[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 133 (Tuesday, September 24, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H10825-H10835]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOMBING IN DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the
concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 200) expressing the sense of the
Congress regarding the bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, as amended.
The Clerk read as follows:
H. Con. Res. 200
Whereas on June 25, 1996, a terrorist truck bomb outside a
military housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 19
members of the Armed Forces and wounded hundreds of others;
Whereas the members of the Armed Forces killed and wounded
in the bombing were defending the national security interests
of the United States;
Whereas the defense of United States national interests
continues to require the forward deployment of members of the
Armed Forces to other countries;
Whereas the members of the Armed Forces are called upon to
perform duties that place their lives at risk from terrorist
elements hostile to the United States;
Whereas global terrorism has demonstrated no respect for
the historic rules of war, no reluctance to strike against
innocent and defenseless individuals, and a willingness to
engage in tactics against which conventional defenses are
difficult;
Whereas it is the duty of the President and the military
chain of command to take all necessary steps to keep members
of the Armed Forces protected and as safe as the nature of
their mission permits;
Whereas the people of the United States stand with those
who have volunteered to serve their country and grieve at the
loss of those who, to quote Lincoln, ``have given their last
full measure of devotion'' to the security and well-being of
the United States;
Whereas those members of the Armed Forces serving in Saudi
Arabia and around the world demonstrate valor and a faith in
the American way of life that reflects honorably not only on
themselves but upon the country that they represent; and
[[Page H10826]]
Whereas the military personnel who lost their lives on June
25, 1996, in the bombing in Dhahran died in the honorable
service of their Nation and exemplified all that is best and
most virtuous in the American people: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring),
That Congress hereby--
(1) recognizes the 19 members of the Armed Forces who died
in the terrorist truck bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on
June 25, 1996, and honors them for their service and
sacrifice;
(2) calls upon the Nation to hold fast the memory of those
who died;
(3) extends its sympathies to the families of those who
died; and
(4) assures the members of the Armed Forces serving
anywhere in the world that their well-being and interests
will at all times be given the highest priority.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spence] and the gentleman from California [Mr.
Dellums] each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
General Leave
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
on the concurrent resolution now under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from South Carolina?
There was no objection.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, on June 25, 1996, a terrorist bomb attack
against a government housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,
resulted in the death of 19 American service members and the wounding
of 200 others. This attack demonstrated that terrorism directed against
Americans is a continuing threat, and that our men and women in uniform
are often at great risk because of the nature of their mission.
Today the House has before it House Concurrent Resolution 200, a bill
authored by my colleague and valued member of the House Committee on
National Security, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Scarborough], that
recognizes and honors the ultimate sacrifice paid by the 19 American
service members who died in this cowardly attack. I believe this bill
is a fitting tribute for the House to make, and I urge my colleagues to
support it.
Mr. Speaker, last week the Committee on National Security held a
hearing to review the Saudi terrorist bombing, the conclusions reached
by the Department of Defense's own investigation, and the appropriate
measures necessary to ensure that United States forces deployed abroad
would be better prepared to deal with similar attacks in the future.
The committee heard from Secretary of Defense Perry, Joint Chiefs of
Staff Chairman General Shalikashvili, and retired Gen. Wayne Downing,
who headed the independent task force charged with investigating the
bombing. The conclusions of General Downing's study were consistent
with the findings of our committee report released last month.
Mr. Speaker, both reports noted the need for greater tactical
intelligence to be used on the terrorist threat to United States
forces, and the conduct of Operation Southern Watch as a temporary
contingency mission, when it is in reality a long-term operation, and
both cited numerous institutional and organizational shortcomings that
contributed to the tragedy that resulted in the death of 19 brave
Americans.
General Downing's report also found fault at all levels of the chain
of command, a conclusion accepted by Secretary of Defense Perry during
his testimony before our committee.
Mr. Speaker, House Concurrent Resolution 200 properly notes that we
have important and legitimate national security interests in Saudi
Arabia and the Middle East that justify our continued presence. The
bill also notes the danger posed to American national interests and
personnel by the threat of global terrorism. I believe it deserves the
unanimous support of all House Members.
I once again want to commend the legislation's author, the gentleman
from Florida [Mr. Scarborough], for his diligent efforts to bring this
legislation to the House floor. Thanks to his commitment, we are here
today ensuring that the brave Americans whose lives were lost in the
Khobar Towers bombing are never forgotten by this House.
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a copy of the report from the
Committee on National Security.
The report referred to is as follows:
The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident--Executive Summary
The terrorist bombing that killed 19 American military
personnel, wounded more than 200 others, and harmed hundreds
more Saudi soldiers and civilians in and around the Khobar
Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996
exposed more than the physical vulnerability of Americans
serving abroad. It exposed the shortcomings of a U.S.
intelligence apparatus that left Americans unprepared for the
threat that confronted them. It exposed significant problems
of continuity and cohesion in the units deployed for
Operation Southern Watch. And it exposed the risks to U.S.
military personnel deployed on contingency operations where
political and cultural sensitivities of the host country are
significant factors.
The ability to acquire and process accurate and timely
intelligence is critical to the successful execution of any
military mission. It is equally essential for force
protection--especially in a world of increasing terrorist
threats. The dearth of reliable intelligence on the terrorist
threat, coupled with the inability to extrapolate from the
intelligence that was available, even after the Riyadh
bombing in November 1995, was one of the primary factors
contributing to the Khobar Towers tragedy. Because
intelligence regarding terrorist threats is more often than
not incomplete and uncertain, both intelligence analysts and
military operators must recognize it for both what it is and
is not and hedge in developing force protection and operation
plans.
In the case of the Khobar Towers bombing, problems
resulting from incomplete intelligence on the terrorist
threat were exacerbated by numerous operational and
organizational shortcomings that limited the ability of Joint
Task Force-Southwest Asia to effectively protect against the
increased terrorist threat. In particular, short tours of
duty, even for senior commanders, compromised the ability of
deployed units to properly address the urgent need to make
long-term security improvements.
Commanders, their staffs and security personnel also need
greater continuity if they are to bring stability to
organizations that currently face constant personnel
turbulence and to develop effective personal and professional
relations with Saudi officials with whom they must work.
Because the various sensibilities of the host nation often
conflict with or complicate the operations of U.S. forces
deployed overseas, American military and political leaders
must remain vigilant for potential problems.
Intelligence and organizational shortcomings are a growing
hallmark of ``temporary'' or ``contingency'' missions that in
reality become long-term commitments. Despite the fact that
Operation Southern Watch has been ongoing since 1992 and the
probability of Iraqi compliance with UN resolution is low,
Saudi and American leaders and the U.S. Air Force observed
and perpetuated the illusion of a ``temporary'' operation.
The Department of Defense needs to review other ongoing
contingency operations to ensure that similar perceptions are
not compromising force protection needs or jeopardizing U.S.
security interests. The proposed movement of significant
numbers of U.S. military personnel to more secure quarters
now agreed to by the United States is clearly warranted, if
not overdue.
Staff Report--August 14, 1996
On June 25, 1996, a terrorist's bomb exploded at the Khobar
Towers housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19
American service personnel, wounding more than 200 others,
killing at least one Saudi civilian and injuring hundreds of
other civilians. The force of the explosion was so great it
heavily damaged or destroyed six high rise apartment
buildings and shattered windows in virtually every other
structure in the compound, leaving a crater in the ground 85
feet wide and 35 feet deep. The blast was felt 20 miles away
in the Persian Gulf state of Bahrain. It was the worst
terrorist attack against Americans in more than a decade.
The Khobar Towers complex is home for the airmen of the
4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional) of the U.S. Air Force, part
of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and coalition forces
from the United Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia
participating in Operation Southern Watch, the United Nations
effort to enforce the ``no-fly'' and ``no-drive'' zones in
Iraq south of the 32nd parallel. Because the bombing was
directed specifically at Americans with such devastating
effect, it has led to questions concerning the security of
U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia and in other regions
of the world.
At the request of Chairman Floyd Spence, a staff delegation
of the House National Security Committee traveled to Dhahran
and visited the site of the bombing from July 10-13, 1996 as
part of the committee's investigation of the incident. The
delegation spent several days interviewing field commanders,
being briefed by those responsible for security measures, and
speaking with the military personnel who played a critical
role just
[[Page H10827]]
prior to and immediately after the blast. The staff also
sought interviews with Saudi officials and FBI agents in
theater, but as the staff's visit coincided with the Saudi
weekend and Sabbath, the Saudis did not provide anyone to be
interviewed. Likewise, the staff delegation was unable to
interview Department of Justice officials, who responded that
any disclosure of information could compromise the integrity
of their ongoing investigation. (A copy of a letter from
Attorney General Janet Reno is included as Appendix A. A
complete list of individuals who were interviewed is included
as Appendix B).
The Khobar Towers bombing tragedy calls into question more
than just the safety of American military forces in Saudi
Arabia. It also raises issues related to the conduct of the
Operation Southern Watch mission, the importance of accurate
intelligence on terrorist activities and capabilities, the
sufficiency of the operational command structure, and the
appropriate balance between the need to protect American
personnel stationed abroad and the desire not to challenge
the sovereignty or offend the sensibilities of host countries
who have granted American forces conditional rights to deploy
on their territory. What follows is an unclassified summary
of the staff's observations and findings regarding the
Dhahran incident.
the bombing incident
On June 25, 1996, at approximately 2200 hours Dhahran local
time, a fuel truck laden with an estimated 3,000-5,000 pounds
of explosives approached the northwest end of the Khobar
Towers compound from the north and turned east onto 31st
Street just outside the perimeter fence separating the
compound from a public parking lot. The truck, and a car that
it was following, continued to travel along the perimeter
fence toward the northeast corner of the compound. Staff
Sergeant Alfredo Guerrero, present at an observation site on
the roof of Building 131, at the northeast corner, spotted
the suspicious car and fuel truck as they continued to travel
along the perimeter fence toward their location. When the
vehicles reached Building 131, they turned left, pointing
away from the building, and stopped. The fuel truck,
positioned behind the car, began to back up into the hedges
along the perimeter fence directly in front of Building 131.
Staff Sergeant Guerrero's suspicion was confirmed when two
men emerged from the truck and quickly got into the car,
which then sped away. At this point, he radioed the situation
to the security desk and began, along with the other two
guards on the roof, to evacuate the building.
Emergency evacuation procedures then began for Building 131
as the three security personnel ran door to door, starting
from the top floor and working their way down, knocking
loudly on each door and yelling for the resident to evacuate.
Three to four minutes after the truck had backed up against
the perimeter fence, the bomb exploded, ripping off the
entire front facade of the eight-story building. Khobar
Towers residents and officials of the 4404th Fighter Wing,
the provisional U.S. Air Force unit conducting Operation
Southern Watch, were unanimous in their belief that quick
action on the part of the guards, who had only been able to
work their way down several floors of the building, helped
saved the lives of a number of residents of Building 131.
Many residents of Building 131 were caught in the building's
stairwells at the moment of the explosion, which may have
been the safest place to be, in the estimation of engineers
and security experts on the scene. However, the force of the
blast demolished the building and severely damaged five
adjacent buildings. Nineteen American service personnel were
killed and more than 200 injured. Hundreds of Saudi and third
country nationals living in the complex and immediate
vicinity were also wounded.
The bomb blast blew out windows throughout the compound and
created a crater 85 feet wide and 35 feet deep. The blast was
felt as far away as Bahrain, 20 miles to the southeast. Most
of the buildings in the ``American sector'' of the Khobar
Towers complex suffered some degree of damage. While
residents of Khobar Towers, 4404th Fighter Wing leaders, and
U.S. intelligence experts conclude that Americans were the
target of the terrorists, and the damage was extensive, an
even greater number of casualties might have occurred had the
driver positioned the truck differently against the fence and
had not at least one row of ``Jersey'' barriers of the kind
used in construction and on U.S. highways been present to
absorb or deflect part of the blast away from the lower level
of Building 131. Senior leaders of the wing, after
consultation with their engineers and with investigators at
the scene, have concluded that this arrangement helped to
prevent the collapse of the lower floors of the building. Had
the lower floors and thus, the entire building, collapsed,
the number of fatalities likely would have been much greater.
the khobar towers compound
Khobar Towers is a series of high-rise apartment buildings
comprising approximately 14 city blocks. U.S. forces occupy a
portion of these buildings on the north end of the complex
stretching roughly two and one half blocks. Other buildings
house troops from the multinational forces participating in
Operation Southern Watch, in particular the British, French,
and Saudi militaries, while some buildings are also used for
Saudi civilian housing. There is only one main access route
into and out of the compound.
The buildings were originally built in the 1970s as
shelters for Bedouins, but remained vacant until the time of
the Persian Gulf War. During the war and in its aftermath,
American military forces operated out of a military airbase
located near Dhahran's commercial airport, where the
facilities were rudimentary and quarters cramped. During the
war, the Saudis offered to house U.S. troops at Khobar
Towers. Accommodating the 500,000 U.S. troops who
participated in the Gulf War, even on a temporary basis,
called for the use of every possible facility. After the war,
the Saudis offered continued use of space in the Khobar
Towers to coalition forces conducting Operation Southern
Watch, and U.S. forces have been housed in Khobar Towers for
the past six years.
The complex is located in the midst of an urban
environment, laced with residential and commercial areas and
mosques. On the north end is the public park and parking lot
where the June 25 bombing took place. The urban setting of
the complex creates unique security difficulties, and
establishing perimeters is particularly challenging. The
nearest perimeter fence was along the north end, only about
85 feet from several residential structures in the complex; a
long perimeter fence on the east side was slightly further
out, but still relatively close to the Khobar Towers
buildings. And the perimeter marking the U.S. part of Khobar
Towers from the other military and civilian housing runs down
the middle of a four-lane street. Prior to the bomb blast,
Air Force security officials at the complex had identified
the perimeter fence as one of the more serious physical
security concerns in conducting antiterrorism vulnerability
assessments.
Use of a general alarm system
The Khobar Towers buildings themselves are of sturdy
construction, built with a minimum of combustible material
and consequently without a fire alarm system. There has been
speculation as to whether a central alarm system should have
been installed and operational at the time of the blast to
reduce reaction and evacuation times. The opinion of Air
Force security officials is that a fire alarm would not have
made a substantial difference, and might even have added
to the confusion and worked against any attempts to
inspire sleeping troops with a sense of urgency about the
suspected bomb threat. For general alarm purposes, the Air
Force uses a loudspeaker system in Khobar Towers called
``Giant Voice.'' However, on the night of June 25, there
was insufficient time to activate it. In fact, commanders
and security officers at Khobar Towers have concluded that
a central alarm system is unlikely to have reduced the
number of fatalities or injuries the night of the blast,
given that it was only a matter of a few minutes between
the time evacuation procedures began and the detonation. A
number of people survived the blast by being in the
stairwell when it occurred. Had a general alarm been
sounded, it is possible that more people would have exited
the building and would have been at greater risk from the
blast's effects. Although the windows in many of the
buildings were blown out, not a single building collapsed
from structured damages as a result of the bomb. Even
Building 131, outside of which the bomb detonated,
remained standing, although the face of the building was
completed sheared off.
Vulnerability of the compound
In sum, the Khobar Towers apartment complex, and the
American portion within, is an inherently vulnerable location
to terrorists threats. The decision recently reached by the
United States and Saudi Arabia to move Operation Southern
Watch and other American military personnel to a more remote
location is a sound decision. Factors cited in press reports
as contributing to vulnerabilities of the complex and
contributing to casualties--the lack of a fire alarm, delays
in activating the Giant Voice, for example--are of marginal
importance, at least in the judgment of Khobar Towers
residents and security officers in the 4404th Fighter Wing.
These security officers and senior wing leaders also said
that a more raid evacuation may have done more harm than
good, exposing more troops to the effects of the blast.
Troops housed in an urban environment, with limited
perimeters, are inviting targets for terrorist attack. While
no location is entirely immune to terrorism, the
vulnerabilities of Khobar Towers made the risks especially
high.
the security situation prior to june 25, 1996
Prior to the November 13, 1995 bombing of the Office of the
Program Manager of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-
SANG) in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, American intelligence and
U.S. military leaders considered the risks to U.S. forces in
Saudi Arabia as low. While terrorist threats against the
United States are not unusual in the region, until recently
terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia has been considered
sporadic and rare. In particular, the threat from internal
Saudi factions and dissidents was rated low by the U.S.
intelligence community. The Saudi ruling family enjoys
generally widespread support, based upon its extensive system
of state-run social services, its largesse with its oil
wealth, and its very conservative interpretation and strong
support of Islam. Moreover, the ruling Al-Saud royal family
brooks no dissent. The Saudi system of justice is swift and
sure: public executions are the norm for serious crimes and
beheadings are not uncommon. The Saudi approach to justice
has long been seen as a deterrent to
[[Page H10828]]
crime and to those who would violate the tenets of Islam.
Second, despite the cultural sensitivities aroused by U.S.
leadership of and participation in the Gulf War, Americans
have long operated in Saudi Arabia on a routine, albeit
restricted, basis. The ARAMCO oil concern employs tens of
thousands of U.S. citizens, and other Westerners also work in
the Kingdom generally without incident. Internal dissent
aimed at the Saudi regime did not, until very recently, begin
to make a link between the ruling regime and the U.S.
military presence.
The OPM-SANG bombing and its aftermath
Both the Saudi and American belief that Saudi Arabia was an
unlikely venue for anti-American terrorist activity was
shattered on November 13, 1995, when a car bomb exploded
outside the headquarters of the OPM-SANG mission. The
building was used by American military forces as a training
facility for Saudi military personnel. The car bomb contained
approximately 250 pounds of explosives. Five Americans were
killed in the OPM-SANG bomb blast and 34 were wounded. Until
then, terrorist actions against Americans in the Kingdom had
been considered unlikely by the U.S. intelligence community.
As a result of the OPM-SANG bombing, security measures were
stepped up at installations where American troops maintained
a presence throughout Saudi Arabia. The U.S. intelligence
community reviewed its analysis of threats to American
military forces and the results of that analysis were
factored into the subsequent vulnerability assessment that
was conducted for the wing commander by the Air Force's
Office of Special Investigations (OSI). As with all Air Force
installations, routine vulnerability assessments of Khobar
Towers and other facilities in Saudi Arabia were conducted by
OSI every six months. The most recent vulnerability
assessment prior to the June 25 bombing at Khobar Towers was
completed in January 1996 and identified numerous security
shortcomings. As a result of the OPM-SANG bombing, the threat
condition for American forces in Saudi Arabia was raised from
THREATCON ALPHA--the second lowest threat condition--to
THREATCON BRAVO, the next highest threat condition.
Consistent with this increased threat situation, additional
security measures were implemented at the Khobar Towers
facility in Khahran. (An explanation of the various Threat
Conditions is attached as Appendix C.) Security officials
held weekly meetings to discuss and review security
procedures, and also conveyed bi-monthly security forums with
participation of British and French coalition forces.
Incidents at Khobar Towers
Since November 1995, security forces at Khobar Towers
recorded numerous suspicious incidents that could have
reflected preparations for a terrorist attack against the
complex. Much of the suspicious activity was recorded along
the north perimeter of Khobar Towers, which bordered on that
portion of the complex used to house Americans. Several
incidents involving individuals looking through binoculars at
the complex were reported. On one occasion, an individual
drove his car into one of the concrete Jersey barriers along
the perimeter, moving it slightly, and then drove away. This
may have been an effort to determine whether the perimeter
could be breached. Other incidents reflected the heightened
state of security awareness. For example, a suspicious
package, which turned out to be non-threatening, was noticed
on May 9, 1996, in the elevator of Building 129 and led to
the building's evacuation. (As Colonel Boyle, the 4044th's
Support Group commander noted, buildings were evacuated no
less than ten times since the November OPM-SANG bombing.)
While a number of incidents could have reflected
preparations for an attack on Khobar Towers, there was no
specific intelligence to link any of them to a direct threat
to the complex. Again, this peculiar position of U.S. forces
in Saudi Arabia complicated the ability of security officials
and intelligence analysts to reach definitive conclusions.
Security officials at Khobar Towers remain unsure whether
surveillance by outsiders was anything more than an attempt
by local Saudis to observe the culturally different Americans
in Western attire. In one incident involving shots fired
outside the compound, it was determined that teenage boys
were firing a new rifle and no threat to the compound was
intended. Nevertheless, the number of reported incidents and
the heightened state of alert after the OPM-SANG bombing led
security officials and wing leaders to reassess the security
situation within the complex.
Security enhancements implemented in spring 1996
In response to these local incidents and following the
November 1995 OPM-SANG bombing, Brigadier General Terryl
Schwalier, commander of the 4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional)
initiated a number of security enhancements that included the
placement of additional concrete Jersey barriers around the
Khobar Towers perimeter, staggered barriers, or
``serpentines,'' along the main entrance to the complex; and
the posting of guards on rooftops. Additionally, bomb dogs
were employed, Air Force and Saudi security patrols were
enhanced, the entry gage to the compound was fortified, and
access was restricted. In March 1996, General Schwalier met
with Lieutenant Colonel James Traister, the wing's new
Security Police Squadron commander, to discuss measures to
prevent penetration of the compound. Although the two
officers discussed a range of security threats, security
efforts focused on preventing a penetration of the complex
itself, and in particular, the threat of a car bomb.
In March, Lieutenant Colonel Traister conducted an
additional, personal assessment of the compound's
vulnerabilities to terrorist action. He subsequently
presented his recommendations to General Schwalier, who
accepted all of them. In April, Colonel Boyle and Lieutenant
Colonel Traister initiated a series of additional
counterterrorism measures. These included posting additional
guards on the roofs, laying seven miles of concertina wire
along the compound perimeter, and trimming vegetation on the
compound side of the perimeter fence. Security forces
increased their patrols, working 12-14 hour shifts 6 days a
week. Staff Sergeant Guerrero noted that security patrols
were losing every third break because they were helping to
fortify the perimeter. Overall, numerous additional security
enhancements were implemented beginning in April. Among the
most visible were substantial guard pillboxes built from
sandbags mounting machine guns to protect the main entrance.
Lieutenant Colonel Traister also initiated monthly security
group meetings with representatives of the other coalition
forces in Khobar Towers. Several security police said they
originally believed Lieutenant Colonel Traister was ``crazy''
because of his obsession with security enhancements at the
compound.
Expansion of the security perimeter
Colonel Boyle dealt directly with his Saudi security
counterparts regarding the issue of the compound perimeter,
which was located less than 100 feet from several housing
units along the north end of the compound. On two occasions--
in November 1995 and March 1996--Colonel Boyle said he asked
Saudi security forces for permission to extend the perimeter.
The Saudi security forces responded that doing so would
interfere with access to a public parking lot that was
adjacent to public park and mosque, stating that the property
was owned by Saudi government ministries and that they did
not have the authority to approve such a move on their own.
While never flatly refusing to extend the perimeter, the
Saudis continued to assert that the existing perimeter was
sufficient against the baseline threat of a car bomb similar
to the Riyadh OPM-SANG bombing, and they did not act to
accommodate the U.S. request. Instead, they offered to
increase Saudi security patrols both inside and outside the
compound, and to run checks of license plates in response to
American concern over suspicious vehicles.
Neither Colonel Boyle nor General Schwalier said they
considered the issue of perimeter extension to be of
sufficient urgency to necessitate the intervention of higher
authorities. This belief was based upon at least two factors,
they said. First, they did not consider the Saudi reluctance
to act on the U.S. request as unusual, given the generally
slow pace of Saudi society and previous experiences in
achieving expeditious Saudi action. As a result of the
perceived need not to offend their Saudi hosts by demanding
quick resolution of problems to American satisfaction, the
perimeter extension issue remained open. Second, both were
consumed by the need to quickly implement the required
security improvements within the compound, as well as by
their numerous other duties. Both General Schwalier and
Colonel Boyle said that their priorities were to accomplish
what was needed within Khobar Towers first before turning to
additional enhancements that would require long-term
negotiation and did not necessarily promise the desired
outcome.
Thus, General Schwalier, Colonel Boyle, and Lieutenant
Colonel Traister continued to work through the checklist of
other measures that could be implemented without the prior
approval of the Saudis and that would mitigate some of the
vulnerabilities presented by the perimeter fence problem. The
aforementioned OSI vulnerability assessment conducted in
January 1996 recommended 39 specific security enhancements to
the compound. However, extension of the perimeter was not
identified as a recommended security fix by either the July
1995 or the January 1996 vulnerability assessment and was,
therefore, not pursued with great urgency or elevated up the
chain of command for higher-level intervention.
Assessment of actions taken and not taken
After the November 1995 Riyadh bombing, security became a
major focus of activity within the 440th Fighter Wing, with
more than 130 specific actions taken in response to the
vulnerability assessments that were conducted in July 1995
and January 1996. Given command priorities, actions that
could be accomplished unilaterally were taken relatively
quickly--actions such as trimming the hedges on the U.S. side
of the perimeter fence to increase visibility along the
compound perimeter. Other actions requiring greater funding
were considered as part of a five-year plan for security
improvements. This included placing Mylar coating on all
windows to reduce the impact of a bomb blast by limiting the
shattering and fragmentation of glass windows and doors. In
retrospect, had Mylar been available at the time of the
blast, it is possible that some casualties might have been
avoided. Even had the bomb been within the parameters of
[[Page H10829]]
the device used in the November 1995 OPM-SANG attack,
untreated windows and sliding glass doors in the Khobar
Towers apartments still would have been vulnerable to the
blast effects. Likewise, the heavier ``blackout'' curtains
that had already been approved for acquisition but not yet
installed would likely have lessened casualties resulting
from shattered glass.
General Schwalier said he did not consider a relocation of
troops from the more exposed locations within the vulnerable
buildings to interior quarters further away from the
perimeter. While in retrospect such a relocation might have
saved lives, prior to the blast relocation was not considered
a priority due to the threat perception that discounted the
prospect of a bomb the size of the one that ultimately
exploded outside Building 131. Relocation also would have
resulted in disruptions to the operations--residents were
housed by military unit in order to maintain some cohesion
and some apartments were used as offices--and a decrease in
the quality of life for personnel having to ``double-up'' in
living quarters. Given the small size of the American sector
of the Khobar Towers complex, consolidating personnel to a
degree that would have produced substantial security
improvements--such as vacating the entire outer ring of
apartment buildings exposed to the perimeter--would have
involved measures not perceived as warranted by the threat
situation.
Overall, theater military commanders exercised an
aggressive and proactive approach to security in the wake
of the OPM-SANG bombing in November 1995. Indeed, some
residents of Khobar Towers believe it is possible that the
bombers struck when they did because they saw a window of
opportunity closing. Lieutenant Colonel Traister's
security enhancements following the OPM-SANG bombing were
visible and extensive--they would not have gone unnoticed
by anyone planning to attack the compound.
General Schwalier and other leaders in the 4404th Fighter
Wing clearly did not press the Saudis for timely action to
resolve specific U.S. security concerns. While the issue of
Saudi cultural and political sensibilities is treated more
fully below, the decision not to elevate these concerns to a
higher level of decision-making must be seen in the context
of the overall environment in which U.S. forces found
themselves. Wing leaders were impressed by their superiors
and in turn impressed upon their troops the need for a
cooperative relationship with Saudi officials and Saudi
society in general. The command is imbused with a desire not
to unnecessarily offend Saudi cultural or political norms.
Host country sensibilities
As with any U.S. military deployment abroad, there is a
need to strike an appropriate balance between the military
requirement for force protection and the political and
diplomatic requirements to understand and work within the
cultural norms of the host country. Under the best of
circumstances in Saudi Arabia, this is not an easy balancing
act, although in some cases, security needs of U.S. forces
are consistent with Saudi preferences. For example, the
recent agreement to relocate U.S. forces to a more remote
location at Al Khari initially stemmed from a suggestion made
by the Saudis.
At Khobar Towers, residents commented about their Saudi
hosts and the challenges of working through issues with them.
The Saudi approach to resolving issues is informal, indirect
and seeks measured consensus rather than quick, clear
decisions. As a result, to Americans the Saudi decision-
making process seems to lack a sense of urgency. Moreover,
many of those interviewed expressed frustration at the
seeming lack of Saudi attention to important security details
prior to June 25. A common element in the comments was that
the Saudis did not take security as seriously as the
Americans.
The very presence of American forces in the Kingdom is
considered by some Saudis to be sacrilegious and an affront
to Islam. Additionally, the strong U.S.-Saudi military
relationship has increasingly been exploited by political
dissidents in Saudi Arabia, under the ostensible guise of
religious observance but often for different reasons.
Consequently, the ruling family has sought to keep the
American presence as segregated as possible from Saudi
society. A visible display of U.S. ``decadence''--
particularly women with exposed skin or driving vehicles--is
an affront to traditional Saudis, and therefore a political
problem for the ruling family. In such an environment, it is
difficult to ensure that U.S. military personnel are treated
fairly and can do their jobs effectively, without insulting
the sensibilities or culture of their hosts, and possibly
risking the internal political consensus that sanctions U.S.
troop deployments.
These cultural differences can have serious security
implications. For example, in the late spring of 1996 U.S.
forces requested that the Saudis trim back the vegetation
that was growing up along the fence around the perimeter of
the Khobar Towers complex. The Saudis refused to do so for
cultural reasons. The overriding U.S. concern was security--
Americans guards needed an unobstructed view of activity
along the outside perimeter of the complex. However, the
Saudis desired to keep American activity out of view of the
average Saudi citizen. In this case, the Americans trimmed
the vegetation on the compound side of the perimeter fence
and employed security forces on top of selected building to
enhance observation. The Saudis did not trim the vegetation
on their side.
Many of the vulnerabilities that were identified by the OSI
January 1996 vulnerability assessment required corrective
action that could only be taken with the support of the
Saudis. For example, stepping up identification checks
outside the compound, trimming vegetation outside the
perimeter, and running license plate checks on suspicious
vehicles required the active cooperation and participation of
Saudi security authorities. Some of these measures were
accomplished, some were not, and some, such as license plate
checks, were only accomplished intermittently.
From the standpoint of domestic politics the Saudis wish
to ensure that the American military presence is perceived as
temporary rather than permanent. For example, there is no
formal ``status of forces'' agreement between the Americans
and the Saudis, as is the case in many other nations where
American troops are forward deployed, that comprehensively
defines the rights and responsibilities of U.S. forces and
the host nation. Rather, the U.S. presense in Saudi Arabia is
delineated by a series of ``stationing'' agreements covering
individual deployments and extending back to 1953. This
complex series of arrangements requires certain adjustments
in the operational activities of the deployed forces. For
example, extraordinary care is taken to ensure that the
flight operations of Southern Watch and crafted to minimize
the effects on Saudi society, to the point of changing
course to avoid flying over Saudi princes' palaces. These
arrangements also complicate the force protection mission.
For example, the relationship between U.S. security police
and their Saudi counterparts has remained intentionally
informal and ad hoc.
The political and cultural sensitivities of the Saudis are
impressed upon U.S. forces from the day they arrive for duty.
For instance, in his ``Commander's Inbriefing,'' presented to
all newly arriving troops, General Schwalier outlined the
standards of the 4404th Wing. ``General Order Number One''
was presented as ``respecting our hosts.
the role of intelligence
One of the primary factors contributing to the loss of
American life from the bombing at Khobar Towers was the lack
of specific intelligence regarding the capabilities of the
terrorists who carried out the June 25 attack. Therefore,
significant questions have been raised concerning the
adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis and the ability
to recognize the limits of the intelligence upon which the
4404th Fighter Wing planned its security measures.
The threat baseline
Prior to the Riyadh bombing of October 1995, U.S. threat
analyses considered the likelihood of a terrorist incident
against Americans in Saudi Arabia very low. In the words of
Major General Kurt Anderson, commander of Joint Task Force-
Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA), the threat was portrayed as coming
from an isolated terrorist incident, ``not by large,
organized groups.'' It was also based on what intelligence
analysts considered to be a ``demonstrated capability.'' This
analysis formed the threat ``baseline'' that was used in the
July 1995 OSI vulnerability assessment.
According to General Anderson, the Riyadh bombing ``changed
the rules of the game.'' The threat analysis conducted after
OPM-SANG incident concluded that there was a much higher
likelihood of terrorism targeted at U.S. forces. The size of
the Riyadh device--approximately 250 pounds of explosives--
also was a surprise. However, the analysis conducted after
the OPM-SANG bombing did not allow that terrorist groups were
capable of building a device larger than the Riyadh car bomb.
The Riyadh attack put everyone within the theater on high
alert, and the frequency of terrorist incidents within the
region seemed to increase. A number of these involved small
bombs set off in Bahrain that apparently were related to
internal problems there and not to the situation in Saudi
Arabia. Increased security awareness at Khobar Towers also
revealed what looked like a pattern of surveillance of the
facility. In November 1995, and in January, March and April
1996, Air Force security police reported a number of
incidents, including Saudis taking photographs and circling
the parking lot adjacent to the north perimeter, but they
were uncertain about their linkage. Also in the spring, a car
bumped and moved the Jersey barriers at the Khobar Towers
perimeter, which security police interpreted as a possible
test of the perimeter's strength.
In retrospect, other incidents also were suggestive. In
January, the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh issued a public advisory
noting that it had received ``disturbing reports that
additional attacks may be planned against institutions
identified with the United States and its interests in Saudi
Arabia.'' In March there was an unconfirmed intelligence
report that a large quantity of explosives was to be smuggled
into Saudi Arabia during the Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca
which draws huge numbers of Muslims to the Kingdom every
year. Also, on March 29, a car was seized at the Saudi-
Jordanian border with 85 pounds of explosives. Perhaps more
significant than the amount of explosives was the fact that
they were very expertly concealed within the car's engine
compartment. Throughout the spring a number of other reports
involving bomb materials were received by U.S. intelligence.
Finally, in May, when the Saudis convicted the four men for
the Riyadh bombing and sentenced them to death, the U.S.
[[Page H10830]]
Embassy released another advisory reporting threats of
``retaliation against Americans in Saudi Arabia'' if the men
were executed.
To General Anderson, these incidents did not represent a
``road map'' leading from the OPM-SANG bombing in Riyadh to
the Khobar Towers bombing. However, taken together with other
information available to U.S. intelligence and suggesting the
possibility of more sophisticated terrorist capabilities, the
pattern of incidents suggests there may have been substantial
shortcomings in the U.S. ability to process accurately
intelligence regarding the terrorist threat to U.S. forces
inside Saudi Arabia.
Intelligence collection
While the precise extent of U.S. intelligence gathering
operations inside Saudi Arabia cannot be discussed within the
context of an unclassified report, commanders in the theater
said they lacked adequate insight into internal Saudi society
or the terrorist threat and prized highly the few independent
intelligence sources they possessed. Further, given the
increasing sophistication of the devices and the operations
employed by terrorist groups operating in Saudi Arabia, which
suggested to intelligence experts that those responsible for
the bombings were most likely part of larger, well-connected
organizations, the difficulties facing intelligence
collection against terrorist organizations in the region
generally and in Saudi Arabia specifically are likely to be
enduring.
A substantial degree of the intelligence available to the
United States on Saudi Arabia comes from the Saudis
themselves. However, on politically sensitive topics--such as
the level of activity of Saudi dissidents--there is reason to
doubt the comprehensiveness of intelligence that is passed to
Americans by the Saudis. To American experts, there appears
to be no tradition of ``pure intelligence''--intelligence
free from political influence--in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the
Saudi style of decentralized and diffused bureaucratic power
is a complicating factor. It is a common belief among U.S.
intelligence and military officials and that information
shared by the Saudis is often shaped to serve the ends of
competing Saudi bureaucracies--interior and defense
ministries, for example--from which it originates.
American intelligence collection efforts regarding
terrorist or dissident activities in Saudi Arabia must also
obviously compete with other intelligence needs. Given the
operational mission of the Air Force in Saudi Arabia, the
principal focus of intelligence activity remains the Iraqi
threat to U.S. and allied aircraft contributing to Operation
Southern Watch. In addition, there have been ample reasons to
operate discreetly in the Kingdom and to avoid the risks that
would be associated with intelligence activities,
particularly human intelligence activities. The Saudis are
among our closest allies in the Middle East and the monarchy
has been seen as generally stable in a tumultuous region.
Developing the kind of human intelligence sources most useful
to protecting U.S. forces against terrorist threats would
require a long-term and possibly high-risk commitment.
Intelligence analysis
The problems of intelligence collection relative to the
terrorist threat against Americans in Saudi Arabia have been
accompanied by problems of analysis. While the issue of
intelligence analysis requires further investigation, several
observations are in order.
Based upon a review of available intelligence information,
it is questionable whether the U.S. intelligence community
provided theater commanders with sufficient intelligence. At
the very least, formal intelligence analyses of the terrorist
threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia failed to project an
increasing bomb-making capability on the part of terrorist
groups. Prior to the Riyadh bombing, there were no incidents
involving a bomb of that size (250 pounds) in Saudi Arabia,
therefore the intelligence threat analysis concluded that
there was not likely to be such a device. Likewise, while the
threat level was raised to a 250-pound car bomb after the
Riyadh bombing, it was not raised beyond. It appears that
threat assessments were more reactive than predictive. While
neither military nor civilian intelligence agencies had
voluminous detailed intelligence on which to base their
projections, officials interviewed said the expertise
required to build a larger truck bomb is not substantially
beyond that required to build a smaller car bomb such as was
used in the November 1995 Riyadh bombing. While intelligence
reports received subsequent to the Riyadh bombing were not
conclusive, they should have forced analysts to at least
reconsider their analyses, although the extent of the
appropriate ``hedge'' factor is difficult to quantify.
For the U.S. intelligence community and the military,
focusing on the Iraqi threat--a tactical necessity and
familiar focus--apparently has been coupled with a certain
complacency about developments within Saudi Arabia, and
perhaps in other Gulf states as well. The result has been to
leave commanders in the theater lacking a good understanding
of particular terrorist capabilities and threats against U.S.
forces. General Anderson said the Kingdom was ``considered
very benign'' with respect to the terrorist threat to U.S.
forces in the region, a belief that was open to question even
prior to the June 25 bombing. Certainly, events proved
General Anderson to be operating under a misapprehension.
Saudi Arabia is located in a violent quarter of the world,
where anti-American sentiments are strong and where Americans
have been frequent targets of terrorism. The Saudi monarchy
has made many enemies in the region. Within Saudi Arabia
itself, more than 630 people were killed in a series of
violent episodes in the city of Mecca between 1979 and 1989.
Press reports and scholarly articles about dissidents within
the Kingdom have been frequent in recent years.
General Anderson said that he has requested that USCENTCOM
assign a counterterrorist intelligence analyst to his staff
to fill what he perceived as an unfilled requirement. He said
the analyst would have two duties: to give him a better
understanding of developments inside Saudi Arabia and to give
him a ``sanity check'' on U.S. intelligence products. The
lack of in-house intelligence analysis capability likely
contributed to an unquestioning acceptance by the command of
formal threat assessments provided by the intelligence
community.
Recognizing the limits of intelligence
Intelligence support to U.S. forces conducting Operation
Southern Watch did not do an adequate job of understanding
and accommodating its own shortcomings. Despite collection
and analysis problems, few if any in the intelligence or
operational chain of command seem to have adopted a skeptical
attitude concerning the limits of intelligence assessments of
the potential threat to U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia.
The command could not know what it did not know, there was no
recognition of limits.
One area requiring further investigation is how the
limitations inherent with available threat intelligence were
explicitly recognized and presented to the operational
consumers as intelligence products worked their way into the
theater. For example, one senior U.S. intelligence official
interviewed said he would never have been so specific in
quantifying terrorist bomb-building capabilities. Yet
security officials at Khobar Towers considered a 250-pound
bomb, one roughly the size of the OPM-SANG bombing, to be a
fixed threat baseline. Based upon staff interviews, it is
evident that intelligence assessments that began as broad
ranges of possible terrorist threats evolved and were viewed
by those responsible for security at Khobar Towers as firm
conclusions.
As a result, officers such as General Schwalier or his
security subordinates did not have the appropriate
understanding and incentive to hedge against a degree of
uncertainty in the projected threat. While neither General
Schwalier nor his subordinates asserted that this hedging
would have made a decisive difference in the measures taken
within the time available prior to the bombing, they did say
it might have made a difference in the urgency associated
with U.S. discussions with the Saudis regarding security.
Acknowledgment of the limited nature of intelligence analysis
of the terrorist threat against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia
might well have increased the urgency with which
recommendations to push out the Khobar Towers perimeter fence
into adjacent civilian areas were pursued with the Saudis, or
even the decision to move out U.S. forces of Khobar Towers
altogether.
continuity of command in the 4404th fighter wing
Intelligence problems were exacerbated by a number of
organizational and operational factors which limited
the ability of JTF-SWA and its subordinate commands to
respond to new security challenges. While none were
sufficient to singularly account for the June 25 bombing,
there were pervasive deficiencies that in the aggregate
resulted in a serious problem. In the race to respond to
the increased threat following the Riyadh bombing, the
4404th Fighter Wing was handicapped by these shortcomings.
Organizational handicaps
The 4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional) is a unit facing
constant organizational turbulence. Average tour length is 90
days. According to General Schwalier, the command averages
between 200 and 300 new personnel every week, or about 10
percent of its total manpower. To keep up with the turnover,
General Schwalier conducts an orientation briefing for
incoming personnel each week.
This level of personnel turbulence affects the wing
leadership as well as the flight line. Prior to General
Schwalier's appointment one year ago, the wing commanders
also had short tours. As the thirteenth commander of the
4404th Fighter wing in four years, General Schwalier is the
first to serve a one-year tour. This concern was raised by
General Schwalier's predecessor in his end-of-tour report.
That report was provided to General Schwalier, who requested
approval of the extension of tour lengths for nine senior
members of the wing staff. Since the June 25 bombing, General
Schwalier had recommended that another nine positions be
approved for extended tours.
In addition, according to General Schwalier, the structure
of command is ``a bare bones operation.'' When the wing was
designed at the start of Operation Southern Watch, it was
intended only to carry out a temporary mission until Iraq
complied with UN resolutions and sanctions were lifted. Four
years later, and despite the continuing augmentation of the
unit following Operation Vigilant Warrior in 1994, the
mission is still formally a temporary one. The result is that
the command lacks many of the support staff and other
resources typical in a permanent wing structure. The wing's
skeletal structure oversees the operation of a wide variety
of aircraft, including F-15s, several
[[Page H10831]]
types of F-16s, A-10s, EF-111s, several types of C-130s, a
C21, AWACS planes, KC-10s and KC-135s, U-2 spy aircraft,
search and rescue helicopters, and has forward air
controllers riding in Army helicopters.
The wing is also widely dispersed geographically. Although
the contingent in Dhahran and housed at Khobar Towers is the
largest, at a total authorized strength of 2,525, other
substantial contingents operate out of Riyadh (1,221), Kuwait
(799, in four locations), and other facilities within Saudi
Arabia (441, in four locations). General Schwalier admitted
that he spent ``much time on the road'' visiting these
``remote sites,'' attempting to build teamwork among elements
of the command and provide the requisite command supervision.
The necessity for unit cohesion is important for a variety
of reasons. Beyond the constant rotations and dispersed
basing, the conduct of no-fly zone missions is an ongoing
problem for the Air Force as well as the other services. The
missions, despite the fact that they are conducted in
``harm's way,'' are widely considered by those who fly them
to be deleterious to pilot training and skills, and a
monotonous routine. No-fly zone duty also is a personal
hardship requiring frequent family separations, not merely
for pilots but for maintenance and other personnel. Yet many
in the wing had served a number of rotations on no-fly-zone
duty and the resulting need to retrain for basic combat
missions imposed a six- to nine-month burden on pilots and
units.
The impact of short tours
The overall result of short tours, a widely dispersed
command, and personnel turbulence is a command that lacks
much if any continuity or cohesion. While the professionalism
of individual members of the commend was apparent, the lack
of continuity among senior leaders was widely recognized by
those interviewed as a shortcoming. General Schwalier
remarked that it was a ``consuming'' leadership challenge--a
viewpoint that was echoed at every echelon of the command.
General Schwalier identified three primary problems that
stemmed from the lack of continuity. The first was an
inability to build a better relationship with the Saudis.
According to General Schwalier, ``You can't build that in two
weeks.'' For example, a common assessment within the wing
leadership is that, although security assistance on the part
of the Saudis had been improving prior to the June 25
bombing, accomplishing more difficult tasks such as expanding
the Khobar Towers security perimeter would take months. The
estimate of Colonel James Ward, commander of the Army-run
logistics operation designed to accommodate any surge of
forces into the theater, was that such a project would
require four to six months. Thus, when the initial
negotiations about such measures ran into Saudi resistance,
General Schwalier's assessment was that these were ``still a
possibility'' that he might be able to ``get to,'' but
improving security within the compound was a more immediate
concern.
A second problem was the difficulty of building
organizational and command stability within the wing. In
particular, implementing the recommendations of the periodic,
six-month vulnerability assessments conducted for the wing
appear to have fallen victim to this sort of organizational
and command instability. For example, the vulnerability
assessment returned from OSI to the wing in September 1995
had been completed the preceding July. Thus, ``by the time
the assessment appeared, the people (who had requested it)
were gone,'' said General Schwalier. When he discovered the
three-month lag, General Schwalier demanded that future
vulnerability assessments be completed and returned to the
command in a more timely fashion.
Colonel Boyle, the departing wing Support Group commander
who had overall responsibility for security measures, said
one of his biggest challenges was training his organization
to the specific requirements of the mission before personnel
rotated to other assignments. ``You never got beyond the
elementary'' level, he said. For example, guards manning
observation posts or other positions often worked only in
single locations or a small number of locations. Short tours
and the demands of the mission prevented them from acquiring
a broader understanding of the security operation or even
manning a substantial variety of posts.
The third problem stemmed from the other effects of working
within a 90-day rotation cycle. While the basic building
blocks of the wing--the fighter and other squadrons that
conducted the flying missions--might be kept relatively
intact, arriving and departing as a whole, higher echelon,
wing-level support activities were primarily conducted by ad
hoc organizations, with personnel arriving and departing
individually. Even senior leaders often would have no more
than 24 to 36 hours of overlap with their predecessors.
Difficulties of developing institutional knowledge on security matters
The lack of unit and leadership continuity made building
and retaining institutional knowledge difficult. After-action
reports or other similar documents were not immediately
available to all incoming commanders; apparently were not
centrally collected, controlled, or disseminated by the wing,
the Air Force, or USCENTCOM; and may not even have been
required. Available reports did not routinely include
``status-action'' assessments high-lighting problems to be
addressed. Nor typically were there pre-rotation
familiarization tours for incoming commanders, staff or
senior enlisted personnel within the wing. These particular
concerns were focused on the support functions of the wing.
The experience of Lieutenant Colonel Traister, the
commander of the wing's security squadron at the time of the
bombing, is indicative of the challenges senior leaders faced
as a result of the lack of continuity. By all accounts,
including those of his subordinates, Lieutenant Colonel
Traister has been a superb commander, but he was confronted
with many problems resulting from organizational instability.
Lieutenant Colonel Traister benefited from the fact that
his previous position was as part of the CENTAF staff. By
virtue of this position, he was able to determine who had
been his predecessors as commanders of the 4404th security
squadron, read their after-action reports (although he said
the records were incomplete and did not contain ``status-
action'' recommendations), and contact a number of them for
personal interviews and recommendations. He also was able to
determine who would be filling important positions that could
affect his own work, such as who his OSI counterpart would
be. By contacting his counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel
Traister was able to establish the beginning of what he saw
as an essential relationship between the two and the building
of teamwork with the special investigator with whom he would
work closely. However, prior to his arrival at Khobar Towers,
he could get access to only the July 1995 vulnerability
assessment, not the 1996 assessment done after the Riyadh
bombing. Yet even that, he said, was a step that his
predecessors typically had been unable to accomplish and was
made possible because of his previous assignment
responsibilities which permitted his access to the reports
and appropriate personnel.
Accordingly, when he arrived at Khobar Towers and received
from General Schwalier his security mission, Lieutenant
Colonel Traister enjoyed advantages his predecessors has not
and was more rapidly able to take measures to improve
security. He said that he spent between two and three weeks
evaluating the compound and the resources he had at his
disposal, a process that he said ``takes three to six
months'' under normal circumstances. At the same time, he
recognized a human intelligence shortfall, and that he
required ``an analyzed (intelligence) product'' that the
skeletal wing staff, the JTF-SWA staff, or even USCENTCOM
would not be able to give him. He also came to understand
that the shortage of Arab linguists in the wing--the entire
4404th has just one--would be a continuing problem for the
security squadron. Lieutenant Colonel Traister said that when
he was stationed in Japan, where the threat level was lower,
the security squadron had retained a linguist of its own and
made arrangements to acquire others in times of crisis.
Institutional shortcomings
General Schwalier also faced a number of institutional
shortcomings that affected the ability of the command to
accomplish longer-term tasks. Although many of these have no
direct bearing on security issues, several do. For example,
the 4404th operated without an established mid- or long-term
budgeting mechanism as is found in other wings. After three
or four months in command, General Schwalier began to focus
on the need to prepare a five-year budget plan. Despite the
fact that the wing had been operating on a temporary mission
basis since 1992, this was the first long-term budget plan
for the wing. Its expenses had previously been paid out of
contingency funds, which were accounted for in yearly, ad hoc
procedures with funds reprogrammed from other Department of
Defense programs. Under General Schwalier's plan, the first
year's budget, covering all aspects of the wing's operations,
totaled $27 million, with $3 million for construction. Though
these construction funds allowed for some repair of the
Khobar Towers facility, which had generally been neglected
and was in need of repair, about one-third was intended for
security improvements. The largest item was $700,000 for
``black-out'' curtains for every apartment and office. Lower
in priority were funds for Mylar covering for the Khobar
Towers windows to reduce the possibilities for fragmented
glass in the event the windows were shattered. As General
Schwalier's plan has not yet made its way through the annual
Air Force budgeting program, it is unclear what the
likelihood was that these recommended improvements--long-term
investments for what then was considered a ``temporary''
mission--would have been realized.
A number of institutional problems at higher echelons of
command also bear upon questions of security. The focus of
operations and intelligence at JTF-SWA was primarily on
conducting the Southern Watch no-fly-zone mission. According
to Major General Anderson, the Joint Task Force commander,
his intelligence staff was a relatively small, 65-person
operation whose focus was on the Iraqi order of battle
relevant to each day's air tasking order. General Anderson
currently has one officer assigned to force protection
issues, but estimates that he needs at least seven or eight
personnel to deal with force protection issues, given the
current threat level. He also said he lacks adequate
intelligence analysis capability for the purposes of
providing a
[[Page H10832]]
``sanity check'' on intelligence assessments provided by
theater and national intelligence organizations, and an
analyst is among the personnel he has requested. The need for
this analytical capability, or at least access to it, was
also expressed by others in the theater.
Also, General Anderson has been given the mission of
``force protection czar'' for the JTF-SWA area of operations,
though his authority is only for the purposes of coordination
rather than command, which is retained at USCENTCOM. General
Anderson did not receive this force protection coordination
authority until April 12, nearly six months after the Riyadh
bombing. According to Army Colonel Ward, for some time ``no
one (in Saudi Arabia) was in charge of force protection after
(the) OPM-SANG (bombing).'' And several elements of General
Anderson's authority as force protection czar took lower
echelons by surprise in that USCENTCOM changed or
contradicted recommendations worked out previously.
Contrasting service approaches to command continuity
It is unclear precisely what the proper tour lengths or
level of organizational or financial commitment to the
mission of the 4404th Fighter Wing should be, but it is clear
that the nature of the mission resulted in some
organizational requirements going unmet. While matching
military forces to missions is more an art than a science,
comparing the Air Force's execution of its mission in Saudi
Arabia with that of other services provides a useful
benchmark. For example, the Army units under Colonel Ward's
command have a much higher percentage of long-service
positions; roughly 10 percent of the 900 soldiers under his
command serve at least a one year tour. When senior
commanders and their staff rotate to the theater, they
typically undertake two extended familiarization tours, with
the first of these tours coming several months prior to
deployment. While many of these positions are associated with
the longer-term logistics effort for which there is no exact
Air Force parallel, others, particularly the Patriot missile
units, are more analogous to the no-fly zone mission. The
Patriot units--which are deployed with a higher-than-normal
manpower level--serve a 120-day tour, and the senior leaders
and staff all have at least one substantial familiarization
tour prior to deployment. Also, each unit has ready access to
the after-action reports of predecessor units. In part
because of its logistics mission, the Army has had a
traditional long-term budget process in place for its units
serving in Saudi Arabia for some time; Colonel Ward's next
budget includes $7 million for military construction
including a ``couple of million'' for security. Finally, his
staff includes two interpreters and his organization includes
a counter-intelligence team with an Arab linguist.
While the reasons for shorter tours have a degree of
validity in terms of lessening the strains of repeated no-
fly-zone tours, family separations, and loss of warfighting
skills, at a minimum senior positions within the wing demand
a greater degree of continuity than has been the case in
past. The fact that General Schwalier was the lone long-term
member of the wing--and that, in four years of operation, he
was the first commander to serve more than a very short
tour--is indicative of the reluctance and unwillingness of
political and military leaders to admit that the mission was
more than temporary and to bestow upon it the full complement
of resources, manpower, and capabilities.
The ``contingency'' nature of Operation Southern Watch
Confronting the fact that Operation Southern Watch is in
fact a long-term commitment and not a temporary contingency
missions poses a domestic political problem for the Saudis
and Americans, and an institutional problem for the Air
Force. The Saudis must face the fact that a continued U.S.
military presence will be necessary to maintain stability in
the region--an admission that raises sensitive domestic
political concerns for the Saudi ruling family. The United
States must similarly understand the nature of its commitment
and aggressively confront the risks such a mission entails,
including the continuing threat of terrorism. For the U.S.
Air Force, such an admission would call into question the
policy of constant personnel rotation, at least at the wing
leadership level.
Any belief that Iraq would quickly comply with the UN
provisions that resulted in the Southern Watch mission has
been misplaced, certainly since late 1994 when Iraqi forces
moved south to threaten Kuwait and the United States
responded with Operation Vigilant Warrior. And given the
statements by U.S. policymakers in the wake of the Riyadh and
Khobar Towers bombings about American determination to
maintain forces in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. military presence
in the Kingdom stands revealed for what it has always been: a
long-term commitment to security and stability in the Gulf.
The Saudis have also, in effect, made such an admission by
agreeing to bear many of the costs of relocating the 4404th
to Al Kharj, an airbase in a more remote location.
While the lack of leadership and organizational continuity
within the 4404th has had wide-ranging effects, it also
played a substantial role in problems confronting the wing's
security personnel in its efforts to react to terrorist
threats. Neither the wing or JTF-SWA level possessed the
intelligence analysis capability to evaluate what proved to
be seriously limited intelligence. There were no budgetary
procedures or processes for making long-term investments in
the Khobar Towers complex, even for security reasons. Only
through the efforts of General Schwalier and his senior staff
were improved security measures within the compound achieved
following the November 1995 Riyadh bombing. Achieving greater
security would have required expanding the perimeters of the
Khobar Tower complex or, as is now planned, a move out of the
facility altogether. These are measures whose quick
consideration and implementation transcend the day-to-day
influence of the 4404th or JTF-SWA, as the direct involvement
of the office of the Secretary of Defense in the recent
negotiations indicates.
immediate post-bombing reaction
In the immediate aftermath of the June 25 bombing, the
medical and other support systems and personnel of the 440th
Fighter Wing appear to have reacted with a high degree of
professionalism. Commanders and troops alike recounted
stories of individual heroism. Major Steven Goff, a flight
surgeon who was badly wounded in the attack, worked
methodically in the compound's clinic to treat more than 200
of his compatriots who were seriously injured. Prior to
receiving formal medical treatment, many of the wounded were
initially treated by the ``buddy care'' system, which also
appears to have worked as planned and insured that no one was
left alone. After the bombing, according to those
interviewed, guards rapidly but methodically went into every
building and checked out every room to ensure that no one was
trapped or unaccounted for.
The medical system also appears to have performed well, and
was blessed with abundant resources. At the clinic, three Air
Force physicians were assisted by an Army doctor and
additional personnel from coalition forces, including the
Saudis. Emergency supplies of blood and other necessary
materials were sufficient to treat more than 250 people.
Everyone who was brought to the clinic for medical treatment,
regardless of the severity of their injuries, lived; the only
fatalities on the evening of June 25 were 16 airmen in
Building 131 who likely died instantly from the initial
explosion, a communications specialist in Building 133 who
was killed when the glass door to his balcony shattered from
the force of the blast, and two other fatalities in Building
131 who might have survived had they been nearer to the
medical facility.
Since the bombing security at the Khobar Towers complex has
been increased significantly. An additional 44 security
personnel have deployed to Khobar Towers, and 44 more were
requested by Lieutenant Colonel Traister and are expected to
be deployed in the near future. The perimeter has been
extended beyond the public parking lot on the north end of
the compound, an additional 1,000 barriers have been erected,
and the number of observation posts has been increased. Saudi
security patrols have been increased outside the perimeter
and agreement with the Saudis to move to a more secure and
remote site has been reached. According to statements by
Defense Secretary Perry, the relocation will be conducted as
quickly as possible.
observations
The unpreparedness of U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia
for the magnitude of the terrorist bomb in Dhahran raises
significant questions about the adequacy of intelligence
support. While intelligence information was provided, it was
not of either the quality nor the quantity necessary to alert
commanders to the magnitude of the terrorist threat they
faced. The lack of on-the-ground intelligence collection and
analysis capabilities deserves priority attention and argues
for a greater commitment of resources.
Greater counter-terrorism intelligence analysis effort is
needed by U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia. The
intelligence staff working for the JTF-SWA commander is
small, focused on the Operation Southern Watch mission and
lacks adequate resources to function as an independent
``sanity check'' on the quality of intelligence received from
USCENTCOM or national intelligence agencies. The JTF
commander requires this analysis capability to function in
his capacity as the local ``force protection czar.''
Likewise, tactical fighter wings and other significant
elements of the JTF should have the capability for timely
access to this independent, in-theater analysis.
The uncertainties inherent in intelligence efforts against
terrorist groups and in friendly but closed societies such as
in Saudi Arabia needs to be adequately conveyed to military
commanders so they can assess intelligence information in the
proper context and retain an ability for independent
judgments about the threat they face. Commanders need to
better understand the limits of intelligence they receive and
be cognizant of a range of threats rather than fixate on a
``baseline'' or overly specific threat assessment.
Three-month troop rotations place unnecessary and
counterproductive strains on unit leaders and staffs. It is
difficult to establish leadership and unit continuity in
contingency operations, let alone to address issues where it
is essential to build relationships of trust with host
nations. Newly-deployed commanders, security chiefs, and
other force protection specialists should not have to relearn
the same lessons learned by their predecessors and work to
establish the same kinds of productive relationships with
their
[[Page H10833]]
Saudi counterparts. While short tours may make sense for
those on the flight line, senior leaders, staff and key
personnel should be deployed for sufficient period to develop
the expertise and experience necessary to ensure the safety
of their commands.
Short rotations reflected the pretense of a ``temporary''
mission. Despite the fact that Operation Southern Watch had
been ongoing since 1992 and the probability of Iraqi
compliance with UN resolutions was low, Saudi and American
leaders and the U.S. Air Force planned and operated based on
the presumption that Operation Southern Watch was only a
temporary mission. An appropriate and earlier recognition by
the civilian and military leadership (a recognition certainly
warranted by Operation Vigilant Warrier in 1994) that the
mission, for all practical purposes, was a ``permanent'' one
might have resulted in a higher degree of leadership and unit
continuity and minimized a number of organizational and
operational shortcomings. The Department of Defense needs to
review other ongoing operations to ensure that U.S. force
protection needs and U.S. security interests are not being
compromised by the limitations inherent in running quasi-
permanent operations under the politically-acceptable rubric
of ``temporary'' contingencies.
Appendix A
Office of the Attorney General,
Washington, DC, July 5, 1996.
Hon. William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Secretary: Media reports concerning the bombing of
the al-Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, purport to
disclose very detailed information pertinent to the ongoing
criminal investigation. Some of the reports appear to be
based on either public statements or leaks by U.S. Government
employees.
The investigation of a terrorist act directed at the United
States overseas is, by its nature, very difficult to conduct.
Public disclosures of details pertinent to the investigation
compound the difficulty and may compromise the prospects for
the eventual success of the investigative effort. In the
event of a U.S. prosecution, such disclosures present
significant litigation problems.
While the public interest in this investigation is
understandable, it is imperative that all federal employees
refrain from unauthorized public disclosures of information
pertinent to the investigation. Disclosures concerning the
events leading up to the bombing--including any prior
warnings or surveillance of the U.S. facility--as well as the
details of the bombing and the results of the investigation
should be limited to those made through authorized agency
channels. Authorized disclosures should be coordinated with
this Department prior to their release by contacting the
Department's Terrorism and Violent Crime Section at 202-514-
0849.
The al-Khobar bombing investigation involves the dedicated
and professional efforts of a large number of federal
personnel. It is imperative that the professionalism of this
effort not be compromised by unauthorized disclosures.
Sincerely,
Janet Reno.
Appendix B
list of individuals interviewed by the delegation
Major General Kurt B. Anderson, JTF/SWA/CC; Brigidier
General Terryl J. Schwalier, 4404WG(P)/CC; Brigidier General
Daniel M. Dick, BG Schwalier's Replacement; Colonel James R.
Ward, ARCENT; Colonel Gary S. Boyle, 4404 Spt Gp/CC;
Lieutenant Colonel James J. Traister, 4404 SPS/CC; Chief
Master Sargeant Jimmy D. Allen, 4404 SPS/CCE; Richard M.
Reddecliff, Office of Special Investigations; Staff Sargeant
Alfredo R. Guerrero, Security Patrol; Senior Airman Corey P.
Grice, Security Patrol; Airman First Class Christopher T.
Wagar, Security Patrol; Staff Sargeant Douglas W. Tucker,
Security Patrol; Lieutenant Colonel John E. Watkins, F-16
pilot; Major James D. Hedges, F-16 pilot; Captain Steven E.
Clapp, F-16 pilot; Captain John P. Montgomery, F-16 pilot;
Major Steven P. Goff, Flight Surgeon.
Appendix C
explanation of terrorist threat conditions
THREATCON NORMAL--Applies when a general threat of possible
terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine
security posture.
THREATCON ALPHA--Applies when there is a general threat of
possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities,
the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and
circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON
BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement
certain measures from higher THREATCONs resulting from
intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this
THREATCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
THREATCON BRAVO--Applies when an increased and more
predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measure
in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for
weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational
capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities.
THREATCON CHARLIE--Applies when an incident occurs or
intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist
action against personnel and facilities is imminent.
Implementation of this measure for more than a short period
probably creates hardship and affects the peacetime
activities of the unit and its personnel.
THREATCON DELTA--Implementation applies in the immediate
area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when
intelligence has been received that terrorist action against
a specific location or person is likely.
Source: Air Force Instruction 31-210, 1 July 1995.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Florida
[Mr. Scarborough] be permitted to control the remaining time on our
side.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from South Carolina?
There was no objection.
Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for his leadership on the
committee, the ranking member for his leadership on the committee, and
obviously the families of these brave young men that died over in Saudi
Arabia, as well as those in the Eglin community in northwest Florida
who saw 11 of the 19 of their bravest men not come back.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.
Saxton].
Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me. I would commend the gentleman for the leadership role he has
brought to bear in bringing this measure to the floor today, because I
think it is of very notable importance.
Mr. Speaker, let me say it is entirely appropriate that we should
make note of the event that occurred in Dhahran in June of this year.
It is, obviously, our intent to speak today to the families of the
people who were involved in that very disastrous event, so it is
appropriate and fitting that we make these remarks on behalf of the
people who were involved and who died on that date.
I think it is also appropriate, Mr. Speaker, that we note that while
we remember an event that occurred, and remember the families that were
affected by it, it is also important for us to look ahead. It is
important for us to understand this event in the context of the future,
and what it could mean to servicemen and servicewomen, their families,
and other civilians who travel outside the United States, and in some
events that could even occur here at home.
Mr. Speaker, those who have the objective of disrupting the American
presence around the world have found what many of us believe is a new
way to accomplish that. In the past, when people wanted to use force to
bring about change of one kind in one part of the world or another,
they would use what we refer to today as conventional force.
Since World War II, or the middle of World War II, the United States
has been the predominant nation or the predominant force in terms of
conventional power and our success at conventional warfare. I think the
many nations around the world have understood that today. They have
understood that they need to find another way to bring about the
changes that they seek. That was learned, I think, in the Middle East
by a number of Middle Eastern nations during the history of the State
of Israel, during the last 50 years or so, when war after war was won
by the Israelis.
{time} 1530
Other people who wanted to disrupt Israeli society and perhaps drive
Israel out of existence used a form of warfare today known as
international terrorism. That international terrorism, of course, still
goes on in the Middle East, and this event which occurred in June is
evidence of that.
In 1991, we decided that we did not like an event that was occurring
or about to occur in the Middle East. It happened to be the invasion by
Saddam Hussein of our friendly associate, Kuwait. And so once again we
demonstrated our capability to carry out a conventional act which
educated in some respects some countries in the Middle East as to our
ability to carry out a conventional defense of that country.
It is notable that since 1991, the acts of terror against American
personnel, both military and civilian, overseas
[[Page H10834]]
has increased. In 1995, there was a bombing in Riyadh where five
American servicepeople lost their lives, and, of course, this bombing
in Dharan is further evidence of the increase of terror against the
United States, against Westerners, and against people who are
considered to be, by them, unfriendly to certain countries in the
Middle East. And so it is important for us to note several things about
these events.
First, we have to note what they are not, or what we believe they are
not. They are not just random acts acting out against the West. They
are well planned, the perpetrators are well trained, they are well
financed, and in some cases, in many cases perhaps--perhaps in most
cases--we believe today they are sponsored by certain states in the
Middle East.
Countries on the suspect list, of course, are Iran, Sudan, Syria,
perhaps in some cases Iraq, some forces out of Turkey, not the Turkish
Government necessarily but some forces in Turkey, some forces in Saudi
Arabia, some forces in Egypt, and perhaps other countries, Libya in
North Africa.
These are well-planned, well-carried-out events which are intended to
accomplish a purpose. Usually that purpose is to drive out or disrupt
the American presence in certain quarters of the world. I think it is
important to understand these things in the context of the Dhahran
bombing and for us to take note as an institution as to what it is the
Americans face overseas.
Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his statement on terrorism
and helping explain to us a little bit more of why what happened,
happened.
My resolution today that I have placed before the House is meant to
honor heroes that were obviously victims of this terror. If is a modest
gesture to salute the 19 men who in life and who in death made their
country proud and, in doing so, gave their country an example of
service, dedication, and nobility for which all Americans should strive
and which we should not forget.
It was only a matter of months ago, on June 25, that an act of
terrorism was perpetrated against the men and women of our armed
services in Saudi Arabia. Those men and women had been called by their
country to a duty in a faraway place to help defend freedom in a land
that has known very little of it.
It was not an easy task to take on. The place our men and women in
uniform were defending is in many respects a forbidding place, a place
of strange customs, of harsh climate, and sometimes unfriendly and
unwel-
coming people. Obviously, it was far removed from family, friends, and
home that all of them knew.
Yet like the professionals that they are, they did their jobs, and in
doing so, they were making sure that we all could enjoy the blessings
of liberty. Then in one split second, the 19 brave young men were
killed.
Among them were A1c Joshua Woody, who was known to his buddies simply
as Woody and was the guy that everybody came to with their problems.
Then there was Capt. Christopher Adams. Captain Adams had barely
escaped another fatal terrorist attack 3 years earlier and had told a
relative of his that he was very fearful of being deployed in Saudi
Arabia. Yet he never hesitated to go when duty called.
Mr. Speaker, Captain Adams was due to be married on October 19. His
last words to his uncle, who is a minister, were, ``When I come back
from Saudi, I'll be sure to give you a call.'' Sadly, instead of
officiating at Mr. Adams' wedding, his uncle presided over his funeral.
Then there was Joseph Rimkus, a brave young man whose aunt is with us
today who has been fighting for the memory not only of her nephew but
for the other 18 young men who were killed over in Saudi Arabia.
These 3 young men and the 16 others who died with them were in many
respects ordinary men. However, these men were doing extraordinary
things. They even in death give us a great example of courage, duty,
honor, and nobility.
Mr. Speaker, I still remember vividly the television scenes of the
military compound, of wounded men and women being removed from the
wreckage, and later still I attended memorial services held at Eglin
Air Force Base in my district, a base where 11 of these 19 young men
came from. I remember the grieving widows and children.
I remember the terrible feeling I felt in the pit of my stomach when
the wife of one of these men who died came up to me and said, ``Please
don't let my husband be forgotten.'' As she handed me a small picture,
she said, ``Please don't let my husband be forgotten.''
As I have stated earlier, I know this is a modest gesture, I know
this does not bring those 19 young men back, but it is all we can do
today.
I also remember the young 10-year-old boy that had gone down to
Panama City to live with his father. And when his father was deployed
and did not come back, I remember going up to him that morning in the
memorial service and talking to him. And he was talking about things
that my 8-year-old boy talks about, the Atlanta Braves, about baseball,
about what school was going to be like in the fall, and it had not
really hit him at that time that his father was gone and that his
father was not coming back and would not be able to go with him to a
ball game, would not be able to share with him in a school play this
year, would not be able to see him grow up, go to college, and do all
the things that I pray to God that I will be able to do.
It was at that moment when I saw him break down at the memorial
service that it hit me, I guess more than it has ever hit me before,
exactly what type of sacrifice these men gave in Saudi Arabia when they
gave their life. It is a terrible price that they had to pay, but it is
a price that they were willing to pay.
It has been said that America is the last best hope of man on earth.
Ronald Reagan talked about that shining city on a hill. But we see in
the bombing both a blessing and the responsibility that such a role
entails.
American men and women are serving in the uniform of their country,
risking their lives in dangerous places all around the world to see to
it that this hope, that this shining city on the hill, never dies. It
is, quite literally, a sacred duty and a duty that, at the very least,
is worthy of our recognition and our honor.
Mr. Speaker, that is what I wanted to do today in a small way with
this resolution. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, the brave men who died
in Saudi Arabia have consecrated that place far above our poor power to
add or to detract. However, if we remember and honor their memories, I
believe that we will be able to carry on in some small way the work for
which they sacrificed their lives.
And may those who carry on take comfort in the thought that their 19
comrades are now safe in the arms of a loving God and that we have done
what I promised that wife we would do, that we have remembered her
husband and the other 18 who died tragically on June 25.
Mr. Speaker, in memory of those who have died and also those that go
on serving in carrying out the duties of freedom, I ask that my
colleagues support this resolution.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr.
Dornan].
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise with my full heart in this
resolution.
I had been over there to visit with these young men from this great
33d Fighter Wing down in northern Florida. One of their squadrons, the
58th, had accounted for more aerial victories in Desert Storm than any
other. They had gotten all the early victories. Because the 1st Fighter
Wing out of Virginia was to guard the oil fields, they went deep into
Iraq and never lost an aircraft.
The corporate memory problem is what I wanted to address today. I can
remember exactly where I was in Phoenix, AZ, when the bomb destroyed
our barracks in Beirut; 220 marines, 17 Army, and 4 Navy died in a
flash, and we always forget about those that are blinded or lose
fingers or an arm or a leg. The wounded toll was terrible.
But before that, in April 1983, a car bomb had gone off in front of
the American Embassy in Beirut, almost the exact number killed as this
19-death tragedy at the Khobar Barracks. Eighteen killed. And then
months later it happened again. I was in Jean Kirkpatrick's office at
the United Nations
[[Page H10835]]
when that bomb went off and tore the whole facade off our Embassy in
Beirut and killed two marines who were up front, in their position,
guarding the security of the Embassy and who comes in the front door,
who is barred entrance.
The bombings in London. I have a photograph back in the Cloakroom. I
would have brought it out, but it would just look brown to the gallery
or to the C-SPAN audience. It is of a car bomb set off in the financial
district of London. And that only one human being died is a miracle
when you look at this photograph: Skyscrapers and buildings going back
100, 200 years; roofs torn off; every single window for a quarter of a
mile on both sides of the street wiped out.
We know about these car bombs. Is it the bureaucracy in the House
that has no corporate memory? In the Senate? About 30 percent of us
were here when the 1983 bombings took place in Beirut killing so many
Americans and so many servicemen.
In the military, though, general officers were around during these
bombings. They do not have this rollover problem and this loss of
institutional memory.
I do not want to see people pay the price of having their careers
destroyed, some of them with combat missions in Southeast Asia or in
the gulf region of the Middle East, but we simply cannot forget the
past. The past is prolog to the future. Study the past, and implement
the security needed.
Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I have tried to listen diligently to all of the remarks
of my distinguished colleagues as they have marched into the well to
address themselves to House Concurrent Resolution 200.
First with respect to the general issue of terrorism, yes, Mr.
Speaker, it is here, it is real, it is alive, it is expanding, it is
evolving, and it will be a threat that America and the world will have
to deal with on an increasing basis as we move into the 21st century.
That is a matter that we must come to grips with and address in
significant terms. It will require the highest and the best in us. It
will require our best thinking, our best judgment and our best
thoughts.
{time} 1545
That is not the moment that we are in at this point. There will also
be recriminations about who did what and who was responsible. That also
is an integral part of the process. But that is not why we are here
today.
We are here today for a very simple, thoughtful, and compassionate
reason; not to politicize, not to demagogue, not to point fingers, but
simply to pause as human beings and to attempt to put our emotional
arms around people who have experienced great tragedy. First, 19 human
beings who paid the ultimate and supreme price of dying in a terrorist
tragedy, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.
Something we have not focused upon is the 200 people, many of whom
severely and significantly were injured, who also paid a very heavy
price. The families that my distinguished colleague from Florida spoke
about, the young child speaking in those kinds of real and powerful
human terms, bring the reality of the risk of serving abroad in
dangerous places as we carry out the foreign policy and national
security policy of this country. It comes to us all too real.
But I just want to rise, along with the distinguished gentleman from
Florida, the author of this concurrent resolution, and join with all of
my colleagues on the Committee on National Security, for we passed this
resolution unanimously, in acknowledging the personal sacrifices the 19
American military personnel to which I alluded earlier gave, killed,
and the more than 200 wounded, on June 25 of this year.
I know that I join with the rest of the country when I say to their
families and fellow service members that they can be assured that this
Nation will long remember their bravery and sacrifices that they have
made for their country.
So I am simply saying, Mr. Speaker, all of the other comments
notwithstanding what this resolution is about, is to ask this body to
pause for a moment, to embrace human life in a compassionate way, to
embrace the families of this country that have grieved and paid an
incredible price; people dying, and mothers and fathers crying, and
children not quite understanding what is going on.
So I urge all of my colleagues to come to the floor at the
appropriate point in these proceedings, to join with the gentleman from
the State of Florida, this gentleman, and all of my colleagues on the
House Committee on National Security, and unanimously pass this
resolution as some modest way of saying to people we feel, we
understand, we care, and we pay tribute.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman
from California for his kind words.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gunderson). The question is on the
motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] that
the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution,
House Concurrent Resolution 200, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor
thereof) the rules were suspended and the concurrent resolution, as
amended, was agreed to.
The title of the concurrent resolution was amended so as to read:
``Concurrent resolution honoring the victims of the June 25, 1996,
terrorist bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.''
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________