[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 133 (Tuesday, September 24, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H10825-H10835]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOMBING IN DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the 
concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 200) expressing the sense of the 
Congress regarding the bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                            H. Con. Res. 200

       Whereas on June 25, 1996, a terrorist truck bomb outside a 
     military housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 19 
     members of the Armed Forces and wounded hundreds of others;
       Whereas the members of the Armed Forces killed and wounded 
     in the bombing were defending the national security interests 
     of the United States;
       Whereas the defense of United States national interests 
     continues to require the forward deployment of members of the 
     Armed Forces to other countries;
       Whereas the members of the Armed Forces are called upon to 
     perform duties that place their lives at risk from terrorist 
     elements hostile to the United States;
       Whereas global terrorism has demonstrated no respect for 
     the historic rules of war, no reluctance to strike against 
     innocent and defenseless individuals, and a willingness to 
     engage in tactics against which conventional defenses are 
     difficult;
       Whereas it is the duty of the President and the military 
     chain of command to take all necessary steps to keep members 
     of the Armed Forces protected and as safe as the nature of 
     their mission permits;
       Whereas the people of the United States stand with those 
     who have volunteered to serve their country and grieve at the 
     loss of those who, to quote Lincoln, ``have given their last 
     full measure of devotion'' to the security and well-being of 
     the United States;
       Whereas those members of the Armed Forces serving in Saudi 
     Arabia and around the world demonstrate valor and a faith in 
     the American way of life that reflects honorably not only on 
     themselves but upon the country that they represent; and

[[Page H10826]]

       Whereas the military personnel who lost their lives on June 
     25, 1996, in the bombing in Dhahran died in the honorable 
     service of their Nation and exemplified all that is best and 
     most virtuous in the American people: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
     concurring),
       That Congress hereby--
       (1) recognizes the 19 members of the Armed Forces who died 
     in the terrorist truck bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 
     June 25, 1996, and honors them for their service and 
     sacrifice;
       (2) calls upon the Nation to hold fast the memory of those 
     who died;
       (3) extends its sympathies to the families of those who 
     died; and
       (4) assures the members of the Armed Forces serving 
     anywhere in the world that their well-being and interests 
     will at all times be given the highest priority.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Spence] and the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dellums] each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)


                             General Leave

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on the concurrent resolution now under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from South Carolina?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, on June 25, 1996, a terrorist bomb attack 
against a government housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 
resulted in the death of 19 American service members and the wounding 
of 200 others. This attack demonstrated that terrorism directed against 
Americans is a continuing threat, and that our men and women in uniform 
are often at great risk because of the nature of their mission.
  Today the House has before it House Concurrent Resolution 200, a bill 
authored by my colleague and valued member of the House Committee on 
National Security, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Scarborough], that 
recognizes and honors the ultimate sacrifice paid by the 19 American 
service members who died in this cowardly attack. I believe this bill 
is a fitting tribute for the House to make, and I urge my colleagues to 
support it.
  Mr. Speaker, last week the Committee on National Security held a 
hearing to review the Saudi terrorist bombing, the conclusions reached 
by the Department of Defense's own investigation, and the appropriate 
measures necessary to ensure that United States forces deployed abroad 
would be better prepared to deal with similar attacks in the future.
  The committee heard from Secretary of Defense Perry, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Chairman General Shalikashvili, and retired Gen. Wayne Downing, 
who headed the independent task force charged with investigating the 
bombing. The conclusions of General Downing's study were consistent 
with the findings of our committee report released last month.
  Mr. Speaker, both reports noted the need for greater tactical 
intelligence to be used on the terrorist threat to United States 
forces, and the conduct of Operation Southern Watch as a temporary 
contingency mission, when it is in reality a long-term operation, and 
both cited numerous institutional and organizational shortcomings that 
contributed to the tragedy that resulted in the death of 19 brave 
Americans.
  General Downing's report also found fault at all levels of the chain 
of command, a conclusion accepted by Secretary of Defense Perry during 
his testimony before our committee.
  Mr. Speaker, House Concurrent Resolution 200 properly notes that we 
have important and legitimate national security interests in Saudi 
Arabia and the Middle East that justify our continued presence. The 
bill also notes the danger posed to American national interests and 
personnel by the threat of global terrorism. I believe it deserves the 
unanimous support of all House Members.
  I once again want to commend the legislation's author, the gentleman 
from Florida [Mr. Scarborough], for his diligent efforts to bring this 
legislation to the House floor. Thanks to his commitment, we are here 
today ensuring that the brave Americans whose lives were lost in the 
Khobar Towers bombing are never forgotten by this House.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a copy of the report from the 
Committee on National Security.
  The report referred to is as follows:

         The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident--Executive Summary

       The terrorist bombing that killed 19 American military 
     personnel, wounded more than 200 others, and harmed hundreds 
     more Saudi soldiers and civilians in and around the Khobar 
     Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996 
     exposed more than the physical vulnerability of Americans 
     serving abroad. It exposed the shortcomings of a U.S. 
     intelligence apparatus that left Americans unprepared for the 
     threat that confronted them. It exposed significant problems 
     of continuity and cohesion in the units deployed for 
     Operation Southern Watch. And it exposed the risks to U.S. 
     military personnel deployed on contingency operations where 
     political and cultural sensitivities of the host country are 
     significant factors.
       The ability to acquire and process accurate and timely 
     intelligence is critical to the successful execution of any 
     military mission. It is equally essential for force 
     protection--especially in a world of increasing terrorist 
     threats. The dearth of reliable intelligence on the terrorist 
     threat, coupled with the inability to extrapolate from the 
     intelligence that was available, even after the Riyadh 
     bombing in November 1995, was one of the primary factors 
     contributing to the Khobar Towers tragedy. Because 
     intelligence regarding terrorist threats is more often than 
     not incomplete and uncertain, both intelligence analysts and 
     military operators must recognize it for both what it is and 
     is not and hedge in developing force protection and operation 
     plans.
       In the case of the Khobar Towers bombing, problems 
     resulting from incomplete intelligence on the terrorist 
     threat were exacerbated by numerous operational and 
     organizational shortcomings that limited the ability of Joint 
     Task Force-Southwest Asia to effectively protect against the 
     increased terrorist threat. In particular, short tours of 
     duty, even for senior commanders, compromised the ability of 
     deployed units to properly address the urgent need to make 
     long-term security improvements.
       Commanders, their staffs and security personnel also need 
     greater continuity if they are to bring stability to 
     organizations that currently face constant personnel 
     turbulence and to develop effective personal and professional 
     relations with Saudi officials with whom they must work. 
     Because the various sensibilities of the host nation often 
     conflict with or complicate the operations of U.S. forces 
     deployed overseas, American military and political leaders 
     must remain vigilant for potential problems.
       Intelligence and organizational shortcomings are a growing 
     hallmark of ``temporary'' or ``contingency'' missions that in 
     reality become long-term commitments. Despite the fact that 
     Operation Southern Watch has been ongoing since 1992 and the 
     probability of Iraqi compliance with UN resolution is low, 
     Saudi and American leaders and the U.S. Air Force observed 
     and perpetuated the illusion of a ``temporary'' operation. 
     The Department of Defense needs to review other ongoing 
     contingency operations to ensure that similar perceptions are 
     not compromising force protection needs or jeopardizing U.S. 
     security interests. The proposed movement of significant 
     numbers of U.S. military personnel to more secure quarters 
     now agreed to by the United States is clearly warranted, if 
     not overdue.

                     Staff Report--August 14, 1996

       On June 25, 1996, a terrorist's bomb exploded at the Khobar 
     Towers housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 
     American service personnel, wounding more than 200 others, 
     killing at least one Saudi civilian and injuring hundreds of 
     other civilians. The force of the explosion was so great it 
     heavily damaged or destroyed six high rise apartment 
     buildings and shattered windows in virtually every other 
     structure in the compound, leaving a crater in the ground 85 
     feet wide and 35 feet deep. The blast was felt 20 miles away 
     in the Persian Gulf state of Bahrain. It was the worst 
     terrorist attack against Americans in more than a decade.
       The Khobar Towers complex is home for the airmen of the 
     4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional) of the U.S. Air Force, part 
     of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and coalition forces 
     from the United Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia 
     participating in Operation Southern Watch, the United Nations 
     effort to enforce the ``no-fly'' and ``no-drive'' zones in 
     Iraq south of the 32nd parallel. Because the bombing was 
     directed specifically at Americans with such devastating 
     effect, it has led to questions concerning the security of 
     U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia and in other regions 
     of the world.
       At the request of Chairman Floyd Spence, a staff delegation 
     of the House National Security Committee traveled to Dhahran 
     and visited the site of the bombing from July 10-13, 1996 as 
     part of the committee's investigation of the incident. The 
     delegation spent several days interviewing field commanders, 
     being briefed by those responsible for security measures, and 
     speaking with the military personnel who played a critical 
     role just

[[Page H10827]]

     prior to and immediately after the blast. The staff also 
     sought interviews with Saudi officials and FBI agents in 
     theater, but as the staff's visit coincided with the Saudi 
     weekend and Sabbath, the Saudis did not provide anyone to be 
     interviewed. Likewise, the staff delegation was unable to 
     interview Department of Justice officials, who responded that 
     any disclosure of information could compromise the integrity 
     of their ongoing investigation. (A copy of a letter from 
     Attorney General Janet Reno is included as Appendix A. A 
     complete list of individuals who were interviewed is included 
     as Appendix B).
       The Khobar Towers bombing tragedy calls into question more 
     than just the safety of American military forces in Saudi 
     Arabia. It also raises issues related to the conduct of the 
     Operation Southern Watch mission, the importance of accurate 
     intelligence on terrorist activities and capabilities, the 
     sufficiency of the operational command structure, and the 
     appropriate balance between the need to protect American 
     personnel stationed abroad and the desire not to challenge 
     the sovereignty or offend the sensibilities of host countries 
     who have granted American forces conditional rights to deploy 
     on their territory. What follows is an unclassified summary 
     of the staff's observations and findings regarding the 
     Dhahran incident.


                          the bombing incident

       On June 25, 1996, at approximately 2200 hours Dhahran local 
     time, a fuel truck laden with an estimated 3,000-5,000 pounds 
     of explosives approached the northwest end of the Khobar 
     Towers compound from the north and turned east onto 31st 
     Street just outside the perimeter fence separating the 
     compound from a public parking lot. The truck, and a car that 
     it was following, continued to travel along the perimeter 
     fence toward the northeast corner of the compound. Staff 
     Sergeant Alfredo Guerrero, present at an observation site on 
     the roof of Building 131, at the northeast corner, spotted 
     the suspicious car and fuel truck as they continued to travel 
     along the perimeter fence toward their location. When the 
     vehicles reached Building 131, they turned left, pointing 
     away from the building, and stopped. The fuel truck, 
     positioned behind the car, began to back up into the hedges 
     along the perimeter fence directly in front of Building 131. 
     Staff Sergeant Guerrero's suspicion was confirmed when two 
     men emerged from the truck and quickly got into the car, 
     which then sped away. At this point, he radioed the situation 
     to the security desk and began, along with the other two 
     guards on the roof, to evacuate the building.
       Emergency evacuation procedures then began for Building 131 
     as the three security personnel ran door to door, starting 
     from the top floor and working their way down, knocking 
     loudly on each door and yelling for the resident to evacuate. 
     Three to four minutes after the truck had backed up against 
     the perimeter fence, the bomb exploded, ripping off the 
     entire front facade of the eight-story building. Khobar 
     Towers residents and officials of the 4404th Fighter Wing, 
     the provisional U.S. Air Force unit conducting Operation 
     Southern Watch, were unanimous in their belief that quick 
     action on the part of the guards, who had only been able to 
     work their way down several floors of the building, helped 
     saved the lives of a number of residents of Building 131. 
     Many residents of Building 131 were caught in the building's 
     stairwells at the moment of the explosion, which may have 
     been the safest place to be, in the estimation of engineers 
     and security experts on the scene. However, the force of the 
     blast demolished the building and severely damaged five 
     adjacent buildings. Nineteen American service personnel were 
     killed and more than 200 injured. Hundreds of Saudi and third 
     country nationals living in the complex and immediate 
     vicinity were also wounded.
       The bomb blast blew out windows throughout the compound and 
     created a crater 85 feet wide and 35 feet deep. The blast was 
     felt as far away as Bahrain, 20 miles to the southeast. Most 
     of the buildings in the ``American sector'' of the Khobar 
     Towers complex suffered some degree of damage. While 
     residents of Khobar Towers, 4404th Fighter Wing leaders, and 
     U.S. intelligence experts conclude that Americans were the 
     target of the terrorists, and the damage was extensive, an 
     even greater number of casualties might have occurred had the 
     driver positioned the truck differently against the fence and 
     had not at least one row of ``Jersey'' barriers of the kind 
     used in construction and on U.S. highways been present to 
     absorb or deflect part of the blast away from the lower level 
     of Building 131. Senior leaders of the wing, after 
     consultation with their engineers and with investigators at 
     the scene, have concluded that this arrangement helped to 
     prevent the collapse of the lower floors of the building. Had 
     the lower floors and thus, the entire building, collapsed, 
     the number of fatalities likely would have been much greater.


                       the khobar towers compound

       Khobar Towers is a series of high-rise apartment buildings 
     comprising approximately 14 city blocks. U.S. forces occupy a 
     portion of these buildings on the north end of the complex 
     stretching roughly two and one half blocks. Other buildings 
     house troops from the multinational forces participating in 
     Operation Southern Watch, in particular the British, French, 
     and Saudi militaries, while some buildings are also used for 
     Saudi civilian housing. There is only one main access route 
     into and out of the compound.
       The buildings were originally built in the 1970s as 
     shelters for Bedouins, but remained vacant until the time of 
     the Persian Gulf War. During the war and in its aftermath, 
     American military forces operated out of a military airbase 
     located near Dhahran's commercial airport, where the 
     facilities were rudimentary and quarters cramped. During the 
     war, the Saudis offered to house U.S. troops at Khobar 
     Towers. Accommodating the 500,000 U.S. troops who 
     participated in the Gulf War, even on a temporary basis, 
     called for the use of every possible facility. After the war, 
     the Saudis offered continued use of space in the Khobar 
     Towers to coalition forces conducting Operation Southern 
     Watch, and U.S. forces have been housed in Khobar Towers for 
     the past six years.
       The complex is located in the midst of an urban 
     environment, laced with residential and commercial areas and 
     mosques. On the north end is the public park and parking lot 
     where the June 25 bombing took place. The urban setting of 
     the complex creates unique security difficulties, and 
     establishing perimeters is particularly challenging. The 
     nearest perimeter fence was along the north end, only about 
     85 feet from several residential structures in the complex; a 
     long perimeter fence on the east side was slightly further 
     out, but still relatively close to the Khobar Towers 
     buildings. And the perimeter marking the U.S. part of Khobar 
     Towers from the other military and civilian housing runs down 
     the middle of a four-lane street. Prior to the bomb blast, 
     Air Force security officials at the complex had identified 
     the perimeter fence as one of the more serious physical 
     security concerns in conducting antiterrorism vulnerability 
     assessments.

                     Use of a general alarm system

       The Khobar Towers buildings themselves are of sturdy 
     construction, built with a minimum of combustible material 
     and consequently without a fire alarm system. There has been 
     speculation as to whether a central alarm system should have 
     been installed and operational at the time of the blast to 
     reduce reaction and evacuation times. The opinion of Air 
     Force security officials is that a fire alarm would not have 
     made a substantial difference, and might even have added 
     to the confusion and worked against any attempts to 
     inspire sleeping troops with a sense of urgency about the 
     suspected bomb threat. For general alarm purposes, the Air 
     Force uses a loudspeaker system in Khobar Towers called 
     ``Giant Voice.'' However, on the night of June 25, there 
     was insufficient time to activate it. In fact, commanders 
     and security officers at Khobar Towers have concluded that 
     a central alarm system is unlikely to have reduced the 
     number of fatalities or injuries the night of the blast, 
     given that it was only a matter of a few minutes between 
     the time evacuation procedures began and the detonation. A 
     number of people survived the blast by being in the 
     stairwell when it occurred. Had a general alarm been 
     sounded, it is possible that more people would have exited 
     the building and would have been at greater risk from the 
     blast's effects. Although the windows in many of the 
     buildings were blown out, not a single building collapsed 
     from structured damages as a result of the bomb. Even 
     Building 131, outside of which the bomb detonated, 
     remained standing, although the face of the building was 
     completed sheared off.

                     Vulnerability of the compound

       In sum, the Khobar Towers apartment complex, and the 
     American portion within, is an inherently vulnerable location 
     to terrorists threats. The decision recently reached by the 
     United States and Saudi Arabia to move Operation Southern 
     Watch and other American military personnel to a more remote 
     location is a sound decision. Factors cited in press reports 
     as contributing to vulnerabilities of the complex and 
     contributing to casualties--the lack of a fire alarm, delays 
     in activating the Giant Voice, for example--are of marginal 
     importance, at least in the judgment of Khobar Towers 
     residents and security officers in the 4404th Fighter Wing. 
     These security officers and senior wing leaders also said 
     that a more raid evacuation may have done more harm than 
     good, exposing more troops to the effects of the blast. 
     Troops housed in an urban environment, with limited 
     perimeters, are inviting targets for terrorist attack. While 
     no location is entirely immune to terrorism, the 
     vulnerabilities of Khobar Towers made the risks especially 
     high.


             the security situation prior to june 25, 1996

       Prior to the November 13, 1995 bombing of the Office of the 
     Program Manager of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-
     SANG) in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, American intelligence and 
     U.S. military leaders considered the risks to U.S. forces in 
     Saudi Arabia as low. While terrorist threats against the 
     United States are not unusual in the region, until recently 
     terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia has been considered 
     sporadic and rare. In particular, the threat from internal 
     Saudi factions and dissidents was rated low by the U.S. 
     intelligence community. The Saudi ruling family enjoys 
     generally widespread support, based upon its extensive system 
     of state-run social services, its largesse with its oil 
     wealth, and its very conservative interpretation and strong 
     support of Islam. Moreover, the ruling Al-Saud royal family 
     brooks no dissent. The Saudi system of justice is swift and 
     sure: public executions are the norm for serious crimes and 
     beheadings are not uncommon. The Saudi approach to justice 
     has long been seen as a deterrent to

[[Page H10828]]

     crime and to those who would violate the tenets of Islam.
       Second, despite the cultural sensitivities aroused by U.S. 
     leadership of and participation in the Gulf War, Americans 
     have long operated in Saudi Arabia on a routine, albeit 
     restricted, basis. The ARAMCO oil concern employs tens of 
     thousands of U.S. citizens, and other Westerners also work in 
     the Kingdom generally without incident. Internal dissent 
     aimed at the Saudi regime did not, until very recently, begin 
     to make a link between the ruling regime and the U.S. 
     military presence.

                 The OPM-SANG bombing and its aftermath

       Both the Saudi and American belief that Saudi Arabia was an 
     unlikely venue for anti-American terrorist activity was 
     shattered on November 13, 1995, when a car bomb exploded 
     outside the headquarters of the OPM-SANG mission. The 
     building was used by American military forces as a training 
     facility for Saudi military personnel. The car bomb contained 
     approximately 250 pounds of explosives. Five Americans were 
     killed in the OPM-SANG bomb blast and 34 were wounded. Until 
     then, terrorist actions against Americans in the Kingdom had 
     been considered unlikely by the U.S. intelligence community.
       As a result of the OPM-SANG bombing, security measures were 
     stepped up at installations where American troops maintained 
     a presence throughout Saudi Arabia. The U.S. intelligence 
     community reviewed its analysis of threats to American 
     military forces and the results of that analysis were 
     factored into the subsequent vulnerability assessment that 
     was conducted for the wing commander by the Air Force's 
     Office of Special Investigations (OSI). As with all Air Force 
     installations, routine vulnerability assessments of Khobar 
     Towers and other facilities in Saudi Arabia were conducted by 
     OSI every six months. The most recent vulnerability 
     assessment prior to the June 25 bombing at Khobar Towers was 
     completed in January 1996 and identified numerous security 
     shortcomings. As a result of the OPM-SANG bombing, the threat 
     condition for American forces in Saudi Arabia was raised from 
     THREATCON ALPHA--the second lowest threat condition--to 
     THREATCON BRAVO, the next highest threat condition. 
     Consistent with this increased threat situation, additional 
     security measures were implemented at the Khobar Towers 
     facility in Khahran. (An explanation of the various Threat 
     Conditions is attached as Appendix C.) Security officials 
     held weekly meetings to discuss and review security 
     procedures, and also conveyed bi-monthly security forums with 
     participation of British and French coalition forces.

                       Incidents at Khobar Towers

       Since November 1995, security forces at Khobar Towers 
     recorded numerous suspicious incidents that could have 
     reflected preparations for a terrorist attack against the 
     complex. Much of the suspicious activity was recorded along 
     the north perimeter of Khobar Towers, which bordered on that 
     portion of the complex used to house Americans. Several 
     incidents involving individuals looking through binoculars at 
     the complex were reported. On one occasion, an individual 
     drove his car into one of the concrete Jersey barriers along 
     the perimeter, moving it slightly, and then drove away. This 
     may have been an effort to determine whether the perimeter 
     could be breached. Other incidents reflected the heightened 
     state of security awareness. For example, a suspicious 
     package, which turned out to be non-threatening, was noticed 
     on May 9, 1996, in the elevator of Building 129 and led to 
     the building's evacuation. (As Colonel Boyle, the 4044th's 
     Support Group commander noted, buildings were evacuated no 
     less than ten times since the November OPM-SANG bombing.)
       While a number of incidents could have reflected 
     preparations for an attack on Khobar Towers, there was no 
     specific intelligence to link any of them to a direct threat 
     to the complex. Again, this peculiar position of U.S. forces 
     in Saudi Arabia complicated the ability of security officials 
     and intelligence analysts to reach definitive conclusions. 
     Security officials at Khobar Towers remain unsure whether 
     surveillance by outsiders was anything more than an attempt 
     by local Saudis to observe the culturally different Americans 
     in Western attire. In one incident involving shots fired 
     outside the compound, it was determined that teenage boys 
     were firing a new rifle and no threat to the compound was 
     intended. Nevertheless, the number of reported incidents and 
     the heightened state of alert after the OPM-SANG bombing led 
     security officials and wing leaders to reassess the security 
     situation within the complex.

            Security enhancements implemented in spring 1996

       In response to these local incidents and following the 
     November 1995 OPM-SANG bombing, Brigadier General Terryl 
     Schwalier, commander of the 4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional) 
     initiated a number of security enhancements that included the 
     placement of additional concrete Jersey barriers around the 
     Khobar Towers perimeter, staggered barriers, or 
     ``serpentines,'' along the main entrance to the complex; and 
     the posting of guards on rooftops. Additionally, bomb dogs 
     were employed, Air Force and Saudi security patrols were 
     enhanced, the entry gage to the compound was fortified, and 
     access was restricted. In March 1996, General Schwalier met 
     with Lieutenant Colonel James Traister, the wing's new 
     Security Police Squadron commander, to discuss measures to 
     prevent penetration of the compound. Although the two 
     officers discussed a range of security threats, security 
     efforts focused on preventing a penetration of the complex 
     itself, and in particular, the threat of a car bomb.
       In March, Lieutenant Colonel Traister conducted an 
     additional, personal assessment of the compound's 
     vulnerabilities to terrorist action. He subsequently 
     presented his recommendations to General Schwalier, who 
     accepted all of them. In April, Colonel Boyle and Lieutenant 
     Colonel Traister initiated a series of additional 
     counterterrorism measures. These included posting additional 
     guards on the roofs, laying seven miles of concertina wire 
     along the compound perimeter, and trimming vegetation on the 
     compound side of the perimeter fence. Security forces 
     increased their patrols, working 12-14 hour shifts 6 days a 
     week. Staff Sergeant Guerrero noted that security patrols 
     were losing every third break because they were helping to 
     fortify the perimeter. Overall, numerous additional security 
     enhancements were implemented beginning in April. Among the 
     most visible were substantial guard pillboxes built from 
     sandbags mounting machine guns to protect the main entrance. 
     Lieutenant Colonel Traister also initiated monthly security 
     group meetings with representatives of the other coalition 
     forces in Khobar Towers. Several security police said they 
     originally believed Lieutenant Colonel Traister was ``crazy'' 
     because of his obsession with security enhancements at the 
     compound.

                  Expansion of the security perimeter

       Colonel Boyle dealt directly with his Saudi security 
     counterparts regarding the issue of the compound perimeter, 
     which was located less than 100 feet from several housing 
     units along the north end of the compound. On two occasions--
     in November 1995 and March 1996--Colonel Boyle said he asked 
     Saudi security forces for permission to extend the perimeter. 
     The Saudi security forces responded that doing so would 
     interfere with access to a public parking lot that was 
     adjacent to public park and mosque, stating that the property 
     was owned by Saudi government ministries and that they did 
     not have the authority to approve such a move on their own. 
     While never flatly refusing to extend the perimeter, the 
     Saudis continued to assert that the existing perimeter was 
     sufficient against the baseline threat of a car bomb similar 
     to the Riyadh OPM-SANG bombing, and they did not act to 
     accommodate the U.S. request. Instead, they offered to 
     increase Saudi security patrols both inside and outside the 
     compound, and to run checks of license plates in response to 
     American concern over suspicious vehicles.
       Neither Colonel Boyle nor General Schwalier said they 
     considered the issue of perimeter extension to be of 
     sufficient urgency to necessitate the intervention of higher 
     authorities. This belief was based upon at least two factors, 
     they said. First, they did not consider the Saudi reluctance 
     to act on the U.S. request as unusual, given the generally 
     slow pace of Saudi society and previous experiences in 
     achieving expeditious Saudi action. As a result of the 
     perceived need not to offend their Saudi hosts by demanding 
     quick resolution of problems to American satisfaction, the 
     perimeter extension issue remained open. Second, both were 
     consumed by the need to quickly implement the required 
     security improvements within the compound, as well as by 
     their numerous other duties. Both General Schwalier and 
     Colonel Boyle said that their priorities were to accomplish 
     what was needed within Khobar Towers first before turning to 
     additional enhancements that would require long-term 
     negotiation and did not necessarily promise the desired 
     outcome.
       Thus, General Schwalier, Colonel Boyle, and Lieutenant 
     Colonel Traister continued to work through the checklist of 
     other measures that could be implemented without the prior 
     approval of the Saudis and that would mitigate some of the 
     vulnerabilities presented by the perimeter fence problem. The 
     aforementioned OSI vulnerability assessment conducted in 
     January 1996 recommended 39 specific security enhancements to 
     the compound. However, extension of the perimeter was not 
     identified as a recommended security fix by either the July 
     1995 or the January 1996 vulnerability assessment and was, 
     therefore, not pursued with great urgency or elevated up the 
     chain of command for higher-level intervention.

               Assessment of actions taken and not taken

       After the November 1995 Riyadh bombing, security became a 
     major focus of activity within the 440th Fighter Wing, with 
     more than 130 specific actions taken in response to the 
     vulnerability assessments that were conducted in July 1995 
     and January 1996. Given command priorities, actions that 
     could be accomplished unilaterally were taken relatively 
     quickly--actions such as trimming the hedges on the U.S. side 
     of the perimeter fence to increase visibility along the 
     compound perimeter. Other actions requiring greater funding 
     were considered as part of a five-year plan for security 
     improvements. This included placing Mylar coating on all 
     windows to reduce the impact of a bomb blast by limiting the 
     shattering and fragmentation of glass windows and doors. In 
     retrospect, had Mylar been available at the time of the 
     blast, it is possible that some casualties might have been 
     avoided. Even had the bomb been within the parameters of

[[Page H10829]]

     the device used in the November 1995 OPM-SANG attack, 
     untreated windows and sliding glass doors in the Khobar 
     Towers apartments still would have been vulnerable to the 
     blast effects. Likewise, the heavier ``blackout'' curtains 
     that had already been approved for acquisition but not yet 
     installed would likely have lessened casualties resulting 
     from shattered glass.
       General Schwalier said he did not consider a relocation of 
     troops from the more exposed locations within the vulnerable 
     buildings to interior quarters further away from the 
     perimeter. While in retrospect such a relocation might have 
     saved lives, prior to the blast relocation was not considered 
     a priority due to the threat perception that discounted the 
     prospect of a bomb the size of the one that ultimately 
     exploded outside Building 131. Relocation also would have 
     resulted in disruptions to the operations--residents were 
     housed by military unit in order to maintain some cohesion 
     and some apartments were used as offices--and a decrease in 
     the quality of life for personnel having to ``double-up'' in 
     living quarters. Given the small size of the American sector 
     of the Khobar Towers complex, consolidating personnel to a 
     degree that would have produced substantial security 
     improvements--such as vacating the entire outer ring of 
     apartment buildings exposed to the perimeter--would have 
     involved measures not perceived as warranted by the threat 
     situation.
       Overall, theater military commanders exercised an 
     aggressive and proactive approach to security in the wake 
     of the OPM-SANG bombing in November 1995. Indeed, some 
     residents of Khobar Towers believe it is possible that the 
     bombers struck when they did because they saw a window of 
     opportunity closing. Lieutenant Colonel Traister's 
     security enhancements following the OPM-SANG bombing were 
     visible and extensive--they would not have gone unnoticed 
     by anyone planning to attack the compound.
       General Schwalier and other leaders in the 4404th Fighter 
     Wing clearly did not press the Saudis for timely action to 
     resolve specific U.S. security concerns. While the issue of 
     Saudi cultural and political sensibilities is treated more 
     fully below, the decision not to elevate these concerns to a 
     higher level of decision-making must be seen in the context 
     of the overall environment in which U.S. forces found 
     themselves. Wing leaders were impressed by their superiors 
     and in turn impressed upon their troops the need for a 
     cooperative relationship with Saudi officials and Saudi 
     society in general. The command is imbused with a desire not 
     to unnecessarily offend Saudi cultural or political norms.


                       Host country sensibilities

       As with any U.S. military deployment abroad, there is a 
     need to strike an appropriate balance between the military 
     requirement for force protection and the political and 
     diplomatic requirements to understand and work within the 
     cultural norms of the host country. Under the best of 
     circumstances in Saudi Arabia, this is not an easy balancing 
     act, although in some cases, security needs of U.S. forces 
     are consistent with Saudi preferences. For example, the 
     recent agreement to relocate U.S. forces to a more remote 
     location at Al Khari initially stemmed from a suggestion made 
     by the Saudis.
       At Khobar Towers, residents commented about their Saudi 
     hosts and the challenges of working through issues with them. 
     The Saudi approach to resolving issues is informal, indirect 
     and seeks measured consensus rather than quick, clear 
     decisions. As a result, to Americans the Saudi decision-
     making process seems to lack a sense of urgency. Moreover, 
     many of those interviewed expressed frustration at the 
     seeming lack of Saudi attention to important security details 
     prior to June 25. A common element in the comments was that 
     the Saudis did not take security as seriously as the 
     Americans.
       The very presence of American forces in the Kingdom is 
     considered by some Saudis to be sacrilegious and an affront 
     to Islam. Additionally, the strong U.S.-Saudi military 
     relationship has increasingly been exploited by political 
     dissidents in Saudi Arabia, under the ostensible guise of 
     religious observance but often for different reasons. 
     Consequently, the ruling family has sought to keep the 
     American presence as segregated as possible from Saudi 
     society. A visible display of U.S. ``decadence''--
     particularly women with exposed skin or driving vehicles--is 
     an affront to traditional Saudis, and therefore a political 
     problem for the ruling family. In such an environment, it is 
     difficult to ensure that U.S. military personnel are treated 
     fairly and can do their jobs effectively, without insulting 
     the sensibilities or culture of their hosts, and possibly 
     risking the internal political consensus that sanctions U.S. 
     troop deployments.
       These cultural differences can have serious security 
     implications. For example, in the late spring of 1996 U.S. 
     forces requested that the Saudis trim back the vegetation 
     that was growing up along the fence around the perimeter of 
     the Khobar Towers complex. The Saudis refused to do so for 
     cultural reasons. The overriding U.S. concern was security--
     Americans guards needed an unobstructed view of activity 
     along the outside perimeter of the complex. However, the 
     Saudis desired to keep American activity out of view of the 
     average Saudi citizen. In this case, the Americans trimmed 
     the vegetation on the compound side of the perimeter fence 
     and employed security forces on top of selected building to 
     enhance observation. The Saudis did not trim the vegetation 
     on their side.
       Many of the vulnerabilities that were identified by the OSI 
     January 1996 vulnerability assessment required corrective 
     action that could only be taken with the support of the 
     Saudis. For example, stepping up identification checks 
     outside the compound, trimming vegetation outside the 
     perimeter, and running license plate checks on suspicious 
     vehicles required the active cooperation and participation of 
     Saudi security authorities. Some of these measures were 
     accomplished, some were not, and some, such as license plate 
     checks, were only accomplished intermittently.
        From the standpoint of domestic politics the Saudis wish 
     to ensure that the American military presence is perceived as 
     temporary rather than permanent. For example, there is no 
     formal ``status of forces'' agreement between the Americans 
     and the Saudis, as is the case in many other nations where 
     American troops are forward deployed, that comprehensively 
     defines the rights and responsibilities of U.S. forces and 
     the host nation. Rather, the U.S. presense in Saudi Arabia is 
     delineated by a series of ``stationing'' agreements covering 
     individual deployments and extending back to 1953. This 
     complex series of arrangements requires certain adjustments 
     in the operational activities of the deployed forces. For 
     example, extraordinary care is taken to ensure that the 
     flight operations of Southern Watch and crafted to minimize 
     the effects on Saudi society, to the point of changing 
     course to avoid flying over Saudi princes' palaces. These 
     arrangements also complicate the force protection mission. 
     For example, the relationship between U.S. security police 
     and their Saudi counterparts has remained intentionally 
     informal and ad hoc.
       The political and cultural sensitivities of the Saudis are 
     impressed upon U.S. forces from the day they arrive for duty. 
     For instance, in his ``Commander's Inbriefing,'' presented to 
     all newly arriving troops, General Schwalier outlined the 
     standards of the 4404th Wing. ``General Order Number One'' 
     was presented as ``respecting our hosts.


                        the role of intelligence

       One of the primary factors contributing to the loss of 
     American life from the bombing at Khobar Towers was the lack 
     of specific intelligence regarding the capabilities of the 
     terrorists who carried out the June 25 attack. Therefore, 
     significant questions have been raised concerning the 
     adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis and the ability 
     to recognize the limits of the intelligence upon which the 
     4404th Fighter Wing planned its security measures.

                          The threat baseline

       Prior to the Riyadh bombing of October 1995, U.S. threat 
     analyses considered the likelihood of a terrorist incident 
     against Americans in Saudi Arabia very low. In the words of 
     Major General Kurt Anderson, commander of Joint Task Force-
     Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA), the threat was portrayed as coming 
     from an isolated terrorist incident, ``not by large, 
     organized groups.'' It was also based on what intelligence 
     analysts considered to be a ``demonstrated capability.'' This 
     analysis formed the threat ``baseline'' that was used in the 
     July 1995 OSI vulnerability assessment.
       According to General Anderson, the Riyadh bombing ``changed 
     the rules of the game.'' The threat analysis conducted after 
     OPM-SANG incident concluded that there was a much higher 
     likelihood of terrorism targeted at U.S. forces. The size of 
     the Riyadh device--approximately 250 pounds of explosives--
     also was a surprise. However, the analysis conducted after 
     the OPM-SANG bombing did not allow that terrorist groups were 
     capable of building a device larger than the Riyadh car bomb.
       The Riyadh attack put everyone within the theater on high 
     alert, and the frequency of terrorist incidents within the 
     region seemed to increase. A number of these involved small 
     bombs set off in Bahrain that apparently were related to 
     internal problems there and not to the situation in Saudi 
     Arabia. Increased security awareness at Khobar Towers also 
     revealed what looked like a pattern of surveillance of the 
     facility. In November 1995, and in January, March and April 
     1996, Air Force security police reported a number of 
     incidents, including Saudis taking photographs and circling 
     the parking lot adjacent to the north perimeter, but they 
     were uncertain about their linkage. Also in the spring, a car 
     bumped and moved the Jersey barriers at the Khobar Towers 
     perimeter, which security police interpreted as a possible 
     test of the perimeter's strength.
       In retrospect, other incidents also were suggestive. In 
     January, the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh issued a public advisory 
     noting that it had received ``disturbing reports that 
     additional attacks may be planned against institutions 
     identified with the United States and its interests in Saudi 
     Arabia.'' In March there was an unconfirmed intelligence 
     report that a large quantity of explosives was to be smuggled 
     into Saudi Arabia during the Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca 
     which draws huge numbers of Muslims to the Kingdom every 
     year. Also, on March 29, a car was seized at the Saudi-
     Jordanian border with 85 pounds of explosives. Perhaps more 
     significant than the amount of explosives was the fact that 
     they were very expertly concealed within the car's engine 
     compartment. Throughout the spring a number of other reports 
     involving bomb materials were received by U.S. intelligence. 
     Finally, in May, when the Saudis convicted the four men for 
     the Riyadh bombing and sentenced them to death, the U.S.

[[Page H10830]]

     Embassy released another advisory reporting threats of 
     ``retaliation against Americans in Saudi Arabia'' if the men 
     were executed.
       To General Anderson, these incidents did not represent a 
     ``road map'' leading from the OPM-SANG bombing in Riyadh to 
     the Khobar Towers bombing. However, taken together with other 
     information available to U.S. intelligence and suggesting the 
     possibility of more sophisticated terrorist capabilities, the 
     pattern of incidents suggests there may have been substantial 
     shortcomings in the U.S. ability to process accurately 
     intelligence regarding the terrorist threat to U.S. forces 
     inside Saudi Arabia.

                        Intelligence collection

       While the precise extent of U.S. intelligence gathering 
     operations inside Saudi Arabia cannot be discussed within the 
     context of an unclassified report, commanders in the theater 
     said they lacked adequate insight into internal Saudi society 
     or the terrorist threat and prized highly the few independent 
     intelligence sources they possessed. Further, given the 
     increasing sophistication of the devices and the operations 
     employed by terrorist groups operating in Saudi Arabia, which 
     suggested to intelligence experts that those responsible for 
     the bombings were most likely part of larger, well-connected 
     organizations, the difficulties facing intelligence 
     collection against terrorist organizations in the region 
     generally and in Saudi Arabia specifically are likely to be 
     enduring.
       A substantial degree of the intelligence available to the 
     United States on Saudi Arabia comes from the Saudis 
     themselves. However, on politically sensitive topics--such as 
     the level of activity of Saudi dissidents--there is reason to 
     doubt the comprehensiveness of intelligence that is passed to 
     Americans by the Saudis. To American experts, there appears 
     to be no tradition of ``pure intelligence''--intelligence 
     free from political influence--in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the 
     Saudi style of decentralized and diffused bureaucratic power 
     is a complicating factor. It is a common belief among U.S. 
     intelligence and military officials and that information 
     shared by the Saudis is often shaped to serve the ends of 
     competing Saudi bureaucracies--interior and defense 
     ministries, for example--from which it originates.
       American intelligence collection efforts regarding 
     terrorist or dissident activities in Saudi Arabia must also 
     obviously compete with other intelligence needs. Given the 
     operational mission of the Air Force in Saudi Arabia, the 
     principal focus of intelligence activity remains the Iraqi 
     threat to U.S. and allied aircraft contributing to Operation 
     Southern Watch. In addition, there have been ample reasons to 
     operate discreetly in the Kingdom and to avoid the risks that 
     would be associated with intelligence activities, 
     particularly human intelligence activities. The Saudis are 
     among our closest allies in the Middle East and the monarchy 
     has been seen as generally stable in a tumultuous region. 
     Developing the kind of human intelligence sources most useful 
     to protecting U.S. forces against terrorist threats would 
     require a long-term and possibly high-risk commitment.

                         Intelligence analysis

       The problems of intelligence collection relative to the 
     terrorist threat against Americans in Saudi Arabia have been 
     accompanied by problems of analysis. While the issue of 
     intelligence analysis requires further investigation, several 
     observations are in order.
       Based upon a review of available intelligence information, 
     it is questionable whether the U.S. intelligence community 
     provided theater commanders with sufficient intelligence. At 
     the very least, formal intelligence analyses of the terrorist 
     threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia failed to project an 
     increasing bomb-making capability on the part of terrorist 
     groups. Prior to the Riyadh bombing, there were no incidents 
     involving a bomb of that size (250 pounds) in Saudi Arabia, 
     therefore the intelligence threat analysis concluded that 
     there was not likely to be such a device. Likewise, while the 
     threat level was raised to a 250-pound car bomb after the 
     Riyadh bombing, it was not raised beyond. It appears that 
     threat assessments were more reactive than predictive. While 
     neither military nor civilian intelligence agencies had 
     voluminous detailed intelligence on which to base their 
     projections, officials interviewed said the expertise 
     required to build a larger truck bomb is not substantially 
     beyond that required to build a smaller car bomb such as was 
     used in the November 1995 Riyadh bombing. While intelligence 
     reports received subsequent to the Riyadh bombing were not 
     conclusive, they should have forced analysts to at least 
     reconsider their analyses, although the extent of the 
     appropriate ``hedge'' factor is difficult to quantify.
       For the U.S. intelligence community and the military, 
     focusing on the Iraqi threat--a tactical necessity and 
     familiar focus--apparently has been coupled with a certain 
     complacency about developments within Saudi Arabia, and 
     perhaps in other Gulf states as well. The result has been to 
     leave commanders in the theater lacking a good understanding 
     of particular terrorist capabilities and threats against U.S. 
     forces. General Anderson said the Kingdom was ``considered 
     very benign'' with respect to the terrorist threat to U.S. 
     forces in the region, a belief that was open to question even 
     prior to the June 25 bombing. Certainly, events proved 
     General Anderson to be operating under a misapprehension. 
     Saudi Arabia is located in a violent quarter of the world, 
     where anti-American sentiments are strong and where Americans 
     have been frequent targets of terrorism. The Saudi monarchy 
     has made many enemies in the region. Within Saudi Arabia 
     itself, more than 630 people were killed in a series of 
     violent episodes in the city of Mecca between 1979 and 1989. 
     Press reports and scholarly articles about dissidents within 
     the Kingdom have been frequent in recent years.
       General Anderson said that he has requested that USCENTCOM 
     assign a counterterrorist intelligence analyst to his staff 
     to fill what he perceived as an unfilled requirement. He said 
     the analyst would have two duties: to give him a better 
     understanding of developments inside Saudi Arabia and to give 
     him a ``sanity check'' on U.S. intelligence products. The 
     lack of in-house intelligence analysis capability likely 
     contributed to an unquestioning acceptance by the command of 
     formal threat assessments provided by the intelligence 
     community.

                 Recognizing the limits of intelligence

       Intelligence support to U.S. forces conducting Operation 
     Southern Watch did not do an adequate job of understanding 
     and accommodating its own shortcomings. Despite collection 
     and analysis problems, few if any in the intelligence or 
     operational chain of command seem to have adopted a skeptical 
     attitude concerning the limits of intelligence assessments of 
     the potential threat to U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia. 
     The command could not know what it did not know, there was no 
     recognition of limits.
       One area requiring further investigation is how the 
     limitations inherent with available threat intelligence were 
     explicitly recognized and presented to the operational 
     consumers as intelligence products worked their way into the 
     theater. For example, one senior U.S. intelligence official 
     interviewed said he would never have been so specific in 
     quantifying terrorist bomb-building capabilities. Yet 
     security officials at Khobar Towers considered a 250-pound 
     bomb, one roughly the size of the OPM-SANG bombing, to be a 
     fixed threat baseline. Based upon staff interviews, it is 
     evident that intelligence assessments that began as broad 
     ranges of possible terrorist threats evolved and were viewed 
     by those responsible for security at Khobar Towers as firm 
     conclusions.
       As a result, officers such as General Schwalier or his 
     security subordinates did not have the appropriate 
     understanding and incentive to hedge against a degree of 
     uncertainty in the projected threat. While neither General 
     Schwalier nor his subordinates asserted that this hedging 
     would have made a decisive difference in the measures taken 
     within the time available prior to the bombing, they did say 
     it might have made a difference in the urgency associated 
     with U.S. discussions with the Saudis regarding security. 
     Acknowledgment of the limited nature of intelligence analysis 
     of the terrorist threat against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia 
     might well have increased the urgency with which 
     recommendations to push out the Khobar Towers perimeter fence 
     into adjacent civilian areas were pursued with the Saudis, or 
     even the decision to move out U.S. forces of Khobar Towers 
     altogether.


            continuity of command in the 4404th fighter wing

       Intelligence problems were exacerbated by a number of 
     organizational and operational factors which limited 
     the ability of JTF-SWA and its subordinate commands to 
     respond to new security challenges. While none were 
     sufficient to singularly account for the June 25 bombing, 
     there were pervasive deficiencies that in the aggregate 
     resulted in a serious problem. In the race to respond to 
     the increased threat following the Riyadh bombing, the 
     4404th Fighter Wing was handicapped by these shortcomings.

                        Organizational handicaps

       The 4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional) is a unit facing 
     constant organizational turbulence. Average tour length is 90 
     days. According to General Schwalier, the command averages 
     between 200 and 300 new personnel every week, or about 10 
     percent of its total manpower. To keep up with the turnover, 
     General Schwalier conducts an orientation briefing for 
     incoming personnel each week.
       This level of personnel turbulence affects the wing 
     leadership as well as the flight line. Prior to General 
     Schwalier's appointment one year ago, the wing commanders 
     also had short tours. As the thirteenth commander of the 
     4404th Fighter wing in four years, General Schwalier is the 
     first to serve a one-year tour. This concern was raised by 
     General Schwalier's predecessor in his end-of-tour report. 
     That report was provided to General Schwalier, who requested 
     approval of the extension of tour lengths for nine senior 
     members of the wing staff. Since the June 25 bombing, General 
     Schwalier had recommended that another nine positions be 
     approved for extended tours.
       In addition, according to General Schwalier, the structure 
     of command is ``a bare bones operation.'' When the wing was 
     designed at the start of Operation Southern Watch, it was 
     intended only to carry out a temporary mission until Iraq 
     complied with UN resolutions and sanctions were lifted. Four 
     years later, and despite the continuing augmentation of the 
     unit following Operation Vigilant Warrior in 1994, the 
     mission is still formally a temporary one. The result is that 
     the command lacks many of the support staff and other 
     resources typical in a permanent wing structure. The wing's 
     skeletal structure oversees the operation of a wide variety 
     of aircraft, including F-15s, several

[[Page H10831]]

     types of F-16s, A-10s, EF-111s, several types of C-130s, a 
     C21, AWACS planes, KC-10s and KC-135s, U-2 spy aircraft, 
     search and rescue helicopters, and has forward air 
     controllers riding in Army helicopters.
       The wing is also widely dispersed geographically. Although 
     the contingent in Dhahran and housed at Khobar Towers is the 
     largest, at a total authorized strength of 2,525, other 
     substantial contingents operate out of Riyadh (1,221), Kuwait 
     (799, in four locations), and other facilities within Saudi 
     Arabia (441, in four locations). General Schwalier admitted 
     that he spent ``much time on the road'' visiting these 
     ``remote sites,'' attempting to build teamwork among elements 
     of the command and provide the requisite command supervision.
       The necessity for unit cohesion is important for a variety 
     of reasons. Beyond the constant rotations and dispersed 
     basing, the conduct of no-fly zone missions is an ongoing 
     problem for the Air Force as well as the other services. The 
     missions, despite the fact that they are conducted in 
     ``harm's way,'' are widely considered by those who fly them 
     to be deleterious to pilot training and skills, and a 
     monotonous routine. No-fly zone duty also is a personal 
     hardship requiring frequent family separations, not merely 
     for pilots but for maintenance and other personnel. Yet many 
     in the wing had served a number of rotations on no-fly-zone 
     duty and the resulting need to retrain for basic combat 
     missions imposed a six- to nine-month burden on pilots and 
     units.

                       The impact of short tours

       The overall result of short tours, a widely dispersed 
     command, and personnel turbulence is a command that lacks 
     much if any continuity or cohesion. While the professionalism 
     of individual members of the commend was apparent, the lack 
     of continuity among senior leaders was widely recognized by 
     those interviewed as a shortcoming. General Schwalier 
     remarked that it was a ``consuming'' leadership challenge--a 
     viewpoint that was echoed at every echelon of the command.
       General Schwalier identified three primary problems that 
     stemmed from the lack of continuity. The first was an 
     inability to build a better relationship with the Saudis. 
     According to General Schwalier, ``You can't build that in two 
     weeks.'' For example, a common assessment within the wing 
     leadership is that, although security assistance on the part 
     of the Saudis had been improving prior to the June 25 
     bombing, accomplishing more difficult tasks such as expanding 
     the Khobar Towers security perimeter would take months. The 
     estimate of Colonel James Ward, commander of the Army-run 
     logistics operation designed to accommodate any surge of 
     forces into the theater, was that such a project would 
     require four to six months. Thus, when the initial 
     negotiations about such measures ran into Saudi resistance, 
     General Schwalier's assessment was that these were ``still a 
     possibility'' that he might be able to ``get to,'' but 
     improving security within the compound was a more immediate 
     concern.
       A second problem was the difficulty of building 
     organizational and command stability within the wing. In 
     particular, implementing the recommendations of the periodic, 
     six-month vulnerability assessments conducted for the wing 
     appear to have fallen victim to this sort of organizational 
     and command instability. For example, the vulnerability 
     assessment returned from OSI to the wing in September 1995 
     had been completed the preceding July. Thus, ``by the time 
     the assessment appeared, the people (who had requested it) 
     were gone,'' said General Schwalier. When he discovered the 
     three-month lag, General Schwalier demanded that future 
     vulnerability assessments be completed and returned to the 
     command in a more timely fashion.
       Colonel Boyle, the departing wing Support Group commander 
     who had overall responsibility for security measures, said 
     one of his biggest challenges was training his organization 
     to the specific requirements of the mission before personnel 
     rotated to other assignments. ``You never got beyond the 
     elementary'' level, he said. For example, guards manning 
     observation posts or other positions often worked only in 
     single locations or a small number of locations. Short tours 
     and the demands of the mission prevented them from acquiring 
     a broader understanding of the security operation or even 
     manning a substantial variety of posts.
       The third problem stemmed from the other effects of working 
     within a 90-day rotation cycle. While the basic building 
     blocks of the wing--the fighter and other squadrons that 
     conducted the flying missions--might be kept relatively 
     intact, arriving and departing as a whole, higher echelon, 
     wing-level support activities were primarily conducted by ad 
     hoc organizations, with personnel arriving and departing 
     individually. Even senior leaders often would have no more 
     than 24 to 36 hours of overlap with their predecessors.

 Difficulties of developing institutional knowledge on security matters

       The lack of unit and leadership continuity made building 
     and retaining institutional knowledge difficult. After-action 
     reports or other similar documents were not immediately 
     available to all incoming commanders; apparently were not 
     centrally collected, controlled, or disseminated by the wing, 
     the Air Force, or USCENTCOM; and may not even have been 
     required. Available reports did not routinely include 
     ``status-action'' assessments high-lighting problems to be 
     addressed. Nor typically were there pre-rotation 
     familiarization tours for incoming commanders, staff or 
     senior enlisted personnel within the wing. These particular 
     concerns were focused on the support functions of the wing.
       The experience of Lieutenant Colonel Traister, the 
     commander of the wing's security squadron at the time of the 
     bombing, is indicative of the challenges senior leaders faced 
     as a result of the lack of continuity. By all accounts, 
     including those of his subordinates, Lieutenant Colonel 
     Traister has been a superb commander, but he was confronted 
     with many problems resulting from organizational instability.
       Lieutenant Colonel Traister benefited from the fact that 
     his previous position was as part of the CENTAF staff. By 
     virtue of this position, he was able to determine who had 
     been his predecessors as commanders of the 4404th security 
     squadron, read their after-action reports (although he said 
     the records were incomplete and did not contain ``status-
     action'' recommendations), and contact a number of them for 
     personal interviews and recommendations. He also was able to 
     determine who would be filling important positions that could 
     affect his own work, such as who his OSI counterpart would 
     be. By contacting his counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel 
     Traister was able to establish the beginning of what he saw 
     as an essential relationship between the two and the building 
     of teamwork with the special investigator with whom he would 
     work closely. However, prior to his arrival at Khobar Towers, 
     he could get access to only the July 1995 vulnerability 
     assessment, not the 1996 assessment done after the Riyadh 
     bombing. Yet even that, he said, was a step that his 
     predecessors typically had been unable to accomplish and was 
     made possible because of his previous assignment 
     responsibilities which permitted his access to the reports 
     and appropriate personnel.
       Accordingly, when he arrived at Khobar Towers and received 
     from General Schwalier his security mission, Lieutenant 
     Colonel Traister enjoyed advantages his predecessors has not 
     and was more rapidly able to take measures to improve 
     security. He said that he spent between two and three weeks 
     evaluating the compound and the resources he had at his 
     disposal, a process that he said ``takes three to six 
     months'' under normal circumstances. At the same time, he 
     recognized a human intelligence shortfall, and that he 
     required ``an analyzed (intelligence) product'' that the 
     skeletal wing staff, the JTF-SWA staff, or even USCENTCOM 
     would not be able to give him. He also came to understand 
     that the shortage of Arab linguists in the wing--the entire 
     4404th has just one--would be a continuing problem for the 
     security squadron. Lieutenant Colonel Traister said that when 
     he was stationed in Japan, where the threat level was lower, 
     the security squadron had retained a linguist of its own and 
     made arrangements to acquire others in times of crisis.

                       Institutional shortcomings

       General Schwalier also faced a number of institutional 
     shortcomings that affected the ability of the command to 
     accomplish longer-term tasks. Although many of these have no 
     direct bearing on security issues, several do. For example, 
     the 4404th operated without an established mid- or long-term 
     budgeting mechanism as is found in other wings. After three 
     or four months in command, General Schwalier began to focus 
     on the need to prepare a five-year budget plan. Despite the 
     fact that the wing had been operating on a temporary mission 
     basis since 1992, this was the first long-term budget plan 
     for the wing. Its expenses had previously been paid out of 
     contingency funds, which were accounted for in yearly, ad hoc 
     procedures with funds reprogrammed from other Department of 
     Defense programs. Under General Schwalier's plan, the first 
     year's budget, covering all aspects of the wing's operations, 
     totaled $27 million, with $3 million for construction. Though 
     these construction funds allowed for some repair of the 
     Khobar Towers facility, which had generally been neglected 
     and was in need of repair, about one-third was intended for 
     security improvements. The largest item was $700,000 for 
     ``black-out'' curtains for every apartment and office. Lower 
     in priority were funds for Mylar covering for the Khobar 
     Towers windows to reduce the possibilities for fragmented 
     glass in the event the windows were shattered. As General 
     Schwalier's plan has not yet made its way through the annual 
     Air Force budgeting program, it is unclear what the 
     likelihood was that these recommended improvements--long-term 
     investments for what then was considered a ``temporary'' 
     mission--would have been realized.
       A number of institutional problems at higher echelons of 
     command also bear upon questions of security. The focus of 
     operations and intelligence at JTF-SWA was primarily on 
     conducting the Southern Watch no-fly-zone mission. According 
     to Major General Anderson, the Joint Task Force commander, 
     his intelligence staff was a relatively small, 65-person 
     operation whose focus was on the Iraqi order of battle 
     relevant to each day's air tasking order. General Anderson 
     currently has one officer assigned to force protection 
     issues, but estimates that he needs at least seven or eight 
     personnel to deal with force protection issues, given the 
     current threat level. He also said he lacks adequate 
     intelligence analysis capability for the purposes of 
     providing a

[[Page H10832]]

     ``sanity check'' on intelligence assessments provided by 
     theater and national intelligence organizations, and an 
     analyst is among the personnel he has requested. The need for 
     this analytical capability, or at least access to it, was 
     also expressed by others in the theater.
       Also, General Anderson has been given the mission of 
     ``force protection czar'' for the JTF-SWA area of operations, 
     though his authority is only for the purposes of coordination 
     rather than command, which is retained at USCENTCOM. General 
     Anderson did not receive this force protection coordination 
     authority until April 12, nearly six months after the Riyadh 
     bombing. According to Army Colonel Ward, for some time ``no 
     one (in Saudi Arabia) was in charge of force protection after 
     (the) OPM-SANG (bombing).'' And several elements of General 
     Anderson's authority as force protection czar took lower 
     echelons by surprise in that USCENTCOM changed or 
     contradicted recommendations worked out previously.

          Contrasting service approaches to command continuity

       It is unclear precisely what the proper tour lengths or 
     level of organizational or financial commitment to the 
     mission of the 4404th Fighter Wing should be, but it is clear 
     that the nature of the mission resulted in some 
     organizational requirements going unmet. While matching 
     military forces to missions is more an art than a science, 
     comparing the Air Force's execution of its mission in Saudi 
     Arabia with that of other services provides a useful 
     benchmark. For example, the Army units under Colonel Ward's 
     command have a much higher percentage of long-service 
     positions; roughly 10 percent of the 900 soldiers under his 
     command serve at least a one year tour. When senior 
     commanders and their staff rotate to the theater, they 
     typically undertake two extended familiarization tours, with 
     the first of these tours coming several months prior to 
     deployment. While many of these positions are associated with 
     the longer-term logistics effort for which there is no exact 
     Air Force parallel, others, particularly the Patriot missile 
     units, are more analogous to the no-fly zone mission. The 
     Patriot units--which are deployed with a higher-than-normal 
     manpower level--serve a 120-day tour, and the senior leaders 
     and staff all have at least one substantial familiarization 
     tour prior to deployment. Also, each unit has ready access to 
     the after-action reports of predecessor units. In part 
     because of its logistics mission, the Army has had a 
     traditional long-term budget process in place for its units 
     serving in Saudi Arabia for some time; Colonel Ward's next 
     budget includes $7 million for military construction 
     including a ``couple of million'' for security. Finally, his 
     staff includes two interpreters and his organization includes 
     a counter-intelligence team with an Arab linguist.
       While the reasons for shorter tours have a degree of 
     validity in terms of lessening the strains of repeated no-
     fly-zone tours, family separations, and loss of warfighting 
     skills, at a minimum senior positions within the wing demand 
     a greater degree of continuity than has been the case in 
     past. The fact that General Schwalier was the lone long-term 
     member of the wing--and that, in four years of operation, he 
     was the first commander to serve more than a very short 
     tour--is indicative of the reluctance and unwillingness of 
     political and military leaders to admit that the mission was 
     more than temporary and to bestow upon it the full complement 
     of resources, manpower, and capabilities.

         The ``contingency'' nature of Operation Southern Watch

       Confronting the fact that Operation Southern Watch is in 
     fact a long-term commitment and not a temporary contingency 
     missions poses a domestic political problem for the Saudis 
     and Americans, and an institutional problem for the Air 
     Force. The Saudis must face the fact that a continued U.S. 
     military presence will be necessary to maintain stability in 
     the region--an admission that raises sensitive domestic 
     political concerns for the Saudi ruling family. The United 
     States must similarly understand the nature of its commitment 
     and aggressively confront the risks such a mission entails, 
     including the continuing threat of terrorism. For the U.S. 
     Air Force, such an admission would call into question the 
     policy of constant personnel rotation, at least at the wing 
     leadership level.
       Any belief that Iraq would quickly comply with the UN 
     provisions that resulted in the Southern Watch mission has 
     been misplaced, certainly since late 1994 when Iraqi forces 
     moved south to threaten Kuwait and the United States 
     responded with Operation Vigilant Warrior. And given the 
     statements by U.S. policymakers in the wake of the Riyadh and 
     Khobar Towers bombings about American determination to 
     maintain forces in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. military presence 
     in the Kingdom stands revealed for what it has always been: a 
     long-term commitment to security and stability in the Gulf. 
     The Saudis have also, in effect, made such an admission by 
     agreeing to bear many of the costs of relocating the 4404th 
     to Al Kharj, an airbase in a more remote location.
       While the lack of leadership and organizational continuity 
     within the 4404th has had wide-ranging effects, it also 
     played a substantial role in problems confronting the wing's 
     security personnel in its efforts to react to terrorist 
     threats. Neither the wing or JTF-SWA level possessed the 
     intelligence analysis capability to evaluate what proved to 
     be seriously limited intelligence. There were no budgetary 
     procedures or processes for making long-term investments in 
     the Khobar Towers complex, even for security reasons. Only 
     through the efforts of General Schwalier and his senior staff 
     were improved security measures within the compound achieved 
     following the November 1995 Riyadh bombing. Achieving greater 
     security would have required expanding the perimeters of the 
     Khobar Tower complex or, as is now planned, a move out of the 
     facility altogether. These are measures whose quick 
     consideration and implementation transcend the day-to-day 
     influence of the 4404th or JTF-SWA, as the direct involvement 
     of the office of the Secretary of Defense in the recent 
     negotiations indicates.


                    immediate post-bombing reaction

       In the immediate aftermath of the June 25 bombing, the 
     medical and other support systems and personnel of the 440th 
     Fighter Wing appear to have reacted with a high degree of 
     professionalism. Commanders and troops alike recounted 
     stories of individual heroism. Major Steven Goff, a flight 
     surgeon who was badly wounded in the attack, worked 
     methodically in the compound's clinic to treat more than 200 
     of his compatriots who were seriously injured. Prior to 
     receiving formal medical treatment, many of the wounded were 
     initially treated by the ``buddy care'' system, which also 
     appears to have worked as planned and insured that no one was 
     left alone. After the bombing, according to those 
     interviewed, guards rapidly but methodically went into every 
     building and checked out every room to ensure that no one was 
     trapped or unaccounted for.
       The medical system also appears to have performed well, and 
     was blessed with abundant resources. At the clinic, three Air 
     Force physicians were assisted by an Army doctor and 
     additional personnel from coalition forces, including the 
     Saudis. Emergency supplies of blood and other necessary 
     materials were sufficient to treat more than 250 people. 
     Everyone who was brought to the clinic for medical treatment, 
     regardless of the severity of their injuries, lived; the only 
     fatalities on the evening of June 25 were 16 airmen in 
     Building 131 who likely died instantly from the initial 
     explosion, a communications specialist in Building 133 who 
     was killed when the glass door to his balcony shattered from 
     the force of the blast, and two other fatalities in Building 
     131 who might have survived had they been nearer to the 
     medical facility.
       Since the bombing security at the Khobar Towers complex has 
     been increased significantly. An additional 44 security 
     personnel have deployed to Khobar Towers, and 44 more were 
     requested by Lieutenant Colonel Traister and are expected to 
     be deployed in the near future. The perimeter has been 
     extended beyond the public parking lot on the north end of 
     the compound, an additional 1,000 barriers have been erected, 
     and the number of observation posts has been increased. Saudi 
     security patrols have been increased outside the perimeter 
     and agreement with the Saudis to move to a more secure and 
     remote site has been reached. According to statements by 
     Defense Secretary Perry, the relocation will be conducted as 
     quickly as possible.


                              observations

       The unpreparedness of U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia 
     for the magnitude of the terrorist bomb in Dhahran raises 
     significant questions about the adequacy of intelligence 
     support. While intelligence information was provided, it was 
     not of either the quality nor the quantity necessary to alert 
     commanders to the magnitude of the terrorist threat they 
     faced. The lack of on-the-ground intelligence collection and 
     analysis capabilities deserves priority attention and argues 
     for a greater commitment of resources.
       Greater counter-terrorism intelligence analysis effort is 
     needed by U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia. The 
     intelligence staff working for the JTF-SWA commander is 
     small, focused on the Operation Southern Watch mission and 
     lacks adequate resources to function as an independent 
     ``sanity check'' on the quality of intelligence received from 
     USCENTCOM or national intelligence agencies. The JTF 
     commander requires this analysis capability to function in 
     his capacity as the local ``force protection czar.'' 
     Likewise, tactical fighter wings and other significant 
     elements of the JTF should have the capability for timely 
     access to this independent, in-theater analysis.
       The uncertainties inherent in intelligence efforts against 
     terrorist groups and in friendly but closed societies such as 
     in Saudi Arabia needs to be adequately conveyed to military 
     commanders so they can assess intelligence information in the 
     proper context and retain an ability for independent 
     judgments about the threat they face. Commanders need to 
     better understand the limits of intelligence they receive and 
     be cognizant of a range of threats rather than fixate on a 
     ``baseline'' or overly specific threat assessment.
       Three-month troop rotations place unnecessary and 
     counterproductive strains on unit leaders and staffs. It is 
     difficult to establish leadership and unit continuity in 
     contingency operations, let alone to address issues where it 
     is essential to build relationships of trust with host 
     nations. Newly-deployed commanders, security chiefs, and 
     other force protection specialists should not have to relearn 
     the same lessons learned by their predecessors and work to 
     establish the same kinds of productive relationships with 
     their

[[Page H10833]]

     Saudi counterparts. While short tours may make sense for 
     those on the flight line, senior leaders, staff and key 
     personnel should be deployed for sufficient period to develop 
     the expertise and experience necessary to ensure the safety 
     of their commands.
       Short rotations reflected the pretense of a ``temporary'' 
     mission. Despite the fact that Operation Southern Watch had 
     been ongoing since 1992 and the probability of Iraqi 
     compliance with UN resolutions was low, Saudi and American 
     leaders and the U.S. Air Force planned and operated based on 
     the presumption that Operation Southern Watch was only a 
     temporary mission. An appropriate and earlier recognition by 
     the civilian and military leadership (a recognition certainly 
     warranted by Operation Vigilant Warrier in 1994) that the 
     mission, for all practical purposes, was a ``permanent'' one 
     might have resulted in a higher degree of leadership and unit 
     continuity and minimized a number of organizational and 
     operational shortcomings. The Department of Defense needs to 
     review other ongoing operations to ensure that U.S. force 
     protection needs and U.S. security interests are not being 
     compromised by the limitations inherent in running quasi-
     permanent operations under the politically-acceptable rubric 
     of ``temporary'' contingencies.

                               Appendix A

                                   Office of the Attorney General,
                                     Washington, DC, July 5, 1996.
     Hon. William J. Perry,
     Secretary of Defense,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: Media reports concerning the bombing of 
     the al-Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, purport to 
     disclose very detailed information pertinent to the ongoing 
     criminal investigation. Some of the reports appear to be 
     based on either public statements or leaks by U.S. Government 
     employees.
       The investigation of a terrorist act directed at the United 
     States overseas is, by its nature, very difficult to conduct. 
     Public disclosures of details pertinent to the investigation 
     compound the difficulty and may compromise the prospects for 
     the eventual success of the investigative effort. In the 
     event of a U.S. prosecution, such disclosures present 
     significant litigation problems.
       While the public interest in this investigation is 
     understandable, it is imperative that all federal employees 
     refrain from unauthorized public disclosures of information 
     pertinent to the investigation. Disclosures concerning the 
     events leading up to the bombing--including any prior 
     warnings or surveillance of the U.S. facility--as well as the 
     details of the bombing and the results of the investigation 
     should be limited to those made through authorized agency 
     channels. Authorized disclosures should be coordinated with 
     this Department prior to their release by contacting the 
     Department's Terrorism and Violent Crime Section at 202-514-
     0849.
       The al-Khobar bombing investigation involves the dedicated 
     and professional efforts of a large number of federal 
     personnel. It is imperative that the professionalism of this 
     effort not be compromised by unauthorized disclosures.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Janet Reno.

                               Appendix B


           list of individuals interviewed by the delegation

       Major General Kurt B. Anderson, JTF/SWA/CC; Brigidier 
     General Terryl J. Schwalier, 4404WG(P)/CC; Brigidier General 
     Daniel M. Dick, BG Schwalier's Replacement; Colonel James R. 
     Ward, ARCENT; Colonel Gary S. Boyle, 4404 Spt Gp/CC; 
     Lieutenant Colonel James J. Traister, 4404 SPS/CC; Chief 
     Master Sargeant Jimmy D. Allen, 4404 SPS/CCE; Richard M. 
     Reddecliff, Office of Special Investigations; Staff Sargeant 
     Alfredo R. Guerrero, Security Patrol; Senior Airman Corey P. 
     Grice, Security Patrol; Airman First Class Christopher T. 
     Wagar, Security Patrol; Staff Sargeant Douglas W. Tucker, 
     Security Patrol; Lieutenant Colonel John E. Watkins, F-16 
     pilot; Major James D. Hedges, F-16 pilot; Captain Steven E. 
     Clapp, F-16 pilot; Captain John P. Montgomery, F-16 pilot; 
     Major Steven P. Goff, Flight Surgeon.

                               Appendix C


               explanation of terrorist threat conditions

       THREATCON NORMAL--Applies when a general threat of possible 
     terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine 
     security posture.
       THREATCON ALPHA--Applies when there is a general threat of 
     possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, 
     the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and 
     circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON 
     BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement 
     certain measures from higher THREATCONs resulting from 
     intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this 
     THREATCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
       THREATCON BRAVO--Applies when an increased and more 
     predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measure 
     in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for 
     weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational 
     capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities.
       THREATCON CHARLIE--Applies when an incident occurs or 
     intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist 
     action against personnel and facilities is imminent. 
     Implementation of this measure for more than a short period 
     probably creates hardship and affects the peacetime 
     activities of the unit and its personnel.
       THREATCON DELTA--Implementation applies in the immediate 
     area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when 
     intelligence has been received that terrorist action against 
     a specific location or person is likely.

       Source: Air Force Instruction 31-210, 1 July 1995.

  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. Scarborough] be permitted to control the remaining time on our 
side.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from South Carolina?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for his leadership on the 
committee, the ranking member for his leadership on the committee, and 
obviously the families of these brave young men that died over in Saudi 
Arabia, as well as those in the Eglin community in northwest Florida 
who saw 11 of the 19 of their bravest men not come back.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
Saxton].
  Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me. I would commend the gentleman for the leadership role he has 
brought to bear in bringing this measure to the floor today, because I 
think it is of very notable importance.
  Mr. Speaker, let me say it is entirely appropriate that we should 
make note of the event that occurred in Dhahran in June of this year. 
It is, obviously, our intent to speak today to the families of the 
people who were involved in that very disastrous event, so it is 
appropriate and fitting that we make these remarks on behalf of the 
people who were involved and who died on that date.
  I think it is also appropriate, Mr. Speaker, that we note that while 
we remember an event that occurred, and remember the families that were 
affected by it, it is also important for us to look ahead. It is 
important for us to understand this event in the context of the future, 
and what it could mean to servicemen and servicewomen, their families, 
and other civilians who travel outside the United States, and in some 
events that could even occur here at home.
  Mr. Speaker, those who have the objective of disrupting the American 
presence around the world have found what many of us believe is a new 
way to accomplish that. In the past, when people wanted to use force to 
bring about change of one kind in one part of the world or another, 
they would use what we refer to today as conventional force.
  Since World War II, or the middle of World War II, the United States 
has been the predominant nation or the predominant force in terms of 
conventional power and our success at conventional warfare. I think the 
many nations around the world have understood that today. They have 
understood that they need to find another way to bring about the 
changes that they seek. That was learned, I think, in the Middle East 
by a number of Middle Eastern nations during the history of the State 
of Israel, during the last 50 years or so, when war after war was won 
by the Israelis.

                              {time}  1530

  Other people who wanted to disrupt Israeli society and perhaps drive 
Israel out of existence used a form of warfare today known as 
international terrorism. That international terrorism, of course, still 
goes on in the Middle East, and this event which occurred in June is 
evidence of that.
  In 1991, we decided that we did not like an event that was occurring 
or about to occur in the Middle East. It happened to be the invasion by 
Saddam Hussein of our friendly associate, Kuwait. And so once again we 
demonstrated our capability to carry out a conventional act which 
educated in some respects some countries in the Middle East as to our 
ability to carry out a conventional defense of that country.
  It is notable that since 1991, the acts of terror against American 
personnel, both military and civilian, overseas

[[Page H10834]]

has increased. In 1995, there was a bombing in Riyadh where five 
American servicepeople lost their lives, and, of course, this bombing 
in Dharan is further evidence of the increase of terror against the 
United States, against Westerners, and against people who are 
considered to be, by them, unfriendly to certain countries in the 
Middle East. And so it is important for us to note several things about 
these events.
  First, we have to note what they are not, or what we believe they are 
not. They are not just random acts acting out against the West. They 
are well planned, the perpetrators are well trained, they are well 
financed, and in some cases, in many cases perhaps--perhaps in most 
cases--we believe today they are sponsored by certain states in the 
Middle East.
  Countries on the suspect list, of course, are Iran, Sudan, Syria, 
perhaps in some cases Iraq, some forces out of Turkey, not the Turkish 
Government necessarily but some forces in Turkey, some forces in Saudi 
Arabia, some forces in Egypt, and perhaps other countries, Libya in 
North Africa.
  These are well-planned, well-carried-out events which are intended to 
accomplish a purpose. Usually that purpose is to drive out or disrupt 
the American presence in certain quarters of the world. I think it is 
important to understand these things in the context of the Dhahran 
bombing and for us to take note as an institution as to what it is the 
Americans face overseas.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his statement on terrorism 
and helping explain to us a little bit more of why what happened, 
happened.
  My resolution today that I have placed before the House is meant to 
honor heroes that were obviously victims of this terror. If is a modest 
gesture to salute the 19 men who in life and who in death made their 
country proud and, in doing so, gave their country an example of 
service, dedication, and nobility for which all Americans should strive 
and which we should not forget.
  It was only a matter of months ago, on June 25, that an act of 
terrorism was perpetrated against the men and women of our armed 
services in Saudi Arabia. Those men and women had been called by their 
country to a duty in a faraway place to help defend freedom in a land 
that has known very little of it.
  It was not an easy task to take on. The place our men and women in 
uniform were defending is in many respects a forbidding place, a place 
of strange customs, of harsh climate, and sometimes unfriendly and 
unwel- 
coming people. Obviously, it was far removed from family, friends, and 
home that all of them knew.
  Yet like the professionals that they are, they did their jobs, and in 
doing so, they were making sure that we all could enjoy the blessings 
of liberty. Then in one split second, the 19 brave young men were 
killed.
  Among them were A1c Joshua Woody, who was known to his buddies simply 
as Woody and was the guy that everybody came to with their problems.
  Then there was Capt. Christopher Adams. Captain Adams had barely 
escaped another fatal terrorist attack 3 years earlier and had told a 
relative of his that he was very fearful of being deployed in Saudi 
Arabia. Yet he never hesitated to go when duty called.
  Mr. Speaker, Captain Adams was due to be married on October 19. His 
last words to his uncle, who is a minister, were, ``When I come back 
from Saudi, I'll be sure to give you a call.'' Sadly, instead of 
officiating at Mr. Adams' wedding, his uncle presided over his funeral.
  Then there was Joseph Rimkus, a brave young man whose aunt is with us 
today who has been fighting for the memory not only of her nephew but 
for the other 18 young men who were killed over in Saudi Arabia.
  These 3 young men and the 16 others who died with them were in many 
respects ordinary men. However, these men were doing extraordinary 
things. They even in death give us a great example of courage, duty, 
honor, and nobility.
  Mr. Speaker, I still remember vividly the television scenes of the 
military compound, of wounded men and women being removed from the 
wreckage, and later still I attended memorial services held at Eglin 
Air Force Base in my district, a base where 11 of these 19 young men 
came from. I remember the grieving widows and children.
  I remember the terrible feeling I felt in the pit of my stomach when 
the wife of one of these men who died came up to me and said, ``Please 
don't let my husband be forgotten.'' As she handed me a small picture, 
she said, ``Please don't let my husband be forgotten.''
  As I have stated earlier, I know this is a modest gesture, I know 
this does not bring those 19 young men back, but it is all we can do 
today.
  I also remember the young 10-year-old boy that had gone down to 
Panama City to live with his father. And when his father was deployed 
and did not come back, I remember going up to him that morning in the 
memorial service and talking to him. And he was talking about things 
that my 8-year-old boy talks about, the Atlanta Braves, about baseball, 
about what school was going to be like in the fall, and it had not 
really hit him at that time that his father was gone and that his 
father was not coming back and would not be able to go with him to a 
ball game, would not be able to share with him in a school play this 
year, would not be able to see him grow up, go to college, and do all 
the things that I pray to God that I will be able to do.
  It was at that moment when I saw him break down at the memorial 
service that it hit me, I guess more than it has ever hit me before, 
exactly what type of sacrifice these men gave in Saudi Arabia when they 
gave their life. It is a terrible price that they had to pay, but it is 
a price that they were willing to pay.
  It has been said that America is the last best hope of man on earth. 
Ronald Reagan talked about that shining city on a hill. But we see in 
the bombing both a blessing and the responsibility that such a role 
entails.
  American men and women are serving in the uniform of their country, 
risking their lives in dangerous places all around the world to see to 
it that this hope, that this shining city on the hill, never dies. It 
is, quite literally, a sacred duty and a duty that, at the very least, 
is worthy of our recognition and our honor.
  Mr. Speaker, that is what I wanted to do today in a small way with 
this resolution. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, the brave men who died 
in Saudi Arabia have consecrated that place far above our poor power to 
add or to detract. However, if we remember and honor their memories, I 
believe that we will be able to carry on in some small way the work for 
which they sacrificed their lives.
  And may those who carry on take comfort in the thought that their 19 
comrades are now safe in the arms of a loving God and that we have done 
what I promised that wife we would do, that we have remembered her 
husband and the other 18 who died tragically on June 25.
  Mr. Speaker, in memory of those who have died and also those that go 
on serving in carrying out the duties of freedom, I ask that my 
colleagues support this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dornan].
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise with my full heart in this 
resolution.
  I had been over there to visit with these young men from this great 
33d Fighter Wing down in northern Florida. One of their squadrons, the 
58th, had accounted for more aerial victories in Desert Storm than any 
other. They had gotten all the early victories. Because the 1st Fighter 
Wing out of Virginia was to guard the oil fields, they went deep into 
Iraq and never lost an aircraft.
  The corporate memory problem is what I wanted to address today. I can 
remember exactly where I was in Phoenix, AZ, when the bomb destroyed 
our barracks in Beirut; 220 marines, 17 Army, and 4 Navy died in a 
flash, and we always forget about those that are blinded or lose 
fingers or an arm or a leg. The wounded toll was terrible.
  But before that, in April 1983, a car bomb had gone off in front of 
the American Embassy in Beirut, almost the exact number killed as this 
19-death tragedy at the Khobar Barracks. Eighteen killed. And then 
months later it happened again. I was in Jean Kirkpatrick's office at 
the United Nations

[[Page H10835]]

when that bomb went off and tore the whole facade off our Embassy in 
Beirut and killed two marines who were up front, in their position, 
guarding the security of the Embassy and who comes in the front door, 
who is barred entrance.
  The bombings in London. I have a photograph back in the Cloakroom. I 
would have brought it out, but it would just look brown to the gallery 
or to the C-SPAN audience. It is of a car bomb set off in the financial 
district of London. And that only one human being died is a miracle 
when you look at this photograph: Skyscrapers and buildings going back 
100, 200 years; roofs torn off; every single window for a quarter of a 
mile on both sides of the street wiped out.
  We know about these car bombs. Is it the bureaucracy in the House 
that has no corporate memory? In the Senate? About 30 percent of us 
were here when the 1983 bombings took place in Beirut killing so many 
Americans and so many servicemen.
  In the military, though, general officers were around during these 
bombings. They do not have this rollover problem and this loss of 
institutional memory.
  I do not want to see people pay the price of having their careers 
destroyed, some of them with combat missions in Southeast Asia or in 
the gulf region of the Middle East, but we simply cannot forget the 
past. The past is prolog to the future. Study the past, and implement 
the security needed.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I have tried to listen diligently to all of the remarks 
of my distinguished colleagues as they have marched into the well to 
address themselves to House Concurrent Resolution 200.
  First with respect to the general issue of terrorism, yes, Mr. 
Speaker, it is here, it is real, it is alive, it is expanding, it is 
evolving, and it will be a threat that America and the world will have 
to deal with on an increasing basis as we move into the 21st century. 
That is a matter that we must come to grips with and address in 
significant terms. It will require the highest and the best in us. It 
will require our best thinking, our best judgment and our best 
thoughts.

                              {time}  1545

  That is not the moment that we are in at this point. There will also 
be recriminations about who did what and who was responsible. That also 
is an integral part of the process. But that is not why we are here 
today.
  We are here today for a very simple, thoughtful, and compassionate 
reason; not to politicize, not to demagogue, not to point fingers, but 
simply to pause as human beings and to attempt to put our emotional 
arms around people who have experienced great tragedy. First, 19 human 
beings who paid the ultimate and supreme price of dying in a terrorist 
tragedy, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.
  Something we have not focused upon is the 200 people, many of whom 
severely and significantly were injured, who also paid a very heavy 
price. The families that my distinguished colleague from Florida spoke 
about, the young child speaking in those kinds of real and powerful 
human terms, bring the reality of the risk of serving abroad in 
dangerous places as we carry out the foreign policy and national 
security policy of this country. It comes to us all too real.
  But I just want to rise, along with the distinguished gentleman from 
Florida, the author of this concurrent resolution, and join with all of 
my colleagues on the Committee on National Security, for we passed this 
resolution unanimously, in acknowledging the personal sacrifices the 19 
American military personnel to which I alluded earlier gave, killed, 
and the more than 200 wounded, on June 25 of this year.
  I know that I join with the rest of the country when I say to their 
families and fellow service members that they can be assured that this 
Nation will long remember their bravery and sacrifices that they have 
made for their country.
  So I am simply saying, Mr. Speaker, all of the other comments 
notwithstanding what this resolution is about, is to ask this body to 
pause for a moment, to embrace human life in a compassionate way, to 
embrace the families of this country that have grieved and paid an 
incredible price; people dying, and mothers and fathers crying, and 
children not quite understanding what is going on.
  So I urge all of my colleagues to come to the floor at the 
appropriate point in these proceedings, to join with the gentleman from 
the State of Florida, this gentleman, and all of my colleagues on the 
House Committee on National Security, and unanimously pass this 
resolution as some modest way of saying to people we feel, we 
understand, we care, and we pay tribute.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman 
from California for his kind words.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gunderson). The question is on the 
motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] that 
the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, 
House Concurrent Resolution 200, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the concurrent resolution, as 
amended, was agreed to.
  The title of the concurrent resolution was amended so as to read: 
``Concurrent resolution honoring the victims of the June 25, 1996, 
terrorist bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.''
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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