[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 125 (Thursday, September 12, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10420-S10424]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DEFERRAL OF ACTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Mr. PELL. Madam President, earlier today the majority and minority
cooperated in the vitiation of a unanimous-consent agreement under
which a landmark international agreement, the Chemical Weapons
Convention, was to have been considered. I hope very much that the
Senate will be able to return to that treaty under more favorable
circumstances.
It is important to understand that the treaty had been subjected to a
barrage of criticism in recent weeks--some of it apparently motivated
by a simple desire to kill the treaty. As a result the treaty's merits
were somewhat obscured.
[[Page S10421]]
The Senate's former majority leader, former Senator Robert Dole, the
Republican Party's current candidate for President, expressed certain
reservations yesterday. Mr. Dole indicated that he would only support
the treaty if we had high confidence that our intelligence community
would detect violations and that the treaty will be truly global and
include such parties as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea.
In the context of the Dole comments it became clear that the Senate
would probably have to consider two amendments offered by the majority
as provided for in the unanimous-consent agreement. The first amendment
appeared likely to prohibit the President from depositing the U.S.
instrument of ratification unless the Director of Central Intelligence
certified to the Senate that the intelligence community could monitor
the treaty with high confidence. The second amendment would have
prevented the President from depositing the instrument of ratification
until he certified that such so-called rogue states as Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, and Syria had ratified the treaty.
The first amendment would have established an impossible standard,
since no Director of Central Intelligence could ever make such a
certification with regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
It is the very nature of chemical weapons that they can be made with
very simple equipment and in small spaces. Nations or terrorist groups
could certainly succeed in manufacturing quantities of lethal
chemicals. Certainly no Director of Central Intelligence could ever
express high confidence about abilities to detect all such activities.
Most of those familiar with the treaty understand that it represents
a departure from the high confidence of detection that could be applied
in earlier accords dealing with strategic offensive arms, for instance.
Silos can be counted and so can submarines and their missiles. Bombers
at airfields are clearly visible.
We must understand now that we are entering new fields of arms
control and that there are going to be fewer absolute certainties.
The important standard to be met with regard to verification of arms
control agreements is that we would be able to detect any militarily
significant illegal activity under the treaty and be able to respond to
that activity before any damage to our national security interests
could occur.
Mr. Dole tied the impossible demand for high confidence in
verification to insistence that the convention be effectively
verifiable. Effective verification alone is a standard most experts
believe this convention should meet and has met. The need for effective
verification has been a commonly accepted standard for years.
Insistence on high confidence of the detection of myriad violations
moves the standard to the realm of impossibility, as Mr. Dole and
treaty opponents know fully.
President George Bush concluded that the treaty was indeed
effectively verifiable. In a July 18, 1994, letter to me, former
President Bush wrote:
The United States worked hard to ensure that the Convention
could be effectively verified. At the same time, we sought
the means to protect both United States security interests
and commercial capabilities. I am convinced that the
Convention we signed served both objectives, effectively
banning chemical weapons without creating an unnecessary
burden on legitimate activities.
Our highest current military authority, General John Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in testimony prepared for
the Committee on Foreign Relations:
While no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, the CWC is
effectively verifiable. It provides for complementary and
overlapping verification requirements that help deter CW
violations. The CWC does this through the most intrusive
verification provisions of any arms control regime to date.
This verification regime consists of declarations, routine
inspections of declared facilities, and short notice
challenge inspection of any facility. Of note, some of the
convention's imperfection was intentional in order to protect
our military interests. The regime allows military commanders
to protect classified information, equipment, and facilities
unrelated to the Convention.
In response to concerns regarding clandestine programs, Secretary of
Defense William J. Perry argued,
While we recognize that detecting illicit production of
small quantities of chemical weapons will be extremely
difficult, we also recognize that that would be even more
difficult without a Chemical Weapons Convention. In fact, the
Chemical Weapons Convention verification regime, through its
declaration, routine inspection, fact-finding, consultation
and challenge inspections, should prove effective in
providing a wealth of information on possible chemical
weapons programs that simply would not be available without
the convention.
Mr. John Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency stated:
While no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, the CWC will
increase the risk of detection and therefore help deter
illicit chemical weapons activities. Its declaration and
inspection provisions will help build a web of deterrence,
detection, and possible sanctions that reduces the incentives
for states to build chemical weapons.
The then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. R. James
Woolsey stated:
The Chemical Weapons Convention provides the intelligence
community with a new tool to add to our collection tool kit.
It is an instrument with broad applicability, which can help
resolve a wide variety of problems. Moreover, it is a
universal tool which can be used by diplomats and
politicians, as well as intelligence specialists, to further
a common goal: elimination of the threat of chemical weapons.
Mr. Woolsey also added:
The isolation and adverse attention that nonsignatories
will draw upon themselves may spur greater multinational
cooperation in attempting to halt offensive chemical weapons
programs.
Secretary of State Christopher argued:
No treaty is 100 percent verifiable, but the Convention is
carefully structured so that Parties tempted to cheat will
never be sure they can evade detection and sanctions. The
sooner the Convention enters into force, the sooner those
countries possessing or seeking chemical weapons will have to
make a choice: abide by its provisions or suffer the weight
of penalties and sanctions imposed by the international
community.
Secretary of Defense Perry stated:
The Chemical Weapons Convention contains the most extensive
verification provisions of any arms control regime. It
consists of detailed declarations, routine inspections of
declared sites and short notice challenge inspections. With
its complementary and overlapping verification requirements,
the Chemical Weapons Convention's regime provides the means
to help deter a state party from violating the provisions of
the Convention. Therefore, we are confident that activities
such as the destruction of declared chemical weapons stocks
and production facilities can be verified. We are confident
that we will be able to detect large-scale production,
filling and stockpiling of chemical weapons.
With regard to the desire that the convention be truly global, I
would point out that history demonstrates that well-conceived treaties,
such as the Chemical Weapons Convention is, pick up parties over time
and become worldwide in scope. That was certainly true of the Limited
Test Ban Treaty and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If we were to
wait to join until all nations that caused us concern had joined, there
is no question in my mind that the convention would be hobbled by our
absence over a number of years.
It is no threat to Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea to say
that we will not join the treaty until they do. Rather than our
applying pressure on them, it is more likely that such a stance would
be used by the rogue states to apply pressure to us. It makes far more
sense to start out, as envisaged by the treaty, with a minimum of 65
states parties and build from that point and be in a position to apply
effective international pressure upon rogue states to behave themselves
and get into the treaty.
Madam President, The Chemical Weapons Convention, if successful, will
ban the production, acquisition, stockpiling, and use of chemical
weapons.
In it each State Party undertakes never, under any circumstances, to
develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical
weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to
anyone;
Use chemical weapons;
Engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and
Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any
activity prohibited to a State Party under this convention.
In addition each State Party undertakes, all in accordance with the
provisions of the convention to destroy the chemical weapons it owns or
possesses or that are located in any place under
[[Page S10422]]
its jurisdiction or control;
Destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another
State Party; and
Destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or
possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or
control.
Finally, each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents
as a method of warfare.
The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for both routine and
challenge inspections to assist in the verification of compliance with
the convention.
Madam President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I
held six public hearings and three closed sessions of the committee in
1994. In those hearings, witnesses included Secretary of State Warren
Christopher; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John
Shalikashvili; the Director of the United States Arms Control
Association, John D. Holum; the U.S. negotiator for the convention,
Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar; the Director of Central Intelligence, R.
James Woolsey; and other senior officers of the national security and
foreign policy agencies of the executive branch. In addition, the
committee received extensive testimony from a number of nongovernmental
witnesses. We were very careful to receive testimony from critics, as
well as supporters, of the treaty so that the committee and the Senate
would be assured the opportunity to receive a balanced and reasoned
judgment on the merits of the convention.
Earlier this year, the committee held wrap-up hearings on the
convention before marking up the treaty this spring. Both critics and
supporters were heard. I and other supporters concluded following these
final hearings that the United States would clearly benefit and could
not suffer significant harm through joining the treaty and helping to
ensure its success.
On April 25, the committee voted by a 2-to-1 margin, 12 to 6, to
approve a substitute resolution of ratification I offered with the
Senator from Indiana, [Mr. Lugar] we were joined as co-sponsors in this
venture by Senators Kassebaum, Biden, Dodd, and Kerry.
In our resolution, which was fully supported by the executive branch,
we made every effort to identify areas of legitimate concern and to
deal effectively with them.
Madam President, I would hope that the resolution adopted by the
committee with strong bipartisan support will help the Senate when it
returns to consideration of this vitally important venture.
Madam President, a number of concerns have been expressed regarding
the possible effects on business of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Some fear that the convention would pose a new and onerous burden on
businesses throughout the country. It is important to understand that
industry representatives were involved throughout the course of the
negotiation and worked carefully to ensure that the chemical weapons
ban would be effective and that it would be quite manageable from the
standpoint of business. Government officials also have been involved in
efforts to ensure that implementation of the convention would
constitute the smallest inconveniences possible.
In that connection, I received a very informative letter today from
the Honorable Michael Kantor, Secretary of Commerce, and Mr. Philip
Lauder, the Administrator of the Small Business administration dealing
with a number of misconceptions regarding the impact of the convention
on small business. Also today, I received additional information in a
letter from Mr. Frederick L. Webber, president and chief executive
officer of the Chemical Manufacturers Association. I ask that the
letter be printed in the Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. PELL. Earlier I drew to my fellow Senators, attention a letter
signed by 53 senior executives of the chemical industry in support of
the convention. I ask unanimous consent that that August 29 letter be
printed in the Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. PELL. Lastly, I would like to make a matter of public record the
widespread support the convention enjoys in the arms control community.
I ask unanimous consent that a September 3 letter to me and my fellow
Members urging approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention also be
printed in the Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr. PELL. We cannot ignore now the fact that the Chemical Weapons
Convention is an integral part of a continuum of arms control
agreements that developed in the period since the Second World War. In
that period we have embarked on undertakings that ban nuclear weapons
in outer space, on the ocean floor, that limit nuclear weapons
elsewhere in the world and have resulted in the removal, following
deployment, of a whole class of nuclear missiles from Europe. The
nations of the world have joined together in a truly global effort to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and they took advantage of
the opportunity last year to extend the non-proliferation treaty
indefinitely, without condition. We and the former Soviet Union forged
ahead with a series of agreements limiting strategic offensive and
defensive missiles and those agreements have now been broadened to
include other successor states of the former Soviet Union. More than 2
decades ago the nations of the world agreed to ban biological weapons.
With this agreement we are attempting to ban chemical weapons.
The result of all this is certainly not a perfect world and all of
our efforts are not completely successful. We know, for instance, that
there are biological weapons in the world. We know that there will be
chemical weapons in the world--even under this convention when
ratified. We know that we cannot solve the world's woes immediately
through such accords, but we can change the goals of the world and we
can change the direction of the body of nations. With the Chemical
Weapons Convention we will move away from a situation which those who
wish to have chemical weapons are free to have them, if not to use
them, to a new situation in which the responsible nations of the world
will be doing their best to banish this class of weapons from the face
of the Earth.
The failure to take this could prove most unfortunate. A U.S.
decision not to join the Chemical Weapons Convention would not stop it
from entering into force, but would surely undermine the effectiveness
of the treaty and would be harmful to critically important U.S.
interests in identifying and dealing with chemical weapons threats in
various parts of the world. It is not in our interest to be on the
outside looking in as the Chemical Weapons Convention is set up.
Madam President, this convention enjoys the support of a number of
Republican Senators and has virtually unanimous Senate Democratic
support. I hope that the Senate will wisely return to consideration of
this convention at an opportune and early moment. There is no question
in my mind that we will pay a price for today's regrettably necessary
decision. We can hope that the opportunity will return to get the
United States back on track with regard to a chemical weapons ban.
Exhibit 1
The Secretary of Commerce,
Washington, DC, September 12, 1996.
Hon. Claiborne Pell,
Ranking Minority Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Pell: We are writing to clarify a number of
misconceptions regarding the impact of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) on small business. Contrary to a number of
allegations, the CWC will not impose a burdensome reporting
requirement on small businesses nor will it subject them to a
frequent and intrusive regime of international inspections.
The Administration estimates that about 2000 firms will be
required to submit a data declaration. The reporting burden
on smaller chemical companies will focus mainly on producers
of ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals'' (carbon
compounds). The vast majority of these--some 1800-1900--
firms, many of which are smaller companies, will only be
required to submit annual reports that identify aggregate
production ranges (e.g., this plant site produced over 10,000
metric tons of Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals last
year.) They will not be required to identify the specific
chemicals that were produced.
[[Page S10423]]
Previously, the Administration had estimated that more
companies would be required to submit a data declaration.
However, additional analysis indicated that many did not
cross the CWC production threshold for reporting. Further,
administrative exemptions at the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] will be crafted to
exclude entire industries from reporting--biomediated
processes (such as certain beverages) and polymers (such as
plastics used in football helmets). In addition, plant sites
that exclusively produce hydrocarbons (e.g. propane and
ethylene) are completely excluded from any reporting
requirements.
This ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals'' data
declaration does not require any information regarding
imports, exports, usage or processing. We estimate that it
will take a few hours to complete this ``Unscheduled Discrete
Organic Chemical'' form the first time. Subsequent annual
reporting should be much more simple and take less time.
No manufacturer of ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic
Chemicals'' will be subject to a routine inspection during
the first three years. After three years, OPCW will address
the issue of inspections for manufacturers of ``Unscheduled
Discrete Organic Chemicals''. It is unlikely that many of
these producers would ever be inspected.
We anticipate that there will be very few challenge
inspections and the prospect for a challenge inspection of a
small producer of ``Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals''
is remote indeed. It is likely that whatever challenge
inspection requests are issued will be directed at military
facilities. These facilities are well prepared to protect
classified and other sensitive information.
In this regard, we want to make it clear that the Synthetic
Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA) and its
260 members support ratification of the CWC. SOCMA's member
companies are typically small businesses with fewer than 50
employees and less than $50 million in annual sales. Further,
in a joint statement issued on September 10, 1996, SOCMA, the
Chemical Manufacturers Association [CMA] and the
Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers Association [PHARMA]
noted that ``We urge the Senate to support this historic arms
control agreement, and the prompt passage of the accompanying
implementing legislation.''
In short, the industry that will be affected by the CWC has
taken a strong position in support of Senate ratification. We
urge you to listen to their advice and ratify this important
treaty.
Sincerely,
Michael Kantor,
Secretary of Commerce.
Philip Lader,
Administrator, Small Business Administration.
Exhibit 2
Chemical
Manufacturers Association,
Arlington, VA, September 9, 1996.
Hon. Claiborne Pell,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Pell: As the Senate prepares to consider the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), questions have been raised
about the impact of the treaty on the commercial chemical
industry in the United States. I want to reassure you that
the U.S. chemical industry unequivocally supports this
Convention.
As I stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on numerous occasions, the Chemical Manufacturers Association
[CMA] has carefully reviewed the impact of the CWC on
industry. We tested the CWC's reporting and inspections
obligations. We balanced the costs and benefits of this
treaty, and found that the benefits far outweigh the costs.
The CWC will require approximately 2,000 commercial
facilities in the United States to report on their
activities. More than 90 percent of those facilities will
only need to file a simple two-page form, once a year with
the government. A second, smaller group of 200 facilites will
have more detailed reporting requirements, and may be subject
to on-site inspections. CMA's members worked closely with the
government in drafting the reporting forms, and in two
separate ``road tests'' of the reporting system, reported
that the system was indeed reasonable. CMA members also
helped craft the inspection procedures under the Convention.
Those procedures have been tested in commercial facilities in
the United States, to favorable reviews.
The second category of affected facilities are those that
produce commercial chemicals that can be diverted into
weapons production. It is important to note that even these
facilities have significant protections under the CWC, such
as the ability to negotiate how inspections are conducted,
and the ability to protect sensitive trade secrets. Companies
affected by these provisions have tested the draft U.S.
reporting forms, and even offered their facilities to test
inspection procedures. They reported to CMA that the CWC's
benefits far out-weighed the comparatively smaller cost of
implementation.
We are confident that between CMA and the other national
trade associations with whom we have worked (including the
Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association and the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, among
others), the overwhelming majority of companies that have
possible CWC-related obligations know and understand their
responsibilities.
The Senate should not learn belatedly about the
implications of the Convention for business, and business
should not learn belatedly about its obligations under the
Convention. That is why education and outreach has been one
of our major goals on the CWC. That is why we have worked
cosely with the U.S. and other governments to focus the
Convention on those facilities that may pose a risk to the
goal of a world free from chemical weapons.
For your further information, I have enclosed a copy of my
May 9, 1996 letter that was sent to all senators, which
details the commercial impact of the CWC.
The American chemical industry fully supports this treaty.
Senator, I urge you to vote in favor of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
If you have any questions concerning the chemical
industry's support for the CWC, please have your staff
contact me or Claude Boudrias, Legislative Representative for
Trade & Tax at 703/741-5915
Sincerely,
Frederick L. Webber,
President & CEO.
Exhibit 3
August 29, 1996.
Hon. Claiborne Pell,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Pell: The undersigned senior executives of
chemical companies urge your vote in support of the Chemical
Weapons Convention [CWC], and quick Senate action on
legislation to implement this important treaty.
The chemical industry has long supported the CWC. Our
industry participated in negotiating the agreement, and in
U.S. and international implementation efforts. The treaty
contains substantial protections for confidential business
information [CBI]. We know, because industry helped to draft
the CBI provisions. Chemical companies also help test the
draft CWC reporting system, and we tested the on-site
inspection procedures that will help verify compliance with
the treaty. In short, our industry has thoroughly examined
and tested this Convention. We have concluded that the
benefits of the CWC far outweigh the costs.
Indeed, the real price to pay would come from not ratifying
the CWC. The treaty calls for strict restrictions on trade
with nations which are not party to the Convention. The
chemical industry is America's largest export industry,
posting $60 billion in export sales last year. But our
industry's status as the world's preferred supplier of
chemical products may be jeopardized if the U.S. does not
ratify the Convention. If the Senate does not vote in favor
of the CWC, we stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars
in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of good-paying
American jobs.
The U.S. chemical industry has spent more than 15 years
working on this agreement, and we long ago decided that
ratifying the CWC is the right thing to do.
We urge you to vote in support of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Sincerely,
J. Lawrence Wilson, Chairman & CEO, Rohm and Has Company,
Chairman, Board of Directors, Chemical Manufacturers
Association.
Alan R. Hirsig, President & CEO, ARCO Chemical Company,
Chairman, Executive Committee, Chemical Manufacturers
Association.
H.A. Wagner, Chairman, President & CEO, Air Products &
Chemicals, Inc.
D.J. D'Antoni, President, Ashland Chemical Company.
Helge H. Wehmeier, President & CEO, Bayer Corporation.
John D. Ong, Chairman & CEO, The BFGoodrich Company.
Robert R. Mesel, President, BP Chemicals, Inc.
Charles M. Donohue, Vice President, Akzo Nobel Chemicals,
Inc.
J. Dieter Stein, Chairman & CEO, BASF Corporation.
W.R. Cook, Chairman, President & CEO, Betz Dearborn, Inc.
Joseph M. Saggese, President & CEO, Borden Chemicals &
Plastics, LP.
Dr. Aziz I. Asphahani, President & CEO, Carus Chemical
Company.
Vincent A. Calarco, Chairman, President & CEO, Crompton &
Knowles Corporation.
Richard A. Hazleton, Chairman & CEO, Dow Corning
Corporation.
Howard J. Rudge, Senior Vice President & General Counsel,
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Company.
Richard G. Fanelli, President & CEO, Enthone-OMI Inc.
J.E. Akitt, Executive Vice President, Exxon Chemical
Company.
William S. Stavropoulos, President & CEO, The Dow Chemical
Company.
Earnest W. Deavenport, Jr., Chairman of the Board & CEO,
Eastman Chemical Company.
Bernard Azoulay, President & CEO, Elf Atochem North
America.
Bruce C. Gottwald, CEO, Ethyl Corporation.
Ron W. Haddock, President & CEO, FINA, Inc.
Robert N. Burt, Chairman & CEO, FMC Corporation.
[[Page S10424]]
Otto Furuta, V.P. Global Logistics & Materials, Management,
Great Lakes Chemical Corporation.
R. Keith Elliott, President & COO, Hercules, Inc.
Hans C. Noetzli, President & CEO, Lonza Inc.
Robert G. Potter, Executive Vice President, Monsanto
Company.
Dr. William L. Orton, Senior Vice President, Chemical
Operations, Givaudan-Roure Corporation.
Michael R. Boyce, President & COO, Harris Chemical Group.
Thomas F. Kennedy, President & CEO, Hoechst Celanese
Corporation.
Mack G. Nichols, President & COO, Mallinckrodt Group, Inc.
S. Jay Stewart, Chairman & CEO, Morton International, Inc.
E.J. Mooney, Chairman & CEO, Nalco Chemical Company.
Jeffrey M. Lipton, President, NOVA Corporation.
Donald W. Griffin, Chairman, President & CEO, Olin
Corporation.
Peter R. Heinze, Senior Vice President, Chemicals, PPG
Industries, Inc.
Phillip D. Ashkettle, President & CEO, Reichhold Chemicals,
Inc.
Ronald L. Spraetz, V.P., External Affairs & Quality,
National Starch & Chemical Company.
J. Roger Hirl, President & CEO, Occidental Chemical
Corporation.
David Wolf, President, Perstorp Polyols, Inc.
Ronald H. Yocum, Chairman, President & CEO, Quantum
Chemical Company.
Thomas E. Reilly, Jr., Chairman, Reilly Industries, Inc.
Peter J. Neff, President & CEO, Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.
Nicholas P. Trainer, President, Sartomer Company.
J. Virgil Waggoner, President & CEO, Sterling Chemicals,
Inc.
W.H. Joyce, Chairman, President & CEO, Union Carbide
Corporation.
Arthur R. Sigel, President & CEO, Velsicol Chemical
Corporation.
Roger K. Price, Senior V.P., Mining & Manufacturing, R.T.
Vanderbilt Company, Inc.
F. Quinn Stepan, Chairman & President, Stepan Company.
William H. Barlow, Vice President, Business Development,
Texas Brine Corporation.
Robert J. Mayaika, President, CEO & Chairman, Uniroyal
Chemical Company, Inc.
John Wilkinson, Director of Government Affairs, Vulcan
Chemicals.
Albert J. Costello, Chairman, President & CEO, W.R. Grace &
Company.
____
Exhibit 4
Approve the Chemical
Weapons Convention,
Washington, DC, September 3, 1996.
Dear Senator: We urge the Senate to approve the Chemical
Weapons Convention when it comes to a vote in September.
The Convention, negotiated and signed by former President
George Bush, is one of the most significant treaties in the
history of arms control. It will ban an entire class of
weapons of mass destruction, including production,
possession, transfer or use of chemical weapons. It will
require all parties to destroy their chemical weapons
stockpiles and production facilities and to open their
chemical industries to international inspection.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is a valuable instrument
for combating the spread of weapons of terror and mass
destruction. The treaty's destruction and verification
provision can build confidence among potential rivals that
they can avoid a chemical arms race. It will also help keep
these weapons out of the hands of terrorists.
The United States chemical industry strongly supports the
Convention. The Pentagon strongly supports the agreement as
well. It is most certainly in both the national and
international interest to achieve the global elimination of a
class of weapons that have proved more dangerous to innocent
civilians than to military forces.
By its terms, the Convention enters into force 180 days
after the 65th state has deposited its instruments of
ratification with the U.N. Secretary General. Sixty-one
countries have ratified the Convention at this point. Timely
action by the Senate will send a clear signal of strong U.S.
support, allowing the United States to exert its full
leadership in persuading other countries to ratify.
We urge the Senate to approve as quickly as possible the
Chemical Weapons Convention, to oppose crippling reservations
or amendments, and at the same time move ahead with
elimination of these heinous weapons from our arsenal.
Yours sincerely,
John B. Anderson, President, World Federalist Association.
Fr. Robert J. Brooks, Director of Government Relations, The
Episcopal Church.
Mark B. Brown, Assistant Director for Advocacy, Lutheran
Office for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church
in America.
J. Daryl Byler, Director, Washington Office, Mennonite
Central Committee.
Robin Caiola, Co-Director, 20/20 Vision National Project.
Becky Cain, President, League of Women Voters.
Rev. Drew Christiansen, S.J., Director of the Office of
International Peace and Justice, United States Catholic
Conference.
Nancy Chupp, Legislative Director, Church Women United.
Gordon Clark, Executive Director, Peace Action.
Tom Clements, Senior Campaigner, International Nuclear
Campaign, Greenpeace.
Thomas B. Cochran, Senior Scientist, Natural Resources
Defense Council.
David Culp, Legislative Correspondent, Plutonium Challenge.
Johathan Dean, Adviser for International Security, Union of
Concerned Scientists.
Ralph DeGennaro, Co-Director, Taxpayers for Common Sense.
Dr. Thom White Wolf Fassett, General Secretary, United
Methodist Board of Church and Society.
Jerry Genesio, Executive Director, Veterans for Peace.
Stephen Goose, Program Director, Human Rights Watch, Arms
Project.
Bruce Hall, Nuclear Disarmament Campaigner, Greenpeace,
USA.
Howard W. Hallman, Chair, Methodists United for Peace With
Justice.
John Isaacs, President, Council for a Livable World.
Amy Isaacs, National Director, Americans for Democratic
Action.
Elenora Giddings Ivory, Director, Washington Office,
Presbyterian Church (USA).
Wayne Jaquith, President, Public Education Center.
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., President, Arms Control
Association.
Michael Krepon, President, Stimson Center.
Ambassador James Leonard, Former U.S. Disarmament
Negotiator.
Jay Lintner, Director, Washington Office, United Church of
Christ, Office for Church in Society.
James Matlack, Director, Washington Office, American
Friends Service Committee.
Lindsay Mattison, Executive Director, International Center.
Timothy A. McElwee, Director, Church of the Brethen,
Washington Office.
Matthew Meselson, Professor of Molecular Biology, Harvard
University.
Terence W. Miller, Director, Maryknoll Justice & Peace
Office.
Bobby Muller, President, Vietnam Veterans of American
Foundation.
Robert K. Musil, Executive Director, Physicians for Social
Responsibility.
Maurice Paprin, President, Fund for New Priorities in
America.
Albert M. Pennybacker, Director, Washington Office National
Council of Churches.
Ann Rhee, Office of Public Policy, United Methodist Church,
Women's Division.
Rev. Meg Riley, Director, Washington Office for Faith in
Action, Unitarian Universalist Association.
Caleb Rossiter, Director, Demilitarization for Democracy.
Rabbi David Saperstein, Director, Religious Action Center
for Reform Judaism.
Mark P. Schlefer, President, Lawyers Alliance for World
Security, Committee for National Security.
Vice Admiral John Shanahan, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Director,
Center for Defense Information.
Susan Shaer, Executive Director, Women's Action for New
Directions.
Alice Slater, Executive Director, Economists Allied for
Arms Reductions.
Amy E. Smithson, Senior Associate, CWC Implementation
Project, The Henry L. Stimson Center.
Jeremy J. Stone, President, Federation of American
Scientists.
Kathy Thorton, RSM, National Coordinator, Network: A
National Catholic Social Justice Lobby.
Kay van der Horst, Director, CTA/Bellona Foundation USA.
Edith Villastrigo, Legislative Director, Women Strike for
Peace.
Ross Vincent, Chair, Environmental Quality Strategy Team,
Sierra Club.
Joe Volk, Executive Secretary, Friends Committee on
National Legislation.
Frank Von Hippel, Princeton University.
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