[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 125 (Thursday, September 12, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10366-S10374]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 TREASURY, POSTAL SERVICE, AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 
                                  1997

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                           Amendment No. 5279

  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, is there any time remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 5 minutes left to the opposition.
  Mr. KERRY. Who is considered the opposition here?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. KERRY. That is the only time remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent simply for 1 
minute to explain.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, this is a very straightforward vote on 
whether or not we are prepared, finally, to include black and smokeless 
powder in a study by appropriate law enforcement authorities of the 
United States. A study to determine whether it can contain taggants so 
that we can investigate pipe bombs and other bombs in the United 
States. Law enforcement has sought this for 17 years. It is a very 
simple vote. There is an adequate offset in the IRS. They have cut the 
bills funding by $1 billion already. The most that this will cost is 
$21 million and of course we hope it will be less, but any argument to 
the contrary that suggests you cannot find the $21 million that have 
been offset here is simply unacceptable. So we ask colleagues to vote 
for this appropriate study.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SHELBY. Madam President, how much time is remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama has 3\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. SHELBY. Madam President, I will be brief on this. We have just 
been told the administration does not support the offset proposed by 
the Senator from Massachusetts on this.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  I move to table the amendment.
  Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
table. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] is 
absent because of illness in the family.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced, yeas 57, nays 42, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 287 Leg.]

                                YEAS--57

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brown
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Frahm
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Kyl
     Leahy
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Pressler
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--42

     Akaka
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Pell
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Pryor
       
  The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 5279) was agreed 
to.
  Mr. SHELBY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. CRAIG. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the pending 
business be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


 Excepted Committee Amendment, beginning on Page 129, Line 20 through 
                           Page 130, Line 18

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I intend to move to table the 
committee amendment beginning on page 129, and ask that it be in order 
to consider that committee amendment at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Madam President, as I indicated, I will move to table the 
committee amendment that strikes a House provision capping the number 
of political employees who are appointed by the President. The effect 
of tabling the committee amendment will be to retain the House language 
and therefore limit the number of executive branch political 
appointees.
  I am pleased to be joined in this bipartisan effort by both Senators 
from Arizona, Mr. McCain and Mr. Kyl, my neighbor from the neighboring 
State of Minnesota, Mr. Grams, and the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. 
Santorum.
  Madam President, the House language we seek to retain caps the number 
of political appointees at 2,300. The CBO estimates that doing so will 
save $228 million over the next 6 years. This bipartisan proposal is 
broadly supported for both its deficit reduction and its policy 
implications.
  Madam President, it has been endorsed by the Citizens Against 
Government Waste, and similar versions of this provision have been 
included in the CBO's deficit reduction proposals, as well as the 
budget assumptions of the other body. The other body passed this exact 
provision on a vote of 267-150, with strong bipartisan support.
  I note that this is a more modest provision than the one the Senate 
passed last year as part of the fiscal year 1996 Treasury-Postal 
appropriations bill. At that time, we in this body capped the executive 
branch political appointees at 2,000, a level that in practice would 
have required a reduction that would have been 60 percent greater than 
the reduction we are proposing today, the reduction that has already 
been approved in the House version of this legislation.
  The provision is also consistent with the recommendations of the Vice 
President's National Performance Review which called for reductions in 
the number of Federal managers and supervisors. That report argued that 
overcontrol and micromanagement not only stifled the creativity of line 
managers and workers, they ``consumed billions per year in salary, 
benefits, and administrative costs.''
  Madam President, that assessment is especially appropriate when we 
think about and look at the issue of political appointees. Between 1980 
and 1992, the number of political appointees in our executive branch 
grew by more than 17 percent, over three times as fast as the total 
number of executive branch employees. Since 1960, political appointees 
have grown in this country in the executive branch by a startling 
percentage of 430 percent. While we have made significant strides in 
the last few years in slowing and even reversing the growth

[[Page S10367]]

in the total number of Federal employees, our progress with respect to 
political appointees has lagged behind.

  Madam President, the exploding number of political appointees was a 
target of the 1989 National Commission on the Public Service which was 
chaired by former Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker. As the 
Commission noted, Presidents must have the flexibility to appoint staff 
that are ideologically compatible. Political appointees, of course, can 
be enthusiastic sources of fresh ideas, and they do bring many times 
meaningful experience from the private sector into an administration. 
Equally as important, political appointees help ensure Government 
response to the policy priorities that were actually mandated by the 
electorate at the ballot box.
  You cannot say that no political appointees are needed. It is very 
important if our election of a President is to have real meaning. 
However, Madam President, as the Volcker Commission found, far from 
enhancing responsiveness, the mushrooming number of Presidential 
appointees actually undermined effective Presidential control of the 
executive branch. The Commission noted that the large number of 
Presidential appointees simply cannot be managed effectively by any 
President or by any White House. There are just too many.
  Altogether, the Volcker Commission argued that the lack of control 
and focus may dilute the President's ability to develop a coherent and 
coordinated program, and to hold Cabinet Secretaries accountable. The 
Commission found that the excessive number of appointees are actually a 
barrier to critical expertise, distancing the President and his 
principal assistants both from the most experienced career officials 
and from the front-line workers. These are the people who are often the 
best positioned to make the critical assessments of Government policy.
  The problem of distancing that was raised by the Volcker Commission 
has been chronicled in more detail by Paul Light in his book 
``Thickening Government.'' Light found that the increasing number of 
political appointees are arrayed in layer upon layer of management, 
layers that did not exist 30 years ago. He found in 1960 there were 17 
layers of management at the very top level of Government; by 1992 there 
were 32 layers. Compounding the problem, Light notes that the 32 layers 
do not stack neatly on top of one another in a unified chain of 
command. Some layers come into play on some issues, but not on other 
issues. Mr. Light asserts that as this sediment has thickened over the 
decades, Presidents have grown increasingly distant from the lines of 
Government, and the front lines from them. He adds that Presidential 
leadership, therefore, may reside in stripping Government of the 
barriers to do its job effectively.
  Madam President, many will recall the difficulties, for example, that 
the current administration has had in filling even some of the more 
visible political appointments. A story in the National Journal in 
November 1993 focusing upon the delays in the Clinton administration in 
filling political positions noted that in Great Britain the transition 
to a new government is finished a week after it begins. A speedy 
transition is possible because the British Government runs on a handful 
of political appointees. According to Paul Light, they have about one-
tenth as many career executives, and only five layers of management 
between the Minister and the British equivalent of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, compared to more than 16 layers here in a comparable 
situation.
  By contrast, the transition of U.S. administrations over the past 35 
years has seen increasing delays and logjams and perfectly illustrates 
another reason why the number of these political appointee positions 
should be cut back. Madam President, the average length of time from 
inauguration to confirmation of top-level executive positions has 
steadily risen from 2.4 months under President Kennedy, to 5.3 months 
under President Reagan, to 8.1 months under President Bush, and now to 
a pretty staggering 8.5 months, on average, under President Clinton.

  The consequences of having so many critical positions unfilled when 
an administration changes can be serious. In the first 2 years of the 
Clinton administration, there were a number of stories and problems 
created by delays in making these appointments.
  From strained relationships with foreign allies over failures to make 
ambassadorial appointments, to the 2-year vacancy that we all read 
about at the top of the National Archives, the record is replete with 
examples of agencies left drifting while a political appointment was 
delayed. Obviously, there were many situations where the delays were 
caused by circumstances beyond the control of this administration. And, 
of course, the figures I just read indicated that this has been a 
problem in many administrations. It is just that, over time, with each 
administration, regardless of party, it has gotten somewhat worse.
  Nonetheless, it is clear that with a reduced number of political 
appointments to fill, the process of selecting and appointing 
individuals to key positions in a new administration is very likely to 
go more smoothly and to be enhanced.
  Madam President, let me also stress that the problem is not simply 
the initial filling of a political appointment, but also the problem of 
keeping somebody in that position for a reasonable period of time. 
Between 1970 and 1986, the tenure of a political appointee was, on 
average, 20 months, and even shorter for schedule C employees.
  In a recent report, the General Accounting Office reviewed a portion 
of these positions for the period of 1981 to 1991, and found high 
levels of turnovers--seven appointees in 10 years for one position--as 
well as delays, usually of months but sometimes years, in filling 
vacancies.
  As I have noted before on this floor, this proposal may not be 
popular with some within this administration and perhaps some in the 
other party who hope to win back the White House in the upcoming 
election.
  I want to stress that I do not believe the effort to reduce the 
number of political appointees should be a partisan issue. It is 
because the only way we are ever going to have control over this is by 
a bipartisan commitment in the House and the Senate to do something 
about the exponential growth in the number of political appointees.
  So I was pleased to introduce earlier in the 104th Congress 
legislation that would have implemented the recommendations of the 
Volcker Commission, and that would have capped the political appointees 
at 2,000. And I was proud to have as cosponsors of that measure my 
friends, the senior Senator from Arizona and also his colleague and my 
friend, the junior Senator from Arizona.
  As I mentioned earlier, this body adopted that provision to last 
year's fiscal year 1996 Treasury-postal appropriations bill. It had 
bipartisan sponsorship. So this body has already gone on record in 
favor of the cap at 2,000. But what we are trying to do by tabling the 
committee amendment today is to at least get us down to the 2,300 that 
the other body has already supported in this legislation we are 
considering today.
  (Mr. THOMAS assumed the chair.)
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the sacrifice that the deficit reduction 
efforts require really have to be spread among all of us. That has 
already been felt by many people all over this country and many 
Government workers all over this country. This measure requires us to 
bite the bullet and impose limitations upon political appointments that 
both parties would probably want to retain.
  The test of a commitment to deficit reduction, however, is not simply 
to propose measures that impact somebody else. As we move forward to 
implement the recommendations of the National Performance Review Board 
to reduce the number of Government employees and streamline agencies 
and make Government more responsive, we should also take this 
opportunity today to right-size the number of political appointees, to 
implement the policies of any administration, without, at the same 
time, unnecessarily burdening the Federal budget.

  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan 
effort. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I listened, I regret to say, only to about 
the last half of the Senator's statement. If he doesn't mind, I would 
like to ask a couple of questions. First of all, my memory, such as it 
is, says that there

[[Page S10368]]

was not a rollcall vote on this last year, is that correct?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. That is correct.
  Mr. KERREY. You have cited a Volcker Commission report repeatedly 
here. Can you describe the details of that commission and how many 
people were on it? Do you have any other cites besides the Volcker 
Commission to base this on?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. In addition to Mr. Volcker's commission, which was 
cited by a number of articles, I also cited the work of Mr. Light, who 
wrote a more extensive book about this subject called ``Thickening 
Government,'' which I quoted at length. It was described that the 
growth of these political appointments has outstripped growth in other 
areas of Government. Therefore, while we have cut back on some of our 
Federal employees, this area continues to grow. I can certainly provide 
the Senator with the details of the Volcker Commission and Mr. Light's 
book.
  Mr. KERREY. The one statement that the Senator from Wisconsin made 
that causes me to have some concern is the statement that I believe the 
Volcker Commission said that political appointees actually make it more 
difficult for the President to carry out whatever it was he or she 
campaigned upon. One of the facts here is that this would take it from 
2,800 down to----
  Mr. FEINGOLD. The current estimate, if I may say to the Senator from 
Nebraska, is about 2,900, but it varies and the Congressional Budget 
Office estimates that it averages around 2,700 or 2,800. The effect of 
this would be, as I understand it, to require, within the next year, a 
reduction of between 400 and 500 positions.
  Mr. KERREY. So that the public can put this into perspective, there 
are 1.971 million Federal employees. Right now, there is an allowance 
for 3,400. I think we are at 2,800 now. This would take us down to 
2,300.
  My concern with the Senator's amendment is based upon having been 
elected for 4 years as Governor, where I came into office with very 
little opportunity for appointments below the top slot. It made it 
difficult, therefore, to come in, having promised to do something, for 
example, with agriculture, with taxes, or with some other area of 
government, and carry that out. The public expected me to be able to do 
it. But, in fact, I would come in with very little real power, because 
there was little opportunity to bring people in who agreed with the 
positions that I had taken during the campaign itself.
  That is why I was concerned when I heard that. It runs against my own 
common experience, my own personal experience. It does not seem to me 
that running at the current level of 2,800, with 3,400 being the cap, 
that does not seem, on the surface, to be like a thickening of the 
Government. It is less than half of 1 percent--current political 
appointees. I know the administration raised concerns, not just for 
themselves but for whoever might follow, that this could impede their 
ability to carry out whatever he or she campaigned upon. It seems to me 
the people expect him to be able to come in and run the bureaucracies 
with the people that have similar views to theirs.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator 
from Nebraska, of course. I respect very much his distinguished tenure 
as Governor of Nebraska and his knowledge of the importance of having a 
political presence within any kind of executive administration, if you 
want to implement the policies you run on.
  I indicated that, and it was also indicated from the Volcker 
Commission, and others' comments to that effect.
  The question is what level? What I have indicated here and want to 
repeat is that that clearly has been a greater theme of government with 
respect to political appointees than other people in executive 
positions. It has grown 17 percent, while in the nonpolitical area it 
has only grown approximately 5 percent. That is the question.
  Clearly, I say to the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. President, there 
must be some point at which there are too many political appointees--
perhaps 10,000, or 8,000. At some point there are too many people. What 
these reports have suggested, almost ironically, is that, if you get 
too many political appointees, the chief executive of a State or the 
Federal Government cannot even keep track of them so that it actually 
can backfire on them. It could actually end up being worse than having 
the right mix between civil service career people and political 
appointees.
  In response to the earlier question, as I understand it, there were 
six members of the task force within the Volcker Commission that 
examined the specific issue of political appointees. The chairman of 
that task force was Elliot Richardson. Among the members were Robert 
McFarlane, Walter Mondale, Benjamin Read, Anne Wexler, and Alan Wolff, 
and they came up with this conclusion that we ought to go to 2,000 
again.
  To reiterate, my amendment--actually the House amendment that I 
simply want to restore--would not take this to 2,000 as I originally 
hoped. It would simply take us to the 2,300 figure.
  Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I still have some questions about this. I 
come at this with some background of longstanding. The Volcker 
Commission report is about 7 years old at this time. I had hearings on 
it when it first came out of the Governmental Affairs Committee. I am 
very familiar with the Volcker Commission report. It came out in 1989, 
I believe. I had hearings on it in the Governmental Affairs Committee 
at the time it came out because I, too, was concerned about the growth 
of Government. We had hearings and worked on some ways to peel back on 
some political appointees to hit the proper balance that needs to be 
hit.
  I do not believe, however, that just mandating it, as we are doing 
with this particular proposal, is the way to go at this thing. I think 
it is in many ways unnecessary and unwarranted because the proposed 
legislation would enforce an arbitrary cap. And it is arbitrary. It is 
not done going department by department and agency by agency, and 
saying, ``Here are some that are excess; here are some that are not.'' 
Doing a study that way just lops off about a third, or 30 percent the 
total number of political appointees, without saying who is going to do 
this job or whether their job can be done by somebody else or absorbed 
by people in the regular civil service ranks, or whatever.
  Let me just say that President Clinton has taken the lead to reduce 
Federal employees while making Government work better. The President's 
plan has carefully analyzed the Federal Government, and it has 
recommended specific and pragmatic ways to reduce the number of 
Government employees. The plan makes 180 specific recommendations to 
streamline the Government and deliver more services for less money.
  By contrast, the proposed legislation singles out political 
appointees while failing to account for how the arbitrary number of 
remaining appointees will manage the Government. As far as reducing 
Government and cutting costs, we began 3 years ago when President 
Clinton began the effort to reduce Government.
  We are all familiar with the National Performance Review under the 
direction of the Vice President. His goal was to create a Federal 
Government that works better and costs less.
  Under the NPR--let us see how we have done with the NPR. After 3 
years in office, the President is well ahead of schedule to reduce the 
size by 272,900--that was the goal by the end of this year--or about a 
12-percent reduction in the Federal workforce. In fiscal year 1995, 
185,000 full-time equivalent positions were cut. By the end of fiscal 
year 1996, 214,000 will have been cut. So we are well on the way to 
cutting that 272,900. So we have reduced. We are about two-thirds of 
the way toward the goal in one-third of the time that we thought it was 
going to take.

  In the Reagan and Bush administrations, from 1980 to 1992, we saw an 
increase of 67,000 in the Federal civilian workforce. That was an 
increase of 3.1 percent. This administration has cut the number of on-
board Federal employees by 225,000 in 3 years. It is a decrease of 10 
percent. A similar reduction has occurred in the percentage of 
political appointees.
  So it has been across the board. It has not been only civil service. 
It has also been the political appointees. There are approximately 6 
percent

[[Page S10369]]

fewer political appointees in this administration than there were 
during the previous administration.
  This is an important thing to note. The last time American taxpayers 
saw levels of Federal employment this low was during the administration 
of President Kennedy.
  This administration established a plan to reduce not only the size of 
the Government but also the number of programs, the number of 
regulations, and the way Government works to develop new partnerships. 
Even though the current level of appointees in this administration is 
below that of the Bush administration in 1992, the proposed legislation 
would force a 30-percent reduction of political appointees in addition 
to the reductions that have already been accomplished.
  The National Performance Review accomplishes the goals of this 
proposed amendment. I have been much involved with the NPR. President 
Clinton has sought to reduce the cost of Government to the American 
public while providing higher quality services. The National 
Performance Review has carefully analyzed the Federal Government and 
has recommended specific, pragmatic ways to reduce the number of 
Government employees, including political appointees, to manage with 
fewer layers of middle management, and to reduce Government 
regulations. For example, President Clinton has reduced the number of 
Department of Agriculture agencies from 43 to 29 and plans to close or 
consolidate 1,200 field offices.
  I think the proposed amendment looks only at one frame of really the 
big picture. The proposed amendment singles out political appointees. 
By singling out political appointees, it examines only one-sixth of 1 
percent of the total Federal employees. About half of the political 
appointees are schedule C employees who are junior and midlevel staff. 
These are not all senior-level managers even though they may be 
political appointees.
  This administration has instead focused on all Federal employees by 
removing layers of management to offer lower level employees greater 
responsibility. It also decentralized decisionmaking and increased the 
scope of managers' control.
  Political appointees execute the policy priorities voiced by the 
American public at the ballot box. Political appointees play a key role 
in carrying forward policy priorities. The Clinton administration has 
an obligation to ensure that the Government is a well-managed 
instrument of the public interest in carrying out programs important to 
the public. Political appointees are entrusted with managing the 
priorities of the American public.
  So just arbitrary cuts in the number of political appointees endanger 
the administration's ability to respond to policy priorities created 
both by law and the American public at the ballot box.
  Mr. President, there was a statement made about how the British 
functioned and how their Government operates and how they can turn 
around the Government in a much shorter time than we can. That is very 
true. Perhaps there are some areas where we can learn from the British 
and other parliamentary forms of government. But they operate on a 
parliamentary form of government quite different from ours. Indeed, 
they are a democracy, but their functions of government are completely 
different than ours where we split the powers out and have the powers 
of government balance each other between the executive and legislative 
branches. Then ours is monitored by the judicial branch, of course, 
when there are any challenges to this. But in a parliamentary system 
theirs is centered in that Prime Minister, and a Prime Minister is 
normally far more powerful than any American President. We may be a 
bigger country and a bigger economy, but as far as the authority to 
commit the affairs of government in a certain direction, a Prime 
Minister speaks with authority for his or her government with a shadow 
Cabinet out there in the offing. That is the reason they always can 
turn over faster than we can. In a parliamentary form of government, 
the Prime Minister can say, ``Here is what is going to happen,'' and 
that is a commitment of government, or that person is turned out of 
office when there is a new election or the party turns him or her out 
of office.
  And so a Prime Minister, as far as getting things done, and as far as 
the hierarchy, the bureaucracy of Government to back that person up, 
there is less turnover in that type system than there is normally in 
our type system with all of its remainder of powers back and forth.
  The loyal opposition in a parliamentary situation has a cabinet, a 
shadow cabinet standing there waiting to come in. They know right then 
who their appointees are going to be, if there are going to be many at 
all, and the actual form of Government goes on. The full-time civil 
servants are lifetime, usually spend a lifetime career in those 
particular positions.
  Now, let us look back at the NPR a minute, the National Performance 
Review. We worked very closely with the National Performance Review in 
the Governmental Affairs Committee. We provided some of the 
legislation, the legal authority for buyouts, for early outs, for early 
retirements, but done with fairness--done with fairness.
  We have cut out a lot of those positions. And as I just read a moment 
ago here, we have, indeed, cut out a number of the political appointees 
with that, and that was done at the initiative of the administration, 
to cut some of those out, cut out some of these layers of management.
  I know Paul Light, in reference to his work. I have his book and have 
read his book. He was on our committee staff at one time and went from 
the committee staff, I think, to the position he has now where he has 
authored a lot of articles, and so on, has done an excellent job in 
what he has done. So I am thoroughly familiar with Paul's work. I know 
him personally. He has done a good job in pointing out a lot of these 
things. We do, indeed, have to be working toward the end he points out 
in the book of this layering of Government, the many layers and levels 
that we have to fix if we truly are going to have efficiency in 
Government.
  But as my distinguished colleague from the Nebraska, the floor 
manager of the bill, pointed out a few moments ago, political 
appointees in our system come in not just as political favors to give 
somebody a Government job. They are put in over the normal civilian 
bureaucracy, the civil service, so that the policies of the new 
President can be implemented; you have people in each one of these 
departments or agencies to do exactly that, to see that the President's 
policies are carried out. They are the implementers.
  Now, do we have too many implementers? Well, I would not quarrel that 
maybe we do, but I think to just arbitrarily say we are going to lop 
off a third of these because we do not like that big number out there 
is a pretty shortsighted way to go at this thing.
  How do we make that kind of change, just whacking away at the 
management levels that the President uses for control in these 
different agencies and departments? How do we just whack away at them 
without knowing what the impact is going to be? I guess I would feel 
much better about it if we had had some hearings on this and have some 
specificity about where we are going to see these cuts occur, how they 
are going to do this. Maybe it will work in some departments; in other 
departments, it might be catastrophic.
  I do agree very much with the distinguished Senator's comments about 
the turnover in the political appointees once they are in office, and 
that disturbs me mightily because we did some studies on that and have 
GAO figures on it. I do not have the current figures with me to be up 
to speed on this.
  Well, I guess I do. Staff just handed me a comment on this.
  Turnover rates of political appointees: Appointees average 2 years of 
service. When NPAS vacancies occur, it often takes months, if not 
years, to fill the slots. Some positions go unfilled for months, if not 
years. By the time you get up to speed on major issues and budget 
procurement and financial management, you are on the way out, and that 
is no way to run the Government.
  So when I have conducted hearings in the past, when we have had 
people come up for confirmation before the committee, I have always 
asked them for a commitment. I asked them for a personal commitment 
that they are in for this term of office of the President. Everyone I 
have run into so far, all those who have been through confirmation--we 
had, I think it is, 40 or 40-

[[Page S10370]]

some who have come before our committee--everyone has given me that 
commitment. I do not think anyone has violated it.

  So we are doing our little bit to get this constancy of Government in 
there also, which I think is very important. I think it is about half 
of the appointees are gone within 28 months, or something like that, I 
think, is the current figure. That is in the ballpark anyway. We would 
have to get more detailed figures on that.
  In fact, we had a hearing on this back a few years ago; I was 
concerned enough. We had GAO do a study, and they came up and gave the 
results to us. We were trying to make sure whatever administration, 
Republican or Democratic, it got a commitment from their political 
appointees coming in not just to get a new entry in their dossier or in 
their record but came in to do their job to the end of that 
administration's 4-year term, whatever it might be.
  So I would feel better about this proposal if we had had some 
hearings or we had details on exactly who was going to be affected--
most, how the President is expected to do his job if he does not have 
his political appointments in there to carry out the policies that he 
has been elected to put into effect in Government, and I do not think 
we have that.
  So I hate to oppose this, but I have to, in all good conscience, do 
that because I do not like this sort of, what I call, a meat-ax 
approach to Government, just say we do not like the number of 
employees; we will whack a third of them off.
  That is basically what we are doing with this. It sounds great. 
Political appointees, everybody would probably agree they are the most 
expendable people in Government, but they are not really. Whether it is 
a Republican administration or Democratic administration, there are 
people out there in Government as political appointees, either 
Secretary, Under Secretary level or whatever, who are implementing the 
policies the administration had just been elected to put into practice.
  So just to say that because they are political appointees we 
automatically can do away with approximately a third of them I do not 
think is realistic. So I have to oppose this. This will probably be 
popular enough--we are going to have a vote on it--to go through, but I 
urge my colleagues to think twice about this before they vote for 
something like this.
  We are progressing in this direction. The administration has had well 
over 200,000 positions cut. We are at the lowest employment level since 
John F. Kennedy. We are bringing the employment of Government down not 
only in civil service but in these political appointments.
  A number of those positions, as I said earlier, have already been 
eliminated by the National Performance Review and more are coming. 
That, to me, is the way to go at this thing--keep the course we are on 
of cutting down civil service. Right now, we are ahead of schedule on 
reaching that cut of 272,900 that the administration set as a goal 
after they did their assessment of all the civil service and of all the 
Government positions.
  I hope we will vote this down so that we do not do more damage here 
than we are doing good. We are heading in the right direction right 
now, and to just automatically say we are going to arbitrarily pick a 
number off the top of our head and whack away is the wrong way to go, 
and I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment.
  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Let me, first of all, say that there is no one who has 
shown more commitment to Government efficiency and making sure we have 
spent our tax dollars properly than the Senator from Ohio, so it is no 
fun disagreeing with him on an issue like this.
  Let me, as I must, respond to a few of the points he made.
  First of all, to hear some of the comments from the Senator from Ohio 
and some of the questions of the Senator from Nebraska, you would think 
what we are proposing to do is to essentially eliminate all political 
appointees.
  That is not what we are doing. The figure that has been bantered 
about is we are cutting the number of political appointees by a third, 
but that is not the case. The estimate we have is that the number 
averages about 2,700 or 2,800 political appointees. The effect of this 
amendment would take it down to about 2,300.
  That is far less than one-third. It is more like 17 percent or 
something close to it. I understand the comparison between the rounding 
off at 3,000 versus the original bill at 2,000 would have produced that 
result, but that is not the effect here. Neither I nor Mr. Volcker's 
commission or Mr. Light at any point suggested you do not need 
political appointees. In fact, I took great care in my original remarks 
to indicate that you absolutely do need some political appointees. You 
must have them in order to implement the political will that 
accompanied a Chief Executive's election to office. So there is no 
disagreement on that point. The only question is what is the proper 
level, and that goes to the second question.

  Are we, as the Senator from Ohio suggested, singling out political 
employees for a cut? Or is it just the opposite, that they have been 
singled out for protection? Federal employment in general, in this 
area, only went up 5 percent between 1980 and 1992; political 
employment has gone up 17 percent. It is awfully hard to explain to the 
people back home, while various local jobs at the Federal level as well 
as so many other things are cut, this area continues to grow and grow 
quickly.
  I think it is interesting the very period that figure comes from, the 
17 percent growth, is the 12 years we are always talking about out 
here--what happened between 1980 and 1992 with our Federal deficit. 
That was the period of exponential growth in the deficit and that is 
what we have been trying to remedy. It seems to me this is admittedly 
small in the big picture but, again, one example of how things got out 
of control. In effect, blank checks were being written all over this 
Government, including in the area of constantly adding political 
appointees.
  That leads me to the point I want to stress to my friend from Ohio. 
He is absolutely right, the progress that has been made by this 
administration is tremendous. I am very proud of it. I would like to 
think I have had a small part in it. The Vice President's national 
performance review has been key. The reductions have been very 
impressive. Every American should be proud that, overall, we have made 
great progress, as the Senator from Ohio has suggested. All I am trying 
to do by this amendment is to round it out; to make sure it does look, 
in the words of the Senator from Ohio, fair; that it just did not 
happen to civil service people but it also happens to political 
appointees.
  I think it is most unfortunate to speak of the great reductions that 
have been made in one area and then find the area where reductions have 
not been made at all is the most sensitive area, of political 
appointees.
  So, some of the language that has been used to describe this 
amendment--being unfair or arbitrary or taking a meat-ax approach--I 
think, is wrong. This is very consistent with the philosophy and spirit 
of the national performance review.
  I want to respond to the Senator from Ohio by pointing out four ways 
in which this is not at all a meat-ax approach.
  First, I reiterate, this does not eliminate all political appointees. 
It reduces them from a figure of about 2,800 now to about 2,300.
  Second, it does not have to happen tomorrow. The President has an 
entire year to get down to this figure. That is the effective date of 
the amendment. It is not immediate.
  Third, and this is a question the Senator from Ohio properly raised 
and it deserves an answer. We put no constraints in this provision on 
how the President is to do this. We do not micromanage it. We do not 
say that some specific number has to come from this department or this 
area of political appointees. We give the President full discretion to 
make this determination, as it generally should be. Sometimes I get 
concerned. We have experienced this, for example, in the area of 
foreign policy, where some folks in this body were trying to 
micromanage the State Department in every respect. That is wrong. But 
it is appropriate for us, in the appropriations process, to set an 
overall level, a maximum number of political appointees, and then say: 
Mr.

[[Page S10371]]

President, we want you to reach that level within a year; we, of 
course, will understand you will make your own determinations how this 
is to happen.
  Finally, though it may not be the most important, because I think the 
Government efficiency aspect and cutting spending are both critical, I 
think a last point needs to be emphasized from my earlier presentation. 
That is these experts, Mr. Volcker, Mr. Light and others, concluded not 
only that we did not need all these folks, necessarily, to have a 
Federal Government that can implement the policies of the President, 
but that it actually is harder for a President to be effective, or a 
Governor to be effective, when there are too many political appointees 
to manage; when there are so many they become a life and an entity of 
their own and the President no longer has the time nor the ability to 
manage all of that.
  That is the title of Mr. Light's book, ``Thickening Government, 
Federal Hierarchy and the Diffusion of Accountability.'' We are noting 
here, not only about limiting the number of employees, we are talking 
about making sure the political appointees who are put in their 
positions are actually accountable to the Chief Executive who was 
elected and whose policies we are concerned about continuing. This is 
not a hatchet job or meat-ax approach. It is a modest amendment. It 
gives the President a year to go forward with this change and I think 
it is perfectly consistent and would be a proud addition to the 
President's tremendous record and progress, not only on reducing the 
number of Federal employees, but his magnificent record on reducing the 
Federal deficit from what would have been $300 billion and is now 
estimated to be only about $117 billion, moving in the right direction 
for the coming fiscal year.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. I am pleased to join once again with my colleague from 
Wisconsin, Senator Feingold, in reducing waste from the budget and 
streamlining government. Senator Feingold and I have stood shoulder to 
shoulder on a number of occasions to cut corporate welfare and to 
reduce the Federal deficit.
  Just a few months ago, we were joined by Senator McCain and Senator 
Thompson in a bold attempt to reduce unnecessary and wasteful corporate 
welfare in the Federal budget by $60 billion over the next 6 years. It 
is sometimes difficult to stare down the special interests and take aim 
at the excess in our budget, but I am determined to continue the fight 
to ensure our children a debt-free future. Mr. President, I appreciate 
having the Senator from Wisconsin as a comrade in arms.
  Last year, I introduced a bill which reduced spending by more than 
$90 billion by the year 2002. One provision of that bill calls for a 
reduction of political appointees in the Federal Government to 2,000. 
The proposal by the Senator from Wisconsin is not quite as ambitious, 
but it is a fine start to rein in the surge in political appointees.
  Mr. President, let me be clear on this point: The great growth of 
political appointees has not occurred under the Clinton Administration. 
As a matter of fact, Vice President Gore has been a stalwart in 
reducing the size of government. Facing the legacy of 12 years of 
irresponsible growth in government under the Reagan-Bush 
Administrations, our current Vice President has worked with the 
Congress to reduce the federal payroll to the size it was when John 
Kennedy was in the White House.
  This amendment supports the spirit of the Vice President's efforts 
and reflects my efforts to curtail the growth of political appointees 
in the Federal Government.
  Mr. President, in my home state of Massachusetts, political 
appointees are known as walruses, and I am pleased to help retire a few 
walruses today. We need to reduce Government responsibly at the Federal 
level and I hope the states follow our leadership.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and join us in 
reducing the size of government and the level of unnecessary Federal 
spending.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I would like to inquire of the Senator 
from Wisconsin how much time does he think he will debate this?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I am prepared to make the motion to table.
  Mr. SHELBY. How about the Senator from Ohio?
  Mr. GLENN. About 5 minutes.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I thank the Senators, both the Senator 
from Ohio and Wisconsin.
  The language the Senator is attempting to restore here is a hot 
political topic, to say the least. The debate about it will, no doubt, 
be one of the main points the media reports in the bill. It will make, 
no doubt about it, the papers and the nightly news, if it is adopted.
  This amendment is great political rhetoric. We all have talked about 
too many political appointees in the past, depending on who was the 
President of the United States. Right now, there are about 2 million 
civil employees in the executive branch of Government. Political 
appointees are responsible for final decisionmaking there, as we know. 
We might not always like what they do, but how many of us can say we 
have not questioned actions of the career bureaucracy? Do we want to 
have a system like Great Britain and Japan and others, in which their 
career bureaucracy runs the Government? I hope not. Political 
appointees, on the other hand, are accountable. They are accountable 
for the decisions they make. I believe, overall, the civil bureaucracy 
is not.
  The American people, I think, deserve accountability from their 
Government officials. By reducing political appointees and increasing 
the size and the power of a faceless bureaucracy, we are reducing 
accountability. Do we want to do that? We may need to adjust where they 
are, but is one-tenth of 1 percent too much for political 
representation? I hope not. I hope my colleagues, at the proper time, 
will vote against the motion to table this amendment, as I agree with 
the Senator from Ohio, this is not the time and this is not the place.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. I have just a few comments here and then we will be 
finished with this.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article out 
of the Washington Post from back in 1994, April 21, 1994, called ``The 
Permanent Non-Government.''
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Apr. 21, 1994]

                      The Permanent Non-Government

       This is no way to run a government. Indeed, to judge from a 
     General Accounting Office study release yesterday, it's a 
     small miracle that the government runs at all. The study, 
     conducted at the request of Sen. John Glenn, found that 
     political appointees stay on the job for only 2.1 years. In 
     other words, they usually leave about the time they might be 
     expected to have figured out what they're doing.
       For some big jobs in troubled agencies, the turnover rates 
     are actually worse. The Federal Aviation Administration has 
     had seven appointed and four acting administrators in the 
     past 15 years; the Federal Housing Administration has had 13 
     commissioners within the past 14 years. And to point out just 
     how bad it can get, Sen. Glenn, the chairman of the Senate 
     Governmental Affairs Committee, noted that within an 18-month 
     period in 1991 and 1992, three different people served in the 
     Education Department as assistant secretary for post-
     secondary education.
       President Clinton has been unusually dilatory in filling 
     government jobs, but the problem of getting people to stick 
     around is not new--the GAO study covered 10 years and three 
     administrations. And once people leave, it takes a long time 
     to get new people behind their desks--from six to 20 months 
     depending on the agency. This all adds up to a big problem, 
     since a president has just four years to make a mark on the 
     government. As Sen. Glenn said in a letter to Mr. Clinton, 
     ``the fact remains that when senior positions are in a 
     constant state of flux, it diminishes the ability of any 
     president to carry out an agenda, to bring needed change in 
     the way government works, or to ensure that the long-term 
     interests, including the use of hard-earned taxpayer dollars, 
     are properly managed.'' Among other things, Sen. Glenn urged 
     Mr. Clinton to seek long-term commitments from his appointees 
     and ``fill vacant positions expeditiously.''
       This is sound advice, especially the part about the 
     vacancies. But the study ought to force a broader inquiry by 
     the reinventing government crew in Vice President Gore's 
     office. Obviously not all of the jobs in question are equally 
     important, nor are the turnovers equally damaging. For some 
     appointees, 2.1 years in government may turn out to be two 
     years too long. And there's nothing wrong with a successful 
     deputy assistant secretary rising to become an assistant 
     secretary. But

[[Page S10372]]

     taking hold of the government and giving it direction is a 
     difficult task.
       Sen. Glenn's study suggests that the entire appointment and 
     confirmation process could use radical streamlining--people 
     will serve in their posts longer if they get there faster. 
     The relationship between civil servants and political 
     appointees also needs fixing. With this kind of turnover, top 
     civil servants have to spend an inordinate amount of time 
     ``educating'' political appointees about their jobs. Yet the 
     United States has tended to reject the British model of 
     having a shallow layer of political appointees on top of a 
     large mandarin blass. But if we don't like the British model, 
     how can we make the one we have created work better? Sen. 
     Glenn deserves some answers.

  Mr. GLENN. It goes into some of these things about the high turnover 
rate that we have of these appointees that come in. I think that is 
almost scandalous in the turnover rate.
  Since I mentioned this a moment ago, we have had a chance to look up 
the figures here. Back in May of 1994, I had hearings on this subject. 
We looked into what had happened over the past decade. In fact it 
covered an 11-year period, back through the Reagan and Bush years. I am 
not pointing it out just politically, because I think the same kinds of 
figures apply, maybe slightly reduced, in the Clinton years so far, 
also.
  At that time, over that 11-year period, during the Reagan and Bush 
years, 30 percent of political appointees had left the Government 
within 18 months of their appointment. Almost one-third of the people 
did not even stay beyond 18 months after being politically appointed. 
And 50 percent--this was the average for that 11-year period--50 
percent of the political appointees were out of Government 27 months 
after their appointment.
  You know, a person comes in here and it takes them a little while to 
find out where the washroom is and who they write to and hiring their 
secretary and one thing or another, so the first 2 or 3 months they are 
here they are not as productive as they should be. And once they decide 
they are going to leave, they are out there and they are short-timers, 
as we used to say in the service. Because they are short-timers and you 
cannot expect anything out of them, so do not give them anything real 
to do. So, take that 6 months out of the service; 30 percent are gone 
after 18 months, you get 1 year out of these people and you cannot 
expect the President's appointees, whether it is Reagan, Bush or 
anybody else, to do a good job in implementing their policies if their 
political appointees are going to turn over in that fast a period of 
time.
  I don't have complete, up-to-date, current figures that compare with 
those. I think it has improved a little bit, but I think it is still 
one of the major problems we face in administering Government, is 
getting these political appointees, not just reducing their overall 
numbers, but getting them to come in and stay long enough to do the job 
for which they were appointed to do. I just wanted to get those figures 
in the Record.
  I gave all my reasons for opposing this before. I would feel much 
better if we had hearings and detailed the exact effect of this thing. 
I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment.
  I yield the floor and yield back whatever time I have remaining.
  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, very briefly, again I salute the Senator 
from Ohio for his knowledge in this area. It is extensive and a great 
contribution to Government efficiency.
  I want to be clear. The great growth in this area did not occur under 
President Clinton. I am, of course, a Democrat supporting his 
reelection, and I am in no way pointing my finger at this 
administration. The facts don't show that at all. This has been a 
gradual process over the years which both parties participated in. I 
want to be clear about that.
  I also want to point out, because I was very appreciative of the 
figures just placed in the Record, yes, there is a high turnover rate. 
This is something I mentioned in my remarks.
  I will add, I gave a number of reasons why I didn't think we had a 
harsh provision. That turnover rate means it is going to be very easy, 
comparatively speaking, for the President to deal with this. If that is 
the turnover rate during the course of the next year, a lot of those 
folks who turn over won't have to be replaced. In other words, we're 
not talking here about mass firings; we are talking about not 
replacing, in many cases, those who have simply chosen to leave after a 
brief tenure.
  Mr. President, if it is consistent with the managers' wishes, I now 
intend to move to table.
  Mr. President, I now move to table that portion of the committee 
amendment beginning on page 129, line 20 through line 18 on page 130.
  Mr. SHELBY. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
lay on the table the committee amendment beginning on page 129, line 20 
through page 130, line 18. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The 
clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] 
is necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] would vote ``nay''.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] is 
absent because of illness in the family.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 36, nays 62, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 288 Leg.]

                                YEAS--36

     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bradley
     Brown
     Bryan
     Coats
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     DeWine
     Feingold
     Frist
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kassebaum
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Leahy
     Lugar
     McCain
     Nickles
     Pressler
     Santorum
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--62

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cochran
     Conrad
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frahm
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Mack
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Stevens
     Thurmond

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Hatfield
     Pryor
       
  The motion to lay on the table the excepted committee amendment 
beginning on page 129, line 20 through page 130, line 18 was rejected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the excepted 
committee amendment.
  The excepted committee amendment on page 129, line 20 through page 
130, line 18 was agreed to.
  Mr. SHELBY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. What is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The committee amendment with the second-degree 
amendment from Senator Kassebaum.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Kassebaum 
amendment temporarily be laid aside.
  Mr. SHELBY. Reserving the right to object at this time, I object.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The Senator from New Jersey has 
the floor.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, is the question, then, the matter of 
finishing amendments or some other procedural thing that has to be 
attended to?
  Otherwise, Mr. President, I have been waiting here for about 2 hours.
  Mr. SHELBY. I respond to the Senator from New Jersey that I have a

[[Page S10373]]

couple of things. I would like to adopt the committee amendment, the 
motion failed to table a few minutes ago, and I would like to move to 
reconsider the vote. I have a unanimous-consent to modify an amendment. 
It will take 2 minutes at the most.
  Senator Specter also has been trying to speak.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I have been waiting for recognition. I ask unanimous 
consent to permit the manager to dispose of the committee business with 
the right to regain the floor after the manager has disposed.
  Mr. SPECTER. Reserving the right to object, I worked it out with the 
manager 5 minutes to speak after he finished the business matters. If I 
could be incorporated in that, I shall not be long. I would not raise 
an objection. I worked it out with the manager.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, it is my understanding that 
recognition is given based on the request from the floor. Now, I do not 
want to get stuck on this too much but I have been waiting a long time. 
I would indulge the Senator from Pennsylvania if I have an assurance 
that it would be no more than 5 minutes of time that he would occupy.
  I would be happy to modify my unanimous-consent agreement if that is 
the understanding we can get.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, that is what I understand.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Therefore, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that the manager have the opportunity to clear up committee business, 
that the Senator from Pennsylvania be recognized for not more than 5 
minutes, and that I then regain the right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the 
Kassebaum amendment temporarily.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                    Amendment No. 5273, As Modified

  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask that a modification be made to 
amendment No. 5273, which was previously adopted. This has been cleared 
by the ranking member, Senator Kerrey. I send the modification to the 
desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is 
so modified.
  The amendment (No. 5273), as modified, is as follows:

       At the end of title V of the bill, insert the following new 
     sections:

     SEC. 5____. COMMEMORATIVE COIN PROGRAM REFORM.

       (a) Commemorative Coin Program Restrictions.--Section 5112 
     of title 31, United States Code, as amended by sections 524 
     and 530 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(m) Commemorative Coin Program Restrictions.--
       ``(1) Maximum number.--Beginning January 1, 1999, the 
     Secretary may mint and issue commemorative coins under this 
     section during any calendar year with respect to not more 
     than 2 commemorative coin programs.
       ``(2) Mintage levels.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     in carrying out any commemorative coin program, the Secretary 
     shall mint--
       ``(i) not more than 750,000 clad half-dollar coins;
       ``(ii) not more than 500,000 silver one-dollar coins; and
       ``(iii) not more than 100,000 gold five-dollar or ten-
     dollar coins.
       ``(B) Exception.--If the Secretary determines, based on 
     independent, market-based research conducted by a designated 
     recipient organization of a commemorative coin program, that 
     the mintage levels described in subparagraph (A) are not 
     adequate to meet public demand for that commemorative coin, 
     the Secretary may waive one or more of the requirements of 
     subparagraph (A) with respect to that commemorative coin 
     program.
       ``(C) Designated recipient organization defined.--For 
     purposes of this paragraph, the term `designated recipient 
     organization' means any organization designated, under any 
     provision of law, as the recipient of any surcharge imposed 
     on the sale of any numismatic item.''.
       (b) Recovery of Mint Expenses Required Before Payment of 
     Surcharges to any Recipient Organization.--
       (1) Clarification of law relating to deposit of surcharges 
     in the numismatic public enterprise fund.--Section 5134(c)(2) 
     of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, 
     including amounts attributable to any surcharge imposed with 
     respect to the sale of any numismatic item'' before the 
     period.
       (2) Conditions on payment of surcharges to recipient 
     organizations.--Section 5134 of title 31, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Conditions on Payment of Surcharges to Recipient 
     Organizations.--
       ``(1) Payment of surcharges.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, no amount derived from the proceeds of any 
     surcharge imposed on the sale of any numismatic item shall be 
     paid from the fund to any designated recipient organization 
     unless--
       ``(A) all numismatic operation and program costs allocable 
     to the program under which such numismatic item is produced 
     and sold have been recovered; and
       ``(B) the designated recipient organization submits an 
     audited financial statement that demonstrates to the 
     satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury that, with 
     respect to all projects or purposes for which the proceeds of 
     such surcharge may be used, the organization has raised funds 
     from private sources for such projects and purposes in an 
     amount that is equal to or greater than the maximum amount 
     the organization may receive from the proceeds of such 
     surcharge.
       ``(2) Annual audits.--
       ``(A) Annual audits of recipients required.--Each 
     designated recipient organization that receives any payment 
     from the fund of any amount derived from the proceeds of any 
     surcharge imposed on the sale of any numismatic item shall 
     provide, as a condition for receiving any such amount, for an 
     annual audit, in accordance with generally accepted 
     government auditing standards by an independent public 
     accountant selected by the organization, of all such payments 
     to the organization beginning in the first fiscal year of the 
     organization in which any such amount is received and 
     continuing until all amounts received by such organization 
     from the fund with respect to such surcharges are fully 
     expended or placed in trust.
       ``(B) Minimum requirements for annual audits.--At a 
     minimum, each audit of a designated recipient organization 
     pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall report--
       ``(i) the amount of payments received by the designated 
     recipient organization from the fund during the fiscal year 
     of the organization for which the audit is conducted that are 
     derived from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the 
     sale of any numismatic item;
       ``(ii) the amount expended by the designated recipient 
     organization from the proceeds of such surcharges during the 
     fiscal year of the organization for which the audit is 
     conducted; and
       ``(iii) whether all expenditures by the designated 
     recipient organization during the fiscal year of the 
     organization for which the audit is conducted from the 
     proceeds of such surcharges were for authorized purposes.
       ``(C) Responsibility of organization to account for 
     expenditures of surcharges.--Each designated recipient 
     organization that receives any payment from the fund of any 
     amount derived from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on 
     the sale of any numismatic item shall take appropriate steps, 
     as a condition for receiving any such payment, to ensure that 
     the receipt of the payment and the expenditure of the 
     proceeds of such surcharge by the organization in each fiscal 
     year of the organization can be accounted for separately from 
     all other revenues and expenditures of the organization.
       ``(D) Submission of audit report.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the end of any fiscal year of a designated recipient 
     organization for which an audit is required under 
     subparagraph (A), the organization shall--
       ``(i) submit a copy of the report to the Secretary of the 
     Treasury; and
       ``(ii) make a copy of the report available to the public.
       ``(E) Use of surcharges for audits.--Any designated 
     recipient organization that receives any payment from the 
     fund of any amount derived from the proceeds of any surcharge 
     imposed on the sale of any numismatic item may use the amount 
     received to pay the cost of an audit required under 
     subparagraph (A).
       ``(F) Waiver of paragraph.--The Secretary of the Treasury 
     may waive the application of any subparagraph of this 
     paragraph to any designated recipient organization for any 
     fiscal year after taking into account the amount of 
     surcharges that such organization received or expended during 
     such year.
       ``(G) Nonapplicability to federal entities.--This paragraph 
     shall not apply to any Federal agency or department or any 
     independent establishment in the executive branch that 
     receives any payment from the fund of any amount derived from 
     the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of any 
     numismatic item.
       ``(H) Availability of books and records.--An organization 
     that receives any payment from the fund of any amount derived 
     from the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of any 
     numismatic item shall provide, as a condition for receiving 
     any such payment, to the Inspector General of the Department 
     of the Treasury or the Comptroller General of the United 
     States, upon the request of such Inspector General or the 
     Comptroller General, all books, records, and work papers 
     belonging to or used by the organization, or by any 
     independent public accountant who audited the organization in 
     accordance with subparagraph (A), which may relate to the 
     receipt or expenditure of any such amount by the 
     organization.
       ``(3) Use of agents or attorneys to influence commemorative 
     coin legislation.--No portion of any payment from the fund to 
     any

[[Page S10374]]

     designated recipient organization of any amount derived from 
     the proceeds of any surcharge imposed on the sale of any 
     numismatic item may be used, directly or indirectly, by the 
     organization to compensate any agent or attorney for services 
     rendered to support or influence in any way legislative 
     action of the Congress relating to such numismatic item.
       ``(4) Designated recipient organization defined.--For 
     purposes of this subsection, the term `designated recipient 
     organization' means any organization designated, under any 
     provision of law, as the recipient of any surcharge imposed 
     on the sale of any numismatic item.''.
       (3) Scope of application.--The amendments made by this 
     section shall apply with respect to the proceeds of any 
     surcharge imposed on the sale of any numismatic item that are 
     deposited in the Numismatic Public Enterprise Fund after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (4) Repeal of existing recipient report requirement.--
     Section 302 of Public Law 103-186 (31 U.S.C. 5112 note) is 
     repealed.
       (c) Quarterly Financial Reports.--Section 5134 of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(g) Quarterly Financial Reports.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than the 30th day of each 
     month following each calendar quarter through and including 
     the final period of sales with respect to any commemorative 
     coin program authorized on or after the date of enactment of 
     the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government 
     Appropriations Act, 1997, the Mint shall submit to the 
     Congress a quarterly financial report in accordance with this 
     subsection.
       ``(2) Requirements.--Each report submitted under paragraph 
     (1) shall include, with respect to the calendar quarter at 
     issue--
       ``(A) a detailed financial statement, prepared in 
     accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, 
     that includes financial information specific to that quarter, 
     as well as cumulative financial information relating to the 
     entire program;
       ``(B) a detailed accounting of--
       ``(i) all costs relating to marketing efforts;
       ``(ii) all funds projected for marketing use;
       ``(iii) all costs for employee travel relating to the 
     promotion of commemorative coin programs;
       ``(iv) all numismatic items minted, sold, not sold, and 
     rejected during the production process; and
       ``(v) the costs of melting down all rejected and unsold 
     products;
       ``(C) adequate market-based research for all commemorative 
     coin programs; and
       ``(D) a description of the efforts of the Mint in keeping 
     the sale price of numismatic items as low as practicable.''.
       (d) Citizens Commemorative Coin Advisory Committee.--
       (1) Fixed terms for members.--Section 5135(a)(4) of title 
     31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(4) Terms.--Each member appointed under clause (i) or 
     (iii) of paragraph (3)(A) shall be appointed for a term of 4 
     years.''.
       (2) Chairperson.--Section 5135(a) of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(7) Chairperson.--
       ``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the 
     Chairperson of the Advisory Committee shall be elected by the 
     members of the Advisory Committee from among such members.
       ``(B) Exception.--The member appointed pursuant to 
     paragraph (3)(A)(ii) (or the alternate to that member) may 
     not serve as the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee, 
     beginning on June 1, 1999.''.
       (e) Effective Date.--This section and the amendments made 
     by this section shall take effect on the date of enactment of 
     this Act.

     SEC. 5____. MINT MANAGERIAL STAFFING REFORM.

       Section 5131 of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (c); and
       (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

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