[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 122 (Monday, September 9, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10069-S10072]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, under a previous unanimous-consent agreement 
entered on June 28, 1996, the Senate is scheduled to consider the 
Chemical Weapons Convention by the end of this week. There has been 
much written and much said about the convention, whether it is the 
right thing to do or not; is it verifiable?
  On the other side, there are those who say it would affect the 
overall atmosphere with regard to these chemical weapons. There is very 
legitimate debate about whether or not this convention should be 
ratified or not. It is my intention to go forward with the 
consideration of this Chemical Weapons Convention beginning probably on 
Thursday. We are scheduled to have votes on Friday.
  But as we near consideration of that convention, I wanted to share 
with my colleagues some of the correspondence that I have recently 
received. Late on Friday of last week, I received a letter of 
opposition to the convention signed by more than 50 defense and foreign 
policy experts, including two former Secretaries of Defense, former 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many others. The letter made 
four fundamental points: The Chemical Weapons Convention is not global, 
it is not effective, and is not verifiable, but it will have 
significant costs to American security.

[[Page S10070]]

  Their letter concludes by stating that ``The national security 
benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its 
considerable costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to reject 
ratification of the CWC unless and until it is made genuinely global, 
effective, and verifiable.''
  This is not my judgment. It is the judgment, however, of Caspar 
Weinberger, William Clark, Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ed Meese, Dick 
Cheney, and many others who served with distinction under Presidents 
Reagan and Bush. I think their views deserve serious consideration from 
every Member.
  As you will note, two of those names that I read are former 
Secretaries of Defense and certainly highly respected. Our colleague 
from the House of Representatives, Dick Cheney, is one that I really 
had not known exactly what his position was, so it was of great 
interest to me to see what his thoughts might be.
  I have two other letters that I encourage Members to review. First, 
the National Federation of Independent Business wrote to me today 
expressing serious concern about the impact of the CWC on the more than 
600,000 members of the NFIB. The letter notes that under the CWC, for 
the first time small businesses would be subject to a foreign entity 
inspecting their businesses. The concerns that are expressed concerning 
increased regulatory burden of the Chemical Weapons Convention on 
American small business I think should be weighed very carefully before 
coming to a decision about his or her attitude and what the position 
would be of that Senator on the convention. I know my colleagues do not 
want to vote first and ask questions later when it comes to small 
business, which already bears a disproportionate share of the 
regulatory burden from the Federal Government.
  I also received a letter today from retired Gen. James A. Williams, 
former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency with almost four decades 
of experience in intelligence. General Williams raises very serious 
concerns over the potential of CWC being used to gain proprietary 
information from American business.
  He concludes that ``there is potential for the loss of untold 
billions of dollars of trade secrets which can be used to gain 
competitive advantage, to shorten R&D cycles, and to steal U.S. market 
share.''
  Many businesses have contacted my office and the offices of other 
Senators expressing these and similar concerns about Senate action on 
this convention.
  Last week I wrote to the President expressing my concern that the 
Clinton administration was less than fully forthcoming in responding to 
the Senate's request for information and documents. I requested 
specific documents previously requested by other Senators. Senator 
Helms, the chairman of the committee with jurisdiction, has been very 
active in trying to have questions answered, to get information 
provided, to get intelligence information available to Senators, and in 
many instances that information was late in coming or has not been 
provided at all. As a matter of fact, much of it has been described as 
being classified; therefore, it could not be provided.
  In view of that, I am very seriously considering and probably will 
seek a closed session to consider this matter so that Senators can be 
made aware of intelligence information that is classified, if that is 
necessary. In order to avoid that, I have asked that some of this 
documentation be declassified by the administration so that all 
Senators can have access to it without our having to go into closed 
session.
  I wanted to call to the Senate's attention this correspondence that I 
have outlined because it is very important that a range of views be 
made available to all Senators. The administration has been making its 
case for quite some time, but opponents of the convention have just 
begun the serious examination the convention really deserves.
  There were some Members who have been involved in this issue --I 
believe Senator Stevens arranged for a briefing this very afternoon 
that was sponsored by the Arms Control Observer Group. We did have some 
people testifying, stating they had opposition to the convention, 
others that were supportive of it. We are trying to get a balance in 
what is presented to the Senators, both privately and publicly.
  My own personal greatest concern is the question of verification. 
What do we do about Iraq? If we pass a convention like this, that would 
be applicable to us, sort of the law-abiding citizens of the world, how 
do we make sure what is happening in Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, the 
renegade countries of the world? Is this going to be a situation where 
we go forward with this convention, this Chemical Weapons Convention, 
yet those who are the real threat do not participate, or deny that they 
are involved, or we are not in a position where we can verify what they 
are actually doing?
  So, I ask unanimous consent the three letters I received and the 
letter I wrote to the President last week be printed in the Record so 
all Senators will have access to these letters and to this information, 
much of which had not been made available prior to tonight.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                            National Federation of


                                         Independent Business,

                                Washington, DC, September 9, 1996.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader, On behalf of the more than 600,000 members 
     of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), I 
     want to express serious concern regarding the regulatory 
     requirements and burdens that would be placed on small 
     businesses who ``produce, process, consume, export or 
     import'' certain regulated chemicals with ratification of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty (CWC) and its implementing 
     legislation.
       This Congress has begun to address the serious problems of 
     paperwork burdens and red tape which are strangling small 
     businesses in this country. The passage of the Paperwork 
     Reduction Act and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
     Fairness Act were positive first steps in reducing the 
     excessive regulatory burden which consistently ranks in the 
     top five problems small business face in NFIB surveys.
       The CWC reverses the trend of reducing the growing 
     regulatory burden on small business. According to the 
     Congressional Office of Technology inspections of businesses 
     required under CWC will cost small business $10,000-$20,000. 
     The typical small business owner takes home only $40,000 per 
     year. The Department of Commerce has estimated that a 
     business will spend from 2.5-9 hours on paperwork for each 
     chemical used depending on its classification.
       There is a great deal of disagreement on the number of 
     businesses which would be affected by the CWC. Numbers have 
     ranged from 3,000 to 10,000. The regulatory burden of the CWC 
     will hit small businesses harder than big business. A 1995 
     Small Business Administration study stated that while small 
     business employs 53 percent of the workforce, they bear 67 
     percent of business' total regulatory expense. Even if the 
     number of small businesses in the initial list of affected 
     companies is limited to a specific list, the fact that 
     additional businesses might be regulated by CWC without 
     approval by the U.S. Congress will leave small business 
     powerless to have any input as it does under the U.S. 
     regulatory system. For the first time, small businesses would 
     be subject to a foreign entity inspecting their business.
       The CWC will continue to bury small businesses in paperwork 
     and regulations. Therefore, NFIB urges your serious 
     consideration of the affect of this Treaty on the small 
     businesses in this country.
           Sincerely,

                                                   Dan Danner,

                                                   Vice President,
     Federal Government Relations.
                                                                    ____

                                                September 9, 1996.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lott: As you weigh the benefits and costs of 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) I would like to offer 
     some insight gained during my 28 years at every level of 
     Military Intelligence and my subsequent ten years in 
     competitive intelligence and counterintelligence for some of 
     the premier companies in this country. The need for 
     international mechanisms to control or eliminate the 
     potential use of chemical weapons cannot be denied but the 
     mechanisms must not be adopted in haste or under pressure. I 
     ask only that you delay consideration long enough for an 
     informed debate to take place, and I stress informed.
       My foremost concern is that the CWC adds little to the 
     ability of this country, or any other for that matter, to be 
     assured that chemical weapons are not being manufactured by 
     specific nations. Experience in Iraq has amply demonstrated 
     the ease with which inspections can be thwarted and sanctions 
     evaded. With all of the effort put into the inspection 
     program the United States is still unable to say whether Iraq 
     retains a capability to manufacture chemical weapons. We are 
     unable to state publicly the chemical weapons production 
     capabilities of nations

[[Page S10071]]

     such as Libya, Iran, Syria, China or Korea. Many nations 
     possess a production capability or are thought to possess 
     such capabilities. Nations that are likely to produce 
     chemical weapons for use by terrorists or for limited 
     battlefield deployment can produce sufficient quantities in 
     laboratories small enough that they can be temporarily closed 
     or relocated to avoid inspections. The exiting treaty on 
     chemical weapons is already so weak on this point that no 
     effort has been made to enforce it and provisions of the CWC 
     are even weaker. Let's discuss objectively what information 
     is required to verify such a treaty, the capabilities 
     required to collect the information, the cost of doing so, 
     and the likelihood of making such collection.
       Furthermore, the opportunity for unfettered access to 
     virtually every industrial facility in this country, not 
     merely the pharmaceutical and chemical plants, would make 
     most foreign intelligence organizations very happy, even 
     gleeful. It is likely to cause the counterintelligence 
     sections of the FBI and the Defense Investigative Service 
     major problems for the foreseeable future. The inspection 
     procedures which apply to ALL industries constitute 
     unprecedented access to our manufacturing base, not just 
     those thought likely to be engaged in proscribed activities! 
     My experience in protecting patents and intellectual property 
     over the past ten years leads me to conclude that there is 
     the potential for the loss of untold billions of dollars in 
     trade secrets which can be used to gain competitive 
     advantage, to shorten R&D cycles, and to steal US market 
     share. To allow the invasion of private property without 
     probable cause or a search warrant could undermine every 
     industrial security standard established under government 
     regulations or by private firms seeking to protect industrial 
     processes or other proprietary information. Under the 
     inspection and reporting practices specified in the CWC I see 
     no prohibition against the exchanging of lucrative 
     information among the nations conducting a given inspection. 
     This country, for valid reasons, does not permit its 
     intelligence agencies to conduct industrial espionage but we 
     may be the only nation in the world to hold to such a 
     standard.
       The CWC constitutes a significant departure from the way 
     this country conducts business and the way our society has 
     elected to protect its very fabric. It seems to me that the 
     CWC has been put together as a placebo measure to make people 
     feel good but without considering the overall long term 
     impact on our industry, our society and our legal system. The 
     Congress bears the responsibility of assuring our citizenry 
     that the advantages and disadvantages have been carefully 
     considered and balanced.
       We look to you to insure that those safeguards are built 
     into the process.
           Sincerely,
                                                James A. Williams,
     LTG U.S. Army (Ret.)
                                                                    ____

                                                September 6, 1996.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently 
     scheduled to take final action on the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention (CWC) on or before September 14th. This treaty has 
     been presented as a global, effective and verifiable ban on 
     chemical weapons. As individuals with considerable experience 
     in national security matters, we would all support such a 
     ban. We have, however, concluded that the present Convention 
     is seriously deficient on each of these scores, among others.
       The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for 
     example, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have not agreed 
     to join the treaty regime. Russia is among those who have 
     signed the Convention but is unlikely to ratify--especially 
     without a commitment of billions in U.S. aid to pay for the 
     destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then, given our 
     experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its 
     repeated refusal to implement the 1900 Bilateral Destruction 
     Agreement on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be 
     expected.
       The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control 
     possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal 
     weapons purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two 
     chemical agents that were employed with deadly effect in 
     World War I--phosgene and hydrogen cyanide. The reason speaks 
     volumes about this treaty's impractical nature: they are too 
     widely used for commercial purposes to be banned.
       The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence 
     community has repeatedly acknowledged in congressional 
     testimony. Authoritarian regimes can be confident that their 
     violations will be undetectable. Now, some argue that the 
     treaty's intrusive inspections regime will help us know more 
     than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however, is 
     whether any additional information thus gleaned will 
     translate into convincing evidence of cheating and result in 
     the collective imposition of sanctions or other enforcement 
     measures. In practice, this test is unlikely to be satisfied 
     since governments tend to look the other way at evidence of 
     non-compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime.
       What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will 
     create a massive new, UN-style international inspection 
     bureaucracy (which will help the total cost of this treaty to 
     U.S. taxpayers amount to as much as $200 million per year). 
     It will jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights by 
     requiring the U.S. government to permit searches without 
     either warrants or probable cause. It will impose a costly 
     and complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 
     8,000 companies across the country may be subjected to new 
     reporting requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs 
     of between thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per 
     year to comply. Most of these American companies have no idea 
     that they will be affected. And perhaps worst of all, the CWC 
     will determine the standard of verifiability that has been a 
     key national security principle for the United States.
       Under these circumstances, the national security benefits 
     of the Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh 
     its considerable costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge 
     you to reject ratification of the CWC unless and until it is 
     made genuinely global, effective and verifiable.
     William P. Clark.
     Dick Cheney.
     Cap Weinberger.
     Jeane Kirkpatrick.
     Edwin Meese III.

  Signatories on Letter to Senator Trent Lott Regarding the Chemical 
                           Weapons Convention

                  (As of September 9, 1996; 9:30 a.m.)

       Signatures on letter:
       William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the 
     President.
       Casper Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense.
       Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense.
       Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United 
     Nations.
       Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General.
       Additional Signatories (retired military):
       General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former 
     Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command.
       Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former 
     Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Aviation.
       Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former 
     Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.
       Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former 
     Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion.
       General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former 
     Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.
       Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps 
     (Retired), former Fleet Marine Force, Commander/Head, Marine 
     Aviation.
       General John L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), 
     former Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief, 
     U.S. Air Force.
       General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former 
     Commander, Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems 
     Command.
       Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), 
     former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
       Additional Signatories (non-military):
       Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space 
     Council.
       Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agency.
       Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of 
     Defense for Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters.
       Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative 
     Organization.
       J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
     Defense.
       Midge Decter, former President, Committee for Free World.
       Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of 
     Intelligence Programs, National Security Council.
       Diana Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory 
     Council.
       Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential 
     Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Services.
       David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional 
     Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
       Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
     State.
       Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
     Defense.
       Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate 
     Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
       Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of 
     Defense.
       William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President.
       James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agency.
       Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic 
     Trade Policy, U.S. Department of Defense.
       Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. 
     Army.
       Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
     for Science and Technology.
       Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
       Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National 
     Security Council.
       Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the 
     President.
       John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs, 
     National Security Council.
       Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology 
     Policy, Department of Commerce.
       Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer.
       Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert 
     specializing in Iraqi affairs.

[[Page S10072]]

       Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense.
       Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine.
       Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Executive Economist, 
     National Security Council.
       Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President 
     for National Security Affairs and former Director of the 
     Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
       Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary 
     of State for Arms Control.
       Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security 
     Council.
       Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of 
     Science and Technology.
       William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and 
     Defense Policy Coordinator to the President.
       Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator.
       Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for 
     Technology Policy, Department of Commerce.
       Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica.
       Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.
                                                                    ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                Office of the Majority Leader,

                                Washington, DC, September 6, 1996.
     President William Jefferson Clinton,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I am writing to ask your cooperation 
     and support for Senate efforts to obtain information and 
     documents directly relevant to our consideration of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention.
       As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to consider 
     the Convention on or before September 14, 1996 under a 
     unanimous consent agreement reached on June 28, 1996. 
     Immediately prior to the Senate agreement on the Convention, 
     I stated, ``With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
     the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader will make every 
     effort to obtain from the administration such facts and 
     documents as requested by the Chairman and ranking member of 
     the Foreign Relations Committee, in order to pursue its work 
     and hearings needed to develop a complete record for the 
     Senate . . .''
       I regret to inform you that your administration has not 
     been fully cooperative in Senate efforts to obtain critical 
     information. Chairman Helms wrote to you on June 21, 1996--
     prior to the Senate setting a date for a vote on the 
     Convention--and asked eight specific questions. Chairman 
     Helms also requested the provision and declassification of 
     documents and a cable relating to critical issues of Russian 
     compliance with existing chemical weapons arms control 
     agreements and with the Chemical Weapons Convention.
       On July 26, 1996, having received no response to his 
     earlier letter, Chairman Helms reiterated his earlier request 
     and asked additional questions concerning the apparent 
     Russian decision to unilaterally end implementation of the 
     1990 U.S.-Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical 
     weapons. Chairman Helms also asked for specific information 
     and documents concerning Russian conditions for ratification 
     of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as other 
     information important to our consideration of the Convention. 
     While Chairman Helms did receive responses to his letters on 
     July 31 and on August 13, his request for declassification of 
     documents was refused and the answers to many of his 
     questions were incomplete.
       During a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on 
     June 17, 1996, Senator Kyl asked for a specific document--a 
     cable written in Bonn, Germany by Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director Holum concerning current 
     Russian government positions on the Bilateral Destruction 
     Agreement, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     and on U.S. assistance for the destruction of Russian 
     chemical weapons. On numerous occasions, Senator Kyl was told 
     the document did not exist. Finally, on July 26, Senator Kyl 
     was able to see a redacted version of the document under 
     tightly controlled circumstances but the document has not 
     been made available to Chairman Helms or other Senators.
       Mr. President, the unanimous consent agreement of June 28, 
     1996, was entered into in good faith, and based on our 
     understanding that the administration could and would be 
     fully forthcoming in the provision of information and 
     documents to enable the Senate to fulfill its constitutional 
     responsibilities. Numerous judgements of the United States 
     intelligence community deserve as wide a circulation as 
     possible--particularly since they are distinctly different 
     than some public statements made by officials of your 
     Administration concerning the Convention.
       Accordingly, I respectfully request that you reconsider 
     your refusal to declassify critical documents and consider 
     the declassification of important intelligence community 
     judgments--consistent with the need to protect intelligence 
     sources and methods. Specifically, I request that you act 
     immediately to declassify the May 21, 1996, cable written by 
     ACDA Director Holum and the July 8, 1996, letter from Russian 
     Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice-President Gore, and 
     consider immediate declassification of the paragraphs from 
     which the attached statements are excerpted--all drawn from 
     documents produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency on the Russian chemical weapons 
     program, the verifiability of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, the effect of the Convention on the chemical 
     weapons arsenals of rogue states, and the relevance of the 
     Convention to acts of terrorism committed with chemical 
     weapons.
       I make these requests to enable the Senate to fully prepare 
     for its consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I 
     am certain you would agree it is necessary for the Senate to 
     have complete and usable information in order to fulfill our 
     constitutional obligations and to responsibly meet the terms 
     of the current unanimous consent agreement. Because the 
     unanimous consent agreement calls for the Senate to vote on 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention by September 14, 1996, I 
     respectfully request that you respond to my declassification 
     requests no later than the close of business on Tuesday, 
     September 10, 1996. With best wishes, I am
           Sincerely,
     Trent Lott.

                          ____________________