to increase taxes.
  Mr. President, on Election Day last year, by overwhelming majorities, 
voters from Florida to California approved initiatives aimed at 
limiting government's ability to raise taxes. Florida's Question One, 
which would require a two-thirds vote of the people to enact or raise 
any state taxes or fees, passed with 69.2 percent of the vote.
  Seventy percent of Nevada voters approved the Gibbons amendment, 
requiring a two-thirds majority vote of the state legislature to pass 
new taxes or tax hikes. South Dakotans easily approved an amendment 
requiring either a vote of the people or a two-thirds vote of the 
legislature for any state tax increase.
  And California voters tightened the restrictions in the most famous 
tax limitation of all, Proposition 13, so that now all taxes at the 
local level must be approved by a vote of the people. Of course, voters 
in my home state of Arizona overwhelmingly approved a state tax limit 
of their own in 1992.
  The Tax Limitation Amendment I am introducing would impose similar 
constraints on federal tax-raising authority. It would require a two-
thirds majority vote of each house of Congress to pass any bill levying 
a new tax or increasing the rate or base of any existing tax. In short, 
any measure taking more out of the taxpayers' pockets would require a 
supermajority vote to pass.
  Congress could vote to waive the requirement in times of war, or when 
the

[[Page S563]]

United States is engaged in military conflict which causes an imminent 
and serious threat to national security. But any new taxes imposed 
under such a waiver could only remain in effect for a maximum of two 
years.
  Most Americans believe the federal government is already taxing them 
far too much. In 1950, the average family paid one dollar in taxes to 
the federal government out of every 50 dollars earned. Today, it pays 
almost one dollar out of every three dollars earned. Add state and 
local taxes to the mix, and the tax bite is closer to one out of every 
two-and-a-half dollars earned.
  I would note that the Tax Limitation Amendment would not affect 
Congress' ability to cut taxes. That could still be achieved by simple 
majority vote. It would, however, make it much harder to raise taxes, 
particularly if there is no broad-based, bipartisan support for the 
proposition in Congress or around the country. It would, for example, 
have prevented enactment of the tax hike of 1993, one of the largest in 
history, and one which even a majority of Senators did not support. 
Vice President Gore broke a 50 to 50 vote tie to secure its passage. 
The TLA would have prevented enactment of the Bush tax increase of 
1990.
  Raising sufficient revenue to pay for government's essential 
operations is obviously a necessary part of governing, but raising tax 
rates is not necessarily the best way to raise revenue. And in any 
event, voters around the country seem to believe that raising taxes 
should only be done when there is broad support for the proposition. 
The TLA will ensure that no tax can be raised in the future without 
such consensus.
  I invite my colleagues to cosponsor the initiative, and I ask 
unanimous consent that the text of the amendment be reprinted in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                              S.J. Res. 9

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of 
     each House concurring therein) That the following article is 
     proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as 
     part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of 
     three-fourths of the several States within seven years after 
     the date of its submission for ratification:

                              ``Article--

       ``Section 1. Any bill to levy a new tax or increase the 
     rate or base of any tax may pass only by a two-thirds 
     majority of the whole number of each House of Congress.
       ``Sec. 2. The Congress may waive section 1 when a 
     declaration of war is in effect. The Congress may also waive 
     section 1 when the United States is engaged in military 
     conflict which causes an imminent and serious threat to 
     national security and is so declared by a joint resolution, 
     adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House, 
     which becomes law. Any provision of law which would, standing 
     alone, be subject to section 1 but for this section and which 
     becomes law pursuant to such a waiver shall be effective for 
     not longer than 2 years.
       ``Sec. 3. All votes taken by the House of Representatives 
     or the Senate under this article shall be determined by yeas 
     and nays and the names of persons voting for and against 
     shall be entered on the Journal of each House 
     respectively.''.

                          ____________________