[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 141 (Thursday, October 3, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1914-E1916]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   SPEECH BY JOHN HOLUM, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 
              AGENCY, ON THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, October 3, 1996

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, since the President signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the United Nations on September 24, 
1996, there are already 100 countries which have followed the U.S. 
lead. This is truly a significant achievement of this President and his 
team led by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Such a diplomatic 
tour de force would not have been possible without the dedicated 
efforts and personal involvement of the Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher and John Holum, Director of ACDA, who were helped by many 
others in and out of the U.S. Government, not to mention the 
contributions of many other nations and individuals.
  This unique achievement was the subject of a speech by Mr. Holum at 
the American Bar Association on September 26, 1996. Mr. Holum, in his 
speech, clearly articulates the CTBT's contribution toward erecting a 
mighty political barrier to any more nuclear explosions

[[Page E1915]]

anywhere and at the same time makes a convincing case of how this 
treaty does not compromise U.S. national security, even as we wait for 
its entry into force. The text follows:

       The crux of my message today is legal, and so I'm grateful 
     for this sophisticated audience of international lawyers, and 
     the chance to discuss the full implications of events earlier 
     this week in New York.
       Two days ago, at the United Nations, President Clinton 
     signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--a major break with 
     the nuclear past, and an immense practical step toward a 
     safer future. It is a landmark achievement for President 
     Clinton, who took a personal and active interest in the 
     effort, and for Secretary Christopher, Secretary O'Leary, 
     National Security Advisor Lake, and many others who played 
     decisive roles.
       ACDA, as you know, had the lead in the negotiations and in 
     the backstopping in Washington. That means I'm realizing 
     these days what Casey Stengel said when he defined managing 
     as ``getting paid for home runs someone else hits.'' For this 
     above all is an achievement of a remarkable team of 
     negotiators, policy analysts and advisors, technical experts, 
     secretaries and clerks--and, of course, lawyers, most of whom 
     you know very well, including Tom Graham, Tom's successor as 
     ACDA's General Counsel Mary Lib Hoinkes, and Marshall Brown 
     and Peter Mason, who carried the legal ball in Geneva.
       For my own part, aside from relevant internal management 
     and the interagency effort to craft negotiable positions, 
     early on I saw one contribution I could make on the scene in 
     Geneva. It began when the negotiations opened in January 
     1994, and I went there and made a speech on the test ban to a 
     plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament. I 
     threatened to keep coming back about every six months and 
     making more speeches until the Treaty was completed. And I 
     make good on that threat.
       The only problem turned out to be that India apparently 
     really liked those speeches--and so was prepared to keep the 
     negotiations going for many more years to come.
       As you know, that obstacle was surmounted. And so we have 
     completed an effort that has been building since the fallout 
     fears of the 1950s, the verification jockeying of the 1960s, 
     the ``missile gap'' perceptions of the 1970s, the further 
     MIRVing of the 1980s, and now the strategic reductions of the 
     1990s.
       Ever since the Trinity test made glass of the desert sand 
     near Alamagordo, New Mexico in 1945, testing has proved a 
     hard habit to break. Partial measures--the Limited Test Ban 
     Treaty of 1963, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the 
     Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976--curbed its most 
     frightening environmental harms, but hardly broke its 
     military momentum. Indeed, most of the world's nuclear tests 
     have occurred in the years since 1963, when the LTBT drove 
     them underground. And with continued testing, nuclear arms 
     capabilities have proliferated horizontally to more 
     countries, and vertically, to fearsome heights of power, 
     portability, and efficiency.
       Still, for all the Treaty's historic importance, its 
     practical effect is widely underestimated. Indeed, the entry 
     into force provision probably has received more attention 
     than all the rest of the Treaty combined. For that provision, 
     as you know, establishes as indispensable for entry into 
     force a group of countries that have in common Conference on 
     Disarmament membership and either nuclear power or research 
     reactors--a total of 44 nations. Among them is India. India 
     says it won't sign. That, it is said, makes the Treaty a 
     nullity.
       Today I want to discuss with you just one issue, which is 
     why that proposition is wrong--why the CTBT, as it stands, in 
     fact means that more than half a century of nuclear testing 
     is over, at least as surely as anything ever can be in 
     international affairs
       I'll address that based upon both the Treaty's political 
     effect and its legal effect now, as well as what we intend to 
     do bring it formally into force.


                    The Political Effect of the CTBT

       The CTBT's political effect has already been considerable. 
     All five declared nuclear weapon states have already stopped 
     testing, in anticipation of the Treaty and under the 
     spotlight of the negotiations. Most recently that has 
     included China. Remember that it also includes a French 
     government under President Chirac that hardly anyone thought 
     would agree to this step.
       The restraining effect was powerfully reinforced when 
     virtually all of the now-61 members of the Conference on 
     Disarmament agreed on the text that Chairman Jaap Ramaker of 
     the negotiating committee drew out of nearly three years of 
     painstaking negotiation. For the first time in history, all 
     five of the declared nuclear weapon states accepted not only 
     the principle of a test ban, but every clause of a completed 
     text. At the last minute in Geneva, India was joined only by 
     Iran in blocking consensus--but then Iran voted for the 
     Treaty in New York, so 60 out of 61 CD members came to be in 
     favor.
       Next, through an initiative by Australia, an overwhelming 
     margin of UN members--158 to 3--voted in New York to 
     approve the Treaty and open it for signature. On that vote 
     India was joined only by its client state Bhutan and by 
     Libya.
       Now we are in the midst of the next step--countries signing 
     and ratifying the Treaty. Thus far 80 countries have done so, 
     including all five of the nuclear weapon states, who signed 
     in succession on Tuesday. Israel also has signed.
       The world is acting with unanimity and resolve, in part 
     because we are not so much making new promises as fulfilling 
     existing ones. In particular, in last May's review and 
     extension conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty, there was no dissent to the decision either to make 
     the NPT permanent or to conclude a CTBT no later than this 
     year. And last December the UN General Assembly resolved, by 
     consensus, for an even faster test ban timetable.
       What has happened is this: There was considerable sympathy 
     in Geneva and New York for the lofty disarmament mandates in 
     which India wrapped its positions. But there was no sympathy 
     whatsoever for any more nuclear tests by anyone, anywhere, 
     for any purpose. There was certainly no sympathy for the idea 
     that one state should present itself as the world's agent to 
     threaten its own nuclear tests as leverage for further 
     disarmament by others. Instead, the countries of the world 
     were determined to validate the work of the Conference on 
     Disarmament, and claim a forty year dream that could no 
     longer be deferred.
       In so doing, no matter what else happens, they have erected 
     a mighty political barrier against nuclear testing. They have 
     declared unmistakably that henceforth the world community 
     will view it as out of bounds for any state. In all 
     likelihood that, alone, will be enough to preclude further 
     nuclear explosions.


                  the legal effect of signing the ctbt

       But there's a strong argument that the CTBT is considerably 
     more than a high political barrier against testing--that the 
     Treaty signings well underway this week erect a legal barrier 
     as well.
       As you know, under customary international law as codified 
     in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
     Treaties, a signatory is obliged, pending ratification, to 
     refrain from any action that would defeat its object and 
     purpose. Broadly speaking, the CTBT's object and purpose is 
     to halt nuclear explosive testing. But we also need to ask, 
     ``Why?'' If the sole aim of the Treaty is to prevent the 
     spread of nuclear weapons to more countries, for example, 
     then arguably its object and purpose would not be defeated if 
     countries that already have such weapons conduct further 
     tests.
       Fortunately, we are not left guessing, for the CTBT text 
     speaks to this issue. The Preamble declares, in pertinent 
     part:
       ``The States Parties to this Treaty . . . Convinced that 
     the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all 
     other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and 
     qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the 
     development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, 
     constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and 
     non-proliferation in all its aspects . . .
       It is fair to assume that the parties, being ``convinced'' 
     of these effects, intend them. The nuclear explosive testing 
     to be stopped by the Treaty is conducted both to develop 
     nuclear weapons and to improve them. Accordingly, as 
     indicated by its Preamble, the CTBT's objective and purpose 
     is to arrest both horizontal and vertical proliferation--not 
     only the spread of nuclear weapons to the ``have nots,'' but 
     also their qualitative improvement by the ``haves.''
       The text of the CTBT has always reflected this dual 
     purpose. The United States expectation has been affirmed many 
     times, at the highest possible level. Most recently, after he 
     signed the Treaty Tuesday, President Clinton told the UN 
     General Assembly:
       ``The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will help to prevent 
     the nuclear powers from developing more advanced and more 
     dangerous weapons. It will limit the ability to other states 
     to acquire such devices themselves.''
       Having identified the Treaty's objects and purposes, the 
     next step is to determine whether they would be defeated by 
     testing. Over the years the United States has developed two 
     basic principles for applying the Vienna Convention rule. 
     First a signatory must take no action that would render its 
     eventual full compliance impossible. Second, it must take no 
     action that would render impossible, at entry into force, re-
     establishment of the status quote for the signatory as of 
     when it signed. In these ways, the rule prevents a signatory 
     from taking advantage of the situation to effectively deprive 
     other parties of the benefits of their bargain.
       By these standards, for example, a country probably could 
     continue to produce chemical weapons after signing the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention, because those made in the 
     interval could still be destroyed, re-establishing the status 
     quo.
       Nuclear explosive testing, however, is done to produce 
     something that is not so destructible: knowledge--or 
     specifically experimental data about whether and how nuclear 
     weapons work. And such knowledge, once gained, cannot be 
     rescinded. Once a country conducts a nuclear test, it cannot 
     unlearn the resulting information. Indeed, even if the test 
     data is not used today in weapons design, it remain available 
     tomorrow for analysis and exploitation. A nuclear explosion 
     is a bell that cannot be un-rung.
       Yet denial of such experimental data is the heart of the 
     CTBT bargain. For all countries, the CTBT aims to pull the 
     plug on the primary escalator up the nuclear weapons learning 
     curve. So for any country to conduct a nuclear explosive test 
     would be to deprive other countries of the benefit of their 
     bargain--denial of the technological fruits of that activity 
     to the testing country.

[[Page E1916]]

       It might be argued, of course, that a test could be 
     conducted for a purpose entirely unrelated to those stated in 
     the Treaty--for example, to make sure an existing weapon 
     won't explode accidentally. But the Treaty negotiators 
     concluded, in part at our insistence, that even nuclear 
     explosions confirmed as entirely peaceful are precluded, 
     because they can't be distinguished from tests with 
     weapons value. Some of you may have heard me refer to so-
     called ``peaceful nuclear explosions'' as the atomic 
     equivalent of a friendly punch in the nose. Whether or not 
     it accepted the characterization, the CD agreed with the 
     conclusion and outlawed PNEs.
       In short, because a test cannot be undone, and the 
     resultant data will not disappear, it is reasonable to 
     conclude that any further testing would defeat the CTBT's 
     object and purpose, and thus is precluded by any signatory 
     state--that if a country signs the CTBT, it is legally bound 
     not to test, whether or not it has ratified, and whether or 
     not the Treaty is in force.


             the u.s. is protected pending entry into force

       Does this mean the U.S. has signed on to a bad security 
     bargain, because we cannot test while others, who haven't 
     signed, can press ahead?
       First, it is important, of course, that all the declared 
     nuclear weapon states, having sighed, are bound to the same 
     extent we are.
       Moreover, note that the obligation not to frustrate the 
     object and purpose of the Treaty does not usurp the Senate's 
     constitutional role of advice and consent to ratification. So 
     if we decide based on international developments that 
     restraint is no longer in our interest, we simply have to 
     provide an authoritative national signal that we no longer 
     intend to ratify the Treaty, and we will no longer be 
     constrained. This is considerably simpler than invoking the 
     ``supreme national interest' clause after ratification to 
     withdraw from the CTBT according to its terms.
       Meanwhile, we can do a great deal to assess whether other 
     countries are holding to the bargain. Even before entry into 
     force, we have excellent and improving capabilities to 
     monitor compliance.
       This baseline confidence derives from our National 
     Technical Means for detecting nuclear explosions--seismic 
     techniques we've been working on for more than 35 years, our 
     satellite nuclear burst detection system, and other assets. 
     Over the years, our seismologists and other scientists have 
     made great strides in event detection, location, and 
     identification--giving us truly sensitive seismic arrays and 
     other forensic techniques of extraordinary utility. Recent 
     strides in computer modeling and data integration are further 
     improving our capabilities. Such efforts have been spurred by 
     the President's call last year to heighten confidence even at 
     very low yields. So even pending the Treaty's entry into 
     force, our national abilities to monitor nuclear testing will 
     stand us in good stead.


          we will not rest until the treaty enters into force

       Does all this mean our diplomatic job is done? Obviously 
     not. Formal entry into force remains indispensable. For only 
     this will bring into being the CTBT's full apparatus for 
     verifying compliance, including the International 
     Monitoring. System with four different kinds of sensors, 
     and its International Data Center, where data from these 
     sensors will be compiled, analyzed, integrated and shared. 
     And the Treaty's provision for on-site inspections is an 
     important means of detecting and deterring cheaters--
     especially in light of recent and emerging advances in 
     detecting the slightest traces of radioactivity that 
     linger for weeks in the vicinity of even a small and well-
     hidden nuclear explosion.
       This is no time to break strike in the hard climb toward 
     entry into force. For we know that a state violating a treaty 
     commitment is even more of a pariah than one violating a 
     powerful international norm . . . that evidence of any 
     violation is all the more credible when every nation has a 
     state and a voice in its discovery . . . that any would-be 
     testing state is less likely to proceed if it has made a 
     conscious decision not to, instead of chafing against an 
     international opinion it does not share.
       It is deeply in our interest for the CTBT to be a binding 
     legal commitment on every country--and for every country to 
     participate in its enforcement. So we are determined to bring 
     it into force.


                               CONCLUSION

       More than 30 years ago, John F. Kennedy said of a CTBT, 
     ``The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and yet so far, 
     would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most 
     dangerous areas. And it would place the nuclear posers in a 
     position to deal more effectively with . . . the further 
     spread of nuclear arms.'' President Kennedy was right on all 
     counts. And his vision is now being realized--a truth to 
     celebrate and savor.
       Nuclear weapons have been explored twice in war--and more 
     than 2,000 times in contemplation of war, at more than 20 
     locations around the globe. And all the while, the world's 
     store of knowledge about how the work has continued to 
     mushroom.
       Now, after five decades of testing and four decades of 
     calls to end it, the world has said, ``enough.'' At long last 
     we have erected a powerful barrier to further testing.
       Let us do out utmost to buttress it, bring it into force--
     and then enforce it for all nations, for all time.
       For as we do, we will ensure that nuclear explosions were 
     known to our century alone--and as the President said at the 
     UN, enter ``a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear 
     weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated.''
       With the era of nuclear testing at an end, we are a giant 
     step closer to that ultimate goal.

                          ____________________