[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 136 (Friday, September 27, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11531-S11533]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NOMINATION OF NAVY CAPT. JEFFREY A. COOK
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I want to discuss an issue I have with
the Armed Services Committee.
On May 15, 1995, I wrote a letter to the chairman of the Committee,
my friend from South Carolina, Senator Thurmond.
This was a very important letter.
It concerned the nomination for promotion of Navy Capt. Jeffrey A.
Cook.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this letter printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Charles E. Grassley,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, May 15, 1995.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Strom: I am writing to raise questions about the
pending promotion of Navy Captain Jeffrey A. Cook to the rank
of rear admiral (lower half).
My questions about Captain Cook's fitness for promotion
pertain to his service as the A-12 class desk officer during
the period 1987 to 1990. In that capacity, he was the chief
engineer for the A-12 stealth bomber program and the
principal adviser for engineering matters to the A-12 program
manager, Captain Lawrence G. Elberfeld.
a-12 criminal investigation
The main source of my concern about Captain Cook's
qualification for promotion are the results of a criminal
investigation. The investigation was conducted by the Chicago
Field Office of the Defense Criminal Investigation Service,
Department of Defense Inspector General (IG). The report on
the investigation is dated April 20, 1994, and carries the
designation 9011045M-20-SEP-90-40SL-E5A/D.
The purpose of the criminal investigation was to examine
allegations that ``U.S. Navy and DOD [Department of Defense]
officials may have concealed or conspired to conceal, or
otherwise thwart, the dissemination of adverse A-12 program
information to the DOD and to Congress.''
The investigation found several specific instances in which
former Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett and other
Navy A-12 program officials ``withheld, concealed, and/or
suppressed adverse A-12 program information'' from cognizant
DOD and Navy oversight personnel and from Congress. Both Mr.
Garrett and Captain Elberfeld are accused of withholding
relevant documents and material during an official inquiry
and subsequent congressional oversight hearings. Worse still,
the report suggests that Mr. Garrett may have in fact
destroyed important evidence during the criminal phase of the
investigation.
Based on the results of the investigation, the Inspector
General concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe
that Federal criminal law had been violated. Therefore, all
the detailed information related to the actions of Secretary
Garrett were referred to the Department of Justice for
possible prosecution. Similarly, the case against Captain
Elberfeld was referred to the Office of the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy for possible court-martial. Captain
Elberfeld was suspected of violating various articles of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, including article 907--
pertaining to false official statements. In both cases, a
decision was made not to prosecute.
captain cook's possible role in a-12 cover-up
Now, this is the issue that must be addressed on the
pending nomination: Did Captain Cook allow himself to be
drawn into the web of deceit spun out by former Secretary
Garrett and Captain Elberfeld? Was Captain Cook a willing or
unwilling participant in
[[Page S11532]]
the scheme to withhold and conceal adverse information on the
A-12 program?
On the surface, Captain Cook's performance appears to have
been exceptional. He is the only Navy official I know of who
was critical of the program, and the investigators say he is
the only person who was ``open and cooperative'' during the
probe. His criticism came in the form of several briefings in
which he ``identified severe technical problems with the A-12
program.'' These briefings are discussed in the IG's
investigative report. His criticism was very much to his
credit.
While his critical technical assessments were commendable,
I fear they may have been nothing more than a clever
bureaucratic ``cover-your-fanny'' operation. This is the
scenario I visualize. Captain Cook would present a briefing
identifying ``severe technical problems,'' but in the face of
opposition and pressure from Captain Elberfeld and more
senior officers, Cook would quickly back down. Without
further protest, Captain Cook would then join Captain
Elberfeld in pumping out false and misleading status reports
on the A-12. In the end, I think, Captain Cook acquiesced in
the scheme to conceal adverse information on the program.
The incidents described on pages C29 to C31 of the
investigative report seem to lend credence to idea that
Captain Cook went along with the coverup.
On April 16, 1990, Captain Cook provided one of his
briefings to a group of senior officers, including Vice
Admiral Richard C. Gentz, Commander of the Naval Air Systems
Command. In the briefing, he identified ``severe technical
problems'' that could ``slip'' the program for at least one
year. After hearing that piece of bad news, Admiral Gentz
told Captain Elberfeld to ``re-assess'' the A-12 program and
report back to him with solutions within 24 hours. As I
understand it, Captain Cook helped Captain Elberfeld
prepare a ``revised'' technical update briefing for
Admiral Gentz. This is where Captain Cook seems to have
taken a 180 degree turn in his thinking. He did an about-
face and worked with Elberfeld late into the night,
twisting and distorting the facts, turning his own
assessment upside down, helping Elberfeld put a favorable
spin on the status of the program. After their night of
handy work, Admiral Gentz felt the one-year ``slip'' was
unnecessary, leaving the money spigot wide open. That
particular piece of work came at a very critical point in
the program. (Refer to page C-31)
Captain Cook also participated in the confiscation and
suppression of a devastating report on the A-12 program. This
incident occurred in February 1990 and is described on pages
C-29 to C-30 of the investigative report.
The highly critical evaluation was prepared by Mr. Ed
Carroll, a civilian production analyst assigned to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense. His report predicted a one-year
``slip'' in the program. The Carroll report was
``confiscated''--allegedly for a security violation--and
``relinquished'' to Captain Cook. He subsequently turned it
over to one of his subordinates, Mr. John J. Dicks. When
investigators discovered the Carroll report buried in A-12
program office files, attached to it was a handwritten note
by Dicks. The note stated in part: ``Keep this package quiet
and close controlled.'' As a result of Cook's actions, the
highly critical Carroll report never saw the light of day.
The handling of the Carroll report suggests to me that
Captain Cook could have played a role in concealing adverse
information on the A-12 stealth bomber.
holding captain cook to a higher standard
Strom, as I said, compared to other A-12 program officials,
Captain Cook's performance was exceptional. It makes him look
like a hero. But in making that comparison, we are holding
him to a negative standard. A candidate for promotion to rear
admiral must be held to a much higher standard--a standard of
excellence. When that is done, I don't think Captain Cook
measures up.
There is a fundamental principle of leadership: ``Seek
Responsibility and Take Responsibility for your Actions.''
At the time, the A-12 was a top priority Navy program. As
chief engineer on the project, he had identified a major
technical problem that posed a very real threat to the
viability of the whole program. It was a ``show stopper''--a
problem that had to be fixed. He was responsible for
developing a sound and timely solution to the problem. He had
a responsibility to follow through. He was fully accountable
for that problem. A man in his position should not wait for
his superiors to tell him what to do. He needed to take the
initiative and solve it--with the approval, of course, of his
superiors. However, when those over him balked at his
solutions but at the same time refused to even address ``show
stopper'' problems, then he had a responsibility to confront
them and push it up the chain of command. For example, he
would have sent a written report up the chain of command to
the top DOD acquisition ``czar''--if necessary, laying out
his view of the problem.
Unfortunately, Captain Cook's protests ended where they
began--in his briefings. Had he pushed them further up the
chain of command, he would have run the risk of ruining his
career. Doing the right thing almost always involves risks
and even danger. Doing what must be done takes courage,
commitment and integrity. Had Captain Cook pursued the more
risky solution, he would have set an example of excellence.
No aspect of leadership is more powerful that setting a good
example. Had he done it, Cook would have been a role model
for all to respect. Strom, we must judge Captain Cook against
such a standard of excellence.
A candidate for promotion to rear admiral should
demonstrate certain outstanding leadership qualities
including courage, competence, candor, commitment, and
integrity. In my mind, Captain Cook failed to demonstrate
those skills as chief engineer on the A-12 project. His
superior officers told him to do the wrong thing, and he did
it. He failed to stick to his beliefs. He failed to act on
the information he had. He failed to demonstrate a solid
commitment to solving the engineering problems that he had
identified and for which he was accountable.
overall impact of a-12 mismanagement
The failure of former Secretary Garrett, Captain Elberfeld,
Captain Cook and others to confront major technical problems
on the A-12 in an open, honest, and timely way has had a
profound, long-term negative impact on the Navy.
The A-12 was supposed to begin replacing the Navy's aging
fleet the A-6 bombers in 1994. That was last year. Well,
there are no A-12 bombers in the fleet and never will be. All
the money spent on the A-12--nearly $3.0 billion--was wasted.
We have absolutely nothing to show for it.
The A-12 program was terminated for default in January
1991. Former Secretary of Defense Cheney killed the program
because it was way over cost and way behind schedule, and no
one could tell him how much money it would take to finish it.
To make matters worse, the two A-12 contractors--McDonnell
Douglas and General Dynamics--are suing the Government for
billions. And the Government's case is weak. It's very
difficult to blame the contractors for what happened when top
Navy officials like Garrett, Elberfeld, and Cook all knew the
program was in deep trouble but did nothing about it. They
just kept shoveling more money at the contractors in the form
of fraudulent progress payments--payments made for work
that was not performed. In all probability, we are going
to end up spending even more money on a dead horse--mainly
because people like Garrett, Elberfeld and Cook didn't do
their jobs. Had any one of them done the right thing, the
A-12 might be in the fleet today.
Strom, I only ask that you review the IG's investigative
report and determine what role, if any, Captain Cook played
in the scheme to withhold and conceal adverse information on
the A-12 program.
I also ask that Captain Cook's performance not be evaluated
against the performance of the other A-12 program officers. I
respectfully request that he be judged against a much higher
standard of excellence. Please let me know what you decide.
Your consideration in this matter is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley,
U.S. Senator.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, this letter raised several very serious
questions about Captain Cook's fitness for promotion to the rank of
admiral.
Specifically, my questions about Captain Cook pertained to his
service as chief engineer on the A-12 stealth bomber project that was
terminated for default in January 1991.
The A-12 project collapsed because of an unresolved engineering
problem--uncontrolled increases in the weight of the airplane.
It was a ``show stopper,'' and Captain Cook was up to his ears in the
whole mess.
As the weight of the airplane grew, the schedule kept sliding, and
the price kept going up.
Eventually, this top priority Navy program was buried in a massive
cost overrun.
This kind of mismanagement was bad enough by itself.
But A-12 mismanagement became a criminal enterprise when senior Navy
officials attempted to conceal and cover up the cost overrun with lies.
They attempted to hide the problem from the Secretary of Defense and
the Congress.
This behavior triggered a criminal investigation by the Inspector
General [IG] of the Department of Defense.
The IG concluded that Federal criminal laws were violated, and the
case was referred to the Justice Department for prosecution.
The investigation found several specific instances in which the
Secretary of the Navy at the time, H. Lawrence Garrett, and A-12
program officials
[[Page S11533]]
``withheld, concealed, and/or suppressed adverse A-12 program
information'' from the Secretary of Defense and the Congress.
That is a quote from the IG's criminal report.
I also believe the IG report shows that Captain Cook may have
participated in the scheme to conceal and suppress adverse information
about the program.
These are very serious allegations.
They need to be addressed and resolved.
Maybe the Committee conducted an investigation and cleared him, but I
do not know that. The Committee has never bothered to tell me about it.
So I was very surprised and very disappointed to find Captain Cook's
name on a July 1996 list of ``United States Navy Flag Officers.''
He has been confirmed and ``frocked.''
That means he wears an admiral's insignia but is still paid as a
captain.
Once an admiral's billet opens up, he will assume the full duties and
responsibilities of an admiral.
Mr. President, I think the Committee owes me an explanation.
Mr. President, on September 27, I wrote a second time--1\1/2\ years
later--to Senator Thurmond, asking for a response.
I ask unanimous consent to have this second letter printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
United States Senate,
Washington, DC, September 27, 1996.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Strom, I am writing to follow up on my letter of May
15, 1995, regarding the nomination for promotion of Navy
Captain Jeffrey A. Cook.
In my letter to you of May 15, 1995, I raised several very
serious questions bearing on Captain Cook's fitness for
promotion to the rank of admiral. My questions were based on
a criminal investigation conducted by the Inspector General
of the Department of Defense. These questions pertained to
his service as chief engineer on the A-12 stealth bomber
project that was terminated for default in January 1991.
These questions suggest that Captain Cook may have
participated in a scheme to conceal adverse information on
the A-12 from both the Secretary of Defense and Congress.
In view of these allegations and since I never received a
response from you, I was very surprised and disappointed to
find Captain Cook's name on July 1996 list of ``United States
Navy Flag Officers.'' This list indicates that he has been
confirmed and ``frocked.'' Once an admiral's billet becomes
available, he will assume the full duties and
responsibilities of the rank.
Would you be kind enough to explain how your Committee
resolved the questions raised in my letter of May 15, 1995.
Had I known that your Committee was prepared to proceed with
this nomination, I would have liked to have had an
opportunity to raise my objections on the floor. Strom, we in
the Senate have a Constitutional responsibility to nurture
topnotch leadership in the Armed Forces. Officers who meet
those high standards should be praised and promoted. Those
who fail to meet the high standards should be weeded out.
I would appreciate a response to my letter.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley,
U.S. Senate.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Had I known the committee was prepared to confirm
Captain Cook, I would have asked for an opportunity to raise my
objections on the floor.
Mr. President, we in the Senate have a constitutional responsibility
to nurture topnotch leadership in the Armed Forces.
Officers who meet those standards should be praised and promoted.
Those who fail to meet those high standards should be weeded out.
Based on what I know right now today, I do not think Captain Cook
meets the highest standards nor should have been promoted to admiral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Grams). The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Murkowski pertaining to the introduction of S.
2150 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from
South Carolina have whatever time he may consume for a tribute--about 4
minutes; that following his remarks, Senator Wyden and I speak as in
morning business for a period not to exceed a total of 20 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from South Carolina.
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