[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 125 (Thursday, September 12, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10420-S10424]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           DEFERRAL OF ACTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

  Mr. PELL. Madam President, earlier today the majority and minority 
cooperated in the vitiation of a unanimous-consent agreement under 
which a landmark international agreement, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, was to have been considered. I hope very much that the 
Senate will be able to return to that treaty under more favorable 
circumstances.
  It is important to understand that the treaty had been subjected to a 
barrage of criticism in recent weeks--some of it apparently motivated 
by a simple desire to kill the treaty. As a result the treaty's merits 
were somewhat obscured.

[[Page S10421]]

  The Senate's former majority leader, former Senator Robert Dole, the 
Republican Party's current candidate for President, expressed certain 
reservations yesterday. Mr. Dole indicated that he would only support 
the treaty if we had high confidence that our intelligence community 
would detect violations and that the treaty will be truly global and 
include such parties as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea.
  In the context of the Dole comments it became clear that the Senate 
would probably have to consider two amendments offered by the majority 
as provided for in the unanimous-consent agreement. The first amendment 
appeared likely to prohibit the President from depositing the U.S. 
instrument of ratification unless the Director of Central Intelligence 
certified to the Senate that the intelligence community could monitor 
the treaty with high confidence. The second amendment would have 
prevented the President from depositing the instrument of ratification 
until he certified that such so-called rogue states as Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, North Korea, and Syria had ratified the treaty.
  The first amendment would have established an impossible standard, 
since no Director of Central Intelligence could ever make such a 
certification with regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  It is the very nature of chemical weapons that they can be made with 
very simple equipment and in small spaces. Nations or terrorist groups 
could certainly succeed in manufacturing quantities of lethal 
chemicals. Certainly no Director of Central Intelligence could ever 
express high confidence about abilities to detect all such activities.
  Most of those familiar with the treaty understand that it represents 
a departure from the high confidence of detection that could be applied 
in earlier accords dealing with strategic offensive arms, for instance. 
Silos can be counted and so can submarines and their missiles. Bombers 
at airfields are clearly visible.
  We must understand now that we are entering new fields of arms 
control and that there are going to be fewer absolute certainties.
  The important standard to be met with regard to verification of arms 
control agreements is that we would be able to detect any militarily 
significant illegal activity under the treaty and be able to respond to 
that activity before any damage to our national security interests 
could occur.
  Mr. Dole tied the impossible demand for high confidence in 
verification to insistence that the convention be effectively 
verifiable. Effective verification alone is a standard most experts 
believe this convention should meet and has met. The need for effective 
verification has been a commonly accepted standard for years. 
Insistence on high confidence of the detection of myriad violations 
moves the standard to the realm of impossibility, as Mr. Dole and 
treaty opponents know fully.
  President George Bush concluded that the treaty was indeed 
effectively verifiable. In a July 18, 1994, letter to me, former 
President Bush wrote:

       The United States worked hard to ensure that the Convention 
     could be effectively verified. At the same time, we sought 
     the means to protect both United States security interests 
     and commercial capabilities. I am convinced that the 
     Convention we signed served both objectives, effectively 
     banning chemical weapons without creating an unnecessary 
     burden on legitimate activities.

  Our highest current military authority, General John Shalikashvili, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in testimony prepared for 
the Committee on Foreign Relations:

       While no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, the CWC is 
     effectively verifiable. It provides for complementary and 
     overlapping verification requirements that help deter CW 
     violations. The CWC does this through the most intrusive 
     verification provisions of any arms control regime to date. 
     This verification regime consists of declarations, routine 
     inspections of declared facilities, and short notice 
     challenge inspection of any facility. Of note, some of the 
     convention's imperfection was intentional in order to protect 
     our military interests. The regime allows military commanders 
     to protect classified information, equipment, and facilities 
     unrelated to the Convention.

  In response to concerns regarding clandestine programs, Secretary of 
Defense William J. Perry argued,

       While we recognize that detecting illicit production of 
     small quantities of chemical weapons will be extremely 
     difficult, we also recognize that that would be even more 
     difficult without a Chemical Weapons Convention. In fact, the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention verification regime, through its 
     declaration, routine inspection, fact-finding, consultation 
     and challenge inspections, should prove effective in 
     providing a wealth of information on possible chemical 
     weapons programs that simply would not be available without 
     the convention.

  Mr. John Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency stated:

       While no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, the CWC will 
     increase the risk of detection and therefore help deter 
     illicit chemical weapons activities. Its declaration and 
     inspection provisions will help build a web of deterrence, 
     detection, and possible sanctions that reduces the incentives 
     for states to build chemical weapons.

  The then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. R. James 
Woolsey stated:

       The Chemical Weapons Convention provides the intelligence 
     community with a new tool to add to our collection tool kit. 
     It is an instrument with broad applicability, which can help 
     resolve a wide variety of problems. Moreover, it is a 
     universal tool which can be used by diplomats and 
     politicians, as well as intelligence specialists, to further 
     a common goal: elimination of the threat of chemical weapons.

  Mr. Woolsey also added:

       The isolation and adverse attention that nonsignatories 
     will draw upon themselves may spur greater multinational 
     cooperation in attempting to halt offensive chemical weapons 
     programs.

  Secretary of State Christopher argued:

       No treaty is 100 percent verifiable, but the Convention is 
     carefully structured so that Parties tempted to cheat will 
     never be sure they can evade detection and sanctions. The 
     sooner the Convention enters into force, the sooner those 
     countries possessing or seeking chemical weapons will have to 
     make a choice: abide by its provisions or suffer the weight 
     of penalties and sanctions imposed by the international 
     community.

  Secretary of Defense Perry stated:

       The Chemical Weapons Convention contains the most extensive 
     verification provisions of any arms control regime. It 
     consists of detailed declarations, routine inspections of 
     declared sites and short notice challenge inspections. With 
     its complementary and overlapping verification requirements, 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention's regime provides the means 
     to help deter a state party from violating the provisions of 
     the Convention. Therefore, we are confident that activities 
     such as the destruction of declared chemical weapons stocks 
     and production facilities can be verified. We are confident 
     that we will be able to detect large-scale production, 
     filling and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

  With regard to the desire that the convention be truly global, I 
would point out that history demonstrates that well-conceived treaties, 
such as the Chemical Weapons Convention is, pick up parties over time 
and become worldwide in scope. That was certainly true of the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If we were to 
wait to join until all nations that caused us concern had joined, there 
is no question in my mind that the convention would be hobbled by our 
absence over a number of years.
  It is no threat to Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea to say 
that we will not join the treaty until they do. Rather than our 
applying pressure on them, it is more likely that such a stance would 
be used by the rogue states to apply pressure to us. It makes far more 
sense to start out, as envisaged by the treaty, with a minimum of 65 
states parties and build from that point and be in a position to apply 
effective international pressure upon rogue states to behave themselves 
and get into the treaty.
  Madam President, The Chemical Weapons Convention, if successful, will 
ban the production, acquisition, stockpiling, and use of chemical 
weapons.
  In it each State Party undertakes never, under any circumstances, to 
develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical 
weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to 
anyone;
  Use chemical weapons;
  Engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and
  Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any 
activity prohibited to a State Party under this convention.
  In addition each State Party undertakes, all in accordance with the 
provisions of the convention to destroy the chemical weapons it owns or 
possesses or that are located in any place under

[[Page S10422]]

its jurisdiction or control;

  Destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another 
State Party; and
  Destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or 
possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or 
control.
  Finally, each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents 
as a method of warfare.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for both routine and 
challenge inspections to assist in the verification of compliance with 
the convention.
  Madam President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I 
held six public hearings and three closed sessions of the committee in 
1994. In those hearings, witnesses included Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John 
Shalikashvili; the Director of the United States Arms Control 
Association, John D. Holum; the U.S. negotiator for the convention, 
Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar; the Director of Central Intelligence, R. 
James Woolsey; and other senior officers of the national security and 
foreign policy agencies of the executive branch. In addition, the 
committee received extensive testimony from a number of nongovernmental 
witnesses. We were very careful to receive testimony from critics, as 
well as supporters, of the treaty so that the committee and the Senate 
would be assured the opportunity to receive a balanced and reasoned 
judgment on the merits of the convention.
  Earlier this year, the committee held wrap-up hearings on the 
convention before marking up the treaty this spring. Both critics and 
supporters were heard. I and other supporters concluded following these 
final hearings that the United States would clearly benefit and could 
not suffer significant harm through joining the treaty and helping to 
ensure its success.
  On April 25, the committee voted by a 2-to-1 margin, 12 to 6, to 
approve a substitute resolution of ratification I offered with the 
Senator from Indiana, [Mr. Lugar] we were joined as co-sponsors in this 
venture by Senators Kassebaum, Biden, Dodd, and Kerry.
  In our resolution, which was fully supported by the executive branch, 
we made every effort to identify areas of legitimate concern and to 
deal effectively with them.
  Madam President, I would hope that the resolution adopted by the 
committee with strong bipartisan support will help the Senate when it 
returns to consideration of this vitally important venture.
  Madam President, a number of concerns have been expressed regarding 
the possible effects on business of the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Some fear that the convention would pose a new and onerous burden on 
businesses throughout the country. It is important to understand that 
industry representatives were involved throughout the course of the 
negotiation and worked carefully to ensure that the chemical weapons 
ban would be effective and that it would be quite manageable from the 
standpoint of business. Government officials also have been involved in 
efforts to ensure that implementation of the convention would 
constitute the smallest inconveniences possible.
  In that connection, I received a very informative letter today from 
the Honorable Michael Kantor, Secretary of Commerce, and Mr. Philip 
Lauder, the Administrator of the Small Business administration dealing 
with a number of misconceptions regarding the impact of the convention 
on small business. Also today, I received additional information in a 
letter from Mr. Frederick L. Webber, president and chief executive 
officer of the Chemical Manufacturers Association. I ask that the 
letter be printed in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. PELL. Earlier I drew to my fellow Senators, attention a letter 
signed by 53 senior executives of the chemical industry in support of 
the convention. I ask unanimous consent that that August 29 letter be 
printed in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 2.)
  Mr. PELL. Lastly, I would like to make a matter of public record the 
widespread support the convention enjoys in the arms control community. 
I ask unanimous consent that a September 3 letter to me and my fellow 
Members urging approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention also be 
printed in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 3.)
  Mr. PELL. We cannot ignore now the fact that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention is an integral part of a continuum of arms control 
agreements that developed in the period since the Second World War. In 
that period we have embarked on undertakings that ban nuclear weapons 
in outer space, on the ocean floor, that limit nuclear weapons 
elsewhere in the world and have resulted in the removal, following 
deployment, of a whole class of nuclear missiles from Europe. The 
nations of the world have joined together in a truly global effort to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and they took advantage of 
the opportunity last year to extend the non-proliferation treaty 
indefinitely, without condition. We and the former Soviet Union forged 
ahead with a series of agreements limiting strategic offensive and 
defensive missiles and those agreements have now been broadened to 
include other successor states of the former Soviet Union. More than 2 
decades ago the nations of the world agreed to ban biological weapons. 
With this agreement we are attempting to ban chemical weapons.
  The result of all this is certainly not a perfect world and all of 
our efforts are not completely successful. We know, for instance, that 
there are biological weapons in the world. We know that there will be 
chemical weapons in the world--even under this convention when 
ratified. We know that we cannot solve the world's woes immediately 
through such accords, but we can change the goals of the world and we 
can change the direction of the body of nations. With the Chemical 
Weapons Convention we will move away from a situation which those who 
wish to have chemical weapons are free to have them, if not to use 
them, to a new situation in which the responsible nations of the world 
will be doing their best to banish this class of weapons from the face 
of the Earth.
  The failure to take this could prove most unfortunate. A U.S. 
decision not to join the Chemical Weapons Convention would not stop it 
from entering into force, but would surely undermine the effectiveness 
of the treaty and would be harmful to critically important U.S. 
interests in identifying and dealing with chemical weapons threats in 
various parts of the world. It is not in our interest to be on the 
outside looking in as the Chemical Weapons Convention is set up.
  Madam President, this convention enjoys the support of a number of 
Republican Senators and has virtually unanimous Senate Democratic 
support. I hope that the Senate will wisely return to consideration of 
this convention at an opportune and early moment. There is no question 
in my mind that we will pay a price for today's regrettably necessary 
decision. We can hope that the opportunity will return to get the 
United States back on track with regard to a chemical weapons ban.

                               Exhibit 1


                                    The Secretary of Commerce,

                               Washington, DC, September 12, 1996.
     Hon. Claiborne Pell,
     Ranking Minority Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
         U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Pell: We are writing to clarify a number of 
     misconceptions regarding the impact of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention (CWC) on small business. Contrary to a number of 
     allegations, the CWC will not impose a burdensome reporting 
     requirement on small businesses nor will it subject them to a 
     frequent and intrusive regime of international inspections.
       The Administration estimates that about 2000 firms will be 
     required to submit a data declaration. The reporting burden 
     on smaller chemical companies will focus mainly on producers 
     of ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals'' (carbon 
     compounds). The vast majority of these--some 1800-1900--
     firms, many of which are smaller companies, will only be 
     required to submit annual reports that identify aggregate 
     production ranges (e.g., this plant site produced over 10,000 
     metric tons of Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals last 
     year.) They will not be required to identify the specific 
     chemicals that were produced.

[[Page S10423]]

       Previously, the Administration had estimated that more 
     companies would be required to submit a data declaration. 
     However, additional analysis indicated that many did not 
     cross the CWC production threshold for reporting. Further, 
     administrative exemptions at the Organization for the 
     Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] will be crafted to 
     exclude entire industries from reporting--biomediated 
     processes (such as certain beverages) and polymers (such as 
     plastics used in football helmets). In addition, plant sites 
     that exclusively produce hydrocarbons (e.g. propane and 
     ethylene) are completely excluded from any reporting 
     requirements.
       This ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals'' data 
     declaration does not require any information regarding 
     imports, exports, usage or processing. We estimate that it 
     will take a few hours to complete this ``Unscheduled Discrete 
     Organic Chemical'' form the first time. Subsequent annual 
     reporting should be much more simple and take less time.
       No manufacturer of ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic 
     Chemicals'' will be subject to a routine inspection during 
     the first three years. After three years, OPCW will address 
     the issue of inspections for manufacturers of ``Unscheduled 
     Discrete Organic Chemicals''. It is unlikely that many of 
     these producers would ever be inspected.
       We anticipate that there will be very few challenge 
     inspections and the prospect for a challenge inspection of a 
     small producer of ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals'' 
     is remote indeed. It is likely that whatever challenge 
     inspection requests are issued will be directed at military 
     facilities. These facilities are well prepared to protect 
     classified and other sensitive information.
       In this regard, we want to make it clear that the Synthetic 
     Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA) and its 
     260 members support ratification of the CWC. SOCMA's member 
     companies are typically small businesses with fewer than 50 
     employees and less than $50 million in annual sales. Further, 
     in a joint statement issued on September 10, 1996, SOCMA, the 
     Chemical Manufacturers Association [CMA] and the 
     Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers Association [PHARMA] 
     noted that ``We urge the Senate to support this historic arms 
     control agreement, and the prompt passage of the accompanying 
     implementing legislation.''
       In short, the industry that will be affected by the CWC has 
     taken a strong position in support of Senate ratification. We 
     urge you to listen to their advice and ratify this important 
     treaty.
           Sincerely,
     Michael Kantor,
       Secretary of Commerce.
     Philip Lader,
       Administrator, Small Business Administration.

                               Exhibit 2

                                                          Chemical


                                    Manufacturers Association,

                                 Arlington, VA, September 9, 1996.
     Hon. Claiborne Pell,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Pell: As the Senate prepares to consider the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), questions have been raised 
     about the impact of the treaty on the commercial chemical 
     industry in the United States. I want to reassure you that 
     the U.S. chemical industry unequivocally supports this 
     Convention.
       As I stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
     on numerous occasions, the Chemical Manufacturers Association 
     [CMA] has carefully reviewed the impact of the CWC on 
     industry. We tested the CWC's reporting and inspections 
     obligations. We balanced the costs and benefits of this 
     treaty, and found that the benefits far outweigh the costs.
       The CWC will require approximately 2,000 commercial 
     facilities in the United States to report on their 
     activities. More than 90 percent of those facilities will 
     only need to file a simple two-page form, once a year with 
     the government. A second, smaller group of 200 facilites will 
     have more detailed reporting requirements, and may be subject 
     to on-site inspections. CMA's members worked closely with the 
     government in drafting the reporting forms, and in two 
     separate ``road tests'' of the reporting system, reported 
     that the system was indeed reasonable. CMA members also 
     helped craft the inspection procedures under the Convention. 
     Those procedures have been tested in commercial facilities in 
     the United States, to favorable reviews.
       The second category of affected facilities are those that 
     produce commercial chemicals that can be diverted into 
     weapons production. It is important to note that even these 
     facilities have significant protections under the CWC, such 
     as the ability to negotiate how inspections are conducted, 
     and the ability to protect sensitive trade secrets. Companies 
     affected by these provisions have tested the draft U.S. 
     reporting forms, and even offered their facilities to test 
     inspection procedures. They reported to CMA that the CWC's 
     benefits far out-weighed the comparatively smaller cost of 
     implementation.
       We are confident that between CMA and the other national 
     trade associations with whom we have worked (including the 
     Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association and the 
     Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, among 
     others), the overwhelming majority of companies that have 
     possible CWC-related obligations know and understand their 
     responsibilities.
       The Senate should not learn belatedly about the 
     implications of the Convention for business, and business 
     should not learn belatedly about its obligations under the 
     Convention. That is why education and outreach has been one 
     of our major goals on the CWC. That is why we have worked 
     cosely with the U.S. and other governments to focus the 
     Convention on those facilities that may pose a risk to the 
     goal of a world free from chemical weapons.
       For your further information, I have enclosed a copy of my 
     May 9, 1996 letter that was sent to all senators, which 
     details the commercial impact of the CWC.
       The American chemical industry fully supports this treaty. 
     Senator, I urge you to vote in favor of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.
       If you have any questions concerning the chemical 
     industry's support for the CWC, please have your staff 
     contact me or Claude Boudrias, Legislative Representative for 
     Trade & Tax at 703/741-5915
           Sincerely,
                                              Frederick L. Webber,
                                                  President & CEO.

                               Exhibit 3

                                                  August 29, 1996.
     Hon. Claiborne Pell,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Pell: The undersigned senior executives of 
     chemical companies urge your vote in support of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention [CWC], and quick Senate action on 
     legislation to implement this important treaty.
       The chemical industry has long supported the CWC. Our 
     industry participated in negotiating the agreement, and in 
     U.S. and international implementation efforts. The treaty 
     contains substantial protections for confidential business 
     information [CBI]. We know, because industry helped to draft 
     the CBI provisions. Chemical companies also help test the 
     draft CWC reporting system, and we tested the on-site 
     inspection procedures that will help verify compliance with 
     the treaty. In short, our industry has thoroughly examined 
     and tested this Convention. We have concluded that the 
     benefits of the CWC far outweigh the costs.
       Indeed, the real price to pay would come from not ratifying 
     the CWC. The treaty calls for strict restrictions on trade 
     with nations which are not party to the Convention. The 
     chemical industry is America's largest export industry, 
     posting $60 billion in export sales last year. But our 
     industry's status as the world's preferred supplier of 
     chemical products may be jeopardized if the U.S. does not 
     ratify the Convention. If the Senate does not vote in favor 
     of the CWC, we stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars 
     in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of good-paying 
     American jobs.
       The U.S. chemical industry has spent more than 15 years 
     working on this agreement, and we long ago decided that 
     ratifying the CWC is the right thing to do.
       We urge you to vote in support of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.
           Sincerely,
       J. Lawrence Wilson, Chairman & CEO, Rohm and Has Company, 
     Chairman, Board of Directors, Chemical Manufacturers 
     Association.
       Alan R. Hirsig, President & CEO, ARCO Chemical Company, 
     Chairman, Executive Committee, Chemical Manufacturers 
     Association.
       H.A. Wagner, Chairman, President & CEO, Air Products & 
     Chemicals, Inc.
       D.J. D'Antoni, President, Ashland Chemical Company.
       Helge H. Wehmeier, President & CEO, Bayer Corporation.
       John D. Ong, Chairman & CEO, The BFGoodrich Company.
       Robert R. Mesel, President, BP Chemicals, Inc.
       Charles M. Donohue, Vice President, Akzo Nobel Chemicals, 
     Inc.
       J. Dieter Stein, Chairman & CEO, BASF Corporation.
       W.R. Cook, Chairman, President & CEO, Betz Dearborn, Inc.
       Joseph M. Saggese, President & CEO, Borden Chemicals & 
     Plastics, LP.
       Dr. Aziz I. Asphahani, President & CEO, Carus Chemical 
     Company.
       Vincent A. Calarco, Chairman, President & CEO, Crompton & 
     Knowles Corporation.
       Richard A. Hazleton, Chairman & CEO, Dow Corning 
     Corporation.
       Howard J. Rudge, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, 
     E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company.
       Richard G. Fanelli, President & CEO, Enthone-OMI Inc.
       J.E. Akitt, Executive Vice President, Exxon Chemical 
     Company.
       William S. Stavropoulos, President & CEO, The Dow Chemical 
     Company.
       Earnest W. Deavenport, Jr., Chairman of the Board & CEO, 
     Eastman Chemical Company.
       Bernard Azoulay, President & CEO, Elf Atochem North 
     America.
       Bruce C. Gottwald, CEO, Ethyl Corporation.
       Ron W. Haddock, President & CEO, FINA, Inc.
       Robert N. Burt, Chairman & CEO, FMC Corporation.

[[Page S10424]]

       Otto Furuta, V.P. Global Logistics & Materials, Management, 
     Great Lakes Chemical Corporation.
       R. Keith Elliott, President & COO, Hercules, Inc.
       Hans C. Noetzli, President & CEO, Lonza Inc.
       Robert G. Potter, Executive Vice President, Monsanto 
     Company.
       Dr. William L. Orton, Senior Vice President, Chemical 
     Operations, Givaudan-Roure Corporation.
       Michael R. Boyce, President & COO, Harris Chemical Group.
       Thomas F. Kennedy, President & CEO, Hoechst Celanese 
     Corporation.
       Mack G. Nichols, President & COO, Mallinckrodt Group, Inc.
       S. Jay Stewart, Chairman & CEO, Morton International, Inc.
       E.J. Mooney, Chairman & CEO, Nalco Chemical Company.
       Jeffrey M. Lipton, President, NOVA Corporation.
       Donald W. Griffin, Chairman, President & CEO, Olin 
     Corporation.
       Peter R. Heinze, Senior Vice President, Chemicals, PPG 
     Industries, Inc.
       Phillip D. Ashkettle, President & CEO, Reichhold Chemicals, 
     Inc.
       Ronald L. Spraetz, V.P., External Affairs & Quality, 
     National Starch & Chemical Company.
       J. Roger Hirl, President & CEO, Occidental Chemical 
     Corporation.
       David Wolf, President, Perstorp Polyols, Inc.
       Ronald H. Yocum, Chairman, President & CEO, Quantum 
     Chemical Company.
       Thomas E. Reilly, Jr., Chairman, Reilly Industries, Inc.
       Peter J. Neff, President & CEO, Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.
       Nicholas P. Trainer, President, Sartomer Company.
       J. Virgil Waggoner, President & CEO, Sterling Chemicals, 
     Inc.
       W.H. Joyce, Chairman, President & CEO, Union Carbide 
     Corporation.
       Arthur R. Sigel, President & CEO, Velsicol Chemical 
     Corporation.
       Roger K. Price, Senior V.P., Mining & Manufacturing, R.T. 
     Vanderbilt Company, Inc.
       F. Quinn Stepan, Chairman & President, Stepan Company.
       William H. Barlow, Vice President, Business Development, 
     Texas Brine Corporation.
       Robert J. Mayaika, President, CEO & Chairman, Uniroyal 
     Chemical Company, Inc.
       John Wilkinson, Director of Government Affairs, Vulcan 
     Chemicals.
       Albert J. Costello, Chairman, President & CEO, W.R. Grace & 
     Company.
                                                                    ____


                               Exhibit 4

                                              Approve the Chemical


                                           Weapons Convention,

                                Washington, DC, September 3, 1996.
       Dear Senator: We urge the Senate to approve the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention when it comes to a vote in September.
       The Convention, negotiated and signed by former President 
     George Bush, is one of the most significant treaties in the 
     history of arms control. It will ban an entire class of 
     weapons of mass destruction, including production, 
     possession, transfer or use of chemical weapons. It will 
     require all parties to destroy their chemical weapons 
     stockpiles and production facilities and to open their 
     chemical industries to international inspection.
       The Chemical Weapons Convention is a valuable instrument 
     for combating the spread of weapons of terror and mass 
     destruction. The treaty's destruction and verification 
     provision can build confidence among potential rivals that 
     they can avoid a chemical arms race. It will also help keep 
     these weapons out of the hands of terrorists.
       The United States chemical industry strongly supports the 
     Convention. The Pentagon strongly supports the agreement as 
     well. It is most certainly in both the national and 
     international interest to achieve the global elimination of a 
     class of weapons that have proved more dangerous to innocent 
     civilians than to military forces.
       By its terms, the Convention enters into force 180 days 
     after the 65th state has deposited its instruments of 
     ratification with the U.N. Secretary General. Sixty-one 
     countries have ratified the Convention at this point. Timely 
     action by the Senate will send a clear signal of strong U.S. 
     support, allowing the United States to exert its full 
     leadership in persuading other countries to ratify.
       We urge the Senate to approve as quickly as possible the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention, to oppose crippling reservations 
     or amendments, and at the same time move ahead with 
     elimination of these heinous weapons from our arsenal.
           Yours sincerely,
       John B. Anderson, President, World Federalist Association.
       Fr. Robert J. Brooks, Director of Government Relations, The 
     Episcopal Church.
       Mark B. Brown, Assistant Director for Advocacy, Lutheran 
     Office for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church 
     in America.
       J. Daryl Byler, Director, Washington Office, Mennonite 
     Central Committee.
       Robin Caiola, Co-Director, 20/20 Vision National Project.
       Becky Cain, President, League of Women Voters.
       Rev. Drew Christiansen, S.J., Director of the Office of 
     International Peace and Justice, United States Catholic 
     Conference.
       Nancy Chupp, Legislative Director, Church Women United.
       Gordon Clark, Executive Director, Peace Action.
       Tom Clements, Senior Campaigner, International Nuclear 
     Campaign, Greenpeace.
       Thomas B. Cochran, Senior Scientist, Natural Resources 
     Defense Council.
       David Culp, Legislative Correspondent, Plutonium Challenge.
       Johathan Dean, Adviser for International Security, Union of 
     Concerned Scientists.
       Ralph DeGennaro, Co-Director, Taxpayers for Common Sense.
       Dr. Thom White Wolf Fassett, General Secretary, United 
     Methodist Board of Church and Society.
       Jerry Genesio, Executive Director, Veterans for Peace.
       Stephen Goose, Program Director, Human Rights Watch, Arms 
     Project.
       Bruce Hall, Nuclear Disarmament Campaigner, Greenpeace, 
     USA.
       Howard W. Hallman, Chair, Methodists United for Peace With 
     Justice.
       John Isaacs, President, Council for a Livable World.
       Amy Isaacs, National Director, Americans for Democratic 
     Action.
       Elenora Giddings Ivory, Director, Washington Office, 
     Presbyterian Church (USA).
       Wayne Jaquith, President, Public Education Center.
       Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., President, Arms Control 
     Association.
       Michael Krepon, President, Stimson Center.
       Ambassador James Leonard, Former U.S. Disarmament 
     Negotiator.
       Jay Lintner, Director, Washington Office, United Church of 
     Christ, Office for Church in Society.
       James Matlack, Director, Washington Office, American 
     Friends Service Committee.
       Lindsay Mattison, Executive Director, International Center.
       Timothy A. McElwee, Director, Church of the Brethen, 
     Washington Office.
       Matthew Meselson, Professor of Molecular Biology, Harvard 
     University.
       Terence W. Miller, Director, Maryknoll Justice & Peace 
     Office.
       Bobby Muller, President, Vietnam Veterans of American 
     Foundation.
       Robert K. Musil, Executive Director, Physicians for Social 
     Responsibility.
       Maurice Paprin, President, Fund for New Priorities in 
     America.
       Albert M. Pennybacker, Director, Washington Office National 
     Council of Churches.
       Ann Rhee, Office of Public Policy, United Methodist Church, 
     Women's Division.
       Rev. Meg Riley, Director, Washington Office for Faith in 
     Action, Unitarian Universalist Association.
       Caleb Rossiter, Director, Demilitarization for Democracy.
       Rabbi David Saperstein, Director, Religious Action Center 
     for Reform Judaism.
       Mark P. Schlefer, President, Lawyers Alliance for World 
     Security, Committee for National Security.
       Vice Admiral John Shanahan, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Director, 
     Center for Defense Information.
       Susan Shaer, Executive Director, Women's Action for New 
     Directions.
       Alice Slater, Executive Director, Economists Allied for 
     Arms Reductions.
       Amy E. Smithson, Senior Associate, CWC Implementation 
     Project, The Henry L. Stimson Center.
       Jeremy J. Stone, President, Federation of American 
     Scientists.
       Kathy Thorton, RSM, National Coordinator, Network: A 
     National Catholic Social Justice Lobby.
       Kay van der Horst, Director, CTA/Bellona Foundation USA.
       Edith Villastrigo, Legislative Director, Women Strike for 
     Peace.
       Ross Vincent, Chair, Environmental Quality Strategy Team, 
     Sierra Club.
       Joe Volk, Executive Secretary, Friends Committee on 
     National Legislation.
       Frank Von Hippel, Princeton University.

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