[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 122 (Monday, September 9, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10047-S10048]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, under a unanimous consent agreement, the 
Senate has obligated itself to consider the Chemical Weapons Convention 
later this week.
  The timing is fortuitous. Getting the Senate to this point has taken 
much longer than was needed or one would have hoped, but, if the Senate 
does indeed decide this week to consent to the ratification of the 
convention, we will be in on the setting up of the organizations 
required by the convention--a conference of all the states parties, a 
41-member executive council, and a technical secretariat, which will be 
the international body responsible for conducting verification 
activities.
  As of this point, 62 nations have ratified the convention. The 
convention will enter into force l80 days after it gains the 65th 
party. If the Senate acts now, our action will enable us to be in on 
every aspect of the setting up of the convention. Moreover, we will 
surely bring others with us and, thus, help ensure widespread adherence 
to the treaty and do much to ensure its effectiveness.
  This treaty represents a serious and important step in our continuing 
effort to curb and to end the threats posed by weapons of mass 
destruction to us, our friends and allies, and to the world.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention, when it enters into force, will ban 
the production, acquisition, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons.
  In it each state party undertakes never, under any circumstances, to:
  Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical 
weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to 
anyone;

  Use chemical weapons;
  Engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and
  Assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any 
activity prohibited to a state party under this convention.
  It is very important that we be involved every step of the way. 
Particularly important is our involvement in a leading role during the 
l80-day period when so much is done to prepare for the entry into force 
of the treaty. Simply put, during this crucial period for the treaty, 
we simply cannot afford to be on the outside looking in. If we stay 
out, we will have no say over the activities of the governing body. We 
will not be involved in the establishment of the inspection regime, 
which, if done as envisaged, could be very important in providing 
information as to the presence or absence, worldwide, of chemical 
weapons programs. If we are not a party, we will certainly avoid having 
the minor inconvenience of international inspections in our country, 
but at the price of having no expert Americans on inspection teams 
worldwide looking for illicit chemical weapons activity.
  These would be major prices to pay for failure to participate in this 
important undertaking. There is another major price to be made if we do 
not become a party. Our failure to join the treaty would constitute a 
major body blow to our critically important chemical industry, which 
supports ratification in overwhelming numbers.
  The problem that failure to ratify would cause for the industry was 
put clearly to the Committee on Foreign Relations by the president of 
the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Mr. Frederick Webber, who said:

       Mr. Chairman, honest businesses have nothing to fear from 
     this treaty. On the contrary, the real price to pay is for 
     not taking action. The United States, as I am sure you know, 
     is the world's preferred supplier of chemical products. 
     Chemical exports, last year, topped $60 billion. Indeed, we 
     are the leading exporting industry in America.
       Those exports, that $60 billion figure, sustained 240,000 
     high-paying American jobs throughout the land. That makes us 
     the nation's largest exporter. More than 10 cents of every 
     export dollar is a product of the chemical industry.
       We are a fast, reliable, high-quality supplier to customers 
     in every corner of the globe. But we could lose that 
     distinction, we could lose it if the U.S. does not ratify the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention.
       The Convention sharply restricts trade in chemicals with 
     countries who are not parties to the treaty. If the Senate 
     does not ratify, our customers will cut us off. They will 
     drop us, and find other suppliers.
       Unfortunately, we will be lumped in the same categories as 
     nations like Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. We do not believe 
     this is an acceptable option.

[[Page S10048]]

       The critics like to say that this treaty imposes too many 
     burdens on business. They say that opening our plants to 
     inspections will mean forfeit our most important trade 
     secrets. It is a good story, if it were true, but it is not.
       Yes, the Convention does open our plants to inspection. But 
     it also offers state-of-the-art protections for confidential 
     business information. This treaty will not reveal our 
     secrets.
       Indeed, it will protect them. We know, because we helped 
     develop the inspection system. Then we put the system to the 
     test over and over again. We learned what works and what does 
     not. We found the gaps, and we believe that we have plugged 
     them.
       Mr. Chairman, let me cut to the bottom line. The benefits 
     of this inspection system far outweigh the costs. The rewards 
     outweigh the risks. The treaty may not provide an iron-clad 
     guarantee that chemical weapons will not ever again be a 
     threat, but it does have teeth. It will provide a real 
     deterrent. It is the best available option.
       The Convention strikes a balance. It is tough, but it is 
     fair. It is intrusive, but it is not stifling. It asks a lot, 
     but in return, it offers a significant reduction in the 
     threat of chemical weapons.

  Mr. President, I find the points raised by industry and the issue of 
U.S. involvement in activities that really are at the heart of our 
national interests to constitute in themselves compelling reasons for 
us to be very, very careful before giving any serious thought to a 
turning down of this treaty. Today and over the next several days, I'm 
sure that Senators will be bombarded with arguments for and against 
this treaty. I would like to draw my fellow Senators attention to a 
very thoughtful analysis provided the committee by Dr. Brad Roberts 
this year. Dr. Roberts, who has spent a considerable time assessing 
issues related to the treaty, spoke in full recognition of some of the 
concerns that have been raised. He said:

       In sum then, the CWC certainly is not perfect, and anybody 
     who has told you it is, is blowing smoke. The relevant 
     question for this committee, though, is simply: Is it good 
     enough? Is the treaty in the national interest?
       If you believe, as I do, that it is better to narrow the 
     proliferation threat, than to let it spiral out of control, 
     which is where it is headed, that the only chemical weapons 
     that matter to the United States are those that pose real 
     military threats, that it is better to share verification and 
     compliance tasks and to have on-site access, than to go it 
     alone on these matters, that it is better to add relatively 
     modest regulatory burdens to industry than to jeopardize its 
     long-term competitiveness, that it is better to create more 
     tools to deal with the proliferation threat of the post-Cold 
     War than to have fewer, and if you agree that it is better to 
     share the burden of managing this problem than to saddle the 
     United States alone, then support the CWC.
       It is not perfect, but it is largely up to us to define and 
     manage its risks through our military programs, our anti-
     chemical protection systems, our own national verification 
     capabilities, a task that is far easier than coping with the 
     risks of a world of much broader chemical and perhaps 
     biological proliferation, and the difficult challenges that 
     would result to U.S. interests, capabilities, and leadership.

  Mr. President, I know my fellow Senators will weigh this treaty very 
carefully before deciding how they wish to vote. I deeply believe that 
a positive vote is the correct one for our national interests. I hope 
very much that most of my fellow Senators will reach the same 
conclusion.

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