[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 128 (Tuesday, September 17, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10626-S10648]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




[[Page S10626]]



          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, at the outset of my comments, I asked 
unanimous consent that I might proceed on the 1997 intelligence 
authorization bill. I had not intended to comment on this subject when 
coming to the floor, but when I arrived here, I was advised that this 
issue is ripe for consideration, and I was asked by the staff if I 
would handle it in a leadership capacity, since I am the only Senator 
in the Chamber. I would like to proceed to do that at this point.
  From the script prepared by the staff, I now ask unanimous consent 
that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 
543, S. 1718, which is entitled the Intelligence authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1718) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1997 for intelligence and intelligence related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and for the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate 
consideration of the bill?
  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill 
which had been reported from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
with amendments, as follows:
  (The parts of the bill intended to be stricken are shown in boldface 
brackets and the parts of the bill intended to be inserted are shown in 
italic.)

                                S. 1718

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Postponement of applicability of sanctions laws to 
              intelligence activities.
Sec. 304. Post-employment restrictions.
Sec. 305. Executive branch oversight of budgets of elements of the 
              intelligence community.

               TITLE IV--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Sec. 401. Access to telephone records.

                      TITLE V--ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

Sec. 501. Short title.
Sec. 502. Prevention of economic espionage and protection of 
              proprietary economic information.

                   TITLE VI--COMBATTING PROLIFERATION

Sec. 601. Short title.

Subtitle A--Assessment of Organization and Structure of Government for 
                        Combatting Proliferation

Sec. 611. Establishment of commission.
Sec. 612. Duties of commission.
Sec. 613. Powers of commission.
Sec. 614. Commission personnel matters.
Sec. 615. Termination of commission.
Sec. 616. Definition.
Sec. 617. Authorization of appropriations.

                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

Sec. 621. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of 
              mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions.

        TITLE VII--RENEWAL AND REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
Sec. 703. Annual reports on intelligence.
Sec. 704. Transnational threats.
Sec. 705. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Sec. 706. National Intelligence Council.
Sec. 707. Enhancement of authority of Director of Central Intelligence 
              to manage budget, personnel, and activities of 
              intelligence community.
[Sec. 708. Reallocation of responsibilities of Director of Central 
              Intelligence and Secretary of Defense for intelligence 
              activities under National Foreign Intelligence Program.]
Sec. 708. Responsibilities of Secretary of Defense pertaining to the 
              National Foreign Intelligence Program.
Sec. 709. Improvement of intelligence collection.
Sec. 710. Improvement of analysis and production of intelligence.
Sec. 711. Improvement of administration of intelligence activities.
Sec. 712. Pay level of Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence.
Sec. 713. General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 714. Office of Congressional Affairs of [the Intelligence 
              Community.] the Director of Central Intelligence.
Sec. 715. Assistance for law enforcement agencies by intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 716. Appointment and evaluation of officials responsible for 
              intelligence-related activities.
[Sec. 717. Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service.]
Sec. [718.] 717. Requirements for submittal of budget information on 
              intelligence activities.
Sec. [719.] 718. Terms of service for members of Select Committee on 
              Intelligence of the Senate.
Sec. [720.] 719. Report on intelligence community policy on protecting 
              the national information infrastructure against strategic 
              attacks.

            TITLE VIII--NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY

[Sec. 801. Establishment.
[Sec. 802. Effective date.]
Sec. 801. National mission and collection tasking authority for the 
              National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 1997 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (12) The Central Imagery Office.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1997, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ____ 
     of the One Hundred Fourth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     1997 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by 
     this section.

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorizations of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of 
     the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1997 the 
     sum of $95,526,000. Within such amounts authorized, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and 
     Development Committee and the Environmental Task Force shall 
     remain available until September 30, 1998.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The staff of the 
     Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence is authorized 265 full-time personnel as of 
     September 30, 1997. Such personnel of the Community 
     Management Staff may be permanent employees of the Community 
     Management Staff or personnel detailed from

[[Page S10627]]

     other elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Reimbursement.--During fiscal year 1997, any officer or 
     employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces 
     who is detailed to the staff of the Community Management 
     Account from another element of the United States Government 
     shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any 
     such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a non-
     reimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the 
     performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 1997 the sum of $184,200,000.
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. POSTPONEMENT OF APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO 
                   INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     441d) is amended by striking ``the date which is one year 
     after the date of the enactment of this title'' and inserting 
     ``January 6, 1998''.

     SEC. 304. POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall prescribe regulations requiring each new and current 
     employee of the Central Intelligence Agency to sign a written 
     agreement restricting the activities of that employee upon 
     ceasing employment with the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (b) Agreement Elements.--The regulations shall provide that 
     an agreement contain provisions specifying that the employee 
     concerned not represent or advise the government, or any 
     political party, of a foreign country during the five-year 
     period beginning on the termination of the employee's 
     employment with the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (c) Disciplinary Actions.--The regulations shall specify 
     appropriate disciplinary actions (including loss of 
     retirement benefits) to be taken against any employee 
     determined by the Director of Central Intelligence to have 
     violated the agreement of the employee under this section.

     SEC. 305. EXECUTIVE BRANCH OVERSIGHT OF BUDGETS OF ELEMENTS 
                   OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report setting forth 
     the actions that have been taken to ensure adequate oversight 
     by the executive branch of the budget of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office and the budgets of other elements of 
     the intelligence community within the Department of Defense.
       (b) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall--
       (1) describe the extent to which the elements of the 
     intelligence community carrying out programs and activities 
     in the National Foreign Intelligence Program are subject to 
     requirements imposed on other elements and components of the 
     Department of Defense under the Chief Financial Officers Act 
     of 1990 (Public Law 101-576), and the amendments made by that 
     Act, and the Federal Financial Management Act of 1994 (title 
     IV of Public Law 103-356), and the amendments made by that 
     Act;
       (2) describe the extent to which such elements submit to 
     the Office of Management and Budget budget justification 
     materials and execution reports similar to the budget 
     justification materials and execution reports submitted to 
     the Office of Management and Budget by the non-intelligence 
     components of the Department of Defense;
       (3) describe the extent to which the National 
     Reconnaissance Office submits to the Office of Management and 
     Budget, the Community Management Staff, and the Office of the 
     Secretary of Defense--
       (A) complete information on the cost, schedule, 
     performance, and requirements for any new major acquisition 
     before initiating the acquisition;
       (B) yearly reports (including baseline cost and schedule 
     information) on major acquisitions;
       (C) planned and actual expenditures in connection with 
     major acquisitions; and
       (D) variances from any cost baselines for major 
     acquisitions (including explanations of such variances); and
       (4) assess the extent to which the National Reconnaissance 
     Office has submitted to Office of Management and Budget, the 
     Community Management Staff, and the Office of the Secretary 
     of Defense on a monthly basis a detailed budget execution 
     report similar to the budget execution report prepared for 
     Department of Defense programs.
       (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
       (1) The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' 
     shall mean the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) The term ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' has 
     the meaning given such term in section 3(6) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)).
               TITLE IV--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

     SEC. 401. ACCESS TO TELEPHONE RECORDS.

       (a) Access for Counterintelligence Purposes.--Section 
     2709(b)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting ``local and long distance'' before ``toll billing 
     records''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 2703(c)(1)(C) of such 
     title is amended by inserting ``local and long distance'' 
     after ``address,''.
       (c) Civil Remedy.--Section 2707 of such title is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``customer'' and 
     inserting ``other person'';
       (2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following: 
     ``If the violation is willful or intentional, the court may 
     assess punitive damages. In the case of a successful action 
     to enforce liability under this section, the court may assess 
     the costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney 
     fees determined by the court.'';
       (3) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections 
     (e) and (f), respectively; and
       (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection (d):
       ``(d) Disciplinary Actions for Violations.--If a court 
     determines that any agency or department of the United States 
     has violated this chapter and the court finds that the 
     circumstances surrounding the violation raise the question 
     whether or not an officer or employee of the agency or 
     department acted willfully or intentionally with respect to 
     the violation, the agency or department concerned shall 
     promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether or not 
     disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or 
     employee.''.
                      TITLE V--ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

     SEC. 501. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Economic Espionage Act of 
     1996''.

     SEC. 502. PREVENTION OF ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND PROTECTION OF 
                   PROPRIETARY ECONOMIC INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after chapter 27 the following new 
     chapter:

                    ``CHAPTER 28--ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

``Sec.
``571. Definitions.
``572. Economic espionage.
``573. Criminal forfeiture.
``574. Import and export sanctions.
``575. Scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
``576. Construction with other laws.
``577. Preservation of confidentiality.
``578. Law enforcement and intelligence activities.

     ``Sec. 571. Definitions

       ``For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions 
     shall apply:
       ``(1) Foreign agent.--The term `foreign agent' means any 
     officer, employee, proxy, servant, delegate, or 
     representative of a foreign nation or government.
       ``(2) Foreign instrumentality.--The term `foreign 
     instrumentality' means any agency, bureau, ministry, 
     component, institution, association, or any legal, 
     commercial, or business organization, corporation, firm, or 
     entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, 
     commanded, managed, or dominated by a foreign government or 
     any political subdivision, instrumentality, or other 
     authority thereof.
       ``(3) Owner.--The term `owner' means the person or persons 
     in whom, or the United States Government component, 
     department, or agency in which, rightful legal, beneficial, 
     or equitable title to, or license in, proprietary economic 
     information is reposed.
       ``(4) Proprietary economic information.--The term 
     `proprietary economic information' means all forms and types 
     of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or 
     engineering information (including data, plans, tools, 
     mechanisms, compounds, formulas, designs, prototypes, 
     processes, procedures, programs, codes, or commercial 
     strategies, whether tangible or intangible, and whether 
     stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, 
     graphically, photographically, or in writing), if--
       ``(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to 
     keep such information confidential; and
       ``(B) the information derives independent economic value, 
     actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and 
     not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the 
     public.
       ``(5) United states person.--The term `United States 
     person' means--
       ``(A) in the case of a natural person, a citizen of the 
     United States or a permanent resident alien of the United 
     States; and
       ``(B) in the case of an organization (as that term is 
     defined in section 18 of this title), an entity substantially 
     owned or controlled by citizens of the United States or 
     permanent resident aliens of the United States, or 
     incorporated in the United States.

[[Page S10628]]

     ``Sec. 572. Economic espionage

       ``(a) In General.--Any person who, with knowledge or reason 
     to believe that he or she is acting on behalf of, or with the 
     intent to benefit, any foreign nation, government, 
     instrumentality, or agent, knowingly--
       ``(1) steals, wrongfully appropriates, takes, carries away, 
     or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains 
     proprietary economic information;
       ``(2) wrongfully copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, 
     photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, 
     photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, 
     communicates, or conveys proprietary economic information;
       ``(3) being entrusted with, or having lawful possession or 
     control of, or access to, proprietary economic information, 
     wrongfully copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, 
     downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, 
     replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, 
     or conveys the same;
       ``(4) receives, buys, or possesses proprietary economic 
     information, knowing the same to have been stolen or 
     wrongfully appropriated, obtained, or converted;
       ``(5) attempts to commit any offense described in any of 
     paragraphs (1) through (4);
       ``(6) wrongfully solicits another to commit any offense 
     described in any of paragraphs (1) through (4); or
       ``(7) conspires with one or more other persons to commit 
     any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (4), 
     and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the 
     object of the conspiracy,

     shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined not 
     more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or 
     both.
       ``(b) Organizations.--Any organization that commits any 
     offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more 
     than $10,000,000.
       ``(c) Exception.--It shall not be a violation of this 
     section to disclose proprietary economic information in the 
     case of--
       ``(1) appropriate disclosures to Congress; or
       ``(2) disclosures to an authorized official of an executive 
     agency that are deemed essential to reporting a violation of 
     United States law.

     ``Sec. 573. Criminal forfeiture

       ``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of State 
     law to the contrary, any person convicted of a violation 
     under this chapter shall forfeit to the United States--
       ``(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any 
     proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the 
     result of such violation; and
       ``(2) any of the property of that person used, or intended 
     to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate 
     the commission of such violation.
       ``(b) Court Action.--The court, in imposing sentence on 
     such person, shall order, in addition to any other sentence 
     imposed pursuant to this chapter, that the person forfeit to 
     the United States all property described in this section.
       ``(c) Applicability of Other Law.--Property subject to 
     forfeiture under this section, any seizure and disposition 
     thereof, and any administrative or judicial proceeding in 
     relation thereto, shall be governed by the provisions of 
     section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
     Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection 
     (d) of that section.

     ``Sec. 574. Import and export sanctions

       ``(a) Action by the President.--The President may, to the 
     extent consistent with international agreements to which the 
     United States is a party, prohibit, for a period of not 
     longer than 5 years, the importation into, or exportation 
     from, the United States, whether by carriage of tangible 
     items or by transmission, any merchandise produced, made, 
     assembled, or manufactured by a person convicted of any 
     offense described in section 572 of this title, or in the 
     case of an organization convicted of any offense described in 
     such section, its successor entity or entities.
       ``(b) Action by the Secretary of the Treasury.--
       ``(1) Civil penalty.--The Secretary of the Treasury may 
     impose on any person who knowingly violates any order of the 
     President issued under the authority of this section, a civil 
     penalty equal to not more than 5 times the value of the 
     exports or imports involved, or $100,000, whichever is 
     greater.
       ``(2) Seizure and forfeiture.--Any merchandise imported or 
     exported in violation of an order of the President issued 
     under this section shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture 
     in accordance with sections 602 through 619 of the Tariff Act 
     of 1930.
       ``(3) Applicability of other provisions.--The provisions of 
     law relating to seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and 
     condemnation of property for violation of the United States 
     customs laws, the disposition of such property or the 
     proceeds from the sale thereof, the remission or mitigation 
     of such forfeiture, and the compromise of claims, shall apply 
     to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been 
     incurred under this section to the extent that they are 
     applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
     chapter.

     ``Sec. 575. Scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction

       ``This chapter applies--
       ``(1) to conduct occurring within the United States; and
       ``(2) to conduct occurring outside the United States if--
       ``(A) the offender is a United States person; or
       ``(B) the act in furtherance of the offense was committed 
     in the United States.

     ``Sec. 576. Construction with other laws

       ``This chapter shall not be construed to preempt or 
     displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, 
     provided by Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or 
     territorial laws that are applicable to the misappropriation 
     of proprietary economic information.

     ``Sec. 577. Preservation of confidentiality

       ``In any prosecution or other proceeding under this 
     chapter, the court shall enter such orders and take such 
     other action as may be necessary and appropriate to preserve 
     the confidentiality of proprietary economic information, 
     consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of 
     Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
     Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws. An 
     interlocutory appeal by the United States shall lie from a 
     decision or order of a district court authorizing or 
     directing the disclosure of proprietary economic information.

     ``Sec. 578. Law enforcement and intelligence activities

       ``This chapter does not prohibit, and shall not impair, any 
     lawful activity conducted by a law enforcement or regulatory 
     agency of the United States, a State, or a political 
     subdivision of a State, or an intelligence agency of the 
     United States.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of chapters at the 
     beginning of part I of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 27 
     the following new item:

``28. Economic espionage.....................................571''.....

       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 2516(1)(a) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended by inserting ``chapter 28 
     (relating to economic espionage),'' after ``or under the 
     following chapters of this title:''.
                   TITLE VI--COMBATTING PROLIFERATION

     SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Combatting Proliferation 
     of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996''.
Subtitle A--Assessment of Organization and Structure of Government for 
                        Combatting Proliferation

     SEC. 611. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be 
     known as the Commission to Assess the Organization of the 
     Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of 
     Mass Destruction (in this subtitle referred to as the 
     ``Commission'').
       (b) Membership.--The Commission shall be composed of eight 
     members of whom--
       (1) four shall be appointed by the President;
       (2) one shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of the 
     Senate;
       (3) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the 
     Senate;
       (4) one shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (5) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (c) Qualifications of Members.--(1) To the maximum extent 
     practicable, the individuals appointed as members of the 
     Commission shall be individuals who are nationally recognized 
     for expertise regarding--
       (A) the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
       (B) the efficient and effective implementation of United 
     States nonproliferation policy; or
       (C) the implementation, funding, or oversight of the 
     national security policies of the United States.
       (2) An official who appoints members of the Commission may 
     not appoint an individual as a member if, in the judgment of 
     the official, the individual possesses any personal or 
     financial interest in the discharge of any of the duties of 
     the Commission.
       (d) Period of Appointment; Vacancies.--Members shall be 
     appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in the 
     Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled 
     in the same manner as the original appointment.
       (e)  Initial Meeting.--No later than 30 days after the date 
     on which all members of the Commission have been appointed, 
     the Commission shall hold its first meeting.
       (f) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the Commission 
     shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may 
     hold hearings.
       (g) Chairman and Vice Chairman.--The Commission shall 
     select a Chairman and Vice Chairman from among its members.
       (h) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet at the call of the 
     Chairman.

     SEC. 612. DUTIES OF COMMISSION.

       (a) Study.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall carry out a thorough 
     study of the organization of the Federal Government, 
     including the elements of the intelligence community, with 
     respect to combatting the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       (2) Specific requirements.--In carrying out the study, the 
     Commission shall--
       (A) assess the current structure and organization of the 
     departments and agencies of the Federal Government having 
     responsibilities for combatting the proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction; and
       (B) assess the effectiveness of United States cooperation 
     with foreign governments

[[Page S10629]]

     with respect to nonproliferation activities, including 
     cooperation--
       (i) between elements of the intelligence community and 
     elements of the intelligence-gathering services of foreign 
     governments;
       (ii) between other departments and agencies of the Federal 
     Government and the counterparts to such departments and 
     agencies in foreign governments; and
       (iii) between the Federal Government and international 
     organizations.
       (3) Assessments.--In making the assessments under paragraph 
     (2), the Commission should address--
       (A) the organization of the export control activities 
     (including licensing and enforcement activities) of the 
     Federal Government relating to the proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction;
       (B) arrangements for coordinating the funding of United 
     States nonproliferation activities;
       (C) existing arrangements governing the flow of information 
     among departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
     responsible for nonproliferation activities;
       (D) the effectiveness of the organization and function of 
     interagency groups in ensuring implementation of United 
     States treaty obligations, laws, and policies with respect to 
     nonproliferation;
       (E) the administration of sanctions for purposes of 
     nonproliferation, including the measures taken by departments 
     and agencies of the Federal Government to implement, assess, 
     and enhance the effectiveness of such sanctions;
       (F) the organization, management, and oversight of United 
     States counterproliferation activities;
       (G) the recruitment, training, morale, expertise, 
     retention, and advancement of Federal Government personnel 
     responsible for the nonproliferation functions of the Federal 
     Government, including any problems in such activities;
       (H) the role in United States nonproliferation activities 
     of the National Security Council, the Office of Management 
     and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and 
     other offices in the Executive Office of the President having 
     responsibilities for such activities;
       (I) the organization of the activities of the Federal 
     Government to verify government-to-government assurances and 
     commitments with respect to nonproliferation, including 
     assurances regarding the future use of commodities exported 
     from the United States; and
       (J) the costs and benefits to the United States of 
     increased centralization and of decreased centralization in 
     the administration of the nonproliferation activities of the 
     Federal Government.
       (b) Recommendations.--In conducting the study, the 
     Commission shall develop recommendations on means of 
     improving the effectiveness of the organization of the 
     departments and agencies of the Federal Government in meeting 
     the national security interests of the United States with 
     respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
     Such recommendations shall include specific recommendations 
     to eliminate duplications of effort, and other 
     inefficiencies, in and among such departments and agencies.
       (c) Report.--(1) Not later than 18 months after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to 
     Congress a report containing a detailed statement of the 
     findings and conclusions of the Commission, together with its 
     recommendations for such legislation and administrative 
     actions as it considers appropriate.
       (2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may include a classified annex.

     SEC. 613. POWERS OF COMMISSION.

       (a) Hearings.--The Commission may hold such hearings, sit 
     and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and 
     receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable 
     to carry out the purposes of this subtitle.
       (b) Information From Federal Agencies.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission may secure directly from 
     any Federal department or agency such information as the 
     Commission considers necessary to carry out the provisions of 
     this subtitle. Upon request of the Chairman of the 
     Commission, the head of such department or agency shall 
     furnish such information to the Commission.
       (2) Classified information.--A department or agency may 
     furnish the Commission classified information under this 
     subsection. The Commission shall take appropriate actions to 
     safeguard classified information furnished to the Commission 
     under this paragraph.
       (c) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United 
     States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions 
     as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
       (d) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of 
     gifts or donations of services or property.

     SEC. 614. COMMISSION PERSONNEL MATTERS.

       (a) Compensation of Members.--Each member of the Commission 
     who is not an officer or employee of the Federal Government 
     shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent 
     of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of 
     the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United 
     States Code, for each day (including travel time) during 
     which such member is engaged in the performance of the duties 
     of the Commission. All members of the Commission who are 
     officers or employees of the United States shall serve 
     without compensation in addition to that received for their 
     services as officers or employees of the United States.
       (b) Travel Expenses.--The members of the Commission shall 
     be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
     subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies 
     under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States 
     Code, while away from their homes or regular places of 
     business in the performance of services for the Commission.
       (c) Staff.--
       (1) In general.--The Chairman of the Commission may, 
     without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, 
     appoint and terminate an executive director and such other 
     additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the 
     Commission to perform its duties. The employment of an 
     executive director shall be subject to confirmation by the 
     Commission.
       (2) Compensation.--The Chairman of the Commission may fix 
     the compensation of the executive director and other 
     personnel without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and 
     subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, 
     relating to classification of positions and General Schedule 
     pay rates, except that the rate of pay for the executive 
     director and other personnel may not exceed the rate payable 
     for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of 
     such title.
       (d) Detail of Government Employees.--Any Federal Government 
     employee may be detailed to the Commission without 
     reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption 
     or loss of civil service status or privilege.
       (e) Procurement of Temporary and Intermittent Services.--
     The Chairman of the Commission may procure temporary and 
     intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, 
     United States Code, at rates for individuals which do not 
     exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay 
     prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under 
     section 5316 of such title.

     SEC. 615. TERMINATION OF COMMISSION.

       The Commission shall terminate 60 days after the date on 
     which the Commission submits its report under section 612(c).

     SEC. 616. DEFINITION.

       For purposes of this subtitle, the term ``intelligence 
     community'' shall have the meaning given such term in section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a(4)).

     SEC. 617. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     for the Commission for fiscal year 1997 such sums as may be 
     necessary for the Commission to carry out its duties under 
     this subtitle.
       (b) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the 
     authorization of appropriations in subsection (a) shall 
     remain available for expenditure until the termination of the 
     Commission under section 615.
                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

     SEC. 621. REPORTS ON ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO 
                   WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED 
                   CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS.

       (a) Reports.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a 
     report on--
       (1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the 
     preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful 
     for the development or production of weapons of mass 
     destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and 
     biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
       (2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such 
     countries.
       (b) Form of Reports.--The reports submitted under 
     subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may include a classified annex.
        TITLE VII--RENEWAL AND REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Intelligence Activities 
     Renewal and Reform Act of 1996''.

     SEC. 702. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     402) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (j); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new 
     subsection (h):
       ``(h)(1) There is established within the National Security 
     Council a committee to be known as the `Committee on Foreign 
     Intelligence'.
       ``(2) The Committee shall be composed of the following:
       ``(A) The Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(B) The Secretary of State.
       ``(C) The Secretary of Defense.
       ``(D) The Assistant to the President for National Security 
     Affairs, who shall serve as the chairperson of the Committee.
       ``(E) Such other members as the President may designate.
       ``(3) The function of the Committee shall be to assist the 
     Council in its activities by--
       ``(A) identifying the intelligence required to address the 
     national security interests of the United States as specified 
     by the President;
       ``(B) establishing priorities (including funding 
     priorities) among the programs, projects, and activities that 
     address such interests and requirements; and

[[Page S10630]]

       ``(C) establishing policies relating to the conduct of 
     intelligence activities of the United States, including 
     appropriate roles and missions for the elements of the 
     intelligence community and appropriate targets of 
     intelligence collection activities.
       ``(4) In carrying out its function, the Committee shall--
       ``(A) conduct an annual review of the national security 
     interests of the United States;
       ``(B) identify on an annual basis, and at such other times 
     as the Council may require, the intelligence required to meet 
     such interests and establish an order of priority for the 
     collection and analysis of such intelligence; and
       ``(C) conduct an annual review of the elements of the 
     intelligence community in order to determine the success of 
     such elements in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating the 
     intelligence identified under subparagraph (B).
       ``(5) The Committee shall submit each year to the Council 
     and to the Director of Central Intelligence a comprehensive 
     report on its activities during the preceding year, including 
     its activities under paragraphs (3) and (4).''.

     SEC. 703. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) In General.--Section 109 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is amended by striking out 
     subsections (a) and (b) and inserting in lieu thereof the 
     following new subsections:
       ``Sec. 109. (a) In General.--(1) Not later than January 31 
     each year, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on the requirements of the 
     United States for intelligence and the activities of the 
     intelligence community.
       ``(2) The purpose of the report is to facilitate an 
     assessment of the activities of the intelligence community 
     during the preceding fiscal year and to assist in the 
     development of a mission and a budget for the intelligence 
     community for the fiscal year beginning in the year in which 
     the report is submitted.
       ``(3) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
     but may include a classified annex.
       ``(b) Matters Covered.--(1) Each report under subsection 
     (a) shall--
       ``(A) specify the intelligence required to meet the 
     national security interests of the United States, and set 
     forth an order of priority for the collection and analysis of 
     intelligence required to meet such interests, for the fiscal 
     year beginning in the year in which the report is submitted; 
     and
       ``(B) evaluate the performance of the intelligence 
     community in collecting and analyzing intelligence required 
     to meet such interests during the fiscal year ending in the 
     year preceding the year in which the report is submitted, 
     including a description of the significant successes and 
     significant failures of the intelligence community in such 
     collection and analysis during that fiscal year.
       ``(2) The report shall specify matters under paragraph 
     (1)(A) in sufficient detail to assist Congress in making 
     decisions with respect to the allocation of resources for the 
     matters specified.
       ``(c) Definition.--In this section, the term `appropriate 
     congressional committees' means the following:
       ``(1) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee 
     on Appropriations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate.
       ``(2) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
     Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on National 
     Security of the House of Representatives.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The section heading of such 
     section is amended to read as follows:


                   ``annual report on intelligence''.

       (2) The table of contents in the first section of that Act 
     is amended by striking the item relating to section 109 and 
     inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 109. Annual report on intelligence.''.

     SEC. 704. TRANSNATIONAL THREATS.

       Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     402) is amended by inserting after subsection (h), as amended 
     by section 702 of this Act, the following new subsection:
       ``(i)(1) There is established within the National Security 
     Council a committee to be known as the `Committee on 
     Transnational Threats'.
       ``(2) The Committee shall include the following members:
       ``(A) The Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(B) The Secretary of State.
       ``(C) The Secretary of Defense.
       ``(D) The Attorney General.
       ``(E) The Assistant to the President for National Security 
     Affairs, who shall serve as the chairperson of the Committee.
       ``(F) Such other members as the President may designate.
       ``(3) The function of the Committee shall be to coordinate 
     and direct the activities of the United States Government 
     relating to combatting transnational threats.
       ``(4) In carrying out its function, the Committee shall--
       ``(A) identify transnational threats;
       ``(B) develop strategies to enable the United States 
     Government to respond to transnational threats identified 
     under subparagraph (A);
       ``(C) monitor implementation of such strategies;
       ``(D) make recommendations as to appropriate responses to 
     specific transnational threats;
       ``(E) assist in the resolution of operational and policy 
     differences among Federal departments and agencies in their 
     responses to transnational threats;
       ``(F) develop policies and procedures to ensure the 
     effective sharing of information about transnational threats 
     among Federal departments and agencies, including law 
     enforcement agencies and the elements of the intelligence 
     community; and
       ``(G) develop guidelines to enhance and improve the 
     coordination of activities of Federal law enforcement 
     agencies and elements of the intelligence community outside 
     the United States with respect to transnational threats.
       ``(5) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
     `transnational threat' means the following:
       ``(A) Any transnational activity (including international 
     terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such 
     weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the national 
     security of the United States.
       ``(B) Any individual or group that engages in an activity 
     referred to in subparagraph (A).''.

     SEC. 705. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) In General.--Title I of The National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 102 (50 U.S.C. 403)--
       (A) by striking the section heading and all that follows 
     through paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and inserting the 
     following:


            ``office of the director of central intelligence

       ``Sec. 102.'';
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (2) of subsection (a) as 
     subsection (a) and in such subsection (a), as so 
     redesignated, by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and 
     (C) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and
       (C) by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following:
       ``(d)(1) There is an Office of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence. The function of the Office is to assist the 
     Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out the duties 
     and responsibilities of the Director under this Act and to 
     carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by law.
       ``(2) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence is 
     composed of the following:
       ``(A) The Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(B) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(C) The National Intelligence Council.
       ``(D) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Collection.
       ``(E) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Analysis and Production.
       ``(F) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Administration.
       ``(G) Such other offices and officials as may be 
     established by law or the Director of Central Intelligence 
     may establish or designate in the Office.
       ``(3) To assist the Director in fulfilling the 
     responsibilities of the Director as head of the intelligence 
     community, the Director shall employ and utilize in the 
     Office of the Director of Central Intelligence a professional 
     staff having an expertise in matters relating to such 
     responsibilities and may establish permanent positions and 
     appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff.''; and
       (2) by inserting after section 102, as so amended, the 
     following new section:


                     ``central intelligence agency

       ``Sec. 102A. There is a Central Intelligence Agency. The 
     function of the Agency shall be to assist the Director of 
     Central Intelligence in carrying out the 
     responsibilities referred to in paragraphs (1) through (4) 
     of section 103(d) of this Act.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by striking the item relating 
     to section 102 and inserting the following new items:

``Sec. 102. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
``Sec. 102A. Central Intelligence Agency.''.

     SEC. 706. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.

       Section 103(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(B), by inserting ``, or as contractors 
     of the Council or employees of such contractors,'' after ``on 
     the Council'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs 
     (5) and (6), respectively;
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
     paragraph (4):
       ``(4) Subject to the direction and control of the Director 
     of Central Intelligence, the Center may carry out its 
     responsibilities under this subsection by contract, including 
     contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the 
     Center with particular assessments under this subsection.''; 
     and
       (4) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by adding at the 
     end the following: ``The Center shall also be readily 
     accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate 
     individuals not otherwise associated with the intelligence 
     community.''.

     SEC. 707. ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE TO MANAGE BUDGET, PERSONNEL, AND 
                   ACTIVITIES OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Section 103(c) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is amended--
       (1) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following 
     new paragraph (1):
       ``(1) facilitate the development of an annual budget for 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     United States by--

[[Page S10631]]

       ``(A) developing and presenting to the President an annual 
     budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program; and
       [``(B) concurring in the development by the Secretary of 
     Defense of the annual budget for the Joint Military 
     Intelligence Program; and
       [``(C) consulting with the Secretary of Defense in the 
     development of the annual budget for the Tactical 
     Intelligence and Related Activities program;'';]
       ``(B) participating in the development by the Secretary of 
     Defense of the annual budgets for the Joint Military 
     Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and 
     Related Activities Program;'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (6) as 
     paragraphs (4) through (7), respectively; and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
     paragraph (3):
       [``(3) manage the national collection activities of the 
     intelligence community in order to ensure that such 
     activities, and the intelligence collected through such 
     activities, meet the national security requirements of the 
     United States;''.]
       ``(3) approve collection requirements, determine collection 
     priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities 
     levied on national collection assets, except as otherwise 
     agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the 
     direction of the President;''.
       [(b) Use of Funds.--
       [(1) Reprogramming.--Subsection (c) of such section is 
     amended by inserting ``or under the Joint Military 
     Intelligence Program'' after ``the National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program''.
       [(2) Transfers.--Subsection (d)(2)(E) of such section is 
     amended by striking ``does not object to'' and inserting ``is 
     consulted by the Director before''.
       [(3) Direction of expenditures.--Such section is further 
     amended--
       [(A) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), and (g) as 
     subsections (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and
       [(B) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection (e):
       [``(e) Use of Funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall, with the approval of the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget and subject to applicable provisions of 
     law (including provisions of authorization Acts and 
     appropriations Acts), direct and oversee the allocation, 
     allotment, obligation, and expenditure of funds appropriated 
     or otherwise made available for the national intelligence 
     programs, projects, and activities that are managed by the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
     the National Security Agency, the Director of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the National 
     Imagery and Mapping Agency.''.]
       (b) Use of Funds.--Section 104 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4) is amended--
       (1) by adding at the end of subsection (c) the following: 
     ``The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director of 
     Central Intelligence before reprogramming funds made 
     available under the Joint Military Intelligence Program.'';
       (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), and (g) as 
     subsections (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and
       (3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection (e):
       ``(e) Database and Budget Execution Information.--The 
     Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense 
     shall jointly issue guidance for the development and 
     implementation by the year 2000 of a database to provide 
     timely and accurate information on the amounts and status of 
     resources, including periodic budget execution updates, for 
     national, defense-wide, and tactical intelligence 
     activities.''.
       [(c) Personnel, Training, and Administrative Activities.--
     Subsection (g) of such section, as redesignating by 
     subsection (b)(3)(A) of this section, is amended--
       [(1) by striking ``Use of Personnel.--'' and inserting 
     ``Personnel, Training, and Administrative Functions.--'';
       [(2) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
       [(A) by striking ``in coordination with'' and inserting 
     ``after consultation with''; and
       [(B) by inserting ``national elements of'' after ``policies 
     and programs within''; and
       [(3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``personnel,'' and all 
     that follows through ``programs'' and inserting ``personnel 
     programs, administrative programs, training programs, and 
     security programs and management activities''.

     [SEC. 708. REALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR OF 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
                   FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER NATIONAL 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       [(a) Consultation of Secretary of Defense With DCI 
     Regarding General Responsibilities.--Subsection (a) of 
     section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     405-5) is amended--
       [(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting 
     ``, in consultation with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence,'' after ``Secretary of Defense''; and
       [(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``appropriate''.
       [(b) Joint Responsibility of DCI and Secretary of Defense 
     for Performance of Certain Specific Functions.--Subsection 
     (b) of that section is amended--
       [(1) by striking ``Responsibility'' and inserting ``Joint 
     Responsibility of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense'';
       [(2) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
     ``Consistent with sections 103 and 104 of this Act,'' and 
     inserting ``The Director of Central Intelligence and'';
       [(3) in paragraph (2)--
       [(A) by striking ``within the Department of Defense''; and
       [(B) by adding ``and'' after the semicolon at the end; and
       [(4) by striking the semicolon at the end of paragraph (3) 
     and inserting a period.
       [(c) Responsibility of Secretary of Defense for Performance 
     of Other Specific Functions.--Such section is further 
     amended--
       [(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d);
       [(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) of subsection (b) the 
     following:
       [``(c) Responsibility of Secretary of Defense for the 
     Performance of Specific Functions.--Consistent with section 
     103 and 104 of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in 
     consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, 
     shall--'';
       [(3) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as 
     paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively, of subsection 
     (c), as added by paragraph (2) of this subsection; and
       [(4) in paragraph (2), as redesignated by paragraph (3) of 
     this subsection, by inserting ``(other than clandestine 
     collection)'' before ``human intelligence activities''.
       [(d) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The section heading of 
     that section is amended to read as follows:


  [``responsibilities of secretary of defense and director of central 
  intelligence pertaining to national foreign intelligence program''.

       [(2) The table of contents in the first section of that Act 
     is amended by striking the item relating to section 105 and 
     inserting the following new item:

[``Sec. 105. Responsibilities of Secretary of Defense and Director of 
              Central Intelligence pertaining to National Foreign 
              Intelligence Program.''.]

     SEC. 708. RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERTAINING 
                   TO THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       Section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-5) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``, in consultation 
     with the Director of Central Intelligence,'' after 
     ``Secretary of Defense'' in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1); and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Annual Evaluation of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.--The Director of Central Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman 
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall submit each year to the 
     Committee on Foreign Intelligence of the National Security 
     Council and the appropriate congressional committees (as 
     defined in section 109(c)) an evaluation of the performance 
     and the responsiveness of the National Security Agency, the 
     National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency in meeting their national missions.''.

     SEC. 709. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

       (a) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Collection.--Section 102 of the National Security Act of 
     1947, as amended by section 705(a)(1) of this Act, is amended 
     by adding at the end the following:
       ``(e)(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in 
     carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, 
     there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
     for Collection, who shall be appointed by the President, by 
     and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(2)(A) If neither the Director of Central Intelligence 
     nor the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a 
     commissioned officer of the Armed Forces at the time of the 
     nomination of an individual to the position of Assistant 
     Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, the 
     President shall nominate an individual for that position from 
     among the commissioned officers of the Armed Forces who have 
     substantial experience in managing intelligence activities.
       ``(B) The provisions of subsection (c)(3) shall apply to 
     any commissioned officer of the Armed Forces while serving in 
     the position of Assistant Director for Collection.
       ``(3) The Assistant Director for Collection shall manage 
     the collection of national intelligence by the intelligence 
     community in order to ensure the efficient and effective 
     collection of national intelligence that is identified for 
     collection by the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
     for Analysis and [Production.] Production.''.
       [``(4) In carrying out the responsibility set forth in 
     paragraph (3), the Assistant Director for Collection shall--
       [``(A) provide guidance and direction for, and concur in, 
     the procurement and operation of systems necessary for the 
     collection of national intelligence; and
       [``(B) assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the 
     formulation of plans and budgets for national intelligence 
     collection activities.''.]
       (b) Consolidation of Human Intelligence Collection 
     Activities.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     [shall enter into an agreement with the Secretary of Defense 
     to transfer from the Secretary to the Director the 
     responsibilities and authorities of the Secretary for the 
     collection of clandestine intelligence from human sources 
     currently conducted by the Defense Human Intelligence Service 
     within

[[Page S10632]]

     the Department of Defense] and the Deputy Secretary of 
     Defense shall jointly submit to the Committee on Armed 
     Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate and the National Security Committee and Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives a report on the ongoing efforts of those 
     officials to achieve commonality, interoperability, and, 
     where practicable, consolidation of the collection of 
     clandestine intelligence from human sources conducted by the 
     Defense Human Intelligence Service of the Department of 
     Defense and the Directorate of Operations of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency.

     SEC. 710. IMPROVEMENT OF ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     amended by section 709(a) of this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(f)(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in 
     carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, 
     there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
     for Analysis and Production, who shall be appointed by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(2) The Assistant Director for Analysis and Production 
     shall--
       ``(A) oversee the analysis and production of intelligence 
     by the elements of the intelligence community;
       ``(B) establish standards and priorities relating to such 
     analysis and production;
       ``(C) monitor the allocation of resources for the analysis 
     and production of intelligence in order to identify 
     unnecessary duplication in the analysis and production of 
     intelligence;
       ``(D) identify intelligence to be collected for purposes of 
     the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Collection; and
       ``(E) provide such additional analysis and production of 
     intelligence as the President and the National Security 
     Council may require.''.

     SEC. 711. IMPROVEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     amended by section 710 of this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(g)(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in 
     carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, 
     there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
     for Administration, who shall be appointed by the President, 
     by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(2) The Assistant Director for Administration shall 
     manage such activities relating to the administration of the 
     intelligence community as the Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall require[, including management of civilian 
     personnel (including recruitment, security investigations, 
     processing, and training of such personnel), information 
     systems, telecommunications systems, finance and accounting 
     services, and security services, and procurement of supplies 
     and support services.''.]

     SEC. 712. PAY LEVEL OF ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence (3).''.

     SEC. 713. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Establishment of Position.--The Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:


          ``general counsel of the central intelligence agency

       ``Sec. 20. (a) There is a General Counsel of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, appointed from civilian life by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(b) The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency.
       ``(c) The General Counsel of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency shall perform such functions as the Director of 
     Central Intelligence may prescribe.''.
       (b) Executive Schedule IV Pay Level.--Section 5315 of title 
     5, United States Code, as amended by section 712 of this Act, 
     is further amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

     SEC. 714. OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OF [THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.] THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     amended by section 711 of this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(h)(1) There is hereby established the Office of 
     Congressional Affairs of [the Intelligence Community.] the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(2)(A) The Office shall be headed by the Director of the 
     Office of Congressional Affairs of [the Intelligence 
     Community.] the Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(B) The Director of Central Intelligence may designate 
     the Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency to serve as the Director of the 
     Office of Congressional Affairs of [the Intelligence 
     Community.] the Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(3) The Director shall coordinate the congressional 
     affairs activities of the elements of the intelligence 
     community and have such additional responsibilities as the 
     Director of Central Intelligence may prescribe.
       ``(4) Nothing in the subsection may be construed to 
     preclude the elements of the intelligence community from 
     responding directly to requests from Congress.''.

     SEC. 715. ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES BY 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 105 the following new section:


         ``assistance to united states law enforcement agencies

       ``Sec. 105A. (a) Authority To Provide Assistance.--
     [Notwithstanding any other provision of law] Subject to 
     subsection (b), elements of the intelligence community may, 
     upon the request of a United States law enforcement agency, 
     collect information outside the United States about 
     individuals who are not United States persons. Such elements 
     may collect such information notwithstanding that the law 
     enforcement agency intends to use the information collected 
     for purposes of a law enforcement investigation or 
     counterintelligence investigation.
       ``(b) Limitation on Assistance by Elements of Department of 
     Defense.--(1) With respect to elements within the Department 
     of Defense, the authority in subsection (a) applies only to 
     the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance 
     Office, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       ``(2) Assistance provided under this section by elements of 
     the Department of Defense may not include the direct 
     participation of a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or 
     Marine Corps in an arrest or similar activity.
       ``(3) Assistance may not be provided under this section by 
     an element of the Department of Defense if the provision of 
     such assistance will adversely affect the military 
     preparedness of the United States.
       ``(4) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations 
     governing the exercise of authority under this section by 
     elements of the Department of Defense, including regulations 
     relating to the protection of sources and methods in the 
     exercise of such authority.
       ``[(b)] (c) Definitions.--For purposes of subsection (a):
       ``(1) The term `United States law enforcement agency' means 
     any department or agency of the Federal Government that the 
     Attorney General designates as law enforcement agency for 
     purposes of this section.
       ``(2) The term `United States person' means the following:
       ``(A) A United States citizen.
       ``(B) An alien known by the intelligence agency concerned 
     to be a permanent resident alien.
       ``(C) An unincorporated association substantially composed 
     of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens.
       ``(D) A corporation incorporated in the United States, 
     except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign 
     government or governments.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 105 the following new item:

``Sec. 105A. Assistance to United States law enforcement agencies.''.

     SEC. 716. APPOINTMENT AND EVALUATION OF OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE 
                   FOR INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES.

       (a) In General.--Section 106 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is amended to read as follows:


``appointment and evaluation of officials responsible for intelligence-
                           related activities

       ``Sec. 106. (a) Concurrence of DCI in Certain 
     Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position 
     referred to in paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense shall 
     obtain the concurrence of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence before [appointing an individual to fill the 
     vacancy.] recommending to the President an individual for 
     appointment to the position. If the Director does not concur 
     in the recommendation, the Secretary may make the 
     recommendation to the President without the Director's 
     concurrence, but shall include in the recommendation a 
     statement that the Director does not concur in the 
     recommendation.
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
       ``(A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
       ``(B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
       ``(b) Consultation with DCI in Certain Appointments.--(1) 
     In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in 
     paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having 
     jurisdiction over the position shall consult with the 
     Director of Central Intelligence before appointing an 
     individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the 
     President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy.
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
       ``(A) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
       ``(B) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
     Research.
       ``(C) The Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and 
     National Security of the Department of Energy.
       ``(D) The Assistant Director, National Security Division of 
     the Federal Bureau of [Investigation.] Investigation.''.
       [``(c) Performance Evaluations.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall provide annually to the Secretary of 
     Defense an evaluation of the performance of the individuals 
     holding the positions referred to in subparagraphs (A) and 
     (B) of subsection (a)(2), and of

[[Page S10633]]

     the individual holding the position of Director of the 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency, in fulfilling their 
     respective responsibilities with regard to the National 
     Foreign Intelligence Program.''.]
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by striking the item relating 
     to section 106 and inserting in lieu thereof the following 
     new item:

``Sec. 106. Appointment and evaluation of officials responsible for 
              intelligence-related activities.''.

     [SEC. 717. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE.

       [(a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:


           [``intelligence community senior executive service

       [``Sec. 110. (a) Establishment.--(1) The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall by regulation establish a 
     personnel system for senior civilian personnel within the 
     intelligence community to be known as the Intelligence 
     Community Senior Executive Service.
       [``(2) The Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service 
     shall include personnel within the following agencies:
       [``(A) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       [``(B) The National Security Agency.
       [``(C) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       [``(D) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       [``(E) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       [``(F) Any other office of the Department of Defense the 
     civilian employees of which are subject to section 1590 of 
     title 10, United States Code, as of the effective date of the 
     regulations prescribed under this section.
       [``(3) The Director of Central Intelligence shall prescribe 
     the regulations required under this section in consultation 
     with the Department of Defense.
       [``(b) Requirements.--The regulations prescribed under this 
     section shall, to the extent not inconsistent with the 
     authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence--
       [``(1) meet the requirements set forth in section 3131 of 
     title 5, United States Code, for the Senior Executive 
     Service;
       [``(2) provide rates of pay for the Intelligence Community 
     Senior Executive Service that are not in excess of the 
     maximum rate or less than the minimum rate of basic pay 
     established for the Senior Executive Service under section 
     5382 of title 5, United States Code, and that are adjusted at 
     the same time and to the same extent as rates of basic pay 
     for the Senior Executive Service are adjusted;
       [``(3) provide a performance appraisal system for the 
     Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service that conforms 
     to the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 43 of title 5, 
     United States Code;
       [``(4) provide for--
       [``(A) removal or suspension from the Intelligence 
     Community Senior Executive Service;
       [``(B) reduction-in-force procedures;
       [``(C) procedures in accordance with which any furlough 
     affecting the Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service 
     shall be carried out;
       [``(D) procedures setting forth due process rights to which 
     members of the Intelligence Community Senior Executive 
     Service are entitled in cases of removal or suspension; and
       [``(E) procedures for periodic recertification;
       [``(5) permit the payment of performance awards to members 
     of the Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service; and
       [``(6) provide that members of the Intelligence Community 
     Senior Executive Service may be granted sabbatical leaves.
       [``(c) Limitations.--(1) Except as provided in subsection 
     (b), the Director of Central Intelligence--
       [``(A) may make applicable to the Intelligence Community 
     Senior Executive Service any of the provisions of title 5, 
     United States Code, applicable to applicants for or members 
     of the Senior Executive Service; and
       [``(B) shall delegate to the heads of the agencies referred 
     to in subparagraphs (B) through (E) of subsection (a)(2) the 
     authority to appoint, promote, and assign individuals to 
     Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service positions 
     within their respective agencies without regard to the 
     provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing 
     appointments and other personnel actions in the competitive 
     service, provided that such actions shall be subject to the 
     approval of the Director of Central Intelligence in 
     accordance with the regulations prescribed under this 
     section.
       [``(2) Members of the Intelligence Community Senior 
     Executive Service shall be subject to the limitations of 
     section 5307 of title 5, United States Code.
       [``(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of title 5, 
     United States Code, any individual who is a member of the 
     Senior Executive Service or an equivalent personnel system at 
     the Central Intelligence Agency or at an agency referred to 
     in subparagraphs (B) through (E) of subsection (a)(2) at the 
     time of the effective date of the regulations prescribed 
     under this section shall be a member of the Intelligence 
     Community Senior Executive Service.
       [``(4) Upon the establishment of the Intelligence Community 
     Senior Executive Service under this section, no individual 
     may be selected for membership in the service unless such 
     individual has served at least one assignment outside his or 
     her employing agency. An assignment to the Office of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall be treated as an 
     assignment outside an individual's employing agency 
     (including an individual employed by the Central 
     Intelligence Agency) for purposes of this subparagraph.
       [``(d) Award of Ranks to Members of Service.--The 
     President, based upon the recommendations of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence, may award ranks to members of the 
     Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service in a manner 
     consistent with section 4507 of title 5, United States Code.
       [``(e) Detail and Assignment of Members.--(1) 
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of 
     Central Intelligence--
       [``(A) may, after consultation with the head of the agency 
     affected, detail or assign any member of the Intelligence 
     Community Senior Executive Service to serve in any position 
     in the intelligence community; or
       [``(B) may, with the concurrence of the head of the agency 
     affected, detail or assign any member of the service to serve 
     in any position in another Government agency or outside the 
     Federal Government.
       [``(2) A member of the Intelligence Community Senior 
     Executive Service may be detailed or assigned under paragraph 
     (1) only if such detail or assignment is for the benefit of 
     the intelligence community.
       [``(3) A member shall not by reason of such detail or 
     assignment lose any entitlement or status associated with 
     membership in the Intelligence Community Senior Executive 
     Service.
       [``(f) Annual Report.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to Congress each year, at the time the budget is 
     submitted by the President for the next fiscal year, a report 
     on the Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service. The 
     report shall include, in the aggregate and by agency--
       [``(1) the number of Intelligence Community Senior 
     Executive Service positions established as of the end of the 
     preceding fiscal year;
       [``(2) the number of individuals being paid at each rate of 
     basic pay for the Intelligence Community Senior Executive 
     Service as of the end of the preceding fiscal year;
       [``(3) the number, distribution, and amount of awards paid 
     to members of the Intelligence Community Senior Executive 
     Service during the preceding fiscal year; and
       [``(4) the number of individuals removed from the 
     Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service during the 
     preceding fiscal year--
       [``(A) for less than fully successful performance;
       [``(B) due to a reduction in force; or
       [``(C) for any other reason.''.
       [(2) The table of contents in the first section of that Act 
     is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
     109 the following new item:

[``Sec. 110. Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service.''.

       [(b) Effective Date of Regulations.--The regulations 
     prescribed under section 110(a) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947, as added by subsection (a)(1), shall take effect one 
     year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       [(c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 12 of the National 
     Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended--
       [(A) by striking out subsections (a) and (c); and
       [(B) by striking out ``(b)''.
       [(2)(A) Sections 1601 and 1603 of title 10, United States 
     Code, are repealed.
       [(B) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 83 
     of such title is amended by striking out the items relating 
     to sections 1601 and 1603.
       [(3) Section 1590 of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       [(A) in subsection (a)(1)--
       [(i) by striking out ``, including positions in the Senior 
     Executive Service,''; and
       [(ii) by striking out ``, except that'' and all that 
     follows through the semicolon and inserting in lieu thereof a 
     semicolon;
       [(B) in subsection (b)--
       [(i) in the third sentence, by striking out ``Except in the 
     case'' and all that follows through ``no civilian'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``No civilian''; and
       [(ii) by striking out the second sentence; and
       [(C) by striking out subsections (f) and (g).
       [(4) Section 1604(b) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended in the second sentence by striking out ``Except in 
     the case'' and all that follows through ``no officer'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``No officer''.
       [(5)(A) Section 2108 of title 5, United States Code, is 
     amended in the flush matter following paragraph (3) by 
     striking ``the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service, 
     the Senior Cryptologic Executive Service'' and inserting 
     ``the Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service''.
       [(B) Section 6304(f)(1) of such title is amended--
       [(i) by striking subparagraphs (C) and (D) and inserting 
     the following new subparagraph (C):
       [``(C) the Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service; 
     or''; and
       [(ii) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph 
     (D).
       [(C) Title 5, United States Code, is further amended by 
     striking ``the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service 
     or the Senior Cryptologic Executive Service'' and inserting 
     ``the Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service'' in 
     each of the following provisions:

[[Page S10634]]

       [(i) Section 8336(h)(2).
       [(ii) Section 8414(a)(2).
       [(6) The amendments made by this subsection shall take 
     effect one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. [718.] 717. REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBMITTAL OF BUDGET 
                   INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Submittal With Annual Budget.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, the President shall include in each 
     budget for a fiscal year submitted under section 1105 of 
     title 31, United States Code, the following information:
       (1) The aggregate amount appropriated during the current 
     fiscal year on all intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government.
       (2) The aggregate amount requested in such budget for the 
     fiscal year covered by the budget for all intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the United States 
     Government.
       (b) Form of Submittal.--The President shall submit the 
     information required under subsection (a) in unclassified 
     form.

     SEC. [719.] 718. TERMS OF SERVICE FOR MEMBERS OF SELECT 
                   COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE SENATE.

       (a) Indefinite Terms of Service.--Section 2(b) of Senate 
     Resolution 400 of the Ninety-fourth Congress (adopted May 19, 
     1976) is amended by striking the first sentence.
       (b) Limit on Term of Chairman and Vice Chairman.--Section 
     2(c) of that resolution is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new sentence: ``No Member shall serve as chairman 
     or vice chairman of the select committee for more than six 
     years of continuous service.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a) 
     and (b) shall take effect with the commencement of the One 
     Hundred Fifth Congress.
       (d) Rules of the Senate.--The amendments made by 
     subsections (a) and (b) are enacted as an exercise of the 
     rulemaking power of the Senate with full recognition of the 
     constitutional right of the Senate to change rules at any 
     time, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as in the 
     case of any other rule of the Senate.

     SEC. [720.] 719. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICY ON 
                   PROTECTING THE NATIONAL INFORMATION 
                   INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST STRATEGIC ATTACKS.

       (a) In General.--(1) Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report setting 
     forth--
       (A) the results of a review of the threats to the United 
     States on protecting the national information infrastructure 
     against information warfare and other non-traditional 
     attacks; and
       (B) the counterintelligence response of the Director.
       (2) The report shall include a description of the plans of 
     the intelligence community to provide intelligence support 
     for the indications, warning, and assessment functions of the 
     intelligence community with respect to information warfare 
     and other non-traditional attacks by foreign nations, groups, 
     or individuals against the national information 
     infrastructure.
       (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
       (1) The term ``national information infrastructure'' 
     includes the information infrastructure of the public or 
     private sector.
       (2) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
            TITLE VIII--NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY

     [SEC. 801. ESTABLISHMENT.

       [(a) Establishment.--(1) Title I of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 
     717 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following:


                 [``national imagery and mapping agency

       [``Sec. 120. (a) Establishment and Duties.--
       [``(1) Establishment and mission.--There is hereby 
     established a National Imagery and Mapping Agency which shall 
     provide timely, relevant, and accurate imagery, imagery 
     intelligence, and imagery-related products and geospatial 
     information in support of the national security objectives of 
     the United States. It shall also have a navigational mission 
     as specified in section 2791 of title 10, United States Code.
       [``(2) Mission of the national imagery and mapping 
     agency.--The National Imagery and Mapping Agency shall have a 
     national mission to support the imagery requirements of the 
     Department of State and other non-Department of Defense 
     agencies, as well as a mission to support the combat and 
     other operational requirements of the Department of Defense. 
     The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish 
     requirements and priorities to govern the collection of 
     national intelligence of national importance by the National 
     Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       [``(3) Director.--The President shall appoint the Director 
     of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The Secretary of 
     Defense shall, with the concurrence of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence, recommend an individual to the 
     President for such appointment. If the Secretary identifies a 
     commissioned officer of the Armed Forces to serve as 
     Director, he shall recommend that individual to the President 
     for appointment to hold the grade of lieutenant general or, 
     in the case of an officer of the Navy, vice admiral, while 
     serving in such position. A commissioned officer appointed 
     by the President under this paragraph shall not be counted 
     against the numbers and percentages of commissioned 
     officers of the rank and grade of such officer for the 
     Armed Force of which such officer is a member.
       [``(4) Deputy director.--There shall be a Deputy Director 
     to assist the Director. The Deputy may be appointed from 
     among the commissioned officers of the Armed Forces, or from 
     civilian life, but at no time shall both the Director and the 
     Deputy Director positions be simultaneously occupied by 
     commissioned officers of the Armed Forces, whether in active 
     or retired status.
       [``(b) Central Intelligence Agency Support for National 
     Imagery and Mapping Agency.--
       [``(1) Administrative and contracting services.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Central 
     Intelligence Agency may, under terms and conditions agreed to 
     by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, provide administrative and contracting services 
     (including the services of security police notwithstanding 
     any limitations on the jurisdiction of such personnel 
     contained in section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Act of 1949), and detail personnel indefinitely to the 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency, in furtherance of the 
     national intelligence effort.
       [``(2) Transfer and acceptance.--The National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency will transfer funds to the Central 
     Intelligence Agency for the purposes of producing imagery and 
     imagery-related products of national importance, and the 
     Central Intelligence Agency may accept a transfer of funds 
     from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the Central 
     Intelligence Agency may expend such funds pursuant to the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to carry out the 
     purposes of paragraph (1).
       [``(c) Funds for Foreign Imagery Intelligence and 
     Geospatial Information Support.--The Director of the National 
     Imagery and Mapping Agency may use appropriated funds 
     available to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to 
     provide foreign countries imagery intelligence and geospatial 
     information support, except that such arrangements shall be 
     coordinated with the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     when they involve imagery intelligence or intelligence 
     products, or any support to an intelligence or security 
     service of a foreign country.
       [``(d) Funds for Civil Applications.--The Director of the 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency may use appropriated 
     funds available to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to 
     support and encourage civilian use of imagery intelligence 
     and geospatial information support provided by the National 
     Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       [``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
       [``(1) The term `geospatial information' means information 
     that identifies the geographic location and characteristics 
     of natural or constructed features and boundaries on the 
     earth, including statistical data, information derived from, 
     among other things, remote sensing, mapping, and surveying 
     technologies, and, for purposes of this section, the term 
     includes mapping, charting and geodetic data, including 
     geodetic products as that term is used in chapter 167 of 
     title 10, United States Code.
       [``(2) The term `imagery' means a likeness or presentation 
     of any natural or man-made feature or related object or 
     activities and the positional data acquired at the same time 
     the likeness or representation was acquired (including 
     products produced by space-based national intelligence 
     reconnaissance systems), in accordance with Executive Order 
     No. 12591, as well as likenesses or presentations produced by 
     satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or 
     other similar means (except that handheld or clandestine 
     photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence 
     collection organizations is excluded)).
       [``(3) The term `imagery intelligence' means the technical, 
     geographic, and intelligence information derived through the 
     interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral 
     materials.''.
       [(2) The table of contents in the first section of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as so amended, is further 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 110 
     the following new item:

[``Sec. 120. National Imagery and Mapping Agency.''.

     [SEC. 802. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       [The amendments made by this title shall take effect on the 
     later of--
       [(1) the date of the enactment of an Act appropriating 
     funds for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency for fiscal 
     year 1997; or
       [(2) October 1, 1996.]

     SEC. 801. NATIONAL MISSION AND COLLECTION TASKING AUTHORITY 
                   FOR THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:


 ``national mission and collection tasking authority for the national 
                       imagery and mapping agency

       ``Sec. 110. (a) National Mission.--The National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency shall have a national mission to support the 
     imagery requirements of the Department of State, the 
     Department of Defense, and other departments and

[[Page S10635]]

     agencies of the Federal Government. The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall establish requirements and priorities to 
     govern the collection of national intelligence by the 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The Secretary of Defense 
     and the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation 
     with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall jointly 
     identify deficiencies in the capabilities of the National 
     Imagery and Mapping Agency to accomplish assigned national 
     missions and shall jointly develop policies and programs to 
     review and correct such deficiencies.
       ``(b) Collection and Tasking Authority.--Except as 
     otherwise agreed by the Director of Central Intelligence and 
     the Secretary of Defense pursuant to direction provided by 
     the President, the Director of Central Intelligence has the 
     authority to approve collection requirements, determine 
     collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection 
     priorities levied on national imagery collection assets.''.
       (2) The table of contents in the first section of that Act 
     is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
     109 the following new item:

``Sec. 110. National mission and collection tasking authority for the 
              National Imagery and Mapping Agency.''.

       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on the later of--
       (1) the date of the enactment of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; or
       (2) the date of the enactment of this Act.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, today the Senate takes up S. 1718, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997. In addition to 
containing the annual authorization for appropriations for elements of 
the U.S. intelligence community, this bill includes a number of 
important provisions intended to ensure that our intelligence agencies 
operate more effectively and more efficiently in the post-cold-war 
world.
  The end of the cold war did not solve America's national security 
concerns. As evidenced by the bombing in June of the Khobar Towers 
facility in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and the possible complicity of 
international terrorists in the downing of TWA flight 800 in July, the 
focus of those concerns can shift with the speed and force of an 
explosion. The need for a national security apparatus that is equally 
dynamic is clear. Title VII of S. 1718--the Intelligence Activities 
Renewal and Reform Act of 1996--contains measures designed to improve 
our Nation's intelligence capabilities in order to meet the rapidly 
changing threats to our national security.
  Title VII takes significant steps toward this objective in two ways: 
First, it improves an institutional framework for ensuring that the 
decisionmakers who rely on intelligence can provide prompt, clear 
guidance to the intelligence community on what their needs are and what 
the priorities are. Second, it improves the Director of Central 
Intelligence's authority and improves the structure he needs to respond 
quickly in an effective, efficient, and responsible manner.
  S. 1718, as originally reported out by the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, reflected the conclusions this committee had reached 
after 6 years of focused examination of the missions, functions, and 
organizational arrangements for the intelligence community. Triggered 
by the end of the cold war, this examination had gained momentum in 
1994 in the wake of the Ames espionage case and the revelation that the 
National Reconnaissance Office [NRO] had built an expensive new 
building without adequately informing Congress.
  I do not need to remind my colleagues that just 2 years ago members 
of this body from both parties--angered by what appeared to be a lack 
of direction and accountability in the intelligence community, and 
particularly in the CIA--stood in this Chamber to call for a massive 
overhaul of our intelligence apparatus. In order to avoid precipitous 
action, the Senate adopted a proposal offered by Senators Warner, 
Graham, and others to create a bipartisan Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community to conduct a credible, 
independent, and objective review of U.S. intelligence. The Commission 
was given a deadline of March 1, 1996, with the expectation that its 
report would inform a legislative debate resulting in enactment of 
needed changes during the 104th Congress. The Commission was chaired by 
former Congressman and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin until his 
untimely death and later by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. 
The 17-member Commission included two of our distinguished colleagues, 
John Warner and Jim Exon, and two of our former colleagues, Warren 
Rudman, who served as vice chairman, and Wyche Fowler.
  While the Aspin-Brown Commission was conducting its review, our 
committee and its staff also held a number of hearings, received 
briefings, and conducted interviews regarding the appropriate missions 
and organizational structure of the intelligence community. During the 
course of these efforts, two additional incidents--the failure of CIA 
officials to inform Congress of the possible involvement of CIA assets 
in human rights abuses in Guatemala and the failure of NRO officials to 
tell either the DCI or Congress that the NRO had accumulated over $1 
billion in unused funds--further convinced our Committee that the 
intelligence community needed greater central direction and 
accountability. Based on the Aspin-Brown Commission's recommendations 
and on the results of our own review, the committee reported out S. 
1718 on April 24, 1996.

  The bill was subsequently taken on sequential referral by the Armed 
Services Committee, which informed the Intelligence Committee that it 
did not want to consider any intelligence reform this year. The 
Intelligence Committee did not believe that intelligence reforms could 
be put off for another year. The rapidly changing world, the recent 
incidents that have undermined public confidence in our intelligence 
agencies, and the work already done by the Aspin-Brown Commission and 
other groups--all of these factors led us to believe that the time was 
ripe for intelligence reform. We marked up our bill in April in order 
to ensure that the Armed Services Committee would have plenty of time 
to consider it.
  The Department of Defense, from the outset, opposed anything in the 
bill that enhanced the authority of the DCI at the expense of the 
Secretary of Defense. In an April 29 letter to the Armed Services 
Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense John White stated that ``clear 
and unambiguous lines of authority from the Secretary of Defense to the 
Defense intelligence agencies and the embedded Service intelligence 
elements are crucial'' to ensuring ``that those who depend on 
intelligence--especially our nation's military forces--receive the 
timely and responsive intelligence they require.'' Deputy Secretary 
White argued that enhancing the DCI's authorities over NSA, NRO, and 
CIO would ``unnecessarily complicate those lines of command and 
control.''
  I agree completely that intelligence consumers, especially military 
consumers whose lives may be at risk, must have timely and responsive 
intelligence. I do not agree, however, that this objective can be 
accomplished through exclusive management by the Secretary of Defense 
of NSA, NRO, and CIO. The fact is that in the course of running an over 
$240 billion department the Secretary of Defense simply does not have 
time to exercise any degree of command and control over Defense 
intelligence agencies.
  The consequences of continuing the fiction of Secretary of Defense 
management of these intelligence agencies at the expense of real 
management by the DCI is significant. The country needs to vest the 
authority in the DCI so that intelligence, such as that produced by the 
Defense Intelligence Agency in mid-June warning of threats to United 
States troops at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, is certain to receive 
the kind of attention it is warranted. We need a DCI who can rattle the 
cages when necessary, so that consumers of intelligence cannot 
attribute policy failures to intelligence shortcomings. Both the 
Downing Commission and the staff report of the SSCI concluded that the 
tragedy at Khobar Towers was not attributable to an intelligence 
failure. It is deeply regrettable that, as a result of changes insisted 
upon by the Armed Services Committee, the country will have to wait for 
another Congress and perhaps additional bitter experiences before the 
needed changes can be made.
  Testifying before our committee on April 24, 1996, Director Deutch 
provided some interesting insights on the ability of the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense to exercise the authorities DOD fought so 
desperately to retain. When asked whether we should hold the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense or the DCI accountable for problems at the NRO, a

[[Page S10636]]

key national intelligence agency within the Department of Defense, he 
responded:

       The Deputy Secretary of Defense has got a tremendous set of 
     issues covering a much larger range of resources--10 times--
     managing ten times the resources we're talking about for the 
     whole intelligence community.
       So to say that you are going to go to the deputy--and I am 
     not talking about personalities--and say to the Deputy 
     Secretary of Defense, why didn't you catch this, he's going 
     to say, well, I count on the DCI to keep track of this and 
     to let the Secretary of Defense know.
       So in some sense, if we are going to say that the Director 
     of Central Intelligence does not view himself or herself as 
     being responsible for the NRO, fundamentally nobody will be.

  In light of these realities, this committee sought to give the DCI 
greater authority and responsibility to manage the intelligence 
community. The Armed Services Committee, asserting their jurisdiction 
over the Defense Department, insisted on a number of changes to keep 
provisions that affected the intelligence agencies within DOD. The 
Armed Services Committee and the Defense Department were most concerned 
about those provisions that would have given the DCI greater authority 
to manage the intelligence community, including those elements of the 
community that are part of the Department of Defense such as the 
National Security Agency [NSA], the National Reconnaissance Office 
[NRO], and the Central Imagery Office. These provisions would have 
given the DCI, as head of the intelligence community, authority to 
execute the budgets for NSA, NRO, and CIO as well as shared 
responsibility, together with the Secretary of Defense and for ensuring 
that these agencies perform their national missions. The DCI would also 
have been given authority to reprogram funds from one program to 
another within the National Foreign Intelligence Program--which is the 
portion of the overall U.S. intelligence budget the DCI is responsible 
for developing each year--even if the affected department or agency 
head objected to that transfer. Finally, the Intelligence Committee had 
voted for a provision to require DCI concurrence on the decision as to 
who should head the major collection agencies: NSA, NRO, and the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency. This was watered down by Armed 
Services to a qualified concurrence, allowing the recommendation of the 
Secretary of Defense to be forwarded to the President over the DCI's 
objection so long as that objection is noted.
  Given the length of time the Armed Services Committee and, then, the 
Government Affairs Committee held this bill, and in light of the 
abbreviated legislative schedule, we were unable to bring these 
important issues to the floor of the Senate for debate and a vote. 
Nevertheless, despite the Defense Department's initial refusal to 
relinquish any significant authority to ensure more efficient and 
effective management of intelligence, we were able to get a bill out of 
the Armed Services Committee that contains important new statutory 
assurances of DCI authority and should enhance the prospects that 
future DCI's will not have to rely merely on the good will of the 
Secretary of Defense in order to effectively manage intelligence. The 
bill before you today contains much of what the Intelligence Committee 
initially proposed, but not as much as the country needs. That greater 
objective will require continued efforts.
  In addition to the amendments made to our bill by the Armed Services 
Committee, the Government Affairs Committees took the bill for 53 days. 
At the end of that time, they reported it out with minor modifications 
to the provision providing for a Commission to Assess the Organization 
of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction.
  Finally, the Rules Committee also originally requested sequential 
referral of our bill in order to review a provision that would have 
amended Senate Resolution 400, the charter for our committee, to 
eliminate the 8-year term limit on committee membership. After 
consultations between our two committees and in response to concerns 
expressed by the majority leader, we agree to delete this provision and 
the Rules Committee withdrew its request for sequential referral of our 
bill. We remain convinced that extending the terms for membership of 
the oversight committee is an essential step in improving congressional 
oversight of intelligence, and I note that elimination of term limits 
was recommended by the Aspin-Brown Commission, on which Senator Warner 
served. But in order to ensure consideration of S. 1718 in this 
shortened legislative year, we have agreed to put off this issue for 
now.

  Now let me summarize the provisions in our bill. I will begin with 
the reform provisions in title VII. The key provisions enhance the 
ability of the DCI to manage the intelligence community by providing 
him with new statutory authority and an improved management structure. 
Specifically, section 707 of the bill gives the DCI new statutory 
authority to participate in the development of the budgets for the 
Joint Military Intelligence Program and for tactical intelligence and 
related activities; to approve all collection requirements and 
priorities and to resolve conflicts among priorities; and the right to 
be consulted by the Secretary of Defense before the Secretary 
reprograms funds within joint military intelligence programs.
  Section 707 would also require the DCI and the Secretary of Defense 
to develop a database of all intelligence programs and activities, 
including resource and budget execution information. The Office of 
Science and Technology Policy within the White House has recently 
developed a database of all research and development activities within 
the Federal Government, and this database has been invaluable for 
identifying duplication among Federal R&D programs. The committee 
believes that the DCI has been hampered in his ability to manage the 
intelligence community by a lack of accurate and comprehensive 
information about all intelligence community activities. Development of 
a database for intelligence activities should give the DCI one of the 
key tools he needs to provide greater direction and control of U.S. 
intelligence programs.
  In addition, section 716 of the bill would require the DCI to concur 
in recommendations by the Secretary of Defense to the President of 
individuals to be directors of NSA, NRO, or the newly created National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency, or to have his lack of concurrence noted. 
The DCI would also have to be consulted by the appropriate department 
head when appointing the heads of the major elements of the National 
Foreign Intelligence Program, including the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Intelligence and Research, the Assistant Director in charge 
of the FBI's National Security Division, the Director of DIA, and the 
Director of the Department of Energy's Office of Non-Proliferation and 
National Security. This new authority will help to remedy a situation 
in which DCI's--despite their statutory role as head of the 
intelligence community--have had little or no say in the appointments 
of the heads of major intelligence community elements. The Armed 
Services Committee also agreed to include in the DOD authorization bill 
a requirement that the DCI provide to the Secretary of Defense an 
annual performance evaluation of the heads of NSA, NRO, and NIMA.
  The bill would also establish three new Senate-confirmed Assistant 
Directors of Central Intelligence to assist the DCI in managing the 
intelligence community. One would focus on managing the intelligence 
community's collection activities; the second would coordinate 
community-wide intelligence analysis and production; and the third 
would coordinate community administrative programs. The committee 
believes that one reason that successive DCI's have been unable to 
exercise stronger management over the intelligence community is that 
they have lacked an adequate management structure. We believe these new 
positions will help the DCI fulfill his community role.
  In addition to strengthening the authorities of the DCI, the bill 
also creates two new committees of the National Security Council--a 
Committee on Foreign Intelligence and a Committee on Transnational 
Threats--to provide better policy guidance for the intelligence 
community and for departments and agencies involving in fighting 
international terrorism and crime. The creation of both committees were 
recommended by the Aspin-Brown Commission.

[[Page S10637]]

  Section 715 clarifies that intelligence collection agencies may 
accept tasking from law enforcement agencies to collect intelligence 
about non-U.S. persons outside the United States. This provision is 
necessary because CIA and NSA read their legal authorities as 
preventing them accepting tasking from law enforcement agencies lest 
they be considered to be exercising law enforcement powers. The 
provision is narrowly tailored to apply only to collection outside the 
United States about non-U.S. persons.

  Section 717 of the bill calls for disclosure of the intelligence 
budget top line--that is, the aggregate of NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA. This 
number has been in the public domain for some time, without carrying us 
down the so-called slippery slope of more detailed disclosures. The DCI 
supports disclosure, the Aspin-Brown Commission supports disclosure, 
and the administration supports disclosure. Disclosure of the top line 
provides no new information to our enemies. In fact, I believe this 
disclosure will actually strengthen our ability to protect vital 
national secrets by bolstering the credibility of our classification 
decisions--officially revealing the budget total tells the American 
public is that we are using classification to protect vital national 
secrets, not to conceal information that might be inconvenient to 
defend. And I think it would not be difficult to defend the size of the 
intelligence budget, given the complex world we live in today.
  These are the principal reform provisions contained in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act. The bill contains a number of 
additional important provisions.
  Title V of the bill criminalizes theft of economic proprietary 
information by a person acting on behalf of a foreign government or its 
agent. This provision is the result of nearly 4 years of hearing and 
study by our committee. We held hearings on this provision earlier this 
year, and we are convinced by both the classified and unclassified 
testimony that economic espionage is a problem that needs to be 
remedied immediately in the interests of our national economy and thus 
our national security.
  Title VI would create a Commission to Assess the Organization of the 
Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. The eight members of the Commission are to be appointed by 
the President and the congressional leadership. The Commission is 
required to conduct a study of the organization of the Federal 
Government, including the intelligence community, for combating weapons 
proliferation.
  Finally, title VIII of the bill, as amended by the Armed Services 
Committee, codifies the national mission and tasking authorities of the 
DCI for the new National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA]. NIMA is a 
new agency within the Department of Defense formed from the current 
Central Imagery Office, the Defense Mapping Agency, CIA's National 
Photographic Interpretation Center, and certain other imagery related 
elements. As originally reported by our committee, title VIII included 
provisions that would have established NIMA. The DOD authorization 
bill, which was reported by the Armed Services Committee later than our 
bill, included a more comprehensive statutory framework governing NIMA, 
and we agreed to the removal of the provisions establishing NIMA in our 
bill and their replacement with provisions in the National Security Act 
defining the new agency's national mission and the DCI's tasking 
authorities. The DCI's tasking authorities are especially important. 
For the first time in statute, the DCI now has the specific authority 
to approve collection requirements, determine collection priorities, 
and resolve conflicts in priorities levied on our national imagery 
satellites and other imagery assets.
  I also want to mention that the Armed Services Committee attempted to 
establish NIMA as a combat support agency of the Department of Defense. 
We strongly opposed this formulation because it slighted the critical 
imagery needs of the National Security Council, the Department of 
State, and other non-DOD consumers. Our committee was unwilling to have 
NIMA cater to the exclusive needs of the Defense Department. 
Accordingly, we modified the language in the DOD authorization bill, 
which we took on sequential referral, to provide that NIMA is not only 
a combat support agency but also has significant national missions. I 
also want to note that although NIMA has been added to the list of 
combat support agencies in 10 U.S.C. 193(f), subsection (d) of section 
193, as amended by the DOD authorization bill, specifically provides 
that the Chairman of the Joint Chief's oversight over NIMA shall apply 
``only with respect to combat support functions [the Agency] performs 
for the Department of Defense.'' This language makes clear that NIMA 
has important noncombat support functions that are not subject to the 
control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

  This concludes my summary of this year's intelligence authorization 
bill, including the reform provisions in title VII. Congress has been 
considering legislation to reform the intelligence community to meet 
the challenges of the post-cold-war world since at least 1990. Today, 
despite continuing bureaucratic resistance, the Senate is taking 
significant steps toward finally achieving that objective.
  I want to thank the distinguished vice chairman, Senator Kerrey, for 
his unflagging and nonpartisan commitment to the work of the committee. 
Senator Kerrey brings to this committee a unique understanding of the 
business of intelligence and a willingness and ability to master even 
the most complex technical issues. His insights and efforts were 
absolutely essential to the passage of this bill and to the committee's 
work overall. In addition, I would like to take this opportunity to 
recognize the excellent work of the committee staff, particularly 
Charlie Battaglia, Chris Straub, Suzanne Spaulding, John Bellinger, and 
Ed Levine.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, this year's bill once again attempts to 
help the intelligence community make the transition to a post-cold-war 
world where the looming military threat of the Soviet Union has been 
replaced by a more subtle--but increasingly serious--array of threats. 
The committee has attempted to help intelligence make the transition 
with a series of provisions in the bill to reform the community's 
weaknesses and renew its confidence in itself and in the products it 
provides to policy makers.
  Chairman Specter has been key in ensuring the committee has moved 
forward to recommend to the Senate important changes in the 
intelligence community. Under his leadership, we have examined in 
detail many shortcomings and failures which can only lead to the 
conclusion substantial change is in order. Without Chairman Specter's 
tireless efforts on the part of reform and renewal, the committee would 
not have been able to get to the point where we are today: recommending 
improvements that will have far reaching effects and make sure the 
intelligence community is positioned to understand the threats of 
tomorrow.
  This year's bill also seeks to provide an adequate level of funding 
for the intelligence community, with the committee seeking a modest, 1 
percent increase to the President's request. Congress has cut the DCI's 
request for national intelligence each year for the past 7 years, and I 
believe stress and strain in our national intelligence capabilities 
will follow unless we reverse this trend. However, since this bill was 
marked up in April, the defense authorization conference acted to cut 
national intelligence by some 3 percent and the ongoing defense 
authorization conference is likely to redirect funds requested by the 
administration for national intelligence to other defense programs. I 
am discouraged that there seems to be no constituency of support for 
national intelligence, even in a year in which the Congress is adding 
significant resources to the defense budget.
  I opened my remarks by saying the committee is once again attempting 
to reform and renew intelligence because it engaged in a similar effort 
as part of the fiscal year 1993 National Foreign Intelligence Program 
authorization process. The committee ran into many roadblocks in the 
fall of 1992 which prevented it from moving ahead with substantial 
reforms. Unfortunately, the committee finds itself in somewhat of a 
similar position today. Nevertheless, we are offering reforms which 
hopefully will point us in the direction of

[[Page S10638]]

improved intelligence support to policy makers while at the same time 
streamlining some of the Intelligence community's procedures so they 
are more responsive to the evolving international environment.

  There are many reasons for intelligence reform and renewal. Several 
of the most significant have found their way into the media. We are all 
aware of the Aldrich Ames spy case where a CIA operations officer gave 
some of our most sensitive information to the Soviet Union reportedly 
resulting directly in the deaths of at least 10 people. We also know 
about the excess funds retained by the National Reconnaissance Office 
which prevented this funding from being available for more immediate 
projects. Incidents such as these help to underscore the need for 
reform.
  The need for reform is widely recognized outside of the Congress. 
Last year Congress authorized a special commission to ``conduct a 
comprehensive review of American intelligence.'' In March of this year, 
the Commission issued a 217-page report containing over 36 
recommendations for significant change. Similarly, the Council on 
Foreign Relations this year issued its own report on the need for 
intelligence reform. Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of 
Diplomacy added its call for reform in a report entitled, ``Checklist 
for the Future of Intelligence.'' And the executive branch recognizes 
the need for reform as well. Their recognition is perhaps captured best 
by a CIA task force with the foreboding name of the ``Intelligence 
Community Revolution Task Force'' which called for sweeping changes.
  The need for reform must be balanced by at least two considerations. 
First, the intelligence community is full of dedicated men and women 
who, through a sense of patriotism and a desire to serve their country, 
will successfully take the intelligence community into the 21st 
century. They will be mentally ready to confront any challenge. Second, 
reform does not mean we should create a ``Department of Intelligence.'' 
Intelligence supports policy. It informs leaders throughout the 
Government and does not have to be organized as a separate part of the 
Government in order to be effective. What must be done, however, is to 
create an organization capable of capitalizing upon the abilities of 
its dedicated men and women and organize it so the leaders of the 
intelligence community have the authorities commensurate with the 
responsibilities for which we hold them accountable. The Congress and 
many parts of the executive branch expect only the best intelligence, 
and the community must be prepared to serve all segments of the 
Government, including the Department of Defense.

  In this regard, I would like to take this opportunity to thank our 
colleagues on the Armed Services Committee. We have worked together to 
make sure intelligence support will be improved in the future and to 
guarantee our unsurpassed defense capabilities remain intact. Without 
the support of the chairman and ranking member, we would not be able to 
present a comprehensive package of reform to the Senate in which we all 
have confidence we are doing the right thing.
  This year, we voted a bill out of Committee: First, changing 
intelligence support to policymakers so the community could better 
capitalize on the rich resources of its people; second, enhancing some 
of the powers of the Director of Central Intelligence so he would be 
able to exercise all of the necessary authorities in the areas for 
which we recognize his responsibility; and third, reorganizing parts of 
the intelligence community so that it is better structured for the 
profusion of different threats endemic to the post cold war world.
  In order to support policymakers better, the bill we introduce today 
contains several important innovations. First, it creates a Committee 
on Foreign Intelligence as part of the National Security Council. This 
committee would meet at least semiannually to provide broad guidance to 
the intelligence community on major issues. In addition to ensuring 
that intelligence would more closely support the needs of all 
policymakers in the Government, it would be required to document the 
priorities of the policymaking community so that intelligence would 
know how to allocate its relatively scarce resources.
  Second, the bill creates a Committee on Transnational Threats as part 
of the National Security Council. In many ways, the threats to our 
national security have changed significantly since the bipolar world 
where the Free World confronted a Communist bloc. The role of the 
nation state is evolving into something different and several 
increasingly serious threats to the United States crossnational 
boundaries. Among these, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction--and their means of delivery--appear as the most 
significant. The policy community, however, still largely focuses on a 
world composed of nations which only theoretically control the 
destinies of all mankind. The intelligence community is struggling to 
bring the transnational threats to the forefront but, since 
intelligence supports policy and not vice versa, its warnings sometimes 
go unheeded. The Committee on Transnational Threats will help to change 
the focus to the new international disorder.
  Mr. President, the committee harbors no illusions about the possible 
destinies of these committees. We all know quite well the usefulness of 
the Low Intensity Conflict Board, an NSC-level board established by the 
Congress to force the policy community to address the growing 
importance of low-intensity conflict. The Committee on Foreign 
Intelligence and the Committee on Transnational Threats both could 
become the moribund bodies the low intensity conflict board has become. 
Nonetheless, our committee feels so strongly that intelligence can 
support policy properly only if the policy makers change their approach 
to international threats, we believe it is best to allow the 
intelligence community to focus its efforts in new and different ways 
based on NSC-level committees. We recommend the Congress should take 
the risk and create these two committees so the necessary tools will be 
available to the President if he chooses to use them.
  Our bill also requires the President to submit an annual report to 
Congress on intelligence needs and priorities for the next fiscal year 
and assess the performance of the intelligence community during the 
previous fiscal year. We envision this to be a companion document to 
the national security strategy of the United States which the President 
is required by law to submit annually to Congress. We believe this will 
help the Congress decide whether intelligence is supporting policy. As 
such, it will allow the Congress to make the tough decisions on which 
programs should be funded and reject those programs inconsistent with 
the President's national security strategy and congressional 
priorities.
  In some respects, the bill has created controversy in the manner with 
which it addresses the office of the Director of Central Intelligence. 
Most Americans expect the DCI to be a director. After 49 years of 
experience, however, it is still painfully obvious he is the 
coordinator of central intelligence, not the director. Each year, after 
he negotiates with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, 
the Secretary of Energy and the FBI Director, the DCI assembles an 
intelligence budget. It often reflects what is bureaucratically 
possible instead of what is required. Therefore, he does not direct 
anything in the fundamental way any leader steers an organization. He 
does not direct the intelligence community because he does not create a 
budget based on his own tough decisions. To make matters worse, once he 
assembles the budget and Congress approves it, the DCI does not control 
how the money is spent. That control belongs to the people with whom he 
negotiated in the first place: the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the FBI Director. Since the 
bill's provisions dealing with budget control have created such 
controversy--sometimes misrepresented in the media as an attempt to 
create a ``Department of Intelligence''--the committee is reporting a 
bill at this late date with fewer DCI budget authorities than 
originally believed to be important. Nonetheless, there are some 
innovations still in the bill which will help the DCI better execute 
his responsibilities.

  Among these innovations is the creation of the positions of three 
Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence.

[[Page S10639]]

 Generally, intelligence is conducted in three steps. First, 
information is collected. Second, the information is analyzed and a 
report is written. Third, the report is disseminated to policy-makers. 
Today, no one other than the DCI is personally responsible for the 
collection of the information and its analysis. I think we can all 
agree the DCI is far too busy to focus on each day's priorities and 
requirements for collecting information. Further, he cannot personally 
supervise the daily work of the thousands of intelligence analysts to 
ensure their reports are properly focused, comprehensive, and delivered 
on time. Thus, the DCI relies on a series of interagency committees to 
help him manage intelligence collection and analysis. We all know what 
it means when someone says a committee is in charge: no one is in 
charge. The bill attempts to correct this lack of accountability for 
intelligence collection and analysis by creating assistant directors 
who will be in charge of those areas important for the production of 
intelligence.
  The bill also creates a third Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence. Today, most people believe the Director of Central 
Intelligence is responsible for administering an intelligence community 
consisting of tens of thousands of people. But, like the areas of 
intelligence collection and analysis, there is no one other than the 
DCI who is personally responsible for the daily management of the 
rambling institution we call the intelligence community. In order to 
assist the DCI in the daily execution of this important responsibility, 
the bill creates the position of an Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence for Administration.
  The committee also has attempted in this bill to strengthen the DCI's 
abilities to discharge his responsibilities by statutorily requiring 
his participation in important executive branch deliberations. As many 
of my colleagues will remember, late last year the media carried 
stories stating the National Reconnaissance Office had amassed a large 
amount of funds excess to their immediate needs. Responding quickly in 
the media, senior Defense officials placed blame elsewhere. They 
accused the congressional oversight committees of being lax. They said 
a secret agreement between the DCI and Secretary of Defense prevented 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense from keeping tabs on NRO 
funding. They said excess funding levels found in the NRO would not 
be found in DOD programs because the NRO was not ``subject to the 
annual [DOD] programming and budgeting `scrub'.'' Based on these rapid 
Department of Defense off the record denials in the press, everyone 
turned to the DCI and asked, ``Where were you?''

  As it turns out Mr. President, there was no secret agreement between 
DOD and the DCI. In fact, there was no agreement, secret or otherwise. 
When asked to produce a copy of the supposed agreement, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense provided the committee with a memo signed in 
the early 1980's. In it, the Secretary of Defense simply reminded his 
staff they could not add or take money away from the National Foreign 
Intelligence Program without officially coordinating it with the DCI.
  Further, at the committee's request, the DOD Inspector General looked 
at eight of DOD's hundreds of procurement programs to see if there were 
funding levels in excess of annual requirements such as those Congress 
found in the NRO. The results are quite enlightening. Despite DOD s 
earlier denials in the media, five of the eight randomly selected 
programs had more money available than they needed in 1996. On the 
average, these five programs had almost 3 months extra funding. In 
fact, one program had 10 months more funding available to it than it 
could use in 1996. So after only a superficial IG evaluation of several 
DOD programs and despite DOD's protestations and claims of budget 
scrubs, we know DOD ends up each year with more funds than they can 
spend. I do not say this in criticism of Defense managers, but rather 
to point to a characteristic common to complex multi-year efforts 
involving new technology, regardless of the Government department 
responsible for them.
  What may be a surprise is the answer to the question: where was the 
DCI when the National Reconnaissance Office was accumulating a backlog 
of spending authority? The answer is, the DCI has no authority over how 
the NRO spends its money after Congress authorizes and appropriates the 
funds. Having no direct authority to move money around or to determine 
if the money could be spent better elsewhere, it should not be a 
surprise the DCI was not monitoring NRO's execution of its budget. That 
authority rested with the Secretary of Defense.
  The Director of Central Intelligence does not have the authority to 
execute the intelligence budget. This has many serious consequences 
both from an internal executive branch oversight perspective and from 
an operational perspective. Budget execution authority has occupied a 
lot of the committee's attention. In the original version of the bill, 
the committee attempted to give the DCI greater authority over his own 
budget. In order to get the bill to this stage in the annual 
authorization process, however, we have dropped several provisions 
which would have ensured greater internal oversight of spending on 
intelligence. Nonetheless, the bill still gives the Director some 
insight into the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and Tactical 
Intelligence and Related Activities--programs funded by the Department 
of Defense. While a modest improvement in aligning the DCI's 
authorities with his responsibilities, this new authority is important 
for ensuring better intelligence support of policy and for improving 
internal executive branch oversight of the Intelligence Community.

  The bill also has one other significant improvement for ensuring 
better oversight of intelligence. The committee is recommending the 
position of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency be 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. As stated in 
its report, the committee believes the confirmation process enhances 
accountability and strengthens the oversight process. Currently, all 
elements of the intelligence community, except the CIA, are part of 
departments having statutory general counsels who are Senate confirmed. 
Many legal issues are unique to the CIA. Unlike the other Senate-
confirmed general counsels, there is little informed public debate to 
aid the CIA's general counsel in its deliberations because the issues 
often involve sensitive intelligence sources or methods. The 
confirmation process allows the Senate to ensure better accountability 
and oversight of this important position.
  Finally, the bill enhances the Director of Central Intelligence's 
authorities by giving him a formal say in the naming of the directors 
of two of his most important agencies: the National Security Agency and 
the National Reconnaissance Office. Under current law and regulation, 
the Secretary of Defense could name the heads of these two intelligence 
community agencies without seeing if the DCI agrees with the 
nominations. I think it should be obvious to my colleagues what I meant 
when I called the DCI the Coordinator of Central Intelligence. Not only 
does the Director not have much direct control over his budget, he also 
does not even have a required formal role in the naming of the heads of 
the intelligence community's agencies. The bill takes a small step 
forward in giving him the opportunity to formally concur with an 
appointment made by the Secretary of Defense. Even under the bill's 
provisions, the Secretary of Defense has sufficient independence he 
could appoint the heads of the National Reconnaissance Office and the 
National Security Agency over the DCI's objection.
  I must add one thing in closing. During the intense discussions over 
the appropriate authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence, it 
became clear to some of us there is a basic misunderstanding of 
intelligence and its relationship to the Department of Defense. Mr. 
President, as I have said time and time again, intelligence supports 
policy. It also supports the planning and the operations of our 
military forces. The Secretary of Defense directly controls the 
intelligence assets to ensure that this essential function of 
intelligence will be fulfilled, and our troops will be properly 
supported. In addition, as a principal customer of the DCI and the most 
knowledgeable and articulate customer, the Secretary of Defense will 
correctly ensure that national intelligence fulfills military 
requirements. This is appropriate and everyone

[[Page S10640]]

agrees it must occur without exception. But the Department of Defense 
is only one of many agencies that executes the foreign policy of the 
United States. And, historically, DOD is the last part of the executive 
branch the President relies upon when he executes U.S. policy overseas. 
We are a nation that believes military power is the court of last 
resort in resolving international disputes, not the first. This makes 
intelligence support to the warfighter the last step of intelligence 
support to foreign policy--not the first. Thus, as some push for more 
and more intelligence support to the warfighter, they in fact risk 
diminishing the creativity and quality of our foreign policy by forcing 
the intelligence community to become ``militarized.'' The intelligence 
community's scarce resources can only do so much and if they focus 
almost exclusively on the Department of Defense, the other elements of 
our Government will not have the benefit of their advice and support. 
This is dangerous for the effectiveness of our foreign policy and could 
eventually lead to an over-reliance on the Department of Defense to 
solve our foreign policy problems simply because the best information 
we have on a foreign policy problem is focused on how to solve it with 
military force. Intelligence support outside of the Department of 
Defense is important, and it is critical to the proper functioning of 
the Government. The Congress must remain vigilant to make sure we do 
not cripple intelligence by relying too heavily on uninformed 
criticisms of intelligence support to the warfighter.

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I rise today to urge my colleagues to 
support the fiscal year 1997 intelligence authorization bill. In 
addition to containing the annual schedule of authorizations for 
intelligence activities, a matter vital to U.S. national security, this 
legislation contains important provisions intended to reorganize the 
U.S. intelligence community in order to increase its efficiency and 
effectiveness. This bill also contains badly needed legislation to 
criminalize the theft of U.S. economic and proprietary data by foreign 
governments or their agents.
  My colleagues should be aware that notwithstanding the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the rise of modern information systems, the 
organization of the United States intelligence community has remained 
essentially unchanged since 1947. The modest changes proposed in this 
legislation, intended to assist the Director of Central Intelligence 
manage this disparate and complex community in behalf of its many 
consumers, are in my view long overdue.
  The U.S. intelligence community is without equal in terms of its 
sophistication and global access. Yet, I believe that we can acquire 
even more capability from our intelligence community if changes are 
made to its organization and management. During the course of the last 
few years, for example, we have learned that the National 
Reconnaissance Office carried billions of dollars in so-called forward-
funding on its books. These funds, which might have been either 
returned to the Treasury or used for more pressing activities in the 
intelligence community or Defense Department, remained hidden from view 
in large part because the Director of Central Intelligence [DCI] and 
his staff were not even aware of their existence. I think this episode 
illustrates as well as any the fact that DCI has often been less of a 
director than a spokesman and ombudsman for the intelligence community. 
His degree of control and access to information has often been 
shockingly limited, yet he is the individual that the President, 
Congress, and the Secretary of Defense look to ensure that the 
intelligence community is operating both effectively and within the 
law.
  Another startling example of the limits of the DCI's control and 
access occurred during the Intelligence Committee's investigation into 
the tragic Aldrich Ames case. One of the surprising facts to emerge 
from this investigation was the revelation that neither William Webster 
nor Bob Gates knew the extent of the losses caused by Aldrich Ames 
within the ranks of the CIA's Russian assets, nor the degree of 
penetration that had obviously occurred. Senior managers in the 
Directorate of Operations, like senior managers in the National 
Reconnaissance Office, felt free to withhold this critical information 
from the individual nominally responsible for the performance of the 
U.S. intelligence community.
  The bill currently before the Senate would significantly strengthen 
the role of the DCI as the leader of the U.S. intelligence community 
and thereby help to ensure greater coherence and discipline within its 
ranks.
  First, section 707 of this bill grants the DCI new statutory 
authority to participate with the Secretary of Defense in developing 
the Joint Military Intelligence Program [JMIP] and individual service 
department [TIARA] intelligence budgets. The intent of this section is 
to eliminate duplication among national and military intelligence 
programs.
  Second, this measure stipulates that the DCI is responsible for 
approving all intelligence collection requirements and priorities.
  Third, it requires the DCI to be consulted regarding proposed 
reprogrammings within the Joint Military Intelligence budget.
  Finally, section 707 requires the DCI and Secretary of Defense to 
develop a joint data base for all intelligence programs' budget and 
activities. This provision will help to eliminate waste and duplication 
by ensuring that the DCI and his staff have access to all of the 
information necessary to evaluate programs within different 
intelligence organizations.
  Section 716 of the bill will give DCI a voice in the selection of the 
individuals who serve as the heads of U.S. intelligence organizations. 
While these same officials must in some cases also report to the 
Secretary of Defense, there is no reason in my view not to involve the 
DCI in their selection. Imagine trying to run a business in the private 
sector, or manage your office here in the Senate, if you were not free 
to select or discipline your subordinates. Yet, that is the situation 
that the DCI finds himself in with regard to his nominal subordinates 
at DIAA, NSA, and NRO--the organizations which account for the great 
preponderance of personnel and resources within the intelligence 
community. This bill will ensure that the DCI concurs in the selection 
of intelligence agency heads by the Secretary of Defense, or that his 
nonconcurrence be brought to the attention of the President in the 
event of a disagreement. The DCI, pursuant to this provision, would 
also provide the Secretary of Defense an annual performance evaluation 
of the heads of NSA, NRO, and the new National Imagery and Mapping 
Agency.
  Sections 709, 710, and 711 of the bill strengthen the DCI's staff by 
establishing new, senior intelligence community staff positions 
directly subordinate to the DCI. Specifically, the bill establishes DCI 
deputies for collection, analysis, and administration. This approach 
differs from that proposed by the administration, which seeks to have a 
single DCI deputy for community affairs and a second for the CIA. I am 
confident that these different approaches, which share a common 
objective, can be resolved in discussions with the House Intelligence 
Committee and the administration prior to approval of the Intelligence 
conference report later this month.
  Mr. President, these organizational provisions are the product of 
numerous hearings held by the Intelligence Committee dating back to 
1990. They are also to some degree the product of the Presidential 
Commission on Intelligence sponsored 2 years ago in the Senate by our 
distinguished colleague Senator John Warner of Virginia. Finally, these 
provisions reflect substantial contributions and refinements made by 
the members and staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. These 
provisions have been the subject of substantial discussions, hearings, 
and debate, and I believe they deserve the support of every Senator.
  In addition to these very substantial and important organizational 
provisions, I would like to draw the attention of my colleagues to 
title V of S. 1718, which criminalizes economic espionage conducted 
against the United States by foreign governments and their agents. Too 
often, when considering the issue of economic espionage, the question 
that has been asked is whether or not the United States should try to 
collect information that might be of value to U.S. industry. I believe 
the answer to that question is

[[Page S10641]]

clearly ``no.'' The issue that has not received as much attention as it 
deserves, in my opinion, concerns the threat posed to the U.S. economy 
by acts of industrial espionage perpetrated by foreign governments.
  Over the last few years I have tried to move the discussion of these 
matters out of the closed-door settings of the Intelligence and Armed 
Services Committees and into the public domain. Nearly 3 years ago the 
Senate adopted an amendment I offered to S. 4, the National 
Competitiveness Act, requiring the President to submit an annual report 
on foreign industrial espionage modeled on the State Department's 
annual report on terrorism, which has done a great deal to increase 
media, and thus public, awareness of the terrorism threat. I offered my 
amendment to the competitiveness bill so that it would attract the 
attention of the business media, rather than the defense-oriented 
press, and so that the Commerce Committee would have jurisdiction over 
it and become a forum for congressional oversight of this problem.
  While this reporting requirement had to be moved to the intelligence 
authorization bill after S. 4 stalled in conference, I am pleased that 
the first two annual reports have resulted in more and better media 
coverage of the threat that economic espionage poses to U.S. industry. 
At the same time, the President's report relegated too much information 
to the classified appendix, not because release of the information 
would have put at risk sources and methods, but because it would have 
diplomatic repercussions. Nevertheless, awareness of the problem has 
been increasing, as has the need to provide new tools to the FBI to 
deter the theft of critical U.S. trade and economic information.
  To their credit, Director Freeh and other administration officials 
have been forward-leaning in addressing the problem, and we are now in 
the position of enjoying administration support for the legislation 
that Senator Specter and I introduced, which has been incorporated in 
this bill, to provide the FBI the tools necessary to defeat and when 
necessary successfully prosecute acts of economic espionage. I expect 
the FBI and the Justice Department to use the new authorities provided 
by this legislation to aggressively investigate and prosecute acts of 
economic espionage.
  Mr. President, I would like to commend the chairman and vice chairman 
of the Intelligence Committee, as well as their staff, for their 
dedication and hard work. It has not been easy to forge a consensus on 
the many legislative provisions contained in this bill, but the very 
dedicated managers of the bill have found solutions to the concerns 
raised by the Armed Services Committee and the Department of Defense.
  In closing, I would like to also express my admiration for the 
thousands of dedicated personnel who labor in obscurity within the U.S. 
intelligence community. Most of their accomplishments remain secret, 
but in my nearly 10 years of service on the Intelligence Committee, I 
have developed enormous respect and appreciation for their 
achievements. They deserve the support and appreciation of the American 
people, the best managerial structure we can provide, and the resources 
necessary to accomplish their many missions. I believe this bill is 
fully consistent with those objectives and I urge its adoption by the 
Senate.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
committee amendments be agreed to; further, that an amendment offered 
by the managers and an amendment offered by Senator Thurmond which are 
at the desk be considered and agreed to en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The committee amendments were agreed to.
  The amendments (Nos. 5355 and 5356) considered and agreed to en bloc 
are as follows:


                           amendment no. 5355

   (Purpose: To strike section 718, relating to terms of service of 
     members of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate)

       On page 72, strike out line 14 and all that follows through 
     page 73, line 9.
                                                                    ____



                           amendment no. 5356

   (Purpose: Relating to the functions of the Assistant Director of 
                  Central Intelligence for Collection)

       On page 52, beginning on line 18, strike out ``shall 
     manage'' and all that follows through page 52, line 23, and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``shall assist the Director of Central 
     Intelligence in carrying out the Director's collection 
     responsibilities in order to ensure the efficient and 
     effective collection of national intelligence.' ''.

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill 
then be read a third time and the Senate then proceed to the 
consideration of Calendar No. 420, H.R. 3259, the House companion 
measure; further, that all after the enacting clause be stricken and 
the text of S. 1718, as amended, be inserted in lieu thereof, H.R. 3259 
then be deemed read a third time and passed, with the motion to 
reconsider laid upon the table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The bill (H.R. 3259), as amended, was deemed read for a third time 
and passed, as follows:

       Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives 
     (H.R. 3259) entitled ``An Act to authorize appropriations for 
     fiscal year 1997 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.'', 
     do pass with the following amendment:
       Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Postponement of applicability of sanctions laws to 
              intelligence activities.
Sec. 304. Post-employment restrictions.
Sec. 305. Executive branch oversight of budgets of elements of the 
              intelligence community.

               TITLE IV--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Sec. 401. Access to telephone records.

                      TITLE V--ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

Sec. 501. Short title.
Sec. 502. Prevention of economic espionage and protection of 
              proprietary economic information.

                   TITLE VI--COMBATTING PROLIFERATION

Sec. 601. Short title.

Subtitle A--Assessment of Organization and Structure of Government for 
                        Combatting Proliferation

Sec. 611. Establishment of commission.
Sec. 612. Duties of commission.
Sec. 613. Powers of commission.
Sec. 614. Commission personnel matters.
Sec. 615. Termination of commission.
Sec. 616. Definition.
Sec. 617. Authorization of appropriations.

                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

Sec. 621. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of 
              mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions.

        TITLE VII--RENEWAL AND REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
Sec. 703. Annual reports on intelligence.
Sec. 704. Transnational threats.
Sec. 705. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Sec. 706. National Intelligence Council.
Sec. 707. Enhancement of authority of Director of Central Intelligence 
              to manage budget, personnel, and activities of 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 708. Responsibilities of Secretary of Defense pertaining to the 
              National Foreign Intelligence Program.
Sec. 709. Improvement of intelligence collection.
Sec. 710. Improvement of analysis and production of intelligence.
Sec. 711. Improvement of administration of intelligence activities.
Sec. 712. Pay level of Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence.
Sec. 713. General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 714. Office of Congressional Affairs of the Director of Central 
              Intelligence.
Sec. 715. Assistance for law enforcement agencies by intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 716. Appointment and evaluation of officials responsible for 
              intelligence-related activities.
Sec. 717. Requirements for submittal of budget information on 
              intelligence activities.

[[Page S10642]]

Sec. 718. Report on intelligence community policy on protecting the 
              national information infrastructure against strategic 
              attacks.

            TITLE VIII--NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY

Sec. 801. National mission and collection tasking authority for the 
              National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 1997 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (12) The Central Imagery Office.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1997, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ____ 
     of the One Hundred Fourth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     1997 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by 
     this section.

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorizations of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of 
     the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1997 the 
     sum of $95,526,000. Within such amounts authorized, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and 
     Development Committee and the Environmental Task Force shall 
     remain available until September 30, 1998.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The staff of the 
     Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence is authorized 265 full-time personnel as of 
     September 30, 1997. Such personnel of the Community 
     Management Staff may be permanent employees of the Community 
     Management Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of 
     the United States Government.
       (c) Reimbursement.--During fiscal year 1997, any officer or 
     employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces 
     who is detailed to the staff of the Community Management 
     Account from another element of the United States Government 
     shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any 
     such officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a non-
     reimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the 
     performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 1997 the sum of $184,200,000.
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. POSTPONEMENT OF APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO 
                   INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     441d) is amended by striking ``the date which is one year 
     after the date of the enactment of this title'' and inserting 
     ``January 6, 1998''.

     SEC. 304. POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall prescribe regulations requiring each new and current 
     employee of the Central Intelligence Agency to sign a written 
     agreement restricting the activities of that employee upon 
     ceasing employment with the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (b) Agreement Elements.--The regulations shall provide that 
     an agreement contain provisions specifying that the employee 
     concerned not represent or advise the government, or any 
     political party, of a foreign country during the five-year 
     period beginning on the termination of the employee's 
     employment with the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (c) Disciplinary Actions.--The regulations shall specify 
     appropriate disciplinary actions (including loss of 
     retirement benefits) to be taken against any employee 
     determined by the Director of Central Intelligence to have 
     violated the agreement of the employee under this section.

     SEC. 305. EXECUTIVE BRANCH OVERSIGHT OF BUDGETS OF ELEMENTS 
                   OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report setting forth 
     the actions that have been taken to ensure adequate oversight 
     by the executive branch of the budget of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office and the budgets of other elements of 
     the intelligence community within the Department of Defense.
       (b) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall--
       (1) describe the extent to which the elements of the 
     intelligence community carrying out programs and activities 
     in the National Foreign Intelligence Program are subject to 
     requirements imposed on other elements and components of the 
     Department of Defense under the Chief Financial Officers Act 
     of 1990 (Public Law 101-576), and the amendments made by that 
     Act, and the Federal Financial Management Act of 1994 (title 
     IV of Public Law 103-356), and the amendments made by that 
     Act;
       (2) describe the extent to which such elements submit to 
     the Office of Management and Budget budget justification 
     materials and execution reports similar to the budget 
     justification materials and execution reports submitted to 
     the Office of Management and Budget by the non-intelligence 
     components of the Department of Defense;
       (3) describe the extent to which the National 
     Reconnaissance Office submits to the Office of Management and 
     Budget, the Community Management Staff, and the Office of the 
     Secretary of Defense--
       (A) complete information on the cost, schedule, 
     performance, and requirements for any new major acquisition 
     before initiating the acquisition;
       (B) yearly reports (including baseline cost and schedule 
     information) on major acquisitions;
       (C) planned and actual expenditures in connection with 
     major acquisitions; and
       (D) variances from any cost baselines for major 
     acquisitions (including explanations of such variances); and
       (4) assess the extent to which the National Reconnaissance 
     Office has submitted to Office of Management and Budget, the 
     Community Management Staff, and the Office of the Secretary 
     of Defense on a monthly basis a detailed budget execution 
     report similar to the budget execution report prepared for 
     Department of Defense programs.
       (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
       (1) The term ``congressional intelligence committees'' 
     shall mean the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) The term ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' has 
     the meaning given such term in section 3(6) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)).
               TITLE IV--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

     SEC. 401. ACCESS TO TELEPHONE RECORDS.

       (a) Access for Counterintelligence Purposes.--Section 
     2709(b)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting ``local and long distance'' before ``toll billing 
     records''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 2703(c)(1)(C) of such 
     title is amended by inserting ``local and long distance'' 
     after ``address,''.
       (c) Civil Remedy.--Section 2707 of such title is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``customer'' and 
     inserting ``other person'';
       (2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following: 
     ``If the violation is willful or intentional, the court may 
     assess punitive damages. In the case of a successful action 
     to enforce liability under this section, the court may assess 
     the costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney 
     fees determined by the court.'';
       (3) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections 
     (e) and (f), respectively; and
       (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection (d):
       ``(d) Disciplinary Actions for Violations.--If a court 
     determines that any agency or department of the United States 
     has violated this chapter and the court finds that the 
     circumstances surrounding the violation raise the question 
     whether or not an officer or employee of the agency or 
     department acted willfully or

[[Page S10643]]

     intentionally with respect to the violation, the agency or 
     department concerned shall promptly initiate a proceeding to 
     determine whether or not disciplinary action is warranted 
     against the officer or employee.''.
                      TITLE V--ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

     SEC. 501. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Economic Espionage Act of 
     1996''.

     SEC. 502. PREVENTION OF ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND PROTECTION OF 
                   PROPRIETARY ECONOMIC INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after chapter 27 the following new 
     chapter:

                    ``CHAPTER 28--ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

``Sec.
``571. Definitions.
``572. Economic espionage.
``573. Criminal forfeiture.
``574. Import and export sanctions.
``575. Scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
``576. Construction with other laws.
``577. Preservation of confidentiality.
``578. Law enforcement and intelligence activities.

     ``Sec. 571. Definitions

       ``For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions 
     shall apply:
       ``(1) Foreign agent.--The term `foreign agent' means any 
     officer, employee, proxy, servant, delegate, or 
     representative of a foreign nation or government.
       ``(2) Foreign instrumentality.--The term `foreign 
     instrumentality' means any agency, bureau, ministry, 
     component, institution, association, or any legal, 
     commercial, or business organization, corporation, firm, or 
     entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, 
     commanded, managed, or dominated by a foreign government or 
     any political subdivision, instrumentality, or other 
     authority thereof.
       ``(3) Owner.--The term `owner' means the person or persons 
     in whom, or the United States Government component, 
     department, or agency in which, rightful legal, beneficial, 
     or equitable title to, or license in, proprietary economic 
     information is reposed.
       ``(4) Proprietary economic information.--The term 
     `proprietary economic information' means all forms and types 
     of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or 
     engineering information (including data, plans, tools, 
     mechanisms, compounds, formulas, designs, prototypes, 
     processes, procedures, programs, codes, or commercial 
     strategies, whether tangible or intangible, and whether 
     stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, 
     graphically, photographically, or in writing), if--
       ``(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to 
     keep such information confidential; and
       ``(B) the information derives independent economic value, 
     actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and 
     not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the 
     public.
       ``(5) United states person.--The term `United States 
     person' means--
       ``(A) in the case of a natural person, a citizen of the 
     United States or a permanent resident alien of the United 
     States; and
       ``(B) in the case of an organization (as that term is 
     defined in section 18 of this title), an entity substantially 
     owned or controlled by citizens of the United States or 
     permanent resident aliens of the United States, or 
     incorporated in the United States.

     ``Sec. 572. Economic espionage

       ``(a) In General.--Any person who, with knowledge or reason 
     to believe that he or she is acting on behalf of, or with the 
     intent to benefit, any foreign nation, government, 
     instrumentality, or agent, knowingly--
       ``(1) steals, wrongfully appropriates, takes, carries away, 
     or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains 
     proprietary economic information;
       ``(2) wrongfully copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, 
     photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, 
     photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, 
     communicates, or conveys proprietary economic information;
       ``(3) being entrusted with, or having lawful possession or 
     control of, or access to, proprietary economic information, 
     wrongfully copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, 
     downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, 
     replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, 
     or conveys the same;
       ``(4) receives, buys, or possesses proprietary economic 
     information, knowing the same to have been stolen or 
     wrongfully appropriated, obtained, or converted;
       ``(5) attempts to commit any offense described in any of 
     paragraphs (1) through (4);
       ``(6) wrongfully solicits another to commit any offense 
     described in any of paragraphs (1) through (4); or
       ``(7) conspires with one or more other persons to commit 
     any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (4), 
     and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the 
     object of the conspiracy,

     shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined not 
     more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or 
     both.
       ``(b) Organizations.--Any organization that commits any 
     offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more 
     than $10,000,000.
       ``(c) Exception.--It shall not be a violation of this 
     section to disclose proprietary economic information in the 
     case of--
       ``(1) appropriate disclosures to Congress; or
       ``(2) disclosures to an authorized official of an executive 
     agency that are deemed essential to reporting a violation of 
     United States law.

     ``Sec. 573. Criminal forfeiture

       ``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of State 
     law to the contrary, any person convicted of a violation 
     under this chapter shall forfeit to the United States--
       ``(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any 
     proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the 
     result of such violation; and
       ``(2) any of the property of that person used, or intended 
     to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate 
     the commission of such violation.
       ``(b) Court Action.--The court, in imposing sentence on 
     such person, shall order, in addition to any other sentence 
     imposed pursuant to this chapter, that the person forfeit to 
     the United States all property described in this section.
       ``(c) Applicability of Other Law.--Property subject to 
     forfeiture under this section, any seizure and disposition 
     thereof, and any administrative or judicial proceeding in 
     relation thereto, shall be governed by the provisions of 
     section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
     Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection 
     (d) of that section.

     ``Sec. 574. Import and export sanctions

       ``(a) Action by the President.--The President may, to the 
     extent consistent with international agreements to which the 
     United States is a party, prohibit, for a period of not 
     longer than 5 years, the importation into, or exportation 
     from, the United States, whether by carriage of tangible 
     items or by transmission, any merchandise produced, made, 
     assembled, or manufactured by a person convicted of any 
     offense described in section 572 of this title, or in the 
     case of an organization convicted of any offense described in 
     such section, its successor entity or entities.
       ``(b) Action by the Secretary of the Treasury.--
       ``(1) Civil penalty.--The Secretary of the Treasury may 
     impose on any person who knowingly violates any order of the 
     President issued under the authority of this section, a civil 
     penalty equal to not more than 5 times the value of the 
     exports or imports involved, or $100,000, whichever is 
     greater.
       ``(2) Seizure and forfeiture.--Any merchandise imported or 
     exported in violation of an order of the President issued 
     under this section shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture 
     in accordance with sections 602 through 619 of the Tariff Act 
     of 1930.
       ``(3) Applicability of other provisions.--The provisions of 
     law relating to seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and 
     condemnation of property for violation of the United States 
     customs laws, the disposition of such property or the 
     proceeds from the sale thereof, the remission or mitigation 
     of such forfeiture, and the compromise of claims, shall apply 
     to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been 
     incurred under this section to the extent that they are 
     applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
     chapter.

     ``Sec. 575. Scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction

       ``This chapter applies--
       ``(1) to conduct occurring within the United States; and
       ``(2) to conduct occurring outside the United States if--
       ``(A) the offender is a United States person; or
       ``(B) the act in furtherance of the offense was committed 
     in the United States.

     ``Sec. 576. Construction with other laws

       ``This chapter shall not be construed to preempt or 
     displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, 
     provided by Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or 
     territorial laws that are applicable to the misappropriation 
     of proprietary economic information.

     ``Sec. 577. Preservation of confidentiality

       ``In any prosecution or other proceeding under this 
     chapter, the court shall enter such orders and take such 
     other action as may be necessary and appropriate to preserve 
     the confidentiality of proprietary economic information, 
     consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of 
     Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
     Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws. An 
     interlocutory appeal by the United States shall lie from a 
     decision or order of a district court authorizing or 
     directing the disclosure of proprietary economic information.

     ``Sec. 578. Law enforcement and intelligence activities

       ``This chapter does not prohibit, and shall not impair, any 
     lawful activity conducted by a law enforcement or regulatory 
     agency of the United States, a State, or a political 
     subdivision of a State, or an intelligence agency of the 
     United States.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of chapters at the 
     beginning of part I of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 27 
     the following new item:

``28. Economic espionage.....................................571''.....

       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 2516(1)(a) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended by inserting ``chapter 28 
     (relating to economic espionage),'' after ``or under the 
     following chapters of this title:''.
                   TITLE VI--COMBATTING PROLIFERATION

     SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Combatting Proliferation 
     of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996''.
Subtitle A--Assessment of Organization and Structure of Government for 
                        Combatting Proliferation

     SEC. 611. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be 
     known as the Commission to Assess the Organization of the 
     Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of 
     Mass Destruction (in this subtitle referred to as the 
     ``Commission'').

[[Page S10644]]

       (b) Membership.--The Commission shall be composed of eight 
     members of whom--
       (1) four shall be appointed by the President;
       (2) one shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of the 
     Senate;
       (3) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the 
     Senate;
       (4) one shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (5) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (c) Qualifications of Members.--(1) To the maximum extent 
     practicable, the individuals appointed as members of the 
     Commission shall be individuals who are nationally recognized 
     for expertise regarding--
       (A) the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
       (B) the efficient and effective implementation of United 
     States nonproliferation policy; or
       (C) the implementation, funding, or oversight of the 
     national security policies of the United States.
       (2) An official who appoints members of the Commission may 
     not appoint an individual as a member if, in the judgment of 
     the official, the individual possesses any personal or 
     financial interest in the discharge of any of the duties of 
     the Commission.
       (d) Period of Appointment; Vacancies.--Members shall be 
     appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in the 
     Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled 
     in the same manner as the original appointment.
       (e)  Initial Meeting.--No later than 30 days after the date 
     on which all members of the Commission have been appointed, 
     the Commission shall hold its first meeting.
       (f) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the Commission 
     shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may 
     hold hearings.
       (g) Chairman and Vice Chairman.--The Commission shall 
     select a Chairman and Vice Chairman from among its members.
       (h) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet at the call of the 
     Chairman.

     SEC. 612. DUTIES OF COMMISSION.

       (a) Study.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission shall carry out a thorough 
     study of the organization of the Federal Government, 
     including the elements of the intelligence community, with 
     respect to combatting the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       (2) Specific requirements.--In carrying out the study, the 
     Commission shall--
       (A) assess the current structure and organization of the 
     departments and agencies of the Federal Government having 
     responsibilities for combatting the proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction; and
       (B) assess the effectiveness of United States cooperation 
     with foreign governments with respect to nonproliferation 
     activities, including cooperation--
       (i) between elements of the intelligence community and 
     elements of the intelligence-gathering services of foreign 
     governments;
       (ii) between other departments and agencies of the Federal 
     Government and the counterparts to such departments and 
     agencies in foreign governments; and
       (iii) between the Federal Government and international 
     organizations.
       (3) Assessments.--In making the assessments under paragraph 
     (2), the Commission should address--
       (A) the organization of the export control activities 
     (including licensing and enforcement activities) of the 
     Federal Government relating to the proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction;
       (B) arrangements for coordinating the funding of United 
     States nonproliferation activities;
       (C) existing arrangements governing the flow of information 
     among departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
     responsible for nonproliferation activities;
       (D) the effectiveness of the organization and function of 
     interagency groups in ensuring implementation of United 
     States treaty obligations, laws, and policies with respect to 
     nonproliferation;
       (E) the administration of sanctions for purposes of 
     nonproliferation, including the measures taken by departments 
     and agencies of the Federal Government to implement, assess, 
     and enhance the effectiveness of such sanctions;
       (F) the organization, management, and oversight of United 
     States counterproliferation activities;
       (G) the recruitment, training, morale, expertise, 
     retention, and advancement of Federal Government personnel 
     responsible for the nonproliferation functions of the Federal 
     Government, including any problems in such activities;
       (H) the role in United States nonproliferation activities 
     of the National Security Council, the Office of Management 
     and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and 
     other offices in the Executive Office of the President having 
     responsibilities for such activities;
       (I) the organization of the activities of the Federal 
     Government to verify government-to-government assurances and 
     commitments with respect to nonproliferation, including 
     assurances regarding the future use of commodities exported 
     from the United States; and
       (J) the costs and benefits to the United States of 
     increased centralization and of decreased centralization in 
     the administration of the nonproliferation activities of the 
     Federal Government.
       (b) Recommendations.--In conducting the study, the 
     Commission shall develop recommendations on means of 
     improving the effectiveness of the organization of the 
     departments and agencies of the Federal Government in meeting 
     the national security interests of the United States with 
     respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
     Such recommendations shall include specific recommendations 
     to eliminate duplications of effort, and other 
     inefficiencies, in and among such departments and agencies.
       (c) Report.--(1) Not later than 18 months after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to 
     Congress a report containing a detailed statement of the 
     findings and conclusions of the Commission, together with its 
     recommendations for such legislation and administrative 
     actions as it considers appropriate.
       (2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may include a classified annex.

     SEC. 613. POWERS OF COMMISSION.

       (a) Hearings.--The Commission may hold such hearings, sit 
     and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and 
     receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable 
     to carry out the purposes of this subtitle.
       (b) Information From Federal Agencies.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission may secure directly from 
     any Federal department or agency such information as the 
     Commission considers necessary to carry out the provisions of 
     this subtitle. Upon request of the Chairman of the 
     Commission, the head of such department or agency shall 
     furnish such information to the Commission.
       (2) Classified information.--A department or agency may 
     furnish the Commission classified information under this 
     subsection. The Commission shall take appropriate actions to 
     safeguard classified information furnished to the Commission 
     under this paragraph.
       (c) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United 
     States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions 
     as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
       (d) Gifts.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of 
     gifts or donations of services or property.

     SEC. 614. COMMISSION PERSONNEL MATTERS.

       (a) Compensation of Members.--Each member of the Commission 
     who is not an officer or employee of the Federal Government 
     shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent 
     of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of 
     the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United 
     States Code, for each day (including travel time) during 
     which such member is engaged in the performance of the duties 
     of the Commission. All members of the Commission who are 
     officers or employees of the United States shall serve 
     without compensation in addition to that received for their 
     services as officers or employees of the United States.
       (b) Travel Expenses.--The members of the Commission shall 
     be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
     subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies 
     under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States 
     Code, while away from their homes or regular places of 
     business in the performance of services for the Commission.
       (c) Staff.--
       (1) In general.--The Chairman of the Commission may, 
     without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, 
     appoint and terminate an executive director and such other 
     additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the 
     Commission to perform its duties. The employment of an 
     executive director shall be subject to confirmation by the 
     Commission.
       (2) Compensation.--The Chairman of the Commission may fix 
     the compensation of the executive director and other 
     personnel without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and 
     subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, 
     relating to classification of positions and General Schedule 
     pay rates, except that the rate of pay for the executive 
     director and other personnel may not exceed the rate payable 
     for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of 
     such title.
       (d) Detail of Government Employees.--Any Federal Government 
     employee may be detailed to the Commission without 
     reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption 
     or loss of civil service status or privilege.
       (e) Procurement of Temporary and Intermittent Services.--
     The Chairman of the Commission may procure temporary and 
     intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, 
     United States Code, at rates for individuals which do not 
     exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay 
     prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under 
     section 5316 of such title.

     SEC. 615. TERMINATION OF COMMISSION.

       The Commission shall terminate 60 days after the date on 
     which the Commission submits its report under section 612(c).

     SEC. 616. DEFINITION.

       For purposes of this subtitle, the term ``intelligence 
     community'' shall have the meaning given such term in section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a(4)).

     SEC. 617. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     for the Commission for fiscal year 1997 such sums as may be 
     necessary for the Commission to carry out its duties under 
     this subtitle.
       (b) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the 
     authorization of appropriations in subsection (a) shall 
     remain available for expenditure until the termination of the 
     Commission under section 615.
                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

     SEC. 621. REPORTS ON ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO 
                   WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED 
                   CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS.

       (a) Reports.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a 
     report on--
       (1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the 
     preceding 6 months of dual-use and other

[[Page S10645]]

     technology useful for the development or production of 
     weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, 
     chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced 
     conventional munitions; and
       (2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such 
     countries.
       (b) Form of Reports.--The reports submitted under 
     subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may include a classified annex.
        TITLE VII--RENEWAL AND REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Intelligence Activities 
     Renewal and Reform Act of 1996''.

     SEC. 702. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     402) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (j); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new 
     subsection (h):
       ``(h)(1) There is established within the National Security 
     Council a committee to be known as the `Committee on Foreign 
     Intelligence'.
       ``(2) The Committee shall be composed of the following:
       ``(A) The Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(B) The Secretary of State.
       ``(C) The Secretary of Defense.
       ``(D) The Assistant to the President for National Security 
     Affairs, who shall serve as the chairperson of the Committee.
       ``(E) Such other members as the President may designate.
       ``(3) The function of the Committee shall be to assist the 
     Council in its activities by--
       ``(A) identifying the intelligence required to address the 
     national security interests of the United States as specified 
     by the President;
       ``(B) establishing priorities (including funding 
     priorities) among the programs, projects, and activities that 
     address such interests and requirements; and
       ``(C) establishing policies relating to the conduct of 
     intelligence activities of the United States, including 
     appropriate roles and missions for the elements of the 
     intelligence community and appropriate targets of 
     intelligence collection activities.
       ``(4) In carrying out its function, the Committee shall--
       ``(A) conduct an annual review of the national security 
     interests of the United States;
       ``(B) identify on an annual basis, and at such other times 
     as the Council may require, the intelligence required to meet 
     such interests and establish an order of priority for the 
     collection and analysis of such intelligence; and
       ``(C) conduct an annual review of the elements of the 
     intelligence community in order to determine the success of 
     such elements in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating the 
     intelligence identified under subparagraph (B).
       ``(5) The Committee shall submit each year to the Council 
     and to the Director of Central Intelligence a comprehensive 
     report on its activities during the preceding year, including 
     its activities under paragraphs (3) and (4).''.

     SEC. 703. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) In General.--Section 109 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is amended by striking out 
     subsections (a) and (b) and inserting in lieu thereof the 
     following new subsections:
       ``Sec. 109. (a) In General.--(1) Not later than January 31 
     each year, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on the requirements of the 
     United States for intelligence and the activities of the 
     intelligence community.
       ``(2) The purpose of the report is to facilitate an 
     assessment of the activities of the intelligence community 
     during the preceding fiscal year and to assist in the 
     development of a mission and a budget for the intelligence 
     community for the fiscal year beginning in the year in which 
     the report is submitted.
       ``(3) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
     but may include a classified annex.
       ``(b) Matters Covered.--(1) Each report under subsection 
     (a) shall--
       ``(A) specify the intelligence required to meet the 
     national security interests of the United States, and set 
     forth an order of priority for the collection and analysis of 
     intelligence required to meet such interests, for the fiscal 
     year beginning in the year in which the report is submitted; 
     and
       ``(B) evaluate the performance of the intelligence 
     community in collecting and analyzing intelligence required 
     to meet such interests during the fiscal year ending in the 
     year preceding the year in which the report is submitted, 
     including a description of the significant successes and 
     significant failures of the intelligence community in such 
     collection and analysis during that fiscal year.
       ``(2) The report shall specify matters under paragraph 
     (1)(A) in sufficient detail to assist Congress in making 
     decisions with respect to the allocation of resources for the 
     matters specified.
       ``(c) Definition.--In this section, the term `appropriate 
     congressional committees' means the following:
       ``(1) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee 
     on Appropriations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate.
       ``(2) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
     Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on National 
     Security of the House of Representatives.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The section heading of such 
     section is amended to read as follows:


                   ``annual report on intelligence''.

       (2) The table of contents in the first section of that Act 
     is amended by striking the item relating to section 109 and 
     inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 109. Annual report on intelligence.''.

     SEC. 704. TRANSNATIONAL THREATS.

       Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     402) is amended by inserting after subsection (h), as amended 
     by section 702 of this Act, the following new subsection:
       ``(i)(1) There is established within the National Security 
     Council a committee to be known as the `Committee on 
     Transnational Threats'.
       ``(2) The Committee shall include the following members:
       ``(A) The Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(B) The Secretary of State.
       ``(C) The Secretary of Defense.
       ``(D) The Attorney General.
       ``(E) The Assistant to the President for National Security 
     Affairs, who shall serve as the chairperson of the Committee.
       ``(F) Such other members as the President may designate.
       ``(3) The function of the Committee shall be to coordinate 
     and direct the activities of the United States Government 
     relating to combatting transnational threats.
       ``(4) In carrying out its function, the Committee shall--
       ``(A) identify transnational threats;
       ``(B) develop strategies to enable the United States 
     Government to respond to transnational threats identified 
     under subparagraph (A);
       ``(C) monitor implementation of such strategies;
       ``(D) make recommendations as to appropriate responses to 
     specific transnational threats;
       ``(E) assist in the resolution of operational and policy 
     differences among Federal departments and agencies in their 
     responses to transnational threats;
       ``(F) develop policies and procedures to ensure the 
     effective sharing of information about transnational threats 
     among Federal departments and agencies, including law 
     enforcement agencies and the elements of the intelligence 
     community; and
       ``(G) develop guidelines to enhance and improve the 
     coordination of activities of Federal law enforcement 
     agencies and elements of the intelligence community outside 
     the United States with respect to transnational threats.
       ``(5) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
     `transnational threat' means the following:
       ``(A) Any transnational activity (including international 
     terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such 
     weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the national 
     security of the United States.
       ``(B) Any individual or group that engages in an activity 
     referred to in subparagraph (A).''.

     SEC. 705. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) In General.--Title I of The National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 102 (50 U.S.C. 403)--
       (A) by striking the section heading and all that follows 
     through paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and inserting the 
     following:


            ``office of the director of central intelligence

       ``Sec. 102.'';
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (2) of subsection (a) as 
     subsection (a) and in such subsection (a), as so 
     redesignated, by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and 
     (C) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and
       (C) by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following:
       ``(d)(1) There is an Office of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence. The function of the Office is to assist the 
     Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out the duties 
     and responsibilities of the Director under this Act and to 
     carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by law.
       ``(2) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence is 
     composed of the following:
       ``(A) The Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(B) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
       ``(C) The National Intelligence Council.
       ``(D) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Collection.
       ``(E) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Analysis and Production.
       ``(F) The Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Administration.
       ``(G) Such other offices and officials as may be 
     established by law or the Director of Central Intelligence 
     may establish or designate in the Office.
       ``(3) To assist the Director in fulfilling the 
     responsibilities of the Director as head of the intelligence 
     community, the Director shall employ and utilize in the 
     Office of the Director of Central Intelligence a professional 
     staff having an expertise in matters relating to such 
     responsibilities and may establish permanent positions and 
     appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff.''; and
       (2) by inserting after section 102, as so amended, the 
     following new section:


                     ``central intelligence agency

       ``Sec. 102A. There is a Central Intelligence Agency. The 
     function of the Agency shall be to assist the Director of 
     Central Intelligence in carrying out the responsibilities 
     referred to in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 103(d) 
     of this Act.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by striking the item relating 
     to section 102 and inserting the following new items:

``Sec. 102. Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
``Sec. 102A. Central Intelligence Agency.''.

     SEC. 706. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.

       Section 103(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(B), by inserting ``, or as contractors 
     of the Council or employees of such contractors,'' after ``on 
     the Council'';

[[Page S10646]]

       (2) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs 
     (5) and (6), respectively;
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
     paragraph (4):
       ``(4) Subject to the direction and control of the Director 
     of Central Intelligence, the Center may carry out its 
     responsibilities under this subsection by contract, including 
     contracts for substantive experts necessary to assist the 
     Center with particular assessments under this subsection.''; 
     and
       (4) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by adding at the 
     end the following: ``The Center shall also be readily 
     accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate 
     individuals not otherwise associated with the intelligence 
     community.''.

     SEC. 707. ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE TO MANAGE BUDGET, PERSONNEL, AND 
                   ACTIVITIES OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Section 103(c) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is amended--
       (1) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following 
     new paragraph (1):
       ``(1) facilitate the development of an annual budget for 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     United States by--
       ``(A) developing and presenting to the President an annual 
     budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program; and
       ``(B) participating in the development by the Secretary of 
     Defense of the annual budgets for the Joint Military 
     Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and 
     Related Activities Program;'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (6) as 
     paragraphs (4) through (7), respectively; and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
     paragraph (3):
       ``(3) approve collection requirements, determine collection 
     priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities 
     levied on national collection assets, except as otherwise 
     agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the 
     direction of the President;''.
       (b) Use of Funds.--Section 104 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4) is amended--
       (1) by adding at the end of subsection (c) the following: 
     ``The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director of 
     Central Intelligence before reprogramming funds made 
     available under the Joint Military Intelligence Program.'';
       (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), and (g) as 
     subsections (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and
       (3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection (e):
       ``(e) Database and Budget Execution Information.--The 
     Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense 
     shall jointly issue guidance for the development and 
     implementation by the year 2000 of a database to provide 
     timely and accurate information on the amounts and status of 
     resources, including periodic budget execution updates, for 
     national, defense-wide, and tactical intelligence 
     activities.''.

     SEC. 708. RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERTAINING 
                   TO THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       Section 105 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-5) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``, in consultation 
     with the Director of Central Intelligence,'' after 
     ``Secretary of Defense'' in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1); and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Annual Evaluation of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.--The Director of Central Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman 
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall submit each year to the 
     Committee on Foreign Intelligence of the National Security 
     Council and the appropriate congressional committees (as 
     defined in section 109(c)) an evaluation of the performance 
     and the responsiveness of the National Security Agency, the 
     National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency in meeting their national missions.''.

     SEC. 709. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

       (a) Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Collection.--Section 102 of the National Security Act of 
     1947, as amended by section 705(a)(1) of this Act, is amended 
     by adding at the end the following:
       ``(e)(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in 
     carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, 
     there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
     for Collection, who shall be appointed by the President, by 
     and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(2)(A) If neither the Director of Central Intelligence 
     nor the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a 
     commissioned officer of the Armed Forces at the time of the 
     nomination of an individual to the position of Assistant 
     Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, the 
     President shall nominate an individual for that position from 
     among the commissioned officers of the Armed Forces who have 
     substantial experience in managing intelligence activities.
       ``(B) The provisions of subsection (c)(3) shall apply to 
     any commissioned officer of the Armed Forces while serving in 
     the position of Assistant Director for Collection.
       ``(3) The Assistant Director for Collection shall assist 
     the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out the 
     Director's collection responsibilities in order to ensure the 
     efficient and effective collection of national 
     intelligence.''.
       (b) Consolidation of Human Intelligence Collection 
     Activities.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     and the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to 
     the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the National Security 
     Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the House of Representatives a report on the ongoing efforts 
     of those officials to achieve commonality, interoperability, 
     and, where practicable, consolidation of the collection of 
     clandestine intelligence from human sources conducted by the 
     Defense Human Intelligence Service of the Department of 
     Defense and the Directorate of Operations of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency.

     SEC. 710. IMPROVEMENT OF ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     amended by section 709(a) of this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(f)(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in 
     carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, 
     there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
     for Analysis and Production, who shall be appointed by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(2) The Assistant Director for Analysis and Production 
     shall--
       ``(A) oversee the analysis and production of intelligence 
     by the elements of the intelligence community;
       ``(B) establish standards and priorities relating to such 
     analysis and production;
       ``(C) monitor the allocation of resources for the analysis 
     and production of intelligence in order to identify 
     unnecessary duplication in the analysis and production of 
     intelligence;
       ``(D) identify intelligence to be collected for purposes of 
     the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
     Collection; and
       ``(E) provide such additional analysis and production of 
     intelligence as the President and the National Security 
     Council may require.''.

     SEC. 711. IMPROVEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     amended by section 710 of this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(g)(1) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in 
     carrying out the Director's responsibilities under this Act, 
     there shall be an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence 
     for Administration, who shall be appointed by the President, 
     by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(2) The Assistant Director for Administration shall 
     manage such activities relating to the administration of the 
     intelligence community as the Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall require.''.

     SEC. 712. PAY LEVEL OF ASSISTANT DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence (3).''.

     SEC. 713. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Establishment of Position.--The Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:


          ``general counsel of the central intelligence agency

       ``Sec. 20. (a) There is a General Counsel of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, appointed from civilian life by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(b) The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency.
       ``(c) The General Counsel of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency shall perform such functions as the Director of 
     Central Intelligence may prescribe.''.
       (b) Executive Schedule IV Pay Level.--Section 5315 of title 
     5, United States Code, as amended by section 712 of this Act, 
     is further amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

     SEC. 714. OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     amended by section 711 of this Act, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(h)(1) There is hereby established the Office of 
     Congressional Affairs of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.
       ``(2)(A) The Office shall be headed by the Director of the 
     Office of Congressional Affairs of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.
       ``(B) The Director of Central Intelligence may designate 
     the Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency to serve as the Director of the 
     Office of Congressional Affairs of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.
       ``(3) The Director shall coordinate the congressional 
     affairs activities of the elements of the intelligence 
     community and have such additional responsibilities as the 
     Director of Central Intelligence may prescribe.
       ``(4) Nothing in the subsection may be construed to 
     preclude the elements of the intelligence community from 
     responding directly to requests from Congress.''.

     SEC. 715. ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES BY 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 105 the following new section:


         ``assistance to united states law enforcement agencies

       ``Sec. 105A. (a) Authority To Provide Assistance.--Subject 
     to subsection (b), elements of

[[Page S10647]]

     the intelligence community may, upon the request of a United 
     States law enforcement agency, collect information outside 
     the United States about individuals who are not United States 
     persons. Such elements may collect such information 
     notwithstanding that the law enforcement agency intends to 
     use the information collected for purposes of a law 
     enforcement investigation or counterintelligence 
     investigation.
       ``(b) Limitation on Assistance by Elements of Department of 
     Defense.--(1) With respect to elements within the Department 
     of Defense, the authority in subsection (a) applies only to 
     the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance 
     Office, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       ``(2) Assistance provided under this section by elements of 
     the Department of Defense may not include the direct 
     participation of a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or 
     Marine Corps in an arrest or similar activity.
       ``(3) Assistance may not be provided under this section by 
     an element of the Department of Defense if the provision of 
     such assistance will adversely affect the military 
     preparedness of the United States.
       ``(4) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations 
     governing the exercise of authority under this section by 
     elements of the Department of Defense, including regulations 
     relating to the protection of sources and methods in the 
     exercise of such authority.
       ``(c) Definitions.--For purposes of subsection (a):
       ``(1) The term `United States law enforcement agency' means 
     any department or agency of the Federal Government that the 
     Attorney General designates as law enforcement agency for 
     purposes of this section.
       ``(2) The term `United States person' means the following:
       ``(A) A United States citizen.
       ``(B) An alien known by the intelligence agency concerned 
     to be a permanent resident alien.
       ``(C) An unincorporated association substantially composed 
     of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens.
       ``(D) A corporation incorporated in the United States, 
     except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign 
     government or governments.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 105 the following new item:

``Sec. 105A. Assistance to United States law enforcement agencies.''.

     SEC. 716. APPOINTMENT AND EVALUATION OF OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE 
                   FOR INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES.

       (a) In General.--Section 106 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6) is amended to read as follows:


``appointment and evaluation of officials responsible for intelligence-
                           related activities

       ``Sec. 106. (a) Concurrence of DCI in Certain 
     Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position 
     referred to in paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense shall 
     obtain the concurrence of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence before recommending to the President an 
     individual for appointment to the position. If the Director 
     does not concur in the recommendation, the Secretary may make 
     the recommendation to the President without the Director's 
     concurrence, but shall include in the recommendation a 
     statement that the Director does not concur in the 
     recommendation.
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
       ``(A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
       ``(B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
       ``(b) Consultation with DCI in Certain Appointments.--(1) 
     In the event of a vacancy in a position referred to in 
     paragraph (2), the head of the department or agency having 
     jurisdiction over the position shall consult with the 
     Director of Central Intelligence before appointing an 
     individual to fill the vacancy or recommending to the 
     President an individual to be nominated to fill the vacancy.
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
       ``(A) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
       ``(B) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
     Research.
       ``(C) The Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and 
     National Security of the Department of Energy.
       ``(D) The Assistant Director, National Security Division of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by striking the item relating 
     to section 106 and inserting in lieu thereof the following 
     new item:

``Sec. 106. Appointment and evaluation of officials responsible for 
              intelligence-related activities.''.

     SEC. 717. REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBMITTAL OF BUDGET INFORMATION ON 
                   INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Submittal With Annual Budget.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, the President shall include in each 
     budget for a fiscal year submitted under section 1105 of 
     title 31, United States Code, the following information:
       (1) The aggregate amount appropriated during the current 
     fiscal year on all intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government.
       (2) The aggregate amount requested in such budget for the 
     fiscal year covered by the budget for all intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the United States 
     Government.
       (b) Form of Submittal.--The President shall submit the 
     information required under subsection (a) in unclassified 
     form.

     SEC. 718. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICY ON 
                   PROTECTING THE NATIONAL INFORMATION 
                   INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST STRATEGIC ATTACKS.

       (a) In General.--(1) Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report setting 
     forth--
       (A) the results of a review of the threats to the United 
     States on protecting the national information infrastructure 
     against information warfare and other non-traditional 
     attacks; and
       (B) the counterintelligence response of the Director.
       (2) The report shall include a description of the plans of 
     the intelligence community to provide intelligence support 
     for the indications, warning, and assessment functions of the 
     intelligence community with respect to information warfare 
     and other non-traditional attacks by foreign nations, groups, 
     or individuals against the national information 
     infrastructure.
       (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
       (1) The term ``national information infrastructure'' 
     includes the information infrastructure of the public or 
     private sector.
       (2) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
            TITLE VIII--NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY

     SEC. 801. NATIONAL MISSION AND COLLECTION TASKING AUTHORITY 
                   FOR THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:


 ``national mission and collection tasking authority for the national 
                       imagery and mapping agency

       ``Sec. 110. (a) National Mission.--The National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency shall have a national mission to support the 
     imagery requirements of the Department of State, the 
     Department of Defense, and other departments and agencies of 
     the Federal Government. The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall establish requirements and priorities to govern the 
     collection of national intelligence by the National Imagery 
     and Mapping Agency. The Secretary of Defense and the Director 
     of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Chairman of 
     the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall jointly identify 
     deficiencies in the capabilities of the National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency to accomplish assigned national missions and 
     shall jointly develop policies and programs to review and 
     correct such deficiencies.
       ``(b) Collection and Tasking Authority.--Except as 
     otherwise agreed by the Director of Central Intelligence and 
     the Secretary of Defense pursuant to direction provided by 
     the President, the Director of Central Intelligence has the 
     authority to approve collection requirements, determine 
     collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection 
     priorities levied on national imagery collection assets.''.
       (2) The table of contents in the first section of that Act 
     is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
     109 the following new item:

``Sec. 110. National mission and collection tasking authority for the 
              National Imagery and Mapping Agency.''.

       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect on the later of--
       (1) the date of the enactment of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; or
       (2) the date of the enactment of this Act.

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
insist on its amendment to H.R. 3259 and request a conference with the 
House, the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on the part of the 
Senate, and, finally, S. 1718 be placed back on the calendar.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Presiding Officer (Mr. Brown) appointed Mr. Specter, Mr. Lugar, 
Mr. Shelby, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Inhofe, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Cohen, 
Mr. Brown, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Graham, Mr. Kerry, Mr. 
Baucus, Mr. Johnston, and Mr. Robb, and from the Committee on Armed 
Services, Mr. Thurmond and Mr. Nunn conferees on the part of the 
Senate.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that the 
Record remain open for the insertion of any additional statements as 
any member of the committee or other Senator may wish to add.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, as I understand the procedure, that now 
concludes the intelligence authorization bill, but since I am here and 
it has just been acted upon, I would like to make a few comments to 
supplement my more extended statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I believe that this legislation is a 
very, very significant step forward in reform of the U.S. intelligence 
community--candidly, not as far as we should have

[[Page S10648]]

gone, not as far as I would like to have gone, but a considerable 
distance, a significant distance in improving the intelligence 
community in the United States.
  The intelligence community has been under considerable attack with 
disclosures of Aldrich Ames, with the problems in Guatemala, with many 
problems around the globe. And last year, at the initiative of our 
distinguished colleague, Senator John Warner, a commission was 
appointed to make recommendations on what should be done to reform the 
U.S. intelligence community. The commission--first headed by former 
Secretary of Defense Aspin, whose untimely death caused a vacancy and 
the need to appoint a subsequent chairman, another former Secretary of 
Defense, Harold Brown--came up with a comprehensive list of 
recommendations, and the Intelligence Committee then held extensive 
hearings on a subject that goes back many years.
  The Intelligence Committee then submitted a program which we thought 
would make very major changes in the U.S. intelligence community. There 
was very considerable objection then raised from a number of quarters, 
principally by the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  Finally, after very extensive negotiations, not only with the Armed 
Services Committee but also with the Governmental Affairs Committee 
and, to a lesser extent, with the Rules Committee, we have hammered out 
the agreement which has been presented here and has been agreed to and 
will now go to conference.
  It had been my desire that there should have been more authority in 
the Director of Central Intelligence on reprogramming, more authority 
on concurrence on the appointment of key officials because of the 
general responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, but 
that was not to be.
  We filed our report at an early stage, but there was a reference 
under the rules of referral to the Armed Services Committee which took 
considerable time and considerable time by the Governmental Affairs 
Committee, and I thank Senator Warner for not taking time in the Rules 
Committee.
  We find ourselves, as we frequently do in the legislative process, 
very close to the end of the session, not with sufficient time to bring 
the matter to the floor and to debate the issues of reprogramming or 
concurrence or appointments or many other issues, so we have had to 
make an accommodation to have the bill handled by unanimous consent in 
the course of a few minutes as we have already done earlier today. 
Senator Kerrey, my distinguished vice chairman, and I have agreed to 
this because, as I say, this is a significant step forward. We want to 
go to conference. We want to get these provisions accepted and placed 
into law even though a great deal more should have been done.

  This bill contains very significant provisions on economic espionage, 
contains a very significant provision on a commission to be established 
to streamline the Federal Government on our handling of weapons of mass 
destruction. Some 96 different agencies now touch that issue. There is 
not centralized command. And those are very, very important matters.
  An interest which I had pursued, to try to give greater authority to 
the Director of Central Intelligence, has come into the spotlight with 
the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers on June 25 of this year, and the 
allegation by the Secretary of Defense, in a July 9 hearing in the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, that there was intelligence failure, 
which I think was an incorrect assertion. The staff of the Intelligence 
Committee--and I emphasize ``the staff'' and not the full Intelligence 
Committee--but the staff prepared a report which was released last 
Thursday with my conclusions in my capacity as chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee, but again not the full committee, but my 
individual conclusions that there was not an intelligence failure.
  Then yesterday we had the report of the Downing task force which took 
to task the Pentagon as well as the local field commanders. I 
personally visited Khobar Towers last month, and on viewing Khobar 
Towers and seeing a fence only 60 feet from these high-rise apartments, 
which house thousands of our airmen, 19 of whom were killed and 
hundreds of whom were injured, it was apparent to me, in the face of 
the many intelligence reports which had been received, that there was 
not an intelligence failure and that there was in fact a failure by the 
military, going to the Pentagon and the highest levels of the Pentagon, 
on failing to act to protect our airmen.
  The conclusions yesterday of the Downing task force, as featured in 
the Associated Press reports, faulted the Pentagon, as well as the 
local commanders, for what had been done. I make comment of this at 
this time because I believe this ties into the reform of the 
intelligence community to have a Director of Central Intelligence who 
collects all of the information and could, in effect, rattle the cages, 
where necessary, to call attention to the top Pentagon officials, 
including the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
about the need for greater protection of our forces. We have not gone 
that far, and we have not accomplished that. I make these comments in 
the context of what had occurred on June 25 and what happened just 
yesterday with the filing of the Downing committee report.
  But I have talked to my colleagues about where we stand now, and the 
sentiments have been expressed that we will have a chance to further 
improve the intelligence community at a later date. But that remains, 
to some substantial extent, unfinished business, as we have unfinished 
business as to how we handle not only intelligence but force protection 
around the United States.
  But this is a significant step forward. This is the very best we 
could do. Those who do not know the interworkings of the Senate might 
be interested to know that any one Senator can tie up this bill. A 
number of Senators interposed objections, which we had to work through 
laboriously to get this bill to the stage where it is now where it has 
been passed.
  I thank my distinguished colleague, Senator Kerrey from Nebraska, who 
has done an extraordinary job in many things over many years, but 
especially on the Senate Intelligence Committee. As we have worked 
together, we have had some tough times, especially as the election 
grows nearer. We have kept the Intelligence Committee working on a 
bipartisan, nonpartisan basis. I think it is indispensable on a 
committee of this sort that the chairman and the vice chairman and 
really members on both sides of the aisle work very closely to keep 
partisan politics out of it. Senator Kerrey and I have worked 
laboriously at that and I think we have succeeded, notwithstanding the 
fact that we face some very, very difficult issues and continue to face 
difficult issues as we work to complete quite a number of projects 
which yet remain undone.
  I would like to single out for special praise--this is always a 
delicate matter--some key staffers, Charles Battaglia, who is the staff 
director, and Chris Straub, who is the staff director for the 
Democrats, the minority staff director, for the extraordinary work 
which they have done on the nights, Saturdays, Sundays, you name it; 
and for general counsel, Suzanne Spaulding, and for Ed Levine, who has 
been a powerhouse in drafting very complex reports. I thank the Chair, 
and I note the presence of my colleague, Senator Pell. I yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
  Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague and friend for yielding at this time.

                          ____________________