[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 134 (Wednesday, September 25, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11238-S11240]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
REPORT BY SENATOR PELL
Mr. THOMAS. Mr President, over the weekend I had the opportunity to
read a report to the Foreign Relations Committee prepared by the
distinguished ranking minority member of the Committee, Senator
Claiborne Pell.
The report, entitled ``Democracy: An Emerging Asian Value,'' details
the Senator from Rhode Island's recent trip to Asia. I was very
interested in the report because the countries Senator Pell visited--
Taiwan, Vietnam, and Indonesia--fall within the jurisdiction of the
subcommittee I chair, the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs. In fact, all three have been of special interest to me and
have been the subject of several hearings in the subcommittee.
I found the distinguished Senator's observations about this dynamic
region to be particularly cogent, and believe that our colleagues--and
the public at large--would benefit from having those observations
accessible to them in the Record. However, since the report is somewhat
lengthy in terms of it being reproduced in the Record, I am going to
treat one country at a time; today, Mr. President, I would direct the
Senate's atttention to the portion of the report on Indonesia.
So, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that pages 9 to 17 of S.
Prt. 104-45, the section on Indonesia, be printed in the Record at the
conclusion of my remarks.
PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. THOMAS. In closing, I must say that it has been a unique pleasure
and honor to serve on the committee with its former Chairman, Senator
Pell. I appreciate his views and opinions, as well as his frequent
participation in the work of my subcommittee. His departure from the
Senate is a loss both to the committee and to the whole institution; he
will be missed.
Excerpt From Senate Print 104-45
Indonesia
a. introduction
Indonesia is a vast, dynamic and complicated country. It
has the fourth largest population in the world and the
largest Muslim population in the world; yet it remains
strongly secular. The government is an authoritarian one, led
and dominated by President Soeharto, a small number of his
advisors and the military. There is no apparent successor to
Soeharto and no tested process in place for a transition of
power. The economy is increasingly open and deregulated, but
subject to widespread corruption and influence peddling.
There are a number of issues of interest to the United
States in Indonesia. Indonesia has had an impressive economic
development and an impressive increase in the average life
expectancy. There is a developing middle class. The
government has developed and implemented a model population
control program. The focus of my trip, however, was a visit
to East Timor. When I was in Indonesia in 1992, President
Soeharto refused my request to visit East Timor because it
was not convenient at that time. I appreciate his willingness
to allow me to visit during this trip.
It is important to note that there are other human rights
problems in Indonesia aside from those in East Timor. Many
independent human rights observer groups criticize government
policies in Ache and Irian Jaya. Issues such as freedom of
the press, freedom of speech, the right to form political
parties and the development of the rule of law are all of
substantial concern in Indonesia today.
In response to a request by the UN, Indonesia establishes a
National Commission on Human Rights to investigate human
rights issues country-wide. I met with several
representatives from the Commission in Jakarta and was
impressed with their dedication to improving the lives of
ordinary Indonesians. Their investigations are hampered,
however, by a lack of funding and staff. Still, they seem to
be operating truly independent of the government and I
commend their efforts.
That our delegation did not focus on human rights issues
outside of East Timor does not mean they are unimportant or
that they are unworthy of international attention. The
broader spectrum of human rights concerns will likely
continue to be an issue for U.S.-Indonesian relations for the
foreseeable future. Time limitations of our trip caused us to
focus our scrutiny primarily on East Timor.
b. east timor
In December 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor, a former
Portuguese colony, during a period of great political
upheaval in Lisbon, which meant that Portugal was in no
position to resist. The Indonesian military has committed
widespread and well-documented human rights abuses in the 20
years since the invasion. The number of East Timorese who
have died from violence, abuse or starvation in these 21
years will probably never be known, but there are credible
estimates that they could number as many as 200,000. A
particularly egregious incident took place on November 12,
1991, when the Indonesian military shot and killed over 200
people (by most credible estimates, although the actual total
will likely never be known), during a peaceful demonstration.
By all accounts, the protesters were unarmed. This became
known alternatively as the Dili or Santa Cruz Massacre. While
no events on this scale have been reported since then,
widespread reports of abuse continue, including arbitrary
arrest, torture, disappearances and killings. I heard several
credible reports of these types of abuses while I was there.
Since I have been back in the U.S., there has been yet
another conflict between Indonesian troops and East Timorese
youth. The most recent disturbance took place in Baucau, a
small city on the northern coast, to the east of Dili. Early
news reports indicated that Catholic East Timorese had taken
to the streets to protest reports that Muslim Indonesians had
torn a picture of the Virgin Mary. The U.S. State Department
reported that roughly 80 were arrested and that the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had been
given access to all of them. There were additional press
reports quoting East Timorese leaders saying that some of
those arrested had been mistreated.
Indonesia and Portugal have not had diplomatic relations
since the takeover. Since 1992, the foreign ministers of each
country have held talks under the auspices of the UN
Secretary General on East Timor, but these talks have
produced little. I met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali
Alatas in Jakarta and was particularly pleased to hear him
speak highly of Portugal's relatively-new Foreign Minister
Jaime Gama. For my part I attended the inauguration of
Portugal's new President, Jorge Sampaio, in April and was
struck by the new Government's interest in seeking some
accommodation with the Indonesians.
Alatas felt that Gama showed a new willingness to listen to
Indonesia's views, in contrast to his predecessor. I, too, am
impressed
[[Page S11239]]
with Gama and know his personal sense that the issue of East
Timor should be resolved. Alatas told me that they could work
toward a solution that would satisfy both countries and
the international community as long as both sides were
``realistic'' in their position.
Sadly, Alatas did not mention the need to satisfy the
wishes of the people of East Timor, although, when I raised
it, he agreed it was important. I encourage continued talks
between Portugal and Indonesia and welcome positive movements
toward a solution. But I believe that any solution which does
not make the desires of the East Timorese as a paramount
concern will ultimately fail.
One of the most obvious issues for most East Timorese is
the strong presence of Indonesian military (ABRI) troops
stationed there. Government officials in East Timor,
including Governor Abilio Soares and Colonel Mahidin
Simbolon, the military commander, told me that Indonesia
stations in East Timor 15,403 troops (including police who,
in Indonesia, are a branch of the military). Government
officials in East Timor and in Jakarta said that there were
two primary reasons why such a force was needed in East
Timor.
First, they are said to be required to keep the peace
threatened by rebels, known as FRETILIN, of whom, according
to Colonel Simbolon, there are 188, armed with 88 weapons.
Second, the military force is needed to perform public
works projects such as building bridges, roads and houses.
The military commander told me that not only were ABRI troops
the only ones willing to go into remote villages to do such
work, but that when the government did pull some troops last
year, local leaders and villagers protested. He argued that
it was much less expensive to have military troops do these
projects than to have civilians do then.
I should note that East Timorese not in the government
strongly and repeatedly disputed the claims that only the
military can perform these tasks and that locals would
protest the removal of troops.
The vast majority of these ABRI troops are not East
Timorese. When asked why so few East Timorese held high level
positions in the military, Colonel Simbolon argued that not
enough East Timorese had gone through the military academy.
He told us only eleven East Timorese had graduated from
Indonesia's military academy and, of those eleven, one is a
first lieutenant and two are second lieutenants. These are
the highest-ranking East Timorese officers in ABRI. On the
police side, the highest-ranking East Timorese is a Major,
who is a traffic chief. Again, Simbolon made the argument
that the East Timorese were not qualified enough.
The presence of this armed, uniformed, non-Timorese force
in East Timor causes immense friction and conflict. The East
Timorese are ethnically different in culture and appearance
from other Indonesian ethnic groups. I was repeatedly told
that Indonesian military and police routinely treat the East
Timorese with disdain and even contempt. Simply put, the
people of East Timor feel they are subjected by a foreign
army of occupation.
I firmly believe that a tremendous amount of the tension
and conflict which exists in East Timor could be relieved if
Indonesia were to slash its troop levels there and turn over
authority at all levels to East Timorese citizens. Governor
Soares and Colonel Simbolon agreed that this could help the
situation, but offered no ideas on how such a change could
come about.
Governor Soares and Armindo Mariano, head of the Golkar
Party in East Timor, are both East Timorese and both stressed
in our meetings that they were working to improve the
``Timorization'' of the local government. Mariano has been a
participant in the All-Timorese dialogue, a forum sponsored
by the UN Secretary General for East Timor--current residents
and those in exile--to explore practical measures to improve
the situation there. It is not a forum for discussing East
Timor's political status.
Both Soares and Mariano are firm in their conviction that
East Timor will develop and prosper only as a part of
Indonesia. When asked how many East Timorese supported
integration with Indonesia, both said the majority did.
But East Timorese who are not a part of the government and
other observers living in East Timor quickly and insistently
contradict this. When asked how a plebiscite on the issue of
independence versus integration would turn out, I was told
that over 90% of the people would choose independence and
that number would include some who formerly supported
integration.
The personification of East Timorese resistance to
Indonesia's occupation of the territory is Commander Xanana
Gusmao, who, at the time he was captured in 1992, was the
leader of the armed resistance. He remains the titular head
of the East Timor-based National Council of Maubere
Resistance (CNRM), which he founded in 1988 to unify East
Timor's various political and armed resistance groups.
Since his arrest and trial he has been imprisoned in
Jakarta where, he is visited regularly by the ICRC and by all
accounts is treated in accordance with international norms.
Xanana, as he is commonly known, has attained a status for
East Timorese similar to that which Nelson Mandela had for
black South Africans while he was in prison.
I was eager to meet with him while I was in Jakarta both to
get to know a person who has such a reputation in East Timor
and to learn his current thinking on the possibilities for a
political settlement of the East Timor situation.
Through I made a request of the Indonesian government for
permission to visit Xanana before I left the U.S. and
repeated the request in each of the meetings I had in
Jakarta, I did not receive permission to see him.
From East Timor I wrote him a letter inquiring about the
conditions of his imprisonment and his views on East Timor's
future. (A copy is printed at the conclusion of this report.)
I then request the letter be delivered to him, but that
request was refused. The Indonesian Correctional Authorities
deemed my message to Xanana ``political'' and therefore
prohibited.
Whenever the possible independence of East Timor is
discussed, talk quickly turns to its potential economic
viability. The territory has few natural resources, but
advocates of independence point out that many independent
Pacific island nations also have few or no resources. One
person questioned what economic independence meant in an era
of increasing international economic interdependence.
Florentino Sarmento, the head of East Timor's largest non-
governmental organization, Etadep, and a delegate to the All-
Timorese dialogue, acknowledged that going it alone would be
difficult, but was convinced that a solution could be found
especially with consultation with political leaders abroad.
In regard to natural resources, East Timor's most valuable
crop is coffee. I was able to visit a coffee cooperative
started last year and funded by USAID. The cooperative,
carried out by the National Cooperative Business Association,
started with only 700 farming families and $7 million in
USAID seed money. It now boasts 6,700 families and expects to
turn a profit as early as the end of this year. Project
director Sam Filiaci stressed he is not there for charity; he
is developing a money-making organization that will provide
lasting economic advantage to all involved, and especially to
East Timorese coffee growers.
On the day I visited one of their processing plants in a
remote mountain location, farmers from miles around gathered.
Proud of their skill and of their new facilities, these
people also told stories of harassment by the military and
police (who turned out in a large force for my visit) and of
insistent pressure on the farmers to move out of the
mountains and down to the more populous areas on the coast.
c. the church's view
East Timor is an overwhelmingly Catholic entity. More than
90% of the population is Catholic and the Church occupies a
critical role in the lives of its citizens. The Church also
plays a large role in the communication between East Timorese
and those in the United States who are interested in the fate
of this land. A number of Portuguese priests previously
stationed in East Timor, along with a number of Timorese
priests, now live in the U.S.
I had hoped to meet with the Bishop of East Timor, Msgr.
Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo. Bishop Belo is widely admired for
his forthright objections to Indonesian human rights abuses
and is a vital leader of his people. Regrettably, he was away
from East Timor during my visit, through we were able to talk
by phone.
I was able to meet with eleven priests from a variety of
East Timorese parishes in what was by far the most fruitful
and dramatic meeting of my trip. Sitting in a large room with
open windows, using a microphone to be heard and taping the
conversation, these priests gradually and fearlessly opened
up to me and told me what they had seen and heard in their
parishes over the last 20 years.
They spoke of military harassment of the Church that varies
from obstructing their ability to meet with their
parishioners to trying to create mistrust among the people of
the Church. One priest told me ABRI tries to reinterpret his
interest in the welfare of his parishioners as political
opposition to Indonesia and integration. No one at the
meeting had ever been arrested by the Indonesian authorities,
but several had been detained and interrogated by them, for
up to ten hours at a time. One told me of receiving a letter
signed by the police insisting that he leave town for a
month, although he proudly said he never left. The worst of
these interrogations took place in 1991 and 1992, in the
aftermath of the Santa Cruz massacre.
None of the priests had been present at the 1991 massacre
but one told us, with great emotion, of his experiences that
day and in the months afterwards. His home is near the Santa
Cruz cemetery where the massacre occurred. He had heard the
shots that morning, but thought at first they were the
rumblings of a storm. When he went out later, he heard from
people what had happened and he went to the cemetery and
tried to give last rites to those who were dying or dead. The
military would not let him approach and tried to make him
leave. He stayed anyway and soon saw three large military
trucks approach and be loaded with corpses. Then he saw other
trucks come that were filled with water and he watched them
spray the blood off the ground where the killings had taken
place.
The wounded were all taken to military hospitals, he said.
He then proceeded, without prompting, to confirm the stories
I had read and been told earlier, that no one was
[[Page S11240]]
allowed to visit these wounded in the hospitals, not even the
priests. Again, he was unable to give last rites to the
dying. He estimated that in the month following the massacre
as many people died in the hospitals, either from poor
treatment or from torture, as had been killed in the
cemetery. He told of hearing eyewitness accounts of mass
graves holding as many as 100 corpses in one pit. He said the
month following the massacre came to be know as ``The Second
Massacre.''
When asked about the type of human rights abuses that occur
today, the priests argued that the fundamental human right of
any people is that of self-determination. The people of East
Timor have been denied that right for over 20 years and all
other rights abuses follow from that fact. They asked me how
far the U.S. government and the U.S. people were willing to
go in helping East Timor in its struggle for self
determination? They asked why, if the U.S. government says it
cares about human rights and cares about human rights abuses
in East Timor, it still continues to support the government
of Indonesia on its occupation of East Timor?
Emotions around the room continued to rise, both from those
telling the stories and those of us listening to them. I was
struck by the knowledge that 5 years previously this group
would have risked the sudden intrusion of armed ABRI
officials, as the priests systematically contradicted
everything Indonesian government officials in Jakarta and in
Dili had said, the people of East Timor resist integration
into Indonesia as strongly now as they did 20 years ago.
There is an ``ebb and flow'' quality to the resistance; the
Indonesians gain the upper hand [through various forms of
intimidation] and the East Timorese temporarily retreat. When
Indonesia seems to lighten up a bit, and the East Timorese
``have the courage to shout,'' the resistance pushes back,
but ABRI always comes back again, in a ``continuous game.''
They provided a document listing the exact type and number of
troops located throughout East Timor (a translated copy of
this document is attached as an appendix to this report) to
show us how pervasive and strong the military is there. When
asked about Indonesia's argument that it has poured more
economic investment into East Timor than into any other
province in Indonesia, they responded disdainfully that ``the
people are not willing to sell their liberty for all the gold
in the world.''
Finally, I asked the fundamental question I had asked in
all the meetings: if it were possible to hold a plebiscite in
East Timor, offering a choice of political arrangements from
autonomy to integration, how would the people vote? This
classical political science-approach to finding a solution
was met with hard nosed realism: how can you even hold out
this approach to a people who have suffered so much for 20
years? More importantly--and fundamentally--after over 20
years of continued resistance in the face of abuse, even
torture and death, have not the people of East Timor already
made their preference clear? Does not their resistance itself
constitute a referendum? What more proof do you need that the
people of East Timor want independence from Indonesia?
To confirm this message, the acting rector of the
University of East Timor, handed me a letter at the airport
as we were leaving Dili, in full view of my ever-present
official escort. By all accounts I have heard, I believe he
was probably questioned after we left; one only hopes that
his position will protect him from rougher treatment. The
letter was written and signed by five university students,
and asks the U.S. Congress to support East Timor in its
struggle for independence from Indonesia. (A copy of the
letter is printed as an annex to this report.) The end of the
letter was particularly moving, as it thanked me for coming
and hoped that my visit was ``independent,'' because they
were concerned that Indonesia sponsored the visits of other
delegations in order to ``shut their mouth and close their
eyes.''
d. conclusion and recommendation
By the time of my departure, it was clear to me that the
people of East Timor continue to resist the often heavy
handed occupation of their island by Indonesia. The
resistance takes many forms and, while armed resistance and
physical resistance may have diminished, it was evident that
the people of East Timor practice an emotional and
intellectual resistance that no amount of military pressure
will ever be able to suppress.
Yet it was also evident that Indonesia will not, in the
foreseeable future, grant East Timor either the autonomy it
clearly wants or a process for determining its own future.
How, then, can U.S. policy bridge the gulf?
The U.N. can both help and hurt. The U.N. sponsored talks
between Portuguese Foreign Minister Gama and Indonesian
Foreign Minister Alatas can bring positive results. But these
talks run a serious risk of ignoring the views and wishes of
the East Timorese themselves. The All-Timorese dialogue
offers more hope, although for the moment the political
status of East Timor is not on the table for discussion. The
best outcome of these two series of talks would be the
implementation of confidence-building measures such as some
form of autonomy for East Timor; a reduction in Indonesian
troop strength; and an increase in the number of East
Timorese in leadership positions in Dili.
Progress in any of these areas would, I believe, be welcome
in East Timor and would ease some of the stark anti-
Indonesian sentiment there. Passions could calm and economic
initiatives, such as the coffee project, could develop. Then
a compromise solution between the East Timorese and the
Indonesians might be found. The key is that the East
Timorese themselves must be a part of the solution from
the beginning. A deal struck between Portugal and
Indonesia or between Alatas and Boutros Ghali, or between
Jakarta and Washington will not provide the solution. No
true and lasting solution can come without East Timorese
input; no solution that is seen as being imposed from
above will work.
Indonesia is one of the most important countries in the
region and will grow increasingly important. It is evident
that the U.S. should have close relations with Indonesia.
Both countries have mutual strategic, economic and
environmental interests and would benefit from increased
cooperation in those areas.
But Indonesia also has serious shortcomings in the way it
treats the East Timorese and others of its citizens and it is
important that, in our dealings with Indonesia, we not ignore
or downplay the fact of these serious human rights problems.
When we have an important bilateral relationship with a
country in which there are human rights problems, there are
those who argue that we should downplay the human rights
concerns and focus, instead, on those areas of mutual
interest, such as strategic or economic, which can strengthen
the relationship. Their theory is that a stronger
relationship might encourage more progress on human rights. I
do not agree with that approach.
U.S. support for human rights in other countries does
matter. All the East Timorese I met told me that foreign
pressure, and especially U.S. pressure, had succeeded in
moving the Indonesian government. Our ability to effect
changes in the human rights politics of Indonesia and other
countries may be limited, but it is important for our nation
to make every effort to do so.
I believe we could have a better and closer relationship
with Indonesia if the government would take what seem to me
to be relatively easy steps. If, for example, they would
switch from a ``heavy'' hand to a ``light'' hand in East
Timor, they would gain improved relations with the U.S. and
other countries and would, in my view, lose little.
Quite aside from its policies toward East Timor, Indonesia
is quickly approaching a critical point in its political
development. President Soeharto's sixth 5-year term in office
will end in 1998. While he has been quoted in the press as
saying he will not run for a seventh term, most political
analysts fully expect him to be in office for life. There is
no chosen successor nor established process for succession.
Indonesian citizens cannot change the government by
democratic means. The government is still heavily dominated
by GOLKAR, the President's party. The government appoints
half the members of the People's Consultative Assembly,
theoretically the highest authority of the state, and the
Assembly in turn elects the President and Vice-President. The
military is automatically given 15% of the seats in the
National Parliament and while 80% of the Parliament is
elected, there are only three legal political parties. Civil
liberties, such as freedom of speech and assembly or freedom
of the press, are severely restricted.
Indonesia has actively worked to open its economy while
keeping its political system relatively closed. Deregulation
and moving away from central control has brought tremendous
growth and development, of which the Indonesian government is
rightfully proud. Could not the same be done in the political
sphere?
Indonesia has the potential to be a great nation with
world-wide influence. But it will never reach that goal with
the anachronistic, authoritarian style of government it
currently has. There are limited signs that this system may
be loosening. The Court system has taken steps toward
functioning independently, but it is not yet truly
independent. There are some non-government organizations that
criticize government policies, but they still operate in an
atmosphere of surveillance and fear of retaliation.
Indonesia should follow the example of Taiwan in the late
1980s and 1990s and take strong steps toward a true
democratic system. One important change it could make now
would be to legalize the formation of other political
parties. The region and even the world has much to gain from
a democratic Indonesia. The U.S. should offer assistance and
encouragement where ever possible and adopt policies that
will help move Indonesia toward that goal.
I hope that Jakarta will take seriously the recommendations
in this report, work for a solution that is acceptable to all
parties, put the issue of East Timor behind them, move toward
democracy, and become the important international power it is
meant to be.
____________________