[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 120 (Thursday, September 5, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H10048-H10074]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1030
           UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES PROTECTION ACT OF 1996

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I 
call up House Resolution 517 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 517

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule 
     XXIII, declare the

[[Page H10049]]

     House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the 
     state of the Union for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3308) 
     to amend title 10, United States Code, to limit the placement 
     of United States forces under United Nations operational or 
     tactical control, and for other purposes. The first reading 
     of the bill shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be 
     confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally 
     divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
     member of the Committee on National Security. After general 
     debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 
     five-minute rule and shall be considered as read. No 
     amendment shall be in order except those printed in the 
     report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this 
     resolution. Each amendment may be considered only in the 
     order specified, may be offered only by a Member designated 
     in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be 
     debatable for the time specified in the report equally 
     divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, 
     shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject 
     to a demand for division of the question in the House or in 
     the Committee of the Whole. The Chairman of the Committee of 
     the Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during further 
     consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a 
     recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to five 
     minutes the minimum time for electronic voting on any 
     postponed question that follows another electronic vote 
     without intervening business, provided that the minimum time 
     for electronic voting on the first in any series of questions 
     shall be fifteen minutes. At the conclusion of consideration 
     of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report 
     the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
     adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered 
     on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without 
     intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or 
     without instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hutchinson). The gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Solomon] is recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Hall] and welcome 
him back from a very productive trip, I understand, to North Korea, 
where there is a serious famine going on.
  Pending yielding that time, Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time 
yielded is for purposes of debate only.
  (Mr. SOLOMON asked and was given permission to include extraneous 
material.)
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 517 is a structured rule 
providing for the consideration of H.R. 3308, the Armed Forces 
Protection Act of 1996. The rule provides for 1 hour of general debate, 
equally divided between the chairman and the ranking member of the 
Committee on National Security. The rule provides that after general 
debate, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 5-minute 
rule, and makes in order only those amendments printed in the report of 
the Committee on Rules.
  Those amendments are as follows: an amendment offered by the 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] making technical 
clarifications, debatable for 10 minutes. That is equally divided 
between them; an amendment offered by the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. 
Bartlett], the gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth], and the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant], pertaining to the wearing of U.N. 
insignia by U.S. Forces. That amendment is debatable for 40 minutes 
and, of course, is equally divided as well. And an amendment offered by 
the distinguished gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder] adding an 
additional reporting requirement of the projected U.S. financial share 
of U.N. operations, which will be debatable for 20 minutes, again 
equally divided.
  The rule further provides that amendments may be considered only in 
the order specified, shall be considered as read, shall not be subject 
to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for a division of 
the question.
  Finally, the rule provides for one motion to recommit, with or 
without instructions.
  Mr. Speaker, the minority was offered 1 hour on a substitute of their 
choice, and they have chosen not to accept that, so there will not be a 
minority substitute offered here today. They did have that opportunity, 
should they have wanted to do it.
  Mr. Speaker, this rule attempts to accommodate the concerns of those 
Members who submitted amendments, yet provides for expeditious 
consideration of this important bill during the abbreviated week. It is 
a good rule and I would certainly urge its adoption.
  On the bill itself, I would just like to make some quick 
observations. For the past several months I have served as the 
Republican leadership's point man on the issue of the U.N. control of 
U.S. Forces. I am pleased to see this legislation before us prior to us 
adjourning in about 3 weeks from now. It is an excellent bill, and I 
commend the chief sponsor, the gentleman from Maine, Mr. Longley, as 
well as the gentleman from South Carolina, Chairman Spence, and the 
gentleman from California, Mr. Dellums, for their work in getting this 
bill to us at this point.

  This legislation is very similar to language in last year's defense 
bill that President Clinton specifically cited as one of the reasons he 
vetoed the measure. In my view, that was a mistake, but unfortunately, 
it fits a pattern established by this President of allowing our 
military forces to be dragged into multinational and other missions 
which have little or no bearing on our national interest of our 
national security.
  This unwise tendency resulted in tragedy in Somalia, losing American 
military lives, and squandered scarce military resources down in Haiti. 
It presently has our forces embroiled in a complex quagmire in Bosnia. 
And a question now arises as to what will happen in Iraq, where there 
is some concern there, certainly on my part there is concern, because 
we know that this is not the same situation as Desert Storm, when we 
saw one country invading the boundaries of another. Now it is a civil 
strife within the boundaries of a country. I just think we have to 
really take a close look at just how much involvement we are in there.
  Mr. Speaker, this legislation obviously does not address all aspects 
of the problem. It simply ensures American command of U.S. Forces in 
U.N. operations, except in extraordinary circumstances. But that is a 
great start. By stipulating that our Armed Forces only serve under U.S. 
military commanders, this legislation will, in turn, ensure that these 
young men and women who serve in our uniform will put their lives of 
the line for American and only American national interests.
  Why should it be otherwise, Mr. Speaker? U.S. military personnel 
swear to defend the United States, not the United Nations. U.S. 
military personnel swear to obey a chain of command leading to the 
President of the United States, not Boutros-Ghali or someone else. That 
is why this is good legislation and that is why I trust we will pass 
this bill overwhelmingly today with bipartisan support.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the following information on 
the amendment process under special rules:

  THE AMENDMENT PROCESS UNDER SPECIAL RULES REPORTED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE,\1\ 103D CONGRESS V. 104TH CONGRESS 
                                            [As of September 4, 1996]                                           
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  103d Congress                        104th Congress           
              Rule type              ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Number of rules    Percent of total   Number of rules    Percent of total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Open/Modified-Open \2\..............                 46                 44                 82                 59
Structured/Modified Closed \3\......                 49                 47                 39                 28
Closed \4\..........................                  9                  9                 18                 13
                                     ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total.........................                104                100                139                100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This table applies only to rules which provide for the original consideration of bills, joint resolutions or
  budget resolutions and which provide for an amendment process. It does not apply to special rules which only  
  waive points of order against appropriations bills which are already privileged and are considered under an   
  open amendment process under House rules.                                                                     
\2\ An open rule is one under which any Member may offer a germane amendment under the five-minute rule. A      
  modified open rule is one under which any Member may offer a germane amendment under the five-minute rule     
  subject only to an overall time limit on the amendment process and/or a requirement that the amendment be     
  preprinted in the Congressional Record.                                                                       

[[Page H10050]]

                                                                                                                
\3\ A structured or modified closed rule is one under which the Rules Committee limits the amendments that may  
  be offered only to those amendments designated in the special rule or the Rules Committee report to accompany 
  it, or which preclude amendments to a particular portion of a bill, even though the rest of the bill may be   
  completely open to amendment.                                                                                 
\4\ A closed rule is one under which no amendments may be offered (other than amendments recommended by the     
  committee in reporting the bill).                                                                             


                          SPECIAL RULES REPORTED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE, 104TH CONGRESS                         
                                            [As of September 4, 1996]                                           
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                 Disposition of 
    H. Res. No. (Date rept.)         Rule type           Bill No.              Subject                rule      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Res. 38 (1/18/95)...........  O................  H.R. 5...........  Unfunded Mandate        A: 350-71 (1/19/ 
                                                                        Reform.                 95).            
H. Res. 44 (1/24/95)...........  MC...............  H. Con. Res. 17..  Social Security.......  A: 255-172 (1/25/
                                                    H.J. Res. 1......  Balanced Budget Amdt..   95).            
H. Res. 51 (1/31/95)...........  O................  H.R. 101.........  Land Transfer, Taos     A: voice vote (2/
                                                                        Pueblo Indians.         1/95).          
H. Res. 52 (1/31/95)...........  O................  H.R. 400.........  Land Exchange, Arctic   A: voice vote (2/
                                                                        Nat'l. Park and         1/95).          
                                                                        Preserve.                               
H. Res. 53 (1/31/95)...........  O................  H.R. 440.........  Land Conveyance, Butte  A: voice vote (2/
                                                                        County, Calif.          1/95).          
H. Res. 55 (2/1/95)............  O................  H.R. 2...........  Line Item Veto........  A: voice vote (2/
                                                                                                2/95).          
H. Res. 60 (2/6/95)............  O................  H.R. 665.........  Victim Restitution....  A: voice vote (2/
                                                                                                7/95).          
H. Res. 61 (2/6/95)............  O................  H.R. 666.........  Exclusionary Rule       A: voice vote (2/
                                                                        Reform.                 7/95).          
H. Res. 63 (2/8/95)............  MO...............  H.R. 667.........  Violent Criminal        A: voice vote (2/
                                                                        Incarceration.          9/95).          
H. Res. 69 (2/9/95)............  O................  H.R. 668.........  Criminal Alien          A: voice vote (2/
                                                                        Deportation.            10/95).         
H. Res. 79 (2/10/95)...........  MO...............  H.R. 728.........  Law Enforcement Block   A: voice vote (2/
                                                                        Grants.                 13/95).         
H. Res. 83 (2/13/95)...........  MO...............  H.R. 7...........  National Security       PQ: 229-199; A:  
                                                                        Revitalization.         227-197 (2/15/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 88 (2/16/95)...........  MC...............  H.R. 831.........  Health Insurance        PQ: 230-191; A:  
                                                                        Deductibility.          229-188 (2/21/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 91 (2/21/95)...........  O................  H.R. 830.........  Paperwork Reduction     A: voice vote (2/
                                                                        Act.                    22/95).         
H. Res. 92 (2/21/95)...........  MC...............  H.R. 889.........  Defense Supplemental..  A: 282-144 (2/22/
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 93 (2/22/95)...........  MO...............  H.R. 450.........  Regulatory Transition   A: 252-175 (2/23/
                                                                        Act.                    95).            
H. Res. 96 (2/24/95)...........  MO...............  H.R. 1022........  Risk Assessment.......  A: 253-165 (2/27/
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 100 (2/27/95)..........  O................  H.R. 926.........  Regulatory Reform and   A: voice vote (2/
                                                                        Relief Act.             28/95).         
H. Res. 101 (2/28/95)..........  MO...............  H.R. 925.........  Private Property        A: 271-151 (3/2/ 
                                                                        Protection Act.         95).            
H. Res. 103 (3/3/95)...........  MO...............  H.R. 1058........  Securities Litigation   .................
                                                                        Reform.                                 
H. Res. 104 (3/3/95)...........  MO...............  H.R. 988.........  Attorney                A: voice vote (3/
                                                                        Accountability Act.     6/95).          
H. Res. 105 (3/6/95)...........  MO...............  .................  ......................  A: 257-155 (3/7/ 
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 108 (3/7/95)...........  Debate...........  H.R. 956.........  Product Liability       A: voice vote (3/
                                                                        Reform.                 8/95).          
H. Res. 109 (3/8/95)...........  MC...............  .................  ......................  PQ: 234-191 A:   
                                                                                                247-181 (3/9/   
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 115 (3/14/95)..........  MO...............  H.R. 1159........  Making Emergency Supp.  A: 242-190 (3/15/
                                                                        Approps.                95).            
H. Res. 116 (3/15/95)..........  MC...............  H.J. Res. 73.....  Term Limits Const.      A: voice vote (3/
                                                                        Amdt.                   28/95).         
H. Res. 117 (3/16/95)..........  Debate...........  H.R. 4...........  Personal                A: voice vote (3/
                                                                        Responsibility Act of   21/95).         
                                                                        1995.                                   
H. Res. 119 (3/21/95)..........  MC...............  .................  ......................  A: 217-211 (3/22/
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 125 (4/3/95)...........  O................  H.R. 1271........  Family Privacy          A: 423-1 (4/4/   
                                                                        Protection Act.         95).            
H. Res. 126 (4/3/95)...........  O................  H.R. 660.........  Older Persons Housing   A: voice vote (4/
                                                                        Act.                    6/95).          
H. Res. 128 (4/4/95)...........  MC...............  H.R. 1215........  Contract With America   A: 228-204 (4/5/ 
                                                                        Tax Relief Act of       95).            
                                                                        1995.                                   
H. Res. 130 (4/5/95)...........  MC...............  H.R. 483.........  Medicare Select          A: 253-172 (4/6/
                                                                        Expansion.              95).            
H. Res. 136 (5/1/95)...........  O................  H.R. 655.........  Hydrogen Future Act of  A: voice vote (5/
                                                                        1995.                   2/95).          
H. Res. 139 (5/3/95)...........  O................  H.R. 1361........  Coast Guard Auth. FY    A: voice vote (5/
                                                                        1996.                   9/95).          
H. Res. 140 (5/9/95)...........  O................  H.R. 961.........  Clean Water Amendments  A: 414-4 (5/10/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 144 (5/11/95)..........  O................  H.R. 535.........  Fish Hatchery--         A: voice vote (5/
                                                                        Arkansas.               15/95).         
H. Res. 145 (5/11/95)..........  O................  H.R. 584.........  Fish Hatchery--Iowa...  A: voice vote (5/
                                                                                                15/95).         
H. Res. 146 (5/11/95)..........  O................  H.R. 614.........  Fish Hatchery--         A: voice vote (5/
                                                                        Minnesota.              15/95).         
H. Res. 149 (5/16/95)..........  MC...............  H. Con. Res. 67..  Budget Resolution FY    PQ: 252-170 A:   
                                                                        1996.                   255-168 (5/17/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 155 (5/22/95)..........  MO...............  H.R. 1561........  American Overseas       A: 233-176 (5/23/
                                                                        Interests Act.          95).            
H. Res. 164 (6/8/95)...........  MC...............  H.R. 1530........  Nat. Defense Auth. FY   PQ: 225-191 A:   
                                                                        1996.                   233-183 (6/13/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 167 (6/15/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1817........  MilCon Appropriations   PQ: 223-180 A:   
                                                                        FY 1996.                245-155 (6/16/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 169 (6/19/95)..........  MC...............  H.R. 1854........  Leg. Branch Approps.    PQ: 232-196 A:   
                                                                        FY 1996.                236-191 (6/20/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 170 (6/20/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1868........  For. Ops. Approps. FY   PQ: 221-178 A:   
                                                                        1996.                   217-175 (6/22/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 171 (6/22/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1905........  Energy & Water          A: voice vote (7/
                                                                        Approps. FY 1996.       12/95).         
H. Res. 173 (6/27/95)..........  C................  H.J. Res. 79.....  Flag Constitutional     PQ: 258-170 A:   
                                                                        Amendment.              271-152 (6/28/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 176 (6/28/95)..........  MC...............  H.R. 1944........  Emer. Supp. Approps...  PQ: 236-194 A:   
                                                                                                234-192 (6/29/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 185 (7/11/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1977........  Interior Approps. FY    PQ: 235-193 D:   
                                                                        1996.                   192-238 (7/12/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 187 (7/12/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1977........  Interior Approps. FY    PQ: 230-194 A:   
                                                                        1996 #2.                229-195 (7/13/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 188 (7/12/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1976........  Agriculture Approps.    PQ: 242-185 A:   
                                                                        FY 1996.                voice vote (7/18/
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 190 (7/17/95)..........  O................  H.R. 2020........  Treasury/Postal         PQ: 232-192 A:   
                                                                        Approps. FY 1996.       voice vote (7/18/
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 193 (7/19/95)..........  C................  H.J. Res. 96.....  Disapproval of MFN to   A: voice vote (7/
                                                                        China.                  20/95).         
H. Res. 194 (7/19/95)..........  O................  H.R. 2002........  Transportation          PQ: 217-202 (7/21/
                                                                        Approps. FY 1996.       95).            
H. Res. 197 (7/21/95)..........  O................  H.R. 70..........  Exports of Alaskan      A: voice vote (7/
                                                                        Crude Oil.              24/95).         
H. Res. 198 (7/21/95)..........  O................  H.R. 2076........  Commerce, State         A: voice vote (7/
                                                                        Approps. FY 1996.       25/95).         
H. Res. 201 (7/25/95)..........  O................  H.R. 2099........  VA/HUD Approps. FY      A: 230-189 (7/25/
                                                                        1996.                   95).            
H. Res. 204 (7/28/95)..........  MC...............  S. 21............  Terminating U.S. Arms   A: voice vote (8/
                                                                        Embargo on Bosnia.      1/95).          
H. Res. 205 (7/28/95)..........  O................  H.R. 2126........  Defense Approps. FY     A: 409-1 (7/31/  
                                                                        1996.                   95).            
H. Res. 207 (8/1/95)...........  MC...............  H.R. 1555........  Communications Act of   A: 255-156 (8/2/ 
                                                                        1995.                   95).            
H. Res. 208 (8/1/95)...........  O................  H.R. 2127........  Labor, HHS Approps. FY  A: 323-104 (8/2/ 
                                                                        1996.                   95).            
H. Res. 215 (9/7/95)...........  O................  H.R. 1594........  Economically Targeted   A: voice vote (9/
                                                                        Investments.            12/95).         
H. Res. 216 (9/7/95)...........  MO...............  H.R. 1655........  Intelligence            A: voice vote (9/
                                                                        Authorization FY 1996.  12/95).         
H. Res. 218 (9/12/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1162........  Deficit Reduction       A: voice vote (9/
                                                                        Lockbox.                13/95).         
H. Res. 219 (9/12/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1670........  Federal Acquisition     A: 414-0 (9/13/  
                                                                        Reform Act.             95).            
H. Res. 222 (9/18/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1617........  CAREERS Act...........  A: 388-2 (9/19/  
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 224 (9/19/95)..........  O................  H.R. 2274........  Natl. Highway System..  PQ: 241-173 A:   
                                                                                                375-39-1 (9/20/ 
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 225 (9/19/95)..........  MC...............  H.R. 927.........  Cuban Liberty & Dem.    A: 304-118 (9/20/
                                                                        Solidarity.             95).            
H. Res. 226 (9/21/95)..........  O................  H.R. 743.........  Team Act..............  A: 344-66-1 (9/27/
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 227 (9/21/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1170........  3-Judge Court.........  A: voice vote (9/
                                                                                                28/95).         
H. Res. 228 (9/21/95)..........  O................  H.R. 1601........  Internatl. Space        A: voice vote (9/
                                                                        Station.                27/95).         
H. Res. 230 (9/27/95)..........  C................  H.J. Res. 108....  Continuing Resolution   A: voice vote (9/
                                                                        FY 1996.                28/95).         
H. Res. 234 (9/29/95)..........  O................  H.R. 2405........  Omnibus Science Auth..  A: voice vote (10/
                                                                                                11/95).         
H. Res. 237 (10/17/95).........  MC...............  H.R. 2259........  Disapprove Sentencing   A: voice vote (10/
                                                                        Guidelines.             18/95).         
H. Res. 238 (10/18/95).........  MC...............  H.R. 2425........  Medicare Preservation   PQ: 231-194 A:   
                                                                        Act.                    227-192 (10/19/ 
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 239 (10/19/95).........  C................  H.R. 2492........  Leg. Branch Approps...  PQ: 235-184 A:   
                                                                                                voice vote (10/ 
                                                                                                31/95).         
H. Res. 245 (10/25/95).........  MC...............  H. Con. Res. 109.  Social Security         PQ: 228-191 A:   
                                                    H.R. 2491........   Earnings Reform.        235-185 (10/26/ 
                                                                       Seven-Year Balanced      95).            
                                                                        Budget.                                 
H. Res. 251 (10/31/95).........  C................  H.R. 1833........  Partial Birth Abortion  A: 237-190 (11/1/
                                                                        Ban.                    95).            
H. Res. 252 (10/31/95).........  MO...............  H.R. 2546........  D.C. Approps..........  A: 241-181 (11/1/
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 257 (11/7/95)..........  C................  H.J. Res. 115....  Cont. Res. FY 1996....  A: 216-210 (11/8/
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 258 (11/8/95)..........  MC...............  H.R. 2586........  Debt Limit............  A: 220-200 (11/10/
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 259 (11/9/95)..........  O................  H.R. 2539........  ICC Termination Act...  A: voice vote (11/
                                                                                                14/95).         
H. Res. 262 (11/9/95)..........  C................  H.R. 2586........  Increase Debt Limit...  A: 220-185 (11/10/
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 269 (11/15/95).........  O................  H.R. 2564........  Lobbying Reform.......  A: voice vote (11/
                                                                                                16/95).         
H. Res. 270 (11/15/95).........  C................  H.J. Res. 122....  Further Cont.           A: 249-176 (11/15/
                                                                        Resolution.             95).            
H. Res. 273 (11/16/95).........  MC...............  H.R. 2606........  Prohibition on Funds    A: 239-181 (11/17/
                                                                        for Bosnia.             95).            
H. Res. 284 (11/29/95).........  O................  H.R. 1788........  Amtrak Reform.........  A: voice vote (11/
                                                                                                30/95).         
H. Res. 287 (11/30/95).........  O................  H.R. 1350........  Maritime Security Act.  A: voice vote (12/
                                                                                                6/95).          
H. Res. 293 (12/7/95)..........  C................  H.R. 2621........  Protect Federal Trust   PQ: 223-183 A:   
                                                                        Funds.                  228-184 (12/14/ 
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 303 (12/13/95).........  O................  H.R. 1745........  Utah Public Lands.....  PQ: 221-197 A:   
                                                                                                voice vote (5/15/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 309 (12/18/95).........  C................  H. Con. Res. 122.  Budget Res. W/          PQ: 230-188 A:   
                                                                        President.              229-189 (12/19/ 
                                                                                                95).            
H. Res. 313 (12/19/95).........  O................  H.R. 558.........  Texas Low-Level         A: voice vote (12/
                                                                        Radioactive.            20/95).         
H. Res. 323 (12/21/95).........  C................  H.R. 2677........  Natl. Parks & Wildlife  Tabled (2/28/96).
                                                                        Refuge.                                 
H. Res. 366 (2/27/96)..........  MC...............  H.R. 2854........  Farm Bill.............  PQ: 228-182 A:   
                                                                                                244-168 (2/28/  
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 368 (2/28/96)..........  O................  H.R. 994.........  Small Business Growth.  Tabled (4/17/96).
H. Res. 371 (3/6/96)...........  C................  H.R. 3021........  Debt Limit Increase...  A: voice vote (3/
                                                                                                7/96).          
H. Res. 372 (3/6/96)...........  MC...............  H.R. 3019........  Cont. Approps. FY 1996  PQ: voice vote A:
                                                                                                235-175 (3/7/   
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 380 (3/12/96)..........  C................  H.R. 2703........  Effective Death         A: 251-157 (3/13/
                                                                        Penalty.                96).            
H. Res. 384 (3/14/96)..........  MC...............  H.R. 2202........  Immigration...........  PQ: 233-152 A:   
                                                                                                voice vote (3/19/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 386 (3/20/96)..........  C................  H.J. Res. 165....  Further Cont. Approps.  PQ: 234-187 A:   
                                                                                                237-183 (3/21/  
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 388 (3/21/96)..........  C................  H.R. 125.........  Gun Crime Enforcement.  A: 244-166 (3/22/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 391 (3/27/96)..........  C................  H.R. 3136........  Contract w/America      PQ: 232-180 A:   
                                                                        Advancement.            232-177, (3/28/ 
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 392 (3/27/96)..........  MC...............  H.R. 3103........  Health Coverage         PQ: 229-186 A:   
                                                                        Affordability.          Voice Vote (3/29/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 395 (3/29/96)..........  MC...............  H.J. Res. 159....  Tax Limitation Const.   PQ: 232-168 A:   
                                                                        Amdmt..                 234-162 (4/15/  
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 396 (3/29/96)..........  O................  H.R. 842.........  Truth in Budgeting Act  A: voice vote (4/
                                                                                                17/96).         

[[Page H10051]]

                                                                                                                
H. Res. 409 (4/23/96)..........  O................  H.R. 2715........  Paperwork Elimination   A: voice vote (4/
                                                                        Act.                    24/96).         
H. Res. 410 (4/23/96)..........  O................  H.R. 1675........  Natl. Wildlife Refuge.  A: voice vote (4/
                                                                                                24/96).         
H. Res. 411 (4/23/96)..........  C................  H.J. Res. 175....  Further Cont. Approps.  A: voice vote (4/
                                                                        FY 1996.                24/96).         
H. Res. 418 (4/30/96)..........  O................  H.R. 2641........  U.S. Marshals Service.  PQ: 219-203 A:   
                                                                                                voice vote (5/1/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 419 (4/30/96)..........  O................  H.R. 2149........  Ocean Shipping Reform.  A: 422-0 (5/1/   
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 421 (5/2/96)...........  O................  H.R. 2974........  Crimes Against          A: voice vote (5/
                                                                        Children & Elderly.     7/96).          
H. Res. 422 (5/2/96)...........  O................  H.R. 3120........  Witness & Jury          A: voice vote (5/
                                                                        Tampering.              7/96).          
H. Res. 426 (5/7/96)...........  O................  H.R. 2406........  U.S. Housing Act of     PQ: 218-208 A:   
                                                                        1996.                   voice vote (5/8/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 427 (5/7/96)...........  O................  H.R. 3322........  Omnibus Civilian        A: voice vote (5/
                                                                        Science Auth.           9/96).          
H. Res. 428 (5/7/96)...........  MC...............  H.R. 3286........  Adoption Promotion &    A: voice vote (5/
                                                                        Stability.              9/96).          
H. Res. 430 (5/9/96)...........  S................  H.R. 3230........  DoD Auth. FY 1997.....  A: 235-149 (5/10/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 435 (5/15/96)..........  MC...............  H. Con. Res. 178.  Con. Res. on the        PQ: 227-196 A:   
                                                                        Budget, 1997.           voice vote (5/16/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 436 (5/16/96)..........  C................  H.R. 3415........  Repeal 4.3 cent fuel    PQ: 221-181 A:   
                                                                        tax.                    voice vote (5/21/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 437 (5/16/96)..........  MO...............  H.R. 3259........  Intell. Auth. FY 1997.  A: voice vote (5/
                                                                                                21/96).         
H. Res. 438 (5/16/96)..........  MC...............  H.R. 3144........  Defend America Act....  .................
H. Res. 440 (5/21/96)..........  MC...............  H.R. 3448........  Small Bus. Job          A: 219-211 (5/22/
                                                                        Protection.             96).            
                                 MC...............  H.R. 1227........  Employee Commuting      .................
                                                                        Flexibility.                            
H. Res. 442 (5/29/96)..........  O................  H.R. 3517........  Mil. Const. Approps.    A: voice vote (5/
                                                                        FY 1997.                30/96).         
H. Res. 445 (5/30/96)..........  O................  H.R. 3540........  For. Ops. Approps. FY   A: voice vote (6/
                                                                        1997.                   5/96).          
H. Res. 446 (6/5/96)...........  MC...............  H.R. 3562........  WI Works Waiver         A: 363-59 (6/6/  
                                                                        Approval.               96).            
H. Res. 448 (6/6/96)...........  MC...............  H.R. 2754........  Shipbuilding Trade      A: voice vote (6/
                                                                        Agreement.              12/96).         
H. Res. 451 (6/10/96)..........  O................  H.R. 3603........  Agriculture             A: voice vote (6/
                                                                        Appropriations, FY      11/96).         
                                                                        1997.                                   
H. Res. 453 (6/12/96)..........  O................  H.R. 3610........  Defense                 A: voice vote (6/
                                                                        Appropriations, FY      13/96).         
                                                                        1997.                                   
H. Res. 455 (6/18/96)..........  O................  H.R. 3662........  Interior Approps, FY    A: voice vote (6/
                                                                        1997.                   19/96).         
H. Res. 456 (6/19/96)..........  O................  H.R. 3666........  VA/HUD Approps........  A: 246-166 (6/25/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 460 (6/25/96)..........  O................  H.R. 3675........  Transportation Approps  A: voice vote (6/
                                                                                                26/96).         
H. Res. 472 (7/9/96)...........  O................  H.R. 3755........  Labor/HHS Approps.....  PQ: 218-202 A:   
                                                                                                voice vote (7/10/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 473 (7/9/96)...........  MC...............  H.R. 3754........  Leg. Branch Approps...  A: voice vote (7/
                                                                                                10/96).         
H. Res. 474 (7/10/96)..........  MC...............  H.R. 3396........  Defense of Marriage     A: 290-133 (7/11/
                                                                        Act.                    96).            
H. Res. 475 (7/11/96)..........  O................  H.R. 3756........  Treasury/Postal         A: voice vote (7/
                                                                        Approps.                16/96).         
H. Res. 479 (7/16/96)..........  O................  H.R. 3814........  Commerce, State         A: voice vote (7/
                                                                        Approps.                17/96).         
H. Res. 481 (7/17/96)..........  MC...............  H.R. 3820........  Campaign Finance        PQ: 221-193 A:   
                                                                        Reform.                 270-140 (7/25/  
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 482 (7/17/96)..........  MC...............  H.R. 3734........  Personal                A: 358-54 (7/18/ 
                                                                        Responsibility Act.     96).            
H. Res. 483 (7/18/96)..........  O................  H.R. 3816........  Energy/Water Approps..  A: voice vote (7/
                                                                                                24/96).         
H. Res. 488 (7/24/96)..........  MO...............  H.R. 2391........  Working Families......  A: 228-175 (7/26/
                                                                                                96).            
H. Res. 489 (7/25/96)..........  MC...............  H.R. 2823........  Dolphin Conservation    A: voice vote (7/
                                                                        Program.                31/96).         
H. Res. 499 (7/31/96)..........  MC...............  H.R. 123.........  English Language        A: 236-178 (8/1/ 
                                                                        Empowerment.            96).            
H. Res. 516 (9/4/96)...........  O................  H.R. 3719........  Small Business          .................
                                                                        Programs.                               
H. Res. 517 (9/4/96)...........  S................  H.R. 3308........  Armed Forces            .................
                                                                        Protection.                             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Codes: O-open rule; MO-modified open rule; MC-modified closed rule; S/C-structured/closed rule; A-adoption vote;
  D-defeated; PQ-previous question vote. Source: Notices of Action Taken, Committee on Rules, 104th Congress.   

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  (Mr. HALL of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 517 is a modified 
closed rule which will make in order H.R. 3308, a bill to prohibit 
placing U.S. military forces under control of foreign commanders in 
U.N. military or peacekeeping operations.
  I do not have any problems with the rule. My concerns are on the 
substance of the bill. This bill is unnecessary. It is probably 
unconstitutional. And it will interfere with the President's ability to 
use U.S. military troops for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions 
around the world.
  I am proud of the role that our service men and women have played 
saving lives and providing humanitarian relief around the world. I have 
been to Somalia, Bosnia, and other places where United States troops 
have worked with our allies to make extraordinary contributions to the 
peoples of those regions.
  I have seen the results of these missions with my own eyes. Starving 
people are fed, the sick are cared for, and the homeless provided 
shelter. These are good things that we should encourage.
  These kinds of missions not only help others. They can boost the 
morale of our own Armed Forces and provide valuable training.
  I fear this bill could greatly diminish the U.N. peacekeeping efforts 
and our ability to contribute to those efforts.
  There is no need to tie the President's hands with this bill. 
Moreover, this bill represents a dangerous overreach by Congress into 
the constitutional powers of the Commander in Chief.
  Finally, I have a concern over the timing of the bill. As we debate 
this measure, our Armed Forces are participating in a joint military 
exercise to patrol the no-fly zone over Iraq. The situation is tense.
  Mr. Speaker, now is not the time to debate a bill that will take away 
power from our Commander in Chief. We need to stand by the President 
and show our support at this critical time.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dornan], one of the most valuable and respected Members 
of this body and a member of the Committee on National Security.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to take some time on the rule. I 
thank the chairman of the Committee on Rules for that, and also I will 
speak on the bill because there is nothing about this legislation that 
is going to in any way inhibit American military forces going on 
humanitarian missions and helping people around the world who find 
themselves in distress, either through man's inhumanity to man or 
through the forces of our Creator, the weather, nature, or starvation, 
which is generally a combination of both, more leaning on the man's 
inhumanity to man side.
  I just came back yesterday from a trip to some of our air bases in 
England and some of our intelligence facilities. As almost all of us 
will do, we asked to have breakfast set up with our constituents, 
usually enlisted people and noncommissioned officers. Then we will do 
the same at lunch and then at dinner, maybe meet with some of the 
commanding officers and senior NCO's. I did that. This piece of 
legislation came up. Of course, being professionals in the field, they 
were not even aware, because they are so busy, dedicated to doing what 
they do, and the men and women are doing it so well.
  We discussed what would be acceptable on, for example, a food 
mission. My friend, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Hall], there is no 
more decent person that I have ever served with in two decades here, 
wants to reach out and help people around the world. But they said an 
armband would suffice to indicate that you are part of some 
humanitarian effort, a vivid colored arm band. Sometimes in a dangerous 
area it can even be what we call day-glo colors to indicate this is a 
peaceful emission.
  But to ask someone to wear headgear, to ask them to wear insignias 
that are sewn onto the uniform, that replace or require the taking off 
of parts of the uniform of the United States of America, which is the 
country to whose Constitution every military person and everyone in 
this Chamber and in the U.S. Senate has sworn to protect and uphold, 
that is asking our military men far too much.
  We can reach out to people. They know from our aircraft coming in 
that it is a U.S. effort. Nobody has the heavy military airlift that we 
do, the brand new C-17, the C-5 Galaxy, the stretch C-141s, or the 
incomparable C-130 Hercules, going everywhere in the world. We do not 
take and repaint our aircraft.

[[Page H10052]]

  But I noticed in Bosnia that they were spraying all the white U.N. 
vehicles with European, what they call woodlands camouflage. When I 
asked on both trips that I went there, just in the last year, I said, 
who owns these vehicles; as we would say in California, who has the 
pink slip, it is still the U.N. So I said, when we pull out of here 
with this NATO mission, then the vehicles will be painted white again 
and go back to U.N. control? That is right.
  So we have in the White House now a team that is almost compulsive, 
until very recently, about putting U.S. forces under foreign 
international command. The whole problem that allowed the killing to go 
on in Bosnia for 2\1/2\ of the 3\1/2\ years was that the White House 
was insistent upon putting us under U.N. command, when the only thing 
people there would have respected was a NATO command, which is totally 
different, because it has a ratified treaty from the last 1940's, 
ratified from the U.S. Congress. In other words, it follows legitimate 
constitutional authority as set down in the greatest document, our 
Constitution, ever written to guide a people and its government.
  I would just like to point out to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Hall], 
that he has probably unknowingly touched on one of the major, if not 
the major, constitutional debates of our time. That is, our President 
is not a dictator. When Reagan was in the White House, I listened to a 
lot of heartfelt pleas from the other side vis-a-vis Central America, 
that there were things the President could not do without coming to 
this Congress.

  There is a very simple line in the Constitution that says ``In time 
of war,'' and war, that meant declared war. Just read the writings of 
our Founding Fathers: In time of war the President shall be the 
Commander in Chief. It is about 18 words, 16 words. Then there is a 
comma and there is another 18 words, ``or when the militia is called to 
active duty.'' Of course that meant then the National Guard, our 
Minutemen, in principle.
  This Congress is the only body that can debate and decide, other than 
in defense of emergencies, and it is debatable whether what is going on 
right now in Iraq is a defensible emergency when we are choosing sides 
between Kurdish groups that are stupidly killing one another after 
Saddam Hussein has mortared and shelled and machine-gunned with 
helicopter gunships their women and children, and we seem to be leaning 
toward the side that is dealing with the world's greatest terrorist 
state, Iran.
  This is a constitutional problem. That our Congress was not informed 
over this action is outrageous. Let us continue to debate that.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Dellums], former chairman of the Committee on 
Armed Services.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the rule for debate on the bill, H.R. 
3308. I do not do so, Mr. Speaker, because I believe the rule offered 
by the Committee on Rules is unfair. In fact, I believe that under the 
circumstances of their mandate to bring this bill to the floor, the 
Committee on Rules has been fair, it has been evenhanded, in attempting 
to construct a rule that would allow for various amendments and for 
general debate on the issue that is before the body.

                              {time}  1045

  The reason, Mr. Speaker, that I oppose the rule is because I believe 
the whole issue presented by H.R. 3308, whether or not the Congress 
should interfere with the President's exclusive powers under the 
Constitution as commander in chief of our Nation's military forces has 
not, and I repeat and underscore for the purposes of emphasis, has not 
received the deliberation and the attention that it deserves in the 
committees of appropriate jurisdiction.
  Mr. Speaker, I would remind you that earlier in this Congress the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], from the other side of the aisle, 
our distinguished chairperson of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
offered an amendment that would have undone the War Powers Resolution, 
despite broad sentiment in the body that the War Powers Resolution has 
indeed not worked to properly balance congressional and Presidential 
powers.
  The effort of the gentleman was defeated, at least in part, Mr. 
Speaker, because of the articulated views of some of us in these 
chambers that matters of this weight should not be legislated initially 
on the floor of this body. That is why there is a committee process 
that allows for significant discussion, debate, deliberation, and 
articulation prior to a piece of legislation coming to the floor of 
this body.
  With all due respect to our chair, the chair of the Committee on 
National Security, the gentleman for whom I have great respect, the 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], I noted in my additional 
views to the committee report on this very bill, H.R. 3308, that our 
committee made only the most cursory examination of this issue, held no 
dedicated hearings on this issue, did not hear from constitutional 
experts on the wisdom of such a course, and marked up the bill under 
pressure to move quickly to the floor.
  Mr. Speaker, we should step back and take a comprehensive look at all 
of the war powers issues that the cold war's end raises for this 
Nation. These are significant issues here. We now find ourselves in 
unprecedented and unchartered waters. It requires the highest and the 
best in us. We should be substantive and deliberative as we embrace 
these difficult questions, not a quick rush to judgment to make some 
thinly veiled political statement. These are massive constitutional 
issues that require that we look at the world as it is evolving.
  Mr. Speaker, we have reached across the aisle and are serious in 
doing so to work with our colleagues in the other party to craft such a 
comprehensive look, and I hope that we do so. It is in that spirit that 
I urge defeat of the rule in order that we will be able to proceed with 
caution and with the dignity and seriousness that is both worthy of the 
very complex and important issue that is before the Chamber.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I must say to the previous speaker, the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] who I just have the greatest respect for, and 
he earned that respect when he was chairman of the Committee on 
National Security, and we all do respect him. However, I just am 
concerned in that he spoke eloquently about how fair this rule is.
  Mr. Speaker, I would just say to the gentleman, this is a 
deliberative body. This is where we debate the issues. And this matter, 
the identical matter, has been before this body four times and has 
already passed this body. It passed under H.R. 7 last year. It was a 
part of the contract for America that we passed. It was in last year's 
defense bill. This year it was marked up, as I understand it, under 
regular procedure.
  Again, this is not something we need constitutional lawyers to tell 
us what to suggest to the President, and that is really all it is, 
because the President does have the prerogative of, if this is a 
national interest or national security issue of the country, he has the 
prerogative not to follow through.
  I happen to be one that does not support the War Powers Act. I think 
the whole act was unconstitutional. This does not interfere with that. 
This simply says that we want our American troops to serve only under 
American command, and by golly, that is what we are going to get one 
way or the other.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  First, I appreciate his compliment; second, to say to the gentleman, 
if the gentleman would recall, back in the early 1970's when we debated 
the War Powers Act, this gentleman was zealous in defending the 
congressional war powers. I was one of very few Democrats in this 
Chamber, very few Members, who opposed the War Powers Act on the 
grounds that it watered down and diluted a very powerful and clear 
statement in the Constitution that Congress should have the right to 
declare war.
  What we are looking at here is a question of congressional 
prerogatives on the one hand and executive prerogatives on the others. 
These are substantive issues that we need to debate.

[[Page H10053]]

With all due respect to the chairman of the Committee on Rules, I 
dissent from him on one significant point. What is the reason why we 
have a committee process and a subcommittee process? That is because at 
the subcommittee we hold the appropriate hearings, we do all of the 
substantive detail, we do bring in experts so that we make informed 
judgments. Each time a committee brings a bill to this floor, the 435 
Members of Congress should feel certain that that committee did its job 
substantively.
  What I am saying to the gentleman, that was not done in this 
instance. We can deliberate here, but this is not the first place that 
this bill ought to be discussed. I thank the gentleman for his 
generosity.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, let me just say that I 
agree with the gentleman. I know that he was a strong, staunch opponent 
of the War Powers Act along with myself and the gentleman from Illinois 
[Mr. Hyde] and many others. But let me just say that this matter has 
been debated on this floor many, many times. It is no different than 
the constitutional amendment to prohibit the physical desecration of 
the flag. We know the issue. It is a very simple issue. That is why it 
should be brought to a vote on this floor.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge support of the rule and the bill.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule. The 
rule before us makes in order four amendments: a manager's amendment, 
one that has bipartisan support and two offered from the minority, 
including a full substitute. I think most people will agree that given 
the limited time remaining in this Congress we have managed to report a 
fair and responsible rule for the consideration of this very important 
legislation. Mr. Speaker, this bill raises the important question of 
whether or not U.S. troops will be put under foreign command or forced 
to wear uniforms other than those of the U.S. Armed Forces. Many 
Americans find these notions abhorrent and I am unalterably opposed to 
placing our troops under anyone not directly accountable to the 
American people and Congress. There has been some misunderstanding 
about what H.R. 3308, the U.S. Armed Forces Protection Act seeks to 
accomplish. So let us be clear: would this bill make it more difficult 
for U.S. Forces to become entangled in international peacekeeping 
missions? Yes. Would it absolutely prohibit our involvement in these 
efforts? No. Since the end of the cold war, the number of United 
Nations peacekeeping missions has soared. Even so, there are no clear 
guidelines for U.S. participation in these adventures. Our experiences 
in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti have taught us a number of important and 
costly lessons. The bill before us works to make the President more 
accountable when deploying our troops as part of international efforts. 
It would prohibit the use of taxpayer's money to pay for U.S. 
participation in U.N. efforts unless: the President certifies that the 
mission is in the national interest, sets forth clear command and 
control arrangements, outlines the anticipated costs and most 
importantly provides an exit strategy for U.S. troops. These are all 
sensible and necessary steps. I strongly urge my colleagues to support 
passage of these important safeguards--we owe it to the American people 
and we owe it to the dedicated men and women who serve our country in 
the Armed Forces.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I 
move the previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hutchinson). Pursuant to House 
Resolution 517 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the 
consideration of the bill, H.R. 3308.

                              {time}  1054


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
3308) to amend title 10, United States Code, to limit the placement of 
United States forces under United Nations operational or tactical 
control, and for other purposes, with Mr. Kolbe in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] and 
the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will each be recognized for 
30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to open the debate on H.R. 3308, the 
United States Armed Forces Protection Act of 1996, which was introduced 
this past April by the distinguished gentleman from Maine [Mr. 
Longley], a valued member of the Committee on National Security.
  This legislation should look very familiar to my colleagues as the 
House has attempted on several occasions to extend protections to 
United States service personnel who are placed under foreign commanders 
in the United Nations peacekeeping or military operations. Were it not 
for President Clinton's veto of last year's defense authorization bill, 
these protections would already be the law of the land.
  Let me briefly revisit this legislation's history, which makes clear 
the long record of bipartisan concern over placing American troops 
under U.N. command. H.R. 3308 had its genesis in section 1041 of the 
fiscal year 1994 Defense Authorization Act back when my colleagues on 
the other side of the aisle were in the majority. Section 1041 required 
the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a formal report 
``whenever the President places United States military forces under the 
operational control of a foreign officer as part of the U.N. 
operation.''
  Last year, the House considered and passed very similar legislation 
several times. This issue was first addressed in H.R. 7, the National 
Security Revitalization Act. The fiscal year 1996 Defense Authorization 
Act also contained virtually identical language, and a modified version 
of the provision was contained in the conference report which was 
passed by both the House and the Senate. But despite the clear 
bipartisan vote of the Congress on this issue, President Clinton vetoed 
the defense bill, due in no small part on his objection to this issue.
  Yet this is eminently reasonable and practical legislation. Critics 
will argue that this legislation infringes upon the President's 
constitutional prerogatives. Let me make clear, this legislation is not 
a prohibition. It simply imposes and additional step any President must 
take before committing young American men and women to serve under the 
flag of the United Nations.
  It is an entirely appropriate policy restriction that simply requires 
any President to certify their subordinating U.S. forces to U.N. 
command is in the Nation's security interest prior to deploying our 
forces on such a command arrangement. This straightforward limitation 
is the unfortunate, but necessary result of the administration's 
willingness, seen from Somalia to Bosnia and from Macedonia to Haiti, 
to subordinate American interests to those of the United Nations.
  Contrary to those who would assert that this legislation is no more 
than an exercise in U.N. bashing, I believe it necessary that it 
recognize the U.N.'s limits as articulated by Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali himself. Last year the Secretary General acknowledged 
that the United Nations does not have ``the capacity to deploy, direct, 
or command and control peace enforcement operations * * * and it would 
be folly to attempt to do so at the present time.'' Under these 
circumstances, the litmus test for any President wanting to subordinate 
U.S. military forces to U.N. command ought to be strict.
  President Clinton's opposition to this bipartisan legislation, which 
was taken to the point of vetoing last year's defense bill, compels us 
to consider it again. I urge my colleagues to once again send an 
unequivocal and bipartisan signal to the President and the American 
people by supporting H.R. 3308.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Maine 
[Mr. Longley] manage the remainder of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
South Carolina?
  There was no objection.

[[Page H10054]]

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, as I noted during the debate on the rule, I do not 
think that our very valuable committee process has succeeded fully in 
considering the weight and the merit of the issue before us. I would 
not reiterate that argument here.
  Despite that fact, I think that much has been said to illuminate the 
pitfalls and the shortcomings of adopting H.R. 3308.

                              {time}  1100

  Mr. Chairman, these pitfalls and shortcomings are very real traps 
that ensnare us when we fail to set aside politics in favor of policy, 
public relations in favor of public education, and short-term advantage 
against the long-term interest of our Nation.
  Let me say why I oppose this bill in as precise a manner as I can, 
Mr. Chairman.
  Foremost, I believe that this legislation will work mischief that 
will place at increased risk the lives and safety of our men and women 
in uniform. It would do so for several reasons. First, it will restrict 
the President from quickly and with confidence in its ultimate 
effectiveness, from establishing command relations that best meet the 
military situation our troops may face.
  Second, by virtue of the message we send to potential allies in these 
actions, and that is that we do not trust your officers, we make it 
more likely that we will go it alone than we will participate in 
coalition efforts which, as I perceive it as the world is evolving to 
the 21st century, more often than not, should and will be the order of 
the day. Going it alone obviously increases the risk to our men and 
women in uniform. It seems to me that that is not discussable or 
debatable. That is clearly a fact.
  U.S. troops in numerous conflicts, Mr. Chairman, including the War of 
Independence up to the operation that we referred to as Operation 
Desert Storm, have been placed under foreign command. So what is all 
the hoopla here? From the very first war that was dedicated to forming 
this Nation to the last time we sent troops to wage war in the context 
of the Persian Gulf we have had American troops under foreign command. 
There is nothing, Mr. Chairman, in our military history that says this 
per se is problematic. Nothing. And I would challenge my colleagues, if 
they can find it historically, to raise the issue on the floor, and I 
will say, point well taken.
  Former military leaders have eloquently set out in a letter to the 
Speaker of this House, Speaker Gingrich, why this is both unnecessary 
and indeed dangerous. I quote from a letter signed by, among others, 
former Joint Chief Chairman General David Jones that was went to our 
Speaker, the gentleman from Georgia, during the debate on H.R. 7 when 
this issue arose.
  I quote: ``We urge rejection of the restrictions on the President's 
command and control authority as unnecessary, unwise and militarily 
unsound,'' end of quote.
  I am opposed to this bill because I believe it is a strategic 
oxymoron, Mr. Chairman. As we have entered into the post-cold-war era, 
both of our Presidents who have governed in this time have come to 
understand the desirability and the common sense in pursuing coalition 
actions and in doing so through the United Nations, when possible.
  This is not a party issue, Mr. Chairman. It should not be a party 
issue. This is common sense. We have an unparalleled opportunity to 
craft new mechanisms for avoiding conflict, dampening it when it 
arises, controlling it when it flares up and in stopping aggression, if 
we must, that are only realizable if we promote, not denigrate, 
multinationalism and internationally sanctioned peace operations.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, I oppose this bill because I believe it 
tramples on the President's unique and exclusive authority as commander 
in chief. I say this as one of the most zealous guardians of 
congressional war power. As I said in the context of the discussion on 
the rule, I was one of the few people in this body that voted against 
the War Powers Act on the grounds that it diluted what is clearly 
stated as congressional war-making powers in the Constitution of the 
United States.
  Further, Mr. Chairman, I have sued Presidents, taken them to Federal 
court, and would again, to defend this body's prerogative to declare 
war and authorize troop deployments to conflicts. I would have voted 
for legislation that compels such prior authorization and opposed the 
War Powers Resolution because I believed it gave the Presidents a blank 
check to go first and seek our approval second.
  But I would hasten to point out, Mr. Chairman, that respect for 
constitutional prerogative is a two-way street, one which we must be 
prepared to walk on in both directions.
  I will not repeat the constitutional arguments laid out in my 
additional views on the committee report. We worked long and hard and 
laboriously on those views. They have been widely read by many, 
extremely well received by most. I urge my colleagues to read those 
views. I do not have time to go into all of that now.
  Suffice it to say that I believe that the Framers of our Constitution 
actively considered the question, should the Congress be involved in 
the command and control of our military forces, and they answered the 
question with a resounding no.
  Read the Federalist Papers. They debated this question specifically. 
They did not want this body involved in command and control. They said 
no. Consider this statement from the Federalist Papers, and I quote:

       The President of the United States is to be the commander 
     in chief. The propriety of this provision is so evident in 
     itself that little need be said to explain or enforce it. 
     They saw this as obvious.
       Of all the cares and concerns of government, the direction 
     of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which 
     distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.

  Mr. Chairman, while the United Nations did not exist and peacekeeping 
was not a part of the lexicon of the Framers of the Constitution, 
nothing about these operations suggests that the principle that the 
legislature has no business in establishing command relations is any 
less true of them than of warfare.
  Should we be concerned with command relationships, Mr. Chairman? The 
answer is yes. Should we seek information from the President on what 
they are? Yes. Should we seek to establish them or proscribe the 
choices any President might make in advance of considering the 
requirements of a military operation? I say no; the Framers of the 
Constitution said no. We should be informed people, but we are moving 
beyond simply being informed.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, for these reasons and others, I urge that the 
committee reject the bill and that we allow the deliberative process of 
congressional committees to work this issue in a more comprehensive 
manner that is sure to produce a better product.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey [Mr. Saxton].
  Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this 
legislation. It is a good bill, a sound bill, and a bill which we need 
for our national security interests and for the men and women who serve 
our country in uniform.
  Let me first commend my good friend, the gentleman from Maine, Jim 
Longley, for his outstanding work on this bill. As a Marine Corps 
reserve officer who served in Desert Storm and in Bosnia, Jim Longley  
brings real-life experience and insight to this issue.
  It is particularly frustrating if not downright dangerous to see the 
growing tendency of this administration to cede operational control of 
U.S. forces to the ill-equipped, ill-prepared bureaucratic United 
Nations. Yes, there are times when we must act in concert with our 
allies, perhaps often, and yes, there are occasions when the United 
Nations can help defuse a crisis. But when U.S. lives and interests are 
at stake, the American public expects and demands that Americans be at 
the helm.
  No one questions the capability of the U.S. military. We have the 
best-trained, best-equipped men and women in the world. To project and 
command military forces over great distances is something that few 
nations can do, and no nation can do it better than the United States. 
Yet this capability does not come without a price. Every year thousands 
of troops are engaged in either real-life or training operations

[[Page H10055]]

which hone this capability, often at great human risk. And they should 
remain under U.S. control.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dornan] quoted the Constitution of the United States. I would like to 
read the relevant passage. I know he is a learned colleague and would 
not like to speak in error.
  Section 2 of the Constitution states, ``The President shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of 
the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service 
of the United States,'' and it goes on, he must require, et cetera, et 
cetera.
  I am simply saying to the gentleman from California that he 
misinterpreted or misquoted the Constitution of the United States. The 
President is indeed the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Colorado [Mr. Hefley].
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, today Congress provides what the American 
people are asking for. Today America begins to tell Boutros Boutros-
Ghali that he cannot send our sons and daughters to war, that only the 
Congress and the American President can do that.
  The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and the 
President the authority of being Commander in Chief as the gentleman 
has just indicated. We must be cautious in protecting that.
  As an original cosponsor of this bill, I believe it is imperative 
that we establish our authority and the authority of the President.
  No American should be placed in harm's way by anyone other than the 
American Congress and the American President.
  Our soldiers should risk their lives only when U.S. national security 
interests are at stake. I do not believe that the Secretary General of 
the United Nations even knows what our national security interests are.
  During this debate, many of my colleagues will say that this is 
simply a political exercise, something to give Bob Dole to use against 
Bill Clinton. If we wanted that, that has already been done. He has 
already vetoed this concept once before. So that has been done. Of 
course we know that he changes his position a lot in an election year, 
so maybe he will again.
  We can never again allow another Somalia. Because U.S. interests 
became intertwined with U.N. interests, 19 Americans lost their lives. 
This must never happen again.
  Let us pass this legislation and send a message to the American 
soldiers that we will never again send them on an ill-defined, fuzzy 
U.N. mission. We never again, Mr. Chairman, should be in a position of 
having American young people risk their lives under a U.N. flag with a 
U.N. patch and under U.N. command and control. If they are going to 
risk their lives, it ought to be under American command and control.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for this bill.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Let me first state to my distinguished colleague from Colorado, he 
began his remarks by saying Boutros Boutros-Ghali should not be able to 
send American troops anywhere in the world. Mr. Chairman, who is 
arguing with that? That is not what this bill deals with. We have 
already said, and I have already said, I am prepared to go all the way 
to court.
  I took President Bush to court in order to preserve the prerogative 
of Congress when many of my colleagues did not have the heart to do it. 
This is not what this debate is about. This is not Congress' war-making 
power. This is about command and control once a decision is made to 
deploy. So I would hope that in the context of the few meager moments 
we have to debate this bill that we stay relevant to what the 
substantive nature of the bill is.
  I would go further and quote from this administration's policy on 
reforming multilateral, multinational peace operations dated May 1994:

       The President retains and will never relinquish command 
     authority over U.S. forces. On a case-by-case basis, the 
     President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under 
     the operational control of a competent U.N. commander for 
     specific operations authorized by the Security Council. The 
     greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be 
     that the United States will agree to have a U.N. commander 
     exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces.

                             {time}   1115

  That is what this President is saying. Let us remove the politics 
from this discussion. Let us remove the bumper strip of rhetoric from 
the discussion. Let us not insult each other's intelligence. Let us not 
denigrate the responsibility we have on the floor. Let us stay focused 
on the substantive nature of the issues before us, whether or not we 
should step on the President's prerogatives in command and control. If 
they are legitimate differences, then let us know that debate.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes and 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter], the distinguished chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Procurement.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to go over the language of 
the provision itself and what it does because the operational and 
tactical control that is vested in the President and his subordinates 
in the American chain of command is a very precious thing not just to 
people that are in the military forces but to their parents, to their 
families, to the people who rely on somebody who is accountable for 
that young person who may be in a life or death combat situation.
  I want to point out to my colleagues that we do not detract from the 
President's ability to, on a very limited basis, cede that operational 
and tactical control to, yes, a foreign commander if it is a unique 
situation; but we require a certification. It is a thorough 
certification.
  First, with respect to David Jones, former chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs and his problems with this certification, if the President does 
not have time to give the certification well in advance, which is what 
we would like to have, because we want the White House to think about 
this, we want them to think it through, then he can give it after he 
has made the deployment.
  Mr. Chairman, nonetheless, we go through some fairly important areas. 
We ask the President when he does this certification to set forth a 
description of the national security interest. We do not think that is 
unfair or unreasonable, that would be advanced by the placement of 
United States forces under the United Nations operational or tactical 
control. We ask him to tell us that. We ask him to tell us the expected 
size and composition of the U.S. forces involved. We think that is 
reasonable. We ask him to explain the precise command and control 
relationship between the U.S. forces involved and the U.N. command 
structure. We think that is reasonable.
  We ask him to explain to us the extent to which the U.S. forces 
involved will rely on forces of other countries for security and 
defense. I think this element is a very important one. The degree to 
which we rely on forces, those Americans that might be under 
operational or tactical control of a U.N. commander that agree that we 
are going to rely on the forces of other countries for security and 
defense, that our forces will see their security depend on somebody 
else, we think that is a very important element for the President to 
lay out.
  So we ask the President to lay out concisely these very important 
elements. We do not deprive him of his constitutional authority. We 
just require him to certify. We think that is reasonable.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Peterson], my distinguished colleague.
  Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong 
opposition to H.R. 3308. This bill is bad foreign policy. It is bad 
military policy.
  Even the title of the bill is wrong. Instead of the title of the bill 
being Armed Forces Protection Act, it should be titled the Armed Forces 
Greater Exposure Act. By passage of this bill, we destroy our 
successful national policy and collective security. We are saying to 
our allies, we do not trust you and that you are not reliable. That is 
a bad message.
  Further, without the burdensharing that comes with the development of

[[Page H10056]]

collective and coalition security with our allies, the United States 
must go it alone. That means that we must deploy more troops and carry 
a greater fiscal burden in any operation that we feel is in our 
national interest. I cannot understand my Republican colleagues who 
have for years said that we cannot be the world's policemen. How do 
they compare that against what is in this bill that essentially says, 
United States, you must go it alone?
  Furthermore, as an aside, what an incredibly critical time to be 
talking about this. When we are trying to hold together a very, very 
important coalition in Iraq and we are at the same time telling those 
partners in this coalition: Hey, we really do not trust you guys; we 
are really not sure whether you are reliable enough to be with us in 
this thing. Very, very bad policy, very bad timing.
  Mr. Chairman, from a military standpoint, this bill is an absolute 
disaster. Now, from an experiential circumstance, I know a little bit 
about this. It has been from 26 years as a fighter pilot in the Air 
Force, serving a significant amount of time in combat. I know something 
about command relationships. This bill ties the hands of the commander, 
the Commander in Chief, No. 1. But perhaps even more importantly, it 
restricts the field commanders' ability to deploy forces in the field, 
even perhaps at the potential of causing the loss of lives.
  The military leaders of this country unanimously find the 
restrictions starting out unnecessary, they are redundant, they are 
also unprecedented. We are changing how we run our military, my 
colleagues. This is micromanagement of the U.S. military. And they also 
find it especially burdensome to the point, I think, it would cause us 
harm.
  They correctly point out that the U.S. joint service doctrine that 
governs our collective security arrangements with our allies are 
impeccably thought out, have been tested over and over, and they work. 
It just works. Why screw up a good deal?

  Mr. Chairman, the bill also undermines the proven and effective 
protocols established by the document. Finally, Secretary Perry, 
Chairman Shalikashvili, all oppose this for the right reasons, because 
it causes harm to our command structure.
  Last year one of my former commanders, Gen. David C. Jones, a former 
commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in a reply to a similar 
circumstance here. He said in his statement: In the post-cold war 
world, it will remain essential that the President retain the authority 
to establish command arrangements that are best suited to the needs of 
future operations. From time to time it will be necessary and 
appropriate, this is a commander speaking now, appropriate to 
temporarily subordinate elements of our forces to the operational 
control of competent commanders from allied or other foreign countries.
  This man is telling it like it is.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a poorly thought out bill. It is really just a 
political statement, in my view. It will cause great harm to the 
effective command and control of our Armed Forces. Let us stand here 
today, this is an opportunity, let us stand here today and send a 
bipartisan relationship message to all of the men and women who are 
bravely serving our country today and tell them, as we have told them 
in a bipartisan fashion in the past, that we do indeed care about them 
and that we do indeed care about their safety.
  This bill does not improve the safety of our armed services men and 
women. It is a disgrace that we are taking this bill up today. This is 
an absolute vote ``no.''
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute and 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan], distinguished chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Personnel.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I did not realize that I only get a minute 
or I would not have used the 3 minutes in the rule on the uniforms. The 
chain of command is far more important. What we are responding here, 
what the whole Congress is responding to is certainly not a disgrace. 
It is a response to the administration's repeated subordination of U.S. 
interests to the U.N. agenda.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to put in the Record myth No. 1, that it is an 
infringement of presidential authority; No. 2, that PDD-25 already 
protects our troops; No. 3, there are precedents for placing U.S. 
troops under foreign control; and myth No. 4, that it will limit troop 
deployment in emergencies.
  In the rule, when I was discussing the Constitution, I transposed my 
thoughts. Yes, it is 16 words, as I said. The President is the 
Commander in Chief, even in peacetime. And I was correct, it is 18 
words referring to the militia, now meaning the National Guard. But in 
section 8 of article I, all the powers of raising and maintaining 
armies and navies and how to uniform and where to send them and to 
declare war, all of that is the House.
  Mr. Chairman, this chart shows when you go in the field to see how 
this really breaks down, when Vice President Al Gore unfortunately said 
on April 14, 1994, I would like to extend my condolences to the 
families of those who died in service to the United Nations, and I know 
our former colleague would like to take that back, look at this chain 
of command, men died in Somalia because the chain of command was so 
complicated, we could not get one of the Indian 14 T-72 tanks or one of 
the dozen M-60 tanks from Italy to break through the blockades across 
those roads and rescue 4 Rangers who died, who bled to death out of the 
19 killed.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth].
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time 
to me. I am in one of the most uncomfortable positions that I have been 
in in this Congress because I find myself on the opposite side from a 
man I revere and respect, the gentleman from South Carolina, Chairman 
Floyd Spence, and some very, very good friends of mine, like the 
gentlemen from California, Duncan Hunter and Duke Cunningham. But I 
rise to oppose H.R. 3308.
  I know that the argument has been made that generals from the 
beginning of our history, foreign generals have assumed command, 
beginning with Lafayette. But, Mr. Chairman, the fact is that the U.N. 
is posing an entirely different situation now. What we need to do now 
is pull back from the position that we find ourselves in, begin to 
operate under the law. And then once, if war is declared and we are in 
the middle of war, of course, as we did in World War II in that great 
victory, we can combine our forces, as we did when we combined the 
forces to make the allied forces, and we were victorious.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to very briefly review the history of command 
and control of the Armed Forces. The U.S. Constitution, article II, 
section 2 states that the President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several 
States when called into actual service of the United States; again, 
when called into service.
  To clarify the point, Hamilton wrote, in Federalist Papers No. 74: 
The President of the United States is to be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several 
States when called into actual service of the United States. The 
propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, Hamilton wrote, 
that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Again, Mr. Chairman, 
when called into service are the key words in the Constitution.
  Then the War Powers Act, the United Nations Participation Act that we 
are extending even further with this bill, the War Powers Act allows 
the President to send troops to hot spots without congressional 
approval for up to 60 days.

                              {time}  1130

  But no, those troops are to remain within U.S. command and control. 
Nothing in the War Powers Act allows for U.N. foreign command and 
control over U.S. troops. The integrity of the U.S. chain of command is 
still intact even after the War Powers Act, and I do not like the War 
Powers Act.
  But, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to read the clear, plain 
language of section 2 or section 3 of this bill. The other side of the 
coin, the United Nations Participation Act, specifically provides that 
when we contemplate a deployment in the United Nations chapter 6, peace 
observation, no prior congressional approval is required. That U.S. 
participation in U.N. chapter 6 millions is limited to 1,000

[[Page H10057]]

noncombatant troops who will not be in harm's way.
  Finally today, though, we have H.R. 3308. the fact is, Mr. Chairman, 
H.R. 3308 allows the President of the United States to place America's 
sons and daughters under U.N. foreign control without congressional 
input and without the operation of law or without a congressional vote, 
only a certification from the President that these are the reasons why 
he called American troops up and placed them in harm's way. H.R. 3308, 
section 3, states that the U.N. foreign control over U.S. Armed Forces 
is allowed, again, if the President only certifies. The bottom line of 
H.R. 3308 would allow the President to put our sons and daughters in 
harm's way.
  I will just wind up and say that as a student of history I think that 
this bill is extending the President's powers much further than what 
presidential candidate Dole stated and what our Republican platform 
says. Please consider that.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Bartlett].
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank my 
friend from Idaho for her remarks because they were my concerns about 
this bill. I was the only member of the Committee on National Security 
to vote against this bill when it came to our committee, and the 
reasons I voted against it were those that were expressed by my 
colleague. I had a problem with the wording that said that the 
President should consult closely with Congress regarding any United 
Nations peace operation that could involve U.S. combat forces. More 
than consulting is required.
  The U.N. Participation Act of 1945, as amended in 1949, says very 
clearly that in any U.N. Chapter 7 operation that the approval of the 
Congress is involved. Essentially every one of the U.N. operations has 
been Chapter 7. There has never been a Chapter 6.
  I want to express my thanks to the gentleman from Maine, Mr. Longley, 
and particularly to chairman Spence for helping to work out this 
problem. The concerns of my colleague from Idaho have been addressed in 
the manager's amendment which will come shortly, which addresses my 
problems with this part of the bill.
  I had a second problem with the bill, and that is that all that was 
required for our young men and women to be required to wear the 
insignia of the United Nations was a certification by the President. I 
thought that this was a violation of article 1, section 9 of the 
Constitution, and I have an amendment which will subsequently come to 
the floor which will address this problem.
  So both of the problems that I originally had with this bill, which 
were similar to those that my friend from Idaho had, are addressed in 
the manager's amendment which will come up next and with my amendment 
which will follow that, so I now am in full support of the bill, and I 
hope that, having corrected these defects in the original bill, that my 
colleague from Idaho will also be in full support of these bills after 
these amendments have been passed.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Kentucky [Mr. Rogers].
  Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this 
time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I support this bill because it protects our fighting 
men and women from incompetent leadership at the U.N., military 
leadership.
  I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and State in 
the Committee on Appropriations that funds the U.N. contributions that 
we make, as well as the peacekeeping contributions that we give to the 
United Nations. We have been working to limit U.S. support for 
additional so-called peacekeeping operations and to reduce the U.S. 
burden, the share that we are required to pay for those missions. 
During the last 3 years we have seen this phrase, aggressive 
multilateralism, carried to an extreme, run amok, if my colleagues 
will, because we were involved at one time in around 18 U.N. 
peacekeeping missions around the world simultaneously, and I found out 
at one point in time--it has been improved somewhat--but at one point 
in time there were some 40 people at the United Nations attempting to 
manage 18 worldwide military operations in extreme circumstances in 
some instances. It just would not work. They were not working on 
weekends; they were working only regular hours. If one got in trouble 
in Somalia or somewhere else where we were involved in a peacekeeping 
operation after 5 o'clock New York time until 8 o'clock the next 
morning, ``Sorry, we are out of business,'' the phones did not answer. 
On weekends, the same thing.
  How can we run military operations in that fashion? I do not want 
American forces exposed to that kind of incompetent leadership as we 
saw in Somalia, the results of that and the deaths of several beloved 
United States soldiers, and so I support this bill. They have 
incompetent leadership; they have incompatible communications gear, 
among other things. I urge the adoption of the bill.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Gilman], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this 
time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join the distinguished principal 
sponsor of this legislation, the gentleman from Maine [Mr. Longley], 
and the distinguished chairman of our Committee on National Security, 
the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence], in urging the House to 
adopt H.R. 3308, the United States Armed Forces Protection Act of 1996.
  This legislation is the culmination of almost 4 years of effort on 
this side of the aisle to curb the misguided impulse of this 
administration to subordinate the finest fighting men and women in the 
world, our U.S. Armed Forces, to the command of the United Nations.
  We all remember the disaster that this administration's excessive 
reliance on the United Nations led us to in Somalia. This legislation 
is intended to reduce the risk of similar U.N. peacekeeping disasters 
in the future.
  At the same time, the legislation is carefully designed to preserve 
flexibility for the President to respond as needed, and in coordination 
with the United Nations if necessary, to unexpected threats to our 
national security.
  Though some are sure to complain that this legislation interferes 
with the President's constitutional prerogatives as Commander in Chief, 
nothing could be further from the truth. Contrary to what some have 
claimed, the President does not have inherent constitutional authority 
to put U.S. Armed Forces under the operational control of whomever he 
pleases.
  The fact is that this legislation stops well short of some of the 
things that we clearly could do consistent with the Constitution, such 
as prohibit foreign operational control of U.S. forces altogether, or 
require Senate confirmation of foreign commanders whom the President 
wants to put in charge of our forces.
  Title 10 of the United States Code already contains a legal 
requirement that senior U.S. military officers be confirmed by the 
Senate before they are put in command of U.S. forces. Opponents of this 
legislation should be glad that we have not sought to extend that 
requirement to foreign military officers, as we clearly could do.
  In 1993 and again in 1994, Mr. Spence and I offered amendments to the 
defense authorization bill very similar to the legislation before us. 
Regrettably, both of those amendments were defeated on party line 
votes.
  Legislation along these lines was included in the Contract With 
America, and was approved by the House in 1995 in the bill H.R. 7. 
Regrettably, when that provision reached President Clinton as part of 
the defense authorization bill for 1996, he cited that provision as one 
of his reasons for vetoing the bill. In order to get that bill enacted, 
Mr. Spence was forced by the President to agree to drop this vital 
provision from their bill.
  It is time, Mr. Chairman, to right that wrong. It is time to enact 
this vital provision from the Contract With America, and to give the 
brave men and women of our Armed Forces the protection they deserve.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished

[[Page H10058]]

colleague, the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder].
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding, and 
I rise in opposition to this bill because I am very troubled by what it 
really means long term.
  As one of the people who talked about burden sharing and the fact 
that the United States should not be a 911 number for the world, and 
another fact out there is the President is trying very hard to hold an 
alliance together in the no-fly zone, to try and keep this alliance 
solidified, I think the timing of this bill is terribly dangerous. I 
think it goes against what so many of us have advocated in trying to 
get the rest of the world to pull a stronger oar. We all understand why 
we had to stand there and be Atlas-like in the post-World War II 
period, because the rest of the world was devastated, but today many of 
our allies have rebuilt, and yet they still want to cast all of that on 
our shoulders, and what we are doing with this bill is giving them one 
more reason why they say, ``You clearly want to go it alone.''
  Now let me point out some things that I think are terribly important. 
No. 1, this bill does not even differentiate between humanitarian 
missions and combat missions. As my colleagues know, those are two very 
major distinctions. No. 2, everybody, and we have got testimony from 
different officers of the U.S. military, everyone agrees that U.S. 
troops are under command and control of the United States even in these 
missions, that only operational oversight is delegated to whoever that 
officer might me, and under that operational authority any U.S. soldier 
is not to do anything that is in violation of U.S. law or U.S. policy.
  And so as a consequence we all know every country in the United 
Nations is hesitant about surrendering total control. But someone has 
to kind of outline the operational control so people do not fall over 
each other and really make tremendous mistakes. We have been doing that 
forever. So people are getting that mixed up, and here what we are 
doing is blurring that line and trying to get people very excited about 
that.
  The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has spoken about what the 
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Jones] has said. We have got 
testimony from many other military officers, including the U.S. officer 
who was in charge of the Haiti mission, who was both under the United 
Nations and under the United States, explaining how this is harmful. So 
I think there are many, many reasons that we really should slow down 
and look at this.

                              {time}  1145

  We also have testimony, and we have had people saying that if this 
bill had been in effect at the time President Bush tried to assemble 
the world against Saddam Hussein, he could not have done it.
  Now, think about that. Think about that. Here we are, trying to 
reassemble that coalition, to stand up to Saddam Hussein, so here we 
come with this. What kind of message is that? So we go forward and as 
we advocate more and more that the rest of the world is to take its 
justifiable role, and it must play a role, we cannot do this for the 
whole world when we are only 3 percent of the world's population. If we 
are going to insist that everybody else does that, what are we saying 
when we pass this bill?
  I understand the politics of it, but I just hope people read it and 
read what our very own military people say about it and our very own 
Defense Department says about it.
  I thank the gentleman from California for his quiet leadership in 
this, in trying to bring some common sense to a heated debate.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have heard a lot of different 
speakers talk. Let me say from personal experience, I served on 7th 
Fleet staff and was in charge of all defense of Southeast Asia 
countries. That included both the host countries as well as our allied 
countries. That was Team Spirit, Tangent Flash, Cobra Gold, and others 
in Southeast Asia.
  Let me tell the Members why I support this bill. We need our troops 
under U.S. command. Let me give a classic example. In Somalia, the 
administration changed the mission from humanitarian to going after 
General Aideed. The administration then reduced the amount of forces, 
making us vulnerable, and at the request of armor from our own military 
commanders, the administration denied that request. It took 7 hours to 
get to our Rangers in Mogadishu. We lost 18 Rangers under U.N. control. 
They had tanks and armor available to get in to those troops. We had a 
person die because they bled to death, because we could not get to 
them.
  All we are asking for is that our troops are guided and administered 
and operationally controlled by U.S. commanders and that they have the 
power to request assets at the same time.
  Another case, in Bosnia. Remember when this country bombed Bosnia-
Herzegovina? Not even the President of the United States or the Vice 
President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense of the 
United States knew that U.S. troops were committed to war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, because the United Nations, under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 
ordered it. We are saying we want our troops to fall under U.S. 
control. We think that is very, very important, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson].
  (Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time 
to me.
  Mr. Chairman, what we have here is an unfortunate debate at a time 
when it is important to send a signal that the country is united behind 
the President, our Commander in Chief. At this very moment, we have 
dealt with military action against Iraq for purposes that are 
bipartisan in support, for international reasons. Yet, once again, if 
this bill passes, and I can hear a train moving, the message is going 
to be the United States again is going it alone, snubbing their nose at 
the United Nations. Right now with our allies we have had difficulty 
getting them to back some of our actions in Iraq. So we are sending an 
unfortunate message at a very unfortunate time.
  Be that as it may. What I think is clear in this debate is this: No. 
1, the reason we are having this debate is, I think appropriate, the 
fact that we have to be very careful when we have limited, temporary 
operational control of foreign commanders. This has been critically 
important to our constituents. They worry about this. But what we are 
doing in this bill, the requirement for Presidential certification 
before putting U.S. forces under U.N. operation and control, is 
unacceptable. It is also unconstitutional.
  Why do we want to tie the hands of the President of the United 
States? The President is the Commander in Chief. He has to have the 
discretion to place U.S. military units under limited temporary U.N. 
operational control if that is the most effective way to ensure our 
security interests.
  What this bill does, it infringes on the exclusive constitutional 
prerogatives of the President as Commander in Chief to determine 
command and control assignments. The discretion to place U.S. military 
units under limited operational control of foreign commanders has been 
part of our Nation's security policy since its founding. The reality is 
it has worked well, because our military leaders know it is important 
to not place any of our troops in any danger and they know the 
sensitivity to this issue of the American people. So why do we not let 
our military, our Commander in Chief, make these choices, instead of 
coming in here, passing a bill that basically says, United Nations, you 
cannot do anything. We are going to be the world's policeman. That is 
the message we are sending.
  Under longstanding U.S. policy, and here it is, I am going to read it 
because it is critically important, this is the Clinton administration 
policy on reforming multilateral peace operations, May of 1994:

       ``The President retains and will never relinquish command 
     authority over U.S. forces. On a case-by-case basis, the 
     President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces

[[Page H10059]]

     under the operational control of a competent U.N. commander 
     for specific operations authorized by the Security Council. 
     The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will 
     be that the United States will agree to have a U.N. commander 
     exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces.

  Mr. Chairman, we do not need this bill. This is not the right time to 
do it also, at a time when our country is undertaking military action. 
Let us support the Commander in Chief. Let us not make this bill a big 
issue.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the following information 
regarding U.N. command and control:

                   United Nations Command and Control

       The President retains and will never relinquish command 
     authority over U.S. forces. On a case by case basis, the 
     President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under 
     the operational control of a competent UN commander for 
     specific operations authorized by the Security Council. The 
     greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be 
     that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise 
     overall operational control over U.S. forces.
       The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming 
     Multilateral Peace Operations--May 1994
       Serious threats to the security of the U.S. still exist in 
     the post-Cold War era. When our interests dictate, the U.S. 
     must be willing and able to fight and win wars, unilaterally 
     when necessary. Circumstances will arise, however, when 
     multilateral action best serves U.S. interests in preserving 
     or restoring peace. The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman; 
     and properly constituted, UN peace operations can be an 
     important instrument for collective action.
       Since our nation's founding, the discretion to place US 
     military units under limited, temporary operational control 
     of foreign commanders has been part of our nation's security 
     structure. From the siege at Yorktown during the 
     Revolutionary War to battles in Europe and the Pacific during 
     WWII to Operation Desert Storm, U.S. forces have an occasion 
     been under the tactical control of foreign commanders.
       The requirement in H.R. 3308 for a Presidential 
     certification before putting U.S. forces under UN operation 
     control is unacceptable. As the Commander-in-Chief, the 
     President must have the discretion to make the decision to 
     place U.S. military units under limited, temporary UN 
     operational control if that is the most effective way to 
     ensure US security interests. This bill infringes on the 
     exclusive constitutional prerogative of the President as 
     Commander-in-Chief to determine command and control 
     arrangements.
       The President retains and will never relinquish command 
     authority over U.S. forces, even when they are temporarily 
     under the operational control of competent UN command. Our 
     uniformed military leadership agrees that this restriction is 
     an unnecessary step which would damage US flexibility in 
     protecting U.S. interests.


                  Q AND A ON U.N. COMMAND AND CONTROL

       Background: H.R. 3308 would restrict the ability of the 
     President to assign forces to mission he deems are in the 
     national interest by putting restrictions on participation in 
     UN operations. Specifically, the proposed legislation would 
     require the President to present a series of certifications 
     that are unreasonable and probably unconstitutional.
       Q: Do you support HR 3308 on UN Command and Control?
       A: First let me make one thing very clear: the chain of 
     command in the US military is and always will be inviolate. 
     It runs from the President through the respective service 
     chains of command to every soldier, sailor and airman in the 
     military. That command relationship is never broken.
       Having said that, United States military history is replete 
     with examples of the US military serving under foreign 
     command: from the revolutionary war, through both World Wars 
     and in the Gulf War.
       As Commander in Chief, I also need the flexibility, when it 
     serves our national interest--and when conditions warrant, to 
     reserve the option to allow US units to serve in allied 
     coalitions, under foreign operational control.
       I agree with the implied message of the bill that the 
     assignment of our military personnel in these types missions 
     must be very carefully considered--and I can assure you that 
     with the best advise of my military advisors--that I do that 
     in every case.
       HR 3308 unduly restricts the flexibility of the Commander 
     in Chief through a series of certifications and other 
     restrictions, and I would veto it if it were to reach my desk 
     in its current form.


             command and control of u.s. forces (h.r. 3308)

       Background: H.R. 3308, presently in the HCONS Committee, 
     limits the placement of U.S. forces under UN operational or 
     tactical control by denying funding for U.S. forces placed 
     under UN control. The exception is if you certify that it is 
     in the national security interests of the United States to do 
     so.
       Points:
       The requirement in H.R. 3308 for a Presidential 
     certification before putting U.S. forces under UN operation 
     control is unacceptable. Since our nation's founding, the 
     discretion to place US military units under temporary 
     operational control of foreign commanders has been part of 
     our nation's security structure. From the siege at Yorktown 
     during the Revolutionary War to Operation Desert Storm, U.S. 
     forces have on occasion been under the operational control of 
     foreign commanders.
       As the Commander-in-Chief, I must continue to have the 
     discretion to make the decision to place U.S. military units 
     under temporary UN operational control if that is the most 
     effective way to ensure US security interests. This bill 
     infringes on my constitutional prerogative as Commander-in-
     Chief to determine what the correct command and control 
     arrangements are to achieve U.S. interests.
       Even when circumstances dictate that it is best to act 
     multilaterally to serve U.S. interests, I will never 
     relinquish command authority over U.S. forces, even when they 
     are temporarily under the operational control of competent UN 
     command.

  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. McKeon].
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 3308, the Armed Forces 
Protection Act.
  The need for this legislation is apparent. From 1948 to 1982, there 
were eight instances where the United States participated in a mission 
where members of our military were placed under a foreign commander. In 
the 5 years since Desert Storm, however, there have been three 
instances: The 1992 U.N. Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia, the 
1993 U.N. Humanitarian Force in Somalia, and the NATO Implementation 
Force in Bosnia. Because of the increasing number of these missions, 
this issue needs to be addressed.
  We have had many debates in this Chamber about the unfocused nature 
of these recent missions. H.R. 3308 clarifies the use of our own forces 
in these situations and seeks to avoid the intervention of our troops 
in areas where we do not have a clear national security interest.
  The President still maintains ample latitude in overseeing the 
deployment of U.S. troops under H.R. 3308. Finally, the Congressional 
Research Service has analyzed H.R. 3308 and determined that it is 
consistent with the powers of Congress in sections eight and nine under 
article one of the Constitution.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on the bill.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dornan].
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I am not going to bring the A frame. Before I run out 
of time, what is wrong with the U.N.'s command, it brought about the 
death of 19 Americans. Two of them got the Medal of Honor for begging 
three times to go down and save the lives of Ward Officer Michael 
Durant's crew. They ended up saving Durant. The other three crew 
members and those two men, their bodies were so abused that it cannot 
be discussed in public out of sensitivity for the families. The word 
beheading comes to mind.
  Here is General Hoar, Central Command, goes right down to the Army 
Rangers with General Harrison in between. When they got pinned down and 
were trapped all night long with four of the young Rangers bleeding to 
death, five of our Delta Force men murdered and five of the helicopter 
crews and two Tenth Mountain divisions.
  Over here is the Turkish commander. I had lunch with him over there a 
week after this tragedy, a fortnight after, Lieutenant General Bier, 
nice man. He told me he wanted more control. I did not say anything to 
ruin his lunch. Now you come down to Montgomery; great guy, takes me up 
on a Blackhawk over the battlefield. When I asked about the Rangers, he 
said, they are not under my command.
  General Montgomery says, they are not under my command. They are 
under General Harrison's command. I said, who is General Harrison? He 
is the commander of Operation Ranger, another two-star. He had a mortar 
land at his feet. It was a dud. We would have lost a two-star General 
in Clinton's first adventure out into the rough world, putting our 
troops under foreign command.
  Then we come down to this mixed-up command down here, and the end 
result was what I rushed my words saying at the end of my first 
remarks: 14 T-72 India tanks, and when I had said to Generals 
Montgomery and Harrison, why did you not use one of those tanks to run 
through these hastily made

[[Page H10060]]

roadblocks instead of getting the United Arab Emirates and the Mountain 
Division guys killed, they said, we did; and they called Delhi and it 
was a Sunday. How about the Italians? They call Rome. Sorry, it is a 
Sunday, we cannot do this.
  This is unbelievable, this compulsion under Halperin, before he left 
in a huff after getting those men killed and seeing our friend, Les 
Aspin, go down in flames. This bill is an absolute necessity. We should 
have a unanimous vote in favor of it.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my colleague, the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] is recognized 
for 2 minutes.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. No. 1, Mr. Chairman, I do not oppose what the 
President has done in Iraq. I support his actions.
  No. 2, I think there is a very good shot of the Democrats reclaiming 
the House, and my chairman for the Committee on Armed Services will be 
the gentleman from California, Ron Dellums. I think he has done a great 
job.
  I want to talk a little bit about a big sinkhole for American 
dollars, talking about another issue. We are talking about military and 
humanitarian aid here. Look, we send soldiers with guns, we do not send 
a welcome wagon. We do not send the United Way here.
  Second of all, I want to talk about policy. I think we have gone too 
far. We have given the Presidents so much latitude they now deploy 
troops and engage in activities, and then, under the War Powers Act, 
they come back to us and give us the courtesy of a conference. Beam me 
up, here.
  I think it is time to get back to the Constitution. There is nothing 
wrong with Congress setting the parameters under which we engage. The 
Commander in Chief keeps our troops ready, but when the people tell the 
Commander in Chief when those troops should be deployed, then that 
Commander in Chief takes over, not until then, Mr. Chairman.
  No one person in America can set America into war. I think it is that 
policy. I am hoping, I am hoping leaders like the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] will get us back to that. I think the most 
important thing the Founders talked about and the biggest debate was 
the declaration of war powers; that in England that royalty could just 
go ahead and set the troops, but in America, no one person can. I think 
this is heart and soul. I think it goes back to the Constitution. Let 
us set the parameters.
  By God, let us give the President authority to do it once we say it 
shall be done, because in America, no one person can unilaterally take 
those actions. That is why I support this bill. I support my amendment 
that our troops are not under any foreign command, but more 
importantly, our amendment that they are not wearing any other patches 
from anywhere else. They could be there, but by God, they wear an 
American and United States uniform. Our troops do not pledge allegiance 
to the United Nations, they pledge allegiance to the United States of 
America.
  I think the bill, although it has some concerns, can be worked out. I 
support it.


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will advise our guests in the gallery that 
manifestations of approval or disapproval are not permitted.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
distinguished gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] is recognized 
for 2 minutes.

                              {time}  1200

  Mr. SKAGGS. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, it is sad that an issue of this importance and 
significance, both constitutionally and for national security policy, 
should be manipulated, really for election year purposes, here in the 
closing weeks of this session of Congress. This bill is ill advised for 
both constitutional law and practical reasons, and even more 
fundamentally, for constitutional policy and reciprocity reasons.
  The first point: It undermines absolutely essential responsibilities 
and authorities that have to be retained in the person of the Commander 
in Chief, the President of the United States. The impracticality of 
trying to comply with the waiver provision, which I am sure is held up 
as some saving aspect of this, but is really a sham, is astounding. It 
requires a President to predict the unpredictable, to foresee the 
unforeseeable, to promise the unprom-isable. It does not work.
  Second, constitutional policy: I agree with my colleague from Ohio, 
Mr. Traficant, this body ought to be standing up for its 
responsibilities under the war powers clause. But if we want future 
Presidents to respect our prerogatives and our power and our 
responsibilities, we need to respect the constitutional prerogatives 
and authorities and powers granted to the President in the 
Constitution.
  To the extent that this bill basically gives the back of our hand, 
for the convenience of a nice political slogan, here a couple of months 
before the election, gives the back of our hand to the important 
constitutional prerogatives of the President of the United States, we 
are in no place down the road a year or two or five from now to stand 
up for the institutional responsibilities of the Congress under the war 
powers clause. We will be in a poorer position then to argue as we 
should and as we ought to have the courage to argue: Mr. President, 
that is our call whether we go to war, not yours.
  But if we are arguing that it is our call, how he arranges the 
command structure of the Armed Forces, how in the world are we credible 
on that much more profound issue in the future?
  Mr. Chairman, this bill's defects are so severe that it deserves to 
be defeated. These defects are ones not only of constitutional law, but 
also of constitutional policy.
  The bill is unconstitutional in its attempt to place limits on the 
President's role as Commander in Chief. I also think that it should be 
rejected as a matter of policy. This attempted interference with the 
President's authority under the Commander in Chief clause will invite 
further Presidential disrespect for Congress' prerogatives under the 
war powers clause, and so will undermine an essential area of comity 
between the executive and legislative branches. If we want the 
President to respect Congress' constitutional prerogatives, we must 
respect his.
  Some may say that the waiver provisions protect the President's 
proper authority. But the fact is that even if including workable 
waiver provisions could save the bill from constitutional attack, the 
waiver and certification requirements in this bill are not workable. As 
drawn, they would require the President to see the unforeseeable, or to 
be forced to choose between a dissembling assertion of knowing what 
cannot be known and an improper abdication of constitutional authority.
  Mr. Chairman, time and again, this Congress has treated the 
Constitution with minimal regard. This reckless measure continues that 
unfortunate pattern. I bringing it to the House floor today, too many 
on the other side of the aisle clearly put a higher priority on bumper-
sticker politics than on proper respect for the historic and 
constitutionally guaranteed authority of the President to command the 
Nation's Armed Forces.
  Article II, section 2 of the Constitution, states that the 
``President shall be Commander in Chief'' of the U.S. Armed Forces. 
This bill seeks to circumvent that part of the Constitution by placing 
severe limits on the President's ability to carry out his central 
national security duties. In my opinion, it should be defeated for this 
reason, if for no other.
  The Department of Justice agrees. In a legal opinion, the Assistant 
Attorney General has recommended that the President veto the bill 
because it ``unconstitutionally constrains the President's exercise of 
his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.'' I'm including 
this Justice Department opinion at the end of this statement. This 
opinion cites clear and longstanding legal authority to support a 
fundamental proposition: ``There can be no room to doubt that the 
Commander in Chief Clause commits to the President alone the power to 
select the particular personnel who are to exercise tactical and 
operational control over U.S. forces,'' The opinion explains further:

       In the present context, the President may determine that 
     the purposes of a particular U.N. operation in which U.S. 
     Armed Forces participate would be best served if those forces 
     were placed under the operational or tactical control of an 
     agent of the U.N., as well as under a U.N. senior military 
     commander who was a foreign national . . . Congress may not 
     prevent the President from acting on such a military judgment 
     concerning the choice of the commanders under whom the U.S. 
     forces engaged in the mission are to serve.


[[Page H10061]]


  Even if the bill were free of serious constitutional flaws, it would 
not be in our real national interest. Starting with the War of 
Independence, the United States has conducted joint military operation 
with allies. In the real world, such arrangements will be possible only 
with allies on a basis of reciprocity--that is, we must occasionally be 
willing to have our forces under the command of others if we expect 
allied forces to be placed under the operational control of Americans. 
We simply can't expect to work effectively with our allies unless we 
are prepared to share operational control in appropriate cases.

  If we refuse to ever do this, ever to share command, in future crises 
we may be forced to go it alone or to do nothing. This may serve the 
political posturing of isolationists in Congress and elsewhere, but it 
will not serve American interests.
  Many of the most significant military triumphs in our history were 
coalition efforts that included military command shared with our 
allies. In 1918, during World War I, some 2 million Americans served 
alongside French and British armies under the overall coordination of a 
French general. During World War II, United States and United Kingdom 
commands and staffs worked as a team to carry out combined Allied 
operations against the Axis powers. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization [NATO], created in 1951, has always used an integrated 
command structure. And in 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, General 
Swartzkopf placed a United States brigade under the operational control 
of the French, just as other allied forces were under the operational 
control of United States forces.
  In fact, as Members should be aware, right now a U.S. Army division 
serves under the U.N. flag in Korea, under operational control of a 
South Korean general. This bill directly threatens the continuation of 
this arrangement and the essential international cooperation on 
security matters it represents.
  This history demonstrates how from time to time our ability to place 
our forces under an ally's operational control--or to take such control 
of an ally's forces--has enhanced our ability to establish and maintain 
alliances and to fashion international coalition efforts when 
circumstances make that the best way for us to pursue U.S. national 
interests.
  This bill politicizes national security and threatens to impair the 
Presidency's ability to make effective foreign policy and national 
security decisions. It should not have been brought to the floor, and 
it should not pass. If the United States is to remain a leader on the 
world stage, Congress must continue to recognize and respect that the 
President--every President--has the constitutionally prescribed 
authority as Commander in Chief to decide how to deploy American 
forces.
  Mr. Chairman, we all know what's going on here. The bill's 
prohibition on U.S. troops under U.N. operational or tactical control 
plays to the frustration many citizens feel about U.S. participation in 
the peacekeeping and peacemaking and humanitarian relief actions of the 
U.N. But the bill ignores the real world requirements of dealing with 
threats to international security. It should not pass.
                                       U.S. Department of Justice,


                                      Office of Legal Counsel,

                                      Washington, DC, May 8, 1996.

Memorandum for Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and 
             Legal Adviser to the National Security Council

     From Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General.

     Re H.R. 3308.

       This memorandum responds to your request for our views as 
     to the constitutionality of H.R. 3308, a bill that would 
     limit the President's ability to place United States armed 
     forces under the United Nations' (``U.N.'') operational or 
     tactical control. We believe that the bill is 
     unconstitutional, and strongly recommend that the President 
     veto it.
       Section 3 of H.R. 3308 would add a new section 405 to 
     chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, to read as 
     follows: ``Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c), 
     funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the 
     Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended for 
     activities of any element of the armed forces that after the 
     date of the enactment of this section is placed under United 
     Nations operational or tactical control, as defined in 
     subsection (f).''
       Proposed subsection 405(f) provides that elements of the 
     armed forces shall be considered to be placed under U.N. 
     operational or tactical control if they are under the 
     operational or tactical control of an individual who is 
     acting on behalf of the U.N. in a peacekeeping, peacemaking 
     or similar activity, and if the senior military commander of 
     the U.N. force or operation is either a foreign national or a 
     U.S. citizen other than an active duty U.S. military officer.
       Proposed section 405 thus bars the President from placing 
     U.S. armed forces participating in U.N. peacekeeping 
     operations under the U.N. operational or tactical control, as 
     so defined.
       Two subsections set out exceptions to the prohibition.\1\ 
     Subsection 405(c) provides that the limitation does not apply 
     if Congress specifically authorizes a particular placement of 
     U.S. forces under U.N. operational or tactical control, or if 
     the U.S. forces involved in a placement are participating in 
     operations conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Footnotes are at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Subsections 405(b) and (d) together provide that the 
     President may waive the limitation if he certifies to 
     Congress 15 days in advance of the placement that it is ``in 
     the national security interests of the United States to place 
     any element of the armed forces under United Nations 
     operational of tactical control,'' and provides a detailed 
     report setting forth specific items of information within 
     eleven district categories.\2\ If the President certifies 
     that an ``emergency'' precluded compliance with the 15 day 
     limitation, he must make the required certification and 
     report in a timely manner, but no later than 48 hours after a 
     covered operational or tactical control is initiated.
       The proposed amendment unconstitutionally constrains the 
     President's exercise of his constitutional authority as 
     Commander-in-Chief. Further, it undermines his constitutional 
     role as the United States' representative in foreign 
     relations. While ``[t]he constitutional power of Congress to 
     raise and support armies and to make all laws necessary and 
     proper to that end is broad and sweeping,'' United States v. 
     O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), Congress may not deploy 
     that power so as to exercise functions constitutionally 
     committed to the Executive alone for that would ``pose a 
     `danger of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch 
     functions.' '' Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) 
     (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)). Nor may 
     Congress legislate in a manner that `` `impermissibly 
     undermine[s]' the powers of the Executive Branch, Commodity 
     Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, [478 U.S. 833 (1986)] at 
     856, or `disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate 
     branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from 
     accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions, 
     `Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, [433 U.S. 425 
     (1977)] AT 433.'' Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695. Even though 
     there are areas in which both Congress and the President 
     have a constitutional voice, and in which Congress, 
     therefore, may rely on its own constitutional authority to 
     seek to guide and constrain presidential choices, it may 
     not impose constraints in the areas that the Constitution 
     commits exclusively to the President, See, e.g., Letter 
     for Richard Darman, Director, Office of Management and 
     Budget, from Bruce Navarro, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
     General, Office of Legislative Affairs (Feb. 2, 1990) 
     (finding provision of Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
     Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, limiting President's ability 
     to receive spies as ambassadors unconstitutional even 
     though President could waive limitation if it was in the 
     national security interests of the United States to do 
     so).
       Article II, Sec. 2, of the Constitution declares that the 
     President ``shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
     of the United States.'' Whatever the scope of this authority 
     in other contexts, there can be no room to doubt that the 
     Commander-in-Chief Clause commits to the President alone the 
     power to select the particular personnel who are to exercise 
     tactical and operational control over U.S. forces. See 
     Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850) (``As 
     commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct 
     the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law 
     at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem 
     most effectual. . . .). Indeed, the major object of the 
     Clause is to ``vest in the President the supreme command over 
     all the military forces,--such supreme and undivided command 
     as would be necessary to the prosecution of a successful 
     war.'' United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281, 284, 284, 
     (1895). See also Nordmann v. Woodring, 28 F. Supp. 573, 578 
     (W.D. Okla, 1939) (``as Commander in Chief, the President has 
     the power to employ the Army and the Navy in a manner which 
     he may deem most effectual''); ``The Federalist'' No. 69, at 
     465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (``[The 
     Commander in Chief power] would amount to nothing more than 
     the supreme command and direction of the military and naval 
     forces, as first General and Admiral of the confederacy. . . 
     .''). William Howard Taft, ``The Boundaries Between the 
     Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches of the 
     Government,'' 25 Yale L. J. 599 610 (1916) (the Commander-in-
     Chief Clause precludes Congress from ``order[ing] battles to 
     be fought on a certain plan'' or ``direct[ing] parts of the 
     army to be moved from one part of the country to another.''); 
     George Sutherland, ``Constitutinal Power and World Affairs'' 
     76-77 (1919) (``in the actual conduct of military operations, 
     in the field where the battles are being fought, in the 
     movement, disposition and discipline of the land and naval 
     forces, the Commander-in-Chief is supreme,''). As Attorney 
     General (later Justice) Robert Jackson explained, ``the 
     President's responsibility as Commander in Chief embraces the 
     authority to command and direct the armed forces in their 
     immediate movements and operations designed to protect the 
     security and effectuate the defense of the United

[[Page H10062]]

     States, . . . [T]his authority undoubtedly includes the power 
     to dispose of troops and equipment in such manner and on such 
     duties as best to promote the safety of the country. 
     ``Training of British Flying Students in the United States,'' 
     40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 61-62 (1941).
       It is for the President alone, as Commander-in-Chief, to 
     make the choice of the particular personnel who are to 
     exercise operational and tactical command functions over the 
     U.S. Armed Forces. True, Congress has the power to lay down 
     general rules creating and regulating ``the framework of the 
     Military Establishment,'' Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 
     301 (1983); but such framework rules may not unduly constrain 
     or inhibit the President's authority to make and to implement 
     the decisions that he deems necessary or advisable for the 
     successful conduct of military missions in the field, 
     including the choice of particular persons to perform 
     specific command functions in those missions. Thus, for 
     example, the President's constitutional power to appoint a 
     particular officer to the temporary grade of Marine Corps 
     brigadier general could not be undercut by the failure of a 
     selection board, operating under a general statute 
     prescribing procedures for promotion in the armed services, 
     to recommend the officer for that promotion. ``Promotion of 
     Marine Officer,'' 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 291 (1956). As Attorney 
     General Rankin advised President Eisenhower on that occasion, 
     ``[w]hile Congress may point out the general class of 
     individuals from which an appointment may be made . . . and 
     may impose other reasonable restrictions . . . it is my 
     opinion that the instant statute goes beyond the type of 
     restriction which may validly be imposed. . . . It is 
     recognized that exceptional cases may arise in which it is 
     essential to depart from the statutory procedures and to rely 
     on constitutional authority to appoint key military personnel 
     to positions of high responsibility.'' Id. at 293, 294 
     (citations omitted).\3\ In the present context, the President 
     may determine that the purposes of a particular U.N. 
     operation in which U.S. Armed Forces participate would be 
     best served if those forces were placed under the operational 
     or tactical control of an agent of the U.N., as well as under 
     a U.N. senior military commander who was a foreign national 
     (or a U.S. national who is not an active duty military 
     officer). Congress may not prevent the President from acting 
     on such a military judgment concerning the choice of the 
     commanders under whom the U.S. forces engaged in the mission 
     are to serve.
       Moreover, in seeking to impair the President's ability to 
     deploy U.S. Armed Forces under U.N. operational and tactical 
     command in U.N. operations in which the United States may 
     otherwise lawfully participate. Congress is impermissibly 
     undermining the President's constitutional authority with 
     respect to the conduct of diplomacy. See, e.g., Department of 
     Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (the Supreme Court has 
     ``recognized `the generally accepted view that foreign policy 
     was the province and responsibility of the Executive' '') 
     (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)); Alfred 
     Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 
     705-06 n. 18 (1976) (``[T]he conduct of [foreign policy] 
     is committed primarily to the Executive Branch.''); United 
     States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960) (the President 
     is ``the constitutional representative of the United 
     States in its dealings with foreign nations''); 
     ``Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-
     Age Destroyers,'' 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484, 486 (1940) 
     (Jackson, Att'y Gen.) (the Constitution ``vests in the 
     President as a part of the Executive function'' ``control 
     of foreign relations''). U.N. peacekeeping missions 
     involve multilateral arrangements that require delicate 
     and complex accommodation of a variety of interests and 
     concerns, including those of the nations that provide 
     troops or resources, and those of the nation or nations in 
     which the operation takes place. The success of the 
     mission may depend, to a considerable extent, on the 
     nationality of the commanding officer, or on the degree to 
     which the operation is perceived as a U.N. activity 
     (rather than that of a single nation or bloc of nations). 
     Given that the United States may lawfully participate in 
     such U.N. operations, we believe that Congress would be 
     acting unconstitutionally if it were to tie the 
     President's hands in negotiating agreements with respect 
     to command structures for those operations.\4\
       It might be argued that section 405 does not impose a 
     significant constraint on the President's constitutional 
     authority because it grants the President the authority to 
     waive the prohibition whenever he deems it in the ``national 
     security interest'' of the United States to do so, provided 
     he reports his decision to execute a waiver to Congress 15 
     days in advance. If he certifies that an emergency is 
     present, he may avoid the 15 day limitation and make a report 
     in a timely manner, but no later than 48 hours after troops 
     are placed under U.N. command. Thus, functionally, section 
     405 effects only a conditional ban on the President's 
     constitutional authority to control the tactical and 
     operational deployment of U.S. forces.\5\ Congress cannot, 
     however, burden or infringe the President's exercise of a 
     core constitutional power by attaching conditions precedent 
     to the exercise of that power. Attorney General Brownell put 
     the matter well:
       ``It is recognized that the Congress may grant or withhold 
     appropriations as it chooses, and when making an 
     appropriation may direct the purposes to which the 
     appropriation shall be devoted. It may also impose 
     conditions with respect to the use of the appropriation, 
     provided always that the conditions do not require 
     operation of the Government in a way forbidden by the 
     Constitution. If the practice of attaching invalid 
     conditions to legislative enactments were permissible, it 
     is evident that the constitutional system of the 
     separability of the branches of Government would be placed 
     in the gravest jeopardy.'' ``Authority of Congressional 
     Committees to Disapprove Action of Executive Branch,'' 41 
     Op. Att'y Gen. 230, 233 (1955).
       Similarly, then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist 
     opined: ``Even in the area of domestic affairs, where the 
     relationship between Congress and the President is balanced 
     differently than it is in the field of external affairs, 
     virtually every President since Woodrow Wilson had had 
     occasion to object to certain conditions in authorization 
     legislation as being violative of the separation of powers 
     between the Executive and the legislative branch. The problem 
     would be met in exacerbated form should Congress attempt by 
     detailed instructions as to the use of American forces 
     already in the field to supersede the President as Commander-
     in-Chief of the armed forces.'' William H. Rehnquist, 
     Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, ``The 
     President and the War Power: South Vietnam and the Cambodian 
     Sanctuaries,'' 21 (May 22, 1970).\6\
       We are mindful that Congress has framed its restriction on 
     placing troops under U.N. control as a prohibition on the 
     obligation or expenditure of appropriated funds. That 
     Congress has chosen to invade the President's authority 
     indirectly, through a condition on an appropriation, rather 
     than through a direct mandate, is immaterial. Broad as 
     Congress' spending power undoubtedly is, it is clear that 
     Congress may not deploy it to accomplish unconstitutional 
     ends.\7\ In particular, as our Office has insisted over the 
     course of several Administrations, ``Congress may not use its 
     power over appropriation of public funds `to attach 
     conditions to Executive Branch appropriations requiring the 
     President to relinquish his constitutional discretion in 
     foreign affairs,' '' 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 30 (1992) (preliminary 
     print) (quoting 14 Op. O.L.C. 38, 42 n.3 (1990) (preliminary 
     print) (quoting 13 Op. O.L.C. 311, 315 (1989) (preliminary 
     print)).\8\
       Accordingly, we believe that H.R., 3308 is 
     unconstitutional, and strongly recommend that the President 
     veto it.


                               Footnotes

     \1\ There is also an exception made for ongoing operations in 
     Macedonia and Croatia.
     \2\ As detailed in subsection 405(d), the report must include 
     eleven distinct elements. It must set forth (1) a description 
     of the national security interests that would be served by 
     the troop placement; (2) the mission of the U.S. forces 
     involved; (3) the expected size and composition of the U.S. 
     forces involved; (4) the precise command and control 
     relationship between the U.S. forces involved and the U.N. 
     command structure; (5) the precise command and control 
     relationship between the U.S. forces involved and the 
     commander of the U.S. unified command for the region in which 
     those U.S. forces are to operate; (6) the extent to which the 
     U.S. forces involved will rely on other nations' forces for 
     security and defense and an assessment of the capability of 
     those foreign forces to provide adequate security to the U.S. 
     forces involved; (7) the exit strategy for complete 
     withdrawal of the U.S. forces involved; (8) the extent to 
     which the commander of any unit proposed for the placement 
     would at all times retain the rights to report independently 
     to superior U.S. military authorities and to decline to 
     comply with orders judged by that commander to be illegal or 
     beyond the mission's mandate until such time as that 
     commander has received direction from superior U.S. military 
     authorities; (9) the extent to which the U.S. retains the 
     authority to withdraw any element of the armed forces from 
     the proposed operation at any time and to take any action it 
     considers necessary to protect those forces if they are 
     engaged; (10) the extent to which the U.S. forces involved 
     will be required to wear as part of their uniform a device 
     indicating U.N. affiliation; and (11) the anticipated monthly 
     incremental cost to the U.S. of participation in the U.N. 
     operation by U.S. forces proposed to be placed under U.N. 
     operational or tactical control.
     \3\ The Acting Attorney General's opinion relied chiefly on 
     Congress' inability to undermine the President's authority 
     under the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, #2, 
     rather than on the promotion procedure's effect on the 
     Commander-in-Chief power. The President's appointment power 
     is not at issue here, because the foreign or other nationals 
     performing command functions at the President's request would 
     be discharging specific military functions, but would not be 
     serving in federal offices. See Memorandum to Andrew Fois, 
     Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, 
     from Richard L. Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
     Office of Legal Counsel. Re: Defense Authorization Act at 
     2n.1 (Sept. 15, 1995), Nonetheless, we believe that the 
     reasoning under the Commander-in-Chief Clause closely 
     parallels that under the Appointments Clause.
     \4\ Past Presidents have committed U.S. forces to foreign 
     command. For example, at a time of great military and 
     diplomatic exigency during the First World War, President 
     Woodrow Wilson agreed, after discussions with our allies, to 
     place U.S. forces under General Foch, as French commander. 
     General Pershing called on General Foch at his headquarters 
     to say, ``[i]nfantry, artillery, aviation, all that we have 
     are yours; use them as you wish,'' 8 Ray Stannard Baker, 
     ``Woodrow Wilson; Life and Letters'' 60 (1939). See also id, 
     at 62 (President Wilson's telegram to General Foch, stating 
     that ``[s]uch unity of command is a most hopeful augury of 
     ultimate success''); id, at 69-70 (resolution of Supreme War 
     Council, stating that General Foch ``is charged by the 
     British, French and American Governments with the 
     coordination of the action of the Allied Armies on the 
     Western Front; to this end there is conferred on him all the 
     power necessary for its effective realization'').
     \5\ Arguably, section 405 effects a complete ban on the use 
     of appropriated funds to support troops under U.N. control in 
     circumstances when the President would find such a deployment 
     advisable but not strictly in the national security interest 
     of the United States. We doubt, however, that such a 
     circumstance is more than hypothetically possible. If

[[Page H10063]]

     the President found it advisable to place U.S. forces under 
     U.N. control, then, ipso facto, it would be in the national 
     security interest to place those troops under U.N. control. 
     To the extent that a contrary circumstance could truly arise, 
     then section 405 is unconstitutional.
     \6\ In a footnote to the text quoted above, Mr. Rehnquist 
     added: ``All of these Presidents have stated in one way or 
     another that just because Congress concededly may refrain 
     from appropriating money at all, it does not necessarily 
     follow that it may attach whatever condition it desires to an 
     appropriation which it does make.''
     \7\ See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872) 
     (appropriations act unconstitutionally intruded on 
     President's pardon power); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 
     303, 316 (1946) (appropriations power misused to impose bill 
     of attainder); cf. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. 
     Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 301 U.S. 
     252, 271 (1991) (Congress may not use its power over Federal 
     property to achieve ends by indirect means that it is 
     forbidden to achieve directly); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. 
     Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926) (State legislature 
     cannot attach unconstitutional condition to privilege that it 
     may deny), See also ``Mutual Security Program--Cutoff of 
     Funds from Office of Inspector General and Comptroller,'' 41 
     Op. Att'y Gen. 507, 530 (1960) (Att'y Gen. Rogers) (``the 
     Constitution does not permit any indirect encroachment by 
     Congress upon [the] authority of the President through resort 
     to conditions attached to appropriations''); 
     ``Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax 
     Refunds,'' 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 61 (1933) (Att'y Gen. 
     Mitchell) (``This proviso can not be sustained on the theory 
     that it is a proper condition attached to an appropriation. 
     Congress holds the purse strings, and it may grant or 
     withhold appropriations as it chooses, and when making an 
     appropriation may direct the purposes to which the 
     appropriation shall be devoted and impose conditions in 
     respect to its use, provided always that the conditions do 
     not require operation of the Government in a way forbidden by 
     the Constitution.''); ``Memorial of Captain Meigs,'' 9 Op. 
     Att'y Gen. 462, 469-70 (1860) (concluding that appropriations 
     bill that contained condition that money be spent only under 
     supervision of congressionally-designated individual was 
     invalid); William P. Barr, contribution to symposium on ``The 
     Appropriation Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause,'' 68 
     Wash. U.L.Q. 623, 628 (1990) (``Congress cannot use the 
     appropriations power to control a Presidential power that is 
     beyond its direct control''); Harold H. Koh, `Why the 
     President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of 
     the Iran-Contra Affair,'' 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1303 n.218 
     (1988) (citing support for view that Congress acts 
     unconstitutionally if it refuses to appropriate funds for 
     President to carry out his constitutional responsibilities); 
     Kate Stith, ``Congress' Power of the Purse,'' 97 Yale L.J. 
     1343, 1351 (1988); Louis Henkin, ``Foreign Affairs and the 
     Constitution'' 115 (1972) (``Congress cannot impose 
     conditions which invade Presidential prerogatives to which 
     the spending is at most incidental'').
     \8\ See also ``The President's Compliance with the `Timely 
     Notification' Requirement of Section 501(b) of the National 
     Security Act,'' 10 Op. O.L.C. 159, 169-70 (1986) (``[W]hile 
     Congress unquestionably possesses the power to make decisions 
     as to the appropriation of public funds, it may not attach 
     conditions to Executive Branch appropriations that require 
     the President to relinquish any of his constitutional 
     discretion in foreign affairs.'').
     This limitation on legislative power has also been 
     acknowledged by Members of Congress. See Orrin Hatch, 
     contribution to symposium, ``What the Constitution Means by 
     Executive Power,'' 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 197, 200-01 (1988) 
     (`constitutional foreign policy functions may not be 
     eliminated by a congressional refusal to appropriate funds. 
     The Congress may not, for example, deny the President funding 
     to receive ambassadors, negotiate treaties, or deliver 
     foreign policy addresses. . . . Congress oversteps its role 
     when it undertakes to dictate the specific terms of 
     international relations.''); Eli E. Nobleman, ``Financial 
     Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign 
     Relations,'' 289 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 145, 150 
     (1983) (citing remarks of Representative Daniel Webster, 
     objecting on constitutional grounds in 1826 to appropriations 
     rider that purported to attach instructions to United States 
     diplomats).
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Florida [Mrs. Fowler].
  (Mrs. FOWLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 
3308, which would establish important limitations on the President's 
ability to place U.S. troops under United Nations or other foreign 
command. It would clarify that the President must certify that placing 
U.S. troops under foreign control is in the national interest and that 
Congress must have a role in approving such actions.
  Given the recent involvement of U.S. troops in peacekeeping missions 
in Somalia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Haiti--sometimes under the 
operational control of foreign commanders--this measure is most timely.
  The Constitution is itself silent on this matter, and the President 
is using a self-prescribed directive to guide his actions. I believe 
this is too important an issue for such treatment. The Constitution 
expressly gives the Congress the power and responsibility to declare 
war, ``raise and support Armies,'' ``provide and maintain a Navy,'' and 
``make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution'' such powers. The Congress clearly has important 
prerogatives in this regard.
  Mr. Chairman, I congratulate Representative Longley for introducing 
this important measure, and urge its support.
  Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot of discussion about what is in 
this bill and what is not in this bill. I would like to discuss what is 
in the bill and focus on that and conclude the debate on that basis.
  First of all, we are talking about the fact that U.N. operations have 
become of late a much more common phenomenon.
  Second, we have seen in the last several years commitments of United 
States forces to U.N. operational control in places like Haiti, 
Croatia, Macedonia, including over 22,000 American forces now deployed 
in Bosnia. We have seen the recent unfortunate experience of the 
commitment of American forces in a combined United States-U.N. 
operation in Somalia that led to the tragic death of 18 valiant 
Rangers.
  What we are also recognizing in this piece of legislation is that 
despite the many deficiencies that we have seen in the conduct of U.N. 
operations, we recognize that there may be situations where it is in 
the national security interest of the United States to participate in 
them, and we have made appropriate provisions for that.
  I would also point out that I stand here as a Member who has on at 
least 3 occasions broken with his own leadership to oppose his 
leadership's efforts to, in my view, interfere with the authority of 
the President of the United States, including most recently I spoke on 
the resolution that was on the floor that would have in my view 
interfered with the President's ability to successfully conclude the 
Dayton Peace Accords.
  Again, I am proud to do that when I think it is in the best interests 
of this country to do so. Yet, I think it is clear that we need to 
recognize that the United Nations is not a military organization.
  I heard earlier remarks referring to the fact that there are 
sometimes humanitarian missions and sometimes there are war-fighting 
missions. The bottom line, as the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] 
said, is that when you send an American soldier overseas with a rifle, 
by its very nature, it involves the risk of war or war-fighting, and we 
need to operate on that basis.
  We have made provisions for four separate situations wherein the 
President can commit forces if he deems it in the best interests of the 
United States. We have provided a 15-day time line in the event that he 
sees the necessity for a commitment of American forces before he needs 
to file any kind of certification.
  We have provided for an emergency commitment of American forces where 
he has the opportunity to provide justification within 48 hours. We 
have also provided exceptions for, yes, if Congress were to authorize 
that action, or if it is an operation commenced under the NATO forces, 
if our forces were to be committed in fulfillment of our commitment to 
NATO.
  However, I think we also need to spend a minute to talk about what 
are we talking about in terms of certifying. We are talking about that 
we want an outline of what is the national security interest involved, 
what is the mission going to be? What kinds of forces? What are the 
command and control relationships? What are the command and control 
relationships between the American commander and the unified American 
command that is responsible for that region of the world? All entirely 
reasonable and this should be done anyway.
  But what we are doing is saying: Mr. President, provide that to the 
Congress.
  I want to end on a personal note, because when we look at the 
incident in October 1993 of those 18 Rangers that were killed in 
Mogadishu, 2 of them were from my State, M. Sgt. Gary Gordon was 
awarded the Medal of Honor, Sgt. Tommy Fields was killed in action.
  When you look at that operation, you see that they did have armor as 
part of the force. The problem was that the armor was under the command 
of another country, and when the first bullets flew, the tanks and the 
armored personnel carriers abandoned our troops in the field. We need 
to prevent that from happening in the future.
  Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, few institutions have enabled 
the expression of the noblest ideas of humankind as has the United 
Nations. Listen to the words that begin the Charter of the United 
Nations written 50 years at the end of World War II:

       We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save 
     succeeding generations

[[Page H10064]]

     from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
     brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
       to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
     dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
     men and women and of nations large and small, and
       to establish conditions under justice and respect for the 
     obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
     international law can be maintained, and
       to promote social progress and better standards of life in 
     larger freedom, and
       for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in 
     peace with one another as good neighbors. . . .

  Listening to those words and seated at the conference to establish 
the United Nations in San Francisco in April 1945 were Mary McLeod 
Bethune of the National Council of Negro Women, Mordecai W. Johnson of 
Howard University, W.E.B. DuBois and Walter White of the NAACP.
  These are not just words. After speaking with the brave and noble men 
that serve under U.N. command, I can conclude that they are proud to be 
a part of a military that brings together all countries that have 
common interest. A U.N. representative from MINURSO stationed in 
Tundouf said, ``It allows me to make my life count for something and it 
allows me to give back to the ones that are less fortunate than I.'' 
The United Nations is a sum of the whole of all nations.
  The command and control of armed forces of the United Nations are men 
and women that make sure that our enemies are kept at bay, that 
regional security and peace are more than just words, and prevention of 
further aggression by any one state. The War Powers Act is not 
absolute. The United States cannot be the world's policemen. We need 
the United Nations.
  Chapter VII, article 51 of the U.N. Charter states that if an armed 
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, we must take the 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
  This is the wrong time to implement this bill. Iraq has violated 
international law, Security Council Resolution 688. Our vital national 
interests are at stake. Bosnia, Haiti, and other countries that require 
chapter VI type activities are vital to protect the weak from the 
strong.
  This bill is wrong, it ties the President's hands. In peacetime, they 
protect us. I cannot with good conscience support this bill, the United 
States Armed Forces Act. I would like to just conclude that 
multilateralism does matter.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, as a U.S. Army veteran myself, I 
rise in strong support of H.R. 3308, the United States Armed Forces 
Protection Act. This bill takes important steps to ensure the 
protection of our troops overseas. While it may not go as far as some 
of us would like, it makes considerable progress to ensure that we 
protect the interests of those who risk their lives by putting on the 
uniform of the U.S. military.
  We remember what happened earlier in the Clinton administration, in 
Somalia, where our United States troops had to rely on U.N. forces for 
backup. It cost 19 of our men and women in uniform their lives. I will 
not allow their lives to be forgotten. I will continue aggressively to 
ensure that our men and women in uniform do not have to rely on the 
United Nations for backup that may or may not come.
  H.R. 3308 extends proper protection to the men and women of the U.S. 
Armed Forces, who have been sent to serve in U.N. peacekeeping 
operations. In particular, the bill prohibits U.S. service members form 
performing duties under the administrative or tactical control of 
foreign officers, unless the President certifies to the Congress that 
such command relationships serve the national security interest of the 
United States.
  The bill also directs the President to submit to the Congress first, 
the national security interest that will be advanced by their mission; 
second, the size, composition, and involvement of the U.S. forces; 
third, the command and control relationship of involved U.S. forces and 
the U.N. command structure, and fourth the exit strategy for U.S. 
forces. It also requires that members of the armed forces be informed 
of their unit's mission and their chain of command in any operation to 
which their unit has been assigned.
  I also fully support provision which will ensure that our men and 
women in uniform are not required to wear the insignia of the United 
Nations or any other foreign entity. I have cosponsored legislation 
that would protect our men and women from this, and am pleased to 
support it here today.
  Finally, I would add that this is the fourth time this Congress has 
had this issue under consideration. Unfortunately, President Clinton 
has rejected this proposal before. Perhaps he will change his mind on 
it and sign the bill this time.
  Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 3308, 
hopefully the final step in a journey which began long ago by Members 
who doubted the wisdom and constitutionality of placing U.S. troops 
under foreign command.
  We began with a letter to President Clinton in opposition to 
Presidential Review Directive 13, which later became Presidential 
Decision Directive 25. We carried on that fight in committee, arguing 
with the State Department about the tragic deaths of American heroes in 
Somalia, including Randall Shughart from my district.
  We included a prohibition on foreign command deployments in the 
Contract With America and worked to have it included in Defense 
authorization bills, all the while tightening loopholes.
  We thought we were successful in attaching these provisions to last 
year's Defense authorization bill. That bill also included a number of 
provisions that would improve the quality of life for American service 
personnel. Unfortunately, that bill was vetoed by the President.
  We stand here today with a clean bill, dealing solely with the issue 
of foreign command of American troops. In recent years, foreign 
command--and U.N. command in particular--has not served the United 
States well.
  A great amount of confusion surrounded our deployment in Somalia, 
confusion that directly resulted in the deaths of American Rangers. 
Never again do I want to be placed in a position of explaining the 
needless deaths of American servicemen because of ineffective command 
and control arrangements.
  This bill will prevent future Somalias. It states simply that 
Americans will not serve under foreign command, unless the President 
reports it is in our best interest. It allows for our continued 
involvement in NATO, and would not impact existing operations in 
Macedonia and Croatia.
  In short, the bill will restore wisdom and stability to any future 
deployments. I thank Chairman Spence and Chairman Gilman for their 
leadership on this issue, and I urge all Members to offer this bill 
their support.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read for amendment under 
the 5-minute rule.
  The text of H.R. 3308 is as follows:

                               H.R. 3308

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``United States Armed Forces 
     Protection Act of 1996''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds as follows:
       (1) The President has made United Nations peace operations 
     a major component of the foreign and security policies of the 
     United States.
       (2) The President has committed United States military 
     personnel under United Nations operational control to 
     missions in Haiti, Croatia, and Macedonia that could endanger 
     those personnel.
       (3) The President has deployed over 22,000 United States 
     military personnel to the former Yugoslavia as peacekeepers 
     under NATO operational control to implement the Dayton Peace 
     Accord of December 1995.
       (4) Although the President has insisted that he will retain 
     command of United States forces at all times, in the past 
     this has meant administrative control of United States forces 
     only, while operational control has been ceded to United 
     Nations commanders, some of whom were foreign nationals.
       (5) The experience of United States forces participating in 
     combined United States-United Nations operations in Somalia, 
     and in combined United Nations-NATO operations in the former 
     Yugoslavia, demonstrate that prerequisites for effective 
     military operations such as unity of command and clarity of 
     mission have not been met by United Nations command and 
     control arrangements.
       (6) Despite the many deficiencies in the conduct of United 
     Nations peace operations, there may be unique occasions when 
     it is in the national security interests of the United States 
     to participate in such operations.
       (b) Policy.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the President should consult closely with Congress 
     regarding any United Nations peace operation that could 
     involve United States combat forces and that such 
     consultations should continue throughout the duration of such 
     activities;
       (2) the President should consult with Congress before a 
     vote within the United Nations Security Council on any 
     resolution which would authorize, extend, or revise the 
     mandate for any such activity;
       (3) in view of the complexity of United Nations peace 
     operations and the difficulty of achieving unity of command 
     and expeditious decisionmaking, the United States should 
     participate in such operations only when it is clearly in the 
     national security interest to do so;
       (4) United States combat forces should be under the 
     operational control of qualified commanders and should have 
     clear and effective command and control arrangements and 
     rules of engagement (which do not restrict their self-defense 
     in any way) and clear and unambiguous mission statements; and
       (5) none of the Armed Forces of the United States should be 
     under the operational control of foreign nationals in United 
     Nations

[[Page H10065]]

     peace enforcement operations except in the most extraordinary 
     circumstances.
       (c) Definitions.--For purposes of subsections (a) and (b):
       (1) The term ``United Nations peace enforcement 
     operations'' means any international peace enforcement or 
     similar activity that is authorized by the United Nations 
     Security Council under chapter VII of the Charter of the 
     United Nations.
       (2) The term ``United Nations peace operations'' means any 
     international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, 
     or similar activity that is authorized by the United Nations 
     Security Council under chapter VI or VII of the Charter of 
     the United Nations.

     SEC. 3. PLACEMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES UNDER UNITED 
                   NATIONS OPERATIONAL OR TACTICAL CONTROL.

       (a) In General.--(1) Chapter 20 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 404 the following 
     new section:

     ``Sec. 405. Placement of United States forces under United 
       Nations operational or tactical control: limitation

       ``(a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsections (b) 
     and (c), funds appropriated or otherwise made available for 
     the Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended 
     for activities of any element of the armed forces that after 
     the date of the enactment of this section is placed under 
     United Nations operational or tactical control, as defined in 
     subsection (f).
       ``(b) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) 
     Subsection (a) shall not apply in the case of a proposed 
     placement of an element of the armed forces under United 
     Nations operational or tactical control if the President, not 
     less than 15 days before the date on which such United 
     Nations operational or tactical control is to become 
     effective (or as provided in paragraph (2)), meets the 
     requirements of subsection (d).
       ``(2) If the President certifies to Congress that an 
     emergency exists that precludes the President from meeting 
     the requirements of subsection (d) 15 days before placing an 
     element of the armed forces under United Nations operational 
     or tactical control, the President may place such forces 
     under such operational or tactical control and meet the 
     requirements of subsection (d) in a timely manner, but in no 
     event later than 48 hours after such operational or tactical 
     control becomes effective.
       ``(c) Additional Exceptions.--(1) Subsection (a) shall not 
     apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of 
     the armed forces under United Nations operational or tactical 
     control if Congress specifically authorizes by law that 
     particular placement of United States forces under United 
     Nations operational or tactical control.
       ``(2) Subsection (a) shall not apply in the case of a 
     proposed placement of any element of the armed forces in an 
     operation conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization.
       ``(d) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements 
     referred to in subsection (b)(1) are that the President 
     submit to Congress the following:
       ``(1) Certification by the President that it is in the 
     national security interests of the United States to place any 
     element of the armed forces under United Nations operational 
     or tactical control.
       ``(2) A report setting forth the following:
       ``(A) A description of the national security interests that 
     would be advanced by the placement of United States forces 
     under United Nations operation or tactical control.
       ``(B) The mission of the United States forces involved.
       ``(C) The expected size and composition of the United 
     States forces involved.
       ``(D) The precise command and control relationship between 
     the United States forces involved and the United Nations 
     command structure.
       ``(E) The precise command and control relationship between 
     the United States forces involved and the commander of the 
     United States unified command for the region in which those 
     United States forces are to operate.
       ``(F) The extent to which the United States forces involved 
     will rely on forces of other countries for security and 
     defense and an assessment of the capability of those other 
     forces to provide adequate security to the United States 
     forces involved.
       ``(G) The exit strategy for complete withdrawal of the 
     United States forces involved.
       ``(H) The extent to which the commander of any unit of the 
     armed forces proposed for placement under United Nations 
     operational or tactical control will at all times retain the 
     right--
       ``(i) to report independently to superior United States 
     military authorities; and
       ``(ii) to decline to comply with orders judged by the 
     commander to be illegal or beyond the mandate of the mission 
     to which the United States agreed with the United Nations, 
     until such time as that commander receives direction from 
     superior United States military authorities with respect to 
     the orders that the commander has declined to comply with.
       ``(I) The extent to which the United States will retain the 
     authority to withdraw any element of the armed forces from 
     the proposed operation at any time and to take any action it 
     considers necessary to protect those forces if they are 
     engaged.
       ``(J) The extent to which United States forces involved 
     will be required to wear as part of their uniform any badge, 
     symbol, helmet, headgear, or other visible indicia or 
     insignia that indicates affiliation to or with the United 
     Nations.
       ``(K) The anticipated monthly incremental cost to the 
     United States of participation in the United Nations 
     operation by the United States forces which are proposed to 
     be placed under United Nations operational or tactical 
     control.
       ``(e) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection 
     (d) shall be submitted in unclassified form and, if 
     necessary, in classified form.
       ``(f) United Nations Operational or Tactical Control.--For 
     purposes of this section, an element of the Armed Forces 
     shall be considered to be placed under United Nations 
     operational or tactical control if--
       ``(1) that element is under the operational or tactical 
     control of an individual acting on behalf of the United 
     Nations for the purpose of international peacekeeping, 
     peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity that is 
     authorized by the Security Council under chapter VI or VII of 
     the Charter of the United Nations; and
       ``(2) the senior military commander of the United Nations 
     force or operation is a foreign national or is a citizen of 
     the United States who is not a United States military officer 
     serving on active duty.
       ``(g) Interpretation.--Nothing in this section may be 
     construed--
       ``(1) as authority for the President to use any element of 
     the armed forces in any operation; and
       ``(2) as authority for the President to place any element 
     of the armed forces under the command or operational control 
     of a foreign national.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I 
     of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new item:

``405. Placement of United States forces under United Nations 
              operational or tactical control: limitation.''.
       (b) Exception for Ongoing Operations in Macedonia and 
     Croatia.--Section 405 of title 10, United States Code, as 
     added by subsection (a), does not apply in the case of 
     activities of the Armed Forces as part of the United Nations 
     force designated as the United Nations Protection Force 
     (UNPROFOR) that are carried out--
       (1) in Macedonia pursuant to United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 795, adopted December 11, 1992, and 
     subsequent reauthorization Resolutions; or
       (2) in Croatia pursuant to United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 743, adopted February 21, 1992, and subsequent 
     reauthorization Resolutions.

     SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT TO ENSURE THAT ALL MEMBERS KNOW MISSION 
                   AND CHAIN OF COMMAND.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 37 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 656. Members required to be informed of mission and 
       chain of command

       ``The commander of any unit of the armed forces assigned to 
     an operation shall ensure that each member of such unit is 
     fully informed of that unit's mission as part of such 
     operation and of that member's chain of command.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new item:

``656. Members required to be informed of mission and chain of 
              command.''.
  The CHAIRMAN. No amendment shall be in order except those printed in 
House Report 104-774, which may be considered only in the order 
specified, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, 
shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in 
the report, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 
opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject 
to a demand for division of the question.
  The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time 
during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request 
for a recorded vote on an amendment, and reduce to 5 minutes the 
minimum time for electronic voting on any postponed question that 
follows another electronic vote without intervening business, provided 
that the minimum time for electronic voting on the first in any series 
of questions shall be 15 minutes.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House 
Report 104-774.


                    amendment offered by mr. spence

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Spence:
       Page 3, after line 18, insert the following new paragraph 
     (and redesignate the succeeding paragraphs accordingly):
       (1) the President should fully comply with all applicable 
     provisions of law governing

[[Page H10066]]

     the deployment of the Armed Forces of the United States to 
     United Nations peacekeeping operations;
       Page 10, line 19, strike out ``and''.
       Page 10, line 22, strike out the period, close quotation 
     marks, and period at the end and insert in lieu thereof ``; 
     or''.
       Page 10, after line 22, insert the following:
       ``(3) as superseding, negating, or otherwise affecting the 
     requirements of section 6 of the United Nations Participation 
     Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287d).''.
       Page 11, beginning on line 4, strike out ``as part of the 
     United Nations force designated as the United Nations 
     Protection Force (UNPROFOR)''.
       Page 11, line 8, insert after ``Macedonia'' the following: 
     ``as part of the United Nations force designated as the 
     United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)''.
       Page 11, line 10, insert after ``1992,'' the following: 
     ``and Resolution 983, adopted March 31, 1995,''.
       Page 11, line 12, insert after ``Croatia'' the following: 
     ``as part of the United Nations force designated as the 
     United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern 
     Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)''.
       Page 11, beginning on line 13, strike out ``Resolution 743, 
     adopted February 21, 1992,'' and insert in lieu thereof 
     ``Resolution 1037, adopted January 15, 1996,''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 517, the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Spence] and a Member opposed each will be 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a technical and 
clarifying amendment that should be noncontroversial. The amendment 
does three things. First, it adds a new finding stating that the 
President should fully comply with all applicable laws when deploying 
United States forces to participate in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. This is a useful clarification to ensure there is no 
ambiguity on the relationship between this legislation and other 
applicable statutes governing the participation of United States forces 
in United Nations operations.
  The second component of the amendment would specifically clarify that 
this bill in no way supersedes, negates or otherwise affects the United 
Nations Participation Act.
  Finally, the bill makes minor conforming changes and updated 
references to a number of United Nations Security Council resolutions 
that have changed since this bill was introduced.
  Again, I believe all of these things are useful and necessary minor 
changes, and I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SPENCE. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, we do not rise in opposition to the amendment and there 
is no organized opposition, so that 5 minutes is not useful. I would 
simply concur in the explanation of the amendment offered by my 
distinguished colleague from South Carolina, Mr. Spence.
  The amendment provides that the President must act consistent with 
United Nations Participation Act, simply stating that the President 
must act consistent with appropriate laws. In this gentleman's humble 
opinion, that is noncontroversial, and I would echo the sentiments of 
my colleagues, that it is, A, noncontroversial and, B, that it is, in 
part, technical.
  I would urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Bartlett].
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I just want to rise to thank 
the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence]. The problems have been 
corrected by this manager's amendment, which was the primary reason I 
was the lone vote against this bill in committee.
  I am very appreciative of the assistance of Chairman Spence in making 
this bill a very much better bill.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from 
Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth].
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I want to quickly clarify my position.
  If the President puts our sons and daughters in harm's way and under 
the United Nations control, he must get congressional authorization. 
Chairman Spence's manager's amendment does clarify that and makes it a 
much better bill.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member rise in opposition to the amendment?
  If not, the question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed 
in House Report 104-774.


             amendment offered by mr. bartlett of maryland

  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Traficant] and I offer an amendment made in order by the rule.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment Offered by Mr. Bartlett of Maryland: At the end 
     of the bill, add the following new section:

     SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON REQUIREMENT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 
                   FORCES TO WEAR UNIFORM ITEMS OF THE UNITED 
                   NATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 45 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 777. Insignia of United Nations: prohibition on 
       requirement for wearing

       ``No member of the armed forces may be required to wear as 
     part of the uniform any badge, symbol, helmet, headgear, or 
     other visible indicia or insignia which indicates (or tends 
     to indicate) any allegiance or affiliation to or with the 
     United Nations except in a case in which the wearing of such 
     badge, symbol, helmet, headgear, indicia, or insignia is 
     specifically authorized by law with respect to a particular 
     United Nations operation.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new item:

``777. Insignia of United Nations: prohibition on requirement for 
              wearing.''.

       Page 9, strike out lines 11 through 16.
       Page 9, line 17, strike out ``(K)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(J)''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 517, the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Bartlett] and a Member opposed, each will control 20 
minutes.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will be 
recognized for 20 minutes in opposition.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Bartlett].
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 
the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant], a coauthor of the amendment, 
be allowed to control half of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Maryland?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] will control 10 
minutes of the time in support of this amendment.
  The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Bartlett] is recognized.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment that I offer today is very simple. It 
will prohibit any member of the Armed Forces from being forced to wear 
any badge, symbol, helmet, head gear, or other visible insignia which 
indicates allegiance or affiliation to the United Nations unless 
specifically authorized by Congress.
  The centerpiece of my amendment is our soldiers' status. Many of our 
military personnel believe that when they don their battle dress 
uniforms with accoutrements from the United Nations, they become U.N. 
soldiers. Indeed, in some cases they are placed under the operational 
control of a U.N. commander who has not taken an oath to defend the 
Constitution, but has rather taken an exclusive oath of allegiance to 
the United Nations.
  The concern of our men and women of the Armed Forces is corroborated 
by Vice President Al Gore who, during a funeral for the soldiers who 
died in a friendly fire accident over Iraq, in an attempt to console 
the families, said the following, and I quote: ``I offer my condolences 
to the families of those who died in the service of the United 
Nations,'' end quote.

[[Page H10067]]

  Clearly, in at least the Vice President's mind, our soldiers were 
fighting as U.N. soldiers. We must never allow this to happen again.
  Second, one brave U.S. Army medic, Specialist Michael New, had the 
courage to challenge the President's policy of requiring our troops to 
wear the uniform of the United Nations. It is important to remember 
that Michael New was not anti-U.N. He served with distinction in other 
U.N. operations, specifically, in Kuwait. However, in that operation 
Specialist New was required to wear the uniform of the United States, 
not the U.N. insignia.

                              {time}  1215

  When Michael New was ordered to go to Macedonia as part of Operation 
Able Sentry, he was told he would be required to wear the blue beret 
and soldier patch of the United Nations. Believing that he had no 
allegiance to the United Nations, he questioned the authority of this 
order. For his faithfulness to the United States, Michael New was 
court-martialed and given a bad conduct discharge which will follow him 
for the rest of his life.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment I offer today will not affect Michael New 
or his case. However, it will prevent this situation from ever 
happening again. Our servicemen and women must always fight as U.S. 
soldiers and must never be asked to choose allegiances between the 
United States and the United Nations.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to join forces with the gentleman from Maryland 
[Mr. Bartlett] on this amendment. I believe that this has come to light 
in the case of Michael New. I believe it does pose some significant 
military questions that must be answered and resolved, and I believe 
the case for such resolution rests in the Congress of the United 
States.
  Some people say there is micromanagement here. I do not quite believe 
that. I think everybody agrees that our military personnel must follow 
orders. There must be a chain of command and a disciplinary structure 
which ensures the operational integrity of their missions, and the 
structure of their management and command.
  However, this has gone on maybe a little far with the case of Michael 
New, sent over to do peacekeeping work in Macedonia. Sometimes I 
question all this peacekeeping. I think we need a little peacekeeping 
at our borders and some of our cities, but that is not the point. 
Michael New went along with the program, but had a serious question of 
wearing insignia, patches, and berets, that signified the U.N. 
operation.
  As you know, Michael New was court-martialed. All of the legal 
activities have been contrary to the wishes certainly of the Michael 
New legal dilemma. Michael New has lost almost every single legal 
skirmish he has had over the issue. But I want to say here on the House 
floor today that Michael New presents to the Congress a legitimate 
concern about how far we have gone beyond some practicality here.
  What did Michael New say? He is not covered by this decision. He 
says, ``I will go, I will serve my country, but I'm only going to wear 
that uniform of the United States of America.''
  I think Michael New in his defeat has offered Congress an opportunity 
to reflect upon themselves and put some sanity back into this whole 
operation of so-called peacekeeping. We do not send soldiers over with 
guns because of all these humanitarian concerns. They are there because 
they are in imminent danger.
  I firmly believe that this amendment is very strict and 
straightforward. It would remove section (J) from this bill, and it 
would say that when our troops are dispatched on official business, in 
harm's way, they will wear an American, United States of America, 
uniform, and they will wear only that uniform because the Congress 
today said so. If there is a compelling reason for that to be waived, 
the Congress of the United States shall approve that decision.
  I am one that believes the Congress has allowed too much authority to 
the White House. This is not a slap at President Clinton. This is 
taking a look at the operations of Congress and what the Constitution 
sets out for us. Congress declares war, Congress sets the parameters by 
which we operate, and Congress instructs. Within that charge, the 
Commander in Chief runs the operation, never deploys those troops 
without our approval, never engages in harm's way without our approval 
and, by God, I think we should repeal the War Powers Act where a 
President could take a unilateral action and give us the courtesy of 
some conference.
  So I think the Michael New case burns at Congress, and it should. I 
think Michael New, twice-decorated veteran, was certainly not 
insubordinate to his country, and I think he underscores the fact that 
when our young men and women walk into that recruiting office and they 
take the oath, they take it to the Untied States of America, not to the 
United Nations.
  I will say one last thing about the United Nations. Congress should 
be investigating that sinkhole of patronage. There is more patronage 
and corruption at the United Nations than there would be in most of the 
scarred political processes that we discussed in our legendary history.
  Mr. Chairman, with that, I support the amendment. I am hoping the 
Congress would support the amendment. It is not an attempt to in fact 
micromanage. It is an attempt to right a wrong. It is an attempt to 
stand up for those soldiers and troops that say ``I'm putting my life 
on the line, but by God I will wear our uniform,'' and, finally, I 
think it is time to take a look at the Constitution. The Constitution 
is quite clear, if we want to take broad interpretation and analysis, 
``No person holding any office of profit or trust shall, without the 
consent of Congress, accept any present, emolument, office or title of 
any kind whatsoever, from any kind prince or foreign state.''
  We can provide and participate in all these U.N. activities but, by 
God, we could wear our uniform. The world knows it, they understand it, 
and they respect it a hell of a lot more than that beret.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.


                      announcement by the chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would again advise our guests that 
manifestations of support or opposition are not permitted from the 
gallery.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, what this amendment is all about is that it prohibits 
U.S. forces from wearing U.N. insignia without congressional 
authorization. We can rap, get emotional, and hit bumper strip accords 
to gain applause from the gallery. Easy to do. I know how to do it. I 
have done it for 30 years. Easy to do. What is not easy is to confront 
the issue on substantive grounds and address the issue in significant 
terms, not for applause but for what is important, the reality of what 
we are dealing with.
  Some have said, ``We don't want to pledge allegiance to the United 
Nations.''
  This is not about pledging allegiance to anyone. That is a copout. 
That is a game. I challenge any Member who makes that statement to 
prove it. But uninformed, unelightened public opinion will applaud that 
comment, because it is rooted in ignorance. It is rooted in fallacious 
ideas. Where are we asking any American troop? I served in the U.S. 
Marine Corps. Nobody asked me to pledge allegiance to the United 
Nations.
  What this is about is wearing insignia. When I was in the Marine 
Corps, if I violated a lawful order, I was court-martialed. Anyone in 
this room who served in the military knows that.
  My distinguished colleague from Ohio, whom I love, talked about one 
person who said, ``No, I'm not going to wear the U.N. insignia.'' Who 
told him to wear the U.N. insignia? Was it Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who 
you keep raising as this big bogeyman on the floor, again to gain 
uninformed, unenlightened emotional applause.
  No, it was an American military officer that said, ``We will wear 
these uniforms.'' No foreign government. No U.N. American.
  I say to my colleague and all Members in this Chamber, the day that 
you

[[Page H10068]]

open the door and say a military person has a right to violate a direct 
lawful order, forget about it. Forget about it.
  What are you saying to yourselves? What are we saying to our people? 
What are we saying to our children when we make this comment? No, you 
can only abide by the laws that you agree with? Is that the society we 
are talking about? There are a whole lot of people out there that take 
that position. We call them criminals.
  Military, that is a whole other kind of world out there when we start 
talking about violating a direct lawful order. Why do people wear 
insignias? One, is to make sure that we all know who is on the same 
team. When you are dealing with a variety of different countries with 
different uniforms, there needs to be something there that says, ``Hey, 
we're all in this together, different colors, different languages.''

  Mr. Chairman, the Judge Advocate General of the Army has said, and I 
quote, ``Soldiers have a duty to obey lawful orders. To allow soldiers 
the right to pick and choose which lawful orders they want to obey 
would, without question, utterly destroy good order and discipline in 
the ranks.''
  How many times have my colleagues here talked about good order and 
discipline?
  Congress, Mr. Chairman, should not interfere with the U.S. military's 
ability to set rules and regulations which enhance military discipline 
and protect soldiers' lives.
  This is not about a campaign slogan. This is not about applause. This 
is about saving people's lives.
  For this reason, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the people who went 
out there and put their lives on the line, whether we agreed or 
disagreed with why they were out there, they were out there because the 
country made that decision. While opposed to placing U.S. troops in 
operations exclusively under U.N. command, and they have taken that 
position, on this particular amendment, on this issue, has stated that 
it cannot condone Specialist New's action in refusing a direct and 
lawful order. My colleagues postulate an amendment based on a violation 
of a lawful order.
  Col. Harry Summers, a highly decorated retired U.S. Army Colonel and 
a nationally syndicated columnist called Specialist New's conviction 
``necessary and proper,'' and he noted, ``Conscience is a slippery 
slope indeed, for if soldiers obey the dictates of their conscience and 
refuse to obey the orders of their military and civilian superiors, 
democracy itself is imperiled.''
  I believe in conscience, and I support people who conscientiously 
stand up and say, ``I choose not to wage war.'' I believe in that. Or 
people who say, ``I conscientiously choose not to want kill another 
human being.'' I believe in that.
  Once you are there and start playing this game, you are going down a 
very slippery slope.
  Understand, Mr. Chairman, what is being said here beyond the 
applause. This endangers U.S. military safety. Why am I saying that? 
Wearing common identifying insignia is a proven--not hypothetical, not 
experimental--proven way for individual members of military units to 
enhance their own safety and prevent potentially deadly confusion in 
the field. It can also protect one from friendly fire. Everybody knows 
who is on the same team, Mr. Chairman.
  This is a especially important when units from different nations 
wearing different basic uniforms are serving together in an operation. 
Restricting the use of such insignia and markings could contribute to 
increased casualties for American personnel serving in these 
operations.
  If we want to debate whether they ought to be in the operations, we 
can agree or disagree on that. I believe that the body politic ought to 
allow for honest debate on issues. We can discuss whether they ought to 
be there or not. I have got my point of view. You have yours. But once 
they are there, this is about the safety of the very lives that you all 
stand up and talk about reversing so much.

                              {time}  1230

  Further, a recently adopted international convention provides 
important legal protections to U.N. peacekeepers and can bring 
enforcement actions against those who attack them. These protections 
are available only to personnel who have clearly identified themselves 
as U.N. peacekeepers by the use of standard insignia. U.S. personnel 
could be deprived of equal international legal status merely for want 
of a U.N. patch. Something very bizarre, Mr. Chairman, and extreme 
about that.
  U.S. courts have consistently upheld the right of the military to 
establish rules and regulations which contribute to military 
discipline. Hopefully, at the end of the day the larger objective, the 
safety of our American military forces. I keep repeating, it is about 
life. It is not about somebody's election. It is not about some 
uninformed, unenlightened emotional applause. It is about looking at 
the substantive issue here.
  We can throw in the little code words, but this is about the 
insignia. We ought to stay focused on what the debate is. If you want 
to debate war powers, I am with you. You want to challenge Presidents 
who talk about taking troops unilaterally, I am with you. This is about 
putting on an insignia that I believe is dangerous.
  Goldman versus Weinberger, 1986, states that to accomplish its 
mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, 
commitment and esprit de corps. The military need not encourage debate 
or tolerate protest to the extent such tolerance is required by the 
civilian state under the first amendment.
  Brown versus Glines, 1980, states that military personnel must be 
ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises, to ensure 
that they are always capable of performing their mission promptly and 
reliably. The military services must insist upon ``a respect for duty 
and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life.''
  The courts have ruled on this. So we offer an amendment because one 
person says, I do not want to wear this U.N. insignia in the military. 
This is violation of a lawful order of an American commander. Anybody 
that says that that is wrong, stand up, prove it to me now. You cannot. 
The man was given a lawful order by an American person, American 
military person. Now, if you can violate that, then what other laws can 
somebody slip by? I want to paint a swastika on some black guy's 
barracks. Hey, it is cool. You can do this. We offer an amendment to 
say it is fine to do that. We would not. There is no one here that 
would have the audacity. I respect everyone in this Chamber that no one 
would come to that level of absurdity. You are close to it here. You 
are close to it here.

  So one guy says you can wear a patch but do not wear the head gear. 
Now we are getting to a level of nuance that is almost comical.
  Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by saying I think this is a terrible 
amendment. It should never have come this far. I believe in my heart of 
hearts, I believe to a moral certainty that there are Members in this 
Chamber who know how bizarre this amendment is, who have served in the 
military, who understand what insignia is really all about and 
understand what safety is really all about. And in their guts they know 
whether they will stand up on the floor and talk about it is another 
matter, whether they will vote appropriately is another matter, but 
they know what command and control is. They know what good order and 
discipline is, and they know what violation of a lawful order is all 
about.
  This is not about allegiance. This is about an insignia that keeps 
good order, good discipline, and safety among the troops. If we could 
come back to that, this amendment would disappear.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill is not, this amendment is not about Michael 
New, and that is something of a distraction. But since he has been 
brought into it, I would simply say that he and all of our other 
military personnel have been told not to obey an unlawful order. 
Whether or not this is a lawful order is now being tested in the 
courts. The courts will decide whether or not it was a lawful order.
  Second, none of our troops can be sent on a U.N. mission without the 
permission of the Congress, because the U.N. Participation Act says 
that chap-

[[Page H10069]]

ter 7, they have all been chapter 7, the Congress must give permission. 
If they get permission to deploy the troops, they can give permission 
to wear the insignia if that is necessary.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, if I could have the attention of my 
friend, the gentleman from California, Mr. Ron Dellums, and he knows 
where I come from, I would like to explain to you why that for many of 
us this is very, very important.
  First of all, I agree with the gentleman; I would not disobey a 
lawful order that was given to me, even though I disagreed with it. 
There is a chain of command in the military and a proper procedure that 
you should follow through.
  I would also say that in my young years, I also made a lot of 
mistakes, and Michael New and others, I think, I do not think it was 
necessarily a mistake. I think that is what we are trying to alleviate 
here in this particular case, where we do not put our young men and 
young women in this situation. I talked about Somalia a minute ago, but 
I would be remiss unless I talked about Lebanon under a Republican 
administration. I am not talking either one here. Then also in Bosnia, 
where I think it is important that the President knows. There is 
another case in which helicopters were shot down in a free fly zone. 
The U.N. controlled it. The AWACS was not notified. The F-15's were not 
notified. We lost two helicopters. Under those circumstances, I think 
if this body let us, our people know that they are under U.N. control, 
then that is fine. All we are trying to do is alleviate that particular 
situation.
  I do not need a U.N. patch to let me know, no more than my friend 
that served in the Marine Corps knows or I have no doubt that there is 
anyone that when we serve with a foreign country that the U.S. Marine 
Corps uniform, the U.S. Navy, Air Force, whatever it happens to be, who 
we represent. All we are saying is that to wear that patch, it should 
require this body, who also agrees to allow them to serve under the 
United Nations.
  What causes one to pick up a flag on the battlefield or charge a 
hill, it is pride. We have a lot of pride in our U.S. military.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Peterson].
  Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to oppose this 
amendment in the strongest possible terms. I certainly want to 
associate myself with the comments of our ranking member. I thought he 
was elegant in performing really the task here of explaining why it is 
so important that we shut down this amendment.
  We cannot be selective and arbitrary in enforcement of military 
orders. I remember in my first military assignment, I looked around and 
it was interesting, we all had the same uniform on. In that process, we 
all transformed ourselves into a team. It made us better. Not only 
that, but it identified us from all of the other individuals in other 
units throughout that area.
  Each new assignment I took I put on a new insignia. I put on a new 
insignia and identified myself with a new team. That new team than took 
on a new relevance to my life and to all of those around, and all the 
other military organizations throughout the world knew who we were.
  Mr. Chairman, to prohibit U.S. forces from wearing the U.S. 
identification marks on their person while serving in authorized U.N. 
operations is wrong-headed and dangerously unsafe.
  Incidentally, why do we hate the United Nations so much? Why? With 
the United Nations and NATO, we have preserved peace on the planet for 
all practical purposes for the last 40 years. Where is the failure of 
the United Nations? It is not a failure.
  Yes, there are problems in the United Nations. We do not have to 
endorse everything they do. But in the overall, they have been very 
successful.
  Has everyone forgotten here, incidentally, the extreme difficulty we 
have had in identifying friend and foe in military operations? Anybody 
here in the military?
  Have we forgotten, too, the multiple sets of friendly fire that we 
have had in our own military experiences on the battlefield because we 
could not identify our own people? Now we are going to say we are going 
to invite ourselves into a United Nations operation without identifying 
ourselves to the Pakistanis, to the French, to whomever else we are 
with. How is it that they are going to identify us? This is going to 
make us a target. Not only is it going to make us a target from the 
foe, it is going to make us a target of our friends. It makes no sense.
  Finally, this amendment establishes the most outrageous congressional 
micromanagement of military activities I have ever witnessed. This is a 
precedent that we will come to regret deeply in the months and years 
ahead. It is not too late, it is not too late to avoid this mistake. 
Just vote no on this outrageous amendment.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes and 30 seconds.
  I think the statement by Mr. Dellums was not only eloquent but very 
intelligent. I do take some exception to it, though.
  I think with WTO, GATT, United Nations, trilateral commissions, 
council of foreign relations, I think we are getting a little diluted 
on allegiance around here. I might be seen as a nationalist and some 
people call me an isolationist, but by God I am American. That is where 
my allegiance is.
  I wanted to say this to the chairman, did Rosa Parks stand up against 
what was considered a lawful order in Montgomery? Yes, it was a 
civilian for sure. But Rosa Parks felt it was wrong. She was willing to 
bear the burden. She was willing to endure wrath, maybe be shot and 
killed, but she believed in the Constitution. Rosa Parks was being 
treated unconstitutionally.
  Michael New went to his commanders, yes, it is about New. But one 
American has changed the tide of history many times. Rosa Parks, Martin 
Luther King, maybe Michael New, because the only recourse is here in 
Congress. What did Michael New say? He went to his commander and said, 
I will do it, show me the constitutionality of it. Show me, because I 
do not want to do it, but show me.
  For lack of an answer, it is recorded and I want it quoted on the 
House floor here today, the commander's answer was, take this as an 
answer, it looks fabulous. It looks fabulous.
  Yes, Michael New violated an order. He suffered great pains for it. 
But that, in a microcosm, has brought the issue to the final resolver 
of issues, the people, the Congress of the United States. And I think, 
yes, this will tone down some of this madness of dilution of 
allegiance. I think it is there. I think the Congress should address 
it.
  In the little bit of time I have left, let me say this, we can talk 
about all these substantive issues, but it was individual Americans who 
took issue. It was those individual Americans, the Rosa Parks who stood 
there and said, by God, I do not know what Constitution you are 
interpreting but I interpret it differently.

                              {time}  1245

  Mr. Chairman, that is what Michael New said, and we have come down to 
the Constitution on military activity. I do not think the Constitution 
even applies anymore. We have surrendered it.
  So let us stay focused on it. There is no one here that is trying to 
make any political statements. I think it is a viable issue; let us 
stay on that issue.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, this is as good a debate as we have had on 
this House floor in a long, long time, but it is because of the quality 
of intellectual potency of the two gentlemen on this side of the aisle 
and some over here. But the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] beat me 
to the punch about a letter from a Birmingham jail. What civil 
disobedience is all about, whether it is Jesus or Gandhi or Reverend 
Martin Luther King, is a measured response to a law one thinks is 
illegal and taking the consequences.
  I picked up the telephone, as the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Military Personnel of the Committee on National Security, and called 
Michael New in Germany a year ago, before all of this started, and I 
advised him to obey an order, even if he

[[Page H10070]]

thought it was unlawful. I had just come back from Macedonia.
  I have to correct something I said earlier. We were repainting all 
our Blackhawk helicopters pure white. The men called them white hawks. 
I flew on one. It made me a little uncomfortable. They could tell what 
they were, but up in Bosnia they were taking Dutch and Ukranian U.N. 
forces, stripping them of their blue braids, taking their shoes off and 
taking their weapons away from them and chaining them to minor little 
tactical targets. That is how much respect some people in that God 
forsaken place had for U.N. personnel.
  But I said to Michael New, ``Obey this order. Macedonia is 
fascinating.'' I did not say he would look fabulous. I said, ``I know 
what you mean. I know how important headgear is and certain regalia,'' 
and, as the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Peterson] said, ``Yes, 
insignias that identify you with a small or tactical team. Ask our 
Green Berets how they feel about their green beret.''
  He said, Congressman, in all due respect I cannot put on that foreign 
regalia. I took an oath to defend the U.S. Constitution and wear its 
uniform.
  I said, ``Are you married?''
  He said, ``No.''
  I said, ``Are your parents behind you?''
  He said, ``Yes sir.''
  I said, ``You're walking into a mine field. They're going to come 
down on you with a court marshal hammer.''
  He said, ``Sir, I'm ready to take my medicine.''
  I said, ``Well, we may readdress this sometime in the Congress, but I 
can't back you up through the court marshal, but I do think the order 
you've been given is illegal.''
  Now I think it is unlawful. I think he stood up against an unlawful 
order, and it is for us, and I will take an hour special order tonight 
to go into this in more detail to eventually correct what happened to 
him.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Let me go very quickly, first, to the constitutional question raised 
by the gentleman from Ohio.
  If we interpret an insignia as an emolument or a title, then the 
gentleman's argument about the Constitution would be relevant and would 
make sense. I do not think an insignia is a bestowing of title or 
providing an emolument. It is simply what it is, marking an insignia.
  Second, both of my colleagues have raised the issue of protest and 
raised Rosa Parks for various obvious reasons. I am an African American 
here, but I do not shirk from that. There are points at which protest 
in this gentleman's opinion not only make sense but that laws ought to 
be changed in order to address the issues being raised by the protest. 
But there are certainly some issues raised by some protest that should 
not require change in law. I believe this is one of them, and I stand 
resolute on that point.
  Third, we are now talking about the final point and come to it, 
gentlemen from California, Ohio. In the military, my colleagues are 
talking about a unit of people. Now remember there are many of my 
colleagues in here who opposed gays in the military, as bizarre as that 
position is. Why did they do it? Because they think that it violates 
unit cohesion.
  Now military force is unit cohesion, and when somebody says I am not 
going to obey, we have got the life and safety of everyone around them 
depending on that level of cohesion. Why can you not see that this is 
also a safety issue beyond politics?
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentlewoman from Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth] who is an original cosponsor of 
this amendment.
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Maryland for 
yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I just want to also clear up some things. This 
amendment again is not about Michael New, but he certainly initiated 
the discussion, he is a brave young man, and I just wanted it clear in 
the Record that in Michael New's trial the judge took judicial notice 
that this was a lawful order, and they were never able to debate the 
fact that this was not a lawful order.
  Michael New took 3 months to make his final decision. He studied, he 
consulted with everyone from his commanders clear up to the Congress. 
He was very precise and his thinking pattern was very deliberate.
  Congress determines what the regulations for the uniforms should be, 
and this was not a lawful order that was given to Michael New, and his 
oath says I will obey lawful orders. The uniform is very, very, very 
important to the military, as we heard from the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cunningham]. If we doubt that, ask Admiral Boorda. 
Well, we cannot now, but the uniform was very, very important to that 
man, and we saw the outcome of that.
  This amendment is a good amendment and makes good policy and good 
sense for the Congress. The men and women in the Armed Forces did not 
take an oath to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, nor to wear the U.N. baby blue. 
That was not their oath.

  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would advise the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. 
Bartlett] that he has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining and the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] has the right to close.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire how much time exists on 
all sides?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Bartlett] has 1\1/2\ 
minutes remaining, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] has 2\1/2\ 
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] has 
3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 1 of my 
minutes be given to the gentleman from Maryland for him to yield as he 
sees fit.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. I appreciate that very much and yield that 
1 minute to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. Seastrand].
  Mrs. SEASTRAND. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this 
amendment. Never in the history of the United Nations have so many 
troops been committed to so many costly and diverse missions. Nowadays 
the United Nations muscle, its blue-helmeted soldiers, seem to be 
everywhere. The United States alone has contributed over 48,000 
personnel to U.N. missions around the globe, and as has been stated 
today, regrettably the United States has undertaken the practice of 
placing our U.S. military personnel under the operational control of 
the United Nations and its commanders.
  But, Mr. Chairman, I just would like to remind everyone that our men 
and women in the Armed Forces have taken an oath to defend the 
Constitution of the United States, not the U.N., and if our men and 
women in the armed services are willing to risk their lives serving 
this country, they have the right to serve under U.S. command wearing a 
U.S. uniform.
  We must also remember that our Armed Forces do serve the blue, but I 
will tell my colleagues it is the red, white and blue of our Nation's 
flag and not the blue of the United Nations.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 1\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Safety is a two-edged sword. I do not think there is 
anything wrong with an insignia. But I think that should be an American 
insignia, that the world should know that if they shoot one of those 
soldiers, by God, they are not shooting somebody from the U.N. 
peacekeeping force, they are shooting an American, and there is nothing 
here that says we cannot put an insignia on peacekeepng activities.
  But I think what is here deals with the individual plight of an 
American that felt he was wronged and it should be righted, and it has 
come to the place of final decision. Where should Michael New go? To 
Knesset? Should he go to the Diet? Should he go to some parliament? 
Michael New took the fall. He, like Rosa Parks and others in our 
history, took a stand. Now we have got to make a decision.
  I know exactly how I feel. Damn it, create an American insignia that 
lets the world know:
  ``When you shoot this soldier, by God, you are shooting and American, 
and don't do it because the Congress of

[[Page H10071]]

the United States will come after you with a Commander in Chief.''
  I think it is time this whole delusion of allegiance be addressed. I 
think we are, often, too many damn allegiances around here.
  What we are saying today is:
  ``You put that insignia on, make an American insignia. Someone shoots 
one of our people, they're just not shooting at some U.N. peacekeeping 
force, because I will tell you what. Peacekeepers don't wear guns.''
  I am hoping we pass this amendment.
  Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Maryland is recognized for 1\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, relative to the issue of 
allegiance, I would just like to say it is my understanding that all of 
the commanders in Macedonia take an exclusive oath of allegiance to the 
United Nations.
  I would like to say to my friends on the other side of the aisle that 
this is not an issue of safety or identification. Our troops have 
performed spectacularly in past U.N. operations in which they wore the 
standard U.S. uniform. I think everybody recognizes a U.S. soldier.
  Second, a bright baby blue cap and shoulder pads do not make our 
troops any safer. I believe this is equivalent to when we removed the 
brass from our officers' battle dress uniforms. However, if the 
administration determines it is absolutely necessary for our troops to 
wear some kind of additional identification, Congress has the power to 
authorize such wear. Although the Clinton administration has chosen to 
ignore U.S. law, all U.N. peacekeeping operations that are mandated 
under chapter 7 of the U.N. charter must receive prior congressional 
approval before such a deployment. Therefore, there is ample 
opportunity for Congress to authorize the wear of such identification 
symbols if they are needed and requested.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment is about what our military is; it is 
about what our military stands for and what our soldiers' allegiances 
are. If my colleagues oppose this amendment and do not believe that 
things we attach to a uniform are significant enough to warrant this 
debate, I ask them to remember for a moment the tragic case of Adm. 
Jerry Boorda. Uniforms are symbols of what we are. They represent our 
values and our culture.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Bartlett-Chenoweth-Traficant 
amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. To close debate, Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my 
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Montana [Mr. Williams].
  Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, insignias are important. Uniforms are 
important. All of us who have served understand that. This amendment is 
important too. I believe, however, it is a politically inspired and 
arbitrary amendment. It is, if one thinks about it, it is at the bottom 
a political end run around the jurisdiction and authority of our 
military commanders who say to those within their charge:
  Wear this particular color helmet or headgear or insignia, not only 
for the purpose of showing friendship to your comrades from another 
nation who fight besides you to protect freedom around the world, but 
for your own safety as well.
  This Congress would say those commanders are wrong, we politicians, 
in the safety of this House, know better.

                              {time}  1300

  Mr. Chairman, I have a feeling this is about more than just one 
soldier who does not know how to obey orders. I think it is about 
multinational military missions, or, as the gentleman from Ohio refers 
to them, too damned many allegiances.
  In this century alone, the United States military has taken part in 
15 multinational military missions, from the 2,000 soldiers and marines 
in the British-led 8-nation force in 1900 responding to the Boxer 
Rebellion in China through the 2 million U.S. soldiers in World War I 
under the armed allied command of French Marshall Ferdinand Foch to the 
most well-known, widespread, and successful military venture in 
history, the Allied operations of World War II in Europe. The United 
States and United Kingdom's commands were interlayered, and United 
States units were often subordinated to the British commanders numerous 
times, including in Italy, in Normandy, and the China-Burma-Indian 
theater. Those experiences made the U.S. military a strong proponent of 
coalition warfare and a world leader besides.
  The point to keep in mind here is the purpose of multinational 
efforts is to create a military advantage for our people, to create the 
safety for our Armed Forces. Never has any U.S. President, including, 
of course, this one, who ordered a multinational arrangement, never for 
a second has one of those Presidents lost direct control.
  It is for the Armed Forces of the United States to follow the 
commands of the Commander in Chief, to follow the commands of their 
military commander. Do not let one soldier who would not do that decide 
what the laws of this land shall be.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the 
Bartlett amendment to the United States Armed Forces Protection Act, 
H.R. 3308. This amendment, which will prohibit U.S. military personnel 
from being forced to wear the uniform or any visible insignia of the 
United Nations unless authorized by Congress, was prompted by the 
Michael New case.
  Specialist Michael New is a two-time decorated veteran. While serving 
in Macedonia, Specialist New refused an order to wear the uniform of 
the United Nations. Specialist New refused to wear the U.N. uniform and 
insignia because he had taken an oath to protect and defend the U.S. 
Constitution from enemies foreign and domestic not the United Nations 
or its charter. As result of Specialist Michael New's actions he was 
court martialed, convicted, and dishonorably discharged.
  I support his decision not to wear the United Nations' uniform. 
Unfortunately, this amendment comes too late for Specialist Michael 
New. However, it will insure that no American will be put in Michael 
New's situation. Never should an American soldier be forced to choose 
allegiances between the United States and the United Nations.
  As to the broader issue regarding U.S. and U.N. troops serving 
together, for the past few years I have heard from many constituents 
concerned about U.S. troops serving under United Nations' control and 
command. Constituents back home in my district do not want the 
President to put U.S. troops under the command and control of the 
United Nations. Mr. Chairman, we need to pass this amendment and the 
underlying bill in order to ensure that the President does not place 
our troops in harms way in U.N. uniforms under U.N. control.
  Mrs. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I support both the Bartlett 
amendment and the Spence amendment to H.R. 3308.
  The Bartlett amendment will prohibit U.S. military personnel from 
being forced to wear the uniform or any visible insignia of the United 
Nations unless specifically authorized by Congress. Article II, section 
2 of the U.S. Constitution gives the President of the United States the 
sole responsibility as the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when 
called in to actual service of the United States. Therefore, I firmly 
believe that wearing any emblem from any foreign nation or 
international organization is unconstitutional. Currently, the bill 
only requires the President to certify to Congress the extent to which 
U.S. troops would be required to wear U.N. insignia. With the adoption 
of the Bartlett amendment, the President will be required to seek 
congressional approval before requiring U.S. troops to wear U.N. 
insignia.
  In regard to the adoption of the Spence amendment to the bill, I 
believe this provision is an important change that will allow me to 
support the bill. This amendment recognizes the law and provisions 
within the Constitution of the United States as ``superseding, 
negating, or otherwise affecting the requirements of section 6 of the 
United Nations Participation Act.'' Consequently, this provision 
clarifies that the U.S. commanding authority will always supersede any 
U.N. authority and command regarding the participation of U.S. troops.
  With the inclusion of these amendments, I urge my colleagues to vote 
for this legislation to restore America's sovereignty from the United 
Nations.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired. The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Bartlett].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.

[[Page H10072]]

  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 276, 
noes 130, not voting 29, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 404]

                               AYES--276

     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentsen
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Clayton
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Green (TX)
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Martini
     Mascara
     McCarthy
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mink
     Molinari
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Ward
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Young (FL)
     Zimmer

                               NOES--130

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Barrett (WI)
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Campbell
     Cardin
     Castle
     Clay
     Clement
     Coleman
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Cummings
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hinchey
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnston
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kleczka
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lofgren
     Longley
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Neal
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Porter
     Rangel
     Reed
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Stokes
     Stupak
     Thornton
     Torres
     Towns
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Volkmer
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--27

     Chapman
     Chrysler
     Collins (IL)
     de la Garza
     Deutsch
     Engel
     Fields (TX)
     Ganske
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Greene (UT)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hayes
     Kingston
     Lantos
     Markey
     Nadler
     Pomeroy
     Rose
     Sanford
     Smith (MI)
     Studds
     White
     Wilson
     Young (AK)
     Zeliff

                              {time}  1321

  The Clerk announced the following pairs:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Sanford for, with Mr. Deutsch against.
       Mr. Hansen for, with Mr. Nadler against.

  Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania and Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas changed their 
vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 404, If I had 
not been late arriving for the vote I would have voted ``yes.''
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed 
in House Report 104-774.


                  amendment offered by mrs. schroeder

  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mrs. Schroeder: On page 9, line 21, 
     insert before the period the following: ``and the percentage 
     that such cost represents of the total anticipated monthly 
     incremental costs of all nations expected to participate in 
     such operation.''

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 517, the gentlewoman from 
Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder], and a Member opposed will each control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder].
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  This amendment is about burdensharing. It is a very key amendment, 
because it basically only asks that when the President engages in the 
rest of the reporting requirements, that they also report to the 
Congress what percentage of the estimated total cost of the mission 
will be picked up by the United States.
  I do not think it is any great secret in this body that the United 
States always contributes way more than troops. Although troops are our 
most precious commodity, we contribute the intelligence, we are also 
contributing AWACS support, communications support, and any number of 
other things. If this amendment passes, it would say that we would have 
to also put in there what the cost of that is. I think we should get 
credit for that in our missions.
  I must also say that having chaired the burden-sharing panel in the 
100th Congress that so much of my colleagues served on, and served on 
with distinction, our committee has had a long attempt to try and 
figure out how we get these numbers under control, because as we look 
at our military allies, they are also our trading competitors. They 
love to kind of shift some of the costs to us. We think, whether we 
decide to do the cost shifting or not, it ought to be open, it ought to 
be out there, and the American public ought to know about this.
  Mr. Chairman, in 1988, at the request of Chairman Aspin, I chaired 
the first and only panel in Congress to look at defense burdensharing. 
We looked at what our contributions to international defense compared 
to that of our allies, and examined the role that international trade 
plays in international security. The panel came up with several 
findings, many of which hold true today. The panel's report found that:
  The United States bears a substantially higher defense burden than 
its allies.
  Europe and Japan did not contribute to world security proportionate 
with their economic abilities. Global trading powers have more than a 
regional responsibility to defense.
  The United States should not pay the lion's share of defense.
  As long as the United States shows a willingness to bear a 
disproportionate share of the defense burden, then our allies will 
allow us to do so. If we indicate our reluctance to pay a 
disproportionate share, then our allies will assume their fair share.
  Since then, Congress has taken up the issue of burdensharing and 
passed important tools. In 1994, the House implemented a formula to 
gain increased contributions for our troops stationed in Europe. Most 
recently, we passed an amendment authored by Mr. Shays

[[Page H10073]]

of Connecticut that would require additional contributions from 
countries where U.S. military forces are permanently stationed. The 
amendment was adopted by a vote of 353 to 62.
  My amendment provides a one more tool to gauge whether the United 
States is paying too much for U.N. military deployments. It would 
require the President to report the percentage of the estimated total 
cost that the United States would bear. In this time of budget 
constraints, the taxpayers deserve to know how much of the world's 
security is being paid for by the United States. Support the Schroeder 
amendment.
  In 1994 the United States accounted for 34 percent of the world's 
military expenditures and 61 percent of NATO's expenses. Since fiscal 
year 1992 we've reported spending of over $8 billion on international 
peacekeeping.
  Mr. Chairman, I understand from the distinguished chairman of the 
committee that he would be willing to accept this amendment, and I am 
happy to yield at this time to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. 
Spence].
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I am aware of the amendment of the gentlewoman from 
Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder]. I know of no objection on our side of the 
aisle to it. I would like to commend her for the amendment. It gives us 
additional information on the cost and cost-sharing arrangement 
associated with United Nations operations. I am prepared to accept the 
amendment.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence] very, very much for accepting the amendment, 
because I really do think it is in the history of the panel.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say this is 
an appropriate amendment for the gentlewoman to have come forward with 
and get unanimously approved as she ends her very distinguished tenure 
here, because she really, more than anybody else, began to call 
people's attention to it, and we need to continue to work on this.
  Mr. Chairman, we cannot read a study of the economic success of the 
tigers of East Asia without learning of the essential contribution of 
free American military protection to their economies as an element in 
their economic development. Our European allies continue to scale down. 
We are in a situation now where we are responding as we see fit for an 
emergency in the Middle East and many of our European allies who are 
the beneficiaries of our largesse are nowhere to be found in our 
support.
  One of the most important mistakes we make today, to our own 
misfortune, is to continue to subsidize at the cost of tens and tens of 
billions of dollars a year the wealthy nations of Europe and the 
increasingly wealthy nations of Asia.

                              {time}  1330

  This is an important reaffirmation of that. It is appropriate that 
the gentlewoman from Colorado be the one once again to bring this to 
us. But we have a lot more work to do. This is a very good step. It 
will show what we know to be the case, the enormous disparity between 
what the American taxpayers put forward and what is put forward by 
nations in Europe and Asia that could very well afford to do more.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for his hard 
work in this area, too. It did not used to be so popular.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas [Ms. Jackson-
Lee].
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise to simply applaud the 
gentlewoman from Colorado for being the lightning rod, if you will, on 
this issue years before I even entered Congress.
  Let me offer to say to you that many of us as Americans will agree 
that the Marshall plan was right. It, in fact, offered to rebuild the 
infrastructure and the opportunities for our European neighbors and 
others. We thought that was right. Americans are charitable people. But 
if there is one issue that comes to me in my townhall meetings, it is 
the question of why we are spending so much money overseas on someone 
else's military problems.
  This amendment is a commonsense approach. Obviously it will be our 
burden to carry on your legacy in years to come, to emphasize the 
importance of maintaining the cost of money spent by the United States 
at the United Nations as it relates to our own defense budget. This one 
that will require congressional intervention and also to get a report 
from the President is clearly the right way to go. I simply want to add 
my accolades and as well my commitment to continue to work on this 
effort with those who are already working in order to respond to some 
very good questions from my constituents and constituents around the 
Nation. Let us be fair but let us not carry the overburden of 
responding to the needs of those around the world. Let us keep peace, 
which is what the gentlewoman is trying to do, but let us do it in a 
fair and equitable manner. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Barrett of Nebraska) having assumed the chair, Mr. Kolbe, Chairman of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
3308) to amend title 10, United States Code, to limit the placement of 
United States forces under United Nations operational or tactical 
control, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 517, he 
reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by 
the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will 
put them en gros.
  The amendments were agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 299, 
nays 109, not voting 25, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 405]

                               YEAS--299

     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Christensen
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Frost
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Green (TX)
     Greene (UT)
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones

[[Page H10074]]


     Kanjorski
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Martini
     Mascara
     McCarthy
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Ward
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Young (FL)
     Zimmer

                               NAYS--109

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Baldacci
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bevill
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Campbell
     Cardin
     Chenoweth
     Clay
     Clayton
     Coleman
     Collins (MI)
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cummings
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Fattah
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jefferson
     Johnston
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     LaFalce
     Leach
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McDermott
     McKinney
     Meek
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moran
     Morella
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Owens
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Richardson
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Stokes
     Stupak
     Thornton
     Torres
     Towns
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--25

     Chapman
     Chrysler
     Collins (IL)
     Conyers
     de la Garza
     Deutsch
     Engel
     Fields (TX)
     Ganske
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hayes
     Kingston
     Lantos
     Myers
     Nadler
     Rose
     Sanford
     Studds
     Walker
     Wilson
     Young (AK)
     Zeliff

                              {time}  1355

  The Clerk announced the following pairs:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Sanford for, with Mr. Nadler against.
       Mr. Deutsch for, with Mrs. Collins of Illinois against.

  Mr. BRYANT of Texas and Mr. MINGE changed their vote from ``yea'' to 
``nay.''
  Mr. FAZIO of California and Mr. FARR of California changed their vote 
from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________