[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 128 (Tuesday, September 17, 1996)]
[House]
[Page H10499]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




         UPCOMING HEARING IN THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. HUNTER. Madam Speaker, I wanted to comment a little bit about the 
upcoming hearing that will be held tomorrow by the Committee on 
National Security, myself and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Weldon], who is here, the chairman of the Committee on National 
Security, the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. Spence], and our 
other members.
  We will have before us the Secretary of Defense and a number of other 
military leaders to explain some of the issues that have arisen from 
the bombing in Saudi Arabia that took place June 25 of this year, the 
bombing of the Khobar Barracks, in which 19 Americans were killed and 
several hundred, more than several hundred, were wounded.
  Madam Speaker, I think this bombing and the way it took place is 
symbolic of the way the Clinton administration conducts national 
defense, at least the American preparation. And the situation we placed 
ourselves in, that our military leaders placed our uniformed people in, 
I think is symbolic of the weakness of the Clinton administration on 
defense, the naivete of the Clinton administration on defense, and the 
fact that they tend to be, time and again, taken by surprise in this 
very dangerous world.
  Mr. Speaker, first, a number of Americans, since the Middle East is 
in the headlines again, a number of Americans are asking what we are 
requesting to do in Iraq. They are worried about what the 
administration has in terms of their plan, whether they have a goal, 
whether they have a military operation that really evaluates all the 
possible contingencies.
  Many people we talked to throughout the country, our constituents, 
say to us, we think, if we have to, we will go in and do the same thing 
that George Bush did several years ago in Desert Storm.
  I just want to report, Madam Speaker, to the House and to our 
constituents, that we cannot do today what we did in Desert Storm, 
because the Clinton administration has dangerously weakened our forces, 
your forces. They took your United States Army, that numbered 18 
divisions, 8 of which we sent to Desert Storm, and they have cut that 
almost in half, to 10 divisions. So we cannot send eight divisions to 
Desert Storm if we have to, because that only leaves two left for 
another contingency that could take place.
  They have cut our fighter airwings, our air power, and reduced them 
from 23 fighter airwings, so we have roughly 50 percent of the United 
States air power that existed just a few years ago.
  They have cut our U.S. Navy from 550 ships to about 350 ships. So 
Madam Speaker, the Clinton administration has dangerously weakened the 
United States.
  With respect to the attack on the Khobar Barracks on June 25, the 
analysis that is coming forth from General Downing's report strongly 
criticizes the way the Department of Defense and the Clinton 
administration handled the security measures that existed immediately 
prior to this bombing.
  Let me just go through some of the criticisms: They strongly 
criticized U.S. central command for failing to support the enhancement 
of force protection measures under an increased threat. Remember, when 
we say increased threat, that last November, 6 months before the 
bombing in Saudi Arabia at the Khobar Barracks, we had a bombing with a 
250-pound bomb at Riyadh. That was November 13, 1995. We should have 
learned something from that.
  But the Downing report criticizes the U.S. central command for 
failing to support the enhancement of force protection measures under 
an increased threat, and they criticize them for creating a confused 
set of command responsibilities. That means that the so-called czar, 
this force protection czar that was put in place, that was put in place 
with such an undermanning of responsibility and had so little 
authority, that in fact that was nobody in Saudi Arabia who really was 
in charge of force protection.
  They are also criticized for passively accepting Air Force manning 
and rotation policies. What does that mean? That means that in this 
fighter airwing the tours are approximately 90 days. That means that 
the command turns over, 10 percent of the command turns over. Every 
week, 10 percent of your command is changed, so there is no continuity 
of leadership, such that a leader realizes he is going to be there for 
a while and has a chance to settle down, look at the security problems, 
and address those problems. So the rotation policy is an extremely bad 
policy and nobody addressed that.
  Let me just say one other thing about the bombing, Madam Speaker, 
that took place in November, that should have warned us about the 
Khobar bombing. That was a 250-pound bomb. We should have known that 
there could be a similar bomb launched on our troops 6 months later at 
Khobar. That occurred. I hope people will watch the hearing tomorrow 
and follow this analysis in depth.

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