[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 137 (Saturday, September 28, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1816-E1818]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            RELEASE OF OBSERVER REPORT ON BOSNIAN ELECTIONS

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, September 27, 1996

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, today the Helsinki Commission, 
which I Chair, is releasing its staff election observer report on one 
of the most important international events of the year--the September 
14 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
  Among their conclusions, the Commission staff state the following:
  The elections cannot be considered free and fair, and were held 
prematurely because of limited international support for existing 
peacekeeping burdens.
  The campaign period detracted the most from the election process, due 
to a lack of freedom of movement, association and expression, as well 
as the continued political activity of persons indicted for war crimes.

[[Page E1817]]

  The provisional results, challenged by allegations of more ballots 
than voters, showed clear victories for the ethnically based parties 
originally brought to power in 1990. Whether the elections have set the 
stage for Bosnia's partition along ethnic lines, or for movement toward 
its effective reunification remains an open question.
  The election administration was extremely complex and required 
significant outside help from the OSCE, which performed considerably 
well given the political and logistical circumstances in which it had 
to work.
  Voter registration was also controversial, including on election day. 
Balloting nevertheless went relatively smoothly. There was some 
confusion in the transport and counting of ballots.
  Mr. Speaker, holding the municipal elections in November as 
tentatively planned by OSCE would be a mistake. Not only would the 
administrative problems associated with the September 14 elections 
unlikely be corrected, the newly elected national institutions which 
must now begin to function should be free from the tensions and 
partisanship of another campaign period. And, a delay would allow time 
for Bosnian local leaders who support a unified, multiethnic Bosnia to 
compete fairly, and then help Bosnia build its democracy from the 
bottom up.
  The Commission has, since 1992, taken the lead in the Congress in 
trying to shape a response to the war in Bosnia. Actively following and 
reporting on developments in the region, the Commission also has a 
particular interest in the effectiveness of the OSCE's organization of 
the Bosnian elections. The Commission held several briefings and 
hearings leading up to these elections, including hearing testimony 
from Bosnian elections officials, representatives of Bosnian political 
parties, OSCE mission chief Robert Frowick, special United States 
envory William Montgomery, and other experts. The Commission staff 
which compiled the election report benefited from being in various 
parts of Bosnia on election day, contributing to the large and 
important task of observing the voting and counting of ballots.
  Bosnia-Herzegovina and most every country emerging from the former 
Yugoslavia will remain high on the United States foreign policy agenda 
through the end of this year and into 1997. I therefore encourage my 
colleagues to read the conclusions of the staff report, which I am 
submitting for the record, and contact the Commission should you wish a 
copy of the full report.

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe--Conclusions of Staff 
        Report on September 1996 Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina

       On September 14, 1996, Bosnia-Herzegovina held its second 
     multi-party elections since the collapse of the one-party 
     Communist political system in the former Yugoslavia in 1989. 
     These elections, however, were the first for that country 
     since the break-up of the old Yugoslav federation and the 
     warfare from 1992 to 1995 which accompanied Bosnia's 
     emergency as an independent state. This fighting, largely 
     directed against the civilian population, left an estimated 
     quarter of a million people dead or unaccounted for, and half 
     the original population of about 4.4 million displaced, 
     internally or abroad as refugees. The warfare ended in 
     December 1995 with the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
     in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereinafter the ``Dayton Agreement''), 
     which divided the single Bosnian state into two entities with 
     significant powers of their own. Even for those who survived 
     the conflict in their own homes and villages, the economic, 
     social and political upheaval associated with the war--let 
     alone the almost universal personal loss of friend and/or 
     family in it--made the holding of free and fair elections in 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina virtually impossible, and filled any 
     attempt to do so with risk.
       Elections were held at the national and lower levels but 
     did not include municipal elections, which were postponed. 
     The election administration was extremely complex and 
     required significant outside help from the OSCE, which 
     performed well given the political and logistical 
     circumstances. The campaign period detracted the most from 
     the election process, due to insufficient freedom of 
     movement, association and expression, as well as the 
     continued political activity of persons indicted for war 
     crimes. Voter registration was also controversial in 
     preparing for elections, and remained a problem on election 
     day itself. Balloting nevertheless went relatively smoothly, 
     although the subsequent transport of counting of ballots was 
     confusing and difficult.
       Few have dared to characterize the September 14 elections 
     in Bosnia-Herzegovina as free and fair. Voters generally had 
     a free choice which could be secretly made when they stepped 
     into the voting booth, but disenfranchisement and an 
     intimidating atmosphere at certain locations detracted from 
     this positive characterization. Moreover, on the basis of the 
     campaign period alone, there was no doubt that the elections 
     were not fair. Opposition parties had little chance to make 
     their views known, let alone to counter aggressively the 
     effects of years of war and propaganda on Bosnian voters from 
     all ethnic groups. And, after the elections, questions 
     regarding the total number of eligible voters make 
     certification of the elections difficult.
       The question, therefore, is not whether these elections 
     were free and fair; they obviously were not. The question is 
     whether the international community was wise to go forward 
     with the elections within the timeframe mandated by Dayton. 
     Based on the overwhelming nature of the victories for the 
     ruling parties in the September 14 elections, there is little 
     doubt that the results probably reflect the general will of 
     the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. With more time, during 
     which more substantial efforts could have been undertaken to 
     increase freedom of movement, of speech and of association, 
     as well as to sideline more effectively those indicted for 
     war crimes or otherwise responsible for the conflict in 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the result might have been different.
       Some who argued for holding the elections on schedule 
     suggested that surprises may result, but they did not. They 
     claimed that the situation might actually worsen unless 
     elections were held soon rather than later, but little 
     evidence of that possibility has surfaced. They argued that 
     parties to the Dayton Agreement must adhere to the deadlines, 
     but, in doing so, Dayton's own prerequisites for effective 
     elections were not sufficiently met. They pointed out that 
     all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted the elections to 
     proceed, but this argument ignored the fact that the ruling 
     parties wanted the elections because they knew they would 
     win; that some other nationalist parties believed the 
     elections could facilitate partition; and that moderate 
     parties were hesitant but felt helpless in countering the 
     larger forces dominating their country's politics. Those who 
     prepared for the administration of the elections deserve 
     credit for their hard work, but additional time would have 
     enabled them to sort out the problems that caused so much 
     confusion around election day.
       Therefore, the main argument for holding the elections by 
     the Dayton deadline seems driven mostly by the international 
     community's limited desire to continue to provide Bosnia's 
     peace and security through IFOR. The current IFOR mandate 
     expires at the end of 1996, and the elections were considered 
     a prerequisite to any withdrawal. Indeed, OSCE Mission Head 
     Robert Frowick succeeded in delaying the initial withdrawal 
     process until after the elections were held. If this 
     influenced the decision on when to hold the elections, then 
     U.S. Government pressure on the OSCE to hold elections 
     prematurely deserves criticism. However, the European critics 
     who wish to place full responsibility with the United States 
     should recognize that, for all its faults, only the U.S.-
     brokered initiatives for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina--both 
     the Federation and the Dayton Agreement--have actually 
     brought peace and produced some results. Also, not one 
     government spoke within OSCE in opposition to holding the 
     elections on September 14. Indeed, probably the greatest 
     opposition came from non-government organizations based in 
     the United States, which might have had greater success in 
     achieving a postponement had some influential countries 
     supported a delay.
       Moreover, the peace process created by the Dayton Agreement 
     may have largely run its course by September 1996, and this 
     process needed something--the elections--to move to a new 
     level. Pressure now rests on those elected to work together 
     to resolve their problems, with less reliance on 
     international involvement. If the international community at 
     least maintains the resolve to prevent any party from 
     resorting again to the use of force to achieve political 
     ends, economic and other social forces may erode the 
     political power of those now taking office and result in a 
     more open, pluralistic society. This could even happen among 
     Serbs, despite their present intention to become independent. 
     Bosniacs, who have been the overwhelming victims, may 
     actually become less willing to reconcile differences as a 
     result. Bosnia's Croats can be expected generally to join 
     with whichever side seems to have the upper hand. For all 
     three, the pervasive fears and prejudices brought about by 
     war and propaganda must be replaced by trust and tolerance if 
     there is to be any hope of long-term success.
       Unfortunately, the OSCE decided within days of the national 
     and entity elections--and before finalizing and certifying 
     the results of these elections--to proceed tentatively with 
     more complex municipal elections in late November 1996. OSCE 
     Coordinator for International Monitoring has personally 
     expressed reservations about this decision. Some of the 
     problems encountered with the national and entity-level 
     elections can be corrected by that date, but the root cause 
     of the original postponement--the registration of persons in 
     specific localities--will be especially difficult to remedy. 
     In the rush to organize the elections, other administrative 
     mistakes are to be expected. Moreover, fledging Bosnian and 
     entity institutions must now try to begin work in the context 
     of a new campaign that will only encourage intransigence. 
     Finally, postponing the local elections for six months or 
     longer provides the best chance for opposition parties to 
     score victories and build democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
     from the bottom up. Comfortable with ethnically oriented 
     leaders offering protection from the top, or reacting to the 
     inability of these leaders to move the country forward, 
     voters could be prepared by that time to vote on the basis of 
     interests other than the need for ethnic cohesion. The ruling 
     parties will be able to ride the wave of victory into local 
     elections held in November 1996, reenforcing splits along 
     ethnic lines.

[[Page E1818]]

       Bosnia's future remains uncertain. A genuinely unified 
     state could still emerge, or the state could be partitioned 
     by its neighbors. To some degree, at least, further action by 
     the international community could influence the direction in 
     which Bosnia will head.
       The OSCE's performance in organizing and conducting the 
     elections has come under considerable criticism. While some 
     of the criticism might be warranted, the OSCE deserves credit 
     for having undertaken an extremely difficult task. Its 
     leadership resisted those governments which sought to 
     pressure it to act one way or another, and was relatively 
     candid in assessing the situation leading up to the 
     elections. In this respect, OSCE was a considerable 
     improvement on the United Nations in its political work in 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, the OSCE can no longer remain on 
     the sidelines for the sake of its reputation. Perhaps the 
     OSCE should have been given a larger role to play earlier. 
     Considering the organization's direct involvement in 
     restoring peace and stability to Bosnia-Herzegovina today, 
     its effectiveness in bringing positive results to Bosnia-
     Herzegovina will depend largely on its ability to avoid 
     repeating past mistakes and, like all international 
     organizations, on the political will of its participating 
     States.