[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 128 (Tuesday, September 17, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10624-S10625]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have come to the floor immediately 
after attending a meeting with President Clinton, the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and Members of both Houses from both parties on the subject of 
Iraq. I would like to comment about an issue which I raised 
specifically with the President, and that is my urging him to submit to 
the Congress of the United States the issue as to whether there should 
be force used against Iraq in the gulf.
  In time of crisis there is no question, under our Constitution, that 
the President as Commander in Chief has the authority to take emergency 
action. Similarly, it is plain that the Congress of the United States 
has the sole authority to declare a war, and that involves the use of 
force, as in the gulf operation in 1991, which was really a war, where 
the President came to the Congress of the United States in January 
1991, and on this floor this body debated that issue and, by a 
relatively narrow vote of 52 to 47, authorized the use of force. It is 
my strong view that the issue of the use of force in Iraq today ought 
to be decided by the Congress of the United States and not unilaterally 
by the President where there is no pending emergency and when there is 
time for due deliberation in accordance with our constitutional 
procedures.
  I note when the first missile attacks were launched 2 weeks ago 
today, on September 3, the President did not consult in advance with 
the Congress, which I believe was necessary under the War Powers Act. 
That is water over the dam. At the meeting this morning there were 
comments from Members of Congress about the need for more consultation. 
I believe the session this morning was the first time that there had 
been a group of Members of the House and Senate assembled to be briefed 
by the administration, by the President, and by the Secretary of State 
and Secretary of Defense.
  We know from the bitter experience of the Vietnam war that the United 
States cannot engage in military action of a protracted nature without 
public support, and the first place to seek the public support is in 
the Congress of the United States in our representative capacity. It is 
more than something which is desirable; it is something which is 
mandated by the constitutional provision that grants exclusive 
authority to the Congress of the United States to declare war. We have 
seen a transition as to what constitutes a war--in Korea, where there 
was no declaration of war by the Congress, in Vietnam, where there was 
no declaration of war by the Congress. And we have seen the adoption of 
the War Powers Act as an effort to strike a balance between 
congressional authority to declare war and the President's authority as 
Commander in Chief; and, as provided under the War Powers Act, where 
there are imminent hostilities, the President is required to consult in 
advance with the Congress and to make prompt reports to the Congress, 
although the President does have the authority to act in case of 
emergency.

  My legal judgment is that the President does have authority as 
Commander in Chief to act in an emergency, even in the absence of the 
War Powers Act. But when there is time for action by the Congress of 
the United States, then that action ought to be taken by the Congress 
on the use of force, which is tantamount to war, which we saw in the 
gulf in 1991 where the Congress did act. And we may see--we all hope we 
do not see it--but we may see that in Iraq at the present time.
  The Congress is soon to go out of session in advance of the November 
elections. While we are here, this issue ought to be considered by the 
Congress of the United States as to whether we are going to have the 
use of force.
  In the meeting this morning, attended by many Members of the House 
and Senate, both Democrats and Republicans, there was considerable 
question raised on both sides of the aisle as to what our policy is at 
the present time, whether we have a coherent policy as to what we are 
going to do there, not only how we get in but how we get out, and what 
our policy ought to be.
  Those policy issues are really matters which ought to be debated by 
the Congress of the United States and acted upon by the Congress of the 
United States.

[[Page S10625]]

  We know there is a considerable problem that we face today on getting 
support from our allies, and that is an indispensable prerequisite, it 
seems to me, for action by the United States military forces. We have 
seen the deployment of air power all the way from Guam for missile 
strikes, and yet we wonder why we are not using air power from Saudi 
Arabia or from Turkey, and the question is raised as to whether the 
Saudis or the people in command of Turkey are willing to allow us to 
use their bases for these air strikes.
  When it comes to the issue of containment, representations were made 
by key administration officials that there is a full and total support 
by the Saudis for our efforts to contain Saddam Hussein, but that when 
it comes to the issue of air strikes, the same cannot be said; there is 
less than a full measure of support from the Saudis. So that when we 
deal with the issue of how much force the United States of America 
ought to use in the gulf against Saddam Hussein, those are the issues 
which ought to be considered by Congress, and we ought to have a 
statement of particularity as to just how much support we are going to 
get from our allies.
  We know the French, illustratively, will refuse to supply in the 
expanded zone to the 33d parallel. There have been reports from Kuwait 
that the Kuwait Government is not prepared, not really willing to have 
us expand our military forces there. There is some dispute about that, 
with representations being made by the administration that the media 
reports have been overblown and that there is really cooperation from 
Kuwait and from Bahrain and from others. But on the face of what is at 
least the public record, there is a serious question as to whether we 
do have real support among our allies. That is something which has to 
be considered in some detail.
  In our meeting this morning, reservations were expressed by Members 
on both sides of the aisle, and there was a question as to what we 
ought to be doing with Saudi Arabia in terms of long-range policy and 
long-range planning. When we moved into the gulf war in 1991, it was an 
emergency situation, but the plan was supposed to enable the Saudis to 
have time to defend themselves and to take action in their own defense, 
and that has not happened. Every time Saddam Hussein moves, there is 
significant expenditure of U.S. resources and U.S. money.
  In the middle of the discussion, we had the point raised about 
whether the defense budget is adequate and a very blunt reference to 
the Chief of Staff, Mr. Panetta, as to agreeing to the figures which 
have come from the appropriators, and that also was obviously a matter 
of fundamental importance by the Congress because we are the 
appropriators and we have had the administration take the position that 
the administration does not like what the Congress is doing by way of 
appropriations. But the administration is coming in with a very 
expensive operation, and it may be justified, it may be warranted, it 
may be necessary, but that is a matter for the Congress to decide as to 
what our policy should be and how much money we are prepared to spend.
  In the meeting today, the question was raised rather bluntly about 
the credibility of the administration in expanding the no-fly zone to 
the south when the actions come against the Kurds in the north, and 
there seems to be a consensus that the action taken thus far by the 
administration has not weakened Saddam Hussein but has strengthened 
Saddam Hussein and that he did, in fact, receive cover when certain 
Kurdish leaders invited him in; and there is a distinction to be made 
about what the United States will do for a vital U.S. interest 
contrasted with what we might do for humanitarian purposes, and that 
while U.S. military personnel may be placed in harm's way where we have 
an issue of a vital national interest, there may be a difference of 
opinion if we are dealing with a humanitarian consideration.

  Mr. President, all of this boils down to the judgment, my judgment, 
that the American people today are not informed about what the 
administration is seeking to do in the gulf and what the administration 
is seeking to do against Saddam Hussein, and the Congress has not been 
consulted in advance of the initial missile strikes and has been, in my 
view, inadequately informed as we have proceeded. When you deal with 
the use of force, which is tantamount to war, that is a matter to be 
decided by the Congress of the United States, leaving to the President 
his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to act in cases of 
emergency. But at this time we do not have an emergency. We have time 
for deliberation in the Congress, for debate in this Chamber and the 
floor of the House of Representatives to decide what our policy should 
be, what we are prepared to spend, and how we ought to proceed. That is 
why in the meeting I asked the President to submit to the Congress his 
request for an authorization for the use of force so that matter could 
be decided by the Congress in accordance with constitutional 
provisions.
  Mr. President, I noted that I made that request to the President, and 
I commented about a letter which I had sent to the President yesterday 
on that subject. I ask unanimous consent that the text of that letter 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                               Washington, DC, September 16, 1996.
     Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
     President of the United States, The White House, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I am writing to you to express my 
     growing concerns over the escalation of U.S. military 
     activity in and around the Persian Gulf and to urge you to 
     promptly seek a resolution from Congress authorizing the use 
     of force in the Gulf. There is no emergency which would 
     require escalation of the use of force by you in your role as 
     Commander-in-Chief. The constitutional role of Congress as 
     the sole authority to declare war should be respected, as it 
     was in 1991, with the Congress determining national policy on 
     our objectives, the conditions of allied burden sharing, an 
     exit strategy and an overall policy which is lacking at the 
     present time. A further statement of my reasons follows.
       First, let me repeat my publicly stated support for the 
     policy of containment of Saddam Hussein's regime and for the 
     practice of United States military involvement in the 
     enforcement of the United Nations' ordered no-fly zone in 
     southern Iraq. No less than in 1991, when I voted to support 
     the use of force in the Gulf War, the United States has vital 
     interests in this region which must be protected.
       Second, I strongly support the bravery and professionalism 
     of our military men and women who are carrying out your 
     orders at substantial risk to their lives.
       All this having been said, I believe your current course of 
     gradual escalation against Iraq, starting with the missile 
     attacks on September 4, (for which you sought no prior 
     authorization from Congress) constitutes the involvement of 
     our armed forces in the sorts of hostile and potentially 
     hostile situations so as to trigger the limit of your 
     authority as commander-in-chief established by the War Powers 
     Act.
       Moreover, this present course of escalation--especially the 
     reported possible dispatch of 3-5,000 ground troops to Kuwait 
     --could well lead to a renewal of full scale war between the 
     United States and Iraq. For example, if, heaven forbid, our 
     Army units were to sustain losses from any form of Iraqi 
     attack, this country would be duty-bound to respond with 
     massive force.
       I know you understand, particularly in view of this 
     country's bitter experiences with undeclared wars in Korea 
     and Vietnam, the paramount importance of the constitutional 
     principle that only Congress can declare war. It is an 
     unavoidable concomitant of this principle that the President 
     cannot have unilateral authority to set up a trip-wire which, 
     if breached, would surely commit this nation to war. Your 
     present posture toward Iraq, however, may be creating just 
     such a trip-wire.
       Beyond the always vital matter of honoring basic 
     constitutional principle, I urge you to promptly seek 
     Congressional authority for the use of force against Iraq 
     because, just as in 1991, this democratic exercise is by far 
     the best way to clarify both the legitimate means and the 
     legitimate ends which underlie our national policy towards 
     Saddam Hussein.
       A congressional debate now will focus you and the Congress, 
     and ultimately the American people, on what our policy should 
     be at this time in the Persian Gulf. It will define national 
     understanding and hopefully shape a national consensus on the 
     key questions which must be answered as the potential for 
     deeper conflict grows--questions such as the proper burden 
     sharing we must demand from our allies in the region and 
     around the world and, most importantly, about an exit 
     strategy to ensure a way back home, in reasonable time and at 
     reasonable cost, for the troops we so rapidly send today into 
     harm's way.
       Thank you for your consideration.
           Sincerely,

     Arlen Specter.
     
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