[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 125 (Thursday, September 12, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10374-S10377]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                NO INTELLIGENCE FAILURE IN SAUDI ARABIA

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished managers and my 
colleague from New Jersey for a brief opportunity to comment about a 
trip which I made to Saudi Arabia, to Dhahran on August 25 and Riyadh 
on August 26, and a report made by the staff of the Intelligence 
Committee.
  Mr. President, the Khobar Towers at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, was the 
scene of a tragic terrorist attack killing 19 Americans and wounding 
hundreds of other Americans. There has been a suggestion made that 
there was an intelligence failure leading to that attack. In my 
capacity as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the committee has 
made an exhaustive study of this subject, and I made a personal visit 
to Saudi Arabia, to Dhahran on August 25 and Riyadh on August 26, and 
my personal conclusion, backed up by the staff report, was that there 
was no intelligence failure.
  In fact, in the preceding year, there had been more than 100 
intelligence reports on alerts of a general nature, and very specific 
reports on an alert to the danger of a car bomb at Khobar Towers. That 
was the essence of a report by the Office of Special Investigations of 
the U.S. Air Force in January 1996. There had been previous reports 
about terrorist attacks at Khobar Towers--the same report about a car 
bombing, which, in fact, did take place in Riyadh on November 13, 1995, 
claiming the lives of five Americans; the State Department alert on 
June 13, just 12 days before the terrorist attack; and a report by the 
Defense Intelligence Agency on June 17, just 8 days before the attack, 
which emphasized the vulnerability of the area and the necessity for 
increased security. Specifically, what the DIA report said about Khobar 
Towers, with a large picture, was, ``A pattern appears to be developing 
that warrants improved security efforts.''
  Notwithstanding these warnings, improved security efforts were not 
undertaken by the Pentagon, by ranking military-civilian DOD 
authorities.
  I visited the scene, Mr. President, and was amazed to see how close 
that fence was to those towers--less than 60 feet away, which was an 
open and notorious invitation to terrorism. For anybody to say, on the 
basis of this record, on the basis of what I have personally observed, 
and on the basis of a staff report by the Intelligence Committee, that 
there was intelligence failure is, simply stated, preposterous. It was 
obvious that that fence had to be moved back. That issue has been 
raised in hearings before the Senate oversight committees and has not 
yet been answered by top officials in the Pentagon.
  Requests have been made for the oversight committees to be informed 
about what military personnel made what request of Saudi officials and 
what the responses of those Saudi officials were, and no information 
has been provided to the oversight committees. The Intelligence 
Committee asked ranking DOD officials what the obligation was to report 
up the chain of command any failure by Saudi officials to move the 
fence back, and that has not been done.
  But on the face of this record, Mr. President, it is plain that there 
has not been a failure of intelligence on the terrorist attack at 
Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996.
  The United States Code requires that the oversight Intelligence 
Committee be informed of significant intelligence failures. My 
conclusion is that there was no such intelligence failure, but, in 
fact, there was a failure of DOD officials to follow up on a well-known 
and obvious terrorist threat.
  I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the report by the staff 
of the Intelligence Committee be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                           Executive Summary

       In the wake of the June 25, 1996, deadly bombing at the 
     Khobar Towers housing complex Saudi Arabia, the Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence staff undertook an inquiry to 
     determine the adequacy of the intelligence concerning the 
     terrorist threat situation in Saudi Arabia. The Committee 
     staff reviewed the collection posture, the analytical 
     products available and the dissemination of threat 
     information.


                               CONCLUSION

       The Khobar Towers tragedy was not the result of an 
     intelligence failure.
     Threat level
       Intelligence regarding the terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia 
     was sufficient to prompt the Defense Intelligence Agency 
     (DIA), in July 1995, to raise the Terrorist Threat Level for 
     Saudi Arabia From Low to Medium.
       Reporting from enhanced intelligence efforts following the 
     November 13, 1995 bombing of the Office of the Program 
     Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG), in which 5 
     Americans were killed by a car bomb, prompted DIA to raise 
     the Threat Level to High, where it stayed until the Khobar 
     Towers bombing.
       The threat in Saudi Arabia is now considered Critical--the 
     highest Threat Level on the Department of Defense scale.
     Collection
       The U.S. intelligence Community in Saudi Arabia gave its 
     highest priority to the terrorist target and aggressively 
     collected against a range of internal and external threats 
     including Iran, Hizballah, and others.
     Analysis
       From April 1995 through the time of the Khobar Towers 
     bombing in June 1996 the intelligence analytic community 
     published

[[Page S10375]]

     more than 100 products on the topic of terrorism on the 
     Arabian peninsula. Among these were several Counter Terrorism 
     Center Threat Assessments and DIA Threat indicators.
       Among the most significant analytical products were the 
     June 13, 1996 Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and 
     Research report and the June 17, 1996 Military Intelligence 
     Digest article outlining numerous suspicious incidents that 
     had occurred at Khobar Towers, which noted that ``a pattern 
     appears to be developing that warrants improved security 
     efforts.''
       The above warnings incorporated intelligence such as (1) 
     ongoing Iranian and radical Islamic fundamentalist groups' 
     attempts to target American servicemen in Saudi Arabia for 
     terrorist acts; (2) the heightened threat that accompanied 
     the execution, carried out on May 31, of the four suspects in 
     the November OPM-SANG attack; and (3) well before the Khobar 
     attack, there was reporting that Khobar might be the target 
     of a bombing attempt.
     Vulnerability assessments
       The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) 
     conducted a vulnerability assessment of the Khobar Towers 
     facility and published its findings in January 1996.
       This AFOSI assessment highlighted various weakness that 
     could be exploited by terrorists, but emphasized the 
     particular vulnerability of perimeter security given the 
     proximity of the outside fence to many of the buildings as 
     well as the lack of the protective coating Mylar on the 
     windows of the Khobar Towers compound where Americans were 
     housed.
       In fact, this weakness had already come to the attention of 
     the base security personnel, who approached the Saudis with a 
     request to move the perimeter 10 feet back. The request to 
     move the fence, made initially in November 1995, was still 
     pending in June 1996, but successive base commanders did not 
     push hard enough for a meaningful movement of the fence for 
     fear of offending host country sensibilities.
       The recommendation concerning Mylar was made part of a 
     ``five-year plan'' for security enhancements on the compound 
     and thus had been delayed indefinitely at the time of the 
     June 25 attack.
     Dissemination
       Analytical products, threat and vulnerability assessments, 
     and valuable raw intelligence were readily available to 
     senior military commanders in Saudi Arabia and their civilian 
     counterparts at the Pentagon.
       Among the most significant were monthly briefings prepared 
     and presented in Saudi Arabia beginning in April 1995 that 
     informed senior military commanders of the three most 
     vulnerable U.S. installations in Saudi Arabia; of the three, 
     two have been attacked (OPM-SANG and Khobar Towers) and the 
     third (the PX Commissary in Riyadh) has been closed.

  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Report on the Khobar 
                        Towers Terrorist Attack


                   scope, objectives, and methodology

       The Staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
     has conducted a preliminary inquiry into the United States 
     Intelligence Community's collection, analysis and 
     dissemination of intelligence concerning terrorist threats in 
     Saudi Arabia prior to the June 25, 1996, bombing at the 
     Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The 
     Committee staff reviewed raw and finished intelligence 
     produced from late 1994 through June 1996. These products 
     include reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, 
     the State Department and others. The staff also interviewed 
     individuals in the Intelligence Community, the Defense 
     Department, and the State Department and accompanied the 
     Chairman of the Committee, Senator Arlen Specter, on a trip 
     to Dhahran, Riyadh, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and other Middle 
     East countries from August 24-29, 1996.
       During and immediately following the visit to Saudi Arabia 
     and the Middle East, Committee staff interviewed field 
     commanders and military personnel who played a critical force 
     protection and security role just prior to and immediately 
     after the blast. The staff also interviewed the FBI lead 
     investigator on the scene in Dhahran, as well as top ranking 
     Intelligence Community personnel. Finally, the staff 
     accompanied Senator Specter to meetings with Saudi Crown 
     Prince Abdullah and Defense Minister Sultan while in Jeddah, 
     as well as other Middle East leaders with unique insight into 
     terrorist activity in the region such as Prime Minister 
     Netanyahu of Israel, President Assad of Syria, and President 
     Arafat of the Palestinian Authority.
       Since the Khobar blast, the Senate Select Committee on 
     Intelligence has held seven hearings focusing on terrorism, 
     Saudi, Arbia, and support to the military in the region. The 
     Committee received testimony from Secretary of Defense 
     William J. Perry, CIA Director John Deutch, FBI Director 
     Louis Freeh, numerous other Administration officials, 
     academicians and other experts.


                               background

       On June 25, 1996, at approximately 10:00 p.m. local time, a 
     massive explosion shook the Khobar Towers housing compound in 
     Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The blast killed 19 American military 
     service personnel and at least one Saudi civilian, wounded 
     more than 200 Americans and injured hundreds of other 
     civilians. At the time, the Khobar Towers complex was home 
     for the airmen of the U.S. Air Force's 4404th Fighter Wing 
     (Provisional) under the operational command the U.S. Central 
     Command (USCENTCOM). The complex also housed forces from the 
     United Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia participating in the 
     United Nations effort to enforce the ``no-fly'' zone in 
     southern Iraq.
       Before the explosion, American personnel at an observation 
     post on the roof of Building 131 at the northeast corner of 
     the Khobar complex reported seeing a fuel truck and a car 
     approach the northwest end of the Khobar Towers compound from 
     the north and turn east onto 31st Street just outside the 
     perimeter fence separating the compound from a public parking 
     lot. The truck and the car that it was following traveled 
     along the perimeter fence toward the northeast corner of the 
     compound and then stopped. A car already in place and facing 
     the two approaching vehicles flashed its lights, presumably 
     to signal to them that their approach was ``all clear.'' The 
     two companion vehicles then continued to travel along the 
     perimeter fence. When the vehicles reached a point adjacent 
     to Building 131, they turned left pointing away from the 
     building, and stopped. The fuel truck backed into the hedges 
     along the perimeter fence directly in front of Building 131 
     as the third car idled and then departed. Two men exited from 
     the truck and hurried into the remaining car, which then sped 
     away.
       Noting this suspicious activity, the U.S. personnel at the 
     Building 131 observation post began an evacuation, but within 
     three to four minutes the bomb exploded, completely 
     demolishing the front facade of this eight-story building. 
     The explosion severely damaged five adjacent buildings and 
     blew out windows throughout the compound. According to a 
     recent report by the House National Security Committee, the 
     size of the blast indicates that the truck carried between 
     3,000 and 5,000 pounds of explosives. In addition to the 
     American causalities, hundreds of Saudi and third country 
     nationals living in the complex and immediate vicinity were 
     also wounded. U.S. intelligence experts and 4404th Wing 
     leaders have concluded that Americans were the target of the 
     terrorist attack.
       The attack at Khobar Towers was the second major terrorist 
     incident directed at U.S. interests, and U.S. military 
     presence specifically, in Saudi Arabia in the past year. On 
     November 13, 1995, a car bomb containing approximately 250 
     pounds of explosives detonated outside the headquarters of 
     the Office of the Program Manager of the Saudi Arabian 
     National Guard (OPM-SANG) in Riyadh. The building was used 
     by American military forces as a training facility for 
     Saudi military personnel. Five Americans died and 34 were 
     wounded in this attack. Prior to this incident DIA 
     categorized the threat to Americans in Saudi Arabia as 
     medium. Six weeks after this incident, that threat level 
     was raised to high.


                        adequacy of intelligence

     Collection
       Pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD-35), 
     terrorism targets in the Middle East are Tier 1 targets and 
     receive the highest priority for collection. Thus, current 
     Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch has placed from 
     the beginning of his tenure the utmost urgency on collection 
     against these targets.
       Even prior to the issuance of PDD-35, however, the U.S. 
     intelligence collection posture in Saudi Arabia had shifted 
     focus. In late 1994, the U.S. Intelligence Community in Saudi 
     Arabia began reporting an increase in threatening activity 
     directed against Americans in the region. Much of this 
     heightened activity was carried out by agents of Iran, either 
     alone or in cooperation with elements of regional radical 
     Islamic fundamentalists. During a visit to Saudi Arabia in 
     December 1994, DCI James Woolsey raised with senior Saudi 
     officials the CIA concern over Iranian intentions and 
     activities in the region.
       Upon his confirmation in May 1995, Deutch concentrated 
     immediately upon the issue of antiterrorism and force 
     protection as a top priority. Deutch visited Saudi Arabia on 
     October 22, 1995, and raised with senior Saudi officials his 
     ``serious concerns'' over Iranian intentions in the region as 
     he emphasized the commitment of the United States to fighting 
     the terrorist threat. Deutch also dispatched other senior CIA 
     officials to Saudi Arabia for detailed discussions of how to 
     address this problem. Intelligence was focused during this 
     period on Iranian operatives in the Eastern Province who were 
     attempting to gather intelligence on the Dhahran Air Base.
       After the OPM-SANG attack on November 13, 1995, collection 
     against terrorist targets in general intensified. 
     Intelligence Community personnel interviewed in Saudi Arabia 
     said that almost all of their time was devoted to 
     counterterrorism and force protection issues and much of this 
     work was driven by the requirements of the military 
     commanders in the theater.
     Analysis
       By March 1995, the Intelligence Community had determined 
     that Iranian operations in Saudi Arabia were no longer simply 
     intelligence gathering activities but contained the potential 
     for the execution of terrorist acts. It had been previously 
     learned that weapons and explosives had been moved in and 
     stored in apparent support of these acts.

[[Page S10376]]

       From the period beginning in April 1995 through the time of 
     the Khobar Towers bombing in June 1996, the Intelligence 
     Community issued finished analysis that clearly highlighted 
     the ongoing and increasing terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia. 
     The CIA and DCI's Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) issued at 
     least 41 different reports on terrorism on the Arabian 
     peninsula. Ten of these were specific threat assessments and 
     six were CTC commentaries focused on the threat to U.S. 
     personnel in Saudi Arabia.
       During the same period, the Defense Intelligence Agency 
     produced more than 60 intelligence products on the terrorist 
     threat in Saudi Arabia. Many of these were factual in nature, 
     reporting on terrorist incidents such as the OPM-SANG 
     bombing, but many others reflected the Intelligence 
     Community's analytical judgment of higher threat levels. In 
     July 1995, DIA raised the terrorist threat level for Saudi 
     Arabia from Low to Medium. After the OPM-SANG attack, the 
     threat level was raised again to High where it stayed until 
     the Khobar Towers bombing. The threat in Saudi Arabia is now 
     considered Critical--the highest threat level on the DIA 
     scale. Perhaps the most significant single DIA analytical 
     product was a June 17, 1996 Military Intelligence Digest 
     article outlining numerous suspicious incidents that had 
     occurred at Khobar Towers and noting that ``a pattern appears 
     to be developing that warrants improved security efforts.'' 
     This report followed only four days after the Department of 
     State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research published ``Saudi 
     Arabia/Terrorism: US Targets?'' focusing attention on the 
     same series of incidents occurring at the Khobar facility.
       Some officials prior to June 25 bombing believed that the 
     earlier events and planning for terrorist acts were actually 
     leading up to a larger bombing campaign against U.S. forces 
     in the Eastern province. These officials postulated after the 
     June 25 attack that Khobar Towers was the likely end-game of 
     the earlier bombing scheme.
     Dissemination
       The emphasis that the DCIs placed on providing intelligence 
     for force protection was reflected by the U.S. intelligence 
     officers in the field as well. As early as January 1995 
     intelligence officers briefed the commander of Joint Task 
     Force/SouthWest Asia (JTF/SWA) and the commander of the Air 
     Base in Dhahran of the serious threat posed to U.S. forces in 
     the Eastern province.
       These briefings continued throughout 1995. The incoming 
     JTF/SWA commander, Major General Franklin, and his Deputy, 
     Admiral Irwin, were briefed on March 16, 1995 along with 
     General Keck, Commander of the 4404th Air Wing, on the most 
     recent intelligence.\1\ Follow up briefings were ordered for 
     JTF/SWA command and security personnel to alert them to the 
     threat. By April 5, 1995, all senior military commanders in 
     the region had received detailed briefings on the threat 
     posed by the increased Iranian presence and activity in the 
     area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       On April 20, 1995 the senior U.S. intelligence official in 
     Saudi Arabia briefed the top military commanders in the 
     region on the Iranian plotting against U.S. military 
     personnel in Saudi Arabia. Discussions were held on actions 
     to be taken to beef up security awareness at various 
     installations throughout Saudi Arabia where a U.S. military 
     presence existed. The intelligence official provided his 
     assessments on the ``softest targets'' in the kingdom (OPM-
     SANG, Khobar Towers, and the PX-Commissary in Riyadh).\2\ A 
     decision was then made to brief all military commanders in 
     the region on a more regular basis on the serious terrorist 
     threat to U.S. military personnel in the region. The 
     military, based upon these threats, sent out a general threat 
     advisory to remain in effect through June 15, 1996. The plan 
     was apparently to supplement this general threat notice with 
     the regular briefings.
       On April 30, 1995, the briefings were expanded to include 
     the ``working level'' commanders in the various units in 
     Saudi Arabia. As part of these briefings, Major General 
     Franklin put out an advisory to senior military commanders 
     including the following: ``Our facilities and access 
     procedures should be reexamined to ensure we are doing the 
     necessary things to minimize unauthorized individuals or 
     vehicles from entering our compounds. Of special concern are 
     unattended vehicles parked near entrances and exits or close 
     to our work and living areas.''
       At the same time Major General Boice, Commander of the U.S. 
     Military Training Mission increased the threat posture for 
     the troops under his command from ``no security threat'' to 
     ``threat alpha.'' On June 25, 1995 Security officers from 
     across the Kingdom held the first monthly (and later weekly, 
     after OPM-SANG) counter-intelligence/force protection 
     meeting.
       In sum, prior to the OPM-SANG bombing there was extensive 
     information available to U.S. personnel in Saudi Arabia 
     concerning the nature of the threat posed by Iranian and 
     other terrorist groups. After the OPM-SANG bombing, more 
     specific intelligence threat information became available. 
     Notable among these are:
       Well before the Khobar attack, there was reporting that 
     Khobar might be the target of a bombing attempt; there were a 
     variety of reports in 1996 indicating that large quantities 
     of explosive had been smuggled into the Eastern province of 
     Saudi Arabia; threats from associates of those Saudi 
     dissidents beheaded by the Saudi government on May 31, 1996 
     for their alleged role in the November 13, 1995 bombing of 
     OPM-SANG; \3\ a Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence 
     and Research report on June 13, 1996 focusing attention on 
     a series of incidents around the Khobar facility; and a 
     June 17, 1996 Pentagon intelligence report highlighting 
     the same incidents at Khobar Towers concluding that a 
     suspicious ``pattern [of surveillance of the Khobar 
     compound's perimeter and other similar incidents] seems to 
     be developing that warrants improved security efforts;''
       In addition, military commanders in the region were very 
     familiar with the terrorism vulnerability assessment of the 
     Khobar Towers compound conducted by the Air Force Office of 
     Special Investigations (OSI) in January 1996. Included within 
     the OSI vulnerability assessment is a ``threat scenario,'' 
     based upon a State Department threat warning system, that 
     included: ``an assessment that a `park and abandon' car bomb 
     was a threat to the compound's security, and an additional 
     assessment that moving back the perimeter fence would lessen 
     the damage that would result from a `park and abandon' car 
     bomb; \4\ a recommendation for the additional security 
     measure of Mylar protective coating on the compound's windows 
     to avoid shattering and fragmentation of glass; the Air Force 
     made this recommendation part of a 5-year plan and thus 
     delayed the addition of Mylar indefinitely.'' \5\
       This intelligence and the vulnerability assessments were 
     combined in three separate but related series of meetings. 
     First, a monthly force protection meeting was convened, co-
     chaired by the Defense Attache and senior intelligence 
     officer. These force protection meetings were made more 
     frequent (once a week) following the OPM-SANG bombing. 
     Second, regular political-military meetings were held at the 
     U.S. Embassy, at which the threat intelligence and 
     vulnerability assessments were discussed. Third, after the 
     OPM-SANG bombing an Emergency Action Committee composed of 
     the most senior military and intelligence officials in the 
     region met regularly and discussed threat intelligence and 
     vulnerability information as the major topic at each meeting.
       As discussed above, senior military commanders in the 
     region were fully briefed on the vulnerability and 
     intelligence threat information. Further, General 
     Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was 
     briefed at length on all intelligence and vulnerability 
     assessments by the senior intelligence officer in Saudi 
     Arabia in May 1996. This officer referred to his briefing of 
     General Shalikashvili as ``intense and to the point'' 
     concerning the threat and vulnerability information. Also, 
     senior military commanders in the regions were quite familiar 
     with the Long Commission Report of the Beirut bombing in 
     1983, which destroyed the U.S. Marine barracks, killing 241 
     Marines.\6\


                 there was not an intelligence failure

       Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 makes it 
     incumbent upon the Director of Central Intelligence, as well 
     as the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities 
     of the United States Government involved in intelligence 
     activities to: ``* * * keep the intelligence committees 
     [House and Senate] fully and currently informed of all 
     intelligence activities. . . . including any . . . 
     significant intelligence failure''; 50 United States Code 
     Sec. 413a*(1)(italic added).
       The totality of the threat information available to the 
     Department of Defense, as well as the posture of the 
     Intelligence Community at the time of the Khobar Towers 
     bombing makes clear that an intelligence failure, either in 
     collection, dissemination or analysis, did not occur. 
     Military commanders in the region and in Washington received 
     highly relevant threat information for a year and a half 
     prior to the Khobar Towers bombing. Intelligence personnel in 
     the region briefed this information exhaustively throughout 
     the region, and the DCI Counterterrorism Center ensured that 
     senior policymakers in Washington were made aware of the 
     threat and vulnerability information.


                               conclusion

       Regarding the question of the adequacy of the collection, 
     analysis and dissemination of intelligence concerning 
     terrorist threats in Saudi Arabia to Defense Department 
     officials in Washington and military commanders in the field 
     prior to the June 25, 1996, bombing at the Khobar Towers 
     housing complex, the available information leads the 
     Committee staff to conclude that the U.S. Intelligence 
     Community provided sufficient information not only to suggest 
     active terrorist targeting of U.S. personnel and facilities, 
     but also to predict probable terrorist targets. Further, 
     having concluded that the DCI was fully cognizant of and 
     attentive to the force protection issues in the Eastern 
     Province prior to the June 25 attack, and that consecutive 
     DCIs ensured that this force protection information was 
     disseminated to proper Defense Department recipients, the 
     Committee staff concludes that an intelligence failure did 
     not occur. Therefore, the Director of Central Intelligence is 
     not obligated to report a significant intelligence failure to 
     the intelligence oversight committees pursuant to Section 
     502(1) of the National Security Act of 1947.


                               footnotes

     \1\ An April 3, 1995, a U.S. intelligence cable noted that 
     ``U.S. military commanders here are very/very concerned about 
     the Iranian efforts in Saudi Arabia.''

[[Page S10377]]

     \2\ After this briefing, the Commander of OPM-SANG, General 
     Nash, approached the same intelligence official to express 
     concern for physical security at the OPM-SANG facility and to 
     specifically ask the official to pass along his concern to 
     U.S. and Saudi intelligence and security officials, which he 
     did.
     \3\ Between May 31 (the date of the execution of the alleged 
     OPM-SANG co-conspirators) and the date of the Khobar bombing 
     on June 25, a primary focus of intelligence was on the threat 
     of associates of the executed individuals seeking revenge 
     against U.S. persons.
     \4\ Senator Specter and staff found the distance to be 
     slightly less than 60 feet from the perimeter fence to the 
     front of Building 131. This is significant because (a) the 
     Defense Department had previously placed the distance at 80 
     feet; (b) according to the House National Security Committee 
     in a recent study, the AFOSI report makes clear that targets 
     closest to perimeter most vulnerable; and (c) the AFOSI 
     report concluded that ``every effort should be made to 
     maximize the distance between a given structure and a 
     potential threat.'' It is also significant because the 
     military commanders apparently never asked the Saudis to move 
     the fence back 400 feet, as DoD had previously claimed. The 
     request was instead to move the fence back 10 feet, which the 
     Saudis quite correctly deemed a purely cosmetic and de 
     minimus action and did not take seriously.
     \5\ Accordingly to tests conducted by military experts since 
     the Khobar attack, even if a bomb the size of OPM-SANG had 
     been used (250 pounds) rather than the 3000-5000 pound device 
     that a House National Security Committee report said was used 
     at Khobar Towers, there would still have been 12 fatalities 
     because the glass on the windows of Building 131 were not 
     treated with Mylar to prevent shattering (as had been 
     recommended by the OSI report).
     \6\ The Secretary of Defense has recently testified that the 
     military was not prepared for a bomb the size of the Khobar 
     device because an explosive that large was unheard of in the 
     region. This testimony is inconsistent with the fact that the 
     U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut was destroyed by a 12,000 
     pound bomb in 1983, killing 241 U.S. Marines.

                          ____________________