Congressional Record, Volume 142 Issue 143 (Monday, October 21, 1996)

[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 143 (Monday, October 21, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12411-S12418]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page S12411]]

FOLLOWING UP ON THE HALPERIN NOMINATION

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, in 1993, the Senate Armed Services
Committee conducted an extensive review of the nomination of Morton
Halperin to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and
Peacekeeping. The committee held an open hearing on November 19, 1993,
where Mr. Halperin appeared to answer questions regarding his
qualifications, background, and activities. Subsequently, however, his
nomination was withdrawn by the President.
At that hearing, Mr. Halperin directly refuted certain information
provided to the committee by Mr. Frank McNamara regarding Mr.
Halperin's nomination. Inasmuch as Mr. McNamara was not present at the
hearing and did not have an opportunity to testify before the
committee, he was unable to defend his position regarding the
nomination.
Mr. President, I therefore ask that the following statement of Mr.
McNamara, fully setting forth his views on Mr. Halperin's nomination,
be inserted in the Record at this point for the information of
Senators.
The statement follows:

Statement of Francis J. McNamara on the Nomination of Morton H.
Halperin To Be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and
Peacekeeping

The following is offered in opposition to the confirmation
of Morton H. Halperin as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Democracy and Peacekeeping.
For some 25 years, as an employee of the Department of
Defense and the National Security Council as well as in
various private sector posts, he has violated security
regulations and/or consistently attacked and strongly opposed
generally accepted security practices, in addition to
demonstrating extremely poor judgment about what constitutes
sensitive security information.
On July 5, 1996, upon entering the employ of the Defense
Department, Mr. Halperin signed an affidavit which said:
``I agree to return all classified material upon
termination of employment in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.''
On September 19, 1969, terminating his employment with the
National Security Council, Mr. Halperin signed another
affidavit:
``I do not now have in my possession or custody or control
any document or other things containing or incorporating
information affecting the national defense, or other security
information material classified Top secret, Secret or
Classified to which I obtained access [during my
employment].''
Did Halperin live up to his word?
Defending a presidential authority vital to the national
security against a lawsuit brought by Halperin, the Carter
Administration on May 24, 1978 filed a brief with the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in which it said that
Halperin took classified documents with him when he left the
Defense Department and so that--
``Dr. Halperin managed to cart off boxes of highly
classified material without the National Security Council's
permission or knowledge when he left the NSC.''
In addition to this double violation of his word and
security regulations, Halperin was deceptive in other ways as
well, according to the 1978 court brief. When Halperin was
with the NSC, Henry Kissinger, the President's national
security adviser, ``specifically instructed'' Halperin not to
talk to journalists, but ``contrary to those instructions Dr.
Halperin talked repeatedly with journalists.''
Also: Halperin told Kissinger in a September 1969 telephone
conversation, ``I haven't talked to the press . . . since
May,'' but the record revealed he ``received a number of
calls from, conversed with and met with a variety of
journalists.''
A wiretap had been placed on Halperin's home phone because
he was the prime suspect in the leak of the secret US bombing
of Cambodia to New York Times reporter William Beecher. That
tap revealed the following about Halperin's conversations on
his home phone: ``revelations on the North Vietnamese
position . . . differing internal recommendations of the
Secretaries of State and Defense and the Attorney General as
to Cambodia . . . his plan to meet with representatives of a
German news magazine about the National Security Council . .
. and a planned meeting with a representative of the Soviet
Union's Pravda.''
Press accounts of Halperin's suit predating the brief had
reported affidavits revealing John Erlichman saying that
Kissinger had described Halperin ``as being singularly
untrustworthy. Defects in his philosophy and character were
generally described (by Kissinger).'' [Washington Post, March
12, 1976]; and that two weeks after Halperin left the
National Security Council, FBI Director Hoover reported to
the White House that he has been heard saying on his
telephone that ``he was to meet with the foreign editor of
Pravda'' [W.P. 3/21/76].
Also reported by the same newspaper: a Kissinger affidavit
said Halperin's FBI security file revealed he had failed to
``report a visit to Greece, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union''
on a passport application; that in 1965 he had received the
Communist magazine, ``World Marxist Review/Problems of Peace
and Socialism'', and that Halperin recalled Kissinger had cut
off his access to
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[[Page S12412]]

``more sensitive information regarding national security
matters'' because of high-level Administration figures'
suspicions about his political views. (3/28/76)
Not only the Carter Administration brief, but various news
accounts reported that Kissinger had hired Halperin for his
NSC position over the objections of FBI Director Hoover, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senator Goldwater,
White House aide Haldeman, and the security officer of the
NSC. Kissinger himself said in Salzburg, Austria, in June
1974 that he had hired Halperin for the NSC ``over the strong
objections of all my associates.''
A J. Edgar Hoover file memo revealed that Kissinger had
called him May 9, 1969, the day the Times story appeared, to
complain that the Beecher story was ``extraordinarily
damaging and uses secret information.'' The Carter
Administration brief noted that the District Court in
Washington had said ``There was justifiably grave concern in
1969 over the leaking of confidential foreign policy
information.'' President Nixon later deposed that Prince
Sihanouk of Cambodia had agreed to the bombing as long as
it was secret, but for internal political reasons could no
longer do so once it became known. A halt to the bombing
was thus forced, with the result that the enemy was
guaranteed a safe haven from which he could attack
American troops and then escape to safety. The President
deposed that the leak was ``directly responsible for the
deaths of thousands of Americans.''
A September 1969 memo from FBI Director Hoover to Attorney
General John Mitchell said Kissinger wanted all the wiretaps
he had requested in trying to identify the source of the leak
discontinued except for those on Halperin.
William C. Sullivan, Assistant FBI Director for
Intelligence, said in a July 8, 1969 memo to Director Hoover:
``As we know, Halperin cannot be trusted. We have learned
enough already from the early coverage of him to conclude
this.''
Another reason for rejecting Halperin's nomination is that
he has revealed a sick, unhealthy animus and hostility toward
the U.S. Intelligence Community and the individual agencies
composing it, despite their vital relationship to the
security of the Nation.
Appearing on the Ben Wattenberg PBS-TV program, ``In Search
of the Real America,'' on June 15, 1978, he contradicted
Wattenberg when Wattenberg said the CIA was a defender of
American freedoms.
``No,'' Halperin replied, ``they've been a subverter of
everybody else's freedom.''
He has also accused CIA officers of ``promoting fascism
around the world.''
What does he think of the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
``Causing violence in American cities has been an on-going
FBI program,'' a pamphlet he published on the Bureau said.
To Halperin it is ``an open question'' whether the CIA and
other agencies in the Intelligence Community would turn to
assassinating American citizens.
Halperin has adopted unbelievably ridiculous positions--as
when he told Wattenberg that he would oppose CIA use of
covert action, even if it were to stop Libyan leader Quadaffi
from sneaking nuclear weapons into New York harbor!
In 1974, referring to the early `70s period of the Vietnam
War, he actually wrote questioning ``the need for the kind
of reconnaissance which involved an intrusion into North
Vietnamese air space''!
He knows as little about the law as he does about war. In
September of 1976, he attacked the Department of Justice for
acting on the belief that when a foreign power is involved,
there is a national security exemption to the Fourth
Amendment. He wrote:
``No court in the United States has ever seriously
considered the possibility that it exists.'' (``First
Principles,'' 9/76)
100% wrong! It is difficult to conceive of a more erroneous
statement. Not only had a number of District Courts
``seriously considered'' its existence at the time, but some
Appeals Courts had as well, and most of the decisions had
upheld the concept.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Footnotes at end of articles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Carter Administration court brief noted ``poor
judgment'' on Halperin's part and ``disquieting'' points in
his conduct. It is my view that he has continued to exhibit
these traits on a considerable number of occasions,
particularly those treated at some length in the attached
``Partial Record''--the cases of Philip Agee, the CIA
Defector; David Truong, the Communist Vietnamese espionage
agent, and the leak of the so-called ``Pentagon Papers.''
For these and other reasons, I believe his confirmation
would constitute a security risk to the United States not
only because of his actions and views concerning what
constitutes sensitive security information, but also because
it would deal a blow to the morale of the Nation's military/
security/intelligence services with related adverse
performance of functions vital to the national security.

further statement of francis j. mcnamara re morton halperin

Concerned about the nomination of Morton Halperin to serve
as an assistant secretary of defense, friends who knew I had
closely studied the assault on the Intelligence Community
that had marked the decade of the mid-seventies to the mid-
eighties and had testified and written about it and also
about Halperin's role in it,\2\ suggested that I assist the
effort of the Center for Security Policy, directed by Frank
Gaffney, Jr., to defeat the nomination, and also that I
prepare a personal statement opposing it.
I did both. Senator Thurmond distributed copies of my
statement to members of the Armed Services Committee and also
to all members of the Senate.
During the November 19, 1993 hearing by the committee on
his nomination, in response to a question by Senator McCain,
Halperin testified:
``Senator McCain, those comments appear to be identical
with a set of allegations made in a document which Senator
Thurmond distributed to members of the committee. That is a
scurrilous, outrageous attack on me, full of false
statements, innuendoes, and misleading assertions. I will
give you just two examples. . . .''
He then branded what I had written about his association
with a group named PEPIC ``an outright lie and a scandalous
attack,'' implied that what my statement said about a listing
of CIA memoirs by former Agency employees fell into the same
category, and asked for permission to insert in the hearing
record ``a detailed response'' to my statement. Senator
Levin, presiding at the time, granted his request.
Having recently undergone surgery, I did not attend the
hearing. After I had obtained a hearing transcript and read
his words, I wrote to the committee on December 15:
``I flatly deny and deeply resent Halperin's charges about
my statement and request that I be granted an opportunity to
appear before the committee to respond to them.
In reply, I was informed that committee rules barred my
appearance because, during the hearing, nothing had been said
on the record authorizing it.
When, on April 12, 1994 I received a copy of the printed
hearing I learned that in his alleged ``detailed response''
to my statement submitted for the record since I had last
seen a transcript, Halperin had added a few choice epithets
describing it: ``inaccurate . . . distorts facts . . .
patently untrue . . . misrepresents . . . absurd . . . false
. . . an outright lie'' [again] (printed record, pages 181,
182).
In the almost 50 years I have been writing, lecturing,
testifying and carrying out various administrative duties in
the security and intelligence fields, particularly as they
relate to Communism, no one has ever before accused me of
lying and making false and misleading statements, except
Radio Moscow and Izvestia. As a matter of fact, the Senate
Internal Security subcommittee said some twenty years ago:
``Mr. McNamara commands a national reputation as a careful
scholar and researcher in matters relating to communism,
extremist activities in general, and internal security.''
Despite this and similar other statements I could quote,
the summary of major developments in the Halperin case
presented June 23 on the Senate floor by the chairman of the
Armed Services Committee appeared to support Halperin 100%
and thus, like Halperin's words, cast doubt on my integrity
and veracity. It was true, the Chairman said, that the
Halperin nomination was controversial, but controversy, he
emphasized, ``should not stand as a judgment on the
individual's qualifications or on the merits of the specific
allegations that were brought to the attention of the
committee. . . . the fact that an allegation has been made
should not stand as a judgment that the allegation is
valid. . . . If credible allegations are presented to the
committee, we will pursue them.''
These, of course, are not more than basic truths, but in
the context in which they were spoken they had a definite
pro-Halperin slant that belittled his critics and tended to
disparage all charges made against him, including mine.
Halperin, the chairman continued, ``has an impressive
record . . . he has taught and lectured widely on a variety
of subjects related to the national security'' and his
nomination ``has received the support of a number of
distinguished Americans, including a bipartisan array of
former government officials.'' The issues raised about his
nomination ``were explored in detail'' at his hearing, during
which Halperin ``demonstrated dignity, seriousness of
purpose, and broad understanding of national security
issues--and patience.'' He ``directly addressed a variety of
allegations concerning his fitness for office'' and ``I was
impressed by the care and attention he gave to each question
. . . none of the allegations of improprieties were
substantiated in the course of the standard report on the
nominee by the FBI, in other investigations by the executive
branch, or in any evidence submitted to the Armed Services
Committee. I would like to quote directly from his testimony
because it deals with a number of charges that were reported
in the news media and that I think he dealt with at the
hearing.''
The chairman then quoted eight paragraphs of Halperin's
testimony in which Halperin summarized in his own words [very
convenient] as many allegations about his record and said of
each one, ``That is false.''
Whether or not Halperin summarized the eight accusations
accurately and his ``false'' claim about them is true, the
fact is that Halperin more than once testified falsely about
my statement in his hearing. There is not a single false
statement, misleading assertion, innuendo, outrageous lie or
any other kind of lie in my statement. Under the general
heading, ``Halperin and Philip Agee,'' it stated:

[[Page S12413]]

``Following is at least part of the public record of Morton
Halperin's actions relative to CounterSpy, the Covert Action
Information Bulletin and Philip Agee:
It continued with the following description of the first of
a series of actions noted, the one Halperin told Senator
McCain was ``an outright lie:''
``CounterSpy's publisher, the Organizing Committee for a
Fifth Estate (OC-5), according to its 1975 annual report,
`had been instrumental in organizing several other
organizations' that year, one of which was `The Public
Education Project on the Intelligence Community (PEPIC) . . .
a year-long effort.'
``Morton Halperin, the report continued, was a member of
PEPIC's speakers bureau, all of whose members `will be
donating their time, energy and fees to PEPIC to ensure its
survival.' ''
``The Senate Internal Security subcommittee, in its 1977
annual report, identified PEPIC as one of `several fronts'
set up by Agee's OC-5 to accomplish its objective of finding
`those individuals with research or organizing abilities to
join the Counter-Spy Team'.''
What is the public record basis for the above three
paragraphs?
The Winter 1976 issue of CounterSpy, which identified
itself as ``The Quarterly Journal of the Organizing Committee
for a Fifth Estate,'' published an item captioned ``Fifth
Estate Annual Report: 1975 . . . .'' (pages 62, 63), the
fifth subsection of which was entitled ``Organizing.'' The
second paragraph of this subsection read as the follows:
``The Organizing Committee has also been instrumental in
organizing several other organizations during 1975. Most of
these organizations are independent of the Fifth Estate and
the Organizing Committee. Others are local research and
action groups, which operate autonomously but may eventually
join the national umbrella of the Fifth Estate.''
This was followed by the names of the four groups the Fifth
Estate had been ``instrumental in organizing'' in 1975, with
a brief description of each one. The second organization
listed was--
``The Public Education Project on the Intelligence
Community (PEPIC) is a year-long effort, sponsored by the
Youth Project, Inc. of Washington, D.C., designed to create
informed public discussion on intelligence issues. . . . All
speakers participating in this project will be donating their
time, energy and fees to PEPIC to ensure its survival.
Speakers include some of the foremost experts on the
intelligence community:''
It then listed the names of the twenty members of PEPIC's
speakers bureau, giving brief identifying date for each. The
sixth read:
``Morton Halperin: Director, ACLU Project on National
Security and Civil Liberties. Co-editor of `The Abuses of the
Intelligence Agencies.'' Former Assistant Deputy Director
(sic) of Defense.''
The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee issued a 55-page
``Annual Report For The Fiscal Year Ending February 28,
1977'' (Reported No. 95-20, 95th Congress, 1st Session),
which contained a two-page section, ``Organizing Committee
For A Fifth Estate'' (pages 43, 44) in which it identified
Counter Spy as OC-5's ``official publication.'' Under a
subhead, ``Objectives of OC-5,'' the Senate report said:
``As stated in its first annual report, dated January 1974,
of the OC-5, its Counterspy campaign against the intelligence
community of the United States was:
``Designed to locate, train and organize those citizens who
have the courage and strength to dedicate their lives and
their resources to changing the current direction of our
government and nation. We are looking for those individuals
with research or organizing abilities to join the Counter-Spy
Team. Our hope is to weld counterspies into groups forming a
nationwide alternative intelligence community--a Fifth
Estate--serving as a force to focus a public effort towards
altering the present course our government is now taking
towards a technofascist society.'
The Senate subcommittee report then commented:
``In an effort to accomplish the above-stated objectives,
OC-5 operates through several fronts, such as: . . . and (5)
Public Education on the Intelligence Community (sic).

* * * * *

``In essence, the objectives of OC-5 are to discredit and
render ineffective all American intelligence gathering
operatiaons--domestic and foreign.''
Thus, everything my statement said in the three paragraphs
about Halperin and PEPIC is, as claimed, based on the public
record. Yet, Halperin had the gall to grossly twist the facts
in an effort to make it appear that I had lied in stating
them.
When Senator McCain, questioning Halperin, referred to my
statement's above-quoted facts about the Halperin-PEPIC-
CounterSpy ties, Halperin claimed:
``The sentence after the one you read about the Organizing
Committee says most of these organizations are independent of
the Fifth Estate and the Organizing Committee, and then it
goes on to list independent organizations who they happen to
think are worthy of drawing to people's attention, and one of
them is this Public Education Project.
``The attempt in that document to suggest that the Public
Education Project was an instrument of the Organizing
Committee and that I worked for that and donated my money to
them and that is why they listed my publication is an
outright lie and a scandalous attack.
``It happens that that organization, which was totally
independent of the Fifth Estate, was project of the Youth
Project, as is indicated in the document which the people who
wrote this for Senator Thurmond had. It was an independent
organization. They asked if they could list my name as
somebody who was available to speak. Along with many other
people I did. I did not in fact end up speaking for them. I
did not donate any money for that purpose, and the assertion
that I supplied money that went to the Fifth Estate is an
outrageous lie.''
Fact: Halperin's testimony that Fifth Estate's annual
report listed PEPIC as an ``independent'' organization is
false, as a mere reading of its words demonstrates. It did
say that ``most'' of the groups it had organized in 1975 were
independent, but it clearly did not specify which were and
which were not.
The second paragraph of Halperin's just quoted testimony is
all falsehood. I did not ``attempt . . . to suggest'' that
PEPIC was an instrument of OC-5. I quoted a formal finding of
a Senate subcommittee which stated that ``OC-5 operates
through several fronts'' and specifically named PEPIC as one
of them. I did not ``suggest'' that Halperin ``worked for''
and ``donated'' money to PEPIC. I accurately stated that the
Fifth Estate annual report listed him as a member of PEPIC's
speakers bureau (which he admits in the next paragraph) and
also reported that all its members would be ``donating their
. . . fees to PEPIC.'' What reason was there to doubt the
word of OC-5, PEPIC's creator, on this point?
Where were the words in which I told, as he testified, ``an
outright lie'' in a ``scandalous'' attack?
Third paragraph: Halperin's claim that PEPIC was ``totally
independent'' of the Fifth Estate and ``an independent
organization'' is flatly contradicted by the report of the
Senate subcommittee. Like most people, I choose to believe
the Senate subcommittee on this point--and would do so
whenever there were conflicting claims between it and
Halperin. Obviously, the fact that PEPIC was ``sponsored
by'' the Youth Project does not mean it was not, or could
not be, a ``front'' for OC-5. I made no ``assertion'' that
Halperin ``supplied money . . . to the Fifth Estate.''
Again, who told an ``outrageous lie,'' Morton Halperin or
I?
Halperin next offered what he claimed was ``another
example'' of an ``outright lie'' in my ``scandalous'' attack
on him:
``one of the charges is that Organizing Notes listed Mr.
Agee's book under `Memoirs by Former Government Employees.'
There is in fact such a list. It lists the following books.''
Halperin then named nine books and their authors,
commenting that various of the authors are supporters and
``strong supporters'' of the agency, and added:
``and I am accused of supporting Agee because Agee's book
was listed along with all those others in what was clearly a
complete list of memoirs.''
Again, Halperin is, at best, in careless errors and
misstating the facts. The relevant part of my statement
distributed by Senator Thurmond is as follows:
``In late 1978, Halperin's CPR published a Materials List
to assist its members in their agit-prop work against
American intelligence agencies. Agee's `Inside the Company'
was included in it under the category `Memoirs by Former
Employees' and his Covert Action Information Bulletin under
`Sources of Information.' ''
Obviously, contrary to his claim, the part of my statement
about which Halperin was testifying did not even mention
``Organizing Notes.'' The so-called Campaign for Political
Rights which Halperin chaired did, as he admits publish a 16-
page Materials List dated ``12/78.'' It had numerous sections
and subsections--``General Organizing Information'',
``Litigation'', ``U.S. Government and Foreign Intelligence
Agencies'', ``FBI'', ``Local and State Police Spying and
Harassment'', ``Surveillance of Women'',``Surveillance of
Black Americans'', etc, etc.
The two-page ``Central Intelligence Agency'' section was
subdivided as follows: ``General'', ``Specific Countries or
Regions'', ``CIA and Human Rights Violations Abroad,'' ``The
CIA and Labor,'' ``CIA--Mind Control Testing,'' and,
finally, ``Memoirs by Former Employees,'' which listed the
works cited by Halperin, including Agee's ``Inside The
Company: CIA Diary.''
Completely false, however, is Halperin's testimony that the
books in the ``Memoirs'' subsection ``was clearly a complete
list of memoirs.'' His Materials List itself contradicts him
on this point because in other subsections it mentions at
least three other works that qualify for the Memoirs
category, all published by December 1978 and all omitted from
it: ``The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence'' by Victor
Marchetti and John Marks; ``Decent Interval'' by Frank Snepp,
and John Stockwell's ``In Search of Enemies.''
In addition, there are other works that could be included:
``The Real CIA'' by Lyman Kirkpatrick; ``Street Man'' by E.
C. ``Mike'' Ackerman; ``The Counter-insurgency Era'' by
Douglas Blaufarb, and ``The Game of Nations'' by Miles
Copeland.
Completely phony, therefore, is Halperin's implication that
he is absolved of any blame for including promoting Agee's
book because it is a memoir and thus has to be included in a
``complete'' list of such works. The truth is

[[Page S12414]]

that the list was not comprehensive and any of the above-
listed books could have substituted for Agee's, but
Halperin's CPR chose to name Agee's book rather than any one
of the others. Why?
Interestingly, Halperin changed his story in submitting his
written ``detailed response'' to my statement to the
committee: He wrote:
``It is true, as the piece [McNamara's statement] claims,
that CPR published a Materials List which included Agee's
``Inside the Company'' and the ``Covert Action Information
Bulletin.'' The list also included books by . . . , all of
whom present far different views of the CIA. CPR was simply
providing a reference list of materials on intelligence
organizations.''
Now it is a mere ``reference list.'' What happened to his
testimony's ``complete list of memoirs''? Could it be that he
lied when he made that claim?
Was Halperin and his CPR ``simply providing a reference
list of materials on intelligence organizations'', or
promoting something, when it noted that its Materials List
``differs from a bibliography in that all materials can be
currently obtained from the organizations and individuals
listed. Please request materials from the noted source'' and
then, immediately after the title of Agee's book, listed the
following source:
``(Penguin Books or Center for National Security
Studies.)''
So it turns out that Halperin's CNSS not only stocked and
peddled Agee's book, but his CPR also publicized this fact
through its Materials List!
To the above-quoted claim about a simple ``reference list''
in his written response submitted for the record to the Armed
Services Committee, Halperin added:
``The piece goes on to say that `Organizing Notes'
`promoted' `Counterspy' and the `Covert Action Information
Bulletin.' As with the Materials List discussed above, the
piece is misconstruing the presentation of reference
information as endorsement.''
But did I misconstrue the above presentation of mere
``reference information'' about Agee's book as endorsement by
Halperin? Why else would Halperin stock and sell it, but not
any other of the nine books on the list? And what about the
following items in his CPR Materials List, not included in my
original statement?
1. At the end of the Memoirs by Former Employees section we
read:
``See . . . Newsletters--Counterspy, Covert Action
Information Bulletin. . . .
2. In the Research section (p. 3) we also read:
``See . . . CIA--`Dirty Work' (article on `How to Spot a
Spook')'' [`Dirty Work' was the short title for Agee's book,
`Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe'].
``Newsletters: `Covert Action Information Bulletin' (How to
Research and Expose CIA personnel).''
3. In the CIA ``Specific Countries or Regions'' section, we
are again treated to:
`` `Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe.' Philip Agee and
Louis Wolf. Compilation of articles, a guide on `spotting a
spook,' and a listing of 700 alleged CIA agents in Western
Europe. 1978. $24.95. $10.00 discount if purchased from
`Covert Action Information Bulletin' with a subscription
order. (Lyle Stuart, Secaucus, NJ or CAIB.)''
4. In the Newsletters section, the CAIB is the second one
recommended (p. 12). Its promotion takes this form:
``Covert Action Information Bulletin. Following in the
footsteps of Counterspy, this periodical has included
articles about CIT activities in Jamaica, research ideas, and
CIA recruitment of foreign officers. Published bimonthly;
$10.00 a year in U.S., $16.00 overseas. (CAIB)''
5. In this same section, the first-listed item is CAIB's
predecessor and sister publication which, like it, relished
exposing the identities and locations of CIA overseas
personnel:
``Counterspy. Covered variety of issues including CIA in
Jamaica, Chile, South America; CIA use of unions overseas and
the League of Women Voter's Overseas Fund; Garden Plot
(national emergency plan). Selected issues, $1.50 and xerox
copies (cost) available. (Public Eye.)''
6. CounterSpy also turns up in two other sections of
Halperin's CPR ``Materials List'', as the source for:
`` `Jordan: A Case of CIA/Class Collaboration.' This
booklet describes CIA involvement in Jordan. 1977; $1.00
(Counterspy, Box 647, Washington, DC 20044.)''
Under the SURVEILLANCE OF WOMEN subsection, we again find:
``See . . . Newsletters . . . Counterspy''
Whatever you do, do not misconstrue any of the following
above-quoted words and phrases as endorsement of CAIB or
Counterspy, or as an indication that Halperin, boss of the
CPR, was supporting Agee or his effort to expose CIA
personnel:
``How to spot a spook--how to research and expose CIA
personnel--a guide on `spotting a spook'--a listing of 700
alleged CIA agents in Western Europe--CIA in Jamaica, Chile,
South America--CIA involvement in Jordan.''
Why shouldn't you believe any of the above could possibly
be mistaken for support for Agee? Because, in his ``detailed
response'' to ``the piece'', Morton Halperin told the SASC
``I never supported nor condoned his [Agee's] activities''
and Halperin is the very embodiment of candor, openness and
truth!

halperin and bills to protect identities of u.s. intelligence agents

Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1981 as
director of the Center for National Security Studies (CNSS),
Halperin stated:
``We do not condone the practice of naming names and we
fully understand Congress' desire to do what it can to
provide meaningful protection to those intelligence agents
serving abroad, often in situations of danger.''
It sounded great--as though he and his CNSS cronies were
all for the national effort to end the damaging and dangerous
exposures of covert U.S. intelligence personnel and would
support legislation to accomplish that purpose.
Doubts about that existed, however, because of another
statement Halperin, this time speaking for the ACLU, had made
to the Senate Intelligence Committee a year earlier:
``I think a citizen has a right to impair and impede the
functions of a Government agency, whether it is the Federal
Trade Commission or the CIA. The fact that your intent is
impair or impede does not make your activity a crime if it is
otherwise legal.''
Halperin placed no restrictions or limits on the devices
used ``to impair and impede,'' leaving open the possibility
that even the technique of impairing by deliberate exposure
of covert intelligence personnel was any citizens ``right''
in his view [a year later, the Supreme Court held that such
exposures ``are clearly not protected by the Constitution'',
i.e., they are not any citizens ``right''].
Additionally, in testimony before the House Intelligence
Committee in 1981, again representing the ACLU, Halperin had
stated:
``I am not sure we would ever reach the point where we
would support any legislation [to criminalize the deliberate
exposure of agents].''
Just where did the slippery-worded Halperin really stand on
the issue?
The only way to find out is to check his actual record, as
revealed by his testimony pro or con various identities
protection bills. Here it is:
1/30/80: House Intelligence Committee, ``Proposals to
Criminalize the Unauthorized Disclosure of the Identities of
Undercover United States Intelligence Officers and Agents.''
Testified for the Center for National Security Studies, which
he directed, in opposition to the proposals (p. 66, et
sequitur).
3/27/80: House Intelligence Committee, ``H.R. 6588, The
National Intelligence Act of 1980.'' Testifying for the CNSS,
Halperin opposed the intelligence identities protection
provisions of the proposed act (pp. 138-142).
6/25/80: Senate Intelligence Committee, ``Intelligence
Identities Protection Legislation.'' Representing the ACLU,
Halperin opposed the legislation (p. 88, et sequitur).
9/5/80: Senate Judiciary Committee, ``Intelligence
Identities Protection Act, S. 2216.'' This time, again
representing the Center for National Security Studies (CNSS),
he opposed the bill (p. 98, et sequitur).
4/8/81: House Intelligence Committee, ``H.R. 4, The
Intelligence Identities Protection Act.'' Back this time
wearing his ACLU hat, he once more took a position against
the proposed law (p. 73, et sequitur).
5/8/81: Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism,
``Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1981--S. 391.''
Back in his CNSS of the ACLU cloak, he again took the
``anti'' position (p. 70, et sequitur).
My statement submitted to the Senate Armed Services
Committee said; ``Halperin campaigned hard against all bills
introduced to criminalize exposures of the identities of U.S.
intelligence personnel, though the Supreme Court had held (in
its Agee passport decision) that such activities `are clearly
not protected by the Constitution'.''
Halperin branded my charge ``an outright lie'' in his
written ``detailed response'' to my statement submitted to
the committee (hearing, p. 182).
But where was my lie? Can he produce evidence in any House
or Senate hearing record that he ever supported any bill
under consideration?
Of course not. And why did he make no attempt to refute my
charge that the CPR, which he chaired, coordinated the mass
signing of letters to the House and Senate which urged the
weakening of bills under consideration?
As a member of AFIO, the Association of Former Intelligence
Officers--whose members represent every intelligence agency
of the U.S.--I was aware that in 1980 it had passed a
resolution urging enactment of an identities protection bill
and followed developments in this area closely. John Warner,
former General Counsel of the CIA, was serving as legal
adviser to AFIO in 1982 when Congress passed, and the
President signed, the desired protection bill. Commenting on
the March 18 Senate 90-6 vote for the bill, Warner wrote in
Periscope, official AFIO newsletter:
``This vote is a significant achievement for those who
support a strong and effective intelligence service. The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Center for
National Security Studies (CNSS) (read: Jerry Berman and
Morton Halperin respectively) had great influence in
proposing some weakening amendments which had been given
approval by the House Intelligence Committee on HR-4 and the
Senate Judiciary Committee on S-391. The bills as reported by
these two committees were amended, however, after floor
debate in the House and Senate, to the language supported by
President

[[Page S12415]]

Reagan, CIA, the Department of Justice--and AFIO. (Jerry
Berman of ACLU was quoted in the Washington Post after the
Senate vote, as admitting `we [ACLU] took a bath.')
``While ACLU and CNSS apparently can influence some
congressmen and certainly initially had their way in the
House and Senate committees, the majority sentiment in both
houses, when it came to a floor vote, demonstrated strong
congressional support for CIA and the US intelligence
effort.''
Warner was thoroughly justified in pairing Berman and
Halperin in his account. Berman, an ACLU attorney, served as
counsel for its Project on National Security which Halperin
directed. He also served as chief legislative counsel for the
Center for National Security Studies which Halperin also
directed and, over the years had worked hand-in-glove with
Halperin on many issues involving intelligence and national
security, opposition to enactment of an agents' identities
protection bill being just one of them.
On June 24, 1982, I attended a hearing of the Senate
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. Berman was there,
too. When the session ended, we spoke briefly in the hall
outside the hearing room. Referring to President Reagan's
signing the identities protection bill into law at CIA
headquarters the day before, Berman said to me:
``It's incredible how Mort [Halperin] and I kept Congress
from doing anything about it for six years.''
The ``it'', of course, was the deliberate exposure of
covert U.S. intelligence personnel by Agee, ``CounterSpy''
and the ``Covert Action Information Bulletin''.
That statement, coming from his close working associate for
a period of years on such matters--combined with the bill
hearings record cited above--reveals Halperin's true position
on the question of ``naming names.'' According to Berman,
they--he and Halperin--did not want Congress to do anything
to stop the continuing exposure of American intelligence
agents; they did not think they had a chance of succeeding in
their efforts on the issue; yet, in an ``incredible''
development, they had prevented any effective Congressional
action for six full years! [Their intense lobbying,
buttonholing, testifying and related actions were known to
all interested in the matter].
One thing is clear. Halperin lied when he accused me of
lying about his opposition to intelligence agents identities
protection bills.
He also lied to Senator Levin on the issue in his Armed
Services Committee testimony, according to Herbert
Romerstein, now retired, who headed the USIA's Office to
Counter Soviet Disinformation and Active Measures and, before
that, was a professional staff member of the House
Intelligence Committee when Halperin testified before it on
agent identity bills in 1980.
Responding to a question by the Senator about his role in
the House Intelligence Committee's action on an identities
protection bill ``making it a crime to disclose the identity
of covert intelligence agents,'' Halperin testified--
``That is right Senator. It was in two parts. There was a
part relating to people like Philip Agee, who were former
government officials, which we actively supported from the
beginning, and there was a second provision which put the
people who were naming names out of the business of naming
names while protecting the right of legitimate journalists to
report on intelligence matters.''
Halperin ``was not telling the truth,'' Romerstein wrote in
``Human events'' shortly after Halperin's appearance, ``I was
present during his testimony'' and in it he said ``any effort
to cover individuals who have not had authorized access to
classified information is inherently flawed . . . the
Constitution does not permit the prosecution of those
individuals.''
The record bears out Romerstein's claim. Later in his
testimony that same day, Halperin stated emphatically that
once someone had gotten the name of an agent by some means
other than official access ``the cat is out of the bag . . .
there is no way constitutionally to deal with the problem.''
It has been Halperin's consistent position that, while an
Agee could be punished for revealing agents' identities he
had learned by authorized access to classified information,
such conduct by others who have learned identities by other
means is completely protected by the Constitution and cannot
be criminalized.
How, then, could he have supported bills that took a
contrary position, as the one eventually enacted did?
And how could he, without lying, tell the Senate Armed
Services Committee in his written reply to my charges that he
``worked hard . . . to formulate constitutional laws that
imposed strict criminal penalties on those who would reveal
undercover agents''?

morton halperin: the non-chair, non-director, non-entity?

Halperin has held important-sounding titles in the anti-
security, anti-intelligence drive of the '70s and '80s. The
ACLU, having given ``top priority'' in 1970 to a nationwide
driven aimed at ``the dissolution of the Nation's vast
surveillance network'' (its collective description of the
CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI, etc. and the security-intelligence
elements of state and local police) that same year set up the
Committee for Public Justice (CPJ) headed by the unrepentant
``ex''-Communist, Lillian Hellman who, when she died in 1984,
left part of her $4 million estate for the establishment of a
fund for Communist writers. Halperin served on the executive
council, newsletter committee and wrote for the newsletter of
the CPJ which had the FBI and Department of Justice as its
targets.
In early 1974, the ACLU Foundation, jointly with the Fund
for Peace, organized the so-called Center for National
Security Studies (CNSS) to serve as the research and
documentation element of the drive. Halperin soon became CNSS
director and held that post until he resigned in late 1992,
remaining as Chair of its Advisory Committee. The next
creation was the Project on National Security and Civil
Liberties, sponsored by the ACLU Foundation and the CNSS
(headed by Halperin). Halperin also became director of this
litigating arm of the nationwide operation. In September
1975, ``First Principles'' was launched, published by the
Project on National Security and Civil Liberties, which
Halperin directed. Halperin became the chief editorial writer
for this information-propaganda newsletter of the drive.
Finally, when the Campaign to Stop Government Spying (CSGS)
was organized as a united front agitprop force for the
operation in 1977, Halperin emerged as its chairman. He
retained his chairmanship of this anti-intelligence
conglomerate when it changed its name the following year to
the Campaign for Political Rights (CPR) and held the post
until the CPR folded in 1984 or so.
The CPR initially billed itself as ``a project of the Youth
Project'' of Washington, D.C. It later described itself as
``a national coalition of over 80 religious, educational,
environmental, civic, women's Native American, black,
latino and labor organizations which have joined together
to work for an end to covert operations abroad and an end
to political surveillance and harassment in the United
States.'' \3\
The CPR began publishing ``Organizing Notes'' (``ON''), its
official monthly which, in time, began featuring an
``Update'' section, saying that the section was ``a combined
effort of First Principles [published by Halperin's CNSS] and
Organizing Notes [published by Halperin's CPR].''
My statement noted that ``CounterSpy'' was on the Steering
Committee of both the CSGS and the CPR, and that the ``Covert
Action Information Bulletin (CAIB)'' was also on that of the
CPR (not formed until 1978, the CAIB did not exist when the
front was launched in 1977 under its CSGS title), and
commented that ``as chairperson of both . . . Halperin must
have had some say about just which groups would be invited to
join, and which would be selected for leadership positions
in, his organization.''
Halperin's reply to the Armed Services Committee: ``The
piece tries to link me to ``CounterSpy'' and OC5 through my
chairmanship'' [of CSGS-CPR]. ``It lists a number of the
member organizations of CPR and its steering committee . . .
and asserts that I had control over that membership. On the
contrary, the policy of CPR at that time was that any
organization could join.''
Another Halperin lie. I did not write that he ``had
control'' over the CSGS-CPR membership, but only that he
``must have had some say'' about it. Did he attend any
meeting at which the CPR's ``open to all'' policy was
discussed or agreed upon. Did he say so much as a word about
it--pro or con? The chairperson of a group having absolutely
no say at all about so basic an issue? Come on!
My statement also noted that ``Organizing Notes,'' the
publication of the CPR which was chaired by Halperin
``routinely promoted both Agee's ``CAIB'' and ``CounterSpy''
as containing worthwhile material of value to its readers,''
and commented that ``as chairperson of the CPR he had to be
responsible for its contents, just as he was for the contents
of the CPR's `Materials List'.''
Halperin's response to the committee: ``This is false; an
editorial staff made decisions about its contents.''
What kind of dim-witted ``refutation'' is this? Does the
fact that the chairperson of an organization has an editorial
or any other kind of staff free him of all responsibility for
the work it does, no matter how atrocious its product?
Please!
My statement also said: ``Halperin's `First Principles',
like `ON','' also routinely gave favorable notice to the
contents of current issues of both ``CounterSpy'' and
``Covert Action Information Bulletin.''
Halperin's response: Not a word.
Strange. As director of both the ACLU`s Project on National
Security and its Center for National Security Studies, each
at different times the publisher of ``First Principles''
(which, like his CPR, had an editorial staff), Halperin says
elsewhere that he is ``proud'' of his work with the two
organizations and expects to be ``held accountable'' for it.
He does not offer in this case, however, the ridiculous ``no
responsibility'' defense he offered in the case of the CPR's
``Organizing Notes.'' At the same time, while refusing to
accept responsibility for the CPR's organizational membership
and leadership and its repeated plugs for Agee's
publications, he apparently accepts responsibility for its
Materials List compilation of CIA memoirs by presenting a
false argument in its defense. Just where does he stand on
this issue of his authority, responsibility and
accountability?
He has a language problem here. Webster's Dictionary of the
American Language defines ``chairperson'' as one who ``heads
a committee, board, etc.'' and variously defines ``head'' as
``a dominant position, position of leadership or first
importance . . . a foremost person; leader, ruler, chief,
etc'';

[[Page S12416]]

says that as an adjective says means ``most important;
principal; commanding, first'' and, as a transitive verb,
``to be chief of; command.''
A director, it says, is a ``supervisor, manager; a person
who directs or controls''; that ``direct'' means ``to manage
the affairs of; guide; conduct; regulate control'';
So, for example, I was deeply involved in the ACLU decision
to file amicus briefs on behalf of. . . .
``So I did have a line responsibility for decisions about
what cases to undertake or what amicus briefs to file.''
(pages 33, 34. Emphasis added).
If Helperin exercised this much authority in the ACLU
itself where he was technically merely in charge of its
Washington office, how much more power must he have wielded
in its various projects, fronts, etc. in which he was
technically the overall boss as director, chairman, etc.?

halperin's hokum on agee's sources

Responding to my charge that Halperin had testified that
``it is difficult to condemn'' people who expose CIA
personnel on the basis of information gleaned from State
Department documents, he claims that my statement
`'completely misrepresents'' his views and that ``when the
context for that fragment is provided'' it is ``clear that
the quoted clause did not refer to someone like Philip Agee
who learned identities as a result of access to classified
information.''
More Halperin hokum--as he makes clear in placing the
``fragment'' in context. His exact testimony read:
``I think where the CIA has not seen fit to provide
appropriate cover for individuals, and it is easy . . . it
determine the name simply by looking at State Department
publications, that it is difficult to condemn people who do
that.'' (emphasis added)
That is precisely one of the things Agee and his
CounterSpy--CAIB crews were doing--``looking at State
Department publications,'' specifically its unclassified
Foreign Service List and Biographic Register, among others.
The first contained the names of all U.S. Foreign Service
officers and the second brief biographic sketches of all U.S.
employees working in the field of foreign affairs, which
obviously embraces many more than State Department personnel.
This practice was clearly what I was referring to in my
words ``information gleaned from State Department
documents,'' and I placed his quote completely in its correct
context, his claim to the opposite notwithstanding.
Because it was known that analyses of these publications
were being used by the Agee crowd and others to help them
uncover CIA personnel using diplomatic cover, the Department
announced in early 1976 that it was halting publication of
both. The Foreign Service List would not appear again, and
the Biographic Register, last published in 1974, would be
classified ``for official use only'' when again released, and
contain more discreet background information.
It is amazing that Halperin would assert in 1993 that his
words, as quoted completely in context by me ``did not refer
to someone like Philip Agee who learned identities as a
result of access of classified information.'' (emphasis
added)
Why? Because only an idiot would believe that, 10 years
after he left the CIA after service in only three countries,
Agee could be making continuing exposures of Agency
personnel, fronts and covert operations in all parts of the
world on the basis of the official access he had had while in
the CIA. The CIA simply is not ``built'' to give any of its
employees such knowledge. Consider, in addition, the
following among other similar facts that could be cited to
demonstrate how ridiculous Halperin's claim about Agee's
sources is:
The Supreme Court, in its 1981 decision upholding the
authority of the Secretary of State to deprive Agee of his
passport, pointed out that when Agee released a list of
alleged CIA agents at a 1974 London press conference, he said
the list--
``was compiled by a small group of Mexican comrades whom I
trained to follow the comings and goings of CIA people before
I left Mexico City'' [where he had been working on his first
book].
The Court also noted, based on unchallenged judicial
evidence, that Agee travels to target countries and--
``recruits collaborators and trains them in clandestine
techniques designed to expose the `cover' of CIA employees
and sources.''
In the introduction to his first book, ``Inside The
Company: CIA Diary,'' Agee thanked the Cuban Communist Party,
other Cuban agencies and a number of individuals and groups
in New York City, London, Paris and Mexico City for the help
they had given him in collecting data and research materials
for it.
As Jeff Stein wrote of ``Inside The Company,'' in ``The
Village Voice'':
``the book drained his [Agee's] mind of every agent, code
name, and cover operation he could remember.''
His ``Covert Action Information Bulletin'' stated
truthfully in its issue of January, 1979:
``The naming of names in books and in publications like
this Bulletin have nothing to do with people Philip Agee may
have met while in the employ of the CIA. And, of course,
Louis Wolf [a member of the Bulletin's editorial board] and
most of the other journalists who are engaged in this
struggle to expose the CIA were never in such government
employ.''
William Schaap, Ellen Ray, and Louis Wolf, all CAIB
editors, testified before the House Intelligence Committee in
January 1980. Speaking for the group, Schaap said:
``You might all be interested to know that Mr. Agee has
not, to our knowledge, named any names in more than 3 years,
and that applies as well to both ``Dirty Work'' and ``Dirty
Work 2,'' the two books which we sitting before you have
coedited [with Agee].''
The late Rep. Larry McDonald stated in Congressional Record
remarks on July 20, 1976:
``It is known that the names of alleged CIA personnel in
London featured in the Spring '76 issue of ``CounterSpy''
were provided by the International Marxist Group, a British
Trotskyist group associated with the FI [Fourth
International, the Trotskyist equivalent of the Comintern],
headed by IPS's [Institute for Policy Studies'] Tariq Ali.''
McDonald also revealed in the June 16 Record that year that
the names of the alleged CIA personnel in Africa named in the
same ``CounterSpy'' issue had been provided by the Black
Panthers and the left-wing Paris publication, ``Liberacion.''
Agee cites Julius Mader's ``Who's Who in the CIA'' as a
source. Published in 1968, this was a joint production of the
Communist East German and Czech intelligence services (Mader
was an East German intelligence officer). Deliberately, only
about half those listed in it were actually CIA personnel.
When Agee and William Schaap announced the publication of
the ``CAIB'' at the Moscow-sponsored 11th World Festival of
Youth and Friendship in Havana in July 1978, they also
announced the formation of Counter-Watch, which was to be a
worldwide network of agents dedicated to exposing CIA
personnel everywhere. Agee said Counter-Watch would give
him--
``a great opportunity to continue my work of recent years .
. . so that the people are able to learn about the methods,
or exactly how to identify the CIA personnel in different
countries'' (emphasis added).
[Schaap said Halperin's CNSS was represented in Havana for
the occasion and that a Damu Smith was also there on behalf
of Halperin's Campaign to Stop Government Spying (CSGS).]
Louis Wolf, the ``CAIB'' editor who co-edited ``Dirty
Work'' with Agee, addressed over 500 delegates to the Havana
Youth Festival, describing in detail how they should go about
uncovering the identities of CIA personnel who were using
military and diplomatic cover. The ``CAIB'' reprinted the
text of his remarks for their educational value in its second
(10/78) issue.
Agee himself, in addition to attending the Soviet-
engineered festival contributed an article to the first issue
of ``CAIB'' distributed gratis to the delegates. His article
was no more than a somewhat altered version of the
introduction to ``Dirty Work.'' In it he said that ``a
continuing effort--and a novel form of international
cooperation'' could ultimately lead to the exposure ``of
almost all of those [CIA personnel] who have worked under
diplomatic cover at any time in their careers.'' He spelled
out the five-step method he had in mind for accomplishing
this, which included the acquisition of lists of all
Americans employed in official U.S. offices in each country,
obtaining old Foreign Service Lists and Biographic Registers
from libraries, getting copies of the Diplomatic and Consular
Lists regularly published by all Foreign Ministries, etc.
Check the information obtained carefully, he said, then
publish it and organize demonstrations: ``Peaceful protest
will do the job. And when it doesn't, those whom the CIA has
most oppressed will find other ways of fighting back'' a
backhand watch to violence against CIA personnel.
From the viewpoint of Halperin's operations, however, the
most interesting item was the opening sentence in the third
of his five-step methods:
``Check the names as suggested in the various articles in
`Dirty Work,' especially John Marks `How to Spot a Spook.' ''
Who was John Marks?
The November 1974 Washington Monthly which originally
published his ``spook'' article, noted that he was ``an
associate'' of Halperin's CNSS, as did the Washington Post
when it published his article, ``The CIA's Corporate Shell
Game'' in 1976 (both of which were reprinted in Agee's
``Dirty Work''). At the time Agee was preparing his above-
mentioned ``CAIB'' article with its promotion of Marks' opus,
Halperin's ``First Principles'' listed Marks as the ``CIA
Project Director'' for the CNSS, which Halperin directed.
Halperin's CNSS reprinted and sold Marks CIA corporate
shell game article in pamphlet form. Marks was also a
member of the Speakers Bureau of Halperin's CSGS, and his
spook article was promoted by Halperin's CNSS and CPR
(e.g., see previous Materials List section).
A former employee of the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Marks first won notoriety when,
under the name Terry Pollack, he wrote an article, ``Slow
Leak In The Pentagon,'' for Ramparts magazine in 1973.
Subtitled ``the informal art of leaking,'' it recounted how a
federal employee with access to top-secret Pentagon documents
had come across a highly sensitive paper of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and, through a Congressional aide, leaked it to the
New York Times. A leakers A-B-C, it was believed to be
autobiographical.
The evidence is thus overwhelming that Agee's
``CounterSpy--CAIB'' exposures of

[[Page S12417]]

CIA personnel, contrary to Halperin's testimony, are not
based on his access to classified information while in the
employ of the CIA. To put it another way, there is a
superabundance of information indicating that Morton
Halperin, the claimed and alleged authority on intelligence
and national security, is in reality a pathetic ignoramus
about such matters.
And isn't it strange that Halperin, who has repeatedly
testified that he is opposed to ``naming names,'' that he has
counseled others not to do so when asked for advice on the
matter [who and when?] and, that he ``detests'' what Agee
does, should have as director of his CIA studies-action
program, a man known throughout the world for his pioneering
article on the techniques for uncovering and exposing covert
U.S. intelligence officers? And isn't it also strange, in
view of his same testimony, that his CNSS and CSGS-CPR have
given so much favorable mention to Marks' ``spook'' article?
[FBI agents searching the apartment of Halperin's friend
and convicted spy [------ ------], found three photocopies of
State Department biographies on foreign service personnel
with this typed notation on them: ``Almost definite spook.''
Truong was a student of Halperin's CIA Project Director, John
Marks, even adopting his language to designate suspected CIA
officers.]
But is Halperin really that ill-informed and unintelligent?
There is evidence to the contrary. In the same testimony in
which he said it is ``difficult to condemn'' exposers who had
never had access to classified information but learned
identities by various analytical techniques, he revealed
thorough knowledge of the instruments used in their analyses:
he referred to the State Department's halting publication of
the Biographic Register, of Embassy telephone directories;
pointed out that articles on identification methods had been
widely distributed (a reference to his friend John Marks
``How to Spot a Spook'', which he had publicized), etc., and
testified knowingly that ``the people who want to publish the
names of agents, the Covert Action Publishers, don't need the
advice of Mr. Agee or any other former official; they could
do it without that, and don't need access to classified
information.''
Clearly, Halperin knew that the exposures in Agee's
``CounterSpy--CAIB'' were not based on access to classified
information.
Why, then, was he spreading the hokum that Agee's
identities were ``a result of access to classified
information''? Only Halperin can answer that.
But it is clear what would have happened if the House and
Senate believed the line he was peddling: Congress would have
enacted identities ``protection'' legislation that was
completely useless. Criminalizing only exposures based on
authorized access to classified information, it would not
touch Agee because it could not be retroactive and he is
incapable of additional such exposures, having long ago
exhausted his knowledge of that type.
Basically, the only real result would be to protect the
Agee's ``CounterSpy--CAIB'' cabal from prosecution while it
continued its dirty work of exposing covert U.S. intelligence
officers, by analytic technique, thus endangering their lives
as well as the national security.

ny ``vague accusation''

My statement opposing Halperin pointed out that ``part of
the public record of Morton Halperin's actions relative to
`Counterspy' . . . and Philip Agree'' was the fact that he
had been singled out for praise in ``Counterspy's'' winter
'76 issue which extended ``special thanks'' to 21 people, his
name and nine other among them being printed in bold type for
emphasis.
It also noted that the magazine did not say what the
special thanks to Halperin were for, but offered several
possibilities based on the public record. Perhaps, I
suggested, it was for many speeches he had made, turning over
his fees, as pledged, to PEPIC; perhaps for his favorite
review of Agee's book in ``First Principles'', but concluded
logically ``it could have been for any number of things he
might have done for ``Counterspy''. All we can do is
speculate--until Halperin reveals it with substantial
evidence to support whatever claim he makes.''
Halperin's response: ``It is difficult to respond to an
accusation as vague as this one. . . . I do not in fact know
what motivated the editors of ``Counterspy'' to mention me.''
Fact: I did not accuse Halperin of anything, vague or
otherwise. I simply stated a fact he cannot dispute:
``Counterspy's'' publicly printed special thanks to him and
called on him to say what they were for.
Do you believe that he does not know what they were for?
Following the murder of CIA station chief Richard Welch in
Athens in December 1975, ``Counterspy'' was probably the most
notorious and despised publication in the non-Communist
world. As it continued its exposures, the initial
denunciations of it--strong as they were originally--grew
more intense in the press, on radio and TV, on the floor of
Congress and in other public forums. And what did readers see
immediately upon opening the issue that, in effect, marked
the first anniversary of Welch's death?
On the contents page, under the names of ``Counterspy's''
editorial board members and the two ``coordinators'' of the
issue, an item calling special attention to Halperin's
name as one meriting the magazine's gratitude. Not only
that, but just about opposite it was the title of an
article beginning on page 26: ``CIA Around the World/Who
was Richard Welch/CIA Agents Named in Europe and Zaire.''
That was really rubbing it in.
If, as Halperin testified, he ``detests'' Agee and what he
does, he must have cringed in shame. He surely was so
mortified that he would never be able to forget the incident
and what caused it, no matter how many years passed. His good
name tarnished forever!
But he apparently has no recollection of the incident or
what led to it!
Presuming he was really desirous of answering my ``vague
accusation,'' couldn't he have gotten in touch in some way
with Julie Brooks and/or Harvey Kahn, coordinators of that
``CounterSpy'' issue--or Tim Butz, Eda Gordon, Winslow Peck,
Dough Porter, or Margaret Van Houten--all editorial board
members at the time and presumably knowledgeable about the
reason for ``CounterSpy's'' gratitude.
Did he try? If so, and he reached one or several of them,
what was he told? If he didn't try, why didn't he?
Finally, there is this: Halperin compiled for the committee
a detailed list of honors and awards he has received, his
employment record, organization memberships, published
writings, the texts of speeches he had delivered, etc. going
back years prior to 1976.
Strange, isn't it, that this is one thing apparently not
recorded or recalled:
But, let's be fair to Morton. As he told the committee, my
accusation was ``vague,'' really vague, so vague as to be
ephemeral, amorphous. Since it was based completely on
``innuendo,'' expecting him to respond to it would be like
asking him to bottle smoke or nail jello to a wall.

just how ``absurd'' were counterspy and caib?

Admitting my charge that ``CounterSpy'' included on its
``Resource List'' two groups he directed, Halperin comments
that he is ``proud'' of his work with the groups and claims
it is ``absurd'' to imply that he was ``in any way
supporting'' the magazine because of this.
No doubt he would make the same comment had I included
another similar fact in my statement: that the initial issue
of Agee's ``CAIB'' featured on its inside back cover an item
entitled ``Publications of Interest'' and a subhead ``Some
Worthwhile Periodicals.'' Only four periodicals were listed
under the subhead presumably because they were the only ones
Agee and his crew knew of and believed would be useful to the
delegates to the Soviet-sponsored Havana conference and to
``CAIB's'' other readers.
The first-listed was ``First Principles,'' the organ of
Halperin's CNSS, its address and subscription price followed
by this parenthetical statement: ``An excellent review of the
abuses of the U.S. intelligence community, with a
comprehensive bibliography in each issue.''
Third listed was ``Organizing Notes,'' the newsletter of
Halperin's CPR. Noting that it was ``available by request to
the Campaign'', the CAIB made this comment after giving its
address:'' (It is suggested that foreign requests include a
contribution to cover airmail postage.) (A review of
activities in the U.S. involving the surveillance practices
of the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies.)''
[The other two listed were the publications of the New
York-based North American Congress on Latin America and a
``counterspies'' magazine published in London.]
What was the significance of this ``CAIB'' item?
Agee and his ``CAIB'' cronies had been in the business of
naming names for at least five years (since the first issue
of ``CounterSpy'' was published in 1973) when they launched
their magazine in Havana in 1978. During those five years
they had full opportunity to analyze reactions pro and con
their operations and to draw conclusions about who their
enemies, critics, opponents, etc., were and also who their
supporters, allies, defenders, sympathizers and apologists
were.
``First Principles'' had been published since 1975,
``Organizing Notes'' since 1977. The ``CAIB--CounterSpy''
personnel had apparently read or subscribed to them because,
as my original statement noted, ``CounterSpy'' had more than
once given favorable notice to both. Sufficient time had
elapsed for the CAIB people to assess the past performance of
both publications and, presuming the continuance of their
leadership, their likely future activity.
Perhaps it was absurd for Agee and his collaborators to
bring Halperin's publications to the attention of all readers
of ``CAIB's'' first issue, with its ``Worthwhile'' plug, in a
mistaken belief about their basic orientation. If it was, I,
for one, can easily understand how they made their mistake
because Halperin fooled me, too, on this issue. Clearly, it
was an ``absurd'' mistake for me to believe that anyone else
would ever think that Halperin supported ``CAIB'' or
``CounterSpy'' in any way simply because of the complimentary
notices those Agee magazines gave his publications.

the revolutionary message in the halperin-cpr ``materials list''

Chaired by Halperin, the CPR was so thoroughgoing in its
efforts to discredit U.S. intelligence agencies that it
sought out every possible item that could be used against
them, even peddling buttons proclaiming

[[Page S12418]]

what it deemed appropriate messages. The last section of its
list offered for $1.00 a 2'' diameter button proclaiming ``I
am Kathy Power.''
What did this signify?
Katherine Ann Power (``Kathy'' to her friends, allies and
defenders), charged with murder, armed robbery, theft of
government property and unlawful flight to avoid prosecution,
turned herself in to authorities in September 1993 after 25
years as a fugitive from justice. On the FBI's Ten Most
Wanted list for 14 of those years--longer than any other
woman in history--she had been dropped from it in 1984 for
lack of any clues to her whereabouts. How had she ``made''
the list?
``Kathy,'' sister revolutionary Susan Saxe, and three ex-
convicts--all ``anti-war'' students at Brandeis University--
broke into a National Guard armory in Newburyport, MA, on
September 20, 1970 and stole blasting caps, 400 rounds of
.30-caliber ammunition, radios and a pickup truck in
preparation for their coming revolution against the U.S.
Three days later, they robbed a Boston branch of the State
Street Bank and Trust of $26,000 to help finance that
revolution. As he approached the front door of the bank in
response to a silent alarm, police officer Walter Schroeder,
a 41-year old father of nine, was shot dead when one of the
convicts, acting as a lookout, emptied his machine gun into
the officer's back. Kathy drove the getaway car.
The three convicts were captured shortly thereafter. Power
and Saxe, also wanted for the $6240 holdup of the Bell
Savings and Loan Association in Philadelphia on September 1,
1970, escaped. A thoroughly unrepentant Saxe, captured in
1975, pleaded guilty to all charges the following year.
``Kathy'' Power continued to elude authorities for 18 more
years--a tribute to the effectiveness of the terrorist
underground in the U.S. Since her surrender, she has been
offered $500,000 for her story. State judge Robert Banks,
sentencing her to 8-12 years and 20 years probation for the
robbery-murder, directed that she not profit a penny by her
story or he would change her sentence to life imprisonment,
declaring:
``I will not permit profit from the lifeblood of a Boston
police officer.'' Schroeder's eldest child, Clare, now a
police officer herself, in court at Power's sentencing,
commented, ``He gave his life to protect us from people like
Katherine Power.''
A federal judge later sentenced Power to five years for the
armory robbery (to be served concurrently with the state
sentence) and a $10,000 fine. Power's lawyers and the
Massachusetts ACLU--true to typical ACLU performance--are
appealing the no profit element of her robbery-murder
sentence as violating her First Amendment right to free
expression.
``Kathy's'' crimes were eight years old when the CPR's
Materials List supporting her message of defiance of the FBI
and the U.S. system of justice was released in 1978. By that
time, all her associates in her crimes had either confessed
to, or been convicted of, them. There was little or no
question about the guilt of the revolutionary fugitive who
was still successfully evading the law and justice.
Yet that was when Halperin's CPR chose to defend and
glorify her--``I am Kathy Power''--to hold her up as a model
who merited the support and adulation of the American people.

footnotes

\1\ District Courts: U.S. v. Clay, '70; U.S. v. Smith, '71;
U.S. v. O'Baugh, '69; U.S. v. Brown, '73; U.S. v. Stone, '69;
U.S. v. Hoffman, '71; Circuit Courts of Appeals: 9th (Buck);
5th (Clay, Brown) 3rd (Butenko).
\2\ ``The Nationwide Drive Against Law Enforcement
Intelligence Activities,'' Hearing, Subcommittee on Internal
Security, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
94th Congress, First Session, September 18, 1975. ``Freedom
of Information Act--Appendix'' Hearings, Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, July-
December, 1981, Volume 2, Serial No. J-97-50, pp. 383-430.
``FOIA: A Good Law that Must Be Changed,'' Human Events,
October 29, 1983, pp. 10-13, particularly 13.
``Will `Mr. Anti-Intelligence' Get Key ACLU Post?,'' Human
Events, December 29, 1984, pp. 10-13, 16.
\3\ CPR member organizations included, in addition to
``CounterSpy'' and ``Covert Action Information Bulletin,''
the National Lawyers Guild, cited as a Communist front by
House and Senate investigating committees, the National
Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression and National
Committee Against Repressive Legislation, both cited by the
House Committee on Internal Security; Women Strike for Peace,
by the House Committee; the National Emergency Civil
Liberties Committee, also by both Senate and House
committees, and a considerable number of violence-advocating
groups such as the Black Panther Party and American Indian
Movement, as well as a number of church-affiliated
organizations.

____________________