[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 139 (Tuesday, October 1, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12080-S12090]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
REFLECTIONS ON PROGRESS IN CIVIL RIGHTS
Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, during my 18 years as a U.S. Senator,
legislation of all sorts and in all issue areas has come before this
body. Of course there were some issues I came to know best, sometimes
because of the nature of my constituency, as was the case with
agriculture and technology issues. But there are other topics the
Senate addressed during this time which stand
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out in my mind for different reasons, such as judiciary and legal
issues and national defense policy. Naturally, since I have a
background in the law, I have a greater personal interest here than I
do some other areas. But, of all the judicial work the Senate has
tackled during my 18 years, its accomplishments in the area of general
civil rights strike me as among its most commendable.
Since 1979, congressional action in the field of civil rights has
been enormously significant. I think it would be appropriate to
highlight some of these issues and events.
Of all the bills relating to civil rights, perhaps first in my mind
is the extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which passed during
my first term. The fair housing bill, which enforced the provisions of
the Fair Housing Act of 1968, also stands out. Another was the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1991, which ensured that discrimination would
not be tolerated in the workplace. But there were others, including the
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Holiday and Holiday Commission bills, the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, the reauthorization of the Civil
Rights Commission, and the Congress' efforts to save the Legal Services
Corporation from the Reagan administration's cuts.
When the Congress considered each of these bills, Members on both
sides took positions reflecting very different philosophies. But I
believe that the need to reconcile various points of view is the
essence of progress in civil rights. For this reason, I am extremely
proud of the Senate for working out the necessary accords to pass these
bills.
In addition to these specific bills, I am also very proud of the
Senate for its advice and consent role in nominations for the Federal
Judiciary and executive positions that affected the civil rights
movement. During the time since my election, the Senate ensured the
continued transition of the South from the 1950's into the next
century. Many ills had yet to be addressed, and the Senate confirmed a
number of individuals who will fight to resolve these ills and voted
down some who might have furthered them.
In 1980, the Senate confirmed the first black district judges in
Alabama. The Congress also worked to preserve the legacy of several
judges from Alabama who had accomplished much in the area of civil
rights, including Justice Hugo Black, Judge Frank Johnson, and Judge
Robert Vance. All of these men furthered the cause of racial progress.
When it came to nominations, I would also like to note that the
Senate occasionally felt it had to oppose some nominees, because it
feared that these individuals might impinge on the enforcement of laws
to protect individual rights. These nominees included some Federal
judicial nominees as well as executive officials. But in each case, I
did my best to remain open-minded until all of the facts were available
and the arguments had been made. I might best compare my view of a
Senator's role in the confirmation process to that of a judge rather
than an advocate.
When it came to some of these bills and nominations, it happened that
my own personal perspective and conscience compelled me to vote
differently than some of my constituents might have liked. This was
particularly true in some instances, including my very painful decision
to oppose the special treatment extension of the insignia patent for
the Daughters of the American Confederacy, which I will discuss later.
My goal here is to reflect upon some of the major
legislation, nominations, and issues which have dominated the Senate's
civil rights debate since I have been here.
Grove City College Civil Rights Restoration Bill
In 1984, I supported the passage of a bill known as Grove City.
Formally known as the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, it did not
pass until 1988. With this bill, the Congress essentially sought to
restore civil rights guaranteed under several major laws restricted by
the Supreme Court. It had a number of opponents among the religious
community, especially, since abortion became a major controversy
surrounding the bill. In fact, the Congress ultimately needed to
override a veto to pass the bill.
Grove City took its name from a February 28, 1984, Supreme Court
decision, Grove City College versus Bell. With this ruling, the Court
altered the interpretation of title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. It found that this law, which prohibited sex discrimination in
federally funded institutions, applied only to the particular program
or activity directly receiving the funds. Therefore, the entire school
was not bound by the antidiscrimination language.
Perhaps the reason the Grove City case was so significant was its
potential impact on three other civil rights laws. These laws were the
Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination Act, and the Rehabilitation
Act, all of which used practically the same language. The Court had
clearly abridged the Government's rights and abilities to fight
discrimination.
According to its stated purpose, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987 sought to restore the ``broad, institution-wide application'' of
Federal antidiscrimination laws. It pertained to each of the four civil
rights laws, and like its previous incarnations, it sought to redefine
``program or activity.''
In 1988, Grove City became Public Law 100-259. But I wasn't
necessarily pleased that the fight had been so hard. I had tremendous
political pressure on me to oppose it. Immediately after I voted for
the override, the vote was referred to as ``another nail in my
coffin.'' To put these thoughts in context, I received over 6,000
contacts, including phone calls or letters from constituents who
criticized me for supporting the bill.
But I think that it was worth the fight. After its passage, the
National Black Law Journal characterized the bill in these terms:
The passage of S. 557 sends a clear signal: discrimination
is illegal and will be prohibited through broad enforcement
of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. Consequently,
the enactment of S. 557 closes a major loophole in our civil
rights laws and preserves two decades of hard-won civil
rights for all Americans.
The Fair Housing Bill
Since my first year as a Senator in 1979, civil rights activists had
been pushing the Congress for legislation to amend the 1968 Fair
Housing Act, and I supported their efforts. However, a broad bill
intended to enforce the provisions of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 did
not pass the Congress until 1988.
My efforts in that first Congress included attaching a provision to
the bill to allow discrimination complaints to be heard by HUD
administrative law judges. A compromise version of this idea appeared
in the final 1988 law.
In 1979, several national surveys spurred a House subcommittee to
pass a fair housing bill. HUD Secretary Harris testified that it was
necessary to improve the 1968 act. The act, she said, ``. . . defined
and prohibited discriminatory housing practices but failed to include
the enforcement tools necessary to prevent such practices and provide
relief to victims of discrimination.''
A companion bill appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee in
the summer of the next year, 1980. During its markups, the committee
adopted several of my amendments. One would allow HUD discrimination
suits to be heard by administrative law judges. These judges would be
appointed by a Fair Housing Review Commission authorized by the bill,
and the President would appoint the commissioners. The Fair Housing
Review Commission would have the authority to review and modify cases.
The second of my amendments would limit suits to individuals who
actually sought fair housing and who felt they had been victims of
discrimination.
By this time, the House had passed its version. Its supporters
included the NAACP, the AFL-CIO, the UAW, the League of Women Voters,
and the ACLU. President Carter was also among this group, calling the
bill ``the most critical civil rights legislation before the Congress
in years.''
It was the House bill which ultimately came to the Senate floor. It
had less luck in the Senate than the House, though; certain Senators
led a filibuster which killed the bill.
Disagreement on the bill focused on two controversies, whether
discrimination should be proven by results or intent, and whether cases
should be
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heard by administrative law judges or Federal judges and juries. Civil
rights groups supported provisions requiring the results standard of
proof; Senate opponents wanted proof of intent. But there did not seem
to be any middle ground. With regard to the administrative law judge
provisions, Senator DeConcini, offered a compromise to allow jury
trials in some cases, but opponents were not receptive. This compromise
just raised too many questions.
Unfortunately, we could not compromise that year, and the bill
ultimately died in a filibuster.
In 1988, we finally passed a broad bill, H.R. 1158, to address the
problem of racial and other discrimination in housing. This bill became
Public Law 100-430, to amend the 1968 Fair Housing Act.
The new law authorized HUD to penalize those who discriminated in
housing sales and rentals. In addition to prohibitions on
discrimination according to race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin specified by the 1968 act, the new law included protections for
the handicapped and families with young children. According to
Congressional Quarterly, this was the first time the Congress protected
these latter categories under its laws.
Before the passage of this new law, HUD only possessed the authority
to mediate battles. The Justice Department could file suits in the case
of discriminatory patterns, and individuals could bring their own
suits. But this bill authorized HUD to pursue suits on a victim's
behalf.
The final law included a compromise version of my administrative law
judge scheme of the 96th Congress. It provided for cases filed by HUD
to be heard in front of administrative law judges, if the parties
involved chose to do so. Where compromise failed in 1980, however, the
1988 law also provided a second option: if just one of the parties
chose it, the case would be heard in a jury trial. The law required the
parties to choose within 20 days.
Voting Rights Extension
In 1982, the Congress passed a law to extend the Voting Rights Act of
1965--H.R. 3112, Public Law 97-205. This new law contained four
essential parts. First, it extended section 5 of the act, the major
enforcement provision, for 25 years. This section, called the
preclearance provision, required 9 States, including my own Alabama,
and parts of 13 others to receive approval from the Department of
Justice before they could change their election laws. Second, it
allowed States that could prove a good voting rights record for the
previous 10 years to bail out of the preclearance section after 1984.
Beginning that year, States desiring to bail out would have to prove
their case before a Federal panel of three judges in Washington, DC.
Third, the extension amended the permanent provisions of the 1965 act
under section 2 to make it easier to prove violations. Previously,
intent to discriminate had to be proven, but under the new law, it
would only be necessary to prove that laws had resulted in
discrimination. Last, the new law also extended bilingual requirements
under the act for 10 years.
But passing this bill was not easy. It had opponents in the Senate
and in the administration. In fact, the chairman of the Senate
judiciary committee was not friendly to its passage. Compromise was
required to save the bill, and I worked behind the scenes, especially
with Senator Dole, to find a proposal which would be acceptable to the
committee.
Congressional Quarterly has since noted that Senator Dole and I
played deciding roles on the Senate judiciary committee. As the bill
came out of subcommittee, the publication noted that divisions on the
full committee left us ``* * * holding the balance of power.'' Seven
members were publicly against the bill, and nine were for it. The
committee had 18 members at the time, and a tie of nine to nine would
have resulted in a failure to report the bill to the full Senate.
I had an agreement with Senator Dole to work together to forge a
compromise which would get committee approval, but not to publicize my
behind-the-scenes activity. The reason for my reluctance to receive any
credit was due to the fact that this was an unpopular bill with white
voters in Alabama, particularly in Mobile.
Notably, Senator Denton, from Alabama, was also a member of the
Judiciary Committee, but he opposed the bill. On June 22, the Talladega
Daily Home printed an editorial contrasting our positions. ``The next
time he comes before Alabama voters to be re-elected or retired,'' it
read, ``U.S. Senator Howell Heflin may have a problem explaining
satisfactorily his vote to extend the so-called voting rights act for
another 25 years.'' About Denton, who opposed the bill, the editorial
wrote he ``won't have the same problem.''
And on May 6, the Mobile Register printed an editorial which
condemned the compromise, writing that it was no compromise at all;
instead, the Register called it ``probably the most discriminatory
legal garbage to ever hit Congress.'' This editorial called on me to
lead a filibuster of the bill for Alabama and particularly Mobile. The
Register wrote that, in light of Mobile versus Bolden, the Voting
Rights Extension would allow any Federal judge to change local
governments' election laws at a whim.
As I mentioned earlier, section 2 of the 1982 extension made it
easier to prove violations by requiring proof of results rather than
intent. This revision would effectively overturn a 1980 Supreme Court
decision, Mobile versus Bolden, upholding the intent requirements.
It was this provision, known as the results test, which first snagged
the bill in the Senate committee; the constitution subcommittee refused
to incorporate the provision in its March mark-up. President Reagan's
Attorney General told the panel that the administration was opposed to
the new provisions.
During this markup, the Senate subcommittee extended section 5, the
enforcement provisions, for 10 years. But by contrast, the House
version of the bill extended section 5 indefinitely. Again, the
Attorney General supported the Senate subcommittee's move, testifying
that the administration opposed a longer extension.
Notably, in the month following this subcommittee vote, U.S. District
Judge Virgil Pittman of Alabama issued an revised opinion on Mobile
versus Bolden declaring that Mobile had discriminated against blacks
based on the results test. This decision, based on results, bolstered
the case of civil rights groups who supported the bill provisions under
section 2.
With these revisions, the bill then came to the full Senate
committee, whose members began to align for or against the extension.
As I mentioned above, nine members supported the House version and
seven opposed it; leaving Dole and me in the middle to work out
something the whole committee could accept.
On May 4, the committee passed our compromise version of the bill,
with only four Senators voting against it. This compromise included
changes to section 2's results language to specify its meaning. Taken
from a 1973 Supreme Court case, White versus Register, the final
version declared that a violation could be proved:
* * * ``if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation.
The compromise also extended section 5 for 25 years, rather than 10,
as the administration and some Senators wanted, or permanently, as the
House wanted.
Still in the way, however, was a filibuster to stop the bill. But the
Senate voted it down. In the end, the Senate amended the House bill to
align it with its own compromise. The House accepted the Senate
amendments on June 23, by unanimous consent.
The Martin Luther King Federal Holiday
In my first month as a Senator, I became a joint sponsor of a bill to
establish a Federal holiday in honor of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
That bill, however, did not become law, and it was not until 1983 that
we were able to establish the holiday. In 1983, I fully supported its
passage-H.R. 3706; Public Law 98-144.
During the 1983 debate, the measure became the victim of a filibuster
led by Senator Jesse Helms. According to Congressional Quarterly,
Senator Helms objected to King's ``action-oriented Marxism,'' and
alleged that King had connections to the communist party. These claims
seemed to me to be without merit.
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When the Senate began consideration of the holiday measure, I voted
to end the filibuster, and I opposed amendments which would effectively
have killed the bill. However, there were two amendments I found to be
in line with my own thinking. They were offered by Senators Randolph
and Boren to require that the King, Washington, and Columbus holidays
be held on the actual dates of the events. In fact, I cosponsored
Boren's amendment, and after that amendment failed, I signed onto a
bill to serve the same purpose. My reasons for supporting this
condition were the cost of a new holiday--the holidays would
occasionally fall on Saturdays and Sundays, saving a great deal of
expense--and I also wanted to ensure the proper observance of
significant historical events. Dr. King's birthday is a significant
date in the history of civil rights in this country, and it is most
fitting to remember its actual date.
The following year, Congress passed a bill establishing a Martin
Luther King Holiday Commission to encourage ceremonies for the first
celebration of the holiday--H.R. 5890; Public Law 98-399. The bill
mandated a 3-member panel to be funded by donations.
Five years later, I cosponsored a bill to make the Martin Luther King
commission permanent. The bill became law--(H.R. 1385, Public Law 101-
30,--and it expanded the commission's role to include the promotion of
racial equality and nonviolent social change. Again, when this bill
came to the Senate floor, a number of amendments effectively to kill it
were offered, and I opposed them all. However, I did support an
amendment to bar the Commission from encouraging civil disobedience.
I joined Senator Sarbanes as a sponsor in support of four different
bills, S. 322 in the 100th Congress, S. 619 in the 101st Congress, S.
239 in the 102d Congress, and S. 27 in the 103d Congress, to set aside
a piece of Federal land in the District of Columbia for the Alpha Phi
Alpha Fraternity to build a memorial to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
However, these bills did not pass.
Funding for Historically Black Colleges
I am especially proud of my efforts to authorize funding for the 1890
land grant colleges, including the Tuskegee Institute--now Tuskegee
University--and Alabama A&M in my home State of Alabama. Even though
these land grant colleges date to the 19th century, they had been
largely ignored until the late 1970's. I consider that this fact
represents a great waste; certainly these institutions deserve equal
treatment, and I believe they are, properly funded, a valuable asset to
the Nation in the field of agricultural research.
First, I would like to give a brief history of the African-American,
1890 land-grant colleges. In 1862, the U.S. Congress passed the first
Morrill Act, which established the basis for land-grant colleges. These
would be established by the States to educate their citizens in
agriculture, home economics, and other practical subjects.
However, the Southern States did not provide funding for black
colleges under this law, so the Congress passed a second Morrill Act in
1890 specifically to support the African-American institutions. From
this history comes the term ``1890 Land-Grant Institutions,''
specifically applied to these historically African-American colleges.
However, the agriculture department did not begin earnestly to fund the
1890 land-grant colleges until 1966. That year, Assistant Secretary Dr.
George Mehren asked the National Academy of Sciences to suggest an
allocation of $283,000 for research at these colleges--under Public Law
89-106.
In 1866, Lincoln University in Missouri became the first such
historically black land-grant college.'' By 1976, there were 16 such
universities. Of these 16, there are 2 in Alabama, the Tuskegee
University and Alabama A&M University.
The Alabama State Legislature created the Tuskegee Institute in 1881;
it was then called The Tuskegee State Normal School for the Training of
Negro Teachers. Booker T. Washington became Tuskegee's first President
and served until he died in 1915.
During these first years, the State legislature appropriated $3,000
for the institution and authorized it a single teacher. The school
remained public until the State legislature granted its board the power
of governance in 1893, but Tuskegee Institute continued to receive
State funds even though they obtained private status.
In 1897, the legislature also established ``The Tuskegee State
Experiment Station.'' George Washington Carver became its director and
served until his death in 1943.
In 1899, the U.S. Congress granted the school 25,000 acres, and in
1906, it established the formal extension program. In 1933, Tuskegee
became a regionally accredited 4-year college, and in 1943 it opened
its graduate schools. Accredited graduate programs now include
architecture, chemistry, dietetics, engineering, nursing, and
veterinary science. Tuskegee's funding from grants remained nominal
until 1972.
Alabama A&M University was founded in 1875 by an ex-slave named
William Hooper Councill. Originally, the Huntsville Normal School was
on West Clinton Street in Huntsville, the school moved to Normal in
1890. After a decrease in enrollment, the institution was renamed in
1919 the State Agricultural and Mechanical Institute for Negroes and
reduced to junior-level training.
During the subsequent years, the school lost its financial support
and nearly fell apart, but in 1927 Dr. J.F. Drake became its new
president and oversaw expansion of the grounds and the return to 4-year
status. It was not until 1962, during the tenure of President Dr.
Richard D. Morrison, that the school became a university, with its own
graduate school.
With this history of great difficulty as well as great leadership in
mind, I hold myself honored to have worked with these institutions. I
am particularly proud of efforts to create the Chappie James Preventive
Health Center at the Tuskegee Institute, and to pass perhaps the first
serious funding authorization for the 1890 black land grant colleges.
During the first summer I was a Senator, I introduced a resolution to
authorize the construction of the General Daniel ``Chappie'' James
Memorial Center for Preventive Health at the Tuskegee Institute. When I
introduced the bill on the Senate floor, I noted that it was the first
preventative health center in the south, maybe the country. I also
stated, proudly, that it would become a museum of the general's
memorabilia.
Furthermore, I argued that the dedication was especially fitting
because General James, the first African-American to rise to a four-
star rank in the U.S. Air Force, had been a beneficiary of Tuskegee's
programs years before. Tuskegee established the first training program
for black pilots, and it was here that General James learned the skills
which furthered his career.
Ultimately, we succeeded in passing the Chappie James Center bill as
a rider to the 1980 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of
1965. My amendment authorized $6 million for the center, and required
that it be constructed at the Tuskegee Institute.
In May 1981, I introduced a bill to help all of the 1890 land grant
colleges. Its language specified that the 1890 land grant colleges
receive money for the purchase of equipment and land, and the planning,
construction, alteration, or renovation of buildings to strengthen
their capacity for research in the sciences of food and agriculture.
That year, the House passed an identical companion bill unanimously.
As I have said many times, the 1890 schools had not, to that point,
had the authorization to receive the benefit of the equipment and
facilities they needed to be competitive. They had nothing from
Congress to rely on, even though the Congress gave these historically
black institutions the same mission as the 1862 schools mandated under
the Morrill Act. Therefore, we owed them the means to fulfill that
mission, research and development in the field of agriculture for the
benefit of the whole country.
As with the Chappie James measure, this authorization passed as a
rider, this time to the 1981 farm bill, Public Law 97-98). This
amendment authorized $10 million annually to each of the historically
black land-grant colleges through 1986--a total of $50 million for
each.
Black Alabamians Become Federal Judges
In the spring of 1979, then-Senator Donald Stewart and I set out to
find five U.S. district judges to fill vacancies in the State of
Alabama. In order to do this, we formed two committees
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and clarified our intentions in charters for each. We called the first
the Federal Judicial Nominating Commission of Alabama, and we called
the second the Alabama Women and Minority Group Search Committee.
First, we intended to seek out the most qualified individuals in the
State. This was the charge of the first committee. But we also sought
to find qualified minorities to fill the slots. This task was the
charge of the second panel, which would advise the first.
Through these efforts, two blacks were selected, and President Carter
formally nominated them both. These men were U.W. Clemon, for Alabama's
northern Federal district, headquartered in Birmingham, and Fred Gray,
for the State's middle Federal district, headquartered in Montgomery.
U.W. Clemon had become a prominent Alabama State senator, and Fred Gray
was a prominent lawyer who had served in many posts. He was perhaps
most widely known as Rosa Parks' lawyer.
Although the hearings were not easy, the Senate confirmed U.W. Clemon
the next year, and he became the first African-American Federal judge
in Alabama. Fred Gray's nomination, however, did not survive the
confirmation process. In his place, I recommended Myron Thompson,
another black, who was confirmed.
As I said many times during this process, I believe that it is
absolutely essential for blacks to serve in Federal courts. In the
committee hearings on our recommended nominees, and on the floor after
their confirmation, I stated that I believe we must make up for years
of injustice in this country. For many long years, blacks were excluded
from the Federal judicial nominating process. True equality under the
law cannot be achieved under such a system. All Americans must feel
they will be treated fairly by the Federal courts, but if certain
citizens are precluded from serving on the bench, the courts cannot
give the perception of fairness.
Civil Rights Commission Extension
In 1983, authorization of the Commission on Civil Rights expired, and
the Congress set about passing a reauthorization. However, President
Reagan intruded, and he tried to restructure the commission for his own
purposes.
In late May, Reagan announced he would replace three commissioners on
the panel--Mary Frances Berry, Bladina Cardenas Ramirez, and Rabbi
Murray Saltzman. According to Congressional Quarterly, the President
sought to remove these commissioners because they had criticized his
administration's policies. To replace them, the President announced
that he would appoint Morris Abram, John Bunzel, and Robert Destro.
Some alleged that Reagan selected these replacements because they
opposed affirmative action and busing.
President Reagan had clearly challenged the independence of the
commission. And the Senate Judiciary Committee responded by putting off
the votes on his new nominees. Ralph G. Neas, executive director of the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, deserves much credit for
lobbying against Reagan's position.
In response, Reagan summarily fired the three commissioners he sought
to replace. CQ wrote that a White House lobbyist admitted that Reagan
fired these individuals because he could not get the votes for his own
nominees. Both Houses of the Congress responded with concurrent
resolutions declaring their intent to create a new commission whose
members would be appointed by the Senate as well as the President. Dr.
Berry and Ms. Ramierez went on to win a suit in the D.C. District Court
which granted an injunction against Reagan's firings.
For my own part, I worked to save Mary Berry's seat through a
compromise which restructured the commission. During final action, the
Senate accepted this compromise amendment, offered by Senator Specter,
Public Law 98-183. Under this compromise, Reagan would have four
appointees, and the Congress would have four, two for each house. The
Commission would therefore have two additional members. The compromise,
among other things, also established that the President had to show
cause for firings, and authorized funding for the Commission. In
response to this last, the House restored funds it had cut from the
appropriations bill.
But in the end, civil rights groups were angry to learn that Reagan
had backed off on an informal part of the compromise. He had promised,
they said, to reappoint two commissioners he had previously opposed,
Louise Smith and Jill Ruckelshaus. Reagan, House Majority Leader
Michel, and Senate Majority Leader Baker, ultimately refused to put
these commissioners on the panel.
Much to my own pleasure, though, the Congress saved Mary Berry's
seat. She is now the chairman of the Commission.
Opposition to Various Nominees Affecting Civil Rights
As I stated before, I feel that the Senate's opposition to a number
of nominees was as important as any of its other accomplishments. In
the South, some changes for the good occurred, and the Senate's work
helped achieve successes in the area of civil rights. It voted down
some individuals because of reasonable doubts concerning their
impartiality in carrying out the duties of the office for which they
were being nominated. These men included William Bradford Reynolds,
Judge Robert Bork, Clarence Thomas, Kenneth L. Ryskamp, William C.
Lucas, and Jefferson Sessions.
With regard to these nominations, my opposition was based on doubts--
doubts about qualifications and about their impartiality as to racial
and civil rights matters. However, I always tried to maintain my sense
of objectivity. I always tried to keep an open mind until the end of
hearings, because I believe hearings are meaningless if Senators do not
examine the facts impartially, if they enter into the proceedings with
prejudice. In fact, I have consistently articulated this view in my
opening statements: We, as Senators, need to act as judges in the
confirmation process. I was often criticized as being indecisive
because I withheld my decision until the end of committee
consideration. But, if I was to be fair to the nominee, then I had to
assume a judge's role.
William Bradford Reynolds' Nomination
In 1985, President Reagan nominated William Bradford Reynolds to
become Associate Attorney General. This position, No. 3 in the Justice
Department's hierarchy, carried with it the responsibility for all
Federal civil matters.
Previously, Reynolds had been the Assistant Attorney General for the
Civil Rights Division, and his record there earned him opponents among
the civil rights community. In fact, I based my own decision to oppose
Reynolds on what I knew of his record.
Examples of Reynolds' opponents included Benjamin Hooks, executive
director of the NAACP; W. Gordon Graham, of the Birmingham city
government, who spoke for himself and Mayor Richard Arrington; William
L. Taylor, director of the National Center for Policy Review; Judy
Goldsmith, president of the National Organization for Women; and Marie
Foster from Selma, who was involved in the civil rights movement in
that city during the 1960's. These individuals all testified very
critically on Reynolds' record, and they all told the committee that he
had worked to set back civil rights.
On June 27, 1985, we voted the nomination down in the judiciary
committee, and it did not go to the floor. My vote decided the outcome.
On June 30, the Huntsville Times reported that this final meeting and
these votes involved ``plenty of gavel-banging and shouting as red-
faced senators fought bitterly over President Reagan's nomination for a
top Justice Department post.'' I waited until that time to cast my
vote, but when I did, I said that I wasn't even certain I felt
comfortable with Reynolds in the position in which he was serving at
the time. I also said I would find out if the Senate could remove him.
In my view, he was deceptive, lacking in forthrightness, evasive, and
misleading during his testimony.
Robert Bork's Nomination
Another individual I ultimately decided to vote against was Judge
Robert Bork, nominated to become an Associate Justice on the Supreme
Court. I was somewhat disconcerted by comments he had made,
particularly with regard to rights guaranteed by the constitution--
rights he said he did not see, but which had been seen by the courts
and Congress on numerous occasions. Most important, though, in the end,
I did not feel confident I knew what
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Judge Bork would do on the Supreme Court. Since the nomination was for
life, I just could not vote for Judge Bork.
President Reagan nominated Judge Bork, who was, at the time, serving
on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in 1987. Bork's advocates argued
that he was a conservative judge who tended to defer to legislatures on
political matters. But his opponents said that he was an activist,
seeking to implement his own agenda. From this dispute, and others, the
Senate entered into one of the most contentious confirmation debates of
my tenure.
Controversy developed because Bork had, in earlier statements and
writings, criticized the constitutionality of a number of Supreme Court
decisions affecting individual rights. He had argued for a restrictive
interpretation of the 14th amendment with regard to sex. Bork had also
criticized decisions which struck down laws because they impinged on
individual privacy, a right Bork had argued was neither explicitly nor
implicitly provided by the Constitution. The decisions he had cited
included the striking of a Connecticut law which banned contraceptives,
as well as the Roe versus Wade decision. Regardless of whether or not I
agree with Roe versus Wade, I do believe in the right to privacy, and
unlike Judge Bork, I do see it in the Constitution.
Notably, Bork had also written that the first amendment applied only
to political speech in a 1971 law review article. He followed this with
a television statement in 1987 in which he said ``other kinds of
speech, speech about moral issues, speech about moral values, religion
and so forth--all of those things feed into the way we govern
ourselves.''
During his testimony before the Judiciary Committee, we questioned
Bork on his earlier statements and decisions. Several of us argued that
Bork was trying to relax his image during these hearings. In fact,
Senator Leahy called Bork's seemingly changing beliefs ``confirmation
conversion.'' Uncertain of Bork's actual position, I cited Bork's
``confirmation protestations'' when I stated my final decision.
I voted against the nominee in the Judiciary Committee, and I also
voted against him in the full Senate. I gave statements before that
committee and on the floor reciting many of the reasons for my
opposition to his confirmation. The bottom line was that I just did not
known how Bork would treat essential, fundamental rights in his
rulings.
The debate over Judge Bork, I might note, was a particularly
unpleasant one. The media became so involved and the attempts to
politicize the debate from both sides became so acidic, that I felt a
particular need to speak on the floor about the potentially damaging
effects on the judiciary. But, of course, this type of public intensity
has surrounded other nominations since.
A number of mailing and telephone campaigns increased this political
nature of the debate. I was even told that my own voice, or an
imitation, was used in a telephone solicitation I certainly did not
authorize. The spill-over from the Bork nomination lingers to this day,
and has affected other nominations since.
Clarence Thomas' Nomination
In October 1991, I voted against confirmation of Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas' nomination. Although I reserved my judgment,
as always, until the nominee had been given a chance to be heard, I
came out against Clarence Thomas well before I knew of Anita Hill's
allegations. I just did not feel that Clarence Thomas was qualified, at
that time, to assume a lifetime seat on the Supreme Court.
I do support a moderately conservative court. But I oppose a right-
wing court which would embrace a regressive philosophy, which would
attempt to rewrite or strike laws written to overcome years of racism
in America. I strongly feared that Clarence Thomas would advocate such
right-wing positions.
I also had reservations based on the contradictory nature of Thomas'
statements on his fundamental view of the law. He had made a number of
statements and written a number of articles before the hearings which
the committee called on him to explain. His answers, however, did not
satisfy me; they showed a man who had seemingly changed his essential
perspective.
At the time, I did not know what the real Clarence Thomas was like or
what role he would play on the Supreme Court, if confirmed. In fact, I
was very much concerned that Thomas' inconsistencies suggested either
intentional deception or a lack of scholarly, considered thought.
One example of my specific reservations was the nominee's apparent
shift in his view of natural law. Thomas had criticized the ``nihilism
of [Oliver Wendell] Holmes,'' who rejected natural law. However, before
the committee, he rejected these earlier statements. He said he made
them ``in the context of political theory,'' and described himself as a
``part-time political theorist.''
Thomas had also criticized the Brown versus Board of Education of
Topeka, KS, decision. And when questioned, Thomas said that he had
never even discussed Roe versus Wade. I would not have opposed the
nominee based on his position on this single case, whatever it may have
been, but I found it extremely unlikely that Thomas had never discussed
Roe versus Wade, a defining point in the laws of this country. In fact,
I was not certain that he was being completely forthcoming, especially
considering the polarizing nature of this particular case in Supreme
Court confirmations.
I was also deeply concerned about Thomas' advocacy for an activist
Supreme Court which would strike down laws because they restrict
property rights. Thomas advocated this position in a 1987 speech before
the Pacific Research Institute, citing the libertarian Stephen Macedo.
I believe, though, that modern constitutional jurisprudence has moved
beyond the Lochner era which relied on natural law, and that individual
rights are just as important as property rights, perhaps even more so.
The Supreme Court has long recognized congressional authority to
regulate commerce. As I stated, according to the libertarian view, we
would have no laws to guarantee occupational safety and health, to
preserve the environment, to protect consumers from unsafe food, to
require airline safety, or to establish a minimum wage.
All of these concerns led me to doubts. I simply could not justify
voting for a nominee whose positions remained so enigmatic,
particularly when he had been nominated to the Supreme Court for life.
The peculiarities surrounding the nomination only increased after
that time. In early October, the public became aware that Anita Hill, a
former Thomas employee, had alleged that the nominee had made unwanted
sexual advances and comments toward her over a number of years. I did
not know if Thomas, or Hill, were telling the truth, or if neither was
telling the complete truth.
I had not known about these allegations until after I made my initial
statement opposing Thomas. The afternoon after my speech, Chairman
Biden informed me of the an FBI file which included the charges. I did
vote against the committee motion to report the nomination favorably to
the floor, which failed in a tie, although I supported sending it to
the full Senate without a recommendation. But I had no reason,
whatsoever, to change my position; Thomas' record, testimony, and lack
of qualifications were reason enough to oppose his confirmation.
Jefferson Sessions' Nomination
On June 5, 1986, the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected President
Reagan's nomination of Jefferson Sessions to become a Federal district
judge in Alabama. There were ten Republicans and eight Democrats on the
committee. The vote for disapproval of his nomination was 10 to 8, with
two Republicans voting against him.
Sessions was, at the time, a U.S. attorney in Alabama. Certain of my
colleagues on the committee criticized comments Sessions allegedly made
against various civil rights organizations as well as favorable
comments made about the Ku Klux Klan. These comments, they argued,
showed a ``gross insensitivity'' to racial matters.
My decision to oppose Sessions was very difficult. Of course, he was
from my home State of Alabama. Frankly, I just did not know whether he
would be a fair and impartial judge. My statement before the committee
recited that since this was a lifetime appointment, we should be very
cautious about his fairness and impartiality.
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William C. Lucas' Nomination
In 1989, I voted against William C. Lucas' nomination to become the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division. Mr.
Lucas happened to be an African-American, and I do not believe I can
state strongly enough my belief in the substantive and symbolic
importance of nominating blacks to these positions. However, when I
weighed the evidence, I found that Mr. Lucas simply was not qualified
to head the Civil Rights Division.
Lucas had worked in the Civil Rights Division in 1963, had been in
the FBI, and he had been the Wayne County, MI--which includes Detroit--
sheriff and county executive before President Bush nominated him to
this post. But he had only just begun to practice law, and he had never
represented a client in court.
Lucas' lack of legal experience showed during the hearings. Lucas
downplayed the importance of recent Supreme Court decisions on civil
rights laws, commenting ``I'm new to the law.'' And when the Chairman
asked Lucas about his view on the recent trend in the Supreme Courts
decisions on civil rights laws he said, ``I have to answer as a
politician because I have not thought about the answer.'' Further,
during the hearings, a number of civil rights activists testified or
submitted statements to the effect that Lucas was not qualified to fill
the position.
While he emphasized that he did not object to Lucas' views, Ralph G.
Neas, executive director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
opposed Lucas on his ``lack of civil rights and legal experience.''
Elaine Jones, deputy director counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, testified that, although her group initially wished to
support Lucas, it found that he did ``not have the training and the
background to litigate and understand the litigation process.'' Citing
the need for experience in Federal litigation, Drew Days, a professor
at Yale Law School and a former holder of the position Lucas would
fill, said Lucas' confirmation would ``be a frustration of the mission
that Congress envisioned when it created that office in 1957.'' William
L. Taylor of the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights testified for his
group, noting his personal belief that Lucas did not meet the standards
set by his organization. Arthur L. Johnson, president of the Detroit
branch of the NAACP said, ``We do not believe that he [Lucas] is
suitable for this highly specialized and important assignment where the
public interest is so sharply focused, and where the trust of black
Americans, and civil rights advocates in particular, should be sought
and even enhanced.'' John H. Buchanan, Jr., of the People for the
American Way also argued that Lucas was ``inadequately qualified.''
On the other hand, some civil rights leaders supported Lucas. Dr. Joe
Reed of the Alabama Democratic Conference was one; Reed urged
confirmation because, at the time, there had been only one African-
American in the post. Another supporter was Alvin Holmes, the senior
black member of the Alabama House of Representatives. These men both
noted their belief that Lucas' opponents had based their views solely
on qualifications. A final example of Lucas' supporters was Father
William Cunningham, director of Focus HOPE of Detroit.
Congressional Quarterly reported on certain questions surrounded
Lucas' record, including brutality in the Wayne County sheriff's
department, a customs dispute, and exaggerations on his resume.
After hearing all of this information, I finally decided to vote
against Mr. Lucas. I based my decision in large part on the importance
of the position. The head of the Civil Rights Division perhaps has more
responsibility than any other single individual for ensuring the
security of our civil rights. The individual who assumes this role
should be well qualified to deal with the intricacies of the law.
Mr. Lucas, I believed, did not possess sufficient legal experience to
undertake the task, and I cast the deciding vote against him. I argued
that, although his supporters and Mr. Lucas himself cited his
accomplishments in Wayne County, the controversy surrounding them,
including brutality in the sheriff's department, indicated to me that
his managerial abilities were also questionable. After the committee
vote, Ralph Neas who had testified against Lucas, announced a success
for civil rights.
Kenneth L. Ryskamp's Nomination
I cast the deciding vote against Kenneth L. Ryskamp of Florida, whom
President Bush had nominated to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. This
circuit covers Florida, Georgia, and my home State of Alabama.
President Bush actually nominated Ryskamp twice. The first time was in
1990, and the Judiciary Committee tabled the nomination that year.
Ryskamp had been criticized by People for the American Way, a civil
liberties group which found that he had ruled against more civil rights
plaintiffs than any other judge nationwide. He had also belonged to a
country club which had an implicit policy of discrimination against
African-Americans and Jews.
Also haunting Ryskamp was a specific case in which a number of
African-Americans in West Palm Beach, including those who had not been
found guilty of any crime, filed a complaint because they had been
attacked by city police dogs. Although the jury had found the city,
individual police participants, and the former police chief guilty of
civil rights violations, Ryskamp threw out the conviction against the
city and the police chief. He said: ``It might not be inappropriate to
carry around a few scars to remind you of your wrongdoing in the past,
assuming the person has done wrong.''
Nine Latin American members of the Florida State Legislature wrote a
letter to express their belief that Ryskamp had ``* * * demonstrated
insufficient sensitivity to ethnic minorities and other groups who have
traditionally been the objects of discrimination.'' In my opposition to
Ryskamp, I weighed this information, and I concluded that, if the
representatives of such a large population felt they would not receive
justice, Ryskamp could not dispense it. With regard to this last point,
I believe it is important to note that these lawmakers were
Republicans, and they had no partisan motivation.
Creation of the 11th Circuit
As a past chairman and now ranking member of the Judiciary
subcommittee which oversees court reform and judicial administration,
one of my great interests as a Senator has been that of improving and
streamlining judicial procedure and process. In June of 1980, I
introduced a bill to divide the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals into two
courts. On October 1, the Congress passed, by voice vote in both
chambers, the House version of the bill to divide the circuit. This
bill became Public Law 96-452.
At the time, this circuit included Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Georgia, Florida, and Alabama; this legislation broke off Georgia,
Florida and Alabama to create the new 11th Circuit, and the others
remained as the new fifth circuit.
The split had been considered several times before, but that year, I
introduced the legislation in response to a request made by the court's
judges. This request came to me as a formal petition, signed by all
twenty-four judges sitting on the court. Among these were Frank
Johnson, Joseph Hatchett, the first African-American on the court, and
Bob Vance. Judge Johnson became the court's spokesman for the split
during hearings on the matter in the House of Representatives.
The main purpose of the bill would be to promote judicial efficiency.
Individual judges in the circuit were burdened by an excessively large
caseload. Further, the entire court had accrued the largest ``en banc''
caseload in U.S. judicial history.
In the past, civil rights groups had opposed the split because, given
the location of the circuit, it heard the most important civil rights
cases in the country. Therefore, these groups did not want to see a
more conservative court created.
In fact, during the House subcommittee hearings, Judge Johnson
testified that he had been opposed to earlier incarnations of the
proposal. He said, ``* * * the basis for my opposition was a firm
belief that the proposal would have a substantial adverse effect on the
disposition of cases in the fifth circuit that involved civil and
constitutional rights.'' After a careful evaluation of the judges who
would go to the different circuits, Judge Johnson changed
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his position to become the spokesman for the split.
According to the circuit judges' proposal, this split was to be
dissimilar to the earlier suggestions in two ways. It would not reduce
the cases filed, nor would it create courts whose views differed from
the present court's. With respect to these modifications, the petition
read that the division could be accomplished ``* * * without any
significant philosophical consequences within either of the proposed
circuits.''
As a Congressman from Mississippi, Jon Hinson, pointed out during the
hearings, the new courts would reflect a balance in their philosophy,
at least as measured by the President who appointed the judges. Nine of
the 14 judges on the fifth circuit were to be Carter's appointees, as
were 7 of 12 on the 11th circuit.
Other former opponents, including Judge Hatchett and U.W. Clemon,
submitted letters to the subcommittee explaining why they had changed
their views. Judge Hatchett noted that the new Fifth Circuit Court
would have no African-American judges, a matter which had caused many
objections. However, he wrote that this matter could be addressed
later. ``While I understand the apprehension caused some persons by two
`new courts,' I do not believe their fears are well founded,'' he
wrote. ``The two courts that will emerge from this division will
probably be no different from the existing fifth circuit.'' Judge U.W.
Clemon wrote that, although he had opposed the 4 to 2 split, this new
proposal ``will not adversely impact on civil rights.'' Clemon added
that it would, in fact, speed the 2-year lag time in the filing of
civil rights cases.
The Frank Johnson Courthouse
During my first year as a Senator, I strongly supported the
nomination of Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., to become a U.S. circuit
judge in what was then the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge
Johnson stands out as one of the most outstanding jurists of our times.
I believe that Judge Johnson has done more in the field of civil
rights than almost any other single judge. He wrote or took part in
numerous historical decisions including those in matters of
desegregation, voter registration, and reapportionment. He was also
variously involved in cases which established new standards in mental
health programs and prisoners' rights. Notably, in 1978, Johnson became
the first Federal district judge to find that an African-American
educational institution discriminated against whites in its hiring
practices.
At the time, I predicted that the Senate would not have the pleasure
of confirming a better candidate for circuit judge in many years. To
Judge Johnson's credit, I believe that my prediction has come true.
To further honor this man, whose fairness and judicial temperament I
deeply respect, at the suggestion of Dr. Joe Reed, I introduced a bill
in the summer of 1991 to name the Federal courthouse in Montgomery the
Frank M. Johnson U.S. Courthouse. This bill became Public Law 102-261.
I felt that it was most appropriate to name this particular
courthouse after Judge Johnson because it was there he began his career
as a Federal judge. Judge Johnson's courtroom truly reflected the terms
rule of law and equal protection of the law. And despite threats on his
life, Judge Johnson at all times courageously upheld equal justice
under the law.
I can only hope that this courthouse will continue to symbolize Judge
Johnson's work, and to be a temple of justice.
The Hugo Black Courthouse
In 1983, I introduced a resolution to designate February 27, 1986,
Hugo LaFayette Black Day. This day marked the 100th anniversary of the
late Supreme Court Justice's birth. The resolution became public law
98-69.
Justice Black was born in Clay County, Alabama, and he was graduated
with honors from the University of AL Law School. He was a practicing
lawyer, a prosecuting attorney, and a police court judge in Birmingham,
and he distinguished himself in all of these positions. He went on to
become a Senator from Alabama, where, among other things, he sponsored
the first minimum wage bill. In 1937, Hugo Black became Franklin D.
Roosevelt's first nominee to the Supreme Court. Justice Black served
there through six Presidents and five Chief Justices.
I know that Justice Black was a great champion of civil rights who
saw the law as a tool to improve everyone's condition. He had a strong
work ethic and a delightful sense of humor, and he had a great sympathy
for victims of injustice. Chief Justice Burger once said, ``He loved
this Court as an institution, and contributed mightily to its work, to
its strength, and to its future. He revered the Constitution: * * * But
above all he believed in the people.''
In 1987, I also worked to pass a bill to name the new Federal
courthouse in Birmingham for Hugo Black. This bill became Public Law
100-160. Former Congressman Ben Erdreich from my State of Alabama
sponsored the bill in the House.
The Bob Vance Courthouse
In January 1990, I was deeply saddened by the murder of my very close
friend, Bob Vance, who served on the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Judge Vance was murdered by a mail bomb which also seriously injured
his wife, Helen Rainey Vance.
I spoke on the floor to honor his memory, and his great
accomplishments in civil rights; sadly, it seemed clear that his
efforts to further the rights of all citizens motivated his murderer. I
wanted, as best I could, to state, unequivocally, that he did not die
in vain, that his work to ensure racial equality did not die with him.
I wanted, very much, for everyone to know that Bob Vance was
responsible, as much as any individual, for stopping racially motivated
bombings like the one which killed him. We need more men like Judge
Vance--men who have the courage to follow the moral imperatives of
their conscience.
A few months later, I worked to pass a bill which renamed the
courthouse at 1800 5th Avenue in Birmingham the ``Robert S. Vance
Federal Building and United States Courthouse''--Public Law 101-304. I
hope that this stands as a testament to this great man's work to fight
racism, and as a symbol of the work we have done as well as what we
have yet to do.
The Daughters of the American Confederacy Insignia Patent
Earlier, I alluded to the United Daughters of the Confederacy
insignia debate. Although I firmly believe that it was the right thing
to do, I made one of my most difficult and unpopular decisions as a
Senator in 1993 when I voted against the special treatment extension of
the design patent for this group. My personal family history is
profoundly connected to the Confederacy. My maternal grandfather was a
signer of the Ordinance of Secession by which Alabama seceded from the
Union, and my paternal grandfather was a surgeon in the Confederate
Army. I also had several close relatives who were killed while serving
in the Confederate Army. All of these family members were convinced
that their cause was right. Honor was their chief motivation at the
time, and these men believed that their honorable course was to defend
their cause and homeland. I felt a tremendous amount of conflict as I
thought about the issue.
Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, our only black Senator, eloquently
argued against extending the patent. Her words made me consider,
carefully, whether we in the Congress truly needed to extend a special
recognition for this symbol of the past. After some considerable
thought, I decided that honor is still a chief motivation. However,
although I revered my ancestors, honor had taken a different meaning
after one hundred and twenty-eight years, and I believe I did the right
thing just as they did.
In May 1993, Senator Moseley-Braun had convinced the Judiciary
Committee to delete provisions of a bill which extended the design
patent concerning the Daughters of the American Confederacy. She argued
that she did not oppose the group's freedom to use whatever symbol it
should chose, but instead she questioned the need for the Congress to
endorse a Confederate symbol with the special protection when an
extension could be obtained through the Office of Patents and
Trademarks in the normal routine manner.
However, the matter came before the full Senate two months later as a
Helms amendment to a bill we were considering at the time.
Senator Moseley-Braun again opposed the amendment, and she made some
compelling arguments on the
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floor. She objected to a special Congressional honor since it would,
she said, conversely dishonor her own ancestors. She explained:
* * * the United Daughters of the Confederacy have every
right to honor their ancestors and to choose the Confederate
flag as their symbol if they like. However, those of us whose
ancestors fought on a different side in the Civil War, or who
were held, frankly, as human chattel under the Confederate
flag, are duty bound to honor our ancestors as well by asking
whether such recognition by the U.S. Senate is appropriate.
I listened to this argument and considered it carefully. With a
divided mind, I ultimately agreed with Senator Moseley-Braun. In its
later report, Congressional Quarterly called my decision ``Perhaps the
turning point in the debate,'' which, until that time, had gone against
Senator Moseley-Braun.
Our colleague from New Jersey, Senator Bradley referred to my
decision in his engaging memoir ``Time Present, Time Past''. He wrote,
``Heflin, who through his actions as a lawyer and judge had long
championed racial justice, rose and said, `I have many connections
through my family to the Daughters of the Confederacy organization and
the Children of the Confederacy, but the Senator from Illinois * * * is
a descendant of those that suffered the ills of slavery.' I have a
legislative director whose great-great grandfather was a slave. I said
to my legislative director, `Well if I vote with Senator Moseley-Braun,
my mother, grandmother, and other ancestors will turn over in their
graves.' He said, `Well, likewise, my ancestors will turn over in their
graves [if you vote against it].' ''
I do not believe, nor did I believe then, that the Daughters of the
American Confederacy is inherently racist nor that it takes part in
racist activities. But I do believe that the U.S. Congress should not
provide a special honor, as Senator Moseley-Braun argued, for a symbol
that offends a large part of its constituency. In America, we have a
long history of racial inequality to correct, and I believe much
remains to be done. I also believe that, for substantive efforts to
succeed, we must work symbolically as well.
On July 23, the Huntsville News, the Selma Times-Journal, the Dothan
Eagle, the Mobile Register, the Birmingham Post-Herald, the Opelika-
Auburn News, the Montgomery Advertiser, and the Gadsden Times wrote
that I had ``turned [my] back on [my] Confederate forefathers.''
On July 24, the Gadsden Times, the Dothan Eagle, the Decatur Daily,
the Talladega Daily Home, and the Columbus Ledger-Enquirer reported
that ``Southern preservationalists portrayed Sen. Howell Heflin as a
Yankee-sympathizing turncoat Friday for his dramatic floor speech and
vote against an insignia bearing a Confederate flag.'' The Tuscaloosa
News also reported these objections, and it wrote that Frances Logan,
president of the Tuscaloosa UDC, called Richard Shelby a traitor
because he also joined Senator Moseley-Braun. The Montgomery Advertiser
also reported objections from members of the UDC and the Sons of
Confederate Veterans.
The UDC in my own home town of Tuscumbia was notably upset with the
Senate. The President of this chapter expressed her disappointment with
me for not stating that the war, and the symbol, were not over slavery.
A former president of the Alabama United Sons of the Confederacy, said:
``What is going to be interesting is when (Heflin) tries to run for re-
election''. * * * ``He's got about as much chance as the proverbial
snowball when he's got these women mad at him.''
On July 24, the Mobile Register editorialized that Senator Shelby and
I were ``swept into political correctness along with * * * other
colleagues * * * to reject a patent for an insignia of the United
Daughters of the Confederacy.'' The editorial further asserted that
rejection of the patent extension would do nothing to prevent racism.
But some articles and editorials were more favorable. On July 23, the
Mobile Press printed an article in which it chose to quote a number of
my colleagues who supported my decision, and the Anniston Star printed
an editorial supporting my decision. This editorial denied that I did
my ancestors a dishonor; in fact, the editorial was so complimentary as
to call my decision courageous. On the 24th, the Andalusia Star-News
gave me the same compliment.
The same day, the Birmingham News/Post Herald editorialized that the
patent issue would be resolved only ``To the satisfaction of neither
side.'' The editorial noted that Senator Shelby's and my votes ``didn't
help them with the average white voter.'' But it added a great
compliment to us both by suggesting that integrity played a part.
The Civil Rights Restoration Act
In 1990, the Congress passed a bill to restore interpretations of
employment civil rights laws recently limited by the Supreme Court. But
President Bush vetoed the bill in the fall, and we failed to override
the veto in the Senate.
This bill was generally called a civil rights restoration bill
because its sponsors sought to overturn a number of Supreme Court
decisions issued in the late 1980's. Congress felt the Court had become
too conservative, depending too heavily on the exact wording of the law
and sacrificing some of its meaning. With respect to the civil rights
cases, particularly, I think the bill's authors felt that the Court had
restricted the laws too much, and I agreed with them.
A filibuster met this bill when it came to the floor in July. At this
time, a number of Senators offered amendments to the bill. I co-
sponsored one offered by Senator Ford to apply the provisions of the
bill to the Senate. The Senate passed this rider, and it voted down
another to allow for special procedures for itself. Among all of the
amendments, however, I think the most important was Senator Kennedy's
amendment to eliminate the requirement of quotas as a remedy in the
bill.
However, despite the Kennedy amendment, President Bush vetoed the
bill based on an objection to quotas. ``It is neither fair nor sensible
to give the employers of our country a difficult choice between using
quotas and seeking a clarification of the law through costly and very
risky litigation,'' he argued in his veto message.
I was disappointed by the veto and puzzled by the President's
reasoning. The bill, I said, included language explicitly stating that
``nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to
require or encourage an employer to adopt hiring or promotion quotas on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.'' I judged
that the bill would only have restored employment practices to the
standard before the Supreme Court restrictions.
The next year, the Congress and President Bush compromised on a new
version of the bill, which the President declared free of quotas. This
bill became Public Law 102-166.
Congressional Quarterly suggested that Bush moved, in large part,
because his civil rights record had earned him enemies in the African-
American community. This publication also wrote that the President had
other political reasons to support the bill. Not least among these were
the Thomas hearings and the GOP candidacy of former Klansman David Duke
for Governor of Louisiana. But to suppose that he was motivated only by
his own gain strikes me as cynical; I believe that the President
deserves credit for supporting and signing this Act.
Ultimately, we worked out a compromise which passed as the Senate
bill. It modified title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to establish
specific compensatory and punitive damages capped according to the size
of the business in cases of intentional bias, and it allowed for
complainants to seek jury trials under this section. The compromise
also rewrote statutes to overturn, effectively, nine Supreme Court
rulings. In answer to Wards Cove, the new law returned the burden of
proof in discrimination cases to the employer, although it left the
definition of business necessity to the courts. It prohibited racial
harassment after hiring, contrary to Patterson versus McLean Credit
Union. It overturned Martin versus Wilks by setting specific statutory
guidelines for third party challenges to consent decrees in affirmative
action cases. Against Price Waterhouse versus Hopkins, it specifically
disallowed consideration of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin no matter what circumstances otherwise surrounded the
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hiring. The new law also allowed a period of time to pass after
seniority systems are implemented in order to examine their effects
before discrimination suits need to be filed. This statute was a
response to Lorance v. AT&T. It further amended Title VII to allow for
those winning suits against the U.S. government to recover interest on
delays, contrary to Library of Congress v. Shaw. In order to reverse
Crawford Fitting Company versus J.T. Gibbons Inc. and West Virginia
University Hospitals v. Casey, it also modified this section to allow
for recovery of the costs in hiring experts. Last, it allowed American
workers abroad to sue U.S. companies for discrimination, against the
Supreme Court's EEOC versus Arabian American Oil Co decision.
Congressional Quarterly wrote that the language to reverse the Wards
Cove decision--with reference to indirect discrimination, called
disparate impact--was vague, and left much undecided. This vagueness
was a function of the compromise we reached with President Bush.
I was disappointed with the law's failure to apply the same statutes
to Senate employment as in the private sector. The bill, however, did
include measures to prevent employment discrimination which held
Senators personally liable.
This measure represented a key step in the elimination of
discrimination, an end I believe the people of America and Alabama
were--and are--working very hard to attain.
The Legal Services Corporation
During the 1980's, Congress saved the Legal Services Corporation,
which provided legal assistance to the poor in civil litigation. This
action followed a series of attacks leveled by President Reagan; each
year he tried to abolish the corporation, and during that time, he also
tried to restrict its activities and reconstitute its board. Since the
Senate would not support his nominations, he made many of them in
recess. Ultimately, after the Congress pushed funding through each
year, Reagan gave in and requested money for the LSC in his last budget
request.
I fought very hard to continue the Legals Services Corporation
because I believe it is essential to true equality of justice. Given
increasing fees and costs, the American system of justice continues to
become more difficult for the poor to access. And this unfortunate
reality has had a disproportionate impact on minorities. Its
continuation represented a great victory for the Congress and the
people.
Church Arson
In June 1996, I strongly supported S. 1890, a bill to increase
Federal protection against arson and other destruction of places of
religious worship. For the past couple of years, black churches had
been burned under suspicious circumstances and with alarming frequency,
and a national response was strongly needed.
To those of us who remember the violence and fires of the early civil
rights movement and who applaud the progress which has been made in
terms of race relations, these latest images in the early hours before
dawn were profoundly disturbing.
I supported this bill and other efforts to stop these kinds of hate
crimes, bring their perpetrators to justice, and encourage compliance
with the law. I also saw this as an opportunity to ask ourselves if we
can do more to advance the causes of equal rights and racial harmony. I
also called for the authorization of a transfer of funds to be used to
implement the provisions of this act at the State and local levels of
government.
Designation of the Route of the Freedom March from Selma to Montgomery
as a National Trail
In 1990, I worked with Senator Kerry to introduce a bill to require a
study to include the Route of Freedom, from Selma to Montgomery, in the
national trails system. I introduced another in 1995 to officially
include the Route of Freedom in the system.
Although a conference report is still pending, the provisions to
designate the Route of Freedom a national trail passed the Congress in
the House's Presidio bill, a larger parks bill.
Sanctions Against South Africa
Beginning in the summer of 1985, I voted for the imposition of
sanctions on South Africa, and I supported them until the end of
apartheid. Although these sanctions remained somewhat unpopular in my
home State, I believed that they were the right thing to do. Events
since then have shown that sanctions did help bring about an end to
apartheid and create a more stable society.
African-American Staff Members
Over the years, I have had many black staff members. In fact, I
believe that I have had more African-Americans working for me than
other Senators. My legislative director, office manager, mobile field
coordinator, and others are black.
As I have said, I believe that inclusion of blacks in government
helps overcome symbolic and substantive obstacles to equality. However,
it just happened that these staffers applied, and they were best
qualified to do the job. This is the way it should be in all cases.
Black Federal Marshals in Birmingham
In 1993, I worked with black political leaders in Alabama to
recommend two African-American U.S. Marshals in my home State. These
men, Robert Moore and Bill Edwards, were very well qualified for the
positions--perhaps even overqualified when compared with the usual
candidates for this position.
Robert Moore had recently retired from the Secret Service, where he
had served as a special agent for 8 years--the last four in senior
status.
On July 15, 1993, Senator Shelby and I recommended Bill Edwards for
the northern district of Alabama. Mr. Edwards had been with the U.S.
Marshal's office in Birmingham since 1970, and at the time of our
letter, he was a senior criminal investigator. He was also in his last
year of law school at the Birmingham School of Law.
That year, Senator Shelby and I also recommended Florence Mangum
Cauthen to the middle district on August 6, and she became the first
female U.S. Marshal in Alabama. Among her other accomplishments, Ms.
Cauthen had taught law at Jones Law School.
Title III of the Higher Education Act
I sought to have a number of Alabama colleges funded through title
III of the Higher Education Act. I supported a proposal to separate the
general college at Tuskegee University from its renowned School of
Veterinary Medicine so that both institutions could receive the benefit
of title III. Normally, schools such as Tuskegee, which are considered
developing institutions, receive only one grant under this law.
Additionally, I saw that junior colleges were included in the title
III developing institutions programs. Over the years, I have worked
closely with the Department of Education to see that junior colleges
and historically black institutions receive title III funds. These
resources have been extremely beneficial.
In the early 1980's Alabama Christian College--now Faulkner
University--was turned down for a title III Developing Institutions
Grant by the Education Department. Fortunately, we were able to prevail
upon the Department and the White House. On a late Sunday afternoon,
officials of the department reassembled outside readers and determined
that Alabama Christian College's title III application should be
granted. A few years later, this school received a challenge grant in
the amount of $1,000,000 to assist in its development efforts.
Conclusion
As I reflect upon my Senate activities in connection with civil
rights, a number of thoughts come to mind, including those surrounding
my decision to run for the U.S. Senate.
Senator John Sparkman was in his late seventies, and many of his
friends did not think he would be a candidate for reelection in 1978.
Then-Governor George Wallace had announced his intention to run for the
Senate and was already conducting a tough campaign against Senator
Sparkman. I had always been a strong supporter of Senator Sparkman. I
was told by friends of his to look at the possibility of running in the
event that Senator Sparkman decided to retire.
I had polls conducted pitting my candidacy against that of George
Wallace. The initial polls showed that if I were to run, Wallace would
be far ahead of me. As I recall, the numbers first polled showed that
Wallace would get about 45 percent and that I would get only about 17
percent. But my pollster, Peter Hart, indicated that there was a large
amount of negative feeling in the
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State toward Wallace at that time and expressed his opinion that
I could win such a race. One of the motivating reasons that caused me
to give serious consideration to the race was that I felt that Alabama
should be represented by a senator who believed in the improvement of
race relations and progress in the area of civil rights.
I met with Senator Sparkman in Washington, and he told me about how
he had entered his first race for Congress. Archie Carmichael was then
the Congressman from Senator Sparkman's district, and Sparkman had been
his campaign manager when he was elected. Congressman Carmichael did
not enjoy being a Congressman, only serving two terms. He called John
Sparkman to Washington and told him that he ought to get ready to run
for his congressional seat; that he had not made up his mind yet, but
that there was a strong possibility that he would not offer himself for
reelection and that Mr. Sparkman should get ready to run in the event
he did not seek his congressional seat again. He said to me, ``I am
telling you that story because I think you ought to get ready to run
for the Senate against Wallace.'' I thanked him and told him I would
follow his advice. I also relayed to him that Congressman Archie
Carmichael was my wife's grandfather. Sparkman said he knew that and
that was one of the reasons he wanted to tell me the story.
A few weeks later, Senator Sparkman announced that he would not be a
candidate for reelection, and I announced the next day that I would be
a candidate for John Sparkman's seat in the U.S. Senate.
My race against George Wallace was heated for several months. And
then, while speaking to the Alabama League of Municipalities Convention
in Mobile, he announced his withdrawal from the Senate race, giving no
reason for his decision. In advance of his announcement, I was told of
several polls that showed I had pulled ahead of Wallace, including a
poll conducted by the Wallace campaign itself.
I attracted other opponents, but won in a run-off race against
Congressman Walter Flowers by a 2-to-1 margin.
As I think back over the reasons I entered the race for the U.S.
Senate, certainly the issue of racial progress in Alabama was a
motivating factor, and I was fearful that if George Wallace was in the
Senate, it could deter needed changes in the civil rights laws.
In 1982, he ran again successfully for Governor. His last
administration was one in which race relations were far more harmonious
than they had been in his previous terms in office, with Wallace
appointing a number of blacks to key positions in his administration.
He publicly stated that his segregation stand had been wrong. At a
recent meeting of southern black Democratic leaders in Atlanta, Dr. Joe
Reed, head of the Alabama Democratic Conference, said I was the first
U.S. Senator from Alabama who believed in civil rights and who took
positive steps to advance the individual rights of all persons.
Mr. President, despite all the progress in race relations and civil
rights over the years, there is still much to be done. Our work remains
unfinished, as the church burnings illustrate. When I reflect on these
horrifying arsons and the death of Judge Bob Vance just a few years
ago, I am again reminded of just how much remains to be done.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to believe that we can ever have a truly
color-blind society. As long as fear, ignorance, and emotion guide some
peoples' thinking, there will be prejudice and bigotry. But we can look
at the great progress we have made--just in the 18 years since I came
to the Senate--and say that we are doing better.
Members might differ on their approaches to civil rights issues.
These approaches will take on different forms based on the region of
the country we come from, our personal philosophical beliefs, and our
political parties. My approach has been to do as much as possible in
the public arena to advance opportunity and justice. At times, this has
meant working behind the scenes to secure progressive judicial
nominations, to craft compromise legislation that could pass and be
signed into law, and working with both sides of an issue to cool
passions and promote harmony. At other times, it has meant taking
strong symbolic stands aimed at education and putting the past behind
us, such as the case with the United Daughters of the Confederacy
issue.
Regardless of what approach we take as leaders, it is our duty to
work in every way we possibly can to see that each and every American
citizen enjoys the same liberty, freedom, and equality of opportunity
as all others. The fulfillment of the promise of the Constitution
demands that we always remain diligent in fulfilling this
responsibility.
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