[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 141 (Thursday, October 3, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12284-S12285]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      ASPEN STRATEGY GROUP RECOMMENDS MEASURES TO REDUCE NUCLEAR 
                          PROLIFERATION THREAT

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, our Nation faces many national security 
challenges in the post-cold war era. I can think of no greater 
challenge than the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. The Aspen Strategy Group, which I chair along with Ken 
Dam, is committed to providing a bipartisan forum within which to 
address this and other national security concerns.
  In August of this year, the Aspen Strategy Group, which included top 
U.S. national security officials and experts, met in Colorado to 
discuss our Nation's proliferation challenges and policies. I believe 
the observations from these meetings, as well as the resulting ideas 
and recommendations, will enhance our Nation's understanding of these 
important issues.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
the Aspen Strategy Group's recommendations related to the threat of 
nuclear proliferation.
  There being no objection, the material was order to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

Bipartisan Aspen Strategy Group Recommends PracticaL Measures to Reduce 
                     Nuclear Proliferation Threats

       The Aspen Strategy Group (ASG), chaired by Senator Sam Nunn 
     and Ken Dam, met in Aspen, Colorado on 10-15 August to 
     examine post-Cold War threats presented by the proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Several top U.S. 
     officials, including the Secretary of Defense, attended the 
     ASG meeting, along with leading experts on weapons 
     proliferation from the United States and other countries. The 
     group reached a general (although not necessarily unanimous) 
     consensus on several points.
       The ASG believes that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction constitutes one of the greatest threats the 
     United States faces in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, 
     controlling WMD proliferation is among our top national 
     security policy priorities.
       Efforts to control WMD proliferation provide a mixture of 
     good news and bad:
       Important progress has been achieved in restraining--even 
     rolling back--nuclear proliferation. The Nuclear 
     Nonproliferation Treaty has been extended indefinitely. The 
     nuclear weapons formerly controlled by Ukraine, Belarus and 
     Kazakhstan have been consolidated in Russian hands. South 
     Africa has voluntarily dismantled its nuclear arsenal. Brazil 
     and Argentina terminated their nuclear efforts, and North 
     Korea has frozen its weapons program. And, most recently, a 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been approved.
       But new threats have also appeared, and they appear 
     particularly difficult to control. Russia continues to 
     present a ``loose nukes'' problem. Moreover, the dangers of 
     biological and chemical weapons proliferation have become 
     more acute. Dual use BW and CW technology is widely 
     available, and such weapons activities are relatively easy to 
     conceal. Subnational groups as well as states have sought 
     (successfully in the case of the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan) 
     to acquire such capabilities. Millenarian or terrorist 
     groups, moreover, may not be susceptible to the rational 
     calculus of deterrents.
       The Aspen Strategy Group believes that, while there is no 
     ``silver bullet'' with which to eliminate threats of WMD 
     proliferation, there are a variety of steps that should be 
     taken to lessen current risks. These include:
       1) Enhance Nunn-Lugar Legislation. The Nunn-Lugar program 
     was designed to improve U.S. security by preventing hostile 
     parties from acquiring the nuclear weapons, materials, and 
     technology of the former Soviet Union. It has achieved 
     demonstrable results. Yet Nunn-Lugar funds have been targeted 
     for cuts by congressional appropriations committees, and 
     critics cite Russian policies vis-a-vis Chechnya, Bosnia or 
     the Middle East as grounds for such cuts.
       The ASG agreed that the Nunn-Lugar legislation is not a 
     favor to Moscow. Rather, it serves the security interests of 
     the United States, and it deserves to be fully funded. The 
     group urges the Administration to exert greater efforts to 
     marshall support for this legislation, and enjoin Congress to 
     extend to it the financial support its success to date 
     warrants.
       2) Ratification of the Chemicals Weapons Convention. 
     Congressional ratification of the CWC is long overdue. While 
     this treaty will not eliminate all CW threats, it does 
     provide significant benefits--not least the assurance that 
     foreign governments will be obligated to monitor terrorist 
     threats.
       Some complain about the treaty's enforcement provisions. 
     But the CWC will soon achieve the ratification by the 65 
     governments that are required for it to go into effect. The 
     ability of the United States to propose modifications and 
     qualifications to the enforcement provisions depends on its 
     being one of the countries ratifying its adoption. Staying 
     out of the treaty, moreover, could place our chemical firms 
     at a commercial disadvantage.

[[Page S12285]]

       Others are concerned that the CWC will not cover the most 
     critical cases, i.e., those in which national governments are 
     determined to develop chemical weapons and seek to evade 
     controls. This may be true, but dealing with these cases will 
     require the effort of international coalitions, and the 
     cooperative process of enacting the CWC will facilitate the 
     establishment of such coalitions. The treaty would also 
     establish international norms for compliance and monitoring, 
     providing objective goals for these coalitions. In light of 
     these benefits, the ASG urges the Congress expeditiously to 
     ratify the CWC.
       (3) Improve federal, state and local capabilities to 
     respond to CW and BW attacks. If a foreign state or terrorist 
     group utilized CW or BW attacks against our people, the first 
     authorities on the scene will be state and local authorities. 
     Thus, cooperation between federal and local authorities is 
     more important than ever, as is cooperation between domestic 
     law enforcement agencies and national intelligence 
     organizations.
       The ASG believes the United States, building on the base 
     established by the Nunn-Lugar legislation and subsequent 
     Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendments, should undertake a more 
     comprehensive effort to develop and coordinate policies for 
     dealing with BW and CW threats. The initial agenda for such a 
     program should include:
       The development of coordinated interagency and federal/
     state/local government plans for responding to a CW and/or BW 
     attack, including the sharing of information, personnel and 
     equipment;
       The review of statutes and other legal institutions 
     necessary for effective cooperation between different levels 
     of government on this issue;
       The promotion of cooperation between government authorities 
     in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries to develop 
     measures to monitor materials that could be used to create 
     chemical and biological agents.
       (4) Review U.S. policy of ``no first use.'' With the end of 
     the Cold War and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, one 
     pillar underlying our reluctance to commit to ``no first 
     use'' of nuclear weapons has disappeared. During the Gulf War 
     the Bush Administration warned Saddam Hussein that any use of 
     chemical or biological weapons would provoke a massive U.S. 
     response--allowing the inference that nuclear weapons might 
     be used. While ASG members held different views about the 
     desirability of translating the Gulf War declaratory policy 
     into a general principle of U.S. policy, they agreed on the 
     importance and timeliness of an official review of this 
     issue.
       (5) Preserve a full-court defense against Iraqi efforts to 
     acquire WMD. Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass 
     destruction in defiance of the international community. 
     Diplomatically, it seeks to initiate United Nations 
     monitoring and remove sanctions. The ASG believes that we 
     must not compromise on the UN enforcement of sanctions on 
     Iraq or its efforts to monitor Iraqi WMD activities. The 
     maintenance of adequate U.S. forces to ensure Iraq's 
     compliance remains essential.
       (6) The role of the media. The ASG urges that the media 
     consider its own role in dealing with issues related to 
     weapons of mass destruction. The widespread availability of 
     sensitive information is a significant factor in the ability 
     of nations and subnational groups to develop WMD. The 
     effectiveness of terrorist groups to employ such weapons for 
     coercion may depend on media reactions. And, if a real or 
     suspected CW or BW attach should occur, the media response 
     (if it stimulated public panic) could greatly complicate the 
     efficacy of official actions.
       These are delicate issues, for they raise questions about 
     civil liberties and freedom of the press. Government 
     officials must be particularly sensitive to these matters in 
     their efforts to address the problem. Yet the media must 
     begin to develop standards for responding to reports of 
     terrorist WMD threats or attacks. Some discussion between 
     representatives of the media and government officials about 
     how the government and the press deal with each other in a 
     crisis and how press freedoms can be reconciled with a need 
     for public order and security would be timely and relevant.

                          ____________________