[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 134 (Wednesday, September 25, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11321-S11326]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997--CONFERENCE REPORT

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of 
conference on (H.R. 3259) and ask for its immediate consideration.
  THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The committee on conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
     two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 
     3259) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     United States Government, the Community Management Account, 
     and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
     System, and for other purposes, having met, after full and 
     free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to 
     their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of 
     the conferees.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the conference report.
  (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the 
Record of September 24, 1996.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am pleased to be able to submit for my 
colleagues' consideration the conference report on H.R. 3259, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. As you know, the 
Senate passed its authorization bill only last week and this may be an 
unprecedented turnaround time from passage of our bill to consideration 
of the conference report. For this, I want to thank House Chairman 
Larry Combest for his outstanding management of what could have been a 
difficult effort at reconciling our two bills. Ranking Member Norman 
Dicks and Vice Chairman Robert Kerrey played equally valuable roles in 
finding the right balance between ardently advocating their positions 
and ensuring eventual passage of this important legislation.
  The rapid progress of this conference report is all the more 
noteworthy in that, in addition to the usual annual authorization of 
expenditures for intelligence and intelligence-related activities, this 
year's authorization bill adds important new provisions to the National 
Security Act of 1947 designed to help the Director of Central 
Intelligence [DCI] exert stronger direction and control over the 
intelligence community.
  Let me remind my colleagues that under the National Security Act the 
DCI wears three hats: principal intelligence adviser to the President 
and the National Security Council; Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency; and head of the intelligence community, which is composed of 13 
different intelligence agencies.
  For a variety of reasons, a long succession of DCI's have devoted 
almost all of their time and energy to their first two jobs--advising 
the President and running the CIA--and have given short shrift to the 
third--managing the intelligence community. The result has been an 
unfortunate lack of coordination and focused effort by our various 
intelligence agencies. This is not to say that our intelligence 
agencies have not been successful. The opposite is true: the United 
States has the premier intelligence apparatus in the world. But because 
they are scattered among so many different departments and agencies 
they have not been able to operate as efficiently and effectively as 
they could.
  Title VIII of the conference report--the Intelligence Renewal and 
Reform Act of 1996--contains provisions intended to strengthen the 
overall management of the intelligence community.
  In particular, to help the DCI perform his community 
responsibilities, title VIII establishes a new Senate-confirmed Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management and three new 
Senate-confirmed Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence. Since the 
National Security Act was enacted in 1947, there have been only two 
statutory positions to manage the intelligence community: a Director of 
Central Intelligence and a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The 
time has come to give the DCI a better community management structure. 
The conference report provides that the DDCI for Community Management 
will manage an intelligence community staff and will direct 
communitywide functions, including personnel, resources, requirements, 
collection, research and development, and analysis and production. Each 
of the three Assistant DCI's will oversee communitywide efforts in a 
particular functional area: collection, analysis and production, and 
administration.
  I should mention that the DCI has expressed some concern about 
whether the three Assistant DCI's should all be

[[Page S11322]]

Presidential appointments subject to Senate confirmation. While noting 
the DCI's concerns, a majority of the conferees concluded that the 
advantages of Senate-confirmation outweigh any potential disadvantages. 
In light of the fact that the three Assistant DCI's will be responsible 
for coordinating functions that cut across a number of different 
departments and agencies, the conferees determined that Senate 
confirmation is necessary to ensure that each of these individuals has 
sufficient stature and focus to impose a more cohesive and coherent 
process for allocating resources in each of these key functional areas.
  The DCI has also questioned whether Senate confirmation of the 
Assistant Directors is warranted given the limited authority vested in 
these positions. In fact, the statutory authority vested in these 
positions is the full authority of the DCI for each respective area. 
Thus, the actual authority exercised by the Assistant Directors will 
depend in large measure on the authority the DCI chooses to delegate 
and support.
  In addition to creating a better intelligence community management 
team, the bill gives the DCI significant new management authorities. 
For example, the Secretary of Defense will be required to obtain the 
DCI's concurrence--or note the DCI's lack of concurrence--before 
recommending an individual to the President to be Director of the 
National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the 
new National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The DCI will also have to be 
consulted regarding the appointments of the heads of the smaller 
intelligence community elements, including the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and 
the FBI's National Security Division. In addition, separate provisions 
added to this year's DOD authorization bill require the DCI to submit 
an annual performance evaluation of the heads of the major defense 
intelligence agencies to the Secretary of Defense. These provisions are 
very significant. Previously, the DCI had little or no say in the 
appointments or evaluation of the heads of the major operating elements 
of the intelligence community.
  I should note that the Director of the FBI objected strenuously to 
requiring the DCI to be consulted before the Attorney General appoints 
the head of the FBI's National Security Division. Director Freeh 
appeared to be concerned that requiring consultation might somehow make 
the FBI Director appear to be subservient to the DCI. In response to 
these concerns, the conferees agreed to modify the original Senate 
provision to require the FBI Director to give the DCI timely notice of 
his recommendation of an individual to fill the position, and to give 
the DCI an opportunity to consult. While agreeing to these changes, the 
conferees noted that the Director of the National Security Division 
manages a significant portion of the national intelligence budget and 
concluded that it is wholly appropriate to give the DCI some voice in 
his or her appointment.
  In addition to having a stronger voice in appointments, the DCI is 
given new statutory authority to participate in the preparation of 
defense intelligence budgets and to be consulted with respect to 
reprogrammings of funds among defensewide intelligence activities. For 
the first time, the DCI is also given the statutory right to establish 
intelligence collection requirements and priorities, and to resolve 
conflicts in collection priorities.
  I also want to take a moment to address the press reports that 
opposition from the Department of Defense killed intelligence reform 
this year. It is true that bureaucratic resistance to change threatened 
reform efforts and that both the Senate and House Intelligence 
Committees agreed to scale back some of their proposals in the interest 
of ensuring passage of the bill. However, many very significant 
provisions remain. The conference report gives the DCI important new 
authorities to manage the intelligence community and, for the first 
time in 50 years, establishes a new intelligence community management 
structure. We expect these provisions will go far to make the 
intelligence community operate more effectively and more efficiently. 
In short, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the reports of the death of 
intelligence reform are greatly exaggerated.
  With the end of the 104th Congress, we mark a significant milestone 
in the history of this Senate, the executive branch, and most of all, 
the intelligence community. Twenty years ago, on May 19, 1976, the 
Senate adopted Senate Resolution 400, establishing the Select Committee 
on Intelligence. The following day, May 20, 15 Senators were appointed 
to this committee, with Senator Inouye as its Chairman and Senator 
Howard Baker its Vice Chairman. Thus, from the very beginning, the 
nonpartisan nature of the committee was reinforced with the seating of 
a Vice Chairman rather than a ranking member. This nonpartisan attitude 
has continued for 20 years, with the Chairmen and Vice Chairmen working 
together overseeing U.S. intelligence, and at the same time ensuring 
that this important instrument of national security is maintained.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a brief statement 
outlining the impressive history of this committee be printed in the 
Record at the conclusion of my statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  [See exhibit 1.]
  Mr. Speaker, the conclusion of the 104th Congress also marks the end 
of my term as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
Thanks in large measure to the commitment of the Vice Chairman, Senator 
Bob Kerrey, and a dedicated staff, it has been a productive tenure. 
Beginning in early 1995 with the confirmation of a new Director of 
Central Intelligence and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and 
culminating with the passage today of significant legislation to 
strengthen the ability of the intelligence community to meet the needs 
of the post-cold-war world, the past 2 years have seen this committee 
address virtually all of the important national security issues 
confronting the country. Through hearings, intensive inquiries, 
committee reports, and legislation, the SSCI has examined the growing 
transnational threats of terrorism, narcotics, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, organized crime, and economic espionage. We have 
continued the committee's focus on counterintelligence and the fallout 
from the treachery of Aldrich Ames, reopened longstanding inquiries 
into the role of the intelligence community in Central America, 
explored the risks and benefits of economic intelligence collection, 
overseen intelligence support to military operations in Bosnia, the 
Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and elsewhere, and provided insights to 
the Senate on intelligence-related aspects of arms control.
  The role that the Vice Chairman has played in these committee 
endeavors cannot be overstated. Senator Kerrey brings a keen mind and 
deep personal commitment to the committee's task of ensuring that this 
country has the best possible intelligence capability--one that is 
effective, efficient, and operates in a manner fully consistent with 
American laws and values. The Vice Chairman and I have not always 
agreed on every aspect of every issue, although the areas of 
disagreement have been remarkably rare. Senator Kerrey has always 
approached these issues with characteristic grace and good humor. A 
determined advocate, he nevertheless finds ways to work through 
problems in a principled manner totally devoid of partisanship. As 
those of you who have had the privilege to serve on the Intelligence 
Committee know, the issues do not all have the glamour of James Bond 
adventures or the sensationalism of front page scandals. Senator Kerrey 
has shown a willingness and an acumen for tackling even the most 
technical and obscure aspects of the committee's work where the 
effectiveness of our intelligence capability is at stake.
  Senator Kerrey's outstanding attributes are echoed in his staff 
director for the committee, Chris Straub. Mr. Straub has brought the 
same kind of nonpartisan professionalism to his work for the committee 
over the past 8 years. I have always found Chris fair, tough, and 
knowledgeable.
  I also want to recognize Art Grant, the minority deputy staff 
director, whose command of the complex and at times arcane world of 
intelligence satellites has contributed greatly to the committee's 
oversight responsibilities in this area.

[[Page S11323]]

  Which brings me to the committee's staff director, Charles Battaglia. 
When I first joined the committee in 1984, I was determined to hire a 
staff person with extensive intelligence experience and an excellent 
reputation within his field. I was lucky enough to find someone who not 
only had these qualities but also possessed the patience, perspective, 
and perseverance that are essential to a successful working 
relationship in this hectic institution. It was Charles Battaglia who 
urged that the committee move from the designee system, where each 
Member could bring on their own staff person--often resulting in 
staffers with little or no intelligence background who's focus was more 
on individual Member issues than on the core work of the committee--to 
a fully professional, nonpartisan staff. This was not an easy 
transition, but Charles Battaglia has managed to ensure Members' needs 
are met without sacrificing the essential work of the committee staff. 
The result is a stronger, more cohesive staff and committee. Mr. 
Battaglia has been an excellent manager, valued adviser, and good 
friend.

  In addition, I would like to thank the other members of the committee 
staff, particularly Suzanne Spaulding, the committee's general counsel, 
and her legal staff, Mark Heilbrun and John Bellinger, for their hard 
work on this legislation and on the many legal issues which have 
confronted the committee over the last 2 years; senior staff member Ed 
Levine, who has led the committee's inquires into issues such as the 
flow of Iranian arms into Bosnia and human rights abuses in Guatemala, 
managing to draft committee reports on these potentially divisive 
issues in a manner that is fair, accurate, and thorough; the 
committee's budget director, Mary Sturtevant, whose mastery of every 
nook and cranny of the dispersed and complex intelligence community 
apparatus has been essential to our oversight function; and Pat 
Hanback, whose audit team has provided professional, detailed reviews 
of areas of oversight concern and has made many important 
recommendations for improvements.
  I would like to express my gratitude as well to the committee's 
support staff for its professionalism in the face of continuing 
demands. Jim Wolfe, the committee's security director, and his staff 
did yeoman work in successfully maintaining the security of a vast 
array of classified material. Kathleen McGhee, the committee's chief 
clerk, and the rest of the staff literally made the engine run. I will 
thank each of them personally at a later time.
  Mr. President, the outstanding efforts of the entire committee staff 
and membership is reflected in this Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1997 and I urge its passage.

     The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Twenty Years of 
                         Intelligent Oversight

       The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was established 
     in 1976 directly as a result of the Senate Select Committee 
     to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence 
     Activities, or the Church Committee, which was set up to 
     examine allegations of intelligence abuses by various 
     intelligence agencies. The findings of this Committee were 
     ample evidence that existing Congressional mechanisms were 
     inadequate to meet the need for continual, focused, 
     institutionalized oversight of the Intelligence Community.
       The Intelligence Committee responded promptly to the need 
     for changes highlighted by the Church Committee. Working with 
     the Judiciary Committees of each house, the intelligence 
     committees developed legislation known as the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 which, for the first 
     time, required that a court order be obtained from a special 
     court established under the Act as a condition for 
     undertaking electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes 
     within the United States. Prior to that time, such 
     surveillance had been carried out without a search warrant or 
     court order, pursuant to the asserted constitutional 
     authority of the President. The Committee, in the 95th 
     Congress, also was the first to begin work on legislation to 
     address the problem of ``Graymail'', i.e., the threat by 
     defendants to disclose highly classified information if they 
     were prosecuted. The committees were instrumental in the 
     enactment of the Classified Information Procedures Act of 
     1980, which established statutory procedures for handling 
     classified information involved in a Federal criminal 
     proceeding.
       Perhaps the most striking fact that we encounter when we 
     look back 20 years, however, is how many of the issues then 
     confronting the Committee are still relevant. Hearings were 
     held in 1977 on the question of whether or not to declose the 
     bottom line amount of the intelligence budget, a question 
     with which we are still wrestling. The Committee looked into 
     the involvement of the National Security Agency in developing 
     the Data Encryption Standard. Today, we are looking into the 
     development of new encryption standards in an effort headed 
     by NSA. Again, in the 95th Congress the Committee published a 
     case study on ``Activities of `Friendly' Foreign Intelligence 
     Services in the United States.'' Presently, in Congress we 
     are looking into activities within the continental United 
     States of the intelligence services of allies and adversaries 
     in the field of economic espionage. The Committee also 
     published its first report on terrorism in the 1970's.
       One of the most important activities of the Senate Select 
     Committee in the 1970's was its involvement in S. 2525, The 
     National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, 
     for out of this effort was born the duty of the Intelligence 
     Community to ensure that both the House and Senate 
     Intelligence Committees were ``fully and currently informed 
     of all the national intelligence activities,'' to include, 
     ``any significant anticipated intelligence activity.'' This 
     has proven to be central to the Committee's ability to carry 
     out its oversight responsibilities.
       As we moved into the 1980's, a new Administration brought a 
     new Director of Central Intelligence. The legislative 
     underpinnings in place were to be sorely tested in the coming 
     years, but in the end, they held up under great pressure. In 
     the early 1980's the Committee looked into and reported on 
     such disparate matters as the U.S. capability to monitor the 
     SALT II treaty; Soviet succession; political violence in El 
     Salvador; the Soviet presence in the United Nations; unrest 
     in the Philippines; and renewed counterintelligence and 
     security concerns in the United States. In 1983 the Committee 
     hired, as a full time staff employee, a Court Reported 
     because of the sensitivity of hearing information. The Select 
     Committee on Intelligence remains the only Committee of 
     either House to have a Reporter as a staffer.
       In late November 1986, the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     was the first Committee to begin an investigation into the 
     Iran-Contra matter. Between the initiation of its 
     investigation on December 1, 1986, and the publication of its 
     public report on January 29, 1987, the Select Committee held 
     over 50 hearings and interviews into the Iran-Contra matter. 
     Following these events, S. 1721, the Intelligence Oversight 
     Act of 1987, and S. 1818, the National Security Act of 1987, 
     were introduced and brought clearly into focus the need 
     for agreement between the Administration and the Congress 
     on reporting requirements and covert action finding 
     notification.
       The Committee reported on many other matters of concern 
     during 1987 and 1988. An extensive investigation resulted in 
     a report on the security at the United States mission in 
     Moscow and other areas of high risk. An exhaustive Committee 
     and staff inquiry resulted in the publication of a report on 
     the monitoring and verification of the Treaty on the 
     Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, 
     the INF Treaty. The Committee further investigated and 
     reported on the FBI's mishandling of a domestic case 
     involving the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El 
     Salvador, or CISPES. While the Committee determined that 
     there were improprieties in the FBI investigation, it also 
     determined that this was an aberration, and that the Bureau 
     continually held to the high standards that were demanded of 
     it.
       The 1980's were also the ``Decade of the Spy.'' By the end 
     of 1987, over 20 Americans had been implicated in espionage 
     or were investigated on counterintelligence grounds. In 
     hindsight, we now know that beginning with the Walker-
     Whitworth, Pollard and Pelton cases in 1985, was Aldrich 
     Ames, who began his traitorous career in 1985 and lasted 
     until 1994.
       Following hearings in 1987 and 1988, the Committee 
     established an independent Inspection General for the CIA. 
     This legislation was included in the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act of 1990, and the first statutory Inspection 
     General at the Central Intelligence Agency was confirmed in 
     the fall of that year.
       In the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair, legislation was 
     introduced with the objective of clarifying the roles of the 
     President and the Congress in approving and overseeing 
     intelligence activities, particularly covert actions. The 
     legislation also provided that Presidential finding must be 
     written, and defined what a covert action is and is not. 
     After much negotiation, the FY 1991 bills was signed into law 
     in August 1991.
       Convinced of the growing threat posed to international 
     stability by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, the Committee, through the FY91 Intelligence 
     Authorization Bill, instructed the DCI to establish a 
     mechanism to deal with these growing threats. This led to the 
     development of the DCI's Nonproliferation Center to look into 
     the spread of chemical biological and nuclear weapons.
       Robert M. Gates, who had been Deputy Director of Central 
     Intelligence under Director Casey, had been nominated for the 
     position of DCI after Director Casey's death in 1987. He 
     pulled his nomination when Members raised questions about his 
     role in Iran-Contra. In mid-1991 he was again nominated to 
     the Director of Central Intelligence. The confirmation 
     hearings for Mr. Gates to be

[[Page S11324]]

     DCI in September and October 1991 were unprecedented in terms 
     of their scope and substance. Eight days of hearings were 
     held, including seven in public session. The nominee's role 
     in the so-called Iran-Contra affair was explored at length, 
     as were allegations that during the tenure of the nominee as 
     Deputy Director for Intelligence the nominee undertook 
     actions resulting in the ``politicization'' of intelligence, 
     or the shaping of intelligence for political purposes. At the 
     conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee issued a 
     225 page report of its findings. In the end, the nomination 
     was approved by the Committee and subsequently approved by 
     the full Senate.
       In October 1992, the Committee began an inquiry into the 
     Intelligence Community's role in the Banca Nazionale del 
     Lavoro, or BNL, affair. This initial inquiry by the Committee 
     resulted in a full staff investigation of the matter. After 
     an intensive investigation, the staff prepared a 163 page 
     report released on February 4, 1993, which focused on the 
     Intelligence Community's involvement in the affair, and found 
     numerous institutional weaknesses in the relationship between 
     intelligence and law enforcement, as well as serious errors 
     in judgment by officials of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency, and the Department of Justice.
       Other efforts by the Committee in 1992 included the 
     Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, which 
     fostered the release of materials concerning the 
     assassination of President John Kennedy; a report on the 
     Treaty on the Reduction of Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
     Arms, or START; and many other activities surrounding 
     chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, Iraqi disarmament, 
     covert action, and so forth.
       Counterintelligence rose to the fore with the February 1994 
     arrest of CIA employee Aldrich Ames. After extensive hearings 
     the Committee issued an analysis of the Ames case in November 
     1994. In addition to criticizing the leniency of the internal 
     disciplinary actions promulgated by the DCI, the Committee 
     found ``numerous and egregious'' shortcomings in the handling 
     of the Ames case. In its report, the Committee proposed 23 
     separate recommendations for change at the agency.
       Counterterrorism jumped to the front with the January 1993 
     murder of two CIA employees at the main gate to CIA 
     headquarters, and a month later the bombing of the World 
     Trade Center in New York City.
       Economic intelligence also emerged in the 1990's to lay 
     claim to the time and assets of the Intelligence Committee 
     and the Intelligence Community. Unfortunately, one of the 
     more noteworthy events which combined the new direction of 
     intelligence gathering with the continued and even enhanced 
     need for counterintelligence occurred when the French 
     government accused the CIA in France of targeting French 
     government officials and high ranking officials in key French 
     commercial firms. Six people were requested to leave the 
     country, and several CIA personnel in other European cities 
     were identified.
       The Intelligence Committee requested the CIA Inspector 
     General to ``analyze the events of this case in detail and 
     report to the Committee on the mistakes that occurred and any 
     necessary corrective measures.'' In the end, it was poor 
     counterintelligence and poor tradecraft which led to the 
     events in France.
       The Committee, in addition, addressed such disparate issues 
     as the Clipper Chip digital telephony, the North American 
     Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Russian and East European 
     organized crime, environmental intelligence, NSA support to 
     law enforcement, as well as the traditional budget and 
     program oversight.
       Controversy, however, seems to have found a home in the 
     Intelligence Community. Charges arose in the mid-1990's that 
     the Central Intelligence Agency had been involved with and 
     had knowledge of several events in Guatemala. The Committee, 
     again through hearings, staff interviews and record reviews, 
     investigated the events surrounding the abduction and murder 
     of an American who ran a small hotel in Guatemala, Michael 
     DeVine; the kidnapping, rape and torture of Sister Diana 
     Ortiz; and the disappearing of Efraim Bamaca, a Guatemalan 
     guerrilla married to an American, Jennifer Harbury. In each 
     of these cases, claims have been made that the CIA had 
     knowledge of or that agents of the CIA were involved in the 
     events themselves.
       Following up on information learned as a result of the Ames 
     inquiry, the Committee investigated a series of events in the 
     CIA's Intelligence Directorate where material prepared for 
     the highest policymakers in the nation was inappropriately 
     identified as to its source. For a period of time, 
     intelligence that the CIA knew was from controlled or co-
     opted sources was delivered to policymakers without proper 
     warnings that the reports did come from controlled sources.
       The Committee is presently involved in investigating the 
     role of U.S. officials in the flow of arms from Iran to 
     Bosnia at a time when there were U.S. and UN sanctions active 
     against such shipments.
       Throughout this 20 year period, two things have stood true. 
     The dedication of the Members of the Senate to this 
     Committee--a Committee assignment which garners more 
     headaches than headlines--and the dedication of a truly 
     professional staff which handles the most sensitive material 
     our nation produces. Since 1976, 61 Senators have served on 
     the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and there have 
     been a total of 221 staff members.
       As the Senate begins its third decade of oversight of the 
     Intelligence Community, it can look back with some pride on 
     the successes of the institutional framework it established. 
     Oversight of intelligence has indeed been conducted in the 
     nonpartisan, focused manner intended. This pride must be 
     tempered, however, with a serious examination of how this 
     oversight can be improved. The Committee advocated one such 
     improvement this year, with the effort to remove the eight-
     year term limit for membership. This restriction, initially 
     put in place out of concern that members might become 
     captives of the intelligence community over time, has proven 
     unnecessary and counterproductive. The concern of cooptation 
     has been belied by the unerring vigilance of long-time 
     members such as Senators William Cohen and John Glenn, whose 
     unswerving principles have led them to be both ardent 
     advocates for and among the harshest critics of the 
     intelligence community. Instead, the term limit has hampered 
     the ability of the Committee to develop the kind of 
     expertise, institutional memory, and dedication the complex 
     field of intelligence requires. While the Committee failed in 
     its effort to remove this limit this year, it will no doubt 
     try again and eventually succeed.
       Additional issues involving the Committee's ability to 
     ensure that it is fully and currently informed of all 
     intelligence activities, the Committee's relationship with 
     other Senate committees, and measures which undermine the 
     authorizing authority of the Committee may require further 
     legislative efforts. Intelligence is a uniquely challenging 
     area of Congressional oversight. Its activities must often be 
     shrouded in secrecy, sheltered from the scrutiny of 
     investigative journalists who so often uncover problems in 
     other areas of government. It is essential, therefore, that 
     Congress have sufficiently strong and effective institutional 
     mechanisms to perform that crucial oversight.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the conference report accompanying the 
fiscal year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act highlights the results 
of significant efforts by many people. This bill creates important 
changes which will help to improve the Director of Central 
Intelligence's ability to manage the intelligence community and also 
improves oversight of the Nation's intelligence activities. It is an 
important step in reforming and renewing the intelligence community.
  I would like to thank Chairman Specter for his bipartisan approach to 
the intelligence community's problems. Intelligence can become the 
topic of partisan debate if we are not careful to preserve its goal of 
providing the unvarnished truth to policy-makers--congressional as well 
as executive branch. Because of the important issues at stake, there 
have been many opportunities throughout this year for partisan politics 
to enter the intelligence community's analysis of what threatens our 
vital interests. But Chairman Specter has steadfastly resisted any 
effort in that direction. As his term as chairman comes to a close, I 
salute him for his wise and farsighted leadership during a period of 
great challenge for the Intelligence Committee. He turned those 
challenges into accomplishments, including the significant reforms 
contained in this conference report. Chairman Specter has also acted on 
behalf of the entire Senate to provide thorough and attentive oversight 
of this Nation's intelligence activities. In the process he has taken 
the bold, and I believe correct, course of convening frequent open 
oversight hearings to acquaint the public with these important issues, 
all the while protecting the secrecy of intelligence sources and 
methods. So I am proud to have served with Chairman Specter during this 
momentous two years, and to have been part of the process which 
produced the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997.
  Chairman Specter and I have been supported by a superb staff effort 
led by a real intelligence professional, Charles Battaglia, the staff 
director of the Intelligence Committee. Mr. Battaglia followed a 
distinguished naval career with service at CIA, he knows this complex 
business from every angle, creates the conditions and prepares the 
tools Senators can use to get results. He also has every right to be 
proud of this bill.
  I would also like to add my sincere thanks to the members of the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. As some of my 
colleagues may recall, there was considerable disagreement between the 
House and Senate in last year's lengthy authorization conference. Not 
so this year. Although there were important differences between the two 
Houses at the beginning of the year, we resolved our differences

[[Page S11325]]

quickly because we realized the significance of our combined efforts. 
Chairman Larry Combest, Ranking Member Norm Dicks, and the other 
members of the House Committee worked with us in a spirit of comity and 
the Senate can be proud of the product. We are returning to the Senate 
with an important piece of legislation.

  Naturally, most of the programmatic work is classified. Nevertheless, 
as I mentioned when I helped introduce the Senate version of the bill, 
some of the most significant provisions are unclassified. The Office of 
the Director of Central Intelligence has been strengthened to allow him 
to manage the intelligence community much better. Among the most 
prominent of these are improved financial management procedures, 
strengthened delineation of authorities for collecting, analyzing, and 
disseminating intelligence, and better internal oversight of 
intelligence activities. In this bill, we have successfully preserved 
the equities of the Secretary of Defense so that intelligence support 
of military operations will be stronger than ever. We have also 
included important provisions to improve intelligence support of law 
enforcement. And, finally, there are also major improvements in support 
of our war against terrorism.
  I cannot over-emphasize the importance of the bill's provisions to 
strengthen the Director of Central Intelligence's management of the 
intelligence community. I am aware of some senior intelligence 
officials to the Oversight Committees efforts to strengthen community 
management, specifically the creation of three new Presidentially-
appointed, Senatorially confirmed Assistant Directors of Central 
Intelligence. I am reminded of the intense effort by some elements of 
the Department of Defense some years ago to undermine the Goldwater-
Nichols reform of defense. As was the case then, we are told that 
strengthened management is, on the one hand, unnecessary and, on the 
other hand, unwieldy. I assure my colleagues that neither criticism is 
warranted.
  Mr. President, the management of intelligence suffers from poor 
senior level management. The culprit is not a person. It is not a 
comment on the superb abilities of the current Director of Central 
Intelligence or his Deputy. Rather, it is a comment on the structure 
they inherited. As the Aspin-Brown Commission noted when it evaluated 
the intelligence community's readiness for the 21st century, the DCI 
faces a dilemma on managing the community which the current structure 
does not solve. He is relatively weak in his ability to manage the 
community and therefore spends most of his time as the principal 
intelligence adviser to the President and as the head of the CIA. The 
bill solves his dilemma by creating a new Deputy Director for Community 
Management. This new senior level official will be assisted by three 
Assistant Directors who will be functional managers of the intelligence 
community. One will handle administration, one will oversee analysis 
and production, and one will supervise intelligence collection.
  In deciding which information to collect about our vital interests, 
four different and independent organizations every day set their own 
goals, priorities, and allocate resources. Except on a by-exception 
basis--and also during an annual budget review--neither the Director of 
Central Intelligence nor his staff have any idea of the duplication 
which exists, the relative effectiveness of one method of collection 
over another to break a tough intelligence target, or the marginal 
utility of procuring new systems to solve new problems. With all of the 
responsibilities pressing upon their daily lives, neither the Director 
nor his Deputy have the time to understand or direct daily the 
community's intelligence collection efforts. In response, the bill 
gives the DCI help in the form of an assistant whose sole purpose is to 
help him do what he already is responsible for doing--manage the 
collection of intelligence.

  Similar problems exist in the areas of intelligence analysis and 
production. Today, CIA's analysts analyze military problems. The 
Defense Intelligence Agency analyzes political problems. The Department 
of State evaluates political and military problems. On a daily, weekly, 
or monthly basis, no one reviews--with any hope of changing the 
community's direction toward new problems--who is analyzing what 
throughout the community. Certainly, as part of the annual budget 
process, the DCI makes a quick review of the intelligence analysis 
structure supporting policy makers. But the DCI's annual review 
addresses analysis and production in only a cursory manner. He needs 
help. The bill gives him help in the form an assistant whose sole 
purpose is to help the DCI do what he already is responsible for 
doing--analyze and produce intelligence.
  Perhaps most fragmented of all are the administrative programs of the 
various intelligence agencies. Each agency maintains separate 
administrative, personnel, security, and training programs. In 1992, 
Congress gave the DCI specific authority to consolidate and reduce 
duplication in these programs, but successive DCI's have done little to 
make use of this authority. Again, the DCI needs help. The bill gives 
him help in the form of an assistant DCI for administration.
  Mr. President, in its confirmation of these new officials, the Senate 
must be vigilant in protecting intelligence from politicization. I 
expect the candidates for these positions to be life-long intelligence 
professionals approaching the pinnacle of their careers. I don't expect 
them to have political leanings that would affect their professional 
judgments, any more than I would expect such leanings in the career 
diplomats the Senate confirms to be Assistant Secretaries of State or 
in the career military officers the Senate confirms to be flag 
officers. I have also heard it argued that senatorial confirmation 
might make these intelligence officials less loyal or less responsive 
to their superiors. Looking again at the Assistant Secretaries of State 
and at the military, I see no empirical data to support this concern. I 
have high hopes that these officials will make our intelligence more 
timely and useful to all its customers, and I will use my role in the 
confirmation process to that end.
  Mr. President, let me note two other provisions in the conference 
report of special interest to me. One provision modifies the House 
bill's prohibition on the CIA use of U.S. journalists as intelligence 
assets unless the President waived the prohibition and made a written 
certification. This procedure seemed to the Senate conferees to be too 
onerous and time consuming. We accepted Director Deutch's assurance 
that any CIA approach to a U.S. journalist would be extremely rare. But 
it seemed to us that such a rare occasion might also require speed, and 
the process to obtain a Presidential waiver and certification would 
take too long. Consequently the conferees agreed to give waiver 
authority to the President or the DCI. In either case, use of the 
waiver would be reported to the oversight committees.
  Second, the conferees agreed to modify a Senate provision denying 
senior CIA personnel the possibility of accepting employment with a 
foreign country within 5 years of retirement. It seemed to us that 
security and the reputation of the service are best protected by a 
clear prohibition on such employment. Our compromise with the House 
reduced the period of prohibition from 5 years to 3 and provided 
authority for the DCI to waive the provision when foreign employment of 
a former senior official is in the U.S. interest. Nonetheless, I think 
we are sending a strong message with this provision and I support it.
  The effort to bring the bill forward for final passage has not been 
easy. Significant change never is, and there is no object more 
resistant to change than the baroque bureaucratic structure that our 
intelligence community has evolved into since 1945. But the effort to 
bring the bill to this point has been worth it. It has been 
strengthened by the intense discussions it generated with the Director 
of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and the other 
Senate committees. Quite correctly, each had strong concerns, and we 
have answered those concerns with an excellent bill. I urge my 
colleagues to support final passage of this important legislation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President; I rise to express my concern regarding 
the fiscal year 1997 intelligence authorization conference report. I 
make these observations, not in my capacity as the chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee, but as an individual Senator

[[Page S11326]]

concerned about growth in Government bureaucracy.
  I am particularly concerned by the fact that the intelligence 
conferees have decided to establish four new senior positions under the 
Director of Central Intelligence, all requiring Senate confirmation. In 
addition to a new Deputy Director, which the administration requested, 
the Intelligence Conferees have agreed to create three new Assistant 
Directors of Central Intelligence. The administration has clearly 
indicated its opposition to the establishment of these Assistant 
Director positions.
  In my view, this is an unnecessary expansion of bureaucracy at a time 
when virtually every other area of Government is shrinking. There is no 
evidence that I am aware of to justify this growth. The Presidential 
commission that just completed its study of these matters, the Brown 
Commission, did not make such a recommendation, nor has the Director of 
Central Intelligence.
  Since the organization of the Office of the Director of Central 
Intelligence does not come under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services 
Committee, Senator Nunn and I have not sought to oppose the 
establishment of these new positions on behalf of the Armed Services 
Committee, even though we agree that the case for their creation is not 
compelling. In the areas where the Armed Services Committee does have 
jurisdiction, the intelligence conference report has been adjusted to 
address concerns that Senator Nunn and I raised on behalf of the Armed 
Services Committee and the Department of Defense. Since the 
Intelligence Conferees addressed these concerns in a satisfactory 
manner, Senator Nunn and I have agreed not to oppose the intelligence 
conference report.
  Notwithstanding our general satisfaction with the intelligence 
authorization conference report, Senator Nunn joins me in registering 
opposition to what we view as an unwarranted expansion of intelligence 
bureaucracy. It is my intent to follow this matter closely in the 
future. The executive branch may choose not to fill these positions. 
Nevertheless, I plan to reexamine the legislation establishing these 
new positions during the 105th Congress.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
conference report be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon 
the table, and that any statements relating to the conference report 
appear at this point in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The conference report was agreed to.

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