[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 134 (Wednesday, September 25, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11232-S11234]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD INDONESIA

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President. I rise today to make a few 
brief remarks about United States policy in Indonesia.
  I am deeply concerned about some of the views being expressed by some 
members of the Clinton administration, and am particularly concerned 
because the administration has been quite culpable in the past with 
regard to aspects of our Indonesia policy. Despite a violent crackdown 
in Jakarta on July 27--not quite 2 months ago--this administration says 
it still intends to go forward with the sale of nine F-16 fighter jets 
to Indonesia.
  Mr. President, the administration had fully intended to send up 
notification of this sale earlier this month. Fortunately, objections 
from myself and many of my colleagues convinced the administration that 
now was not the right time to announce officially the intention to sell 
fighter jets to Indonesia.
  I am pleased that--for the time being--this sale cannot move forward, 
at least until Congress reconvenes in January.
  But what concerns me today, Mr. President, are recent statements that 
suggest that the administration necessarily will attempt to notify 
Congress again in January--apparently without conditioning this move on 
any actions by the Indonesian authorities either in the past or in the 
coming months.
  Given the history of human right abuses in Indonesia, as well as the 
events of July 27, I find this attitude difficult to accept.
  Last week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on 
United States policy toward Indonesia. We heard from two very capable 
administration witnesses and four distinguished private panelists, 
including a political science professor from the University of 
Wisconsin, Madison.
  As one of the witnesses commented, this may have been the first 
hearing in many years to look at the full scope of American ties to 
Indonesia.
  Mr. President, I recognize that Indonesia is an important country and 
a valuable ally. It is the largest country in Southeast Asia, and its 
population

[[Page S11233]]

of more than 200 million people is the fourth largest in the world. It 
plays a significant role in Asian affairs, and has been instrumental in 
conflict resolution efforts in the region. It also has been an 
important ally of the United States in international forums, such as 
the United Nations.
  I also salute Indonesia's economic success, and believe there are 
many valuable lessons in Indonesia's experience which can be applied to 
other developing countries across the world.
  Mr. President, these achievements cannot--and do not--excuse 
Indonesia's consistently dismal record on human rights and its 
continuous assault on democratic freedoms.
  Mr. President, I am particularly concerned about the massive human 
rights abuses that continue in East Timor.
  As we all know, Indonesia has sustained a brutal military occupation 
of East Timor since 1975. Human rights organizations from around the 
world, as well as our own State Department, continue to report 
substantial human rights violations by the Indonesian military--
including arbitrary arrests and detentions, curbs on freedom of 
expression and association, and the use of torture and summary killings 
of civilians.
  More recently, we have heard reports of the Indonesian military 
conducting systematic training of East Timorese youth to take part in 
local militia groups. We also have heard disturbing reports of 
increasing religious and ethnic tension in East Timor, which at times 
is exacerbated by government inaction.
  On top of the ongoing pattern in East Timor, the July 27 events in 
Jakarta reinforce my perception of an Indonesian regime that squashes 
alternative political discourse.
  On that day, hundreds of people rioted after President Soeharto 
attempted to oust Megawati Sukarnoputri, a popular opposition leader, 
from her position as chair of the Indonesian Democratic Party, or PDI.
  During the riot, arson-led fires caused considerable property damage. 
At least five people were killed, at least 149 injured, and hundreds 
arrested. But, as Human Rights Watch reports, many of those arrested 
did not appear to be responsible for initiating the riot. Instead, most 
were linked, or accused of being linked, to the reform movement or 
specifically to the Megawati camp.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
a September 20, 1996, article from the Washington Post which describes 
how difficult it is for Megawati to operate as an opposition candidate 
after government officials ousted her as party leader, threatened to 
shut down party headquarters, and arrested many of her supporters.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1996]

              Indonesian Says Slow Approach Avoids a Trap

                         (By Keith B. Richburg)

       Jakarta, Indonesia, Sept. 19--Police are still hauling in 
     her supporters for questioning. Already more than 100 
     languish in jail, and dozens others are missing. A member of 
     parliament, she has been left off the list of candidates for 
     next year's parliamentary elections, meaning she may lose her 
     only official platform for challenging the government. Now 
     the police say they will shut down her new headquarters 
     because it violates local zoning laws.
       These are trying times for Indonesia's premier opposition 
     leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Just a few months after she 
     emerged from virtual obscurity to become the first real 
     rallying point for opposition to President Suharto's 30-year 
     rule, Sukarnoputri finds herself besieged, harassed, called 
     in for questioning like a common criminal, facing the 
     likelihood of being sidelined from her country's tightly 
     controlled political process--and grappling with the mounting 
     impatience of her own supporters.
       But even with these pressures weighing on her, Sukarnoputri 
     remains surprisingly sanguine, unhurried, almost eerily 
     serene. She is not out on the streets, not leading rallies, 
     not exhorting her followers. This morning, she is seated at 
     the dining room table of her spacious house in Jakarta's 
     south suburbs, taking a Spanish lesson from her regular 
     tutor.
       What has learning Spanish got to do with leading a ``people 
     power'' movement against Asia's longest-serving and most 
     durable leader?
       ``I think it will be easier for me to communicate with 
     Latin American people,''; Sukarnoputri explains later, after 
     the tutor has left for the day. ``And also Spanish is more 
     important in the United States,'' she adds, citing the 
     increasing Hispanic population there.
       Sukarnoputri clearly has her own agenda. And while her 
     backers and sympathizers may be growing frustrated, she is 
     determined to proceed at her own slow and steady pace, 
     careful not to engage the government in direct confrontation 
     and not be goaded by her more radical followers.
       ``They want me to do something more concrete, like have a 
     rally,'' she said. ``But at the moment, I think that is not a 
     good tactic, because so many people are still intimidated.''
       She said the political situation remains tense after a July 
     27 riot--prompted by a government raid--in which five people 
     were killed and several banks and government offices gutted 
     by fire. The government used the riot as a pretext to launch 
     a widespread crackdown on opposition organizers, labor 
     leaders, human rights activists and anyone else suspected of 
     links to the long-dormant and outlawed Indonesian Communist 
     Party, which tried to foment revolution here three decades 
     ago.
       The most serious anti-government outburst in recent memory, 
     the July riot erupted after police backed by army troops 
     raided the old headquarters of the officially sanctioned 
     Indonesian Democratic Party, or PDI, to oust a group of 
     Sukarnoputri supporters who had occupied the building in 
     protest of a government-orchestrated party coup that replaced 
     her as party leader. The government apparently feared that 
     Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia's charismatic first 
     president, Sukarno, could become a potent challenger to the 
     incumbent Suharto.
       Sukarnoputri said today that she did not believe her 
     supporters were involved in the rioting, but that the 
     violence was sparked by government agents who wanted to 
     discredit her movement and use the unrest as the pretext for 
     the wider crackdown that followed.
       ``It could not have been common people,'' she said. ``It 
     must have been professionals. . . . I think there was some 
     engineering. How could common people burn so many high 
     buildings in such a short time? I think they wanted to make a 
     trigger, a trap, for people who are pro-democracy.''
       Sukarnoputri said her go slowly, softly approach--for 
     example, not calling any new street protests and, thus, not 
     defying a government ban on rallies--is to avoid falling into 
     another ``trap.'' She said: ``So many people try to make 
     moves, to push, to push PDI to use violence or hard action. 
     But if we do, they will trap us, just like that riot.''
       Some observers here--Western diplomats, journalists, 
     academics--say Sukarnoputri may be correct, that moving too 
     quickly with mass actions will expose more of her supporters 
     to arrest, prison, or worse.
       But many also say that with her quiet approach, 
     Sukarnoputri may have let her moment pass, that the momentum 
     and publicity generated by the government's heavy-handed 
     takeover of party headquarters may already be lost.
       ``I don't think she's in an enviable position,'' a Western 
     diplomat said. ``She can maintain her status as a symbol of 
     opposition, but without doing anything, that fades.''
       The other legal challenges and obstacles Sukarnoputri faces 
     may prove even more damaging to her long-term ability to 
     mount a credible challenge to the regime.
       On Monday, the day for filing candidate lists for next 
     June's parliamentary elections, the anti-Sukarnoputri faction 
     of the Democratic Party showed up early in the morning at the 
     National Election Commission offices with a list of names 
     that did not include Sukarnoputri or any of her supporters. 
     When a Sukarnoputri deputy came that afternoon with a 
     separate ``Megawati slate,'' election officials refused to 
     accept it.
       Sukarnoputri is challenging her ouster as party leader in 
     Indonesian courts, and she said she also will file suit to 
     have her candidates' list accepted. If she is not a candidate 
     next year, she will lose her seat and whatever slim chance 
     she may have had of running against Suharto for the 
     presidency in the next election in two years. (The Indonesian 
     president is not directly elected but voted on by a people's 
     assembly.) Under Indonesia's restricted political system, if 
     Sukarnoputri loses her current parliamentary seat, she will 
     be unable to gather supporters, make speeches or call 
     political rallies.
       But Sukarnoputri is undeterred. She said she insists on 
     exhausting all legal remedies first, mainly as a way to test 
     the independence of the country's judiciary. If she is 
     prevented from running for office next year, she said, her 
     exclusion will serve to point out flaws in the electoral 
     process.
       ``It will be a big problem for the government,'' she said. 
     ``There are already so many people protesting to the 
     government [about] why I, a popular and sympathetic person in 
     the country, am not on the national list. People will see the 
     election is not free and fair.''
       But even if she loses, Sukarnoputri disagrees with the 
     analysis that her stature will fade.
       In our culture, there is not only a formal leader. There is 
     also an informal leader,'' she said. ``Sometimes the informal 
     leader can be more powerful than the formal leader. You can 
     see how my father, even though he has already passed away, in 
     spirit still lives inside the Indonesian people.''

[[Page S11234]]

       She added, ``I'm sure about that.''

  Mr. FEINGOLD. The climate described in the article clearly is not one 
that supports freedom of expression, freedom of the press or freedom of 
association.
  The events of July 27 underscore the Government's intention to foster 
a repressive climate in the months leading up to the 1997 parliamentary 
elections.
  As the New York Times declared in a recent editorial, ``This is no 
time to be selling high-performance warplanes to Indonesia.''
  The administration says its policy is ``to make available to 
Indonesia military equipment that will support legitimate external 
defense needs.'' At the same time, the United States will not export or 
transfer to Indonesia small arms, crowd control equipment or armored 
personnel carriers until we have seen significant improvement in human 
rights in the country, particularly in East Timor.
  Mr. President, I am pleased that the Congress and the administration 
have worked together to develop a policy linking the sale of small arms 
to Indonesia to its human rights record. This policy evolved from an 
amendment that I offered to the foreign aid appropriations bill several 
years ago.
  But I believe that we are missing an important opportunity to apply 
pressure to the Indonesian regime by failing to impose comparable 
conditions on the F-16 sale. In fact, in public statements since 
congressional notification was delayed, the administration has not even 
mentioned human rights or democratic values in connection with the 
sale.
  Instead, it continues to state publicly that it intends to go through 
with the sale as early as January.
  I believe official advocacy of the F-16 sale sends the wrong message 
to the Indonesian military. It sends the message that--despite our 
concerns about the lack of respect for human rights in East Timor and 
despite the continued failure of the Indonesian military to respond 
substantively to these concerns--the United States will continue to 
supply substantial amounts of lethal military equipment to Indonesia.
  If the events of July 27 tell us nothing else, they should signal to 
us that Indonesia still has a long way to go in terms of respect for 
human rights and democratic values.
  I believe that we should support progress in these areas--only when 
real progress actually is achieved. Instead, within weeks of a major 
crackdown by the Indonesian authorities, the administration persists in 
its plans to provide Indonesia with nine advanced military planes.
  I do not think now is the time to be rewarding Indonesia with nine 
planes. Only when we see some improvement in Indonesia's conduct should 
we be elevating the level of our military ties to the country.
  In sum, I continue to believe that--in Indonesia, as elsewhere--we 
must consider a military's human rights record as one of the 
determining factors in deciding whether or not the U.S. Government 
should license or facilitate a foreign arms sale.
  As a result, I oppose the administration's plans to allow the 
transfer of the F-16's to Indonesia at this time, or in the near 
future, and I intend to work with a number of other Members of the 
Senate who share that view to persuade the administration that a change 
in policy is warranted here.
  Mr. GRAHAM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
  (The remarks of Mr. Graham pertaining to the introduction of S. 2121 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')

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