[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 134 (Wednesday, September 25, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11238-S11240]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         REPORT BY SENATOR PELL

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr President, over the weekend I had the opportunity to 
read a report to the Foreign Relations Committee prepared by the 
distinguished ranking minority member of the Committee, Senator 
Claiborne Pell.
  The report, entitled ``Democracy: An Emerging Asian Value,'' details 
the Senator from Rhode Island's recent trip to Asia. I was very 
interested in the report because the countries Senator Pell visited--
Taiwan, Vietnam, and Indonesia--fall within the jurisdiction of the 
subcommittee I chair, the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. In fact, all three have been of special interest to me and 
have been the subject of several hearings in the subcommittee.
  I found the distinguished Senator's observations about this dynamic 
region to be particularly cogent, and believe that our colleagues--and 
the public at large--would benefit from having those observations 
accessible to them in the Record. However, since the report is somewhat 
lengthy in terms of it being reproduced in the Record, I am going to 
treat one country at a time; today, Mr. President, I would direct the 
Senate's atttention to the portion of the report on Indonesia.
  So, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that pages 9 to 17 of S. 
Prt. 104-45, the section on Indonesia, be printed in the Record at the 
conclusion of my remarks.
  PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. THOMAS. In closing, I must say that it has been a unique pleasure 
and honor to serve on the committee with its former Chairman, Senator 
Pell. I appreciate his views and opinions, as well as his frequent 
participation in the work of my subcommittee. His departure from the 
Senate is a loss both to the committee and to the whole institution; he 
will be missed.

                    Excerpt From Senate Print 104-45

                               Indonesia


                            a. introduction

       Indonesia is a vast, dynamic and complicated country. It 
     has the fourth largest population in the world and the 
     largest Muslim population in the world; yet it remains 
     strongly secular. The government is an authoritarian one, led 
     and dominated by President Soeharto, a small number of his 
     advisors and the military. There is no apparent successor to 
     Soeharto and no tested process in place for a transition of 
     power. The economy is increasingly open and deregulated, but 
     subject to widespread corruption and influence peddling.
       There are a number of issues of interest to the United 
     States in Indonesia. Indonesia has had an impressive economic 
     development and an impressive increase in the average life 
     expectancy. There is a developing middle class. The 
     government has developed and implemented a model population 
     control program. The focus of my trip, however, was a visit 
     to East Timor. When I was in Indonesia in 1992, President 
     Soeharto refused my request to visit East Timor because it 
     was not convenient at that time. I appreciate his willingness 
     to allow me to visit during this trip.
       It is important to note that there are other human rights 
     problems in Indonesia aside from those in East Timor. Many 
     independent human rights observer groups criticize government 
     policies in Ache and Irian Jaya. Issues such as freedom of 
     the press, freedom of speech, the right to form political 
     parties and the development of the rule of law are all of 
     substantial concern in Indonesia today.
       In response to a request by the UN, Indonesia establishes a 
     National Commission on Human Rights to investigate human 
     rights issues country-wide. I met with several 
     representatives from the Commission in Jakarta and was 
     impressed with their dedication to improving the lives of 
     ordinary Indonesians. Their investigations are hampered, 
     however, by a lack of funding and staff. Still, they seem to 
     be operating truly independent of the government and I 
     commend their efforts.
       That our delegation did not focus on human rights issues 
     outside of East Timor does not mean they are unimportant or 
     that they are unworthy of international attention. The 
     broader spectrum of human rights concerns will likely 
     continue to be an issue for U.S.-Indonesian relations for the 
     foreseeable future. Time limitations of our trip caused us to 
     focus our scrutiny primarily on East Timor.


                             b. east timor

       In December 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor, a former 
     Portuguese colony, during a period of great political 
     upheaval in Lisbon, which meant that Portugal was in no 
     position to resist. The Indonesian military has committed 
     widespread and well-documented human rights abuses in the 20 
     years since the invasion. The number of East Timorese who 
     have died from violence, abuse or starvation in these 21 
     years will probably never be known, but there are credible 
     estimates that they could number as many as 200,000. A 
     particularly egregious incident took place on November 12, 
     1991, when the Indonesian military shot and killed over 200 
     people (by most credible estimates, although the actual total 
     will likely never be known), during a peaceful demonstration. 
     By all accounts, the protesters were unarmed. This became 
     known alternatively as the Dili or Santa Cruz Massacre. While 
     no events on this scale have been reported since then, 
     widespread reports of abuse continue, including arbitrary 
     arrest, torture, disappearances and killings. I heard several 
     credible reports of these types of abuses while I was there.
       Since I have been back in the U.S., there has been yet 
     another conflict between Indonesian troops and East Timorese 
     youth. The most recent disturbance took place in Baucau, a 
     small city on the northern coast, to the east of Dili. Early 
     news reports indicated that Catholic East Timorese had taken 
     to the streets to protest reports that Muslim Indonesians had 
     torn a picture of the Virgin Mary. The U.S. State Department 
     reported that roughly 80 were arrested and that the 
     International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had been 
     given access to all of them. There were additional press 
     reports quoting East Timorese leaders saying that some of 
     those arrested had been mistreated.
       Indonesia and Portugal have not had diplomatic relations 
     since the takeover. Since 1992, the foreign ministers of each 
     country have held talks under the auspices of the UN 
     Secretary General on East Timor, but these talks have 
     produced little. I met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali 
     Alatas in Jakarta and was particularly pleased to hear him 
     speak highly of Portugal's relatively-new Foreign Minister 
     Jaime Gama. For my part I attended the inauguration of 
     Portugal's new President, Jorge Sampaio, in April and was 
     struck by the new Government's interest in seeking some 
     accommodation with the Indonesians.
       Alatas felt that Gama showed a new willingness to listen to 
     Indonesia's views, in contrast to his predecessor. I, too, am 
     impressed

[[Page S11239]]

     with Gama and know his personal sense that the issue of East 
     Timor should be resolved. Alatas told me that they could work 
     toward a solution that would satisfy both countries and 
     the international community as long as both sides were 
     ``realistic'' in their position.
       Sadly, Alatas did not mention the need to satisfy the 
     wishes of the people of East Timor, although, when I raised 
     it, he agreed it was important. I encourage continued talks 
     between Portugal and Indonesia and welcome positive movements 
     toward a solution. But I believe that any solution which does 
     not make the desires of the East Timorese as a paramount 
     concern will ultimately fail.
       One of the most obvious issues for most East Timorese is 
     the strong presence of Indonesian military (ABRI) troops 
     stationed there. Government officials in East Timor, 
     including Governor Abilio Soares and Colonel Mahidin 
     Simbolon, the military commander, told me that Indonesia 
     stations in East Timor 15,403 troops (including police who, 
     in Indonesia, are a branch of the military). Government 
     officials in East Timor and in Jakarta said that there were 
     two primary reasons why such a force was needed in East 
     Timor.
       First, they are said to be required to keep the peace 
     threatened by rebels, known as FRETILIN, of whom, according 
     to Colonel Simbolon, there are 188, armed with 88 weapons.
       Second, the military force is needed to perform public 
     works projects such as building bridges, roads and houses. 
     The military commander told me that not only were ABRI troops 
     the only ones willing to go into remote villages to do such 
     work, but that when the government did pull some troops last 
     year, local leaders and villagers protested. He argued that 
     it was much less expensive to have military troops do these 
     projects than to have civilians do then.
       I should note that East Timorese not in the government 
     strongly and repeatedly disputed the claims that only the 
     military can perform these tasks and that locals would 
     protest the removal of troops.
       The vast majority of these ABRI troops are not East 
     Timorese. When asked why so few East Timorese held high level 
     positions in the military, Colonel Simbolon argued that not 
     enough East Timorese had gone through the military academy. 
     He told us only eleven East Timorese had graduated from 
     Indonesia's military academy and, of those eleven, one is a 
     first lieutenant and two are second lieutenants. These are 
     the highest-ranking East Timorese officers in ABRI. On the 
     police side, the highest-ranking East Timorese is a Major, 
     who is a traffic chief. Again, Simbolon made the argument 
     that the East Timorese were not qualified enough.
       The presence of this armed, uniformed, non-Timorese force 
     in East Timor causes immense friction and conflict. The East 
     Timorese are ethnically different in culture and appearance 
     from other Indonesian ethnic groups. I was repeatedly told 
     that Indonesian military and police routinely treat the East 
     Timorese with disdain and even contempt. Simply put, the 
     people of East Timor feel they are subjected by a foreign 
     army of occupation.
       I firmly believe that a tremendous amount of the tension 
     and conflict which exists in East Timor could be relieved if 
     Indonesia were to slash its troop levels there and turn over 
     authority at all levels to East Timorese citizens. Governor 
     Soares and Colonel Simbolon agreed that this could help the 
     situation, but offered no ideas on how such a change could 
     come about.
       Governor Soares and Armindo Mariano, head of the Golkar 
     Party in East Timor, are both East Timorese and both stressed 
     in our meetings that they were working to improve the 
     ``Timorization'' of the local government. Mariano has been a 
     participant in the All-Timorese dialogue, a forum sponsored 
     by the UN Secretary General for East Timor--current residents 
     and those in exile--to explore practical measures to improve 
     the situation there. It is not a forum for discussing East 
     Timor's political status.
       Both Soares and Mariano are firm in their conviction that 
     East Timor will develop and prosper only as a part of 
     Indonesia. When asked how many East Timorese supported 
     integration with Indonesia, both said the majority did.
       But East Timorese who are not a part of the government and 
     other observers living in East Timor quickly and insistently 
     contradict this. When asked how a plebiscite on the issue of 
     independence versus integration would turn out, I was told 
     that over 90% of the people would choose independence and 
     that number would include some who formerly supported 
     integration.
       The personification of East Timorese resistance to 
     Indonesia's occupation of the territory is Commander Xanana 
     Gusmao, who, at the time he was captured in 1992, was the 
     leader of the armed resistance. He remains the titular head 
     of the East Timor-based National Council of Maubere 
     Resistance (CNRM), which he founded in 1988 to unify East 
     Timor's various political and armed resistance groups.
       Since his arrest and trial he has been imprisoned in 
     Jakarta where, he is visited regularly by the ICRC and by all 
     accounts is treated in accordance with international norms. 
     Xanana, as he is commonly known, has attained a status for 
     East Timorese similar to that which Nelson Mandela had for 
     black South Africans while he was in prison.
       I was eager to meet with him while I was in Jakarta both to 
     get to know a person who has such a reputation in East Timor 
     and to learn his current thinking on the possibilities for a 
     political settlement of the East Timor situation.
       Through I made a request of the Indonesian government for 
     permission to visit Xanana before I left the U.S. and 
     repeated the request in each of the meetings I had in 
     Jakarta, I did not receive permission to see him.
       From East Timor I wrote him a letter inquiring about the 
     conditions of his imprisonment and his views on East Timor's 
     future. (A copy is printed at the conclusion of this report.) 
     I then request the letter be delivered to him, but that 
     request was refused. The Indonesian Correctional Authorities 
     deemed my message to Xanana ``political'' and therefore 
     prohibited.
       Whenever the possible independence of East Timor is 
     discussed, talk quickly turns to its potential economic 
     viability. The territory has few natural resources, but 
     advocates of independence point out that many independent 
     Pacific island nations also have few or no resources. One 
     person questioned what economic independence meant in an era 
     of increasing international economic interdependence.
       Florentino Sarmento, the head of East Timor's largest non-
     governmental organization, Etadep, and a delegate to the All-
     Timorese dialogue, acknowledged that going it alone would be 
     difficult, but was convinced that a solution could be found 
     especially with consultation with political leaders abroad.
       In regard to natural resources, East Timor's most valuable 
     crop is coffee. I was able to visit a coffee cooperative 
     started last year and funded by USAID. The cooperative, 
     carried out by the National Cooperative Business Association, 
     started with only 700 farming families and $7 million in 
     USAID seed money. It now boasts 6,700 families and expects to 
     turn a profit as early as the end of this year. Project 
     director Sam Filiaci stressed he is not there for charity; he 
     is developing a money-making organization that will provide 
     lasting economic advantage to all involved, and especially to 
     East Timorese coffee growers.
       On the day I visited one of their processing plants in a 
     remote mountain location, farmers from miles around gathered. 
     Proud of their skill and of their new facilities, these 
     people also told stories of harassment by the military and 
     police (who turned out in a large force for my visit) and of 
     insistent pressure on the farmers to move out of the 
     mountains and down to the more populous areas on the coast.


                          c. the church's view

       East Timor is an overwhelmingly Catholic entity. More than 
     90% of the population is Catholic and the Church occupies a 
     critical role in the lives of its citizens. The Church also 
     plays a large role in the communication between East Timorese 
     and those in the United States who are interested in the fate 
     of this land. A number of Portuguese priests previously 
     stationed in East Timor, along with a number of Timorese 
     priests, now live in the U.S.
       I had hoped to meet with the Bishop of East Timor, Msgr. 
     Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo. Bishop Belo is widely admired for 
     his forthright objections to Indonesian human rights abuses 
     and is a vital leader of his people. Regrettably, he was away 
     from East Timor during my visit, through we were able to talk 
     by phone.
       I was able to meet with eleven priests from a variety of 
     East Timorese parishes in what was by far the most fruitful 
     and dramatic meeting of my trip. Sitting in a large room with 
     open windows, using a microphone to be heard and taping the 
     conversation, these priests gradually and fearlessly opened 
     up to me and told me what they had seen and heard in their 
     parishes over the last 20 years.
       They spoke of military harassment of the Church that varies 
     from obstructing their ability to meet with their 
     parishioners to trying to create mistrust among the people of 
     the Church. One priest told me ABRI tries to reinterpret his 
     interest in the welfare of his parishioners as political 
     opposition to Indonesia and integration. No one at the 
     meeting had ever been arrested by the Indonesian authorities, 
     but several had been detained and interrogated by them, for 
     up to ten hours at a time. One told me of receiving a letter 
     signed by the police insisting that he leave town for a 
     month, although he proudly said he never left. The worst of 
     these interrogations took place in 1991 and 1992, in the 
     aftermath of the Santa Cruz massacre.
       None of the priests had been present at the 1991 massacre 
     but one told us, with great emotion, of his experiences that 
     day and in the months afterwards. His home is near the Santa 
     Cruz cemetery where the massacre occurred. He had heard the 
     shots that morning, but thought at first they were the 
     rumblings of a storm. When he went out later, he heard from 
     people what had happened and he went to the cemetery and 
     tried to give last rites to those who were dying or dead. The 
     military would not let him approach and tried to make him 
     leave. He stayed anyway and soon saw three large military 
     trucks approach and be loaded with corpses. Then he saw other 
     trucks come that were filled with water and he watched them 
     spray the blood off the ground where the killings had taken 
     place.
       The wounded were all taken to military hospitals, he said. 
     He then proceeded, without prompting, to confirm the stories 
     I had read and been told earlier, that no one was

[[Page S11240]]

     allowed to visit these wounded in the hospitals, not even the 
     priests. Again, he was unable to give last rites to the 
     dying. He estimated that in the month following the massacre 
     as many people died in the hospitals, either from poor 
     treatment or from torture, as had been killed in the 
     cemetery. He told of hearing eyewitness accounts of mass 
     graves holding as many as 100 corpses in one pit. He said the 
     month following the massacre came to be know as ``The Second 
     Massacre.''
       When asked about the type of human rights abuses that occur 
     today, the priests argued that the fundamental human right of 
     any people is that of self-determination. The people of East 
     Timor have been denied that right for over 20 years and all 
     other rights abuses follow from that fact. They asked me how 
     far the U.S. government and the U.S. people were willing to 
     go in helping East Timor in its struggle for self 
     determination? They asked why, if the U.S. government says it 
     cares about human rights and cares about human rights abuses 
     in East Timor, it still continues to support the government 
     of Indonesia on its occupation of East Timor?
       Emotions around the room continued to rise, both from those 
     telling the stories and those of us listening to them. I was 
     struck by the knowledge that 5 years previously this group 
     would have risked the sudden intrusion of armed ABRI 
     officials, as the priests systematically contradicted 
     everything Indonesian government officials in Jakarta and in 
     Dili had said, the people of East Timor resist integration 
     into Indonesia as strongly now as they did 20 years ago. 
     There is an ``ebb and flow'' quality to the resistance; the 
     Indonesians gain the upper hand [through various forms of 
     intimidation] and the East Timorese temporarily retreat. When 
     Indonesia seems to lighten up a bit, and the East Timorese 
     ``have the courage to shout,'' the resistance pushes back, 
     but ABRI always comes back again, in a ``continuous game.'' 
     They provided a document listing the exact type and number of 
     troops located throughout East Timor (a translated copy of 
     this document is attached as an appendix to this report) to 
     show us how pervasive and strong the military is there. When 
     asked about Indonesia's argument that it has poured more 
     economic investment into East Timor than into any other 
     province in Indonesia, they responded disdainfully that ``the 
     people are not willing to sell their liberty for all the gold 
     in the world.''
       Finally, I asked the fundamental question I had asked in 
     all the meetings: if it were possible to hold a plebiscite in 
     East Timor, offering a choice of political arrangements from 
     autonomy to integration, how would the people vote? This 
     classical political science-approach to finding a solution 
     was met with hard nosed realism: how can you even hold out 
     this approach to a people who have suffered so much for 20 
     years? More importantly--and fundamentally--after over 20 
     years of continued resistance in the face of abuse, even 
     torture and death, have not the people of East Timor already 
     made their preference clear? Does not their resistance itself 
     constitute a referendum? What more proof do you need that the 
     people of East Timor want independence from Indonesia?
       To confirm this message, the acting rector of the 
     University of East Timor, handed me a letter at the airport 
     as we were leaving Dili, in full view of my ever-present 
     official escort. By all accounts I have heard, I believe he 
     was probably questioned after we left; one only hopes that 
     his position will protect him from rougher treatment. The 
     letter was written and signed by five university students, 
     and asks the U.S. Congress to support East Timor in its 
     struggle for independence from Indonesia. (A copy of the 
     letter is printed as an annex to this report.) The end of the 
     letter was particularly moving, as it thanked me for coming 
     and hoped that my visit was ``independent,'' because they 
     were concerned that Indonesia sponsored the visits of other 
     delegations in order to ``shut their mouth and close their 
     eyes.''


                    d. conclusion and recommendation

       By the time of my departure, it was clear to me that the 
     people of East Timor continue to resist the often heavy 
     handed occupation of their island by Indonesia. The 
     resistance takes many forms and, while armed resistance and 
     physical resistance may have diminished, it was evident that 
     the people of East Timor practice an emotional and 
     intellectual resistance that no amount of military pressure 
     will ever be able to suppress.
       Yet it was also evident that Indonesia will not, in the 
     foreseeable future, grant East Timor either the autonomy it 
     clearly wants or a process for determining its own future. 
     How, then, can U.S. policy bridge the gulf?
       The U.N. can both help and hurt. The U.N. sponsored talks 
     between Portuguese Foreign Minister Gama and Indonesian 
     Foreign Minister Alatas can bring positive results. But these 
     talks run a serious risk of ignoring the views and wishes of 
     the East Timorese themselves. The All-Timorese dialogue 
     offers more hope, although for the moment the political 
     status of East Timor is not on the table for discussion. The 
     best outcome of these two series of talks would be the 
     implementation of confidence-building measures such as some 
     form of autonomy for East Timor; a reduction in Indonesian 
     troop strength; and an increase in the number of East 
     Timorese in leadership positions in Dili.
       Progress in any of these areas would, I believe, be welcome 
     in East Timor and would ease some of the stark anti-
     Indonesian sentiment there. Passions could calm and economic 
     initiatives, such as the coffee project, could develop. Then 
     a compromise solution between the East Timorese and the 
     Indonesians might be found. The key is that the East 
     Timorese themselves must be a part of the solution from 
     the beginning. A deal struck between Portugal and 
     Indonesia or between Alatas and Boutros Ghali, or between 
     Jakarta and Washington will not provide the solution. No 
     true and lasting solution can come without East Timorese 
     input; no solution that is seen as being imposed from 
     above will work.
       Indonesia is one of the most important countries in the 
     region and will grow increasingly important. It is evident 
     that the U.S. should have close relations with Indonesia. 
     Both countries have mutual strategic, economic and 
     environmental interests and would benefit from increased 
     cooperation in those areas.
       But Indonesia also has serious shortcomings in the way it 
     treats the East Timorese and others of its citizens and it is 
     important that, in our dealings with Indonesia, we not ignore 
     or downplay the fact of these serious human rights problems.
       When we have an important bilateral relationship with a 
     country in which there are human rights problems, there are 
     those who argue that we should downplay the human rights 
     concerns and focus, instead, on those areas of mutual 
     interest, such as strategic or economic, which can strengthen 
     the relationship. Their theory is that a stronger 
     relationship might encourage more progress on human rights. I 
     do not agree with that approach.
       U.S. support for human rights in other countries does 
     matter. All the East Timorese I met told me that foreign 
     pressure, and especially U.S. pressure, had succeeded in 
     moving the Indonesian government. Our ability to effect 
     changes in the human rights politics of Indonesia and other 
     countries may be limited, but it is important for our nation 
     to make every effort to do so.
       I believe we could have a better and closer relationship 
     with Indonesia if the government would take what seem to me 
     to be relatively easy steps. If, for example, they would 
     switch from a ``heavy'' hand to a ``light'' hand in East 
     Timor, they would gain improved relations with the U.S. and 
     other countries and would, in my view, lose little.
       Quite aside from its policies toward East Timor, Indonesia 
     is quickly approaching a critical point in its political 
     development. President Soeharto's sixth 5-year term in office 
     will end in 1998. While he has been quoted in the press as 
     saying he will not run for a seventh term, most political 
     analysts fully expect him to be in office for life. There is 
     no chosen successor nor established process for succession.
       Indonesian citizens cannot change the government by 
     democratic means. The government is still heavily dominated 
     by GOLKAR, the President's party. The government appoints 
     half the members of the People's Consultative Assembly, 
     theoretically the highest authority of the state, and the 
     Assembly in turn elects the President and Vice-President. The 
     military is automatically given 15% of the seats in the 
     National Parliament and while 80% of the Parliament is 
     elected, there are only three legal political parties. Civil 
     liberties, such as freedom of speech and assembly or freedom 
     of the press, are severely restricted.
       Indonesia has actively worked to open its economy while 
     keeping its political system relatively closed. Deregulation 
     and moving away from central control has brought tremendous 
     growth and development, of which the Indonesian government is 
     rightfully proud. Could not the same be done in the political 
     sphere?
       Indonesia has the potential to be a great nation with 
     world-wide influence. But it will never reach that goal with 
     the anachronistic, authoritarian style of government it 
     currently has. There are limited signs that this system may 
     be loosening. The Court system has taken steps toward 
     functioning independently, but it is not yet truly 
     independent. There are some non-government organizations that 
     criticize government policies, but they still operate in an 
     atmosphere of surveillance and fear of retaliation.
       Indonesia should follow the example of Taiwan in the late 
     1980s and 1990s and take strong steps toward a true 
     democratic system. One important change it could make now 
     would be to legalize the formation of other political 
     parties. The region and even the world has much to gain from 
     a democratic Indonesia. The U.S. should offer assistance and 
     encouragement where ever possible and adopt policies that 
     will help move Indonesia toward that goal.
       I hope that Jakarta will take seriously the recommendations 
     in this report, work for a solution that is acceptable to all 
     parties, put the issue of East Timor behind them, move toward 
     democracy, and become the important international power it is 
     meant to be.

                          ____________________