[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 117 (Friday, August 2, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9625-S9627]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      JAPAN CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES

 Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise to speak about an item 
that is not in the news right now. But that could have significance for 
United States construction companies and for United States-Japan trade 
relations. It has come to my attention that the Japanese Government is 
building a new airport near Nagoya, Japan called the Chubu 
International Airport. This multibillion-dollar project will be that 
country's largest public works effort for the next decade. The first 
flights are planned for the year 2005.
  As many of my colleagues are already aware, American construction 
companies must be included in any list of our most competitive 
international industries. These companies have particular expertise in 
building large airports, having constructed the international airports 
in Hong Kong and Seoul, Korea, among others. Curiously, only in Japan 
have they been unsuccessful.
  This is not for lack of trying. American construction, architecture, 
and design engineering firms have been trying to participate in the 
Japanese market for over a decade, with limited success. I have taken 
to the Senate floor many times to complain about how United States 
companies were blocked from participating in any meaningful way in the 
construction of the Kansai International Airport, despite numerous 
promises from the Japanese Government to allow their participation.
  But Mr. President, my purpose here is not to recount the sorry tale 
of closed construction markets in Japan. I will just note that we have 
gone through years of negotiations to try to open Japan's construction 
market and break their corrupt dango system. In 1994, in the face of 
United States sanctions under title VII, Japan agreed to adopt an 
action plan to eliminate the numerous barriers to foreign participation 
in their public works market.
  And I must say, Mr. President, that the first two reviews of the 
action plan have been very disappointing. In fiscal year 1995, foreign 
firms won only one construction project, out of a total of 613 let out 
for bid, and one design project, out of 20. The dedicated commerce 
officials monitoring Japan's performance indicate that United States 
companies still face unsatisfactory restrictions on the size and scope 
of joint-venture consortia that can bid on major procurement projects 
and still face discriminatory prequalification criteria.

  But you don't get anywhere crying over lost opportunities, so today I 
instead want to use my remarks to point out to the Japanese Government 
that the Chubu project presents an opportunity for the Government to 
demonstrate its openness to foreign participation. And, it gives Japan 
the opportunity to enjoy a world class international airport.
  In order to make this happen, the procurement agency for Chubu should 
immediately move to adopt open and competitive bidding procedures as 
called for under the United States-Japan bilateral understandings.
  Mr. President, I will be watching very closely and I fully expect 
United States firms to be given equal opportunity to participate, 
commensurate with their ability.
  I understand that our Commerce Department officials will travel to 
Japan again in September for further consultations, and I hope that 
they will receive positive news on the Chubu project.


                             Bosnia Policy

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the deployment to Bosnia of the 
International Force [IFOR] has passed its midway mark and I would like 
to review with my colleagues what I believe has been accomplished to 
date, the many questions yet unanswered by the Administration, as well 
as the dangerous pitfalls I see on the road ahead.
  Mr. President, I was one of those who voted against the deployment of 
U.S. troops to Bosnia, to take part in the NATO-led effort to enforce 
the military provisions of the Dayton Accord. I was skeptical then, and 
remain so today, of Administration assertions that U.S. strategic 
interests in Central Europe or in the ``future of NATO'' justified this 
costly investment of troops and resources abroad. I took with a grain 
of salt Administration promises that U.S. troops would be out of Bosnia 
in a year's time and Administration assurances that it would work to 
level the military playing field between Serbs and Muslims.
  I maintained then--I reiterate today--that it is the Congress--the 
Congress--which had to authorize the deployment, after thorough 
consultation with the Administration. From all reports coming out of 
Bosnia, we are now paying the piper for moving without the careful 
deliberation and consideration of pros and cons that a real policy 
debate would have engendered. If the Administration had truly consulted 
with the Congress--and not simply presented us with a fait accompli--we 
might have been able to anticipate many of the problems now facing IFOR 
and its parallel civilian institutions. I recognize that the issues and 
problems are complex and I do not mean to suggest that I or the Senate 
would have all or even some of the answers.
  But I did pose a number of questions to the Administration during 
last year's all-too-brief hearings on the deployment and in the 
subsequent cursory debate on the Senate floor, in an attempt to focus 
priorities and anticipate problems. But as you know, the decision had 
already been made to move forward and the Congress sidelined, a sad 
fact I blamed as much on our timidity as the Administration's 
circumvention of constitutional process.
  I recognize, Mr. President, that the Dayton Accord and the IFOR 
deployment to enforce its provision has not been without some real 
benefit. We can all be grateful that people are no longer dying en 
masse in Bosnia; U.S. and other IFOR troops are to be applauded for 
having largely succeeded in enforcing the military aspects of the 
agreement.
  The head of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA], Lt.Gen. Patrick 
Hughes, testified earlier this year that he expected that the parties 
would continue generally to comply with the military aspects of the 
Dayton Accord and with IFOR directives. Hughes ``did not expect'' U.S. 
or allied forces to face organized military resistance; any ``modest'' 
threat remained limited to mines and sporadic low-level violence, such 
as terrorism. NATO commander Joulwan recently confirmed that many of 
the peacekeeping tasks delegated to IFOR have been completed, including 
overseeing the transfer of territory, the demobilization of troops and 
the storage of heavy weapons.
  But there are disturbing signs, Mr. President, that the progress is 
transitory and perhaps even an illusion.

[[Page S9626]]

Compliance is begrudging; ``the spirit of Dayton'' encouraged at the 
point of NATO arms.
  In an October 19, 1995 letter to Secretary Perry, I asked just how 
durable an IFOR-enforced peace would be. Specifically, I asked for some 
assurance that the Serbs had abandoned their quest for a ``Greater 
Serbia'' and that the territorial integrity of Bosnia would be 
protected.
  The facts on the ground provide the disturbing answer. General 
Hughes, for one, was troubled by the ``fundamentally'' unchanged 
strategic political goals of the former warring factions; that is, 
eventual permanent partition. Upon IFOR's withdrawal, Hughes foresaw: 
Bosnian Serbs seeking political confederation with Yugoslavia; Bosnian 
Croats with Zagreb; resistance by Serbs and Croats to efforts of the 
Muslim-led government to assert its authority; collapse of the 
``Federation'' of Croats and Muslims, intended as a counterweight to 
the Serbian entity created by Dayton, under the mutual hostility of 
Muslim and Croat; and delay or stymie of civil affairs, such as 
elections.
  In short, Mr. President, there is the real possibility that after a 
nearly $2.8 billion investment just for the deployment of our troops to 
Bosnia, we will be back at square one: hostile, ethnically-divided 
factions facing off at tenuous borders under unstable military, 
economic and social conditions.
  In my letter to Secretary Perry and during floor debate, I also 
raised the question of cost, especially in light of how this expensive 
deployment would undermine efforts to balance the budget. In December, 
the Congress was told the cost would be roughly $2.0 billion. I 
predicted then that the bill would be a lot more. Now, because of 
unexpected costs and delay associated with a winter deployment, 
intelligence gathering and engineering efforts, the most recent DoD 
estimate of which I am aware is for $2.8 billion. Just how reliable is 
this estimate, or will there be more unexpected costs? I suspect it is 
hardly prophetic if I venture that the tab presented to the American 
taxpayer--just for the military side of this adventure--will top $3 
billion, if not more.
  I asked the Administration back in October if the U.S. would withdraw 
regardless of whether the mission was a success. I asked because I had 
my doubts that the stated goal--ending the fighting and raising an 
infrastructure capable of supporting a durable peace--was doable in 
twelve months time. I foresaw a danger that conditions would remain so 
unsettled that it would then be argued that it would be folly--and 
waste--to withdraw on schedule.
  It should be no surprise then, Mr. President, that European diplomats 
are questioning whether IFOR should exit on schedule--claiming 
success--if the ``fundamental'' nation-building task of elections has 
not been completed. We know from press reports that the Europeans are 
pressuring the U.S. to stay on as well, in an undefined role and for an 
uncertain period of time.
  While I welcomed Vice President Gore's declaration that our troops 
would be withdrawn on schedule, I also note that only yesterday 
Secretary of State Christopher testified before the SFRC that ``final 
decisions'' on withdrawal would have to await the results of the 
September elections and then qualified that by stating the military 
mission would be completed ``roughly'' by the 1-year deadline. In 
short, the very spectre I envisioned 7 months ago may be coming to 
haunt us.
  Speculation that IFOR (and U.S. troops) will extend beyond one year 
is worrisome, given the assurances we heard last December that this 
deployment was limited in time. Even the weak resolution passed by the 
Senate accepting the deployment did not envision an open-ended affair. 
I urge the Administration to heed the sage observation of Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Chairman General Shalikashvili, who has reiterated that U.S. 
troops will be out of Bosnia by December. He said that if the factions 
wanted peace, then a one year IFOR deployment was enough; an extended 
mission would not alter the intentions of the parties.

  In any event, the Pentagon has also apparently modified the 
President's promise that our troops would be home by December 20. Now, 
I understand, exit will begin on or around that date, ensuring that 
some of our men and women will be in Bosnia well into 1997. Another 
option I have heard mentioned is having a reduced IFOR force--
principally British and French troops--remain in Bosnia after December, 
under U.S. air cover.
  Let me say now, Mr. President, that I am opposed to the continued 
deployment of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia after December 1996. I do 
not think they should be there now and I expect the Pentagon to brief 
us on its plans for a timely exit.
  That said, I am not necessarily opposed to a limited U.S. support 
role. I remain deeply concerned that Dayton produced a Muslim 
geographic entity essentially DOA. If ethnic partition is inevitable, 
the Muslim rump state likely to emerge will have no coastline, be an 
economic basketcase for the foreseeable future, and remain surrounded 
by hostile neighbors.
  Our political, moral, financial and strategic investment in Dayton 
and in IFOR requires that we not allow the Muslim entity to wither on 
the vine. The dividends--stability in Europe, enhanced credibility in 
the Muslim world, undermining Iranian inroads, economic opportunities 
for U.S. business--outweigh the costs.
  Which brings me, Mr. President, to the next question I raised in 
October: what provision had the Administration made for the arming and 
training of Bosnia's Muslims? I have argued almost from the moment I 
first entered the Senate that we should arm and train the Muslims, 
permitting them to adequately defend themselves. If we had done so 
three years ago, we would likely not have found ourselves in a position 
of enforcing a peace that the factions may not want.
  I am pleased to note President Clinton's July announcement that the 
military assistance program for the Bosnian-Muslim federation is 
finally scheduled to begin. A contingent of Bosnian soldiers--all 
Muslims--reportedly arrived in Turkey in June for training and $98.4 
million in U.S. arms are scheduled to be shipped to the Bosnian army, 
including M60 tanks, armored personnel carriers and antitank weapons in 
the next several weeks. Turkey has reportedly matched the U.S. pledge 
and U.S private contractors will assist the Turks in improving command-
and-control and other military procedures. I hope that this marks the 
genesis of a Muslim force capable of defending itself against the 
better-armed Serbs, should the peace collapse, a not unforeseeable 
possibility.
  But I wonder, Mr. President, where are our European allies? Even with 
the U.S. and Turkish pledges, there remains a $600 million shortfall on 
the amount needed to adequately equip and train the Muslims. The 
Europeans--especially the French and British--have contributed nothing 
and their support for Dayton Accord provisions calling for adequate 
arming and training of the Muslims, are lukewarm, at best. Yet while 
they continue to view sending Western arms to Bosnia as destabilizing, 
they do not seem to object to having Iran--an otherwise hostile state 
with which they wish to trade--arm the Muslims.
  I had thought that we had received assurances from the Europeans that 
they would support the arm and train provisions of Dayton. Have we been 
bamboozled? What is the Administration doing to press the issue?
  Yet another question I asked of Secretary Perry last year regarded 
U.S. treatment of indicted war criminals, such as General Mladic and 
Mr. Karadzjic. The issue of dealing with persons today government 
officials responsible for effecting Dayton's provisions, but who 
yesterday were mass murderers, is not an easy one. All the factions in 
Bosnia harbor such men and each of the ethnic communities--especially 
the Muslims--suffered grievously at their hands.
  Some argue that the process of reconciliation would be better served 
by putting the past behind us. I disagree wholeheartedly. The 
international community has made a judgment that those involved in 
genocide must be brought before a court of justice. Certainly in 
investigating these cases and prosecuting these men we risk 
exacerbating old wounds. But I believe the healing process is better 
served by bringing these crimes out into the light of day and punishing 
those responsible. Otherwise, the victims families will allow the 
resentments to fester and the cycle of violence inevitably erupt anew.

[[Page S9627]]

  I understand the view of the IFOR military commanders, who are 
reluctant to involve themselves and their troops in this sort of 
distasteful civilian task and in the dangers of ``mission creep.'' In a 
cauldron such as Bosnia, the last thing the peace enforcers want is to 
be perceived as taking sides.
  But I believe that the higher moral and practical obligation involved 
requires that IFOR troops vigorously protect those seeking to uncover 
evidence of these crimes. The presence of a protective cordon of IFOR 
troops at Srebrenica, where the first solid evidence of mass murder and 
atrocities on an appaling scale is now being exhumed, is a welcome 
development. I note, however, that the two most prominent war 
criminals, Karadzic and Mladic, continue to flout their disdain for 
such pronouncements. Karadzic, for example, dismissed the moderate 
Serbian prime minister, Rajko Kasagic, in mid-May.
  That act seems to me to be an act of real political power and 
certainly not in keeping with State Department assessments that the man 
is being ``sidelined.'' Karadzic's June 30 transfer of power to a 
political flunky was merely another transparent attempt to avoid 
punishing economic sanctions. And despite Ambassador Holbrooke's 
efforts last month to strip Karadzic of political influence, I think we 
all understand that Karadzic continues to call the shots, which are 
aimed at the underpinnings of Dayton.
  There are other problems, of course. Carl Bildt, the High 
Representative for implementation of Dayton has noted that while the 
formal structures of civilian implementation are in place, the 
political will to make Dayton work is clearly missing. Conditions are 
nowhere near settled enough to conduct ``free and fair'' elections; 
absent are freedom of movement, freedom of association, a balanced 
media, and the right to vote in secret near one's home.
  Ambassador Frowick, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) mission head in Bosnia, even went so far as to admit July 
29 that, at best, the elections could be expected to be ``reasonably 
democratic,'' adding that ``free and fair is a stretch.'' Frankly, I'm 
puzzled as to how elections neither free nor fair can ever be 
reasonably democratic.
  Yet, the OSCE certified June 25 that such elections can be held by 
September 14. The chief of staff of the OSCE, William Steubner, 
resigned in June, reportedly over a disagreement as to whether Bosnia 
is anywhere near being ready for an election. The continued influence 
of thugs such as Karadzic, the reports that Serbian goons are 
preventing Serbs from voting in the their former home districts--one 
Serb official reportedly dismissed objections by stating: ``Who cares 
where they want to vote; they'll vote where we say.'' It was only in 
June that another 100 Muslims were forced out of their homes in Bosnian 
Serb territory. In the suburbs of Sarajevo and in countless villages 
across the former Yugoslavia the triumph of ethnic cleansing is 
apparent. All prisoners of war have not been released, as required by 
Dayton. Foreign forces remain in Bosnia long after the deadline for 
their departure; indeed, despite the Administration's certification 
that these people have left, the Washington Post reported July 8 that 
some Islamic fighters are burrowing in, creating mischief and posing a 
potential threat to IFOR troops. If true, how will this affect the 
Administration's pledge that the arm and train program will not come up 
to speed until those forces are gone?
  These political problems--which certainly threaten the long term 
health of Dayton--are compounded by economic difficulties. A question I 
did not ask in October, but which looms now over the process, is that 
of paying for the reconstruction of Bosnia? How realistic is the 
expectation that the international community will pony up the estimated 
$5.1 billion necessary over three years to put Bosnia back on the road 
to recovery? In April, in Brussels, World Bank and EU officials 
requested $1.8 billion in reconstruction aid for 1996. Donors have 
pledged barely one-third of that amount and the World Bank has received 
only one-half (or $300 million) of that in actual commitments. Is it 
any wonder that the Sarejevo government may look again to Tehran, which 
recently offered $50 million in assistance?
  Which leads me Mr. President, in a roundabout way back to the first 
and most important question I put to Secretary Perry back in October, 
and which I discussed at length during the December floor debate: why 
would the Administration not seek Congressional approval and support 
for the deployment to Bosnia? As I said then, it is through the 
authorization process--a procedure mandated by the Constitution--that a 
deployment is explained and refined; that questions are answered; fears 
alleviated; and the American people given an opportunity to air their 
views on what the mission is worth to them.
  This first and last question, Mr. President, has never been answered. 
The result has been uncertainty and more questions. To date, we have 
been fortunate that the results have not been more tragic, the sad 
circumstances surrounding Secretary Brown's mission notwithstanding.
  I remain unconvinced that the IFOR-imposed ceasefire masks anything 
more than an inevitable slide towards permanent partition; if that is 
the case--and I hope I am wrong--then I and the American people want to 
know how this costly deployment furthered the national interest. Mr. 
President, I hope we will have public hearings soon on the status of 
the deployment and that the Administration will answer the questions I 
put forward in October and repeated here today. I acknowledge again the 
Congress' own culpability in not forcing the issue and asserting its 
constitutional authority and responsibility on the deployment. I hope 
that the lessons learned here will lead to more backbone in the 
future.

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