[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 122 (Monday, September 9, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10069-S10072]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, under a previous unanimous-consent agreement
entered on June 28, 1996, the Senate is scheduled to consider the
Chemical Weapons Convention by the end of this week. There has been
much written and much said about the convention, whether it is the
right thing to do or not; is it verifiable?
On the other side, there are those who say it would affect the
overall atmosphere with regard to these chemical weapons. There is very
legitimate debate about whether or not this convention should be
ratified or not. It is my intention to go forward with the
consideration of this Chemical Weapons Convention beginning probably on
Thursday. We are scheduled to have votes on Friday.
But as we near consideration of that convention, I wanted to share
with my colleagues some of the correspondence that I have recently
received. Late on Friday of last week, I received a letter of
opposition to the convention signed by more than 50 defense and foreign
policy experts, including two former Secretaries of Defense, former
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many others. The letter made
four fundamental points: The Chemical Weapons Convention is not global,
it is not effective, and is not verifiable, but it will have
significant costs to American security.
[[Page S10070]]
Their letter concludes by stating that ``The national security
benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its
considerable costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to reject
ratification of the CWC unless and until it is made genuinely global,
effective, and verifiable.''
This is not my judgment. It is the judgment, however, of Caspar
Weinberger, William Clark, Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ed Meese, Dick
Cheney, and many others who served with distinction under Presidents
Reagan and Bush. I think their views deserve serious consideration from
every Member.
As you will note, two of those names that I read are former
Secretaries of Defense and certainly highly respected. Our colleague
from the House of Representatives, Dick Cheney, is one that I really
had not known exactly what his position was, so it was of great
interest to me to see what his thoughts might be.
I have two other letters that I encourage Members to review. First,
the National Federation of Independent Business wrote to me today
expressing serious concern about the impact of the CWC on the more than
600,000 members of the NFIB. The letter notes that under the CWC, for
the first time small businesses would be subject to a foreign entity
inspecting their businesses. The concerns that are expressed concerning
increased regulatory burden of the Chemical Weapons Convention on
American small business I think should be weighed very carefully before
coming to a decision about his or her attitude and what the position
would be of that Senator on the convention. I know my colleagues do not
want to vote first and ask questions later when it comes to small
business, which already bears a disproportionate share of the
regulatory burden from the Federal Government.
I also received a letter today from retired Gen. James A. Williams,
former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency with almost four decades
of experience in intelligence. General Williams raises very serious
concerns over the potential of CWC being used to gain proprietary
information from American business.
He concludes that ``there is potential for the loss of untold
billions of dollars of trade secrets which can be used to gain
competitive advantage, to shorten R&D cycles, and to steal U.S. market
share.''
Many businesses have contacted my office and the offices of other
Senators expressing these and similar concerns about Senate action on
this convention.
Last week I wrote to the President expressing my concern that the
Clinton administration was less than fully forthcoming in responding to
the Senate's request for information and documents. I requested
specific documents previously requested by other Senators. Senator
Helms, the chairman of the committee with jurisdiction, has been very
active in trying to have questions answered, to get information
provided, to get intelligence information available to Senators, and in
many instances that information was late in coming or has not been
provided at all. As a matter of fact, much of it has been described as
being classified; therefore, it could not be provided.
In view of that, I am very seriously considering and probably will
seek a closed session to consider this matter so that Senators can be
made aware of intelligence information that is classified, if that is
necessary. In order to avoid that, I have asked that some of this
documentation be declassified by the administration so that all
Senators can have access to it without our having to go into closed
session.
I wanted to call to the Senate's attention this correspondence that I
have outlined because it is very important that a range of views be
made available to all Senators. The administration has been making its
case for quite some time, but opponents of the convention have just
begun the serious examination the convention really deserves.
There were some Members who have been involved in this issue --I
believe Senator Stevens arranged for a briefing this very afternoon
that was sponsored by the Arms Control Observer Group. We did have some
people testifying, stating they had opposition to the convention,
others that were supportive of it. We are trying to get a balance in
what is presented to the Senators, both privately and publicly.
My own personal greatest concern is the question of verification.
What do we do about Iraq? If we pass a convention like this, that would
be applicable to us, sort of the law-abiding citizens of the world, how
do we make sure what is happening in Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, the
renegade countries of the world? Is this going to be a situation where
we go forward with this convention, this Chemical Weapons Convention,
yet those who are the real threat do not participate, or deny that they
are involved, or we are not in a position where we can verify what they
are actually doing?
So, I ask unanimous consent the three letters I received and the
letter I wrote to the President last week be printed in the Record so
all Senators will have access to these letters and to this information,
much of which had not been made available prior to tonight.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
National Federation of
Independent Business,
Washington, DC, September 9, 1996.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Leader, On behalf of the more than 600,000 members
of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), I
want to express serious concern regarding the regulatory
requirements and burdens that would be placed on small
businesses who ``produce, process, consume, export or
import'' certain regulated chemicals with ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty (CWC) and its implementing
legislation.
This Congress has begun to address the serious problems of
paperwork burdens and red tape which are strangling small
businesses in this country. The passage of the Paperwork
Reduction Act and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act were positive first steps in reducing the
excessive regulatory burden which consistently ranks in the
top five problems small business face in NFIB surveys.
The CWC reverses the trend of reducing the growing
regulatory burden on small business. According to the
Congressional Office of Technology inspections of businesses
required under CWC will cost small business $10,000-$20,000.
The typical small business owner takes home only $40,000 per
year. The Department of Commerce has estimated that a
business will spend from 2.5-9 hours on paperwork for each
chemical used depending on its classification.
There is a great deal of disagreement on the number of
businesses which would be affected by the CWC. Numbers have
ranged from 3,000 to 10,000. The regulatory burden of the CWC
will hit small businesses harder than big business. A 1995
Small Business Administration study stated that while small
business employs 53 percent of the workforce, they bear 67
percent of business' total regulatory expense. Even if the
number of small businesses in the initial list of affected
companies is limited to a specific list, the fact that
additional businesses might be regulated by CWC without
approval by the U.S. Congress will leave small business
powerless to have any input as it does under the U.S.
regulatory system. For the first time, small businesses would
be subject to a foreign entity inspecting their business.
The CWC will continue to bury small businesses in paperwork
and regulations. Therefore, NFIB urges your serious
consideration of the affect of this Treaty on the small
businesses in this country.
Sincerely,
Dan Danner,
Vice President,
Federal Government Relations.
____
September 9, 1996.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lott: As you weigh the benefits and costs of
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) I would like to offer
some insight gained during my 28 years at every level of
Military Intelligence and my subsequent ten years in
competitive intelligence and counterintelligence for some of
the premier companies in this country. The need for
international mechanisms to control or eliminate the
potential use of chemical weapons cannot be denied but the
mechanisms must not be adopted in haste or under pressure. I
ask only that you delay consideration long enough for an
informed debate to take place, and I stress informed.
My foremost concern is that the CWC adds little to the
ability of this country, or any other for that matter, to be
assured that chemical weapons are not being manufactured by
specific nations. Experience in Iraq has amply demonstrated
the ease with which inspections can be thwarted and sanctions
evaded. With all of the effort put into the inspection
program the United States is still unable to say whether Iraq
retains a capability to manufacture chemical weapons. We are
unable to state publicly the chemical weapons production
capabilities of nations
[[Page S10071]]
such as Libya, Iran, Syria, China or Korea. Many nations
possess a production capability or are thought to possess
such capabilities. Nations that are likely to produce
chemical weapons for use by terrorists or for limited
battlefield deployment can produce sufficient quantities in
laboratories small enough that they can be temporarily closed
or relocated to avoid inspections. The exiting treaty on
chemical weapons is already so weak on this point that no
effort has been made to enforce it and provisions of the CWC
are even weaker. Let's discuss objectively what information
is required to verify such a treaty, the capabilities
required to collect the information, the cost of doing so,
and the likelihood of making such collection.
Furthermore, the opportunity for unfettered access to
virtually every industrial facility in this country, not
merely the pharmaceutical and chemical plants, would make
most foreign intelligence organizations very happy, even
gleeful. It is likely to cause the counterintelligence
sections of the FBI and the Defense Investigative Service
major problems for the foreseeable future. The inspection
procedures which apply to ALL industries constitute
unprecedented access to our manufacturing base, not just
those thought likely to be engaged in proscribed activities!
My experience in protecting patents and intellectual property
over the past ten years leads me to conclude that there is
the potential for the loss of untold billions of dollars in
trade secrets which can be used to gain competitive
advantage, to shorten R&D cycles, and to steal US market
share. To allow the invasion of private property without
probable cause or a search warrant could undermine every
industrial security standard established under government
regulations or by private firms seeking to protect industrial
processes or other proprietary information. Under the
inspection and reporting practices specified in the CWC I see
no prohibition against the exchanging of lucrative
information among the nations conducting a given inspection.
This country, for valid reasons, does not permit its
intelligence agencies to conduct industrial espionage but we
may be the only nation in the world to hold to such a
standard.
The CWC constitutes a significant departure from the way
this country conducts business and the way our society has
elected to protect its very fabric. It seems to me that the
CWC has been put together as a placebo measure to make people
feel good but without considering the overall long term
impact on our industry, our society and our legal system. The
Congress bears the responsibility of assuring our citizenry
that the advantages and disadvantages have been carefully
considered and balanced.
We look to you to insure that those safeguards are built
into the process.
Sincerely,
James A. Williams,
LTG U.S. Army (Ret.)
____
September 6, 1996.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently
scheduled to take final action on the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) on or before September 14th. This treaty has
been presented as a global, effective and verifiable ban on
chemical weapons. As individuals with considerable experience
in national security matters, we would all support such a
ban. We have, however, concluded that the present Convention
is seriously deficient on each of these scores, among others.
The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for
example, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have not agreed
to join the treaty regime. Russia is among those who have
signed the Convention but is unlikely to ratify--especially
without a commitment of billions in U.S. aid to pay for the
destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then, given our
experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its
repeated refusal to implement the 1900 Bilateral Destruction
Agreement on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be
expected.
The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control
possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal
weapons purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two
chemical agents that were employed with deadly effect in
World War I--phosgene and hydrogen cyanide. The reason speaks
volumes about this treaty's impractical nature: they are too
widely used for commercial purposes to be banned.
The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence
community has repeatedly acknowledged in congressional
testimony. Authoritarian regimes can be confident that their
violations will be undetectable. Now, some argue that the
treaty's intrusive inspections regime will help us know more
than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however, is
whether any additional information thus gleaned will
translate into convincing evidence of cheating and result in
the collective imposition of sanctions or other enforcement
measures. In practice, this test is unlikely to be satisfied
since governments tend to look the other way at evidence of
non-compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime.
What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will
create a massive new, UN-style international inspection
bureaucracy (which will help the total cost of this treaty to
U.S. taxpayers amount to as much as $200 million per year).
It will jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights by
requiring the U.S. government to permit searches without
either warrants or probable cause. It will impose a costly
and complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as
8,000 companies across the country may be subjected to new
reporting requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs
of between thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per
year to comply. Most of these American companies have no idea
that they will be affected. And perhaps worst of all, the CWC
will determine the standard of verifiability that has been a
key national security principle for the United States.
Under these circumstances, the national security benefits
of the Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh
its considerable costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge
you to reject ratification of the CWC unless and until it is
made genuinely global, effective and verifiable.
William P. Clark.
Dick Cheney.
Cap Weinberger.
Jeane Kirkpatrick.
Edwin Meese III.
Signatories on Letter to Senator Trent Lott Regarding the Chemical
Weapons Convention
(As of September 9, 1996; 9:30 a.m.)
Signatures on letter:
William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the
President.
Casper Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense.
Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense.
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations.
Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General.
Additional Signatories (retired military):
General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former
Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command.
Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Aviation.
Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.
Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion.
General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.
Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps
(Retired), former Fleet Marine Force, Commander/Head, Marine
Aviation.
General John L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired),
former Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief,
U.S. Air Force.
General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former
Commander, Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems
Command.
Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired),
former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
Additional Signatories (non-military):
Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space
Council.
Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters.
Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization.
J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense.
Midge Decter, former President, Committee for Free World.
Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of
Intelligence Programs, National Security Council.
Diana Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory
Council.
Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential
Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Services.
David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State.
Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense.
Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense.
William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President.
James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic
Trade Policy, U.S. Department of Defense.
Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S.
Army.
Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Science and Technology.
Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National
Security Council.
Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the
President.
John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs,
National Security Council.
Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology
Policy, Department of Commerce.
Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer.
Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert
specializing in Iraqi affairs.
[[Page S10072]]
Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense.
Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine.
Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Executive Economist,
National Security Council.
Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs and former Director of the
Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary
of State for Arms Control.
Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security
Council.
Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of
Science and Technology.
William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and
Defense Policy Coordinator to the President.
Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator.
Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for
Technology Policy, Department of Commerce.
Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica.
Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.
____
U.S. Senate,
Office of the Majority Leader,
Washington, DC, September 6, 1996.
President William Jefferson Clinton,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: I am writing to ask your cooperation
and support for Senate efforts to obtain information and
documents directly relevant to our consideration of the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to consider
the Convention on or before September 14, 1996 under a
unanimous consent agreement reached on June 28, 1996.
Immediately prior to the Senate agreement on the Convention,
I stated, ``With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention,
the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader will make every
effort to obtain from the administration such facts and
documents as requested by the Chairman and ranking member of
the Foreign Relations Committee, in order to pursue its work
and hearings needed to develop a complete record for the
Senate . . .''
I regret to inform you that your administration has not
been fully cooperative in Senate efforts to obtain critical
information. Chairman Helms wrote to you on June 21, 1996--
prior to the Senate setting a date for a vote on the
Convention--and asked eight specific questions. Chairman
Helms also requested the provision and declassification of
documents and a cable relating to critical issues of Russian
compliance with existing chemical weapons arms control
agreements and with the Chemical Weapons Convention.
On July 26, 1996, having received no response to his
earlier letter, Chairman Helms reiterated his earlier request
and asked additional questions concerning the apparent
Russian decision to unilaterally end implementation of the
1990 U.S.-Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical
weapons. Chairman Helms also asked for specific information
and documents concerning Russian conditions for ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as other
information important to our consideration of the Convention.
While Chairman Helms did receive responses to his letters on
July 31 and on August 13, his request for declassification of
documents was refused and the answers to many of his
questions were incomplete.
During a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on
June 17, 1996, Senator Kyl asked for a specific document--a
cable written in Bonn, Germany by Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director Holum concerning current
Russian government positions on the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
and on U.S. assistance for the destruction of Russian
chemical weapons. On numerous occasions, Senator Kyl was told
the document did not exist. Finally, on July 26, Senator Kyl
was able to see a redacted version of the document under
tightly controlled circumstances but the document has not
been made available to Chairman Helms or other Senators.
Mr. President, the unanimous consent agreement of June 28,
1996, was entered into in good faith, and based on our
understanding that the administration could and would be
fully forthcoming in the provision of information and
documents to enable the Senate to fulfill its constitutional
responsibilities. Numerous judgements of the United States
intelligence community deserve as wide a circulation as
possible--particularly since they are distinctly different
than some public statements made by officials of your
Administration concerning the Convention.
Accordingly, I respectfully request that you reconsider
your refusal to declassify critical documents and consider
the declassification of important intelligence community
judgments--consistent with the need to protect intelligence
sources and methods. Specifically, I request that you act
immediately to declassify the May 21, 1996, cable written by
ACDA Director Holum and the July 8, 1996, letter from Russian
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice-President Gore, and
consider immediate declassification of the paragraphs from
which the attached statements are excerpted--all drawn from
documents produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agency on the Russian chemical weapons
program, the verifiability of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, the effect of the Convention on the chemical
weapons arsenals of rogue states, and the relevance of the
Convention to acts of terrorism committed with chemical
weapons.
I make these requests to enable the Senate to fully prepare
for its consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I
am certain you would agree it is necessary for the Senate to
have complete and usable information in order to fulfill our
constitutional obligations and to responsibly meet the terms
of the current unanimous consent agreement. Because the
unanimous consent agreement calls for the Senate to vote on
the Chemical Weapons Convention by September 14, 1996, I
respectfully request that you respond to my declassification
requests no later than the close of business on Tuesday,
September 10, 1996. With best wishes, I am
Sincerely,
Trent Lott.
____________________