[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 125 (Thursday, September 12, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10366-S10374]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
TREASURY, POSTAL SERVICE, AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS ACT,
1997
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Amendment No. 5279
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, is there any time remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 5 minutes left to the opposition.
Mr. KERRY. Who is considered the opposition here?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. KERRY. That is the only time remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent simply for 1
minute to explain.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, this is a very straightforward vote on
whether or not we are prepared, finally, to include black and smokeless
powder in a study by appropriate law enforcement authorities of the
United States. A study to determine whether it can contain taggants so
that we can investigate pipe bombs and other bombs in the United
States. Law enforcement has sought this for 17 years. It is a very
simple vote. There is an adequate offset in the IRS. They have cut the
bills funding by $1 billion already. The most that this will cost is
$21 million and of course we hope it will be less, but any argument to
the contrary that suggests you cannot find the $21 million that have
been offset here is simply unacceptable. So we ask colleagues to vote
for this appropriate study.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SHELBY. Madam President, how much time is remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama has 3\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. SHELBY. Madam President, I will be brief on this. We have just
been told the administration does not support the offset proposed by
the Senator from Massachusetts on this.
I yield the remainder of my time.
I move to table the amendment.
Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to
table. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] is
absent because of illness in the family.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
who desire to vote?
The result was announced, yeas 57, nays 42, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 287 Leg.]
YEAS--57
Abraham
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Bond
Brown
Burns
Campbell
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Domenici
Exon
Faircloth
Frahm
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Hatfield
Heflin
Helms
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kempthorne
Kerrey
Kyl
Leahy
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Pressler
Roth
Santorum
Shelby
Simpson
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NAYS--42
Akaka
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Bradley
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Chafee
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kennedy
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Levin
Lieberman
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Pell
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Simon
Wellstone
Wyden
NOT VOTING--1
Pryor
The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 5279) was agreed
to.
Mr. SHELBY. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. CRAIG. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the pending
business be set aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Excepted Committee Amendment, beginning on Page 129, Line 20 through
Page 130, Line 18
Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I intend to move to table the
committee amendment beginning on page 129, and ask that it be in order
to consider that committee amendment at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Madam President, as I indicated, I will move to table the
committee amendment that strikes a House provision capping the number
of political employees who are appointed by the President. The effect
of tabling the committee amendment will be to retain the House language
and therefore limit the number of executive branch political
appointees.
I am pleased to be joined in this bipartisan effort by both Senators
from Arizona, Mr. McCain and Mr. Kyl, my neighbor from the neighboring
State of Minnesota, Mr. Grams, and the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Santorum.
Madam President, the House language we seek to retain caps the number
of political appointees at 2,300. The CBO estimates that doing so will
save $228 million over the next 6 years. This bipartisan proposal is
broadly supported for both its deficit reduction and its policy
implications.
Madam President, it has been endorsed by the Citizens Against
Government Waste, and similar versions of this provision have been
included in the CBO's deficit reduction proposals, as well as the
budget assumptions of the other body. The other body passed this exact
provision on a vote of 267-150, with strong bipartisan support.
I note that this is a more modest provision than the one the Senate
passed last year as part of the fiscal year 1996 Treasury-Postal
appropriations bill. At that time, we in this body capped the executive
branch political appointees at 2,000, a level that in practice would
have required a reduction that would have been 60 percent greater than
the reduction we are proposing today, the reduction that has already
been approved in the House version of this legislation.
The provision is also consistent with the recommendations of the Vice
President's National Performance Review which called for reductions in
the number of Federal managers and supervisors. That report argued that
overcontrol and micromanagement not only stifled the creativity of line
managers and workers, they ``consumed billions per year in salary,
benefits, and administrative costs.''
Madam President, that assessment is especially appropriate when we
think about and look at the issue of political appointees. Between 1980
and 1992, the number of political appointees in our executive branch
grew by more than 17 percent, over three times as fast as the total
number of executive branch employees. Since 1960, political appointees
have grown in this country in the executive branch by a startling
percentage of 430 percent. While we have made significant strides in
the last few years in slowing and even reversing the growth
[[Page S10367]]
in the total number of Federal employees, our progress with respect to
political appointees has lagged behind.
Madam President, the exploding number of political appointees was a
target of the 1989 National Commission on the Public Service which was
chaired by former Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker. As the
Commission noted, Presidents must have the flexibility to appoint staff
that are ideologically compatible. Political appointees, of course, can
be enthusiastic sources of fresh ideas, and they do bring many times
meaningful experience from the private sector into an administration.
Equally as important, political appointees help ensure Government
response to the policy priorities that were actually mandated by the
electorate at the ballot box.
You cannot say that no political appointees are needed. It is very
important if our election of a President is to have real meaning.
However, Madam President, as the Volcker Commission found, far from
enhancing responsiveness, the mushrooming number of Presidential
appointees actually undermined effective Presidential control of the
executive branch. The Commission noted that the large number of
Presidential appointees simply cannot be managed effectively by any
President or by any White House. There are just too many.
Altogether, the Volcker Commission argued that the lack of control
and focus may dilute the President's ability to develop a coherent and
coordinated program, and to hold Cabinet Secretaries accountable. The
Commission found that the excessive number of appointees are actually a
barrier to critical expertise, distancing the President and his
principal assistants both from the most experienced career officials
and from the front-line workers. These are the people who are often the
best positioned to make the critical assessments of Government policy.
The problem of distancing that was raised by the Volcker Commission
has been chronicled in more detail by Paul Light in his book
``Thickening Government.'' Light found that the increasing number of
political appointees are arrayed in layer upon layer of management,
layers that did not exist 30 years ago. He found in 1960 there were 17
layers of management at the very top level of Government; by 1992 there
were 32 layers. Compounding the problem, Light notes that the 32 layers
do not stack neatly on top of one another in a unified chain of
command. Some layers come into play on some issues, but not on other
issues. Mr. Light asserts that as this sediment has thickened over the
decades, Presidents have grown increasingly distant from the lines of
Government, and the front lines from them. He adds that Presidential
leadership, therefore, may reside in stripping Government of the
barriers to do its job effectively.
Madam President, many will recall the difficulties, for example, that
the current administration has had in filling even some of the more
visible political appointments. A story in the National Journal in
November 1993 focusing upon the delays in the Clinton administration in
filling political positions noted that in Great Britain the transition
to a new government is finished a week after it begins. A speedy
transition is possible because the British Government runs on a handful
of political appointees. According to Paul Light, they have about one-
tenth as many career executives, and only five layers of management
between the Minister and the British equivalent of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary, compared to more than 16 layers here in a comparable
situation.
By contrast, the transition of U.S. administrations over the past 35
years has seen increasing delays and logjams and perfectly illustrates
another reason why the number of these political appointee positions
should be cut back. Madam President, the average length of time from
inauguration to confirmation of top-level executive positions has
steadily risen from 2.4 months under President Kennedy, to 5.3 months
under President Reagan, to 8.1 months under President Bush, and now to
a pretty staggering 8.5 months, on average, under President Clinton.
The consequences of having so many critical positions unfilled when
an administration changes can be serious. In the first 2 years of the
Clinton administration, there were a number of stories and problems
created by delays in making these appointments.
From strained relationships with foreign allies over failures to make
ambassadorial appointments, to the 2-year vacancy that we all read
about at the top of the National Archives, the record is replete with
examples of agencies left drifting while a political appointment was
delayed. Obviously, there were many situations where the delays were
caused by circumstances beyond the control of this administration. And,
of course, the figures I just read indicated that this has been a
problem in many administrations. It is just that, over time, with each
administration, regardless of party, it has gotten somewhat worse.
Nonetheless, it is clear that with a reduced number of political
appointments to fill, the process of selecting and appointing
individuals to key positions in a new administration is very likely to
go more smoothly and to be enhanced.
Madam President, let me also stress that the problem is not simply
the initial filling of a political appointment, but also the problem of
keeping somebody in that position for a reasonable period of time.
Between 1970 and 1986, the tenure of a political appointee was, on
average, 20 months, and even shorter for schedule C employees.
In a recent report, the General Accounting Office reviewed a portion
of these positions for the period of 1981 to 1991, and found high
levels of turnovers--seven appointees in 10 years for one position--as
well as delays, usually of months but sometimes years, in filling
vacancies.
As I have noted before on this floor, this proposal may not be
popular with some within this administration and perhaps some in the
other party who hope to win back the White House in the upcoming
election.
I want to stress that I do not believe the effort to reduce the
number of political appointees should be a partisan issue. It is
because the only way we are ever going to have control over this is by
a bipartisan commitment in the House and the Senate to do something
about the exponential growth in the number of political appointees.
So I was pleased to introduce earlier in the 104th Congress
legislation that would have implemented the recommendations of the
Volcker Commission, and that would have capped the political appointees
at 2,000. And I was proud to have as cosponsors of that measure my
friends, the senior Senator from Arizona and also his colleague and my
friend, the junior Senator from Arizona.
As I mentioned earlier, this body adopted that provision to last
year's fiscal year 1996 Treasury-postal appropriations bill. It had
bipartisan sponsorship. So this body has already gone on record in
favor of the cap at 2,000. But what we are trying to do by tabling the
committee amendment today is to at least get us down to the 2,300 that
the other body has already supported in this legislation we are
considering today.
(Mr. THOMAS assumed the chair.)
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the sacrifice that the deficit reduction
efforts require really have to be spread among all of us. That has
already been felt by many people all over this country and many
Government workers all over this country. This measure requires us to
bite the bullet and impose limitations upon political appointments that
both parties would probably want to retain.
The test of a commitment to deficit reduction, however, is not simply
to propose measures that impact somebody else. As we move forward to
implement the recommendations of the National Performance Review Board
to reduce the number of Government employees and streamline agencies
and make Government more responsive, we should also take this
opportunity today to right-size the number of political appointees, to
implement the policies of any administration, without, at the same
time, unnecessarily burdening the Federal budget.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan
effort. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I listened, I regret to say, only to about
the last half of the Senator's statement. If he doesn't mind, I would
like to ask a couple of questions. First of all, my memory, such as it
is, says that there
[[Page S10368]]
was not a rollcall vote on this last year, is that correct?
Mr. FEINGOLD. That is correct.
Mr. KERREY. You have cited a Volcker Commission report repeatedly
here. Can you describe the details of that commission and how many
people were on it? Do you have any other cites besides the Volcker
Commission to base this on?
Mr. FEINGOLD. In addition to Mr. Volcker's commission, which was
cited by a number of articles, I also cited the work of Mr. Light, who
wrote a more extensive book about this subject called ``Thickening
Government,'' which I quoted at length. It was described that the
growth of these political appointments has outstripped growth in other
areas of Government. Therefore, while we have cut back on some of our
Federal employees, this area continues to grow. I can certainly provide
the Senator with the details of the Volcker Commission and Mr. Light's
book.
Mr. KERREY. The one statement that the Senator from Wisconsin made
that causes me to have some concern is the statement that I believe the
Volcker Commission said that political appointees actually make it more
difficult for the President to carry out whatever it was he or she
campaigned upon. One of the facts here is that this would take it from
2,800 down to----
Mr. FEINGOLD. The current estimate, if I may say to the Senator from
Nebraska, is about 2,900, but it varies and the Congressional Budget
Office estimates that it averages around 2,700 or 2,800. The effect of
this would be, as I understand it, to require, within the next year, a
reduction of between 400 and 500 positions.
Mr. KERREY. So that the public can put this into perspective, there
are 1.971 million Federal employees. Right now, there is an allowance
for 3,400. I think we are at 2,800 now. This would take us down to
2,300.
My concern with the Senator's amendment is based upon having been
elected for 4 years as Governor, where I came into office with very
little opportunity for appointments below the top slot. It made it
difficult, therefore, to come in, having promised to do something, for
example, with agriculture, with taxes, or with some other area of
government, and carry that out. The public expected me to be able to do
it. But, in fact, I would come in with very little real power, because
there was little opportunity to bring people in who agreed with the
positions that I had taken during the campaign itself.
That is why I was concerned when I heard that. It runs against my own
common experience, my own personal experience. It does not seem to me
that running at the current level of 2,800, with 3,400 being the cap,
that does not seem, on the surface, to be like a thickening of the
Government. It is less than half of 1 percent--current political
appointees. I know the administration raised concerns, not just for
themselves but for whoever might follow, that this could impede their
ability to carry out whatever he or she campaigned upon. It seems to me
the people expect him to be able to come in and run the bureaucracies
with the people that have similar views to theirs.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator
from Nebraska, of course. I respect very much his distinguished tenure
as Governor of Nebraska and his knowledge of the importance of having a
political presence within any kind of executive administration, if you
want to implement the policies you run on.
I indicated that, and it was also indicated from the Volcker
Commission, and others' comments to that effect.
The question is what level? What I have indicated here and want to
repeat is that that clearly has been a greater theme of government with
respect to political appointees than other people in executive
positions. It has grown 17 percent, while in the nonpolitical area it
has only grown approximately 5 percent. That is the question.
Clearly, I say to the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. President, there
must be some point at which there are too many political appointees--
perhaps 10,000, or 8,000. At some point there are too many people. What
these reports have suggested, almost ironically, is that, if you get
too many political appointees, the chief executive of a State or the
Federal Government cannot even keep track of them so that it actually
can backfire on them. It could actually end up being worse than having
the right mix between civil service career people and political
appointees.
In response to the earlier question, as I understand it, there were
six members of the task force within the Volcker Commission that
examined the specific issue of political appointees. The chairman of
that task force was Elliot Richardson. Among the members were Robert
McFarlane, Walter Mondale, Benjamin Read, Anne Wexler, and Alan Wolff,
and they came up with this conclusion that we ought to go to 2,000
again.
To reiterate, my amendment--actually the House amendment that I
simply want to restore--would not take this to 2,000 as I originally
hoped. It would simply take us to the 2,300 figure.
Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I still have some questions about this. I
come at this with some background of longstanding. The Volcker
Commission report is about 7 years old at this time. I had hearings on
it when it first came out of the Governmental Affairs Committee. I am
very familiar with the Volcker Commission report. It came out in 1989,
I believe. I had hearings on it in the Governmental Affairs Committee
at the time it came out because I, too, was concerned about the growth
of Government. We had hearings and worked on some ways to peel back on
some political appointees to hit the proper balance that needs to be
hit.
I do not believe, however, that just mandating it, as we are doing
with this particular proposal, is the way to go at this thing. I think
it is in many ways unnecessary and unwarranted because the proposed
legislation would enforce an arbitrary cap. And it is arbitrary. It is
not done going department by department and agency by agency, and
saying, ``Here are some that are excess; here are some that are not.''
Doing a study that way just lops off about a third, or 30 percent the
total number of political appointees, without saying who is going to do
this job or whether their job can be done by somebody else or absorbed
by people in the regular civil service ranks, or whatever.
Let me just say that President Clinton has taken the lead to reduce
Federal employees while making Government work better. The President's
plan has carefully analyzed the Federal Government, and it has
recommended specific and pragmatic ways to reduce the number of
Government employees. The plan makes 180 specific recommendations to
streamline the Government and deliver more services for less money.
By contrast, the proposed legislation singles out political
appointees while failing to account for how the arbitrary number of
remaining appointees will manage the Government. As far as reducing
Government and cutting costs, we began 3 years ago when President
Clinton began the effort to reduce Government.
We are all familiar with the National Performance Review under the
direction of the Vice President. His goal was to create a Federal
Government that works better and costs less.
Under the NPR--let us see how we have done with the NPR. After 3
years in office, the President is well ahead of schedule to reduce the
size by 272,900--that was the goal by the end of this year--or about a
12-percent reduction in the Federal workforce. In fiscal year 1995,
185,000 full-time equivalent positions were cut. By the end of fiscal
year 1996, 214,000 will have been cut. So we are well on the way to
cutting that 272,900. So we have reduced. We are about two-thirds of
the way toward the goal in one-third of the time that we thought it was
going to take.
In the Reagan and Bush administrations, from 1980 to 1992, we saw an
increase of 67,000 in the Federal civilian workforce. That was an
increase of 3.1 percent. This administration has cut the number of on-
board Federal employees by 225,000 in 3 years. It is a decrease of 10
percent. A similar reduction has occurred in the percentage of
political appointees.
So it has been across the board. It has not been only civil service.
It has also been the political appointees. There are approximately 6
percent
[[Page S10369]]
fewer political appointees in this administration than there were
during the previous administration.
This is an important thing to note. The last time American taxpayers
saw levels of Federal employment this low was during the administration
of President Kennedy.
This administration established a plan to reduce not only the size of
the Government but also the number of programs, the number of
regulations, and the way Government works to develop new partnerships.
Even though the current level of appointees in this administration is
below that of the Bush administration in 1992, the proposed legislation
would force a 30-percent reduction of political appointees in addition
to the reductions that have already been accomplished.
The National Performance Review accomplishes the goals of this
proposed amendment. I have been much involved with the NPR. President
Clinton has sought to reduce the cost of Government to the American
public while providing higher quality services. The National
Performance Review has carefully analyzed the Federal Government and
has recommended specific, pragmatic ways to reduce the number of
Government employees, including political appointees, to manage with
fewer layers of middle management, and to reduce Government
regulations. For example, President Clinton has reduced the number of
Department of Agriculture agencies from 43 to 29 and plans to close or
consolidate 1,200 field offices.
I think the proposed amendment looks only at one frame of really the
big picture. The proposed amendment singles out political appointees.
By singling out political appointees, it examines only one-sixth of 1
percent of the total Federal employees. About half of the political
appointees are schedule C employees who are junior and midlevel staff.
These are not all senior-level managers even though they may be
political appointees.
This administration has instead focused on all Federal employees by
removing layers of management to offer lower level employees greater
responsibility. It also decentralized decisionmaking and increased the
scope of managers' control.
Political appointees execute the policy priorities voiced by the
American public at the ballot box. Political appointees play a key role
in carrying forward policy priorities. The Clinton administration has
an obligation to ensure that the Government is a well-managed
instrument of the public interest in carrying out programs important to
the public. Political appointees are entrusted with managing the
priorities of the American public.
So just arbitrary cuts in the number of political appointees endanger
the administration's ability to respond to policy priorities created
both by law and the American public at the ballot box.
Mr. President, there was a statement made about how the British
functioned and how their Government operates and how they can turn
around the Government in a much shorter time than we can. That is very
true. Perhaps there are some areas where we can learn from the British
and other parliamentary forms of government. But they operate on a
parliamentary form of government quite different from ours. Indeed,
they are a democracy, but their functions of government are completely
different than ours where we split the powers out and have the powers
of government balance each other between the executive and legislative
branches. Then ours is monitored by the judicial branch, of course,
when there are any challenges to this. But in a parliamentary system
theirs is centered in that Prime Minister, and a Prime Minister is
normally far more powerful than any American President. We may be a
bigger country and a bigger economy, but as far as the authority to
commit the affairs of government in a certain direction, a Prime
Minister speaks with authority for his or her government with a shadow
Cabinet out there in the offing. That is the reason they always can
turn over faster than we can. In a parliamentary form of government,
the Prime Minister can say, ``Here is what is going to happen,'' and
that is a commitment of government, or that person is turned out of
office when there is a new election or the party turns him or her out
of office.
And so a Prime Minister, as far as getting things done, and as far as
the hierarchy, the bureaucracy of Government to back that person up,
there is less turnover in that type system than there is normally in
our type system with all of its remainder of powers back and forth.
The loyal opposition in a parliamentary situation has a cabinet, a
shadow cabinet standing there waiting to come in. They know right then
who their appointees are going to be, if there are going to be many at
all, and the actual form of Government goes on. The full-time civil
servants are lifetime, usually spend a lifetime career in those
particular positions.
Now, let us look back at the NPR a minute, the National Performance
Review. We worked very closely with the National Performance Review in
the Governmental Affairs Committee. We provided some of the
legislation, the legal authority for buyouts, for early outs, for early
retirements, but done with fairness--done with fairness.
We have cut out a lot of those positions. And as I just read a moment
ago here, we have, indeed, cut out a number of the political appointees
with that, and that was done at the initiative of the administration,
to cut some of those out, cut out some of these layers of management.
I know Paul Light, in reference to his work. I have his book and have
read his book. He was on our committee staff at one time and went from
the committee staff, I think, to the position he has now where he has
authored a lot of articles, and so on, has done an excellent job in
what he has done. So I am thoroughly familiar with Paul's work. I know
him personally. He has done a good job in pointing out a lot of these
things. We do, indeed, have to be working toward the end he points out
in the book of this layering of Government, the many layers and levels
that we have to fix if we truly are going to have efficiency in
Government.
But as my distinguished colleague from the Nebraska, the floor
manager of the bill, pointed out a few moments ago, political
appointees in our system come in not just as political favors to give
somebody a Government job. They are put in over the normal civilian
bureaucracy, the civil service, so that the policies of the new
President can be implemented; you have people in each one of these
departments or agencies to do exactly that, to see that the President's
policies are carried out. They are the implementers.
Now, do we have too many implementers? Well, I would not quarrel that
maybe we do, but I think to just arbitrarily say we are going to lop
off a third of these because we do not like that big number out there
is a pretty shortsighted way to go at this thing.
How do we make that kind of change, just whacking away at the
management levels that the President uses for control in these
different agencies and departments? How do we just whack away at them
without knowing what the impact is going to be? I guess I would feel
much better about it if we had had some hearings on this and have some
specificity about where we are going to see these cuts occur, how they
are going to do this. Maybe it will work in some departments; in other
departments, it might be catastrophic.
I do agree very much with the distinguished Senator's comments about
the turnover in the political appointees once they are in office, and
that disturbs me mightily because we did some studies on that and have
GAO figures on it. I do not have the current figures with me to be up
to speed on this.
Well, I guess I do. Staff just handed me a comment on this.
Turnover rates of political appointees: Appointees average 2 years of
service. When NPAS vacancies occur, it often takes months, if not
years, to fill the slots. Some positions go unfilled for months, if not
years. By the time you get up to speed on major issues and budget
procurement and financial management, you are on the way out, and that
is no way to run the Government.
So when I have conducted hearings in the past, when we have had
people come up for confirmation before the committee, I have always
asked them for a commitment. I asked them for a personal commitment
that they are in for this term of office of the President. Everyone I
have run into so far, all those who have been through confirmation--we
had, I think it is, 40 or 40-
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some who have come before our committee--everyone has given me that
commitment. I do not think anyone has violated it.
So we are doing our little bit to get this constancy of Government in
there also, which I think is very important. I think it is about half
of the appointees are gone within 28 months, or something like that, I
think, is the current figure. That is in the ballpark anyway. We would
have to get more detailed figures on that.
In fact, we had a hearing on this back a few years ago; I was
concerned enough. We had GAO do a study, and they came up and gave the
results to us. We were trying to make sure whatever administration,
Republican or Democratic, it got a commitment from their political
appointees coming in not just to get a new entry in their dossier or in
their record but came in to do their job to the end of that
administration's 4-year term, whatever it might be.
So I would feel better about this proposal if we had had some
hearings or we had details on exactly who was going to be affected--
most, how the President is expected to do his job if he does not have
his political appointments in there to carry out the policies that he
has been elected to put into effect in Government, and I do not think
we have that.
So I hate to oppose this, but I have to, in all good conscience, do
that because I do not like this sort of, what I call, a meat-ax
approach to Government, just say we do not like the number of
employees; we will whack a third of them off.
That is basically what we are doing with this. It sounds great.
Political appointees, everybody would probably agree they are the most
expendable people in Government, but they are not really. Whether it is
a Republican administration or Democratic administration, there are
people out there in Government as political appointees, either
Secretary, Under Secretary level or whatever, who are implementing the
policies the administration had just been elected to put into practice.
So just to say that because they are political appointees we
automatically can do away with approximately a third of them I do not
think is realistic. So I have to oppose this. This will probably be
popular enough--we are going to have a vote on it--to go through, but I
urge my colleagues to think twice about this before they vote for
something like this.
We are progressing in this direction. The administration has had well
over 200,000 positions cut. We are at the lowest employment level since
John F. Kennedy. We are bringing the employment of Government down not
only in civil service but in these political appointments.
A number of those positions, as I said earlier, have already been
eliminated by the National Performance Review and more are coming.
That, to me, is the way to go at this thing--keep the course we are on
of cutting down civil service. Right now, we are ahead of schedule on
reaching that cut of 272,900 that the administration set as a goal
after they did their assessment of all the civil service and of all the
Government positions.
I hope we will vote this down so that we do not do more damage here
than we are doing good. We are heading in the right direction right
now, and to just automatically say we are going to arbitrarily pick a
number off the top of our head and whack away is the wrong way to go,
and I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment.
Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Let me, first of all, say that there is no one who has
shown more commitment to Government efficiency and making sure we have
spent our tax dollars properly than the Senator from Ohio, so it is no
fun disagreeing with him on an issue like this.
Let me, as I must, respond to a few of the points he made.
First of all, to hear some of the comments from the Senator from Ohio
and some of the questions of the Senator from Nebraska, you would think
what we are proposing to do is to essentially eliminate all political
appointees.
That is not what we are doing. The figure that has been bantered
about is we are cutting the number of political appointees by a third,
but that is not the case. The estimate we have is that the number
averages about 2,700 or 2,800 political appointees. The effect of this
amendment would take it down to about 2,300.
That is far less than one-third. It is more like 17 percent or
something close to it. I understand the comparison between the rounding
off at 3,000 versus the original bill at 2,000 would have produced that
result, but that is not the effect here. Neither I nor Mr. Volcker's
commission or Mr. Light at any point suggested you do not need
political appointees. In fact, I took great care in my original remarks
to indicate that you absolutely do need some political appointees. You
must have them in order to implement the political will that
accompanied a Chief Executive's election to office. So there is no
disagreement on that point. The only question is what is the proper
level, and that goes to the second question.
Are we, as the Senator from Ohio suggested, singling out political
employees for a cut? Or is it just the opposite, that they have been
singled out for protection? Federal employment in general, in this
area, only went up 5 percent between 1980 and 1992; political
employment has gone up 17 percent. It is awfully hard to explain to the
people back home, while various local jobs at the Federal level as well
as so many other things are cut, this area continues to grow and grow
quickly.
I think it is interesting the very period that figure comes from, the
17 percent growth, is the 12 years we are always talking about out
here--what happened between 1980 and 1992 with our Federal deficit.
That was the period of exponential growth in the deficit and that is
what we have been trying to remedy. It seems to me this is admittedly
small in the big picture but, again, one example of how things got out
of control. In effect, blank checks were being written all over this
Government, including in the area of constantly adding political
appointees.
That leads me to the point I want to stress to my friend from Ohio.
He is absolutely right, the progress that has been made by this
administration is tremendous. I am very proud of it. I would like to
think I have had a small part in it. The Vice President's national
performance review has been key. The reductions have been very
impressive. Every American should be proud that, overall, we have made
great progress, as the Senator from Ohio has suggested. All I am trying
to do by this amendment is to round it out; to make sure it does look,
in the words of the Senator from Ohio, fair; that it just did not
happen to civil service people but it also happens to political
appointees.
I think it is most unfortunate to speak of the great reductions that
have been made in one area and then find the area where reductions have
not been made at all is the most sensitive area, of political
appointees.
So, some of the language that has been used to describe this
amendment--being unfair or arbitrary or taking a meat-ax approach--I
think, is wrong. This is very consistent with the philosophy and spirit
of the national performance review.
I want to respond to the Senator from Ohio by pointing out four ways
in which this is not at all a meat-ax approach.
First, I reiterate, this does not eliminate all political appointees.
It reduces them from a figure of about 2,800 now to about 2,300.
Second, it does not have to happen tomorrow. The President has an
entire year to get down to this figure. That is the effective date of
the amendment. It is not immediate.
Third, and this is a question the Senator from Ohio properly raised
and it deserves an answer. We put no constraints in this provision on
how the President is to do this. We do not micromanage it. We do not
say that some specific number has to come from this department or this
area of political appointees. We give the President full discretion to
make this determination, as it generally should be. Sometimes I get
concerned. We have experienced this, for example, in the area of
foreign policy, where some folks in this body were trying to
micromanage the State Department in every respect. That is wrong. But
it is appropriate for us, in the appropriations process, to set an
overall level, a maximum number of political appointees, and then say:
Mr.
[[Page S10371]]
President, we want you to reach that level within a year; we, of
course, will understand you will make your own determinations how this
is to happen.
Finally, though it may not be the most important, because I think the
Government efficiency aspect and cutting spending are both critical, I
think a last point needs to be emphasized from my earlier presentation.
That is these experts, Mr. Volcker, Mr. Light and others, concluded not
only that we did not need all these folks, necessarily, to have a
Federal Government that can implement the policies of the President,
but that it actually is harder for a President to be effective, or a
Governor to be effective, when there are too many political appointees
to manage; when there are so many they become a life and an entity of
their own and the President no longer has the time nor the ability to
manage all of that.
That is the title of Mr. Light's book, ``Thickening Government,
Federal Hierarchy and the Diffusion of Accountability.'' We are noting
here, not only about limiting the number of employees, we are talking
about making sure the political appointees who are put in their
positions are actually accountable to the Chief Executive who was
elected and whose policies we are concerned about continuing. This is
not a hatchet job or meat-ax approach. It is a modest amendment. It
gives the President a year to go forward with this change and I think
it is perfectly consistent and would be a proud addition to the
President's tremendous record and progress, not only on reducing the
number of Federal employees, but his magnificent record on reducing the
Federal deficit from what would have been $300 billion and is now
estimated to be only about $117 billion, moving in the right direction
for the coming fiscal year.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KERRY. I am pleased to join once again with my colleague from
Wisconsin, Senator Feingold, in reducing waste from the budget and
streamlining government. Senator Feingold and I have stood shoulder to
shoulder on a number of occasions to cut corporate welfare and to
reduce the Federal deficit.
Just a few months ago, we were joined by Senator McCain and Senator
Thompson in a bold attempt to reduce unnecessary and wasteful corporate
welfare in the Federal budget by $60 billion over the next 6 years. It
is sometimes difficult to stare down the special interests and take aim
at the excess in our budget, but I am determined to continue the fight
to ensure our children a debt-free future. Mr. President, I appreciate
having the Senator from Wisconsin as a comrade in arms.
Last year, I introduced a bill which reduced spending by more than
$90 billion by the year 2002. One provision of that bill calls for a
reduction of political appointees in the Federal Government to 2,000.
The proposal by the Senator from Wisconsin is not quite as ambitious,
but it is a fine start to rein in the surge in political appointees.
Mr. President, let me be clear on this point: The great growth of
political appointees has not occurred under the Clinton Administration.
As a matter of fact, Vice President Gore has been a stalwart in
reducing the size of government. Facing the legacy of 12 years of
irresponsible growth in government under the Reagan-Bush
Administrations, our current Vice President has worked with the
Congress to reduce the federal payroll to the size it was when John
Kennedy was in the White House.
This amendment supports the spirit of the Vice President's efforts
and reflects my efforts to curtail the growth of political appointees
in the Federal Government.
Mr. President, in my home state of Massachusetts, political
appointees are known as walruses, and I am pleased to help retire a few
walruses today. We need to reduce Government responsibly at the Federal
level and I hope the states follow our leadership.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and join us in
reducing the size of government and the level of unnecessary Federal
spending.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I would like to inquire of the Senator
from Wisconsin how much time does he think he will debate this?
Mr. FEINGOLD. I am prepared to make the motion to table.
Mr. SHELBY. How about the Senator from Ohio?
Mr. GLENN. About 5 minutes.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I thank the Senators, both the Senator
from Ohio and Wisconsin.
The language the Senator is attempting to restore here is a hot
political topic, to say the least. The debate about it will, no doubt,
be one of the main points the media reports in the bill. It will make,
no doubt about it, the papers and the nightly news, if it is adopted.
This amendment is great political rhetoric. We all have talked about
too many political appointees in the past, depending on who was the
President of the United States. Right now, there are about 2 million
civil employees in the executive branch of Government. Political
appointees are responsible for final decisionmaking there, as we know.
We might not always like what they do, but how many of us can say we
have not questioned actions of the career bureaucracy? Do we want to
have a system like Great Britain and Japan and others, in which their
career bureaucracy runs the Government? I hope not. Political
appointees, on the other hand, are accountable. They are accountable
for the decisions they make. I believe, overall, the civil bureaucracy
is not.
The American people, I think, deserve accountability from their
Government officials. By reducing political appointees and increasing
the size and the power of a faceless bureaucracy, we are reducing
accountability. Do we want to do that? We may need to adjust where they
are, but is one-tenth of 1 percent too much for political
representation? I hope not. I hope my colleagues, at the proper time,
will vote against the motion to table this amendment, as I agree with
the Senator from Ohio, this is not the time and this is not the place.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. I have just a few comments here and then we will be
finished with this.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article out
of the Washington Post from back in 1994, April 21, 1994, called ``The
Permanent Non-Government.''
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Apr. 21, 1994]
The Permanent Non-Government
This is no way to run a government. Indeed, to judge from a
General Accounting Office study release yesterday, it's a
small miracle that the government runs at all. The study,
conducted at the request of Sen. John Glenn, found that
political appointees stay on the job for only 2.1 years. In
other words, they usually leave about the time they might be
expected to have figured out what they're doing.
For some big jobs in troubled agencies, the turnover rates
are actually worse. The Federal Aviation Administration has
had seven appointed and four acting administrators in the
past 15 years; the Federal Housing Administration has had 13
commissioners within the past 14 years. And to point out just
how bad it can get, Sen. Glenn, the chairman of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, noted that within an 18-month
period in 1991 and 1992, three different people served in the
Education Department as assistant secretary for post-
secondary education.
President Clinton has been unusually dilatory in filling
government jobs, but the problem of getting people to stick
around is not new--the GAO study covered 10 years and three
administrations. And once people leave, it takes a long time
to get new people behind their desks--from six to 20 months
depending on the agency. This all adds up to a big problem,
since a president has just four years to make a mark on the
government. As Sen. Glenn said in a letter to Mr. Clinton,
``the fact remains that when senior positions are in a
constant state of flux, it diminishes the ability of any
president to carry out an agenda, to bring needed change in
the way government works, or to ensure that the long-term
interests, including the use of hard-earned taxpayer dollars,
are properly managed.'' Among other things, Sen. Glenn urged
Mr. Clinton to seek long-term commitments from his appointees
and ``fill vacant positions expeditiously.''
This is sound advice, especially the part about the
vacancies. But the study ought to force a broader inquiry by
the reinventing government crew in Vice President Gore's
office. Obviously not all of the jobs in question are equally
important, nor are the turnovers equally damaging. For some
appointees, 2.1 years in government may turn out to be two
years too long. And there's nothing wrong with a successful
deputy assistant secretary rising to become an assistant
secretary. But
[[Page S10372]]
taking hold of the government and giving it direction is a
difficult task.
Sen. Glenn's study suggests that the entire appointment and
confirmation process could use radical streamlining--people
will serve in their posts longer if they get there faster.
The relationship between civil servants and political
appointees also needs fixing. With this kind of turnover, top
civil servants have to spend an inordinate amount of time
``educating'' political appointees about their jobs. Yet the
United States has tended to reject the British model of
having a shallow layer of political appointees on top of a
large mandarin blass. But if we don't like the British model,
how can we make the one we have created work better? Sen.
Glenn deserves some answers.
Mr. GLENN. It goes into some of these things about the high turnover
rate that we have of these appointees that come in. I think that is
almost scandalous in the turnover rate.
Since I mentioned this a moment ago, we have had a chance to look up
the figures here. Back in May of 1994, I had hearings on this subject.
We looked into what had happened over the past decade. In fact it
covered an 11-year period, back through the Reagan and Bush years. I am
not pointing it out just politically, because I think the same kinds of
figures apply, maybe slightly reduced, in the Clinton years so far,
also.
At that time, over that 11-year period, during the Reagan and Bush
years, 30 percent of political appointees had left the Government
within 18 months of their appointment. Almost one-third of the people
did not even stay beyond 18 months after being politically appointed.
And 50 percent--this was the average for that 11-year period--50
percent of the political appointees were out of Government 27 months
after their appointment.
You know, a person comes in here and it takes them a little while to
find out where the washroom is and who they write to and hiring their
secretary and one thing or another, so the first 2 or 3 months they are
here they are not as productive as they should be. And once they decide
they are going to leave, they are out there and they are short-timers,
as we used to say in the service. Because they are short-timers and you
cannot expect anything out of them, so do not give them anything real
to do. So, take that 6 months out of the service; 30 percent are gone
after 18 months, you get 1 year out of these people and you cannot
expect the President's appointees, whether it is Reagan, Bush or
anybody else, to do a good job in implementing their policies if their
political appointees are going to turn over in that fast a period of
time.
I don't have complete, up-to-date, current figures that compare with
those. I think it has improved a little bit, but I think it is still
one of the major problems we face in administering Government, is
getting these political appointees, not just reducing their overall
numbers, but getting them to come in and stay long enough to do the job
for which they were appointed to do. I just wanted to get those figures
in the Record.
I gave all my reasons for opposing this before. I would feel much
better if we had hearings and detailed the exact effect of this thing.
I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment.
I yield the floor and yield back whatever time I have remaining.
Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, very briefly, again I salute the Senator
from Ohio for his knowledge in this area. It is extensive and a great
contribution to Government efficiency.
I want to be clear. The great growth in this area did not occur under
President Clinton. I am, of course, a Democrat supporting his
reelection, and I am in no way pointing my finger at this
administration. The facts don't show that at all. This has been a
gradual process over the years which both parties participated in. I
want to be clear about that.
I also want to point out, because I was very appreciative of the
figures just placed in the Record, yes, there is a high turnover rate.
This is something I mentioned in my remarks.
I will add, I gave a number of reasons why I didn't think we had a
harsh provision. That turnover rate means it is going to be very easy,
comparatively speaking, for the President to deal with this. If that is
the turnover rate during the course of the next year, a lot of those
folks who turn over won't have to be replaced. In other words, we're
not talking here about mass firings; we are talking about not
replacing, in many cases, those who have simply chosen to leave after a
brief tenure.
Mr. President, if it is consistent with the managers' wishes, I now
intend to move to table.
Mr. President, I now move to table that portion of the committee
amendment beginning on page 129, line 20 through line 18 on page 130.
Mr. SHELBY. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to
lay on the table the committee amendment beginning on page 129, line 20
through page 130, line 18. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield]
is necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from
Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] would vote ``nay''.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] is
absent because of illness in the family.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 36, nays 62, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 288 Leg.]
YEAS--36
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Bradley
Brown
Bryan
Coats
Cohen
Coverdell
DeWine
Feingold
Frist
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Harkin
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kassebaum
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Leahy
Lugar
McCain
Nickles
Pressler
Santorum
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Thomas
Thompson
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
NAYS--62
Abraham
Akaka
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Conrad
Craig
D'Amato
Daschle
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Exon
Faircloth
Feinstein
Ford
Frahm
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Hatch
Heflin
Helms
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Lautenberg
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Mack
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nunn
Pell
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Sarbanes
Shelby
Simon
Simpson
Stevens
Thurmond
NOT VOTING--2
Hatfield
Pryor
The motion to lay on the table the excepted committee amendment
beginning on page 129, line 20 through page 130, line 18 was rejected.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the excepted
committee amendment.
The excepted committee amendment on page 129, line 20 through page
130, line 18 was agreed to.
Mr. SHELBY. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. What is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The committee amendment with the second-degree
amendment from Senator Kassebaum.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Kassebaum
amendment temporarily be laid aside.
Mr. SHELBY. Reserving the right to object at this time, I object.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The Senator from New Jersey has
the floor.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, is the question, then, the matter of
finishing amendments or some other procedural thing that has to be
attended to?
Otherwise, Mr. President, I have been waiting here for about 2 hours.
Mr. SHELBY. I respond to the Senator from New Jersey that I have a
[[Page S10373]]
couple of things. I would like to adopt the committee amendment, the
motion failed to table a few minutes ago, and I would like to move to
reconsider the vote. I have a unanimous-consent to modify an amendment.
It will take 2 minutes at the most.
Senator Specter also has been trying to speak.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. I have been waiting for recognition. I ask unanimous
consent to permit the manager to dispose of the committee business with
the right to regain the floor after the manager has disposed.
Mr. SPECTER. Reserving the right to object, I worked it out with the
manager 5 minutes to speak after he finished the business matters. If I
could be incorporated in that, I shall not be long. I would not raise
an objection. I worked it out with the manager.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, it is my understanding that
recognition is given based on the request from the floor. Now, I do not
want to get stuck on this too much but I have been waiting a long time.
I would indulge the Senator from Pennsylvania if I have an assurance
that it would be no more than 5 minutes of time that he would occupy.
I would be happy to modify my unanimous-consent agreement if that is
the understanding we can get.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, that is what I understand.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Therefore, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
that the manager have the opportunity to clear up committee business,
that the Senator from Pennsylvania be recognized for not more than 5
minutes, and that I then regain the right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the
Kassebaum amendment temporarily.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 5273, As Modified
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask that a modification be made to
amendment No. 5273, which was previously adopted. This has been cleared
by the ranking member, Senator Kerrey. I send the modification to the
desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is
so modified.
The amendment (No. 5273), as modified, is as follows:
At the end of title V of the bill, insert the following new
sections:
SEC. 5____. COMMEMORATIVE COIN PROGRAM REFORM.
(a) Commemorative Coin Program Restrictions.--Section 5112
of title 31, United States Code, as amended by sections 524
and 530 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(m) Commemorative Coin Program Restrictions.--
``(1) Maximum number.--Beginning January 1, 1999, the
Secretary may mint and issue commemorative coins under this
section during any calendar year with respect to not more
than 2 commemorative coin programs.
``(2) Mintage levels.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
in carrying out any commemorative coin program, the Secretary
shall mint--
``(i) not more than 750,000 clad half-dollar coins;
``(ii) not more than 500,000 silver one-dollar coins; and
``(iii) not more than 100,000 gold five-dollar or ten-
dollar coins.
``(B) Exception.--If the Secretary determines, based on
independent, market-based research conducted by a designated
recipient organization of a commemorative coin program, that
the mintage levels described in subparagraph (A) are not
adequate to meet public demand for that commemorative coin,
the Secretary may waive one or more of the requirements of
subparagraph (A) with respect to that commemorative coin
program.
``(C) Designated recipient organization defined.--For
purposes of this paragraph, the term `designated recipient
organization' means any organization designated, under any
provision of law, as the recipient of any surcharge imposed
on the sale of any numismatic item.''.
(b) Recovery of Mint Expenses Required Before Payment of
Surcharges to any Recipient Organization.--
(1) Clarification of law relating to deposit of surcharges
in the numismatic public enterprise fund.--Section 5134(c)(2)
of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``,
including amounts attributable to any surcharge imposed with
respect to the sale of any numismatic item'' before the
period.
(2) Conditions on payment of surcharges to recipient
organizations.--Section 5134 of title 31, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f) Conditions on Payment of Surcharges to Recipient
Organizations.--
``(1) Payment of surcharges.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no amount derived from the proceeds of any
surcharge imposed on the sale of any numismatic item shall be
paid from the fund to any designated recipient organization
unless--
``(A) all numismatic operation and program costs allocable
to the program under which such numismatic item is produced
and sold have been recovered; and
``(B) the designated recipient organization submits an
audited financial statement that demonstrates to the
satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury that, with
respect to all projects or purposes for which the proceeds of
such surcharge may be used, the organization has raised funds
from private sources for such projects and purposes in an
amount that is equal to or greater than the maximum amount
the organization may receive from the proceeds of such
surcharge.
``(2) Annual audits.--
``(A) Annual audits of recipients required.--Each
designated recipient organization that receives any payment
from the fund of any amount derived from the proceeds of any
surcharge imposed on the sale of any numismatic item shall
provide, as a condition for receiving any such amount, for an
annual audit, in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards by an independent public
accountant selected by the organization, of all such payments
to the organization beginning in the first fiscal year of the
organization in which any such amount is received and
continuing until all amounts received by such organization
from the fund with respect to such surcharges are fully
expended or placed in trust.
``(B) Minimum requirements for annual audits.--At a
minimum, each audit of a designated recipient organization
pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall report--
``(i) the amount of payments received by the designated
recipient organization from the fund during the fiscal year
of the organization for which the audit is conducted that are
derived from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the
sale of any numismatic item;
``(ii) the amount expended by the designated recipient
organization from the proceeds of such surcharges during the
fiscal year of the organization for which the audit is
conducted; and
``(iii) whether all expenditures by the designated
recipient organization during the fiscal year of the
organization for which the audit is conducted from the
proceeds of such surcharges were for authorized purposes.
``(C) Responsibility of organization to account for
expenditures of surcharges.--Each designated recipient
organization that receives any payment from the fund of any
amount derived from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on
the sale of any numismatic item shall take appropriate steps,
as a condition for receiving any such payment, to ensure that
the receipt of the payment and the expenditure of the
proceeds of such surcharge by the organization in each fiscal
year of the organization can be accounted for separately from
all other revenues and expenditures of the organization.
``(D) Submission of audit report.--Not later than 90 days
after the end of any fiscal year of a designated recipient
organization for which an audit is required under
subparagraph (A), the organization shall--
``(i) submit a copy of the report to the Secretary of the
Treasury; and
``(ii) make a copy of the report available to the public.
``(E) Use of surcharges for audits.--Any designated
recipient organization that receives any payment from the
fund of any amount derived from the proceeds of any surcharge
imposed on the sale of any numismatic item may use the amount
received to pay the cost of an audit required under
subparagraph (A).
``(F) Waiver of paragraph.--The Secretary of the Treasury
may waive the application of any subparagraph of this
paragraph to any designated recipient organization for any
fiscal year after taking into account the amount of
surcharges that such organization received or expended during
such year.
``(G) Nonapplicability to federal entities.--This paragraph
shall not apply to any Federal agency or department or any
independent establishment in the executive branch that
receives any payment from the fund of any amount derived from
the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of any
numismatic item.
``(H) Availability of books and records.--An organization
that receives any payment from the fund of any amount derived
from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of any
numismatic item shall provide, as a condition for receiving
any such payment, to the Inspector General of the Department
of the Treasury or the Comptroller General of the United
States, upon the request of such Inspector General or the
Comptroller General, all books, records, and work papers
belonging to or used by the organization, or by any
independent public accountant who audited the organization in
accordance with subparagraph (A), which may relate to the
receipt or expenditure of any such amount by the
organization.
``(3) Use of agents or attorneys to influence commemorative
coin legislation.--No portion of any payment from the fund to
any
[[Page S10374]]
designated recipient organization of any amount derived from
the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of any
numismatic item may be used, directly or indirectly, by the
organization to compensate any agent or attorney for services
rendered to support or influence in any way legislative
action of the Congress relating to such numismatic item.
``(4) Designated recipient organization defined.--For
purposes of this subsection, the term `designated recipient
organization' means any organization designated, under any
provision of law, as the recipient of any surcharge imposed
on the sale of any numismatic item.''.
(3) Scope of application.--The amendments made by this
section shall apply with respect to the proceeds of any
surcharge imposed on the sale of any numismatic item that are
deposited in the Numismatic Public Enterprise Fund after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(4) Repeal of existing recipient report requirement.--
Section 302 of Public Law 103-186 (31 U.S.C. 5112 note) is
repealed.
(c) Quarterly Financial Reports.--Section 5134 of title 31,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(g) Quarterly Financial Reports.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than the 30th day of each
month following each calendar quarter through and including
the final period of sales with respect to any commemorative
coin program authorized on or after the date of enactment of
the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1997, the Mint shall submit to the
Congress a quarterly financial report in accordance with this
subsection.
``(2) Requirements.--Each report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include, with respect to the calendar quarter at
issue--
``(A) a detailed financial statement, prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles,
that includes financial information specific to that quarter,
as well as cumulative financial information relating to the
entire program;
``(B) a detailed accounting of--
``(i) all costs relating to marketing efforts;
``(ii) all funds projected for marketing use;
``(iii) all costs for employee travel relating to the
promotion of commemorative coin programs;
``(iv) all numismatic items minted, sold, not sold, and
rejected during the production process; and
``(v) the costs of melting down all rejected and unsold
products;
``(C) adequate market-based research for all commemorative
coin programs; and
``(D) a description of the efforts of the Mint in keeping
the sale price of numismatic items as low as practicable.''.
(d) Citizens Commemorative Coin Advisory Committee.--
(1) Fixed terms for members.--Section 5135(a)(4) of title
31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(4) Terms.--Each member appointed under clause (i) or
(iii) of paragraph (3)(A) shall be appointed for a term of 4
years.''.
(2) Chairperson.--Section 5135(a) of title 31, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(7) Chairperson.--
``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the
Chairperson of the Advisory Committee shall be elected by the
members of the Advisory Committee from among such members.
``(B) Exception.--The member appointed pursuant to
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) (or the alternate to that member) may
not serve as the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee,
beginning on June 1, 1999.''.
(e) Effective Date.--This section and the amendments made
by this section shall take effect on the date of enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 5____. MINT MANAGERIAL STAFFING REFORM.
Section 5131 of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
____________________