[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 120 (Thursday, September 5, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9960-S9962]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      AVIATION SECURITY CHALLENGES

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the vitally 
important issue of aviation security challenges. Last month, the 
Commerce Committee which I chair held an open hearing to examine 
aviation security. Later this month, we will hold a closed hearing to 
further consider this vitally important issue.
  At the outset, let me stress that the United States continues to have 
the

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best aviation safety record in the world. Every day, 1.5 million people 
fly commercially in the United States and we have a marvelous record of 
getting passengers safely to their destinations. Regrettably, however, 
recent incidents have caused the traveling public great anxiety. It is 
our responsibility to help reassure the public of our superb air safety 
record.
  Impressive as U.S. aviation safety statistics are, we cannot rest on 
our laurels. Statistics are no comfort to a family which has lost a 
loved one or friend in an aviation tragedy. On a bipartisan basis, 
Congress and the administration must constantly strive to do better in 
the area of aviation safety. In fact, I believe we must rededicate 
ourselves to the goal of zero aviation accidents, whether caused by 
safety lapses, security breaches, or other factors.
  Today, I would like to briefly discuss three points.
  First, it is imperative that Congress and the administration resist 
the temptation to rush to embrace any simple solution to the very 
complex aviation security challenges we face. Rather, an effective 
aviation security program depends on a number of components working 
together in a coordinated manner to form a virtual security net 
protecting the traveling public. These elements include: the collection 
of intelligence information used to identify potential threats; 
coordination of efforts by law enforcement agencies to interdict 
threats; human factors including effective passenger screening; and 
technology. As is the case with any system, aviation security is only 
as strong as the weakest link in the security chain.
  Each of these components needs to be improved. In the areas of 
technology and human factors, there is vast room for improvement. 
Simply put, we can do a better job protecting the traveling public. We 
must do a better job.
  In recent weeks the aviation security debate has understandably 
focused on the lack of explosive detection capability in our Nation's 
airports. This focus is well placed. After all, in 1990 Congress 
recognized explosive detection systems needed to be installed in our 
airports and directed FAA to mandate deployment of such systems by 
November 1993. Yet today--nearly 6 years later and after the Federal 
Aviation Administration [FAA] has spent more than $150 million in 
taxpayer money on explosive detection research--our airports continue 
to lack the capability to screen checked baggage for explosives. To 
make matters worse, our airports stand out as soft targets for aviation 
terrorism because many airports around the world already have put in 
place U.S.-manufactured explosive detection devices as part of their 
heightened security measures.
  While I am pleased we are finally field testing a FAA-certified 
explosive detection system, the current absence of explosive detection 
capability in our airports raises a fundamental policy question: Should 
Congress require interim deployment of existing explosive detection 
devices until a FAA-certified explosive detection system successfully 
completes operational testing and is available in sufficient quantities 
to be deployed at least in our highest risk airports? I strongly 
believe the answer is yes. We should take a very hard look at those 
U.S.-manufactured bulk and trace explosive detection devices which 
currently are widely used around the world.

  Tempting as it is, however, I hope the aviation security debate does 
not continue to be transfixed on technology. For instance, I am equally 
concerned about the shortcomings in so-called aviation security human 
factors. Passenger screening personnel are our most visible line of 
defense at airports. Unfortunately, all too often they are inadequately 
trained and suffer from a very high rate of turnover. Currently, 
companies hired by airlines to provide screening services at our 
Nation's airports are not subject to any certification requirement. 
Similarly, screening personnel are not required to be certified. We 
should carefully consider whether such certification requirements would 
provide the quality control assurance we expect and the traveling 
public deserves. At the same time, Congress should not overlook 
measures that should be taken to strengthen the intelligence gathering 
and enforcement elements of our aviation security system.
  As the aviation security debate continues, our goal should be nothing 
less than improving every component of our security system and ensuring 
we have no weak links.
  Second, Congress and the administration must be very cautious to 
avoid a ``one size fits all'' approach to aviation security policy. The 
security challenges faced by small airlines and small airports are 
truly unique. They differ markedly from those faced by international 
carriers and major hub airports. Accordingly, it is critically 
important these differences are not overlooked in a rush to heighten 
aviation security standards.
  Earlier this year, the U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO] released 
a study I requested which found that many small communities across the 
country currently suffer from inadequate air service. Having just 
returned from my home State of South Dakota where maintaining adequate 
air service is a day-to-day struggle, I can report from the front lines 
that GAO is absolutely correct. Even where a small community is lucky 
enough to have air service, often that service is economically fragile. 
Even a small economic shock can sever a community's only remaining air 
service link to our national air service network.
  Passengers traveling to and from small cities must have the same 
level of security as those traveling to and from large hub airports. I 
believe, however, there are thoughtful ways of accomplishing this goal 
without toppling this fragile economic balance. For instance, is it 
good policy to force a small community like Mitchell, SD, which had 
just 34 commercial boardings in July to install at its airport a CTX-
5000 explosive detection machine costing $1 million? How about 
Brookings, SD, and Yankton, SD, which in July had 104 and 112 boardings 
respectively? I believe the answer clearly is no, particularly since 
hand searching of selected luggage at our small airports is a viable, 
cost-effective and common sense alternative.
  Unfortunately, this kind of ``one size fits all'' approach was 
embraced by the House last month when it adopted Section 111 of the 
Aviation Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1996 which calls for new, 
costly security measures to be imposed on small airlines. I have no 
doubt this is a well-intentioned provision. However, it fails to 
recognize FAA's ongoing assessment of the threat faced by small 
airlines and the unique security needs of passengers traveling on such 
carriers. One thing is certain--this expensive, unfunded mandate likely 
would cause a further erosion of air service in our small cities and 
that is why I will oppose it in the Senate.
  Before I move on to my final point, let me reiterate that persons 
traveling to and from small communities deserve the same level of 
security as those traveling in larger markets. Due to profound 
differences in both passenger numbers and in threat levels, however, we 
can meet this goal without resorting to the identical, very expensive 
measures called for in our major international hub airports. Continued 
air service to many small communities depends on an appreciation of 
this simple, but critically important, point.
  The final point I wish to discuss today is that the enormous 
potential cost of security upgrades requires that heightened security 
measures be based on the philosophy of focussing limited resources on 
the most threatening passengers and cargo. For that reason, I have 
advocated the use of passenger profiling as the ideal way to weed out 
non-threatening passengers and thereby enabling airlines to target 
security resources more effectively. I stressed this point in the 
Commerce Committee's aviation security hearing last month and want to 
reemphasize it today.
  As in the case of explosive detection systems, the problem in the 
United States is not developing sophisticated weapons to fight aviation 
terrorism, the problem is deploying them. Passenger profiling is 
another case in point. While countries with highly regarded aviation 
security systems such as Israel and the Netherlands put great emphasis 
on passenger profiling, thus far we have failed to follow their lead. 
What makes this so remarkable is U.S. carriers have long recognized the 
security benefits of passenger profiling and

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Northwest Airlines, in close cooperation with the FAA, recently 
developed perhaps the most sophisticated automated profiling system 
available. I am very pleased that FAA is working closely with Northwest 
to put the finishing touches on this system and to make it available to 
other airlines as soon as possible.
  In my view, using passenger profiling as the bedrock of any aviation 
security system is good common sense policy. This is especially the 
case when one considers the cost of explosive detection systems, the 
limited space available in many of our airports for such systems, and 
the commercial need for our airlines to avoid unnecessary ground 
delays. An increased reliance on passenger profiling as the first step 
in assessing passenger threats makes perfect sense. It can help make an 
overall aviation security program effective, quick and efficient for 
the traveling public. At the same time, it can help make heightened 
security measures cost-effective and operationally viable for our 
airlines.
  Is passenger profiling a flawless or foolproof piece to our aviation 
security puzzle? No. Short of grounding all airplanes, no perfect 
solution exists. However, automated passenger profiling holds great 
promise as a key part of an integrated aviation security system. For 
instance, Northwest's system looks at more than 100 criteria for each 
passenger and--based on a ranking system and parameters that can be 
flexibly set based on perceived threats in any market--calculates which 
passengers should receive special security attention. Although no 
system can predict human behavior with 100 percent accuracy, this 
system appears to hold the promise of helping to allocate security 
resources with a very high probability of certainty.
  In addition, I am sensitive to the concerns some have raised about 
the constitutional implications of passenger profiling. While much has 
been written about potential economic costs of heightened aviation 
security measures, inevitably there will be civil liberties costs as 
well. As with economic considerations, we must balance costs and 
benefits. Considering that passenger profiling looks at an enormous 
number of varied factors, I believe any civil liberties costs resulting 
from passenger profiling will be very minimal compared to the 
significant social benefits resulting from minimizing public anxiety 
about the security of air travel.
  Let me conclude by reiterating that we can, and we must, do a better 
job in aviation security. If Congress, the administration, airlines and 
airports work cooperatively in the spirit of making every component of 
our security system as strong as possible, I have no doubt we will meet 
this challenge.

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