[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 126 (Friday, September 13, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10540-S10546]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         DEFENSE BURDENSHARING

  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to report 
briefly on a trip which I made from August 16 through August 31 of this 
year. Madam President, the trip focused on a number of key items in my 
travels which took me to Korea, Japan, and

[[Page S10541]]

China, then to the Gulf States of Oman, Saudi Arabia, then to Israel 
and Syria, with a brief stop in Paris, and back to the United States.
  One of the themes of concern to me, Madam President, was the issue of 
the enormous U.S. military expenditure, and the need to have 
burdensharing from our allies where we are maintaining so much of the 
cost of defense.
  The Japanese are paying 70 percent of the cost. But it seems to me 
realistic that with their enormous gross national product, and their 
ability to pay their own defenses, that even 70 percent is not 
sufficient in the context of spending so little of their own money on 
national defense. The 70-percent figure is much larger than the moneys 
paid by the Saudis, where we have recently seen plans to move our base 
from Dhahran to the desert with a 50-percent sharing by the Saudis. But 
even there, when we are there to protect their interests and they are a 
very affluent nation, it seems to me that more ought to be undertaken 
by the Saudis. In South Korea, we have 37,000 American troops, and 
there have long been suggestions that some of those troops ought to be 
withdrawn.

  South Korea, again, is a very prosperous nation. Some of their 
defense planning is long range, not on the immediate potential threat 
from North Korea. And there again, it would be reasonable to have more 
cost sharing by the South Koreans. I suggest that our defense policy 
ought to undertake a look globally beyond NATO as to burdensharing with 
the specific reference to Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia.
  During the course of travels, we also had a considerable focus on the 
nuclear threat, and, potentially, real problems in North Korea, where 
they have the wherewithal to have nuclear weapons, and where they have 
ballistic missiles which are reported to have sufficient thrust to 
reach Japan or Alaska, and far beyond.
  The situation in North Korea is very unstable. I had hoped to visit 
North Korea personally, and had some preliminary indications, up to the 
start of the trip, that we could do so, but at the last minute we were 
told we could not visit North Korea.
  The situation there is unstable because of the shortage of food, and 
I think that we have to engage the North Koreans. We have to do what we 
can to see that there is a stable government there. Assistance on food 
is elementary. Japan and South Korea are aiding. We are to some extent, 
but we have to keep a close watch on the volatility, and the potential 
instability in North Korea.
  When we traveled to China, a key focus of attention was the trade 
issue, and we were told that trade is not calculated properly because 
of certain statistics coming from Hong Kong. But we made the point as 
emphatically as we could that there needed to be more reciprocity and 
more openness of the Chinese markets. We visited the city of Harbin in 
Manchuria and saw really great potential for American growth, the 
growth of American trade, meeting with United States businessmen in 
that community.
  While in China, we also took up the issue of freedom of religion, 
noting the fact that Christians were not permitted to practice 
religion, and recent activities by the Chinese Government inhibited 
freedom of religion by Christians, and by Jews, and those with 
different religious views. We were assured, but I think vacuously, in 
their statements that there was freedom of religion, but the facts are 
very much to the contrary. And we asserted that point with some 
forcefulness.
  We also took up the issue of the sale of M-11 missiles from China to 
Pakistan. We protested that very strongly. We were told by the Chinese 
that they had not violated international accords, and there again a 
stalemate in our discussions.
  There is a real question as to how we deal with the Chinese, whether 
by sanctions or totally by diplomacy. My sense is we have to consider 
sanctions. With the Chinese destabilizing the subcontinent of Taiwan, 
firing their own ballistic missiles close to Taiwan, it seems to me 
that we have to be forceful and really consider the imposition of 
sanctions there.
  Moving on to Saudi Arabia, we had an opportunity to view the Khobar 
Towers site at Dhahran, a subject I reported on briefly in a floor 
statement yesterday--an enormous tragedy, 19 Americans killed, hundreds 
wounded. Seeing the perimeter fence less than 60 feet from Khobar 
Towers, it was apparent, on a cursory inspection, that it was an open 
invitation to terrorism. As noted in my floor statement yesterday, it 
was my conclusion that there had been ample warnings about the 
potentiality of terrorists at the perimeter fence, and the possible use 
of a large bomb.
  That is something that will be considered in greater detail by the 
Downing Task Force, but there is an urgent need for stepped-up force 
protection, certainly in places like Khobar Towers, and doubtless 
around the world considering the escalating threat of terrorism.
  We had a chance to meet with Defense Minister Sultan, Crown Prince 
Abdullah, and urged cooperation with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation on the inquiries to determine who the terrorists were at 
Khobar Towers, and reregistered our complaints that the FBI had not an 
opportunity to interview the four men who were executed for the 
November 13, 1995, car bombing in Riyadh, and raised the issue about 
the need for Saudi Arabia to undertake a greater share of the cost of 
the defense burdens.

  Before arriving in Saudi Arabia, we made a brief stop in Mongolia, an 
independent nation, landlocked between China and Russia, quite a 
product of an emerging democracy, having thrown off the yoke of the 
Soviet Union even before its disintegration. There we saw an effort for 
democratic process succeeding in its embryo stage, and an effort for 
the free market.
  Coming to the Mideast, we had an opportunity to confer with Prime 
Minister Netanyahu, Syrian President Assad, and Palestinian Chairman 
Arafat. There is obvious difficulty with the new government being beset 
by problems on all sides. We find disagreements within the Likud 
government, but it is my impression that Prime Minister Netanyahu is up 
to the challenge.
  We had an extended discussion with Chairman Yasser Arafat, and I must 
say that every time I meet with Chairman Arafat, it is a wonder to me 
that we are doing business with a man who has had such a long record of 
terrorism. Going back to September 13, 1993, when then Prime Minister 
Rabin, and then Foreign Minister Peres shook the hand of Yasser Arafat, 
it seemed to me that if the Israeli leaders were prepared to do so, the 
United States should be supportive of their efforts toward the peace 
process. Certainly the Israelis have suffered the major burden of the 
terrorist attack by the PLO in the Mideast area.
  In the conversations with Chairman Arafat, we discussed the 
resolution that Senator Shelby and I had introduced, which was enacted, 
which conditioned U.S. aid on a change of the PLO charter. Chairman 
Arafat assured us it had been done. And when he produced the document, 
it was evident on its face that it was insufficient, the document 
saying merely that all provisions inconsistent with the September 13, 
1993, agreement would be revoked. That is not sufficient, and we made 
that point as emphatically as we could.
  We then talked about terrorism, and with Yasser Arafat, a man who has 
been on a first-name basis, and has dealt with the terrorists of the 
area, Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas and Hamas, and emphasized as strongly as we 
could the need for the Palestinian authority to be proactive in 
stopping terrorist attacks in that area.
  Chairman Arafat assured us that he was doing what he could, 
emphasized the point that he himself was subject to terrorist 
assassination plots, and said that he would do what he could. But I 
think that is an area which requires increasing U.S. pressure. We need 
to be as emphatic as we can that if we are to continue United States 
military aid to the Palestinians, they are going to have to take 
effective action against terrorism.
  Mr. President, in accordance with my practice to report on foreign 
travel, this floor statement summarizes a trip taken from August 16 
through 31, 1996, to Asia and the Mideast, focusing on the North Korean 
threat, the question of sanctions against China for selling M-11 
missiles to Pakistan and for firing a ballistic missile 100 miles from

[[Page S10542]]

Taiwan, the June 25 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, the Mideast 
peace process and terrorism, with a stop in Paris for discussions on 
terrorism and trade en route back to the United States.
  We had hoped to visit North Korea to personally inspect the North 
Korean nuclear facility and to meet with North Korean leaders. But, 
despite several months of efforts, the North Koreans ultimately refused 
to allow my visit.
  We were able, however, to discuss the North Korean situation with 
local American authorities and with leaders of North Korea's immediate 
neighbors: Japan, South Korea, and China. Specifically, we met with 
American military leaders, including our commanders in Japan and South 
Korea; Japanese, Korean, and Chinese foreign affairs and trade 
ministers; and with our ambassadors and embassy teams. We wanted to 
investigate not only the North Korean threat, but whether we should ask 
South Korea to shoulder a larger share of the defense burden--no small 
matter when we face deficits and difficult domestic spending cuts.
  Upon arrival in Japan on the evening of August 18, we met with Marine 
Brig. Gen. Terrance Murray, deputy commander of United States forces in 
Japan. I continued my discussion with General Murray and his top aides 
the next morning, focusing largely on the North Korean threat and the 
allocation of United States resources in Japan. It struck me that our 
arrangement with Japan, in which the Japanese Government pays 70 
percent of the cost of United States forces in Japan, offered a model 
for renegotiating with South Korea, and our costs in defending Saudi 
Arabia. When dealing with such prosperous nations, there is no reason 
why they should not pay the full cost of their own defense.
  Following our second meeting with General Murray, we met with Rust 
Deming, our Charge d'Affaires, and the Embassy team in Tokyo. We agreed 
that Congress should focus on unfair trade practices in Japan that cost 
American companies millions of dollars and American workers tens of 
thousands of jobs. By demonstrating sustained interest in trade issues, 
and by more congressional visits to Japan, we can send Japan a message 
that the United States has staying power.
  Mr. Deming and his team of issues experts discussed how American 
companies find themselves competing for a small portion of various 
Japanese markets, or find themselves shut out entirely, as networks of 
Japanese firms buy only from each other, while enjoying the profits as 
American firms buy from them. We do not even have the recourse of some 
developing nations, which are allowed under GATT to set formulas that 
require, for example, that the Japanese build one automobile in a host 
country for every given number of cars they sell there.
  Industries in which American firms suffer from unfair Japanese market 
restrictions include semiconductors, automobiles and auto parts, 
insurance and civil aviation. Several major corporations in my own 
State of Pennsylvania are being handcuffed.

  Following my meeting with the Tokyo Embassy team, I took up trade 
issues in an hour-long meeting with Masaki Orita, Director General of 
Japan's North American Affairs Bureau. I told Mr. Orita there was a lot 
of anger in America, which I see almost every time I hold an open-house 
town meeting in Pennsylvania, that American markets are open to Japan, 
but Japanese markets are closed to America. I told Mr. Orita I did not 
agree with him that the atmosphere has improved on United States-
Japanese trade, when we face a $59.5 billion deficit even though it has 
been reduced from $65 billion.
  After our meeting, I asked Mr. Orita to pose for a photograph with 
me. As I prepared to snap the photo, Mr. Orita remarked with pleasure 
that my Olympus pocket camera was made in Japan. I told Mr. Orita that 
we believed in free markets, and were pleased to buy Japanese products, 
if they were the best available at the best prices. I said Japan ought 
to allow Kodak to compete with Fuji in its film market.
  When my flash failed to fire, Mr. Orita immediately said the problem 
was with the batteries, and not with the camera. I told Mr. Orita that 
my batteries were also made in Japan.
  I brought up trade again at my next meeting, with Kenzo Oshima, 
Deputy Director General of Japan's Asian Affairs Bureau. During our 
hour-long talk, we also focused on the North Korean situation and the 
prospect for Four Power Talks among the United States, North Korea, 
South Korea, and Japan.
  Mr. Oshima told me he was apprehensive about North Korean military 
aggression.
  North Korea is already over the line, I said. By legal definition, an 
arm raised in a threat to strike--or missiles massed on the DMZ--
constitutes assault. The actual act of striking constitutes battery.
  We agreed that food should be given to North Korea for humanitarian 
reasons, even at the risk that some of our contributions would be 
diverted to uses that increase friction on the Korean Peninsula.
  On costs, I pressed Mr. Oshima that Japan should contribute more to 
the North Korean process, especially in light of an additional $25 
million in United States aid recently approved by the United States 
Senate. Mr. Oshima promised a meaningful contribution from Japan, but 
would not offer a figure.
  On Tuesday, August 20, we met in Seoul, South Korea, for 2 hours with 
Ambassador James Laney, members of the Embassy team, and Marine Maj. 
Gen. Frank Libutti. Our experts stressed that we faced a threat of 
miscalculation or desperation from North Korea. Ambassador Laney and 
General Libutti, like the experts in Japan, thought the North Korean 
regime was weakening, and was near destabilization.
  Mr. Laney noted that the room where we were sitting at the United 
States Embassy in Seoul was 23.4 miles from the North Korean border. 
General Libutti added that a North Korean rocket could reach Seoul in 
less than 1 minute.
  We also discussed efforts to find remains of the 8,000 United States 
soldiers unaccounted for during the Korean war. Until recently, those 
efforts have been stymied by North Korea's refusal to admit United 
States search teams. But recently, joint United States-Korean 
teams have found some remains.

  I told Mr. Laney that South Korea should pay more of the costs of the 
protection it enjoys from the 37,000 United States troops stationed 
there. Under a 1954 treaty, the United States pledged to defend South 
Korea, a rare and sweeping commitment. I noted that Japan pays 70 
percent of the cost of the United States forces within its borders, 
while South Korea now pays only one third of its cost, and is scheduled 
to pay an additional 10 percent each year. I told Ambassador Laney that 
I did not find that arrangement adequate.
  We met next at Yongsan Garrison, headquarters of the combined United 
States-Korean force, for an hour with Gen. John Tilelli, the United 
States commander in chief. We discussed the North Korean threat and 
military strategy in some detail. General Libutti also attended and 
participated in that meeting. We discussed, in greater detail than I 
had with General Murray in Japan, the massive, 3-week war game that 
United States and its allies had just begun involving various scenarios 
of military conflicts with North Korea. I told General Tilelli I 
thought it was essential, apart from the game's value as training, to 
show the North Koreans that we are ready.
  Afterward, we met with Ambassador Yoo Chong Ha, South Korea's Senior 
Presidential Secretary for Foreign and National Security Affairs. We 
had a somewhat tense conversation about whether South Korea could not 
share more of its defense costs. I pointed out that Congress was very 
uneasy about the amount of money we are spending in South Korea, and 
about the number of United States troops stationed there. I pressed Mr. 
Ha that South Korea should contribute more toward its own defense. I 
asked him why South Korea should not bear the entire cost of its 
defense.
  Mr. Ha replied that South Korea is already buying substantial amounts 
of United States armaments, and is increasing its share of defense 
costs. Stating my own personal disagreement, I said that South Korea 
was not paying enough.
  Our final meeting in Seoul was with South Korean Foreign Minister 
Gong Ro Myung. We talked at length about

[[Page S10543]]

North Korea's terrorist threat. I noted that North Korea remains on our 
terrorist nations list, which bars most United States contact.
  While North Korea has not been charged with committing a terrorist 
act since 1987, Mr. Myung said he was investigating allegations that a 
North Korean agent had murdered a South Korean man in China just a week 
earlier, in mid-August.
  On August 20, we traveled to Harbin, China, a sprawling city of 3 
million in Heilongjiang Province. We were especially interested in 
visiting China's outlying provinces to get a feel for United States 
market potential. In Harbin, we continued our talks on trade. We were 
accompanied throughout by United States Consul General Carl Wycoff.
  We met with Gov. Tian Fengshan, leader of the Heilongjiang Province, 
and discussed opportunities for development and American industry 
within his borders. The Governor said he was encouraging Americans and 
other foreigners to invest in his province, and was working on a 
cooperative agreement with the State of Alaska.
  I met next with a group of American businessmen working in the Harbin 
area. They reported frustration with China's redtape. A fiberglass pipe 
manufacturer, for example, complained about Chinese requirements that 
he secure a separate permit for every shipment of the same type of 
imported materials.

  We were warned that the Chinese often welcome innovators, learn their 
techniques, and exploit them or force them out.
  In the evening, we attended a dinner with the Deputy Governor and 
several of his aides. We covered a gamut of subjects, including free 
elections and the democratic process. The Deputy Governor, proposed by 
the State committee, had been elected without opposition. In response 
to my question, he said he found Boris Yeltsin's recent campaign for 
President of Russia, including campaign stops at a disco, effective in 
appealing to voters.
  On August 21, I met with the Vice-President and several professors at 
the Harbin Institute of Technology, all of whom had been among the 
first wave of Chinese academics who studied in the United States in the 
early 1980's. One computer science professor had briefly been one of my 
constituents, when he studied for 2 years at Carnegie Mellon University 
in Pittsburgh.
  I toured the city, including stops at an open market and a western-
style department store, and was struck by the strong demand for western 
mechanized goods, and the opportunity for American firms. I chose to 
visit Harbin largely because it was not a westernized southern port, 
which draws most foreign traffic and interest.
  On August 21, we traveled to Mongolia, largely to investigate what 
the United States could do to foster the fragile democracy and market 
economy that only recently freed itself from the Soviet yoke.
  Upon arrival in the evening in the capital city of Ulaan Baatar, we 
met with Charge d'Affaires Llewellyn Hedgbeth, members of the Embassy 
team, Peace Corps Director Mark Zober, and three Peace Corps volunteers 
assigned to Mongolia.
  In the morning, we met with the economic adviser to the Prime 
Minister, an American policy expert named Jim Bikales; with the Chief 
of the Mongolian National Intelligence Agency, Dalhjavyn Sandag; and 
with the Secretary of the Mongolian National Security Agency, 
Jargalsaihany Enkhsaihan. We discussed the host of economic travails 
threatening Mongolia's fledgling market economy, including a banking 
crisis that spurred a credit shortage; a budget crisis; and shrinking 
GDP growth.
  We met next with Radnaasumberel Gonchigdorj, Chairman of the Hural, 
the Mongolian Parliament. Mr. Gonchigdorj said U.S. assistance is 
vital, especially for a Mongolian economy so weak that social services 
are an unaffordable luxury. I told the chairman that his country was a 
shining example of the trend toward democracy, and that we wanted to 
help, and would help, but faced a deficit problem of our own.
  Asked for my suggestions, I urged the chairman and his colleagues to 
privatize as soon as possible the two-thirds of the Mongolian economy 
that they have not yet privatized.
  Later in the day, we returned to the Government complex to meet with 
Prime Minister Mendsaihny Enkhsaihan, an economist by training. For 
almost an hour, we discussed primarily economic and fiscal matters. The 
Prime Minister told me his goal was to privatize 60 percent of state 
assets by the year 2000. I urged him, as I had urged Hural Chairman 
Gonchigdorj, to privatize the rest of the economy as fast as he could.
  We spent the evening with Sanjaasurenglin Zorig, a key government 
leader who holds the title Chairman of the Standing Committee on State 
Structure, and several other members of the Hural. During a wide-
ranging, 2-hour conversation, I urged Mr. Zorig, as I had urged the 
Prime Minister and Hural Chairman earlier, to privatize the rest of the 
economy.
  I was struck to learn that Mr. Zorig and several of his colleagues 
had followed the 1991 confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice 
Clarence Thomas, which they had watched on then-Soviet television. I 
was heartened that they grasped, through the often-heated proceedings 
and Soviet censorship, the theme of judicial independence that we 
Americans prize.
  From Mongolia, we flew to Beijing, China, on August 23 for a series 
of meetings with Chinese national leaders and with United States 
Ambassador James Sasser, a former Senate colleague, and his Embassy 
team.
  My concerns included China's sales to Pakistan of M-11 missiles, 
which could potentially deliver nuclear warheads to India; Chinese 
ballistic missile tests near Taiwan; China's relationship with North 
Korea; our trade deficit with China; and human rights violations, 
including alleged persecution of Christians.
  After an hour-long discussion with Ambassador Sasser and his experts, 
we attended a luncheon with Chinese Friendship Association President 
Lui Shuqing, who serves as an ambassador to American Government 
leaders. After much prodding, he allowed that China fired ballistic 
missiles within 100 miles of Taiwan as a warning to the breakaway 
republic not to go too far down the road to independence.
  We met next for an hour with Vice Premier Qian Qichen, who also 
serves as China's Foreign Minister. Mr. Qian was also guarded, from the 
outset. Mr. Qian flatly maintained that China had not sold missiles to 
Pakistan in violation of international agreements, despite evidence and 
acknowledgments. ``We'll just have to disagree about that,'' I told the 
Vice Premier. I added that the Senate was considering taking action 
against China, including sanctions.
  Mr. Qian said the Chinese opposed sanctions on principle, because 
they were unwarranted. He added that sanctions would not work against 
China, and were a two-edged sword that could hurt both China and the 
United States. On trade, the Vice Premier and I again reached an 
impasse. I maintained that a $35 billion trade imbalance was 
unacceptable. Mr. Qian dismissed the disparity as a matter of my 
statistics, which he said improperly included trade with Hong Kong. 
When I told the Vice Premier we were concerned about freedom of 
religion for Christians in China, he assured me that China allows 
freedom of worship for all sects.
  We ended the day with a meeting, followed by a formal dinner, with 
Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Cao Cangchuan, the equivalent to our 
vice-chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. Our substantive 
conversation focused on defense budgets and manpower allocation.
  We traveled to Muscat, Oman, on August 24, to begin a series of 
Mideast stops, focusing on the Mideast peace process; the Khobar Towers 
bombing and terrorism; Iran's role in the region and its relationship 
with the United States; and Saudi Arabia's role in and reimbursement 
for its own defense.
  After a briefing by Ambassador Frances Cook and members of her 
Embassy team, we met for an hour with Sayyid Badr, Chief of the Omani 
Office of the Foreign Minister. I complimented Mr. Badr for Oman's 
recognition of and rapport with Israel, including the two nations' 
exchange of trade representatives and Oman's lifting of its boycott 
against Israel several months earlier. Mr. Badr said Oman's 
relationship with Israel was complicated by Oman's need to maintain

[[Page S10544]]

relations with its Arab neighbors who were hostile to the Jewish State.
  We began the morning of August 25 by having breakfast with 
Pennsylvanians on the Embassy staff. Afterward, I fielded questions 
from Omani journalists at an airport news conference, mostly offering 
my assessments on the prospects for Mideast peace and for combating 
terrorism. We have to be tougher with Iran, which may be sponsoring 
terrorism and fundamentalism, I told the reporters. On the issue of the 
June 25 Khobar Towers bombing, which may have been state-sponsored, I 
said terrorism today is an act of war, and we did not intend to be 
victims of acts of war without reprisal.
  We spent August 25 in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, inspecting the Khobar 
Towers Air Force apartments that were hit by the June 25 truck bomb, 
and discussing the situation with base commander Maj. Gen. Kurt 
Anderson, Brig. Gen. Dan Dick, Consul Gen. Doug Green, Capt. Rick 
Reddecliff of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and FBI 
and CIA officials. My staff and I conducted interviews, then held a 
detailed discussion at the Consul General's headquarters and toured the 
apartment complex. Afterward, I met with 20 officers and airmen who had 
been in Khobar Towers when the bomb exploded, including many who were 
injured.
  Khobar Towers Building 131 was a horrible sight, more ghastly up 
close than even television or news photographs can convey. The 
building's front wall had been sheared off by the blast, exposing 
twisted wreckage and blood-stained walls. The wire fence in front of 
the building, the subject of so much controversy, measured 60 feet as I 
paced it off--far less than the 80 feet as previously reported.
  The officers and airmen who had been at Khobar Towers on the night of 
June 25 described, calmly and precisely, how the blast blew out their 
windows, lacerating them with glass shards, and propelled them across 
their living rooms. I told them that the United States now has 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, based on a 1984 law that I helped draft, 
to investigate terrorist attacks against Americans anywhere in the 
world. I told them terrorism is a war, and that we would do our utmost 
to bring those responsible to justice.
  We traveled to Riyadh in the evening, and discussed the Mideast 
situation with Charge D'Affaires Theodore Kattouf, the Embassy team, 
and senior Air Force, focusing on Saudi Arabia's contribution to 
regional defense.
  I expressed the opinion that Saudi Arabia, with its oil wealth, 
should pay more of the costs of United States forces committed to 
defend the kingdom, citing as an example Japan's 70 percent 
contribution to the cost of United States forces there. We have vital 
national interests in the Mideast, but it is, first, a Saudi property 
right that we are protecting. I noted there was great concern in the 
Congress about Saudi Arabia's refusal to let us interrogate the four 
suspects in the November 13 car bombing in OPM-SANG in Riyadh that 
killed five Americans.
  In mid-morning of August 26, we flew to Jeddah for meetings with 
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz Saud and Saudi Defense 
Minister Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud.
  In each hour-long meeting, we focused on the Khobar Towers bombing 
and Mideast terrorism. In response to my questions, each Saudi leader 
said some suspects had already been arrested in the Khobar Towers 
bombing, some had been released, and the process was continuing. I 
asked whether the Saudis would allow the CIA and FBI to interrogate 
suspects in the Khobar Towers attack when they are found, noting our 
concern that United States officials were denied the chance to 
interrogate the OPM-SANG suspects before they were beheaded. The crown 
prince was noncommittal, but the defense minister indicated such 
interviews would be permitted.
  At each meeting, I asked whether the United States would be justified 
in taking military action against any nation which might be responsible 
for the Khobar Towers bombing. By reference, I cited our bombing raid 
against Libya in 1986, in retaliation for the German discotheque blast 
that killed two American soldiers and our missile attack on the Iraqi 
Intelligence headquarters following discovery of the Iraqi plan to 
assassinate former President Bush.
  Neither agreed with such retaliatory action. The crown prince 
volunteered a reference to Hizbollah and said if Hizbollah is found to 
be involved, retaliation should be directed against them.
  Each Saudi leader rejected my suggestion that Saudi Arabia exchange 
ambassadors or trade representatives with Israel. Such an exchange 
would work against peace, the defense minister said.
  We traveled to Israel on the afternoon of August 26, and proceeded 
directly to a gathering in Tel Aviv for Israel's new ambassador to the 
United States, Eliahu Ben Elissar.
  We began the next morning with an hour-long briefing from United 
States Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, focusing on the dynamics of 
Israel's new Likud Government and the challenges it faces, at home and 
from its Mideast neighbors.
  From there, we met for an hour with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu. Mr. Netanyahu said he wanted to begin peace negotiations 
with his Arab neighbors, and felt bound by the Oslo Accords that 
Israel's Rabin/Peres government had signed before Mr. Netanyahu took 
office, even though those agreements did not reflect Mr. Netanyahu's 
own position. The Prime Minister said, however, that he was not 
obligated to go beyond those contracts, which were vague. He said that 
friction with Syrian President Assad, among others, centered on 
differences over the extent of Israel's commitments.
  Mr. Netanyahu said he was eager to get to the negotiating table with 
Syrian President Assad. I noted that years earlier, I had urged Mr. 
Assad, without success, to meet with Mr. Shamir when he was Israel's 
Prime Minister. Prime Minister Netanyahu asked me to carry a message to 
President Assad, whom I was scheduled to meet with the next day.
  We next met for an hour with Natan Sharansky, the dissident and 
former Soviet prisoner turned Israeli Minister of Industry and Trade. 
Mr. Sharansky, whose immigrant party now holds seven seats in Knesset, 
said he wanted to accelerate immigration into Israel, but was 
contending with Israeli housing that, as he put it, took the worst from 
capitalism and socialism. I told him my father had immigrated from 
Ukraine to the United States as a boy in 1911, and that I understood 
the immigrant's position. We agreed that Russian Jews should have a 
choice where they emigrate, rather than being limited to Israel.

  We met next with David Levy, the Israeli Foreign Minister. Mr. Levy 
said he was not satisfied that Palestinian Chairman Yasir Arafat was 
doing enough to combat terrorism. I told Mr. Levy that legislation I 
sponsored with Alabama Senator Richard Shelby, which is now law, 
requires the Palestinians to crack down on terrorism and to delete 
references in their charter to the destruction of Israel, in order to 
receive $500 million in United States aid.
  Mr. Levy replied that Mr. Arafat had told him the charter changes 
would have to go before a committee and would take 6 months. Mr. Levy 
said he told Mr. Arafat those efforts did not satisfy Israel. I told 
Mr. Levy I had pressed Mr. Arafat about the charter changes in the 
past, and that I would press him again when I met with the Palestinian 
leader later in the day.
  I also asked Mr. Levy if he wanted me to convey any message to Syrian 
President Assad. Mr. Levy asked me to tell Mr. Assad to cease creating 
an atmosphere of terrorism, and that the Israelis were willing to enter 
direct negotiations with the Syrians without preconditions.
  We met next with former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Mr. 
Shamir maintained unequivocally that Israel must be strong and hard in 
its negotiations with its Arab neighbors, or will get nothing. He 
inveighed against any Israeli concessions, including land for peace.
  His position has always been the same, I told the former Prime 
Minister.
  We met next with Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon, the former 
general. Mr. Sharon said Israel is struggling to accommodate an ongoing 
immigration in the face of increasing water shortages. One of Mr. 
Sharon's deputies said the water crisis is more

[[Page S10545]]

difficult than the Arab-Israeli situation. But Mr. Sharon, touting the 
education and skills of Israeli immigrants, said the desert nation 
would find a way to provide enough water for all its newcomers, even if 
a million Jews emigrate from the United States.
  In response to a question about the controversy over a possible 
Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, Minister Sharon produced a map of the 
city and detailed the thousands of years of Jewish presence there. The 
minister stated that Israel would give the 100,000 Palestinians who 
reside in Hebron control of the city only under an arrangement that 
protects the rights and interests of the Jewish population there.
  We ended August 27 with an evening meeting with Palestinian Chairman 
Yasser Arafat at Mr. Arafat's Gaza headquarters. Chairman Arafat opened 
our 90-minute session with a litany of complaints about his treatment 
by the Israelis, including the demolition of a community center earlier 
in the day.
  I pressed Chairman Arafat about his obligations, under the Specter-
Shelby amendment, to crack down on terrorism and to delete from the 
Palestinian charter all calls for the destruction of Israel, in order 
to receive the United States aid.
  Chairman Arafat claimed that he had deleted all references to 
destroying Israel from the Palestinian charter, at great personal and 
political cost. He said he had cut so much from the Palestinian charter 
that nothing remained of the document, and that the charter would have 
to be redrafted, probably in November or December. The Chairman showed 
me documents that he said proved he had made the required changes. 
After reviewing those documents, I said the changes were insufficient. 
All that was said was that all references to Israel were revoked where 
inconsistent with the September 13, 1993 agreement.

  Chairman Arafat told me he had been warned that Iranians would 
assassinate him for changing the charter. I asked Mr. Arafat what we 
could do to stop terrorism. He replied that it was very difficult. He 
suggested we pressure Libya through the United Nations, rather than by 
taking unilateral action.
  The next day, August 28, we traveled to Damascus to meet with Syrian 
President Assad. Our meeting lasted 3\1/2\ hours. We focused on the 
Mideast peace process and on terrorism. I conveyed Israeli Prime 
Minister Netanyahu's message that Israel had only peaceful intentions 
toward Syria, that both sides should move immediately to reduce 
military tensions, and that Mr. Netanyahu wanted to reopen direct 
negotiations between Israel and Syria.
  President Assad replied that Syria would not go back to the table 
until Prime Minister Netanyahu reaffirms the land-for-peace basis of 
negotiations, and agrees to pick up where Israel's previous Labor 
Government left off. President Assad dismissed current Syrian troop 
movements in Southern Lebanon as merely technical and routine, and not 
threatening. He rejected a Lebanon-first approach, the Israeli offer to 
negotiate the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon as a first step 
before re-opening bilateral peace talks.
  I urged President Assad to sit down with Prime Minister Netanyahu, 
even if they seemed to have no common ground.
  On the issue of terrorism, I told President Assad the American press 
had reported that the bomb-making materials used in the Khobar Towers 
blast had passed through Syria. He said that this was possible. He said 
it was unlikely that Iran was involved in the bombing. I urged 
President Assad repeatedly to share with us any information that he may 
get about the Khobar Towers bombing.
  President Assad suggested the United States adopt a law-enforcement 
response to terrorism, rather than a military response. As for the 
Hizbollah and other terrorist groups reputed to operate within Syria, 
President Assad asserted he had no control over what some individuals 
do, and that it was inappropriate for the United States to ask Syria to 
go to war against these groups, even though Syria had the power to 
destroy them. Hizbollah considers itself to have the political and 
religious duty to liberate its land, President Assad said, and has 
taken a leading role in the struggle with Israel.
  After returning to Israel in the evening, I met again with Israeli 
Prime Minister Netanyahu, to brief him on my discussion with President 
Assad, and telephoned Foreign Minister Levy for the same purpose.
  We made a final stop in Paris on the way back to the United States, 
to explore the French and European response to terrorism and France's 
relationship with Iran and the Middle East.
  We met for an hour with French Interior Minister Jean Louis Debre, 
who is roughly equivalent to the United States Attorney General, and at 
length with United States Ambassador Pamela Harriman and her Embassy 
team.
  Madam President, there is a great deal more to be said, but I know 
colleagues are awaiting floor time for morning business. So I will 
conclude this summary, noting that a much more extensive comment than 
my floor statement is contained in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, at the conclusion of 
my remarks, an article which I wrote for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.
  I yield the floor.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                   [From the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette]

        Host Nations Must Cover More Costs of U.S. Troops Abroad

                           (By Arlen Specter)

       The truck bomb that killed 19 Americans at the Khobar 
     Towers Air Force apartments June 25 has left Building 131 a 
     faceless, four-story mass of twisted wreckage and blood-
     stained walls that bakes in the Saudi Arabian sun. The 
     destruction is more grisly up close than in any news 
     photograph, as I discovered last month while inspecting the 
     complex during a Senate Intelligence Committee trip to Asia 
     and the Mideast.
       After a total of 24 Americans were killed in Saudi Arabia 
     in the Khobar Towers bombing and in a 1995 terrorist blast at 
     a U.S.-run training facility in Riyadh, our troops are moving 
     from Dhahran to Kharj, in the middle of the desert. The 
     relocation will cost an estimated $200 million, and Defense 
     Secretary Perry has arranged with the Saudis for each nation 
     to pay half the cost.
       Saudi Arabia is not an isolated situation. Around the 
     globe, American troops in harm's way defend our vital 
     national interests, such as Saudi oil, while protecting our 
     host nations and their interests in the process. We cannot, 
     of course, put a price tag on the lives and limbs of our 
     young soldiers cut down by terrorist bombs. But we can, and 
     should, ask our allies to shoulder more of the cost and 
     responsibility for defending them and their property.
       While the number of U.S. troops deployed around the world 
     has sharply declined since the height of the Cold War, the 
     United States still spends huge sums and deploys thousands of 
     troops on foreign soil, while facing massive deficits at 
     home. Several nations I recently visited, including Saudi 
     Arabia, South Korea and Japan, could pay the entire cost of 
     our defense efforts on their soil, or at least more of it. If 
     we toughen our bargaining position, we certainly can get a 
     better deal.
       In each country I visited on my recent trip, I asked if 
     there was any reason the host nation could not pay its entire 
     defense bill, including the cost of U.S. forces committed to 
     that nation's defense. Generally, our embassy experts shook 
     their heads and said there was not. The foreign leaders 
     disagreed, offering statistics about the volume of U.S. arms 
     they buy, their incidental expenses such as land values of 
     U.S. bases, and their own budget deficits. I found their 
     arguments unconvincing.
       At an absolute minimum, we should bill host nations for 70 
     percent of our costs of defending them, following the formula 
     we apply with Japan. And in Japan, which has a $4.5 trillion 
     economy, and in many other countries, the share should be 
     higher.
       Saudi Arabia is an extreme case. Between World War II and 
     1975, the United States gave Saudi Arabia a total of $328.4 
     million in economic and military aid, according to the U.S. 
     Agency for International Development. We trimmed and ended 
     this largesse as oil revenues filled Saudi coffers. But we 
     still post 5,000 U.S. troops on Saudi soil.
       ``The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital 
     interest to the United States,'' as President Bush said in 
     1990, after Iraq invaded Kuwait. If a hostile nation seized 
     Saudi oil wells, the largest reserve in the world, the 
     American economy and world markets could tumble.
       That state of affairs should stimulate debate in the United 
     States on the dangers and disadvantages of reliance on 
     Mideast oil, on exploring alternative sources of energy, on 
     conserving oil and gas, on lower speed limits, and perhaps 
     even on higher taxes for oil and gas to stimulate 
     conservation. It is not a reason for us to bear the bulk of 
     the Saudi defense burden.
       Why shouldn't the Saudis foot the whole bill? Why shouldn't 
     they at least pay the entire $200 million cost of relocating 
     our troops to safer ground, after terrorist bombs murdered 
     two dozen Americans? As The Washington Post reported, ``On 
     the scale of Saudi Arabia, which has paid out about $50 
     billion

[[Page S10546]]

     to nations that fought in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 
     extra $100 million amounted to a modest commitment, whatever 
     reservations the Saudis may have.''
       We never went into the Persian Gulf War expecting to remain 
     a permanent presence. At a recent meeting with Secretary 
     Perry, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, one of the Senate's most 
     respected voices on military matters, noted that we deployed 
     troops to the Persian Gulf on an emergency basis, expecting 
     the Saudis to take over. At that meeting, Senator Nunn said 
     the Saudis could afford the military hardware and could 
     recruit troops to provide for their defense.
       To add insult to injury, several nations are skinning us on 
     trade, while also skinning us on defense costs.
       Saudi Arabia, for example, is our largest trading partner 
     in the Middle East. In 1994, the last year for which figures 
     are available, the Saudis exported an estimated $8 billion to 
     the United States and imported an estimated $6.4 billion from 
     us, for a trade deficit of $1.6 billion.
       The United States has played a major role in fostering 
     South Korea's massive economic growth, to the point that 
     South Korea is now the world's 11th-largest economy. But 
     South Korea retains obstacles to free trade and restrictions 
     on market access, and poorly protects intellectual property 
     rights, all of which costs U.S. firms and U.S. workers.
       Meanwhile, South Korea pays only one third of the $900 
     million annual local-currency cost for the 37,000 U.S. troops 
     stationed on its soil. South Korea spends millions on its own 
     long-term military preparations, while we handle and finance 
     the lion's share of day-to-day defense.
       Our whopping $59.5 billion trade deficit with Japan fuels 
     our budget deficit. In Japan, American companies find 
     themselves competing for small portions of various markets, 
     or find themselves shut out entirely, as networks of Japanese 
     firms buy only from each other, while enjoying the profits as 
     American firms buy from them. Several major corporations in 
     Pennsylvania are being handcuffed.
       Meanwhile, the United States stations 47,000 troops in 
     Japan, at a cost of more than $8 billion per year. The 
     Japanese government contributes almost $5 billion per year. 
     But total Japanese defense spending represents less than 1 
     percent of Japan's GNP, compared to the 4 percent of our GNP 
     the United States spends on defense.
       I am not suggesting that we turn American troops into 
     mercenaries, or that Saudi Arabia or most other host nations 
     could defend themselves alone as well as we can jointly 
     defend them. But there must be equity. There must be shared 
     responsibility.
       After inspecting Khobar Towers last month, I met with 20 
     officers and airmen who had been in and around the complex 
     when the 5,000-pound truck bomb went off. For an hour, in 
     turn, these men and women calmly recounted their own injuries 
     and the efforts, by those who were able, to aid more 
     seriously wounded comrades and to remove bodies. At the end 
     of our talk, a young captain said that despite all we do in 
     Saudi Arabia, our troops are not even allowed to fly the 
     American flag above the U.S. compound. Something is wrong, he 
     said.
       I agree.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the hour 
to which I was assigned begin at 1:10, and conclude at 2:10.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________