[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 136 (Friday, September 27, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11531-S11533]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                NOMINATION OF NAVY CAPT. JEFFREY A. COOK

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I want to discuss an issue I have with 
the Armed Services Committee.
  On May 15, 1995, I wrote a letter to the chairman of the Committee, 
my friend from South Carolina, Senator Thurmond.
  This was a very important letter.
  It concerned the nomination for promotion of Navy Capt. Jeffrey A. 
Cook.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this letter printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                              Charles E. Grassley,


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                     Washington, DC, May 15, 1995.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Strom: I am writing to raise questions about the 
     pending promotion of Navy Captain Jeffrey A. Cook to the rank 
     of rear admiral (lower half).
       My questions about Captain Cook's fitness for promotion 
     pertain to his service as the A-12 class desk officer during 
     the period 1987 to 1990. In that capacity, he was the chief 
     engineer for the A-12 stealth bomber program and the 
     principal adviser for engineering matters to the A-12 program 
     manager, Captain Lawrence G. Elberfeld.


                      a-12 criminal investigation

       The main source of my concern about Captain Cook's 
     qualification for promotion are the results of a criminal 
     investigation. The investigation was conducted by the Chicago 
     Field Office of the Defense Criminal Investigation Service, 
     Department of Defense Inspector General (IG). The report on 
     the investigation is dated April 20, 1994, and carries the 
     designation 9011045M-20-SEP-90-40SL-E5A/D.
       The purpose of the criminal investigation was to examine 
     allegations that ``U.S. Navy and DOD [Department of Defense] 
     officials may have concealed or conspired to conceal, or 
     otherwise thwart, the dissemination of adverse A-12 program 
     information to the DOD and to Congress.''
       The investigation found several specific instances in which 
     former Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett and other 
     Navy A-12 program officials ``withheld, concealed, and/or 
     suppressed adverse A-12 program information'' from cognizant 
     DOD and Navy oversight personnel and from Congress. Both Mr. 
     Garrett and Captain Elberfeld are accused of withholding 
     relevant documents and material during an official inquiry 
     and subsequent congressional oversight hearings. Worse still, 
     the report suggests that Mr. Garrett may have in fact 
     destroyed important evidence during the criminal phase of the 
     investigation.
       Based on the results of the investigation, the Inspector 
     General concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe 
     that Federal criminal law had been violated. Therefore, all 
     the detailed information related to the actions of Secretary 
     Garrett were referred to the Department of Justice for 
     possible prosecution. Similarly, the case against Captain 
     Elberfeld was referred to the Office of the Judge Advocate 
     General of the Navy for possible court-martial. Captain 
     Elberfeld was suspected of violating various articles of the 
     Uniform Code of Military Justice, including article 907--
     pertaining to false official statements. In both cases, a 
     decision was made not to prosecute.


             captain cook's possible role in a-12 cover-up

       Now, this is the issue that must be addressed on the 
     pending nomination: Did Captain Cook allow himself to be 
     drawn into the web of deceit spun out by former Secretary 
     Garrett and Captain Elberfeld? Was Captain Cook a willing or 
     unwilling participant in

[[Page S11532]]

     the scheme to withhold and conceal adverse information on the 
     A-12 program?
       On the surface, Captain Cook's performance appears to have 
     been exceptional. He is the only Navy official I know of who 
     was critical of the program, and the investigators say he is 
     the only person who was ``open and cooperative'' during the 
     probe. His criticism came in the form of several briefings in 
     which he ``identified severe technical problems with the A-12 
     program.'' These briefings are discussed in the IG's 
     investigative report. His criticism was very much to his 
     credit.
       While his critical technical assessments were commendable, 
     I fear they may have been nothing more than a clever 
     bureaucratic ``cover-your-fanny'' operation. This is the 
     scenario I visualize. Captain Cook would present a briefing 
     identifying ``severe technical problems,'' but in the face of 
     opposition and pressure from Captain Elberfeld and more 
     senior officers, Cook would quickly back down. Without 
     further protest, Captain Cook would then join Captain 
     Elberfeld in pumping out false and misleading status reports 
     on the A-12. In the end, I think, Captain Cook acquiesced in 
     the scheme to conceal adverse information on the program.
       The incidents described on pages C29 to C31 of the 
     investigative report seem to lend credence to idea that 
     Captain Cook went along with the coverup.
       On April 16, 1990, Captain Cook provided one of his 
     briefings to a group of senior officers, including Vice 
     Admiral Richard C. Gentz, Commander of the Naval Air Systems 
     Command. In the briefing, he identified ``severe technical 
     problems'' that could ``slip'' the program for at least one 
     year. After hearing that piece of bad news, Admiral Gentz 
     told Captain Elberfeld to ``re-assess'' the A-12 program and 
     report back to him with solutions within 24 hours. As I 
     understand it, Captain Cook helped Captain Elberfeld 
     prepare a ``revised'' technical update briefing for 
     Admiral Gentz. This is where Captain Cook seems to have 
     taken a 180 degree turn in his thinking. He did an about-
     face and worked with Elberfeld late into the night, 
     twisting and distorting the facts, turning his own 
     assessment upside down, helping Elberfeld put a favorable 
     spin on the status of the program. After their night of 
     handy work, Admiral Gentz felt the one-year ``slip'' was 
     unnecessary, leaving the money spigot wide open. That 
     particular piece of work came at a very critical point in 
     the program. (Refer to page C-31)
       Captain Cook also participated in the confiscation and 
     suppression of a devastating report on the A-12 program. This 
     incident occurred in February 1990 and is described on pages 
     C-29 to C-30 of the investigative report.
       The highly critical evaluation was prepared by Mr. Ed 
     Carroll, a civilian production analyst assigned to the Office 
     of the Secretary of Defense. His report predicted a one-year 
     ``slip'' in the program. The Carroll report was 
     ``confiscated''--allegedly for a security violation--and 
     ``relinquished'' to Captain Cook. He subsequently turned it 
     over to one of his subordinates, Mr. John J. Dicks. When 
     investigators discovered the Carroll report buried in A-12 
     program office files, attached to it was a handwritten note 
     by Dicks. The note stated in part: ``Keep this package quiet 
     and close controlled.'' As a result of Cook's actions, the 
     highly critical Carroll report never saw the light of day. 
     The handling of the Carroll report suggests to me that 
     Captain Cook could have played a role in concealing adverse 
     information on the A-12 stealth bomber.


               holding captain cook to a higher standard

       Strom, as I said, compared to other A-12 program officials, 
     Captain Cook's performance was exceptional. It makes him look 
     like a hero. But in making that comparison, we are holding 
     him to a negative standard. A candidate for promotion to rear 
     admiral must be held to a much higher standard--a standard of 
     excellence. When that is done, I don't think Captain Cook 
     measures up.
       There is a fundamental principle of leadership: ``Seek 
     Responsibility and Take Responsibility for your Actions.''
       At the time, the A-12 was a top priority Navy program. As 
     chief engineer on the project, he had identified a major 
     technical problem that posed a very real threat to the 
     viability of the whole program. It was a ``show stopper''--a 
     problem that had to be fixed. He was responsible for 
     developing a sound and timely solution to the problem. He had 
     a responsibility to follow through. He was fully accountable 
     for that problem. A man in his position should not wait for 
     his superiors to tell him what to do. He needed to take the 
     initiative and solve it--with the approval, of course, of his 
     superiors. However, when those over him balked at his 
     solutions but at the same time refused to even address ``show 
     stopper'' problems, then he had a responsibility to confront 
     them and push it up the chain of command. For example, he 
     would have sent a written report up the chain of command to 
     the top DOD acquisition ``czar''--if necessary, laying out 
     his view of the problem.
       Unfortunately, Captain Cook's protests ended where they 
     began--in his briefings. Had he pushed them further up the 
     chain of command, he would have run the risk of ruining his 
     career. Doing the right thing almost always involves risks 
     and even danger. Doing what must be done takes courage, 
     commitment and integrity. Had Captain Cook pursued the more 
     risky solution, he would have set an example of excellence. 
     No aspect of leadership is more powerful that setting a good 
     example. Had he done it, Cook would have been a role model 
     for all to respect. Strom, we must judge Captain Cook against 
     such a standard of excellence.
       A candidate for promotion to rear admiral should 
     demonstrate certain outstanding leadership qualities 
     including courage, competence, candor, commitment, and 
     integrity. In my mind, Captain Cook failed to demonstrate 
     those skills as chief engineer on the A-12 project. His 
     superior officers told him to do the wrong thing, and he did 
     it. He failed to stick to his beliefs. He failed to act on 
     the information he had. He failed to demonstrate a solid 
     commitment to solving the engineering problems that he had 
     identified and for which he was accountable.


                  overall impact of a-12 mismanagement

       The failure of former Secretary Garrett, Captain Elberfeld, 
     Captain Cook and others to confront major technical problems 
     on the A-12 in an open, honest, and timely way has had a 
     profound, long-term negative impact on the Navy.
       The A-12 was supposed to begin replacing the Navy's aging 
     fleet the A-6 bombers in 1994. That was last year. Well, 
     there are no A-12 bombers in the fleet and never will be. All 
     the money spent on the A-12--nearly $3.0 billion--was wasted. 
     We have absolutely nothing to show for it.
       The A-12 program was terminated for default in January 
     1991. Former Secretary of Defense Cheney killed the program 
     because it was way over cost and way behind schedule, and no 
     one could tell him how much money it would take to finish it. 
     To make matters worse, the two A-12 contractors--McDonnell 
     Douglas and General Dynamics--are suing the Government for 
     billions. And the Government's case is weak. It's very 
     difficult to blame the contractors for what happened when top 
     Navy officials like Garrett, Elberfeld, and Cook all knew the 
     program was in deep trouble but did nothing about it. They 
     just kept shoveling more money at the contractors in the form 
     of fraudulent progress payments--payments made for work 
     that was not performed. In all probability, we are going 
     to end up spending even more money on a dead horse--mainly 
     because people like Garrett, Elberfeld and Cook didn't do 
     their jobs. Had any one of them done the right thing, the 
     A-12 might be in the fleet today.
       Strom, I only ask that you review the IG's investigative 
     report and determine what role, if any, Captain Cook played 
     in the scheme to withhold and conceal adverse information on 
     the A-12 program.
       I also ask that Captain Cook's performance not be evaluated 
     against the performance of the other A-12 program officers. I 
     respectfully request that he be judged against a much higher 
     standard of excellence. Please let me know what you decide.
       Your consideration in this matter is greatly appreciated.
           Sincerely,
                                              Charles E. Grassley,
                                                     U.S. Senator.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, this letter raised several very serious 
questions about Captain Cook's fitness for promotion to the rank of 
admiral.
  Specifically, my questions about Captain Cook pertained to his 
service as chief engineer on the A-12 stealth bomber project that was 
terminated for default in January 1991.
  The A-12 project collapsed because of an unresolved engineering 
problem--uncontrolled increases in the weight of the airplane.
  It was a ``show stopper,'' and Captain Cook was up to his ears in the 
whole mess.
  As the weight of the airplane grew, the schedule kept sliding, and 
the price kept going up.
  Eventually, this top priority Navy program was buried in a massive 
cost overrun.
  This kind of mismanagement was bad enough by itself.
  But A-12 mismanagement became a criminal enterprise when senior Navy 
officials attempted to conceal and cover up the cost overrun with lies.
  They attempted to hide the problem from the Secretary of Defense and 
the Congress.
  This behavior triggered a criminal investigation by the Inspector 
General [IG] of the Department of Defense.
  The IG concluded that Federal criminal laws were violated, and the 
case was referred to the Justice Department for prosecution.
  The investigation found several specific instances in which the 
Secretary of the Navy at the time, H. Lawrence Garrett, and A-12 
program officials

[[Page S11533]]

``withheld, concealed, and/or suppressed adverse A-12 program 
information'' from the Secretary of Defense and the Congress.
  That is a quote from the IG's criminal report.
  I also believe the IG report shows that Captain Cook may have 
participated in the scheme to conceal and suppress adverse information 
about the program.
  These are very serious allegations.
  They need to be addressed and resolved.
  Maybe the Committee conducted an investigation and cleared him, but I 
do not know that. The Committee has never bothered to tell me about it.
  So I was very surprised and very disappointed to find Captain Cook's 
name on a July 1996 list of ``United States Navy Flag Officers.''
  He has been confirmed and ``frocked.''
  That means he wears an admiral's insignia but is still paid as a 
captain.
  Once an admiral's billet opens up, he will assume the full duties and 
responsibilities of an admiral.
  Mr. President, I think the Committee owes me an explanation.
  Mr. President, on September 27, I wrote a second time--1\1/2\ years 
later--to Senator Thurmond, asking for a response.
  I ask unanimous consent to have this second letter printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                         United States Senate,

                               Washington, DC, September 27, 1996.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Strom, I am writing to follow up on my letter of May 
     15, 1995, regarding the nomination for promotion of Navy 
     Captain Jeffrey A. Cook.
       In my letter to you of May 15, 1995, I raised several very 
     serious questions bearing on Captain Cook's fitness for 
     promotion to the rank of admiral. My questions were based on 
     a criminal investigation conducted by the Inspector General 
     of the Department of Defense. These questions pertained to 
     his service as chief engineer on the A-12 stealth bomber 
     project that was terminated for default in January 1991. 
     These questions suggest that Captain Cook may have 
     participated in a scheme to conceal adverse information on 
     the A-12 from both the Secretary of Defense and Congress.
       In view of these allegations and since I never received a 
     response from you, I was very surprised and disappointed to 
     find Captain Cook's name on July 1996 list of ``United States 
     Navy Flag Officers.'' This list indicates that he has been 
     confirmed and ``frocked.'' Once an admiral's billet becomes 
     available, he will assume the full duties and 
     responsibilities of the rank.
       Would you be kind enough to explain how your Committee 
     resolved the questions raised in my letter of May 15, 1995. 
     Had I known that your Committee was prepared to proceed with 
     this nomination, I would have liked to have had an 
     opportunity to raise my objections on the floor. Strom, we in 
     the Senate have a Constitutional responsibility to nurture 
     topnotch leadership in the Armed Forces. Officers who meet 
     those high standards should be praised and promoted. Those 
     who fail to meet the high standards should be weeded out.
  I would appreciate a response to my letter.
           Sincerely,
                                              Charles E. Grassley,
                                                      U.S. Senate.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Had I known the committee was prepared to confirm 
Captain Cook, I would have asked for an opportunity to raise my 
objections on the floor.
  Mr. President, we in the Senate have a constitutional responsibility 
to nurture topnotch leadership in the Armed Forces.
  Officers who meet those standards should be praised and promoted.
  Those who fail to meet those high standards should be weeded out.
  Based on what I know right now today, I do not think Captain Cook 
meets the highest standards nor should have been promoted to admiral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Grams). The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Murkowski pertaining to the introduction of S. 
2150 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced 
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from 
South Carolina have whatever time he may consume for a tribute--about 4 
minutes; that following his remarks, Senator Wyden and I speak as in 
morning business for a period not to exceed a total of 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from South Carolina.

                          ____________________