[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 137 (Saturday, September 28, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11759-S11762]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 TERRORISM MEETS PROLIFERATION: THE CONVERGENCE OF THREATS IN THE POST 
                              COLD WAR ERA


                      When Fiction Becomes Reality

 Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, last year, I spoke to a group about 
the changes that have occurred since the demise of

[[Page S11760]]

the former Soviet Union. In my remarks, I offered a Tom Clancy-like 
hypothetical, set in 1998, that was intended to illustrate the possible 
nightmares that we might face in an age of proliferation. In my 
scenario, Libyan terrorists used a drone aircraft filled with anthrax 
to attack the Capital during the President's State of the Union 
Address. Seventy-two hours later, the Government is stunned as 
Washington hospitals are overwhelmed with fatalities, including many of 
our elected and appointed leaders. In my scenario, there were few 
survivors except for those few visionary Senators who had retired in 
1996.
  Today I will offer another scenario, perhaps even more unbelievable, 
Imagine that a group of religious zealots led by a charismatic, half-
blind yoga instructor assembles an international following of nearly 
50,000 members and collects over $1 billion in assets. Further imagine, 
this group recruits physicists and scientists from all over the world, 
and finds a large number of converts among the scientific and 
professional communities in Russia and Japan. Believing it is their 
destiny to destroy the world, they begin work on nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons right under the noses of their governments and go 
completely unnoticed by foreign intelligence services. They purchase 
sophisticated dual-use technology along with many of the precursors 
needed to develop their lethal weapons. They send their members 
worldwide: looking for the Ebola virus in Zaire; mining for uranium in 
Australia; seeking protein databases for biological weapons and laser 
instruments in the United States; and obtaining helicopters and drone 
aircraft, as well as other weapons delivery systems, from the former 
Soviet Union and elsewhere. They then conduct macabre experiments on 
sheep and humans.
  They are only caught after an attempted sarin nerve gas attack on a 
major subway system goes awry. A mistake in crafting their delivery 
system reduces the possible fatalities from tens of thousands, to 12 
people, although 5,000 are injured including scores with severe nerve 
damage.
  Of course, this is not a Tom Clancy novel, it is fact. If I had used 
this same scenario before March 20, 1995, the date of the Tokyo subway 
sarin gas attack, people would have said, ``impossible.'' The world has 
learned much since then about the Aum Shinrikyo attack. Much of what we 
know stems from hearings held by the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations last year. Those hearings revealed that the Aum and 
their doomsday weapons were simply not on anybody's radar screen.
  The initial response to the subcommittee's revelations was 
astonishment and disbelief. It sounded unbelievable. Subsequent 
hearings focused on another previously unthinkable event, the 
frightening prospect of nuclear chaos in the aftermath of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The Aum, we now know, was not alone in trying to 
exploit instability in Russia to buy unconventional weapons and 
materials--the Iranians and others have been shopping around the former 
Soviet Union in search of materials, technology, and know-how.
  The seizure of 2.7 kilograms of weapon grade uranium in the Czech 
capital of Prague and other smaller amounts of plutonium elsewhere in 
Europe prove that nuclear smuggling is a reality. These shipments were 
intercepted by law enforcement authorities, but is it possible that 
other shipments may have gone undetected? Last spring I participated in 
a CSIS study of the nuclear black market headed by former FBI and CIA 
Director, William Webster. The CSIS panel, which included top 
intelligence and nuclear specialists, concluded that this was a problem 
we cannot ignore. It is simply unrealistic to assume that the tons of 
nuclear materials that are improperly secured, along with thousands of 
out-of-work Soviet weapons scientists and their equipment will never 
end up in the wrong hands. Add to this new proliferation problem 
evidence of possible organized crime involvement in weapons smuggling 
and you have the ingredients of a full blown disaster looming on the 
horizon.

  Unfortunately, nuclear smuggling is only part of the problem, and 
perhaps even the least likely one to threaten our security.


          unthinkable power within the grasp of the unthinking

  Weapons of mass destruction are increasingly within the grasp of a 
growing number of developing countries, sub-national groups, terrorist 
groups and even individuals. The borderless world of cyberspace expands 
access to information about terrorist techniques and unconventional 
weapons even further. Various violence-prone groups now share recipes 
for making weapons of mass destruction on the Internet and offer their 
trade secrets on how to make and use unconventional weapons for sale 
through catalogs. This situation is, as observed by Alvin Tofler, ``The 
ultimate devolution of power, the demassification of mass-destruction 
weapons.''
  Proliferation and terrorism are not new threats. However, changes in 
the international situation, in access to technology, and in terrorist 
motivation require us to think anew about the potential use of 
unconventional weapons against the United States.
  In August I attended a meeting of the Aspen Strategy Group that 
examined these post-cold-war security threats. The Aspen Strategy Group 
is a bipartisan committee sponsored by the Aspen Institute that 
examines critical issues affecting U.S. national security. Secretary of 
Defense William Perry and other top officials also attended the 
meeting.
  The consensus of the meeting was that the convergence of 
proliferation, terrorism, and organized crime makes the post-cold-war 
period a uniquely dangerous time for our country. Although the risk of 
nuclear war is vastly reduced and the overall outlook for our security 
is greatly improved, the risk of chemical, biological or some form of 
nuclear terrorism has increased. This new threat does not put our 
civilization at risk in the way that nuclear confrontation did, but it 
is much harder to deter. The familiar balance of nuclear terror has 
yielded to a much unpredictable situation, where adversaries may not be 
dissuaded by threats of retaliation. Our massive retaliatory forces are 
useless against terrorists who hide among civilian populations. Our 
biggest threats of the future may well be people who do not have a 
return address.
  At the same time that most of the world has turned its back on 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, a few desperate nations, 
terrorist groups, ideologically driven cults, ethnic minorities, 
disaffected political groups and even individuals may view weapons of 
mass destruction as the only way to wield power over world events. And 
if battlefield-usable weapons are not available, crude bombs or 
dispersal systems may suffice to produce mass terror. The Aspen group 
and other assess the risk of chemical and biological terrorism as 
higher than nuclear, with the caveat that radiological weapons could 
produce massive terror even without posing a major health hazard.
  The trend lines in the last several years are not encouraging. In our 
own country, survivalist and militia-type groups have been charged with 
attempting to acquire bubonic plague and ricin, a deadly substance 
derived from the castor bean. A small amount of ricin can kill in 
minutes if ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through the skin. Two 
individuals associated with a group called the Minnesota Patriots 
Council were convicted of planning to use ricin to assassinate IRS 
officials and other Government employees. A former member of the Aryan 
Nation ordered the plague, saying he needed it for research purposes. 
And it is useful to recall that in May 1994, the sentencing judge in 
the World Trade Center case said the defendants had placed sodium 
cyanide in their explosives package with the intent of creating a 
poisonous cyanide gas but fortunately the gas burned during the 
explosion. If true, we have already had the first attempted chemical 
terrorist attack here at home.


                     preparing for the unthinkable

  Add to these events the bombings in Oklahoma and Dharhan, the plans 
of the World Trade Center bombers to blow up tunnels during New York 
City rush hour and another plot to kill thousands by downing commercial 
aircraft and the challenge is clear. The moral, political, military, 
and technical factors that made WMD terrorism unthinkable may not last 
forever. The nuclear strategist Herman Kahn warned over thirty years 
ago that we

[[Page S11761]]

must think about the unthinkable in order to avoid it. We need to think 
about the unthinkable possibility of a terrorist WMD attack against our 
country.
  These indicators of terrorism's future take place against a 
background of proliferation, which also continues after the cold war. 
We learned in 1995, after four years of unprecedented inspections, the 
true extent of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
programs. Before the gulf war, Saddam Hussein possessed bombs and 
missiles deployed with anthrax, botulinum, sarin and VX, the most 
lethal form of nerve gas. Saddam also planned to seize the safeguarded 
enriched uranium from Iraq's civilian nuclear program and quickly make 
it into a nuclear bomb. Iran is developing nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons; and Libya continues its drive for weapons of mass 
destruction. North Korea still possesses an unknown quantity of 
plutonium and continues to sell missiles despite the freeze on its 
nuclear construction projects; China may be selling nuclear missile 
technology despite its pledges not to do so. In South Asia, we see 
India and Pakistan embarking on a nuclear arms race. The list of 
countries actively pursuing chemical and biological weapons and 
missiles continues to grow. There are some bright spots on the 
proliferation front--not least of which is the fact that Ukraine, 
Belarus and Kazakstan are giving up the Soviet weapons on their 
territory. The new twist is that terrorists may join the ranks of the 
proliferators. Some proliferators such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria 
are also sponsors of terrorism. Would a government supply WMD 
capabilities to terrorists, or help terrorists acquire weapons of mass 
destruction from the former Soviet Union?
  This possibility poses a clear challenge to our intelligence and law 
enforcement efforts against this threat. We cannot keep track of every 
cult and every disaffected group or individual. While we can and must 
improve our intelligence capabilities, this is one area in which an 
ounce of prevention is worth more than a pound of cure. Job number one 
is to make sure the actual weapons materials are safe from diversion at 
the source. The cooperative threat reduction programs do just that, and 
we have just passed legislation to beef up our efforts to improve the 
security of Russian and FSU nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
materials. That legislation also included support for detection and 
interdiction of smuggling of these lethal materials, and increased 
penalties for those who are caught.
  Our intelligence and law enforcement efforts also benefit from 
international cooperation. We need to strengthen the safeguards of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to make certain that nuclear 
materials can all be accounted for, and that suspicious nuclear 
programs are carefully scrutinized. The Chemical Weapons Convention is 
not a cure-all, but it is a step in the right direction and will 
provide additional technical and political barriers to deter and detect 
covert chemical weapons programs. As for those who cheat on their 
international commitments or shun the norms of international behavior, 
we must be willing to hold them accountable.

  Proliferation and terrorism are not new threats. Each will continue 
to be a threat in its own right and neither shows signs of disappearing 
any time soon. What is new is the degree of overlap between them. A new 
breed of terrorism appears willing to take even more extreme measures 
in pursuit of even more extreme objectives.


                        a comprehensive strategy

  We need to address the threat posed by the convergence of 
proliferation and terrorism in a comprehensive way. Unfortunately, the 
task is even more difficult than negotiating with an ideologically 
hostile, aggressive, and nuclear-armed superpower. For certain 
religiously or ideologically driven terrorists, self-preservation may 
not even be a priority, as it was for the Soviets. The traditional 
tools of statecraft--the careful blending of force and diplomacy--may 
have little relevance where the goals of mass destruction and 
retribution, or supposed divine inspiration, are concerned. The 
explosive mix of age-old zealotry and new-age weaponry has brought 
instruments of unthinkable destructive power within the grasp of those 
willing to commit the unthinkable.
  A new strategy to combat the convergence of proliferation and 
terrorism should consist of several aspects adapted from our current 
defense posture. The three main components should be deterrence, 
interdiction and consequence mitigation.
  With respect to deterrence, our enemies should never doubt our 
willingness to respond to any attack, with overwhelming force, whether 
or not weapons of mass destruction are involved. At the same time, it 
should also be clear that the use of weapons of mass destruction 
against the United States would guarantee a retaliation that would far 
exceed any attacker's ability to withstand. In light of our 
conventional weapons superiority, overwhelming retaliation can be 
carried out under most circumstances without resort to nuclear weapons, 
although nuclear deterrence should remain an option. For the present, 
ambiguity regarding our response may inspire caution in the minds of 
any potential attacker.
  The threat of overwhelming retaliation, however, is not effective 
against terrorists, unless they can be traced to a state sponsor. 
Terrorists typically hide among civilian populations, thus ruling out 
certain retaliatory options. Of course, military force can still be 
directed against terrorists where they hide, and we have the capability 
to conduct special operations, but law enforcement agencies will also 
be on the forefront of our counter-terrorism efforts. Nation that 
sponsor WMD terrorism should not feel safe from retaliation. Moreover, 
terrorists of all types should know with certainty that the United 
States will vigilantly track down and punish them for their criminal 
acts. In the case of WMD terrorism, the world will not be a big enough 
place to hide, and any person, group or state associated with such 
terrorists will be held equally responsible. Fortunately, there is 
broad consensus throughout the world on extradition and hot-pursuit of 
terrorists--that consensus is even more solid where WMD are concerned.
  Interdiction is the second part of the stragety--to detect and stop 
illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction and related 
technologies, both at our borders and those of cooperating countries. 
This task will require the accelerated development of improved 
detection technologies for chemical, biological, and radiological 
materials as well as training of foreign customs inspectors and law 
enforcement officials. We have taken some steps toward improving our 
interdiction capabilities and training foreign customs officials, but 
we have a long ways yet to go. I am confident that there are promising 
technologies and innovative methods out there if we are willing to 
properly fund and support them. My colleagues Dick Lugar and Pete 
Domenici, and I have called for a new Manhattan Project to solve this 
problem, and the national laboratories at Livemore, Los Alamos and 
elsewhere are doing some promising work in this area. The Defense 
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act which we sponsored provides $27 
million to begin this effort.

  The third part of our strategy is preparedness to face the threat if 
prevention fails. We need to rethink and then rebuild our domestic 
preparedness and planning. Some important improvements have been made 
recently but, again, much remains to be done. Some agencies, like the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] have updated their Cold War 
mission. Others, like the Departments of Defense and Energy, possess 
specialized equipment and expertise that must be available if a WMD 
incident occurs. Managing these efforts during a crisis is the job of 
law enforcement, although their mission to apprehend suspects and 
collect evidence may sometimes have to take a back seat to public 
safety.
  This is just on the Federal level. We heard during our hearings the 
concerns of the first responders--the fire, medical, police, public 
works, and other local officials who would be the first on the scene in 
the event of a chemical, biological, or nuclear incident. We owe it to 
those public servants and the citizens they protect to make available 
the training, equipment, and expertise needed to prevent them from 
joining the ranks of the first victims of an attack. Our strategy must 
consolidate

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our scattershot efforts to focus on this problem.
  The legislation I sponsored with Senators Lugar and Domenici 
contained a key section on domestic preparedness. We provided the 
authority and funding to begin to establish special chemical and 
biological emergency response teams and to train local officials. We 
also included a provision to improve coordination of all the relevant 
agencies and departments by establishing a special coordinator at the 
White House. The Coordinator would oversee the Government's 
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, counterterrorism, intelligence, 
and law enforcement activities that are directly relevant to this 
problem, but are spread far and wide throughout the various 
departments, and pull them together in a coherent policy.
  The change in the nature of the threat requires a change in the way 
we organize our resources to provide for our defense. We should be 
willing to rethink and reshape the cold war bureaucracy and adjust our 
institutions to respond dynamically to a dynamic threat. We will need 
new doctrine and innovative technologies, improved intelligence and law 
enforcement, and cooperation with foreign governments to address this 
threat. The three-pronged strategy I have described is within our reach 
and within our budget. Of course we will need to shift priorities and 
more funding will be required. But the threat of terrorist attack on 
American cities involving radiological, chemical, biological or nuclear 
weapons has reached a point where a new effort is required. We should 
not wait to take action in the wake of an incident. This is a clear and 
present danger that requires a timely response.

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