[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 143 (Monday, October 21, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12425-S12435]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                REFLECTIONS ON U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY

 Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I have had the opportunity to serve 
on the Committee on Agriculture since 1981. The agricultural community 
in Alabama and the Nation, while small in number, is a considerable 
part of our economy. In fact in Alabama, agriculture and forestry are 
the largest sectors of the economy.
  Therefore, I felt compelled to serve on this committee. It has been 
extremely difficult for most of the newspaper reporters in Alabama to 
cover the action of this committee. I felt at times that my press 
secretary needed to give them a map to find the Senate Agriculture 
Committee hearing room. The issues are complicated and few reporters 
have an understanding of the basics of farm policy. As a general rule, 
this accounts for the sparsity of news stories about agriculture in 
Alabama and Washington newspapers.
  In addition to farm programs, the committee had jurisdiction over a 
great number of rural development programs, rural electrification, and 
rural water programs that are an extremely important aspect that can 
improve the daily lives of the millions of people that live in rural 
areas of this Nation.
  The agricultural community is considerably better off today than when 
I came to the Senate in 1979. During my years on the Agriculture 
Committee, we have been able to craft foreign policy which provides 
market stability and allows U.S. farmers to aggressively pursue 
international markets. At the same time, these farm programs have 
dramatically reduced the cost to the U.S. Treasury. And the most 
important part that is so often overlooked, American farms provide a 
stable supply of food for American families at a lower cost than any 
part of the world. Legislation passed by the Committee is often called 
farm bills. It would be more appropriately entitled Food Safety and 
Consumer Protection Legislation.


                               Farm Bills

  In 1981, I had my first experience with the Congress' major farm 
authorization bill. With this bill, Members who strongly supported 
agriculture sought to expand foreign markets for U.S. exports and to 
protect them from selective embargoes. But Alabama's chief priority was 
the preservation of the peanut program. That year, the USDA and a 
number of Senators pushed for its elimination. But Alabama's farmers 
had just suffered 2 years of droughts, and they were already in a 
difficult situation. The program's proponents managed to push the 
program through the Agriculture Committee by a vote of 12 to 4. 
However, it was defeated on the floor of the Senate, and supporters had 
to work in the back rooms to devise the Heflin-Warner compromise. This 
effort succeeded. On the Senate floor, Senator Nunn credited me with 
the compromise:

       * * * I think the Senator from Alabama has worked longer 
     and harder on the peanut program than anyone I know in this 
     body. He has spent literally hundreds of hours working 
     diligently to protect the program that is of vital interest 
     to the State of Alabama and also the State of Georgia as well 
     as other states.
       * * * I have been following his lead on this issue as well 
     as many other farm issues, and I thank him for an exceptional 
     job all the way through.

  However, it was just that--a compromise--and I was not entirely 
please with the outcome. For instance, although the 1981 farm bill 
established farm-based poundage quotas, increased loan supports, and a 
cost-of-production price escalator, it technically eliminated the 
peanut allotment program.
  During the farm bill debate, Alabama's delegation was also very 
concerned with improving soybean production and exports. Over the 
previous few years, the U.S. share of the world soybean export market 
had dropped from 90 percent to 70 percent. Despite this drop, U.S. 
soybean production had tripled, but only because planting had tripled. 
Crop yields had not improved, and export policies were lagging. In 
fact, if the situation did not change, the United States would only 
create a domestic surplus of soybeans. So I introduced a bill to create 
the Research Soybean Institute, which would examine ways to improve 
production, exporting, and marketing. The institute would also address 
problems such as the cyst nematode parasite--and other issues like it. 
These provisions became a part of the 1981 farm bill.
  With Senator Melcher's help, we passed another amendment to the farm 
bill which required that imported meats be held to the same inspection 
standards as domestic meats. Specifically, we sought to prohibit horse 
and kangaroo meats from being sold as ``beef.'' Clearly, this language 
had a dual purpose, to protect the interests of the cattle ranchers, 
and to ensure that consumers who bought hamburgers actually ate beef.
  When the farm bill debate came to an end, I objected strongly to the 
administration's substitute bill. Although it retained the peanut 
compromise, the kangaroo and horse meat language, and the soybean 
institute, this bill has gone too far. This was the first attack on the 
farmer during my career; he had become a victim of the USDA's fiscal 
austerity in the Republican administration's sometimes too broad 
attempts to cut domestic spending in the wrong places. I objected 
chiefly to the commodity provisions, especially loan levels and target 
price figures, but I voted for the bill anyway because I thought it was 
more important to have a 4-year bill than none at all.
  But implementation of this farm bill proved nearly as difficult, 
especially for peanuts. The USDA tried to enact regulations to cut the 
peanut poundage quotas. Its cuts would only hurt the small quota 
holders who could not afford the overhead of production. Supporters 
contracted the USDA, and cited the provisions in the peanut language 
which required a fair and equitable system for quota reduction. 
Targeting the small farmer like this was--* * * a misinterpretation of 
both the spirit and intent of the Congress if not an outright violation 
of the letter of the law itself. The USDA agreed to back off until it 
had received clarification of congressional intent.
  The years following this farm bill also saw difficulties for the 
cotton program. In 1984, the administration sought a freeze in target 
prices, which it won. I blocked the bill when it came to the Senate 
floor, and I set conditions on this freeze. Specifically, I succeeded 
in setting the inventory carryover trigger for the paid diversion of 
cotton at 2.7 rather than 4 million bales in 1985, increasing the rate 
from $0.25 to $0.30 per pound if this inventory reached 4.1 million 
bales, and $0.35 if it reached 4.7 million bales. I also secured 
assurances for an extra $500 million in CCC export credit loan 
guarantees for 1984, including $100 million specifically for cotton, 
and $2 billion in 1985. Other successes which came out of this bill 
included changes to the FmHA disaster loan programs, including 
increased funding and increased loan ceilings, eligibility expansion to 
counties adjacent to declared disaster areas, extension of application 
deadlines to 8 months, extension of repayments limits by 8 years, and 
scheduling of interest rates to their original level or the current 
prevailing rate, whichever was lower. Sometimes it's like dealing with 
a mule--you have to use a 2 by 4 to get its attention.
  When the next farm bill around in 1985, we introduced the Southern 
Agriculture Act of 1985 preemptively to save the peanut and cotton 
programs. Specifically, it would increase peanut poundage quotas to the 
existing level for the national, edible market. I also sought to allow 
for double cropping, conservation tillage, and other ideas endemic to 
the South. But these programs represented only one small part of 
overall farm policy; the export-import programs were certainly as 
great. I had hoped that the United States might also be able to 
increase its share of foreign markets.
  The House Agriculture Committee adopted my Southern Agriculture Act

[[Page S12426]]

that year without changes, making it, for a time, part of the farm 
bill. House Chairman Kika de la Garza of Texas gave me considerable 
support. Incorporation of the peanut program was eminently logical 
because it was the only program which had actually made the Government 
money over the previous 2 years. The Senate Agriculture Committee also 
adopted much of my measure, but I knew that it would be difficult to 
pass it through the full Senate. The Senate committee also incorporated 
language proposed by Senator Dole which I cosponsored to create a 
National Commission on Agriculture Policy into the farm bill.
  When the Senate committee passed its version of the bill, I was 
certainly pleased that it included the Southern Agriculture Act, but I 
was disappointed with its export provisions. As I saw it, the problem 
with U.S. farm exports had been that the agriculture secretaries had 
not used the tools Congress created for them to implement an aggressive 
export promotional program.
  In fact, when the conference committee reported its version of the 
bill, I was struck that it deceived and betrayed soybean farmers. The 
conferees had dropped our amendment to prevent the U.S. Government from 
providing loans or grants to foreign soybean producers. The committee 
had also changed another of our amendments to establish a marketing 
loan without lowering soybean loan rates. I intended the measure, which 
had passed the Senate, to authorize the Agriculture Secretary to 
implement a plan to increase competitiveness of American soybeans in 
foreign markets. The conference version, however, effectively 
legislated lower soybean prices for the farmer since it lowered the 
loan rates. American taxpayer dollars were being used to enhance the 
competitive capability of major soybean competitor countries such as 
Brazil and Argentina.
  In fact, I voted against the 1985 farm bill coming out of conference. 
I believe that it effectively legislated lower commodity prices. The 
credit provisions were also unforgiving. FmHA loan availability 
decreased, and foreclosures were therefore likely to increase, I 
believed.
  However, I was pleased that the bill maintained the peanut program, 
included better research titles, and addressed conservation. 
Specifically, the bill included the Conservation Reserve Program, and 
the swamp-buster and sod-buster provisions, which would allow for 
better long-term farming.
  In hindsight, though, one of the most important provisions, if not 
the most important, was the establishment and implementation of the 
cotton marketing loan. It is generally understood that U.S. 
agricultural commodities must be competitive in the world market if the 
sector is to be economically viable.
  Some 95 percent of cotton entering world trade does so with the 
benefit of a subsidy of one kind or another. The net effect is a world 
price which is often below the cost of production in most, if not all, 
exporting countries. In shaping cotton policy to address this kind of 
global competition, we had to decide whether to fashion a program which 
would enable U.S. cotton to compete aggressively or, instead, assume 
the role of residual supplier.
  Until implementation of the marketing loan in 1985, U.S. cotton was 
generally relegated to the role of residual supplier. In 1985, however, 
we made a decision to meet subsidized competition head on. The 
establishment of the marketing loan has served to accomplish several 
fundamental marketing objectives: First, permits U.S. commodities to 
meet price competition, second, avoids excessive stock accumulations, 
third, allows producers to market commodities over a period of time, 
rather than dumping the entire crop on the market at harvest time and 
fourth, serves as a safety net under producer income.
  I am proud of the cotton marketing loan and believe it has become the 
cornerstone of the U.S. cotton program. The indisputable success in the 
industry supports this assertion as the marketing loan has spurred 
domestic mill consumption and aided exports. For instance, the 
marketing loan is responsible for: reversing a 26-year decline in 
offtake of U.S. cotton; reversing a 43-year decline in U.S. mill cotton 
consumption; and reversing a 70-year decline in cotton's share of U.S. 
mill fiber consumption.
  When the Senate considered its version of the 1986 tax reform bill, I 
strongly supported an amendment to restore provisions which allowed 
farmers to average their incomes over several years. It made up for 
revenue losses, which were estimated at $66 million, by repealing a tax 
break on wealthy, foreign real estate investors in the United States. 
Since there had been an increasing amount of foreign investor 
speculation in U.S. property, particularly in farmland, I thought it 
was appropriate to compensate for the revenue losses through this 
source. Another amendment the Senate adopted would refund unused 
investment tax credits to farmers. Specifically, the language provided 
for farmers to apply the credits against previous years' taxes at $0.50 
per dollar. It also established yearly limits for the refund. The 
authors of this tax reform bill sought to eliminate credits for the 
future. However, since farmers were heavily capitalized with the high 
level of mechanization of modern farming, Congress needed to make tax 
reform a little fairer for agriculture by permitting farmers to trade 
in some of their unused tax credits for cash.
  In 1986, critics of the cotton program maintained that it involved 
million dollar payments to large corporations. But this was an unfair 
characterization of the program. These large payments resulted from the 
Secretary's discretion; they were not mandated by the program itself. 
In fact, the program had ameliorated price reductions from domestic 
surpluses and improved sales overseas due to U.S. cotton prices that 
were on par with world prices for the first time in nearly 2 years. 
Competitive prices should provide the commodity with a turnaround.
  In 1987, I introduced the farmers recovery tax bill to restore the 
income averaging price, investment tax credits, and capital gains, all 
of which had been repealed in the 1986 tax reform bill. As in the case 
of the amendments which I supported in 1986, these provisions applied 
exclusively to farmers. Before the passage of that bill, it had 
appeared that our tax policy was the only policy that provided some 
equity or incentive to the agriculture and timber sectors, but to 
compound the economic woes of rural America, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
repealed provisions of the tax laws that were beneficial to these areas 
of our economy.
  When the 1990 farm bill came before the Congress, President Bush's 
administration sought to cut the cotton and peanut programs, but it 
failed. We also won a marketing loan for soybeans, specifically to 
increase America's international competitiveness in this market. Last, 
the bill included provisions we designed to provide funding for rural 
firefighting and to double the amount the Government could spend on the 
development of rural water and sewer systems.
  As in 1985, I introduced the Southern Agriculture Act to reauthorize 
the cotton and peanut programs. The administration had proposed a 10-
percent cut in these programs, but this bill would maintain the 1985 
bill's statutes. What could the farmer buy that cost 90 percent of what 
it did in 1985? Certainly, farm machinery and fertilizer prices had not 
decreased.
  With regard to the peanut program, Secretary Yeutter's proposed cuts 
would be devastating. If it had been adopted by Congress, it would not 
only destroy the peanut farmers, it would also cause a serious 
recession in the peanut-producing areas of Alabama and other States. At 
the end of July, the Senate defeated an amendment to implement his 
cuts.
  One of the biggest problems about forging the peanut compromise in 
1990 was the fact that division existed among the country's peanut 
farmers. Georgia's farmers had split from the rest, and I assumed the 
role of peacemaker between Georgia's peanut-growers and the rest, 
including farmers from Alabama. Notably, my compromise was the first 
supported by all the grower groups and major peanut product 
manufacturers.
  The soybean loan included in the bill would serve to combat cheaper 
foreign competition. The loan was something I had fought for since the 
1985 farm bill.
  In 1986, I objected to the Reagan administration's decision to pursue 
the World Bank's loan to Argentina. Argentina was America's second 
greatest

[[Page S12427]]

competitor in soybeans, and it was able to undercut U.S. prices and 
flood the world markets by directly subsidizing those firms that 
process and export soybeans. The World Bank loan would further 
subsidize competition to the United States--an unfair practice. In 
1987, I attached language to the agricultural trade bill to prohibit 
U.S. subsidies for foreign farmers competing with U.S. farmers. One 
issue that had brought more complaints and more attention from Alabama 
farmers is the Government subsidies that enhanced the competitiveness 
of agricultural producers in countries such as Brazil and Argentina. 
Sadly enough, many of these subsidies were provided not by the 
governments of these countries, but rather by the U.S. Government.
  At the end of 1987, I attached a soybean marketing program to the 
Senate budget reconciliation bill. This amendment would revive language 
that I had attached to the 1985 farm bill, but the conferees had 
effectively killed the provision by leaving it to the Secretary's 
discretion. He did not exercise that discretion. The soybean program 
involved CCC loans from 1988 through 1990, and I modeled it after my 
1985 cotton program. I hoped that it would be an innovative approach 
that would provide enough flexibility to the Secretary of Agriculture 
to meet our world competitors on a level playing field. Although it 
passed the Senate shortly later, I had to reintroduce it in 1988. With 
a marketing loan, U.S. soybeans will be available on the world market 
at the same price as that made possible by foreign government subsidies 
for our foreign competitors. At that time, U.S. soybean acreage had 
dropped to a quarter of its 1979 level. Of course, the loan ultimately 
became a part of the 1990 farm bill.
  With other provisions I included in the final bill, I sought to 
increase the farmer's flexibility to plant second crops on program 
plots. This practice is known as double-cropping.
  With the Southern Agriculture Act, we also sought to create a 
Southern Institute for Agriculture Resource Policy to conduct 
scientific studies on improved farming techniques.
  The committee also approved a proposal to provide Federal matching 
funds for rural firefighters. The money would go to State forestry 
agencies and volunteers, and it was included in the final version of 
the bill. My language also proposed a Southern Forest Regeneration 
Center.
  The final bill included my provisions to expand the Talladega 
National Forest into Cherokee County and extend an Alabama trail closer 
to the Appalachian Trail.
  The final bill also included our language to create the star schools 
program. Through the use of state-of-the-art telecommunications 
equipment, the Star Schools-Medlink program that was passed in the 1990 
farm bill allows small rural schools or hospitals to be linked with the 
highest quality educational programs and technology developments of 
other areas. Using this technology in a medical situation, a doctor at 
a clinic in a rural area could send moving images of a brain scan to a 
specialist at a hospital hundreds of miles away.
  The final bill also included language to provide Federal assistance 
for rural development, including water and sewers, and a loan program 
to aid small, rural businesses. There is no one answer that every 
community can use to achieve economic vitality. However, there are 
common threads. First of all, the leadership for rural development must 
be taken to local community organizations--rural electric cooperatives, 
counties, economic development district, and other local entities. I 
was especially proud of these provisions as they were included in the 
final version of the bill.
  With Senator Pryor's help, we included language in the 1990 farm bill 
to authorize $15 million for research on poultry diseases and to 
require that foreign poultry meet domestic inspection standards. 
However, President Bush failed to meet this requirement, arguing that 
it was an impediment to free trade. In fact, he even imposed a 1990 
hiring freeze on inspectors.
  In 1991, peanut farmers faced another problem when the ITC ruled that 
300 million pounds of foreign peanuts be allowed into the American 
market--a total equaling 10 percent of the domestic market. I contacted 
the President to protest this ruling, in some large part because it 
violated language that I included in the 1990 farm bill to require that 
imports meet the same quality as the domestic product. Chinese peanuts, 
known to be infected with the striped virus, would be among the 
imports. Further, allowing such a high number into the country would 
cost the government $84 million, according to the USDA. Although he 
reduced the number to 100 million, the President decided to allow the 
peanuts into the country. In 1993, we contacted the trade 
representative to urge inclusion of a provision in NAFTA requiring that 
the stringent domestic inspection standards be imposed on imports.
  Although farm bills had always been the result of compromise, and 
therefore were somewhat less than I had wanted, supporters had 
succeeded in maintaining the commodity programs at an acceptable level 
until this year. The 1996 farm bill debate posed a serious threat to 
the continuation of farm programs, and southern farmers would be 
especially affected by various proposals.
  From the beginning of last year, the Republicans had pushed for 
elimination of the commodity programs and the price supports. Given the 
successes of these programs, like the cotton program, I cannot 
understand the prejudice with which they approached the cuts.
  To pass programs that I believe are worthwhile, I have frequently 
involved myself in the strategy which has worked so well for Senators 
over the years. To demonstrate this point, when I saw that the cotton 
program was in serious trouble, I offered by support for other programs 
to gain backing for cotton. As I told the American Sheep Industry 
Association in June 1994, there isn't much wool in Alabama, but there 
isn't much cotton in Idaho or Montana. But if those of us in 
agriculture didn't work together, we cannot survive the plans to 
dismantle the fundamentals of farming in this country.
  As it came up for review, supporters tried to impress upon Members 
the importance of the cotton program. The cotton program was designed 
to meet market conditions in the United States and abroad. In 1995, the 
year that the Republicans tried to eliminate it, the cotton program 
proved itself effective. Although there was a bumper cotton crop, the 
market price remained above the target price. Additionally, we stressed 
that wheat and feed grains account for 50 percent of all farm program 
costs, and the cotton program cost only 10 percent of the total Federal 
farm outlays.
  Agriculture had already taken its fair share of cuts. The agriculture 
budget had dropped from $26 billion in 1985 to just under $10 billion 
in 1995. However, reductions in the peanut program had never resulted 
in Americans paying less for their groceries. The cost is always 
absorbed by someone in the chain between the producer and the 
supermarket, and economic studies and history do not suggest that cuts 
would reduce the price now.
  With agriculture very much in mind, I voted against the Republican 
budget resolution. This resolution would have cut $8 billion from 
farming over 5 years. Naturally, I had other concerns when I decided to 
oppose the bill including Medicare and Social Security, as well as the 
idea of promising to cut the deficit and taxes.
  After the Senate agriculture committee completed its mark-up on the 
budget resolution, preliminary estimates for the cuts in the commodity 
programs totaled $13.3 billion over 7 years. Chairman Lugar's intention 
was to do his best to eliminate the commodity programs, and he had 
stated his strong opposition for some time.
  Along with others, I continued the fight for the preservation of the 
cotton and peanut programs. Noting that cotton had enjoyed a record 
year, I promised to introduce a bill to extend that program as written, 
with just a few changes.
  The average peanut farmer has only 98 acres, whereas the 7 largest 
corporations that use peanuts to manufacture their products had more 
than $140 billion in total sales during 1994. It is no coincidence that 
some Members of Congress who oppose the program just happen to have 
some of those same corporations in their states. It is these same 
corporations that stand to be the big winners if the peanut program 
were eliminated, not the real consumers.

[[Page S12428]]

The GAO had issued a study which showed that the consumer absorbed a 
cost of $300-$500 million, but the program's opponents misrepresented 
this study in the last round, arguing that this cost was passed onto 
the retail consumer. As a matter of fact, in testimony before the House 
Agriculture Subcommittee on Specialty Crops and its Chairman, Charlie 
Rose, the GAO testified that the consumer they referenced was the first 
purchaser of peanuts, or the manufacturer. They further testified in 
substance that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that any 
reduction in the loan rate would be passed along to the retail 
consumer.
  Critics who sought to eliminate the peanut program during the 1995 
farm bill debated used this GAO report as one justification for ending 
the peanut program. Armed with the earlier GAO testimony, 
representatives from the peanut product manufacturers association were 
asked if any reduction in the loan rate would be passed to the 
consumer. They responded by stating that loan rate reductions would not 
be passed along to the consumer, instead, savings would be used to 
develop new products.
  The peanut program has served to balance the playing field between 
small farmers and multinational corporations. It is bad policy to 
eliminate the peanut program only to increase corporate profits at the 
expense of rural economies and the true consumer who will notice 
absolutely no difference in the price they pay at the grocery store.
  In September, I introduced the Southern Agriculture Act of 1995 to 
revise and extend the loan and other programs for cotton, peanuts, and 
oilseeds. Under this bill, the cotton program would have been extended 
as written. The 1994 crop had been a record crop in production, 
exports, and total offtake. Many of our competitors had experienced 
insect infestations causing higher world market prices. As a matter of 
fact, cotton prices had climbed to their highest levels at any time 
since the Civil War, topping $1 a pound. Therefore, I saw no reason to 
alter a program that was functioning effectively. The peanut program 
would be slightly changed, with a freeze imposed on the support prices 
at the 1995 crop level. In an effort to address the claims of the 
peanut program's critics, the National Peanut Growers Group adopted a 
series of program changes to eliminate all taxpayer costs and open the 
program to new products. I included many of the NPPA no-net-cost 
reforms into my peanut title, including eliminating the undermarketings 
provisions. However, from a strategy perspective, I knew that the farm 
bill debate would require a great deal of give and take and felt that 
under no circumstances should we begin negotiating from our bottom 
line. Since they did not receive price supports, my bill would have 
extended the marketing loans for soybeans and oilseeds. In addition to 
extending the marketing loan, we increased the loan rate from $4.92 a 
bushel to $5.25 a bushel. The lower loan rate had ceased to be an 
effective safety net for oilseed producers. Our title on oilseeds was 
heralded by the American Soybean Association as the best proposal put 
forward for oilseed producers. In the end, a modified version of my 
proposal was adopted and signed into law.
  The reason why I introduced this bill was simply that I utterly 
opposed Chairman Lugar's farm bill. Among other things, his bill would 
have destroyed the peanut program. However, I believed that 14 of 18 
Senators on the committee favored a peanut bill without a cut in the 
price support. Because he had such a strong opposition, the chairman 
employed delay tactics to push the bill back to the reconciliation 
deadline when the members of the Budget Committee could write the farm 
bill. These Senators were much less sympathetic to the needs of the 
southern peanut farmer.
  At that time, certain Senators tried to put an additional assessment 
on peanut producers. They were trying to force the farmer to pay for 
the entire adminstrative cost of the program. However, the Senators who 
pushed for this assessment were from wheat States; notably, they did 
not try to impose the same condition on wheat farmers. However, we 
secured language which stated that the existing budget deficit 
assessment paid by producers would be targeted to offsetting program 
costs and no other assessments would then be necessary.

  With regard to the ongoing farm bill negotiations, the Agriculture 
chairman continued to refuse meetings, despite the strong bipartisan 
support for the peanut program. He knew that he would not get his way, 
but that was no reason to keep us from meeting to come up with a budget 
bill that saved money but did not destroy the peanut program. In the 
end of committee action that year, the farm provisions included a 
peanut compromise, but I was never consulted. I was shut out of all 
discussions about it; the Republicans told me it would be their bill. I 
could not explain to farmers why these Senators voted for a 7-year 
program for wheat, corn, rice, sugar, and other commodities, but 
decided to kill the peanut program after 5 years.
  Simply stated, this bill would force a disproportionate share of 
agricultural budget cuts on the South. It would have its most profound 
negative effects on new and old farmers there. Most of the growth in 
cotton production had occurred in the South, but the new cotton program 
would shut out new farmers from its provisions. This bill required that 
farmers demonstrate participation in 3 of the previous 5 years in order 
to continue participation in the cotton program. Many of the new cotton 
acres in this program were the result of the successful boll weevil 
eradication program. Land once infested with boll weevils had recently 
been eradicated, however, the majority of these new acres had not been 
in the program long enough to qualify under these new rules. 
Eligibility for participation in the cotton program would be reduced 
nationally by 30 percent, and in Alabama, 38 percent of cotton farmers 
would be excluded. Furthermore, Buck Johnson, director of the Federal 
Farm Service agency of Georgia, estimated that the Senate's version of 
the reconciliation bill would put 30 percent of older farmers in the 
South out of business.
  In response to being closed out from the historically bipartisan task 
of writing farm legislation, and seeing the unacceptable changes to the 
peanut program, Representative Charlie Rose and I introduced a no-net-
cost peanut program bill in an effort to preserve a viable program for 
peanut farmers. It would achieve savings by eliminating the standing 
1.35-million-ton floor for the national poundage quota; in fact, the 
Heflin-Rose peanuts program would have saved $43 million more than the 
Republican plan contained in the reconciliation bill. Under our no-net-
cost bill, the Agriculture Secretary would set this national poundage 
quota, thereby eliminating undermarketings and limiting disaster 
transfer payments. By contrast, the Republican plan would reduce the 
support price and freeze it for 7 years. The USDA estimated that the 
Republican plan would immediately reduce peanut farmers' income by 30 
percent. Not only did it cost more, the Republican plan slashed a 
peanut farmer's income by $68 per ton. A study by Auburn University on 
the impact of potential policy changes in the peanut program found that 
a reduction in the support price to $610 per ton, and a reduction in 
the national poundage quota to 1.1 million tons, would result in a 
negative impact of $219 million and a loss of almost 3,000 jobs in 
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. The economic impact and job losses are 
not limited solely to peanut producers. Under this analysis, the 
wholesale and retail trade, service industries, real estate and 
financial sectors are especially hard hit. In fact, nationwide, the 
study indicated total job losses of 5,440 and a negative economic 
impact of $375 million.

  The cotton program in the Republican proposal, too, made no sense. 
Under its provisions, cotton farmers would no longer be paid for the 
cotton they produced. Instead, they would sign a production flexibility 
contract which would subsidize a farmer, whether or not he produces a 
crop. These decoupled payments would apply to cotton, rice, wheat, 
corn, and feed grain producers, and they would actually encourage a 
wheat or corn grower to plant cotton if the world price were high 
enough to justify the switch. The Republican bill provided for 7 years 
of narcotic welfare payments designed to bring about the corporate 
takeover of agrarian America. This Republican

[[Page S12429]]

proposal would have undermined everything accomplished with respect to 
farm legislation; it would have eliminated the farmer safety net and 
disrupted the delicate balance of supply-price stability taken for 
granted by consumers.
  I commend the President for vetoing this bill. It would have created 
a welfare state. the Republicans claimed that they could lower interest 
rates by balancing the budget, but ironically, their farm bill raised 
interest rates solely on CCC borrowers. They also claimed that they 
wanted farm programs to be more market oriented, but it removed the 8-
month-loan extension for cotton. Further, their failure to pass 
legislation left farmers with no clear direction for the upcoming 
planting season, and, therefore, banks would not give farmers loans for 
this year's crops.
  At the end of last year, Representative Rose and I introduced another 
no-net-cost peanut program that would be funded by an assessment on 
imported peanuts and revenue from NAFTA and GATT. This bill would have 
maintained the $678-per-pound-quota rate. It would also assure that 
revenue from NAFTA and GATT would pay for the program rather than 
reducing farm income. Last, the bill would require that imported 
peanuts meet the same high quality standards as domestic peanuts, 
ensuring that they were not grown with chemicals and pesticides banned 
in the United States.
  Clearly, the Congress had failed rural America by not passing a farm 
bill. By including, historically, stand-alone-farm legislation in the 
broad Republican proposal to balance the budget, farmers and rural 
America became hostage to a myriad of issues culminating with a 
Presidential veto. As a result, farmers were left without congressional 
direction for the upcoming planting season and were anxiously awaiting 
a new farm law. This necessity had become most pressing at the 
beginning of this year. Without a farm bill, the Agriculture Secretary 
would be forced to implement the 1949 Agriculture Act. That law 
provided a formula based on parity with the standard of living in 1949. 
The difference in the value of the dollar and the standard of living 
between 1949 and 1996 would create an explosion in the price of food.

  But fearful of efforts to resurrect the freedom-to-farm bill, I 
pointed out that its provisions to guarantee payments to farmers 
whether they produced a crop or not was fundamentally flawed. In times 
of high market prices, the program would provide a bonus check, and it 
would not be sufficient in times of low market prices. It is 
unconscionable to make these kinds of payments in times of high market 
prices, especially when we are reducing school lunches and other 
essential programs.
  Ultimately, the Senate passed a modified version of the farm 
provisions that had been contained in the Republican reconciliation 
bill. I voted for it, because we were able to make marginal 
improvements in the bill and, therefore, I felt that the good 
outweighed the bad. Most importantly, the Senate version of this bill 
reinstated permanent law. By doing so, the inclusion of permanent law 
ensures that Congress must again address farm laws rather than simply 
allowing them to expire. Republican lawmakers had intended the 
decoupled, fixed-but-declining payments to farmers to be the price paid 
for eliminating farm programs. Congressional Democrats, on the other 
hand, believed that a stable and abundant food supply to be in the 
national interest and, therefore, refused to turn our back on American 
farmers. The inclusion of permanent law was an enormous victory for 
Democrats thus ensuring our commitment to farming families and the role 
they play in our society.
  Additionally, I was able to beat, soundly, efforts by a freshman 
Senator to kill the peanut program and to keep a 5-percent penalty for 
the use of the loan program out of the bill. Opponents of the peanut 
program had conspired to include this last provision to penalize 
producers who put their peanuts into the loan. The provision was 
removed from consideration due to my strong objections.
  During conference, the committee fought off a number of detrimental 
peanut provisions. I successfully fought off a House provision to lower 
the loan rate another 5 percent if a producer put his peanuts under 
loan. If this language had passed the rate would have dropped to 
$579.50 per ton; we worked to maintain it at $610. I also fought off 
another House provision to allow unlimited cross-county sale of 
peanuts. Instead, the committee adopted a compromise to allow 40 
percent transfers after 5 years. Under the House-passed version, 
producers would have to pay an additional assessment to cover program 
costs if any at the end of the year. Further, the shellers' assessment 
had been exempted by House Republicans from offsetting program costs 
even though they benefit from the program. However, we were able to 
arrange this so the shellers' assessment will also go to offsetting the 
costs, which will protect the producers from having an unlimited 
possibility for increased assessments. As far as the pool compliance 
language is concerned, the House bill would exempt the profits from 
additional peanuts from going to cover peanut program losses. This was 
changed to the Senate version that would permit additional gains from 
buyback and redemption to be used to offset program costs. This change 
would also reduce the possibility of the need for increased assessments 
on producers.

  Problems with the overall farm bill included: It did not provide a 
safety net for farmers and it made payments regardless of price, but it 
did give farmers something to work with as they prepare for planting 
season; the peanut language would cut farmers' income; but cotton came 
out fairly well, specifically preserving the marketing loan, and back 
payments would come soon, which would help weather-damaged cotton 
farmers.
  Administration: In the early 1980's, the greatest problem facing 
farmers was the 20-percent or higher interest rates. Most farmers who 
borrowed money to finance their crops in 1980 borrowed the money when 
interest rates were already high, then they lost money because of the 
drought. I arranged meetings with Reagan's Agriculture Secretary Block 
to impress this point upon him.
  During 1982, I fought the Reagan administration's plan to subject 
agriculture to FTC control in the Commerce Committee. American farmers 
were having a tough enough time making ends meet without having to deal 
with yet another layer of bureaucrats in Washington, DC, meddling in 
their affairs.
  I strongly supported the recent reorganization of the USDA. During 
1994, the Agriculture Committee considered a bill to facilitate the 
reorganization. The bill would reform the administrative functions, and 
reassign sub-Cabinet officers by mission, reduce the number of agencies 
from 43 to 29, and it would consolidate country offices in favor of 
one-stop shopping centers. Through this effort, the USDA hoped to 
reduce staff and cut costs. Although much of this reorganization could, 
and did, take place on the regulatory level, the committee wanted to be 
certain to work out any legislation that might become necessary. Given 
concerns about the deficit, the time had clearly come to reduce the 
size and cost of the USDA in favor of a more efficient department. In 
the final days of the 103d Congress, a USDA reorganization bill was 
passed creating a more streamlined and efficient Department of 
Agriculture.
  Disaster aid/crop insurance: I have always done my best to pay 
attention to the needs of farmers in times of natural disasters in 
Alabama. In 1979, we had a drought and Hurricane Frederick. In 1980, we 
had an even worse drought. In 1982, interest rates forced me to request 
Agriculture Secretary Block to initiate the Economic Emergency Loan 
Program. The same year, I urged Block to change a FmHA regulation 
requiring the rescheduling of loan at the cripplingly high rates of the 
day. I testified before the Forestry Subcommittee to warn of the impact 
of these rates. In 1982, I also fought to save the NWS agriculture 
program during Commerce Committee action. The farm weather forecasting 
service saved American farmers more than $750 million each year in the 
production costs of the major agricultural commodities of cotton, corn, 
soybeans, livestock, wheat, and rice, but it only cost $1.2 million. 
The committee approved a bill I cosponsored to combat these high 
interest rates on farms. The bill would extend the economic emergency 
loan

[[Page S12430]]

program for a year and create an individual evaluation program to 
reschedule existing FmHA loans at their original interest rates, rather 
than the high rates of 1982. I also called a farm crisis meeting in 
Montgomery to discuss interest rates and other problems facing the 
State's farmers. In 1983, the FmHA ran out of money to pay for its 
operating loans in 17 States, including Alabama. I urged the USDA to 
reallocate the money, threatening legislative action, the USDA 
complied. Spring freezes also plagued farmers in 1983. Near the year's 
end, I sponsored a measure to disregard payment-in-kind acreage in 
eligibility determination for natural disaster emergency loans. The 
existing program required that a farmer suffer a 30-percent loss to be 
eligible. However, payment-in-kind acreage would not count in these 
estimates, so they were frequently inaccurate. In 1984, the Senate 
passed a bill I cosponsored to establish a 15-member special task force 
on agricultural credit to ensure its availability at reasonable 
interest rates. I noted a survey of bankers, many of whom believed that 
farmers would default on their loans. Further, 100,000 farmers would be 
forced out of business that year, and the statistics indicated that 
half of family farmers would disappear in less than a generation. In 
1985, I emphasized the farm credit crisis in the country, with a farm 
debt the size of the Federal deficit; the FmHA had not acted to combat 
the problem--it had $630 million available for Federal loan guarantees 
but used only $25 million. That same year, I met with Willie Nelson to 
advise him on how to distribute the proceeds from FarmAid. We had 
another drought in 1986, which spurred me to begin hearings to 
investigate drought cycles in the South and possible ways to handle 
them.

  In 1987, I introduced a bill to save the farm credit system. It would 
have authorized bonds and the restructuring of the system, including a 
cooling-off period before mergers went into effect. It would protect 
important farmers' stockholdings in the system and establish an 
assistance board to financial institutions providing farm loans. I 
introduced another amendment to protect advanced payment for prepayment 
accounts held by Federal land banks, part of the farm credit system. 
The amendment would simply have required that money deposited into 
these advanced payment accounts would immediately, prior to the capital 
depletion or insolvency of a Federal land bank, be applied as payment 
against the borrower's loan.
  Alabama suffered another drought in 1988. I introduced a drought 
assistance bill to mandate emergency aid from the Secretary of 
Agriculture. The bill also included a private water project. It would 
have created water cooperatives financed by loans or bonds to transport 
water for irrigation. When conferees finished their report, I 
criticized their changes to the feed and livestock provisions, but I 
was pleased that the House had not weakened the peanut provisions.

  In 1989, I pushed the Air Force to track hurricanes in the gulf and 
Pacific coast States; Hurricane Frederick in 1979, for example, had 
caused relatively little property damage and loss of life because of 
advanced warnings. The Air Force agreed to retain the WC-130 program.
  In August of that year, the Senate approved the Rural Partnership Act 
of 1989. The bill strengthened Federal support of State and regional 
economic programs, or rural electric cooperatives, and of land grant 
university research and extension programs. It was only a modest 
beginning, but it might be a great help to rural communities.
  That same month, the Senate also approved a disaster relief bill. 
Alabama had another drought in 1990. And we had an unusually rainy 
spring in 1991. With Senator Cochran, I introduced legislation that 
year to force the President to provide emergency funding. The USDA had 
made money available through FmHA loans, but the President had not 
delivered it according to his authority provided by a 1991 supplemental 
appropriations bill. In the fall of that year, I supported the passage 
of a bill to provide aid through FEMA. This bill included language 
practically identical to language I introduced during the 1990 farm 
bill debate to make 65-percent payments to farmers who had suffered 35 
percent or more in losses. After continued contacts with the President, 
he finally released the disaster money in 1992.
  Winter storms and flooding, as well as a number of tornadoes, plagued 
the State in 1994. Tropical storm Alberto also caused a great deal of 
flooding that year. I also pushed the disaster assistance amendment to 
include funding for flood victims in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida in 
the fiscal 1995 agriculture appropriations. I also pushed a bill I 
sponsored to authorize funding for flood relief through the Agriculture 
Committee. The Senate passed this measure unanimously. In fact, the 
vote on flood relief compelled me to miss my chance to act as the 
President's personal representative on the 50th anniversary of the 
liberation of Guam; I had served as Marine lieutenant and I was one of 
the first on the beaches. In 1995, I asked the USDA to extend the 
Federal crop insurance deadline; there were a number of farmers who had 
not applied. The USDA established this deadline under the previous 
year's crop insurance bill, but it would not help any farmers who had 
not applied; they would no longer be eligible for disaster payments. 
With the passage of Federal crop insurance reform late in 1994, the 
program signaled a break from the routine of passing disaster bills. 
With this new program and approach, I knew there would be a period of 
adjustment. I believed that it was a reasonable request given that 
Congress had only months before passed the crop insurance reform and 
USDA had not fully implemented the program while expecting farmers to 
educate themselves and embrace the reforms in a very short period of 
time. The least that could be done was extend the crop insurance sign 
up deadline and allow farmers adequate time to inform themselves of 
these significant changes regarding disaster assistance.

  Hurricanes Erin and Opal passed through Alabama in 1995. I 
cosponsored a Cochran bill to authorize the Agriculture Secretary to 
provide supplemental crop disaster assistance in addition to benefits 
provided by the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994. Cotton producers had 
been plagued by a severe drought and worm infestations during the 1995 
crop. This was particularly disappointing due to the fact that 1994 was 
a record year for the U.S. cotton crop. Expectations were high for 1995 
and nationwide plantings were up by as much as 20 percent in some 
States. While the drought contributed a great deal to the 1995 cotton 
disaster, the insect infestations were particularly devastating. The 
insect situation was so bad that the EPA authorized the temporary use 
of the insecticide Pirate to fight the tobacco budworm and beet army 
worm.
  The final blow to cotton farmers was Hurricane Opal. After already 
experiencing terrible growing conditions in 1995, just prior to 
harvesting what cotton that was left, Opal took care of the cotton that 
the drought and insects had not.
  Hurricane Opal was a devastating storm, not only for its timing 
regarding cotton farmers, but for all Alabamians in southeast Alabama. 
Opal caught a great deal of structural damage and produced a large 
amount of debris. Fortunately, we were able to successfully petition 
the USDA for assistance under the Emergency Conservation Program [ECP]. 
Under the ECP, Alabamians received approximately $5 million in 
assistance for debris removal and structural repair.
  In an effort to address the problem of annual disaster assistance 
bills, and provide a model for crop insurance reform, in 1993 I began 
meeting with grower groups to hear their ideas on an effective system 
of crop insurance. In this endeavor, the National Cotton Council was 
particularly helpful.
  The message from farmers was that the cost of production was 
continuing to rise, cotton prices were declining or flat at best, and 
disaster assistance was triggered only by production or yield losses.
  As a result of these roundtable meetings, I introduced the Farmers' 
Risk Management Act of 1994. This legislation called on the Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation to offer producers the option of a cost-of-
production system which would be based upon each individual producer's 
actual cost of production. This bill would have also allowed a producer 
to choose between using his actual yields and his farm program yields 
in determining his crop insurance yields.

[[Page S12431]]

  Many of the ideas put forth in this legislation were rolled into the 
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994. As a matter of fact, the 
Heflin proposal on a cost-of-production system was used to design an 
income-protection pilot program that is being implemented this year.
  This new approach will cover farmers when gross income falls below 
established limits. This pilot program creates a system that would 
guard against yield losses and low harvest prices.
  The implementation of this pilot program could not have come at a 
more important time. This first year's experience with the catastrophic 
coverage under the new crop insurance reforms has proven to be 
inadequate. More importantly, though, after the 1996 farm bill and its 
uncertain future effects on American farmers, we find ourselves faced 
with the possible phase-out of farm programs. It is, therefore, 
absolutely essential that we have a reliable crop insurance plan that 
will provide some type of safety net for producers. The significance of 
this new approach is that it addresses fluctuations in price, where the 
current crop insurance program only takes into account losses from 
reduced yields.
  I am proud of these efforts made on behalf of trying to forge a new 
and more effective direction in regard to crop insurance. It is my hope 
that this pilot program will grown and be implemented on a national 
level.
  In 1984, Senator Hollings and I introduced a bill to create a 
national storm-scale operational and research meteorology [STORM] 
program to update the country's extreme weather prediction systems. 
With this bill, we sought to emphasize the transition from the old 
radar systems to the implementation of the new NEXRAD system. This bill 
passed the Senate, but it died in the House. Senator Hollings and I 
reintroduced this bill in 1986 after NASA lost a weather satellite. Our 
resolution would also have urged the administration to launch another 
GOES satellite and increase weather reconnaissance flights in the 
interim. The Commerce Committee passed this resolution in June.
  In 1990, the battle to preserve Huntsville's weather station began; 
the NWS had proposed dropping the weather station serving northern 
Alabama in the implementation of its NEXRAD system. That year, I met 
with the Deputy Director of the NWS to urge him to consider 
Huntsville's proposal to donate a weather radar system. I continued 
this fight in 1994, making certain to be continually in contact with 
the NWS and the NOAA to advocate maintenance of the Huntsville 
facility. In 1994, I also contacted the Vice President to solicit his 
help in the continuation of the Huntsville National Weather Service 
Radar. I told him that I believed eliminating the station under NEXRAD 
would leave northern Alabama and southern Tennessee in a vulnerable 
position. That same year, I extracted promises from the Director of the 
NWS, Dr. Elbert Friday, to push back closing of this doppler radar 
station. I also introduced the Weather Service Modernization Review Act 
of 1994 to require a study on the potential impact of closing weather 
stations. The Vice President ordered the study by the National Research 
Council. This study revealed that the Huntsville area would, in fact, 
suffer from the lack of its own NEXRAD station. In 1995, I cited this 
study, and contacted the committee chairmen who oversaw the NOAA and 
the NWS: Gramm, Pressler, and Hollings. The Commerce Committee approved 
an amendment to the Weather Service authorization to make it more 
difficult to close 32 weather stations, including the Huntsville 
station. I also contacted the Secretary of Commerce to advocate a new 
station in the Huntsville area; he promised to install a center in 
northern Alabama. After his death this year, the NWS announced that it 
would honor its commitment to install that center.

  After a number of tornadoes in northeast Alabama in 1994, the USDA 
and I jointly announced that the NWS' All Hazard Weather Radio Network 
would put up a station to provide early warnings in the area. I had 
toured this area, including Goshen and its United Methodist Church--
which had been destroyed by the storm--with Vice President Gore, where 
I solicited his support to deal with such problems in the future. 
However, I was concerned about the performance of early warning systems 
in the State after more tornadoes hit Arab and Joppa the next year.
  In 1995, I supported a Cochran amendment to the Commerce, Justice, 
State appropriations bill to restore funding for the agricultural 
weather service centers at Stoneville, MS, and in Auburn. Weather is 
the single most important external element in the production equation. 
But this year, as the deadline for these centers' cutoff approached, I 
met with NWS officials to discuss forecasts in the future. With 
Representative Browder, I pushed for continuation of these ag forecasts 
by transferring the NWS over to the USDA. Despite Senator Cochran's 
support, who realized the importance of specialized ag weather 
forecasts, the Republican agenda of the 104th Congress called for 
downsizing the Federal Government and this vital service fell prey to 
privatization.


                                Research

  An action I am most proud of in the field of research is the passage 
of a bill that I authorized making it a Federal crime to vandalize, 
destroy or make unauthorized use of animal research facilities, 
including data, equipment and the animals themselves. The Animal 
Research Facilities Protection Act, which was signed into law as the 
Animal Enterprise Act would impose severe penalties on individuals or 
groups who interfered with medical and other research facilities where 
animals are use.
  Unfortunately, some groups are so opposed to the use of animals in 
this essential research that they set fire to research facilities or 
break into laboratories to steal animals and destroy equipment, records 
and research data. The real price of these types of crimes are paid by 
all those who are waiting for cures and treatments for their 
afflictions. Research into Alzheimer's disease, cancer, AIDS, substance 
addiction and mental health were at stake here.
  Public interest in animal welfare should be encouraged. Research 
utilizing laboratory animals has led to many of medical history's most 
significant breakthroughs. These animals are used only when necessary 
and should be housed, handled and treated humanely. Those who disagree 
with the responsible use of animals in research do not have the right 
to take the law into their own hands.
  While a few States have already enacted laws increasing penalties for 
crimes against research facilities, I felt it was necessary to 
establish protections on the Federal level.


                                Tuskegee

  In 1862, the U.S. Congress passed the first Morrill Act which 
provided for the establishment of land-grant institutions in the 
Southern and border States. These institutions were designed to educate 
citizens in the field of agriculture, home economics, the mechanic arts 
and other practical skills. Since the Southern States were 
uncooperative in funding historically African-American institutions 
under this law, Congress passed a second Morrill Act in 1890, creating 
the 1890 land-grant institutions.
  Alabama has two 1890 land-grant institutions, the Tuskegee Institute 
and Alabama A&M. Tuskegee was created by an act of the Alabama 
Legislature and granted land by the U.S. Congress.
  Although the 1890 institutions were chartered more than 100 years 
ago, a stream of ``hard'' money for research was not created until 
fiscal year 1967. The Tuskegee Institute was not officially a land-
grant college, but in 1980, I was able to have the Tuskegee Institute 
added to the permanent list of 1890 institutions and ensure there would 
be a continuous stream of Federal research funds. Further, Congress 
created the Chappie James Center at Tuskegee with the 1890 
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965, and it ensured 
funding for each of these institutions with the 1981 farm bill.


                                 Auburn

  I have worked closely with Alabama's 1862 land-grant institution, 
Auburn University, over the years and the 104th Congress was no 
exception. I was especially successful in completing, or continuing, 
funding for several very important research initiatives through the 
college of agriculture and the Alabama Agriculture Experiment Station 
in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture.
  Funding for the completion of the new poultry science facility at 
Auburn

[[Page S12432]]

was achieved in the fiscal year 1997 agriculture appropriations bill. 
This $12 million facility will provide a state of the art facility for 
essential research into one of the most important agriculture sectors 
in Alabama, the poultry industry.
  I was also successful in securing funds for continued water quality 
research conducted at the Alabama Agriculture Experiment Station. The 
research involves a team effort by scientists at Auburn and other land-
grant universities, the CSREES, the TVA, State and private agencies, 
and most importantly, the producers. New technology is implemented 
immediately, which enhances the development and growth of agricultural 
industries. The water quality research also addresses problems that 
confront rural development and the sustainability of agricultural 
enterprises. Most importantly, though, this research is responsible for 
developing and implementing water and crop management practices that 
both enhance agriculture production and protect and preserve an 
important natural resource--water.
  One specific example of this is the irrigation project being 
conducted at the experiment substation in Bell Mina, AL. Increased 
demand for irrigation water in the southwestern United States is 
causing increased stress on many streams where farmers are pumping 
directly from the stream. As a possible method to decrease this demand 
during periods of low stream flow and to make more water available for 
irrigation, a study was initiated to evaluate the feasibility of 
pumping during high stream flows to off-stream storage sites. These 
sites could be on-farm or farmer-shared reservoirs. The irrigation 
reservoir at Bell Mina has been completed and the early results appear 
promising.
  The National Soil Dynamics Laboratory at Auburn conducts research 
designed to solve soil management problems. Developing effective 
methods of managing soil to maintain its quality, and to improve the 
quality and productivity of degraded soil, requires a multidisciplinary 
program. One component of this research being conducted at the soil 
laboratory is the agronomic portion. House appropriators eliminated 
funding for this component in their agriculture appropriations bill. 
Fortunately, I was able to have this funding restored in the Senate 
bill. The agronomic portion of the multidisciplinary program at the 
soil lab is vital because it is the very portion that facilitates the 
technology transfer from the lab to the field.


                                  TVA

  I fought for continuation of TVA's National Fertilizer and 
Environmental Research Center after the Clinton administration had 
targeted it for elimination. The administration argued that this 
research should be conducted privately. But I contacted the VP and the 
Budget Director, and it was simply a matter of explaining that NFERC 
was an up-and-running research center that was already accomplishing 
many of the environmental goals set by the administration. Once this 
was laid out for them, they saw that it made no sense to kill a working 
program in order to create new programs with similar goals.
  I also introduced a bill to transfer aquaculture from the Interior 
Department to the USDA. This was a long-overdue streaming measure that 
will greatly improve the overall efficiency and timeliness of 
aquaculture research. Specifically, it saved the Southeastern Fish 
Cultural Laboratory in Marion by moving it from Interior to the USDA. 
It was adopted in the most recent farm bill. The U.S. aquaculture 
industry has grown more than 15 percent annually since 1980. As a 
result, aquaculture has emerged as a solid alternative for farmers and 
allowed them to diversity. In fact, aquaculture is of vital importance 
to the economy of west Alabama. Over 20 percent of the area's 
population is employed directly in the production or the processing of 
catfish.


                             Rural Electric

  While commodity programs seem to dominate agriculture policy, rural 
development policy is an area that I have paid special attention to. 
This is particularly true with regard to rural electrification.
  Most recently I authored the Rural Electrification Loan Restructuring 
Act of 1993 which was signed into law on November 1, 1993, as Public 
Law 103-129.
  This legislation eliminated the authority of the REA Administrator to 
make 2 percent loans, established criteria for a REA electric 
distribution borrower can qualify for a 5 percent loan, and authorized 
the Administrator to make loans at the municipal cost of capital. This 
legislation also addressed high density cooperatives, rural development 
eligibility, and private capital requirements among other things.
  In the 1996 farm bill, I was instrumental in securing additional loan 
restructuring authority for the Secretary of Agriculture regarding 
rural electric loans. We are currently working with the USDA to 
promulgate regulations that will provide the Secretary with sufficient 
flexibility to carry out the intention of Congress.
  As part of the Republican plan to balance the budget, Republicans 
proposed selling off the Power Marketing Administrations, which provide 
electricity to regional distribution cooperatives. The primary concern 
with this proposal was that PMA ``purchasers'' would have to increase 
the price at which they made electric power available in order to 
recover their purchasing costs. I believed strongly that this would 
ultimately translate into higher utility costs for end-users of rural 
electric cooperatives.
  With this issue being debated in the Energy Committee, when a seat on 
the committee became available, I returned to the Energy Committee and 
assisted in preventing this proposal from being made a part of the 
Republican reconciliation bill.


                                 Trade

  In 1981, I applauded the President's decision to lift the Soviet 
grain embargo. I did believe that the United States needed to take 
action against the Soviets for invading Afghanistan. However, it is 
most regrettable that the farmers of the United States have had to bear 
the cost of this foreign policy instrument alone. For that reason, in 
1982, I urged the President to develop a long-term, Soviet grain 
agreement. I advocated ending grain embargoes and working to expand 
export markets, including multiple year extensions of trade agreements. 
A 1-year extension has the effect of a defacto embargo because it keeps 
the specter of an embargo looming over the whole grain growing and 
exporting industry. The mere threat of an embargo keeps grain prices 
depressed and plays havoc with the entire farm economy. In 1983, after 
the downing of the Korean jetliner attack, I feared that the President 
would impose another embargo on the Soviets, so I introduced a bill to 
create a state undersecretary for agricultural affairs. It seemed that 
increasingly our agricultural policy is being set by officials of the 
State Department as they respond to international events. In 1984, the 
Senate passed a bill I cosponsored to require congressional approval of 
trade embargoes. It would require that both Houses approve an embargo 
within 60 days and review it every 6 months. There was no doubt that 
past embargoes, and the threat of new embargoes, significantly 
contributed to the erosion of U.S. export dominance and the resulting 
decline in farm income.
  In 1983, when the President was preparing to visit Japan, I sponsored 
a sense-of-the-Senate resolution to urge that United States negotiators 
should insist that Japan dismantle all of its barriers on imported 
beef. This resolution passed. I urged the passage of a similar 
resolution in 1984. In 1988, the beef agreement with Japan expired, and 
negotiations stalled.
  Then an unusual series of events occurred. The Japanese Ambassador 
asked me in my capacity as chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts of 
the Judicial Committee to pass a courts bill allowing the use of 
Japanese language interpreters in Federal court cases. We succeeded in 
getting the necessary legislation approved. The Ambassador thanked me 
and then asked me if there was anything he could do for me. I replied I 
would like to meet with the Japanese Minister of Agriculture, trade 
representatives, and two members of the Diet. I was able to bring 
representatives of the National Cattlemen's Association to the meeting. 
We had a very frank discussion and reported the progress to the U.S. 
trade representatives. Fortunately, a few

[[Page S12433]]

days later a very favorable trade arrangement was worked out and 
American beef was allowed to be exported to Japan in far greater 
numbers than before. The arrangement further eliminated the quotas 
after 3 years, at which time the Japanese could impose tariffs if beef 
passed trigger levels.
  I have been concerned about poultry exports for some time. In 1983, I 
wrote to the trade representative to urge him to address Brazil's 
increase in poultry exports. From 1976 to 1980, the U.S. share dropped 
from 20 percent to almost nothing. Since Brock did not act, several 
other Senators and I contacted the President directly, noting that the 
U.S. share of the world poultry market had fallen from 97 percent to 13 
percent over 20 years. To address these concerns, I attached a poultry 
export marketing program to the Agriculture Committee's payment-in-kind 
bill. This bill was designed to open new markets and recapture old 
ones.
  In 1984, I joined several other Senators to urge the President to 
negotiate with the Canadian Prime Minister to address hog trade. 
Legislation was before the Congress to impose duties, we informed the 
CPM, and their exports to the United States had risen 10 times. In 
1985, I pressed this point again. Disputes with Brazil over poultry, 
China over cotton, and Australia over beef, combined with this trade 
imbalance had clearly demonstrated that the United States needed to put 
an end to the use of unfair subsidized competition and to recoup its 
fair share of world export trade. I was pleased that the Commerce 
Department acted to impose duties on Canadian pork. I also wrote to the 
Trade Representative in 1994 to urge him to seek Canadian compliance 
with the terms of NAFTA. I also joined Representative Rose to urge an 
ITC investigation of dumping of Canadian peanut paste in the United 
States.

  When the United States began to consider food aid to the Soviet Union 
in 1990, I encouraged the USDA to aid that country by developing food 
distribution practices rather than simply granting money. The precedent 
for such aid was the food for progress program created in the 1985 farm 
bill and successfully implemented in the Uruguay round. But as the 
situation became more severe in the Soviet Union, I urged the 
Agriculture Secretary to provide emergency, ready-to-cook provisions. 
People were in desperate need of immediate help, and raw commodities 
like grain would not be as helpful. I did, however, remind the 
Secretary that the aid would need to be provided as a credit, not a 
grant. I also urged the Agriculture Secretary not to abandon United 
States textile bags in this Food for Peace Program; that decision would 
have resulted in the loss of American jobs in favor of Chinese slave 
labor. I also advocated sending peanut butter and other peanut products 
to Russia, which was looking for a cheap meat substitute.
  This year, I urged the President to resolve the trade dispute with 
the Russians when they announced that they would no longer import 
United States poultry. The Russians had refused to recognize the United 
States system of poultry inspection. Along with several of my 
colleagues, we urged President Clinton to carry this issue to the 
highest levels of the Russian Government. While in Russia, Vice 
President Gore and Secretary Glickman raised this issue and soon 
afterward, an agreement was reached. The poultry industry is extremely 
important to the economy of Alabama. It accounts for 54 percent of all 
farm income in the State and 75 percent of farm exports.
  In conjunction with other Senators from poultry producing States, in 
the 104th Congress we also had to fight barriers to interstate free 
trade. The current regulation regarding the labeling of ``fresh'' 
poultry states that poultry preserved above zero degrees fahrenheit 
shall be labeled fresh, and poultry below zero degrees, the point at 
which animal flesh freezes, shall be labeled frozen.
  The USDA, on behalf of California poultry producers, promulgated 
regulations to raise the benchmark for fresh to 26 degrees based on the 
premise of consumer claims that the current regulations for poultry 
labeling was misleading.
  We were able to demonstrate, however, that this was actually an 
effort by the California poultry industry to erect a barrier to 
shipments of poultry from historic poultry producing regions, 
specifically the Southeast. I obtained a copy of a report by the 
California Poultry Working Group, an industry panel designed to study 
and make recommendations on the California poultry industry, that 
stated in its findings that the single, most significant barrier to 
industry growth was the high cost of poultry production in California. 
On the other hand, poultry producers in the Southeast are able to 
produce broilers and ship them to other parts of the country at a 
profit.
  With Senator Cochran's leadership, we were able to block the 
implementation of this new regulation in the fiscal year 1996 
agriculture appropriations bill. During negotiations on the fiscal year 
1997 agriculture appropriations bill a compromise was agreed to. 
Ironically, the compromise was essentially the same proposal that I put 
forward a year earlier. Nevertheless, it was a deal that Southeast 
poultry producers could live with.


                               Conclusion

  In addition to rewriting farm policy, the 104th Congress made 
substantial progress in other areas under the agricultural policy 
umbrella. Earlier this year, the Congress passed and the President 
signed H.R. 2029, the Farm Credit System Reform Act of 1996. This 
important legislation brought a degree of regulatory reform to the Farm 
Credit System Banks while also addressing needed charges in Farmer Mac 
and resolving the FAC debt issue.
  Of major significance, Congress finally broke the logjam that had 
lasted for nearly 2 decades and passed legislation to rewrite Federal 
pesticide laws, bringing about much needed reform of the outdated 
Delaney clause.
  The Food Quality Protection Act, H.R. 1627, received unanimous 
support once all the pieces of the puzzle were put into place. 
Traditionally, the battleground between industry and environmental 
supporters, the urgency to resolve pesticide legislation was created by 
court rulings that would have ordered the EPA to begin canceling the 
use of some common chemicals.
  The bill as signed into law will revise pesticide registration under 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, 
speeding up some EPA registration procedures. The bill also recognizes 
separate registration procedures for minor use chemicals, and under 
legislation I coauthored, antimicrobials, or common household and 
industrial chemical cleansers.
  Most importantly, this legislation reformed the notorious Delaney 
clause of the 1958 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which barred 
processed food from containing even minute amounts of cancer-causing 
chemicals. The hard-fought compromise of the Delaney reform will impose 
a safety standard to ensure that pesticide residues on both raw and 
processed food pose no reasonable risk of harm. This standard 
essentially means that there will likely be no more than a one-in-a-
million chance that a residue would cause cancer. The old standard was 
completely outdated, given modern technology, that prevented some 
chemicals from being used that actually reduced the natural level of 
carcinogens in many commodities. This is an important reform and I am 
glad that we were able to achieve this victory this year.

  While there were some victories over the last 2 years, there were 
also some defeats and close calls. I have long been a supporter of 
private property rights legislation. As a matter of fact, the only 
private property bill to pass the Senate in the 103d Congress was the 
Heflin-Dole private property bill. I am sorry to say that the effort to 
pass private property rights legislation failed in this Congress. I 
also regret that attempts to move regulatory reform legislation were 
not successful.
  As I close out my career in the U.S. Senate, I reflect back on all 
that has been accomplished. With regard to agriculture, I am extremely 
pleased and proud of the progress made on behalf of rural America and 
family farms.
  Over the last 18 years, I am proud to say that I have been a part of 
working to ensure that electricity and water and sewer systems were 
extended to areas where they once were not. We have strengthened the 
family farm by providing adequate capital to farms and agribusiness. We 
have passed farm bills that have stabilized the family farm, made the 
American farmer the

[[Page S12434]]

envy of the world and at the same time, protected the environment and 
reduced the deficit. Through the work on the Agriculture Committee we 
have extended technological advancements into rural America through 
telemedicine and distance learning initiatives. Foreign markets for 
U.S. agricultural products have been opened wide and agricultural 
research has led to more efficient farming with breakthroughs such as 
no-till agriculture and precision farming employing satellite imagery.
  While a great deal has been accomplished, I am still concerned about 
what the future may hold. As the American society continues to become 
more urban, fewer and fewer have an appreciation for issues affecting 
rural America. Furthermore, I believe that most take for granted that 
only 3 percent of the American population, in addition to feeding the 
world, provide this country with the highest quality, most abundant and 
affordable food supply of any nation in the world.
  The 1996 farm bill, which is a major departure from traditional farm 
programs, leaves an uneasy feeling for the future. Although it was 
ostensibly designed to bring certainty to farming, I believe the 1996 
farm bill created many potential problems that we may not even be aware 
of for some years to come. Specifically, I believe decoupling payments 
from market prices was a mistake. Only time will tell, but I hope that 
there will be Members of Congress who are sympathetic to the needs of 
rural America should the Freedom to Farm proposal fail.
  I am also concerned about the state of the cotton industry. I have 
been contacted recently by sectors of the industry raising concerns 
about the growing volume of cotton imports into this country. This is 
something that I plan to monitor in the near future. Also, I am curious 
to see the effectiveness of the bioengineered Bt cotton seed. Bt cotton 
was engineered to be resistant to insects. To date, reports indicate a 
great deal of success with this new cotton. I will be curious to review 
results after the current harvest is complete,.
  Farming families and rural communities are the backbone of this great 
Nation. I am proud to have served on their behalf on the Agriculture 
Committee for 18 years. As I return to Alabama and the many farmers in 
northern Alabama, I will continue to meet with, and monitor, the state 
of U.S. agriculture and the proud farmers who produce our food and 
fiber. It is my sincere hope that those who remain in Congress, and 
those to come, will give the proper consideration to rural issues as 
they come before this body.
   Mr. President, back on August 20, 1996, the Alabama Peanut Producers 
held a dinner in my honor. I was very thankful and humbled by their 
outpouring of affection and humor that evening.
  One of the most memorable and humorous speeches was one given by 
Texas Congressman Charlie Stenholm, a long-time friend and colleague. I 
have had the pleasure of working with him over the years on many 
agricultural issues, particularly those relating to the peanut program. 
Should the Democrats regain the House majority this fall, Charlie will 
probably be the Agriculture Committee's new chairman.
  I ask that a copy of Congressman Stenholm's remarks be printed in the 
Record. It gives an entertaining and humorous inside account of some of 
our behind-the-scenes battles on these important issues over the years.
  The material follows:

    Notes for Speech at Senator Howell Heflin Event, August 20, 1996

       Senator Heflin was elected to the United States Senate in 
     1978, and begin serving on the Senate Agriculture Committee 
     just as the committee began work on the 1981 farm bill. 
     Everyone knew the '81 bill would be a challenge, the 
     Republicans had just taken the White House and the Senate. 
     Senator Richard Lugar became the Chairman of the Senate 
     Committee on Agriculture. The Indiana Senator was not known 
     for his support of the peanut program.
       Those present at the time and involved in the development 
     of the farm bill remember that then Freshman Senator Howell 
     Heflin took a particular interest in the peanut program. One 
     producer representative, Larry Meyers, has commented that in 
     his 24 years in Washington, Senator Heflin was the only 
     Senator who, when asked to support the program, made Larry 
     sit at the Senator's desk while he went through the entire 
     bill, discussing even the proper placement of commas and 
     semicolons, to ensure the bill reflected truly what was best 
     for peanut growers.
       That kind of detail and preparation has made Senator Heflin 
     a formidable foe on the Senate floor for those who sought to 
     end the program. A couple of interesting stories came out of 
     that 1985 farm bill period. Early in the farm bill process, 
     another new Senator and now Governor of California Pete 
     Wilson tried to offer a difficult to understand amendment 
     affecting a small crop in California. It was just before 
     lunch, members were anxious to adjourn the meeting and there 
     was little interest in the amendment. When Senator Wilson 
     finished offering his amendment, there was an awkward silence 
     when no one seconded the amendment. Suddenly, just before the 
     Chairman was about to rule the amendment out of order and 
     adjourn the committee for lunch, Senator Heflin suddenly 
     spoke of the amendment's outstanding merit and seconded the 
     motion. With that, the Committee quickly approved the measure 
     and adjourned for lunch.
       Senator Wilson quickly left his seat and came around the 
     table to say thank you to Senator Heflin, who he admitted he 
     really did not know since they were both new to the 
     committee.
       Senator Heflin replied to Senator Wilson with a smile and a 
     wink, ``Senator, we don't grow your California crops in 
     Alabama, but we do grow peanuts!''
       Senator Wilson got the message, and later voted in support 
     of the peanut program.
       At another point about this time, then Secretary of 
     Agriculture came before the Senate agriculture committee to 
     promote a new program called ``P, I, K'' or Payment In Kind. 
     After the Secretary finished testifying in favor the PIK 
     program, Senator Heflin questioned the Secretary with a long 
     inquiry wherein Senator Heflin clearly referred to the 
     program as ``P, I, P'' or as the ``PIP'' program several 
     times.
       In responding to the Senator, Secretary Block first tried 
     to correct Senator Heflin, ``It's the P, I, K program, 
     Senator, PIK!'' Senator Heflin paused for a dramatic moment 
     and replied, ``Oh, I thought you said P, I, P, the Pig in a 
     Poke program.'' The room roared with laughter, and everyone 
     understood Heflin's attitude about the proposed new program.
       On a more serious note, there can be little doubt, that, 
     over the years, Senator Howell Heflin has been ``Mr. Peanut'' 
     in the Senate, and the real reason the program has enjoyed 
     such strong support over the years in the Senate.
       It was not always that way. During the debate on the 1981 
     farm bill when the Senator was still new in the Senate, then 
     Committee Chairman Richard Lugar offered in the Senate a 
     motion that effectively killed the peanut program. In a 
     dramatic, difficult vote, the Senate approved Senator Lugar's 
     motion. There was then a pause in the deliberations when 
     Senator Heflin and Senator Warner of Virginia got all the 
     peanut representatives and farmers that were in Washington 
     for the Farm Bill debate into a room to discuss what to do 
     next. Everyone agreed the peanut acreage allotment program 
     was dead, but if another type of program could be designed 
     in a matter of minutes that would keep peanut farmers in 
     business without allotments, perhaps the Senate could be 
     persuaded to accept some type of new program.
       Mr. Ross Wilson, a strong admirer of Senator Heflin and the 
     manager of the Southwest Peanut Grower's association sat down 
     with the peanut leadership present, and wrote out in longhand 
     on a yellow pad what is essentially the poundage quota 
     program we have today. Senator Heflin and Senator Warner then 
     took that yellow pad to the Senate floor and passed a new 
     peanut program.
       It was a dramatic moment. It meant hundreds, if not 
     thousands of small farmers could stay in business, and it 
     came about because Senator Heflin was willing to stand up 
     with farmers.
       And as a result, you can say Senator Howell Heflin is, 
     ``The Father of the Modern Peanut Program.''
       In the ensuing years, during farm bill debates and even 
     during appropriations considerations, the peanut program has 
     been attacked several times, But each time, we had a peanut 
     leader in the Senate: Senator Howell Heflin would stand and 
     defend the program strongly as he did this year, and each 
     time, those attacking the program suffered defeat and the 
     peanut program continues.
       We owe him a great deal of appreciation.
       Yes, although it can be said Senator Heflin saved the 
     peanut program repeatedly over the years, but in addition, 
     there are several provisions of the peanut program we can 
     look to and know that they developed directly by the 
     Senator: The support price escalator based on the cost of 
     production we enjoyed since 1985 until this year; the 
     three marketing associations being written clearly into 
     the law; and dozens of smaller provisions that have made 
     the program work more efficiently and at lower cost to the 
     government.
       In addition, and perhaps most significant, and something I 
     have personally witnessed, has been Senator Heflin's work in 
     Conference.
       After the House and Senate pass a bill, there are almost 
     always differences that must be resolved in what we call a 
     ``Conference''; a meeting of members to iron out the 
     differences and come up with language both Houses will 
     approve.
       This is where Senator Howell Heflin has been of most value 
     to this industry, particularly this year when we had to make 
     the most of a bad situation.

[[Page S12435]]

       Charlie Rose and I always knew, if we lost an important 
     provision, Senator Heflin would put it back in, or if we 
     could get a new provision, Senator Heflin could keep it in 
     when the bill came to conference.
       This year it was particularly true when you can credit 
     Senator Heflin with killing the 5-percent penalty for loan 
     peanuts which would have hurt every peanut farmer in this 
     country.
       It was fun to watch: When the debate got heated, if you saw 
     Senator Heflin lean back in this chair, slowly push the 
     plastic back on his cigar and begin to chew, you knew he was 
     thinking and was about to close in for the kill--this year on 
     the Republican Leadership that was seeking to decimate the 
     program.
       I know you are not fully happy with the program the way it 
     turned out in the end, but we got one. And the challenge can 
     be summed up with the remark that Senator Richard Lugar was 
     heard to make after the farm bill conference: ``In looking at 
     this language, I can see that once again, Senator Howell 
     Heflin has prevailed over those of us who sought to end the 
     peanut program.''
       Senator Heflin, that is a fitting tribute.
       Congratulations, and thank you.

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