[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 140 (Wednesday, October 2, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12198-S12200]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

 Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, last week marked the 35th 
anniversary of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, whose 
purpose is to reduce threats to the United States through arms control, 
nonproliferation, and disarmament. It is the only agency of its kind in 
the U.S. Government, or, in fact, the world.
  This is a bittersweet anniversary for the agency. On the one hand, it 
just has witnessed the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 
New York. ACDA was at the forefront of advocating and negotiating this 
treaty, which represents an historic achievement by banning all nuclear 
explosions worldwide.
  On the other hand, however, arms control efforts have just been dealt 
a great setback by virtue of the Senate's decision not to take up the 
Chemical Weapons Convention this year. I would like to take this 
opportunity to express my strong support for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention [CWC] and my concern over the delay in giving advice and 
consent to its ratification.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention is an unprecedented international 
agreement designed to eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass 
destruction. Unlike earlier protocols which prohibit only the use of 
chemical weapons, this Convention aims at stopping their production, 
transfer, and storage by providing incentives to participation, 
verification of compliance, and penalties for violation. It now has 
been signed by 160 countries and ratified by 64. The United States is 
the only G-7 country not to have ratified it. All of our major trading 
partners have done so. And many of the countries whose adherence is 
most important will not ratify it if the United States does not.
  The CWC has been before the Senate for consideration for nearly 3 
years now. During that period, Senators from every relevant committee 
have had ample opportunity to examine the convention and to address the 
issues that have been raised in connection with it. The Foreign 
Relations Committee, for example, has held 8 public hearings and 1 
closed hearing, with 31 separate witnesses, along with numerous 
briefings in open and closed session, since the spring of 1994. The 
Armed Services Committee has held three hearings on the military 
implications of the treaty, and additional hearings have been held in 
the Intelligence Committee, the Governmental Affairs Committee, and, 
more recently, the Judiciary Committee. On April 25, 1996, the Foreign 
Relations Committee reported a bipartisan resolution of ratification, 
addressing all the major issues that were raised during the course of 
consideration of the convention.
  This treaty will not make the threat of chemical weapons 
automatically disappear from the face of the earth. But it will 
constrain the proliferation of chemical weapons, it will establish 
international norms and standards against them, and it will make it 
harder for rogue regimes and terrorists to gain access to them. It will 
deter covert chemical weapons programs by making them much more 
difficult and expensive--legally, morally, and financially--to 
maintain. There is currently no legal regime prohibiting the 
development, production, storage, and transfer of chemical weapons, and 
therefore no legal basis on which to challenge chemical weapons 
programs.
  I believe there are three major reasons why this treaty will serve 
American interests, and why a failure to ratify it could have 
devastating repercussions.
  First, the CWC requires others to join us in doing something we 
already plan to do. As a matter of U.S. policy we have already decided 
to destroy our current stockpile of chemical weapons. There is a 
provision in law, first signed by President Reagan, that we eliminate 
our chemical weapons by the year 2004. We are going to do that 
regardless of what happens with this treaty, because we think that is a 
wise thing to do. The leaders of our military services have agreed that 
we can effectively deter the use of chemical weapons without 
threatening retaliation in kind. In short, we don't need chemical 
weapons and we don't want them.
  The value of this treaty is that it brings along many other countries 
in

[[Page S12199]]

agreeing to do the same thing. So rather than taking a unilateral 
action, we will be establishing a basis for others to take similar 
action. As Lt. Gen. Wesley Clark, Director of Strategic Plans and 
Policy in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told the 
Foreign Relations Committee:

       The convention's imposition of an internationally 
     recognizable obligation to destroy all chemical weapons 
     essentially places all other CW capable state parties on an 
     equal footing with the United States. Because of the 
     convention's trade restrictions and provisions, proliferators 
     outside the convention will find it increasingly more 
     difficult to acquire the chemical precursors essential to 
     building a chemical weapons stockpile.

  Similarly, Stanley Weiss, chairman of Business Executives for 
National Security, wrote in the Washington Times:

       Without the treaty, the United States can only act 
     unilaterally against nations like China, believed to be 
     assisting Iran to develop chemical weapons. With the CWC in 
     force, those countries who do business with rogue nations run 
     the risk of being cut from nearly every trading nation on the 
     planet.

  The second major reason this treaty is in our interests is because it 
will provide us with better information about what other countries are 
doing in the area of chemical weapons. We know that the verification 
regime in this treaty is not perfect. There will probably be countries 
or agencies that will cheat on this agreement, and there are others who 
may not sign it. But if we are party to the treaty, we will have an 
opportunity to investigate and inspect potential violations. We will 
have access to information about what those countries are doing. In 
fact, Secretary of Defense Perry argued:

       . . .while we recognize that detecting illicit production 
     of small quantities of CW will be extremely difficult, we 
     also recognize that would be even more difficult without a 
     CWC. In fact, the CWC verification regime, through its 
     declaration, routine inspection, fact-finding, consultation 
     and challenge inspections, should prove effective in 
     providing a wealth of information on possible CW programs 
     that simply would not be available without the convention.

  Likewise, then-CIA Director James Woolsey noted that ``We will know 
more about the state of chemical warfare preparations in the world with 
the treaty than we would know without it.''
  The point is that we are going to have to monitor potential 
violations in either case. Regardless of whether there is a treaty or 
not, regardless of whether we ratify it or not, our intelligence 
agencies will need to collect information about chemical weapons 
production and possession by other countries. But if we participate in 
the Convention, we will have more avenues to learn about those 
violations, and we will have an opportunity that we otherwise would not 
have to conduct challenge inspections.
  Moreover, any violations that are discovered will be made known to 
the world and receive universal condemnation. The treaty in effect 
creates an international mechanism for identifying and exposing 
violators. As Secretary of State Christopher pointed out to the Foreign 
Relations Committee, ``By ratifying the Convention, we will add the 
force and weight of the entire international community to our efforts 
to assure the destruction of Russian chemical stocks. Our action will 
also spur other nations such as China to ratify and join the regime.'' 
An op-ed by Amy Smithson in the Baltimore Sun last year noted that 
``the Senate's consent to ratification of the CWC would help open 
Russian storage sites to international scrutiny, allowing inspectors to 
inventory and secure these weapons. If the Senate ratifies the treaty, 
which will ban the development, production, stockpiling and use of 
chemical weapons, pressure will increase for Russia to do the same.''
  Third, a failure to ratify would put U.S. interests at a distinct 
disadvantage. If the CWC enters into force without us, then U.S. 
chemical manufacturers will immediately find themselves under economic 
sanctions. They will immediately have to obtain end-user certificates 
for the sale of certain chemicals abroad, and after 3 years they will 
not be able to export them at all. Indeed, a letter signed by the CEO's 
of 53 of the largest chemical firms in the country warns as follows:

       Our industry's status as the world's preferred supplier of 
     chemical products may be jeopardized if the U.S. does not 
     ratify the Convention. If the Senate does not vote in favor 
     of the CWC, we stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars 
     in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of good-paying 
     American jobs.

  So the consequences of not approving the treaty will be very 
considerable both on U.S. industry and for our overall national 
interests. Unfortunately, this appears to be a situation in which 
partisan political considerations have played an important role. On 
this point, I ask that three editorials, from the Washington Post, the 
New York Times, and the Baltimore Sun, be inserted in the Record at the 
conclusion of my remarks.
  Some of the arguments that have been made against this treaty are 
very difficult to follow. On the one hand, opponents have argued that 
it does not allow anytime, anywhere inspections, and thus that some 
violations might go undetected. But it was the Bush administration that 
decided, as a matter of protecting U.S. national interests, that we did 
not want to have anytime, anywhere inspections because that would 
jeopardize our trade secrets and national security, and possibly 
violate constitutional rights. So it was the United States, under a 
Republican administration, that decided not to include unrestricted 
inspections.
  On the other hand, opponents contend that the treaty is too intrusive 
and allows international investigators too much latitude in inspecting 
U.S. facilities. I find this argument surprising when the chemical 
manufacturers themselves are strongly supporting this treaty. In the 
letter that I cited earlier, the CEO's state:

       Our industry participated in negotiating the agreement and 
     in U.S. and international implementation efforts. The treaty 
     contains substantial protections for confidential business 
     information (CBI). We know, because industry helped to draft 
     the CBI provisions. Chemical companies also helped test the 
     draft CWC reporting system, and we tested the on-site 
     inspection procedures that will help verify compliance with 
     the treaty. In short, our industry has thoroughly examined 
     and tested this Convention. We have concluded that the 
     benefits of the CWC far outweigh the costs.

  How can it be argued that the inspections regime is too rigorous, and 
at the very same time that it is not rigorous enough? Both the Bush 
administration and the Clinton administration, after thorough review, 
have concluded that the balance obtained in this treaty is fair and 
reasonable. As former President Bush wrote in a letter to Senators Pell 
and Lugar in July 1994:

       The United States worked hard to ensure that the Convention 
     could be effectively verified. At the same time, we sought 
     the means to protect both United States security interests 
     and commercial capabilities. I am convinced that the 
     Convention we signed served both objectives, effectively 
     banning chemical weapons without creating an unnecessary 
     burden on legitimate activities.

  Mr. President, this is a Convention that was negotiated and signed by 
Republican administrations and has received broad bipartisan support. 
We have heard testimony from the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
about the importance of this treaty to U.S. national interests. Gen. 
John Shalikashvili testified that ``from a military perspective, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly in our national interest.'' 
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, along with Attorney General 
Janet Reno, wrote in a recent op-ed for the Washington Post:

       The case for ratification is compelling on both military 
     and law enforcement grounds. . . . Destroying existing 
     chemical weapons and preventing potential enemies from 
     obtaining them will unmistakably strengthen America's 
     defense, which is why both Presidents Reagan and Bush, 
     together with America's military leaders, have strongly 
     supported the conclusion of such a treaty. . . .By moving 
     forward on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States 
     also will greatly improve its law enforcement capabilities 
     for investigating and prosecuting those who plan chemical-
     weapons attacks. . . . To increase the battlefield safety of 
     our troops and fight terror here and around the globe, the 
     Senate should ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention now.

  I think it is unfortunate that the treaty has been deferred until 
next year. Here we had an opportunity to move forward on an agreement 
that clearly would promote American interests, increase American 
security, and preserve American leadership. I regret that was not done, 
and I urge that it be taken up promptly in the next Congress.
  The articles follow:

               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1996]

                            Treaty Turnabout

       For the better part of a decade Sen. Robert Dole was a part 
     of the legion of Republicans,

[[Page S12200]]

     including Ronald Reagan, George Bush, James Baker, Brent 
     Scowcroft, Colin Powell and Richard Lugar, who supported 
     writing a treaty to outlaw poison gas. Last week, on the eve 
     of a Senate vote on ratification, Mr. Dole indicated that he 
     had changed his mind and joined the opposition to the treaty 
     of his former Senate colleagues Trent Lott, Jesse Helms, Jon 
     Kyl and others.
       It is hard to believe the political campaign had nothing to 
     do with the candidate's flip-flop, although Mr. Dole does 
     cite reasons. He suggests he had reservations about the 
     treaty's coverage--the rogue states that are its prime target 
     will surely reject it--and about its enforceability, which 
     under the best of circumstances will not be foolproof. Others 
     who are not running for office have also cited these views, 
     but we think there are strong arguments against them. The 
     treaty does not immediately reach the rogues, but it does 
     create a legal and political framework in which they can be 
     better isolated and pursued. The implicit opposition 
     alternative of a treaty with full coverage simply does not 
     exist. Again, enforcement will not be total under this 
     treaty, but here is a case where the best is the enemy of the 
     good. Enforcement will be better than it is without a treaty, 
     and practice can make it better still.
       Mr. Dole cites the situation of American chemical companies 
     which, he believes, would suffer under unacceptably intrusive 
     inspection obligations. But the companies themselves have 
     greeted the treaty as a welcome and bearable liberation of 
     their exports from the onus of contributing to rogue chemical 
     stocks. The former majority leader seems unaware that the 
     ``unilateral chemical disarmament'' that he now opposes was 
     begun by President Reagan. The American military does not 
     want a weapon that is irrelevant to deterrence and more 
     dangerous to handle than any conceivable battlefield benefit 
     warrants.
       The treaty has been pulled, not killed. In other political 
     circumstances, it can be sent back up to the Senate. But 
     meanwhile, the ratifications of other states will bring it 
     into effect. As a result, the American government will be 
     frozen out of the treaty's initial application--this can only 
     warm the poison gas crowd--and the American chemical industry 
     will risk a cutoff of tens of billions of dollars in exports. 
     We don't believe that's in the United States' national 
     interest or Mr. Dole's, for that matter.
                                                                    ____


               [From the New York Times, Sept. 15, 1996]

                      Mr. Dole Bumps a Good Treaty

       It is not uncommon for election-year politics to 
     contaminate Congressional lawmaking, but a vitally important 
     international treaty should not be cynically sacrificed for 
     political advantage. That is what happened last week when Bob 
     Dole reached back into the Senate to block the expected 
     approval of an agreement banning the development, production, 
     stockpiling, sale and use of chemical weapons.
       In so doing, Mr. Dole derailed a treaty negotiated by the 
     Administrations of his Republican brethren Ronald Reagan and 
     George Bush, and supported by Republicans and Democrats. 
     Though Mr. Dole offered many policy objections, the real 
     point was to pick a fight with President Clinton and deny him 
     the afterglow of a diplomatic achievement.
       As the Senate vote approached last week, Mr. Dole, who had 
     not previously opposed the agreement, chimed in with a letter 
     to the majority leader, Trent Lott, urging that approval be 
     withheld until the accord had been accepted by virtually 
     every other country in the world and there was assurance that 
     even the smallest violations could be detected. Fearing they 
     could no longer count on the 67 votes needed for approval, 
     treaty sponsors pulled the measure, dooming it in this 
     Congress. It can be brought back for a vote next year.
       No treaty can absolutely prevent terrorists and other 
     outlaws from smuggling small quantities of chemical weapons. 
     But the Chemical Weapons Convention, already signed by 160 
     nations and ratified by 63, could make it much harder for 
     countries like Iraq, or criminals like the group that 
     unleashed lethal sarin gas in the Tokyo subways last year, to 
     obtain toxic chemicals or their ingredients.
       American military leaders, responsible politicians of both 
     parties and the American chemical industry all favor the 
     treaty.
       The convention, including its verification system and 
     severe restrictions on chemical purchases from countries that 
     have not ratified, is now likely to go into effect without 
     the United States, potentially costing the American chemical 
     industry billions of dollars in lost exports.
       Mr. Dole complained that the convention imposed intrusive 
     paperwork on American industry and risked the trade secrets 
     of American chemical manufacturers. But the agreement's 
     inspection and paperwork provisions were negotiated in close 
     cooperation with the chemical industry.
       The United States is already destroying most of its own 
     chemical weapons arsenal, and current Pentagon doctrine 
     excludes the use of these weapons even in response to a 
     chemical attack.
       Mr. Dole's new scorched-earth strategy in Congress was not 
     limited to the chemical weapons treaty. To insure that the 
     President cannot claim credit for enactment of an immigration 
     bill this year, Mr. Dole is now pressing to give states the 
     right to deny a public education to the children of illegal 
     immigrants. He knows that provision would lead either to 
     defeat the bill in the Senate or to a Clinton veto.
       At least this particular maneuver would do little harm 
     since the immigration bill is filled with other unacceptable 
     provisions. But imperiling the Chemical Weapons Convention is 
     trifling with the national interest. It is a measure of his 
     desperation that Mr. Dole would seek to stir his becalmed 
     campaign by blocking such an important and beneficial treaty.
                                                                    ____


                [From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 14, 1996]

                  Dole's Re-Entry Into Senate Affairs

       So great is the Republican impulse to deny President 
     Clinton bill-signing ceremonies before the November election 
     that his opponent, Bob Dole, has slipped into a negative 
     posture that strikes us as dumb politics. Acting somewhat as 
     Senate majority leader in absentia, Citizen Dole has used his 
     influence with some former colleagues to ditch two key pieces 
     of legislation--a wide-ranging reform of immigration laws and 
     ratification of a Chemical Weapons Convention crafted during 
     the Bush administration.
       Both measures are believed to have fairly wide public 
     support. Both are now in coma due to poison pill amendments 
     prescribed by Mr. Dole. One can only hope that after election 
     passions wane, wiser counsels will prevail.
       The roadblock on immigration reform is due to a Dole-backed 
     amendment that would allow states to deny public schooling to 
     children of illegal immigrants. ``I can't believe they are 
     doing this,'' lamented Sen. Alan Simpson, R-Wyo., an ally of 
     the GOP nominee for president.
       The treaty dealing with poison gas was put on the back 
     burner after the Clinton administration spurned killer 
     amendments that would have prevented its implementation until 
     Iraq, Libya and North Korea ratify it, thus giving these 
     rogue states veto power. Another Republican, Sen. Richard 
     Lugar of Indiana, said the whole process has been 
     ``politicized'' in ways harmful to U.S. foreign policy.
       The Chemical Manufacturers Association, fearful of setbacks 
     in international trade, complained that treaty opponents have 
     ``disfigured and distorted [it] beyond recognition.'' But 
     hard-line unilateralists, such as Sens. Jesse Helms and Jon 
     Kyl, contend that international controls under the convention 
     would add to the costs of small chemical companies.
       It is a shame that a treaty aimed at reducing stockpiles of 
     mustard gas, nerve agents and other deadly chemicals has 
     fallen victim to U.S. domestic politics. This country was its 
     foremost advocate, not least because an estimated 30,000 tons 
     of Russian chemical weapons are vulnerable to theft and 
     misuse by terrorists and pariah governments. Now Moscow can 
     continue to abstain. Now the votes of only a handful of 
     foreign nations can put the treaty into effect without U.S. 
     participation.
       Just as the U.S. needs to control immigration, so it needs 
     to play a leading role in policing a treaty that would ban 
     manufacture as well as use of chemical weaponry. Once the 
     election is over, both issues require resurrection.

                          ____________________