[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 113 (Monday, July 29, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9016-S9027]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE DRUG EPIDEMIC
Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, as I have said many times on the floor,
we are in the midst of a drug epidemic in the United States of enormous
proportions that are not yet, I do not believe, fully comprehended.
Drug use among our youth has doubled in the last 36 months, ending 12
years of a continued decline in drug use.
Mr. President, this administration, unfortunately, has to come to
terms with this issue because it is pretty clear that its decision to
shut down the drug office, to shut down interdiction efforts, to
dramatically curtail the war on drugs, and to the change policy
regarding rehabilitation has had some very, very uncomfortable
consequences.
What does it mean when you say drug use has ``doubled''? Does that
mean two more people use it? No. What it means is there are 2 million
American families who have fallen victim to the tragic consequences of
involving themselves in drugs.
Mr. President, in a moment I am going to yield to the distinguished
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, the senior Senator from Utah. But
let me say that among the data we are now discovering is the fact that
our youth currently do not see drugs as a threat to them. How could
that be? How could it be that the vast majority of youngsters no longer
see that as a threat to them? Therefore, they are not concerned about
it. Therefore, they use it more freely. Therefore, twice the number use
it today.
I just have to say that over the last several months, this cavalier
attitude from the President's press secretary and others and the
revelation about drug use in the White House itself--I mean, everybody
understands the White House is a bully pulpit. If that pulpit is
sanctioning, or appears to be sanctioning, or appears to be minimizing
the serious effects of drug use, it should not be surprising that our
young people do not understand the consequences.
I am afraid that what has surfaced over the last several weeks--the
word that comes to mind is ``cavalier''--is that it is not really
important, that message has created a very, very serious repercussion
in our country. It has to be turned around and changed quickly.
Mr. President, with that opening statement, I yield up to 15 minutes
to the distinguished Senator from Utah.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized for 15
minutes.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Patrick
Murphy, a detailee on my staff, be granted floor privileges for the
remainder of this Congress.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, our Federal drug policy is at a crossroads.
Unfortunately for Americans, drug control is not a national priority
for the Clinton administration. For some time now I have been saying
that President
[[Page S9017]]
Clinton has been AWOL--absent without leadership--in the war on drugs.
Put another way, the Clinton White House has been MIA in the drug war--
mired in arrogance. Ineffectual leadership and failed Federal policies
have combined with ambiguous cultural messages to generate changing
attitudes among our young people and sharp, serious increases in
youthful drug use.
This is painfully evidenced by this chart on my right, which shows
that after a 12-year steady decline in drug use by high school seniors,
from 1980 to 1992, there has been a sharp increase in such drug use
during the last 3 years. As you can see, the decline came from 1980
downhill in every one of these categories, and in every one of the
categories since 1992 drug use has started to go up sharply.
Even more troubling is that this increase has been uniform as to
those who have used drugs in the past month, in the past year, and
those children trying drugs for the first time.
No one is more responsible for our current dilemma than President
Clinton. For more than 3 years, I have taken to the floor of the Senate
to warn my colleagues and the Nation about the threat we face due to
President Clinton's abdication of leadership in the war on drugs. What
also troubles me is that a defeatist outlook in the drug war appears
now to be supplemented by a softer attitude tolerating or excusing drug
use.
The Clinton administration has caused serious damage to this country
as a direct result of failed policies and absent leadership in the war
on drugs. Indeed, as one more manifestation of the administration's
arrogance of power, we now know that the White House strong-armed the
Secret Service into granting security passes for at least a dozen
persons who had engaged in the recent use of, among other illegal
drugs, crack cocaine and hallucinogens. In responding to questions
concerning this matter, White House spokesman Mike McCurry disdainfully
suggested that prior drug use was no big deal. What a terrible message
to send to the country, especially to our young people. Where was
President Clinton during this episode? Why didn't he admonish his
spokesman? When will someone at the White House acknowledge that drug
use is a big deal.
To his credit, Mr. McCurry has expressed regret for having been so
cavalier; but, it is quite telling that it was the President's
spokesman who expressed this attitude of tolerance for drug use.
Remember, this is the same President who named the stealth drug czar
Lee Brown and Surgeon General Jocelyn Elders, a proponent of legalizing
drugs.
Let me be clear. I am not suggesting that people who experimented
with drugs in their youth are categorically unfit for public service.
But we should not make room at the policy table for those who have used
drugs even as students and believe that their drug use was not a
serious wrong, unfortunate step in their life. Nor should those who
still use drugs or have recently done so be given a public trust
especially in the White House. It is this mindset which will result in
defeat.
Both President Reagan and President Bush led from the front on this
war, confronting our Nation's drug problems head on with positive
results. As a Nation, we were committed to winning the war on drugs,
and we were making gains. Since President Clinton has assumed office,
his administration's campaign against drugs has been in full retreat,
and America is now losing the war.
During the Reagan and Bush era, the United States saw dramatic
reductions in casual drug use. From 1977 to 1992, casual drug use was
more than cut in half. Cocaine use fell by 79 percent, while monthly
use fell from 2.9 million users in 1988 to 1.3 million in 1992. Such
reductions were achieved not by hollow rhetoric but through sustained,
visible use of the bully pulpit, increased quantities, a clear and
quantifiable antidrug policy and, most important, strong Presidential
leadership. Substantial investment of resources, coupled with the
effective use of the bully pulpit, caused a strong reverberation of
antidrug sentiment throughout this Nation.
From his very first days in office, President Clinton was derailing
the effective approaches of prior administrations. Although he promised
to ``reinvent our drug control programs,'' and ``move beyond
ideological debates,'' the President announced a new approach to drug
policy, deemphasizing law enforcement and cutting interdiction. He
called his approach a controlled shift. In hindsight, it has been an
approach of reckless abdication. The Clinton administration renounced
the proven policies of previous administrations and instead oversaw the
following:
Federal illegal drug caseloads were reduced by 10.3 percent from
fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 1995;
The Governmentwide interdiction budget was cut by 39 percent since
1993;
Supply reduction has been put in utter disarray, with a 53 percent
drop in our ability to interdict and push back drug shipments in the
drug transit zone;
Between 1992 and 1994, cocaine seized by the Customs Service and
Coast Guard dropped 70 percent and 71 percent, respectively.
The National Drug Control Policy staff was cut from 147 to 25, but
Congress did restore funding for adequate staffing levels this fiscal
year, and with the President's approval finally admitted that they were
wrong;
The administration's fiscal year 1995 budget proposed to slash 621
drug enforcement positions from the DEA, INS, FBI and Customs Service;
From 1992 to 1995, the Drug Enforcement Administration lost 227 agent
positions, more than 6 percent of its agent force;
President Clinton signed legislation repealing mandatory minimums for
some drug traffickers and dealers;
And agreed to more than $230 million in cuts to drug education and
prevention funds in 1993.
It really is no surprise, therefore, that as the administration has
turned a blind eye to this problem, drug dealers have flooded our
Nation's streets with more illegal drugs and steadily declining prices.
For example, as this next chart here reflects, the last several years
have seen a dramatic drop in heroin prices. Since 1992, it has
dramatically dropped. In fact, you can see it dropped very dramatically
there, and then the purity, of course, has been going up. So the drop
in heroin prices, combined with the dramatic increase in the purity of
such heroin on the streets, has been catastrophic.
The conclusion that can be drawn from these facts is clear. Supply is
way up on our city streets resulting in more lethal drugs being
available to our children at a much cheaper rate. Despite such glaring
evidence, the Clinton administration continues to remain silent on
addressing this problem.
In short, since 1992, the bully pulpit has gathered dust, liberal
soft-headed policies have been implemented, and a mentality of
tolerance for drugs has taken root. As a result, almost every available
indicator today shows the United States is losing our fight against
drugs. Let us just consider some of the evidence.
First, drugs are cheap and more available. Since 1993, the retail
price of cocaine has dropped by more than 10 percent. The price of
heroin has plummeted from $1,647 a gram in 1992 to $966 a gram in
February 1996.
Second, since President Clinton took office, the number of 12- to 17-
year-olds using marijuana has almost doubled--2.9 million kids compared
with the 1992 level of 1.6 million. According to a most recent
University of Michigan study, one in three high school seniors now
smokes marijuana, and 48.4 percent of the class of 1995 had tried
illegal drugs.
You can see why I got so upset when Mr. McCurry made his comments.
Now, to his credit, he has basically apologized for those, and I accept
his apology. But it should never have happened to begin with. And it is
this tolerance in the White House that is causing these problems. It
comes through to these kids and to everybody else, it seems to me.
Third, the number of cocaine and heroin-related emergency room
admissions has jumped to historic levels. In the first half of 1995,
cocaine-related emergency room cases were 65 percent above the level in
the first half of 1991. Heroin admissions soared 120 percent over this
same period of time.
Fourth, methamphetamine use has soared with meth-related emergency
room admissions in 1995 increasing by
[[Page S9018]]
more than 320 percent since 1991. And yet, I might add, someone on the
other side of the aisle is blocking consideration of a bipartisan
Hatch-Biden methamphetamine bill. I urge the President to call off his
guardians of gridlock so we can pass this bill that is critical to this
country.
Fifth, LSD use has reached the highest rate since recordkeeping
started in 1975. Fully 11.7 percent of the class of 1995 had tried it
at least once.
That is mind-boggling.
The widespread increase in illegal drug use is not surprising when
the relative ease in which these drugs are now brought across our
borders is considered. Recent reports indicate that Mexican drug
cartels are no longer interested in merely crossing our southern border
to peddle their drugs. Ranchers along the Texas and New Mexico border
are now finding themselves being forced to sell their border properties
to these armed thugs. They are getting plenty of money for it. Why
would they pay these exorbitant rates? But people are afraid not to
sell to them for fear they will be killed.
As a result, a virtual superhighway for illegal drug flow into this
country is being created--some say has already been created.
We are literally losing ground against drugs. In an effort to call
attention to this disturbing development, I will be holding a hearing
in the Judiciary Committee this Wednesday on precisely these points:
What is happening on our southern border?
Due to President Clinton's failure in the drug war, our children are
at greater risk, our law enforcement efforts are strained more than
ever, and our borders, it appears, are now being bought up by drug
smugglers.
To his credit, President Clinton named Gen. Barry McCaffrey as his
new drug czar. General McCaffrey is a committed man. I have respect for
him. But it may be too little too late. Such 11th hour tactics do not
obviate one absolute truth: For the last 3 years, in the battle to
regain our streets from the plague of illegal drugs, this
administration has let our country down.
The Nation must have effective moral leadership in this war against
drugs. The President has turned back the clock 20 years in the drug
war. He has hurt this Nation by his lack of leadership on this issue,
and it is time to turn this retreat around.
I again call on our President not just to join, but to lead an attack
on illegal drugs and their use in this country.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary and a series of
excerpts of relevant reports be printed in the Record. They are most
informative. I urge my colleagues to read them.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Summary
Key Findings
Losing ground against drugs
1. The number of 12-17 year-olds using marijuana increased
from 1.6 million in 1992 to 2.9 million in 1994.
2. The number of individuals prosecuted for federal drug
violations dropped from 25,033 in 1992 to 23,114 in 1993, and
still lower to 21,905 in 1994--a 12 percent drop in just two
years.
3. Street-level heroin is at a record level, even as the
price of a pure gram fell from $2,032 to $1,278 per gram
between February 1993 and February 1995.
Setting the course: a national drug strategy
1. Attitudes among teenagers about the dangers of drug use
are changing--for the worse. After more than a decade of
viewing drugs as dangerous, a new generation increasingly
sees no harm in using drugs.
2. The President has abandoned the bully pulpit against
drugs and radically reduced the staff of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy from 147 to 25, rendering it
largely ineffectual.
News conference from National Drug Policy Director McCaffrey
1. Heroin's popularity continues to rise and inexperienced
dealers are selling dangerous mixtures called heroin
``cocktails'' which have hospitalized more than 120 people in
May alone.
2. Methamphetamine, Rohypnol, Ketamine, Quaaludes, and
ephedrine are drugs emerging as ``club drugs'' and continue
to rise in popularity among young adults.
The Clinton administration's continuing retreat in the war on
drugs--Heritage Foundation
1. The Clinton Administration's failure to appoint
effective leaders in key positions to articulate and enforce
a strong anti-drug message has seriously undercut drug
efforts.
2. Former drug-policy Director Lee Brown attributes the
``troubling'' decline in prosecutions to ``the policies of
the new U.S. Attorneys who de-emphasized prosecution of
small-scale drug offenders.''
Adolescent drug use likely to increase again in '96--
Partnership for a Drug-Free America
1. Driven by increasingly lax attitudes about marijuana,
America's teenagers are seeing fewer risks and more personal
rewards in drug use. They are less likely to consider drug
use harmful and risky, more likely to believe that drug use
is widespread and tolerated, and feel more pressure to try
illegal drugs than teens did just 2 years ago.
Journal of the Clandestine Laboratory Investigating Chemists
Association
1. Numerous labs have been seized showing increasing
production of methamphetamines. Laboratory operators are
taking advantage of the fact that all sales of the
pseudoephedrine drug products, regardless of the quantity
involved, are completely unregulated.
Drug use rises again in 1995 among American teens--The
University of Michigan
1. Annual surveys of some 50,000 students in over 400
public and private secondary schools nationwide reveal that
in 1995, marijuana use continued the strong resurgence that
began in the early 1990s with increased use at all grade
levels. The proportion of eighth-graders taking any illicit
drug has almost doubled since 1991, has risen nearly two-
thirds among 10th-graders since 1992, and has risen by nearly
half among 12th-graders.
Preliminary estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network--
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
1. Comparing the first half of 1995 with the first half of
1994, there was a 10 percent increase in drug-related
hospital emergency department episodes. Heroin-related
episodes increased by 27 percent, marijuana-related episodes
increased by 32 percent, and methamphetamine-related episodes
increased by 35 percent.
Women and drugs--Wall Street Journal (June 6, 1996)
1. Unfortunately, the gender gap among drug users is
quickly closing as women catch up with men when it comes to
smoking, drinking, and doing drugs.
____
Losing Ground Against Drugs--A Report on Increasing Illicit Drug Use
and National Drug Policy
(Prepared by Majority Staff, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senator
Orrin G. Hatch, Utah, Chairman)
Introduction
Through the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the United
States experienced dramatic and unprecedented reductions in
casual drug use.
The number of Americans using illicit drugs plunged from
24.7 million in 1979 to 11.4 million in 1992. The so-called
``casual'' use of cocaine fell by 79 percent between 1985 and
1992, while monthly cocaine use fell 55 percent between 1988
and 1992 alone--from 2.9 million to 1.3 million users.
On the surface, little appears to have changed since 1992.
For the nation as a whole, drug use remains relatively flat.
The vast majority of Americans still do not use illegal
drugs.
Unfortunately, this appearance is dangerously misleading.
Drug use has in fact experienced a dramatic resurgence among
our youth, a disturbing trend that could quickly return the
United States to the epidemic of drug use that characterized
the decade of the 1970s.
Recent surveys, described in detail in this report, provide
overwhelming evidence of a sharp and growing increase in drug
use among young people:
The number of 12-17 year-olds using marijuana increased
from 1.6 million in 1992 to 2.9 million in 1994. The category
of ``recent marijuana use'' increased a staggering 200
percent among 14-15 year-olds over the same period.
Since 1992, there has been a 52 percent jump in the number
of high-school seniors using drugs on a monthly basis, even
as worrisome declines are noted in peer disapproval of drug
use.
One in three high school seniors now smokes marijuana.
Young people are actually more likely to be aware of the
health dangers of cigarettes than of the dangers of
marijuana.
Nor have recent increases been confined to marijuana. At
least three surveys note increased use of inhalants and other
drugs such as cocaine and LSD.
Drug use by young people is alarming by any standard, but
especially so since teen drug use is at the root of hard-core
drug use by adults. According to surveys by the Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse, 12-17 year-olds who use
marijuana are 85 times more likely to graduate to cocaine
than those who abstain from marijuana. Fully 60 percent of
adolescents who use marijuana before age 15 will later use
cocaine. Conversely, those who reach age 21 without ever
having used drugs almost never try them later in life.
Described another way, perhaps 820,000 of the new crop of
youthful marijuana smokers will eventually try cocaine. Of
these 820,000 who try cocaine, some 58,000 may end up as
regular users and addicts.
The implications of public policy are clear. If such
increases are allowed to continue for
[[Page S9019]]
just two more years, America will be at risk of returning to
the epidemic drug use of the 1970s. Should that happen, our
ability to control health care costs, reform welfare, improve
the academic performance of our school-age children, and
defuse the projected ``crime bomb'' of youthful super-
predator criminals, will all be seriously compromised.
With these thoughts in mind, I am pleased to present
``Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on Increasing Illicit
Drug Use and National Drug Policy'' prepared at my direction
by the majority staff of the United States Senate Committee
on the Judiciary. This report examines trends in drug use and
the Clinton Administration's sometimes uneven response to
them, including the Administration's controversial policy of
targeting chronic, hardcore drug users. The report also
reviews the state of trends in use and availability. And,
finally, it evaluates the performance over the past three
years of our nation's criminal justice and interdiction
systems.
The report finds Federal law enforcement under severe
strain just as the technical sophistication of drug
trafficking syndicates is reaching new heights. It finds that
the Administration's supply reduction policy is in utter
disarray, with a 53 percent drop in our ability to interdict
and push back drug shipments in the transit zone. The report
also finds increases in the purity of drugs and the number of
drug-related emergency room admissions of hard-core users.
Federal drug policy is at a crossroads. Ineffectual
leadership and failed federal policies have combined with
ambiguous cultural messages to generate changing attitudes
among our young people and sharp increases in youthful drug
use.
The American people recognize these problems and are
increasingly concerned: A Gallup poll released December 12,
1995 shows that 94 percent of Americans view illegal drug use
as either a ``crisis'' or a ``very serious problem.'' Their
concern, which I share, underscores the danger of
compromising our struggle against the drug trade. I look
forward to addressing the issues raised in this report in
future hearings of the United States Senate Committee on the
Judiciary.
overview
For its first eight months in office, the Clinton
Administration's approach to the drug issue could best be
described as benign neglect. Then, in September 1993, the
Administration announced a new approach to drug policy,
promising to ``reinvent our drug control programs'' and
``move beyond ideological debates.'' The new Administration
policy deemphasized law enforcement and shifted away from
interdiction, while promising dividends from treating hard-
core drug users.
Almost three years into the Administration, however, the
results of its early neglect, and subsequent policy
``reinvention,'' are in. Drug use is up--dramatically so
among young people. Promised reductions in hard-core use--the
centerpiece of the Administration strategy--have failed to
materialize. New money to expand the nation's treatment
system has coincided with a projected decrease in treatment
``slot.''
Law enforcement efforts, mean-while, are not keeping pace
with the kingpins who run the drug trade, whose resources and
technical sophistication are increasing yearly. Prosecutorial
efforts appear to have stumbled as well, with a 12 percent
decline in prosecutions over just two years.
Presidentially ordered interdiction cuts appear to have
resulted in an increased supply of drugs on American streets.
Illicit drugs are now available in greater quantities, at
higher purity, and at lower prices than ever before. The
Administration's strategy for coping with these problems is
predicated on a series of goals that one drug policy expert
described as ``merely an unprioritized list [that does
little] to direct policy.
Viewed together, these factors paint a disturbing picture
of inattention to a serious and growing national threat.
____
Preliminary Estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service
highlights
The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) is a national
probability survey of hospitals with emergency departments
conducted annually by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA). The survey is designed to
collect data on emergency department episodes which are
directly related to the use of an illegal drug or non-medical
use of a legal drug. Analyses in this report focus primarily
on recent trends in drug-related episodes. Preliminary
estimates for the first half of 1995 are compared with data
from the first half of 1994. The major DAWN findings are:
In the first half of 1995, there were 279,100 drug-related
hospital emergency department episodes representing an
increase of 10 percent from the first half of 1994 (252,600).
An estimated 76,800 cocaine-related episodes were reported
in the first half of 1995 compared with 68,400 in the first
half of 1994, an increase of 12 percent.
Cocaine-related episodes rose by 21 percent (from 26,100 to
31,500) among persons aged 35 years and older between the
first half of 1994 and the first half of 1995. A 17 percent
increase was observed among blacks (from 36,200 to 42,500).
The number of heroin-related episodes increased by 27
percent between the first half of 1994 and the first half of
1995 (from 30,000 to 38,100).
Between the first half of 1994 and the first half of 1995,
heroin-related episodes increased by 39 percent among whites
(from 10,800 to 15,000) and by 32 percent (from 16,100 to
21,100) among persons aged 35 years and older.
Marijuana/hashish-related episodes rose from 19,100 in the
first half of 1994 to 25,200 in the first half of 1995, a 32
percent increase. Marijuana episodes usually occur in
combination with other substances, particularly alcohol and
cocaine.
The number of methamphetamine (speed)-related episodes
increased by 35 percent (from 7,800 to 10,600) between the
first half of 1994 and the first half of 1995.
introduction
This report contains preliminary data for the first 6
months of 1995 and final annual and semi-annual estimates of
drug-related emergency department episodes for 1988 through
1994, from the Drug Abuse Warning Network [DAWN], an ongoing
national survey of hospital emergency departments.
Since the early 1970's, DAWN has collected information on
patients seeking hospital emergency department treatment
related to their use of an illegal drug or the nonmedical use
of a legal drug. The survey provides data that describe the
impact of drug use on hospital emergency departments in the
United States. Data are collected by trained reporters--
nurses and other hospital personnel--who review medical
charts for indications--noted by hospital staff who treated
the patients--that drug use was the reason for the emergency
department visit. Thus, the accuracy of these reports depends
on the careful recording of this information by hospital
staff.
To be included in DAWN, the person presenting to the
emergency department must be aged 6 years and older and meet
all four of the following criteria:
The patient was treated in the hospital's emergency
department;
The patient's presenting problem was induced by or related
to drug use, regardless of when the drug ingestion occurred;
The case involved the nonmedical use of a legal drug or any
use of an illegal drug;
The patient's reason for taking the substance included one
of the following: (1) dependence, (2) suicide attempt or
gesture, or (3) psychic effects.
Hospitals eligible for DAWN are non-Federal, short-stay
general hospitals that have a 24-hour emergency department.
Since 1988, the DAWN emergency department data have been
collected from a representative sample of these hospitals
located throughout the coterminous United States, including
21 oversampled metropolitan areas. The data from this sample
are used to generate estimates of the total number of
emergency department drug episodes and drug mentions in all
such hospitals.
Recently, SAMHSA conducted a thorough review of the
computer programs which produces the DAWN estimates. As a
result, corrections were made to the 1993 estimates that had
been previously released. Estimated presented in the last
DAWN release (Advance Report Number 11 ``Preliminary
Estimates from the DAWN--1994'') and in Annual Emergency
Department Data 1993 [Series 1, Number 13-A, DHHS Pub. No.
(SMA) 96-3080] and in this report are based on these
corrected programs. Because the impact on national estimates
was found to be small for 1992, those estimates were not
revised. However, the impact is significant for some
metropolitan areas and may be significant for selected drugs.
Thus, readers should use caution when comparing 1992 (and
earlier) estimates and 1993 (and later) estimates. See
Appendix I for details.
Estimates from DAWN are released periodically in reports
such as this Advance Report, and are published in Annual
Reports which contain more detailed tables and a complete
description of the DAWN methodology (reference: Annual
Emergency Department Data 1993. Series I, Number 13-A. DHHS
Pub l. No. (SMA) 96-3080). 1995 estimates in this report are
preliminary because they are based on incomplete data and
adjustment factors from the previous year. Final estimates
for 1995 will be published later when all hospitals
participating in DAWN have submitted their data and when
additional ancillary data used in estimation become
available. The differences between preliminary and final
estimates are due to several factors: final estimates include
data from a small number of late-reporting hospitals;
additional hospitals are added to the sample and incorporated
into the final estimates; and data from the most current
listings of all eligible hospitals are used to produce the
final weights.
The DAWN system also collects data on drug-related deaths
from a nonrandom sample of medical examiners. Data from
medical examiners are not included in this report. Medical
examiner data are published annually (reference: Annual
Medical Examiner Data 1994. Series I, Number 14-B. DDHS Pub.
No. (SMA) 96-3078).
____
Setting the Course--A National Drug Strategy
(By the Task Force on National Drug Policy, and convened by: Majority
Leader Bob Dole and Speaker Newt Gingrich)
task force on national drug policy
Senator Charles Grassley, Co-Chair,
Senator Orrin Hatch, Co-Chair,
Senator Spence Abraham,
[[Page S9020]]
Senator John Ashcroft,
Senator Paul Coverdell,
Senator Alfonse D'Amato,
Senator Mike DeWine,
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison,
Senator Olympia Snowe,
Representative Henry Hyde, Co-Chair,
Representative William Zeliff, Co-Chair,
Representative Mike Forbes,
Representative Ben Gilman,
Representative Bill McCollum,
Representative Rob Portman,
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Representative Clay Shaw,
Representative J.C. Watts.
executive summary
The facts are simple. After more than a decade of decline,
teenage drug use is on the rise. Dramatically. Every survey,
every study of drug use in America reconfirms this depressing
finding.
What is even more disturbing is that attitudes among
teenagers about the dangers of drug use are also changing--
for the worse. After more than a decade of viewing drugs as
dangerous, a new generation increasingly sees no harm in
using drugs.
Just such a shift in attitudes engendered the last drug
epidemic in this country. The 1960s saw a significant
movement among many of the nation's intellectual leaders,
media gurus, and even some politicians that glorified drug
use. These attitudes influenced the thinking and decision
making of many of our young people. We are still living with
the consequences of the 1960s and 1970s attitudes in the form
of a long-term addict population and thousands of casualties,
including a staggering number of drug-addicted newborns and
many of our homeless.
The American public recoiled at the social pathologies
associated with the illegal drug epidemic then, and recent
polls indicate that they are just as concerned today that we
are about to repeat history because we failed to learn our
lesson. Despite the fact that we made major inroads on
reducing drug use in the 1980s, the press and many others
have helped to create the idea that nothing works and that
our only policy options are the decriminalization or outright
legalization of drugs.
The media turned their attention away from the drug issue
and have not returned to it in the last three years. The
Clinton Administration has downplayed the drug issue,
demoting it as a national priority and distancing the
President from it. The message that drug use was wrong was
de-emphasized, while interdiction and enforcement were
downplayed in order to concentrate on treatment. The result
has been to replace ``Just Say No'' with ``Just Say
Nothing.'' We are suffering the consequences.
On December 13, 1995, Majority Leader Bob Dole and Speaker
of the House Newt Gingrich convened a bicameral Task Force on
National Drug Policy to break the silence. They asked the
Task Force to make recommendations on how Congress might, as
it has many times in the past, put drugs back on the national
agenda. This report is the result of the Task Force's
efforts. It reflects the results of town meetings,
discussions with experts, and meetings with leading treatment
and prevention organizations. This report represents a
beginning of effort not the conclusion.
The Task Force's first and most important recommendation
calls for a serious national drug strategy. Recent
Administration strategies have been thin and they have
arguably failed to meet the clear statutory obligation that
specific and measurable objectives be included. Our national
strategy is incomplete and has focused efforts in areas that
have not worked. We need a more serious effort.
Such a strategy does not have to re-invent the wheel. It
does need to do the right things with the right stuff. This
means a focus on prevention, law enforcement, and
interdiction. It means presidential leadership within the
Executive Branch and at large. It involves congressional
oversight of programs and support to effective, well-managed
efforts. It means a program that adds substance to rhetoric
and matches ends to means in a sustainable effort.
A reinvigorated national drug strategy needs to focus on
five major elements:
1. We need a sound interdiction strategy that employs our
resources in the transit zone, in the source countries of
Latin America, and near the borders to stop the flow of
illegal drugs. This means renewed efforts at US Customs, DEA,
INS, DoD, and the Coast Guard to identify the sources,
methods, and individuals involved in trafficking and going
after them and their assets.
2. A renewed commitment to the drug effort requires a
serious international component that increases international
commitment to the full range of counter-drug activities.
These must involve efforts to prevent money laundering; to
develop common banking practices that prevent safe havens;
serious commitments to impose sanctions on countries that
fail to meet standards of cooperation; efforts to ensure
proper controls over precursor chemicals; and an
international convention on organized crime that develops
common approaches for targeting the main international
criminal organizations, their leaders and assets.
3. US national drug strategy should also take steps to
ensure that drug laws are effectively enforced, particularly
that there be truth in sentencing for rug trafficking and
drug-related violent crimes.
4. Prevention and education are critical elements in a
renewed strategy. There needs to be greater coordination and
effective oversight of Federal prevention and education
programs, which should involve the integration of disparate
drug programs in HHS, DoJ, and elsewhere under one authority.
This more integrated approach should focus on empowering
local communities and families, and must develop more
effective evaluation programs to determine which delivery
mechanisms are the best.
5. Treatment must remain an important element to any
strategy, but more needs to be done to eliminate duplication
and waste. A renewed strategy needs to look at establishing
more effective evaluation techniques to determine which
treatment programs are the most successful. Accountability
must be a key element in our programs.
We also need to look at the role of religious institutions
in our efforts to combat drug use. America cannot ignore the
link between our growing drug problem and the increase in
moral poverty in our lives.
The members of the Task Force also note that even the best
strategy in the world is worth no more than the effort spent
on turning it into reality. Thus, the Administration and
Congress have a responsibility to develop and implement
sustained and sustainable programs. An effective effort,
however, must go beyond what the Executive and Congress can
do. A true national effort must involve parents, families,
schools, religious institutions, local and state governments,
civic groups, and the private sector.
Finally, the Task Force members note that many of our
current social pathologies, in addition to drug use, arise
from causes directly related to a climate that disparages
essential moral and ethical principles of personal behavior.
Out of the best of intentions, we have pursued policies that
have replaced a sense of personal responsibility with
conscienceless self-esteem. In doing so, we have belittled
traditional family virtues and encouraged a cheapening of
social discourse. Our public places have become threatening
to decent people because of misplaced tolerance for
aggression and public incivility. Many of our children are
now having children, born out of wedlock into lives of
meanness and violence.
In calling for a recommitment to sustained, coherent
efforts against drugs, the Task Force members recognize that
this effort is part of a larger struggle for the soul our
young people and our future. We reject the counsels of
despair that say that nothing can be done. That our only
recourse is to declare surrender and legalize drugs. We
recognize that the drug problem is a generational one. Every
year the country produces a new platoon of young people who
must be guided to responsible adulthood. A continuing, vital
anti-drug message sustained by meaningful prevention, law
enforcement and interdiction programs is part of the
responsibility our generation has to the next. This report is
a wake-up call to America to do its duty.
____
The University of Michigan,
December 11, 1995.
Drug Use Rises Again in 1995 Among American Teens
Ann Arbor.--The use of drugs among American secondary
school students rose again in 1995, continuing a trend that
began in 1991 among eighth-grade students, and in 1992 among
10th- and 12th-graders, according to scientists at the
University of Michigan.
The proportion of eighth-graders taking any illicit drug in
the 12 months prior to the survey has almost doubled since
1991 (from 11 percent to 21 percent). Since 1992 the
proportion using any illicit drugs in the prior 12 months has
risen by nearly two-thirds among 10th-graders (from 20
percent to 33 percent) and by nearly half among 12th-graders
(from 27 to 39 percent.)
The findings are from the Monitoring the Future Study, a
series of annual surveys of some 50,000 students in over 400
public and private secondary schools nationwide. The U-M
investigators who have directed the study for the 21 years of
its existence are social scientists Lloyd Johnston, Jerald
Dachman and Patrick C. Malley--all faculty at the U-M's
Survey Research Center. The work is supported by the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, one of the National Institutes of
Health in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
In 1995, marijuana use, in particular, continued the strong
resurgence that began in the early 1990's, with increased use
at all three grade levels. Among eighth-graders, annual
prevalence (i.e., the proportion reporting any use in the 12
months prior to the survey) has risen to two-and-one-half
times its level in 1991, from 6 percent in 1991 to 16 percent
in 1995. Among 10th-graders, annual prevalence has nearly
doubled from the low point in use in 1992 of 15 percent to 29
percent in 1995; among 12th-graders annual prevalence has
increased by more than half, from the low point of 22 percent
in 1992 to 35 percent in 1995.
``Of particular concern in the continuing rise in daily
marijuana use,'' observes Johnston. Nearly one in 20 (4.6
percent) of today's high school seniors is a current daily
marijuana user, and roughly one in every 35 10th-graders (2.8
percent). Fewer than one in a hundred eight-graders use at
that level (0.8 percent). These rates have risen sharply as
overall marijuana use has increased.
The investigators found that while marijuana use has shown
the sharpest increase, the use of a number of other illicit
drugs, including LSD, hallucinogens other than LSD,
amphetamines, stimulants, and inhalants, has also continued
to drift upward.
[[Page S9021]]
The use of LSD continued to rise in all three grade levels
in 1995, continuing longer-term increases that began at least
as far back as 1991. The proportions reporting and LSD use in
the 12 months prior to the 1995 survey were 3 percent, 7
percent, and 8 percent for eighth-, 10th-, and 12th-graders,
respectively.
Hallucinogens other than LSD, taken as a class, showed
smaller increases in 1995 at all three grade levels. The
annual prevalence rates for eighth-, 10th-, and 12th-graders
are considerably lower than for LSD: 2 percent, 3 percent,
and 4 percent, respectively.
The longer-term rise in the use of amphetamine stimulants
continued in 1995 at the eighth- and 10th-grade levels, but
use leveled among 12th-graders. Annual prevalence rates are 9
percent, 12 percent, and 9 percent for grades eight, 10, and
12, respectively.
The use of cocaine in any form continued a gradual upward
climb, though most of the one-year changes do not reach
statistical significance. The same is true for crack cocaine.
So far, at least, these increases have been very gradual. The
annual prevalence rates for use of cocaine in any form are
2.6 percent, 3.5 percent, and 4 percent for grades eight, 10,
and 12, respectively, while for crack use they are 1.6
percent, 1.8 percent, and 2.1 percent.
Several other classes of illicit drugs also have been
showing very gradual increases since the early 1990s,
including tranquilizers and three drug classes reported only
for 12th-graders--barbiturates, ice (crystal
methamphetamine), and opiates other than heroin.
Questions about heroin use have been in the study from the
beginning and have generally shown low (and for many years
among 12th-graders, stable) rates of use. However, use began
to rise after 1991 among 10th- and 12-graders, and after 1993
among eighth-graders, as well. There was a statistically
significant increase in annual heroin prevalence among
eighth-graders in 1994, and then among 12-graders in 1995.
All three grades showed some increase in both years. While
the annual prevalence rates for heroin remain quite low in
1995 compared to most other drugs, they are nevertheless two
to three times higher than they had been a few years ago. The
annual prevalence rates in 1995 are between 1.1 percent and
1.4 percent at all three grade levels.
The small increase in heroin use in 1994 led the
investigators to distinguish in half of the 1995
questionnaires between two different methods for taking
heroin: with a needle and without a needle. Their hypothesis
was that non-injection forms of use (e.g., snorting or
smoking) may be accounting for the rise in overall use.
Consistent with this hypothesis, in 1995 a large proportion
of those reporting heroin use indicated that at least some of
their use involved a non-injection method of administration
(63 percent, 75 percent, and 89 percent of the past-year
heroin users in grades eight, 10, and 12, respectively)
Further, a substantial proportion indicated using heroin only
in a non-injectable form (32 percent, 45 percent, and 57
percent of the past-year heroin users for grades eight, 10,
and 12, respectively).
``Obviously this is not a runaway epidemic among teens, but
it should give rise to some caution,'' Johnston comments.
``Many of these young users may be under the misconception
that they cannot become addicted to heroin if they use it in
a non-injectable form. The fact is that they can. In
Southeast Asia and other parts of the world there are many
thousands of opium smokers who are heavily addicted, and
heroin is simply a powerful derivative of opium.
``While these levels of illicit drug use are certainly
reason for concern,'' observes Johnston, ``it should be noted
that they are still well below the peak levels attained in
the late 1970s. We are in a relapse phase in the longer-term
epidemic, if you will, but it is certainly not something over
which society is powerless. Our great progress in the past at
lowering the rates of illicit drug use among our young people
is proof of that.'' To illustrate, between 1979 and 1992, the
proportion of 12th-graders reporting using any illicit drug
in the 12 months prior to the survey fell by half, from 54
percent to 27 percent.
Alcohol use among American secondary students generally has
remained fairly stable in the past few years, though at rates
which most adults would probably consider to be unacceptably
high. (This remains true in 1995, although there has been
some small increase among 12th-graders over the past two
years.) In 1995 the proportions of students having five or
more drinks in a row during the two weeks preceding the
survey were 15 percent, 24 percent, and 30 percent for the
eighth-, 10th-, and 12th-graders, respectively.
____
[From the Backgrounder, the Heritage Foundation, July 12, 1996]
The Clinton Administration's Continuing Retreat in the War on Drugs
(By John P. Walters and James F.X. O'Gara)
Highlights
The Clinton Administration has a poor record in fighting
the war on drugs. Interdiction efforts and prosecution for
illegal drugs are down, illegal drug usage and emergency room
admissions are up. Part of the problem has been a failure in
personnel management: the inability or unwillingness to
appoint effective leaders in key positions to articulate and
enforce a strong anti-drug message, as well as inappropriate
reductions in staff at agencies dedicated to dealing with the
problem on the front lines.
The President must exercise leadership on this issue and
use his bully pulpit to send an unambiguous anti-drug
message. Members of Congress also need to focus federal
efforts on law enforcement and interdiction programs that
work, and fund only those rehabilitation programs that have a
track record of success. One way Congress can do this is to
allow funding for drug counseling and drug rehabilitation
programs provided by religious organizations.
America's illegal drug problem is complex and presents a
special challenge for policymakers in Congress and the White
House. But the complexity and the difficulty of the issue are
no excuse for ineffective policy and a lack of serious
effort.
Introduction
The Clinton Administration continues to retreat in the war
on drugs. After a decade of consistent progress during the
Reagan and Bush Administrations, almost every available
indicator today shows the United States is losing--some would
say surrendering--in the prolonged struggle against illegal
drugs. Consider the evidence:
Since President Clinton took office, the number of 12-to-
17-years-olds using marijuana has almost doubled--2.9 million
compared with the 1992 level of 1.6 million.\1\ One in three
high school seniors now smokes marijuana, and 48.4 percent of
the Class of 1995 had tried drugs by graduation day.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LSD use has reached the highest rate since record-keeping
started in 1975. Fully 11.7 percent of the Class of 1995 had
tried it at least once.\3\
The number of cocaine-and heroin-related emergency room
admissions has jumped to historic levels. In the first half
of 1995, cocaine-related emergency room cases were 65 percent
above the level in the first half of 1991. Heroin admissions
soared 120 percent over the same period.\4\
Methamphetamine use has turned into a major problem,
particularly in the Western United States. In the first half
of 1995, meth-related emergency room cases were up by 321
percent compared with the first half of 1991.\5\
While there are many different reasons for this
deterioration in America's resistance to illegal drugs, part
of the explanation is a failure in federal policy. President
Clinton and his Administration have demonstrated little
leadership on the issue and have failed to send out an
unambiguous message of disapproval to young Americans. The
President's personnel appointments in this area have ranged
from the virtually invisible, as in the case of former ``drug
czar'' Lee Brown, to the embarrassing, as in the case of Dr.
Joycelyn Elders, former Surgeon General of the United States.
Staffing at the Office of National Drug Control Policy was
cut by 80 percent--from 147 to 25. Moreover, although the
President's election year budget reverses this cut and
requests major increases for drug law enforcement, his FY
1995 request would have eliminated 621 drug enforcement
positions.
The Clinton Administration's policy initiatives have been
similarly ineffectual, especially their focus on hard core
drug users at the expense of stronger law enforcement and
interdiction. The evidence is in: Federal illegal drug
caseloads fell by 10.3 percent from FY 1992 to FY 1995; the
government-wide interdiction budget has been cut 39 percent
since 1993; the impact of interdiction programs has dropped
off sharply; and drug-related hospital emergency room
admissions have hit record levels.
Instead of pursuing ineffectual anti-drug policies and
giving the impression that curbing drug use is not a
priority, the President and Congress should demonstrate
leadership in this deadly contest. If the United States is
serious about combating the infiltration of illegal drugs
across America's borders and into the nation's cities, towns,
neighborhoods, and schools, several steps need to be taken:
The President must use the ``bully pulpit'' of his office
to send out a clear message that drug use is unacceptable.
American must assist its allies in Latin America and
elsewhere in their efforts to take on the drug cartels.
The President must propose budgetary, personnel, and policy
initiatives that make it absolutely clear that Washington
means business in curbing the flow of drugs into America.
Congress should pass legislation to close loopholes that
result in excessively lenient sentences for marijuana
smugglers.
Congress should continue to block the United States
Sentencing Commission's proposals to lower sentences for
crack cocaine dealers.
Washington must get serious about promoting rehabilitation
that works, such as religion-based programs, instead of
simply funding programs that promise to rehabilitate drug
addicts and fail to deliver. Congress should re-evaluate all
treatment programs carefully. The basis of federal funding
for drug rehabilitation should be a clear track record of
success.
America succeeded in reducing the rate of drug use,
especially among vulnerable teenagers, in the 1980s because
local efforts were reinforced by a serious program of law
enforcement, interdiction, and hard-headed demand reduction
policies, and because the Reagan and Bush Administrations
made it very clear that they were determined to win the war
against drugs. Unfortunately, the
[[Page S9022]]
Clinton Administration has adopted a very different posture,
and America is now losing the war.
the failure of leadership
The illegal drug problem is admittedly complex, but
complexity is no excuse for inaction. President Clinton began
derailing the successful approaches of prior administrations
from the earliest days of his presidency. After promising to
``reinvent our drug control programs'' and ``move beyond
ideological debates,'' the President announced a new approach
to drug policy, de-emphasizing law enforcement and effecting
a ``controlled shift'' away from interdiction. More
important, in a message to Congress, he promised to ``change
the focus of drug policy by targeting chronic, hardcore drug
users.'' \6\ This ineffectual policy--the latest
manifestation of the liberals' commitment to a ``therapeutic
state'' in which government serves as the agent of personal
rehabilitation--seems to have been rejected even by the
President's new drug czar. General Barry McCaffrey, who has
moved to elevate the profile of prevention programs.
Cuts in the interdiction system and the dismantling of
other programs with records of success have been accompanied
by the increased availability of drugs. Ironically, the
Clinton drug policy has been most harmful to its intended
beneficiaries--the very hard-core drug addicts who are
cycling through emergency rooms at record rates.
The President's lack of visibility on the drug issue has
drawn criticism from prominent congressional supporters of
drug control programs, including leading Democrats in the
House and Senate. Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) admits he has
``been openly critical of this President's silence.''\7\ And
Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY) has gone so far as to
declare, ``I've been in Congress over two decades, and I have
never, never, never found any Administration that been so
silent on this great challenge to the American people.''\8\
In fact, since taking office, President Clinton has been
significantly engaged in only one aspect of the drug
problem--drugs in schools, which arguably is not even the
federal government's responsibility. In June 1995, Clinton
promised to veto any attempt by the 104th Congress to cut the
Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities program, which
Congress had evaluated and found to be ineffective. Bob
Peterson, former Michigan drug czar, described the program as
a ``slush fund,'' and even former ONDCP Director Lee Brown
acknowledged ``abuses of the program'' in testimony before a
House subcommittee.\9\''
The Disturbing Change in the Trends. During the 1980s and
early 1990s, the United States experienced dramatic
reductions in casual drug use--reductions that were won
through increased penalties, strong presidential leadership,
and a clear national anti-drug message. Beyond the
substantial investment of resources, engaged commanders in
chief used the bully pulpit to change attitudes. Because
Ronald Reagan and George Bush visibly involved themselves in
the effort to combat illegal drugs, they helped rescue much
of a generation. Overall, casual drug use was cut by more
than half between 1977 and 1992. Casual cocaine use fell by
79 percent, while monthly use fell from 2.9 million users in
1988 to 1.3 million in 1992.\10\ Strong presidential
leadership had tangible effects.
Against this backdrop of accomplishment, Bill Clinton
promised to get even tougher than his predecessors. Indeed,
while campaigning for the presidency, then-Governor Clinton
appeared to take an even harder line on illegal drugs than
Bush, declaring that ``President Bush hasn't fought a real
war on crime and drugs . . . [and] I will.'' On the link
between drugs and crime, Clinton said, ``We have a national
problem on our hands that requires a tough national
response.''\11\
Despite the tough rhetoric, however, the President's
performance has been disappointing. Perhaps the first solid
indication that rhetoric and reality would not fit neatly in
the same policy box was the appointment of Dr. Joycelyn
Elders of Arkansas as Surgeon General of the United States.
Dr. Elders, among other things, offered the taxpayers the
tantalizing theory that legalization of drugs might
``markedly reduce our crime rate'' without increasing drug
use.\12\ As for the President himself, his image of
rhetorical toughness was compromised on occasion by remarks
that could at best be described as indifferent, at worst as
flippant.\13\
downgrading the war on drugs
The President's ill-considered public words have been
accompanied by a reduction in tangible resources and effort.
Within weeks of taking office, the Clinton Administration
announced that it would slash the Office of National Drug
Control Policy staff from 147 to 25. The President made the
Director of the Office a member of the Cabinet, but the move
was empty symbolism. This became painfully evident when his
new Director, former New York City Police Commissioner Lee P.
Brown, was observed to be virtually invisible during his two-
and-one-half-year tenure. President Bush's Drug Policy
Director, William Bennett, told Congress that the Clinton
Administration cuts essentially would relegate the new
Director to the position of an office clerk.\14\
Cuts in the drug czar's office prefigured much larger cuts
in federal enforcement and interdiction agencies. The
Administration's fiscal 1995 budget, for example, proposed to
slash 621 drug enforcement positions from the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), Customs Service, FBI, and Coast
Guard.\15\ The DEA, America's only law enforcement agency
dedicated exclusively to fighting the drug trade, lost 227
agent positions between September 1992 and September 1995--
more than 6 percent of its agent force.
Declining Caseloads. Cuts in law enforcement paralleled
reduced drug case filings. The Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts registered a 10.3 percent reduction in federal
case filings between FY 1992 and FY 1995, and the total
number of defendants indicted in these cases declined by 8.5
percent. The number of federal drug cases refused for
prosecution increased by 18.6 percent over the same period as
U.S. Attorneys pursued more investigations into health-care
fraud and other areas deemed to be of greater priority than
combating illegal drugs.
In an April 26, 1995, letter to Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT), then-Drug Policy Director Lee
Brown attributed the ``troubling'' decline in prosecutions to
``the policies of the new U.S. Attorneys who de-emphasized
prosecution of small-scale drug offenders.'' Director Brown
also quoted the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to
the effect that the change had been ``consistent with DOJ
policy''.
Despite the abundance of data confirming the declining
trend in illegal drug prosecutions, Clinton Administration
officials have cited different figures, compiled by the
Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, to suggest that case
filings and defendants prosecuted actually rose 12.9 and 12.1
percent, respectively, between fiscal 1994 and fiscal 1995.
But even according to these figures, the number of drug
defendants prosecuted dropped for the three years prior to
1995, and remains 5.2 percent below the FY 1992 level.\16\
In a textbook illustration of the laxness of Clinton
Administration drug policy, the Los Angeles Times revealed on
May 12, 1996, that hundreds of marijuana smugglers ``have
been allowed to go free after U.S. authorities arrested them
with substantial quantities of drugs at ports of entry in
California.'' \17\ Attorney General Janet Reno objected to
the article's claims, noting that the individuals in question
are ``punished'' by having their border crossing cards
confiscated. Ms. Reno added that prosecution may be
``deferred'' only if five mitigating factors are present, a
claim that elicited this reaction from Bush Administration
Drug Enforcement Administration head Robert C. Bonner:
Reno claims that only Mexican nationals qualify under the
leniency policy. This results in two standards of justice.
U.S. citizens are prosecuted, but Mexican nationals get a
free ride to Mexico.
Another criterion is being caught with under 125 pounds of
marijuana. So, if you are smuggling ``only'' 100 pounds, with
a wholesale value of over $100,000, you meet one of the
criteria.
Now, Reno also says that there must also be ``insufficient
evidence'' of knowledge and intent, but, of course, no one
should be prosecuted, regardless of citizenship or quantity,
if evidence of knowledge and intent are not present.\18\
Dropping the Safeguards. The Clinton Administration began
to reduce America's drug interdiction efforts within a year
of the inaugural. On November 3, 1993, against the vehement
objections of senior Coast Guard officers, the National
Security Council issued a classified presidential memorandum
dictating a ``controlled shift'' of interdiction assets to
other functions. At the same time, flight hours in the so-
called ``transit zone'' between the United States and South
America were cut by 50 percent, many interdiction aircraft
and helicopters were put into mothballs, ship ``steaming
days'' were cut by a third, and Department of Defense
detection and monitoring budgets were reduced by more than
half. Controlling for inflation, the aggregate government-
wide drug interdiction budget has been cut 39 percent since
the last year of the Bush Administration.\19\
The impact of these cuts was almost immediate: Between 1993
and 1994, U.S. interdiction forces experienced a 47 percent
drop in their ability to stop drug shipments from Latin
America. Cocaine seizures by the Customs Service and the
Coast Guard fell by 70 percent and 71 percent, respectively,
during the same period.\20\ Overall interdiction
effectiveness has dropped by a cumulative 64 percent between
1993 and 1996.\21\
Some, including General McCaffrey, have attempted to argue,
against the evidence, that this reduced effectiveness was the
result of changing trafficker routes, not vastly diminished
levels of national effort. This argument is refuted by an
interdiction study commissioned by the Clinton Administration
itself. The study, performed for the Office of National Drug
Control Policy by the EBR Corporation, using conservative
assumptions, showed that restoring $500 million in assets to
the transit zone could cause seizures, jettisons, and
mission-aborts totaling 130 tons of cocaine per year. In
round terms, this means that restoring half the assets cut by
the Clinton Administration could result in the seizure or
disruption of more than the entire amount of cocaine seized
domestically every year.
Stimulating Demand. Cuts in interdiction and law
enforcement have had additional consequences that should have
been predictable to anyone with even a modicum of
understanding of the basic economic laws of supply and
demand. Between 1993 and 1994--the first year of the
``controlled shift'' away
[[Page S9023]]
from interdiction--the retail price of a gram of cocaine
dropped from $123 to $104. Two years later, the price was
still a low $107 per gram. Heroin prices have fallen even
more sharply, from $1,647 per pure gram in 1992 to $966 per
gram in February 1996.\22\ The increased availability of such
relatively cheap drugs has helped drive hard-core drug use--
as reflected in emergency room admissions--to record levels.
While most drugs are produced in inaccessible regions
overseas, limiting the impact of U.S.-sponsored eradication
programs, the bulk of the marijuana consumed in the United
States is produced domestically. Domestic marijuana
eradication under the Bush Administration was highly
successful--so successful, in fact, that marijuana became
more expensive, ounce for ounce, than gold. Hawaiian
producers were forced to import marijuana to satisfy local
demand for the first time in recent history.
The Clinton Administration, however, has deemphasized
marijuana eradication. There has been a 59 percent reduction
in cultivated plants destroyed since 1992.\23\ The drug
budget of the U.S. Park Service has been cut 22 percent from
the FY 1992 level,\24\ resulting in a 47 percent reduction in
plants eradicated by the Park Service. Once again, increases
in supply have fueled demand (use by 8th graders has
increased 184 percent since 1992) and caused prices to drop
(marijuana prices are at the lowest level in eight years).
The ubiquitous availability of illegal drugs--de facto
legalization--is confirmed by the Administration's own data.
According to the latest White House report on drug use,\25\
heroin is now so cheap and pure that it has ``driven new
demand and drawn some former addicts back into use.''
Meanwhile, the availability of cocaine and crack is described
as ``high,'' and marijuana is ``plentiful and potent'' and
``widely available'' in all areas of the country except
California.
By making drugs more expensive, aggressive interdiction and
law enforcement efforts reduce use among particularly
vulnerable inner-city populations by forcing addicts to spend
their limited disposable income on a smaller quantity of
drugs.\26\ A cocaine addict named ``Joe,'' interviewed for a
book \27\ on the impact of cocaine, describes the phenomenon:
``What keeps you from dying is you run out of money.''
Conversely, paring back supply reduction programs hits
hardest those who are most heavily addicted and least able to
resist drug use.
Rising Emergency Room Cases. This phenomenon is evident in
the record number of drug-related emergency room admissions
that have followed in the wake of the Clinton
Administration's cuts to enforcement and interdiction
programs. (It is instructive that these record increases have
occurred despite the Clinton strategy's stated concern for
hard-core addicts, the primary population captured by the
emergency room statistics.) Compared with the first half of
1994 (which was then the high water mark for drug-related
emergency room cases), cocaine-related emergencies have
increased 12 percent (from 68,400 to 76,800); heroin-related
episodes have risen 27 percent (from 30,000 to 38,100);
marijuana-related episodes have increased 32 percent (from
19,100 to 25,200); and methamphetamine cases have jumped by a
staggering 35 percent (from 7,800 to 10,600)
Hard-core addicts deserve access to treatment, but
experience teaches that the typical addict will cycle through
the treatment system several times over a period of years
before getting off drugs, with many never reaching that goal.
A 1994 RAND study found that only 13 percent of heavy cocaine
users who receive treatment are either non-users or light
users at the end of a year. The study also found that 20
percent of heavy users continue to use drugs while in
treatment.\28\
Getting serious about hard-core drug use ultimately
requires America to do more to fight youthful drug use: While
hard-core users are mostly beyond the reach of drug treatment
professionals, today's young people can be dissuaded from
going down the road that leads to hard-core addiction. In
fact, those who reach age 21 without using drugs almost never
try them later in life. Conversely, drug users almost always
start young, and almost invariably by smoking marijuana.\29\
An About Face? With U.S. Army General Barry McCaffrey's
appointment as the new point man on drugs, the President
indicated he was reversing his decision to gut ONDCP and
discarding his misguided strategy of targeting hard-core
users. The editors of The Washington Post called the change
an ``about face.'' President Clinton was able to capitalize
on the installation of a tough-minded general; White House
aide Rahm Emmanuel was candid enough to say that the changes
were ``what the President believes will help us improve on
our record.'' \30\
Given the Clinton Administration's previous track record,
however, it remains unclear whether Director McCaffrey's
appointment means a genuine change in course. His is a
managerial position that accords him little line authority,
and his policy accomplishments will depend largely on his
willingness and ability to take on the various empires of the
federal bureaucracy. This in turn will depend on the degree
to which he is supported by the President of the United
States.
Unfortunately, early indications suggest that Director
McCaffrey may be reticent to test the President's commitment
to an effective anti-drug strategy. For instance, McCaffrey
recently sided with the Department of State in supporting a
determination that Mexico had ``cooperated fully'' with the
United States on drug control matters, even though the head
of the DEA objected that the government of Mexico had not
done enough to warrant that designation. This determination
was made even though the Administration could have waived the
sanctions that typically accompany decertification.
This decision sounds a disturbing signal about the degree
of General McCaffrey's leverage on drug questions. The United
States imports 400 tons of cocaine annually, 70 percent of it
transshipped through Mexico. Yet Mexico's seizures have
slumped to roughly one-twentieth of the amount passing
through their country. Arrest figures are down significantly,
and the former president's brother, Raul Salinas, has been
arrested on suspicion of ``drug-related charges.'' Four
Mexican trafficking ``confederations,'' meanwhile, operate
with relative impunity. But President Clinton's statement
to Congress explained away Mexican inaction on the peso
crisis and declared weakly that President Zedillo's
administration has ``set the stage for action against the
major drug cartels in Mexico.'' \31\ For too long, the
U.S. has accepted at face value repeated Mexican promises
of future aggressive action against the drug trade. It is
time for such complacency to end.
McCaffrey also appears to have had little positive impact
on recent high-level appointments. For example, on June 12,
1996, Patricia M. McMahon was nominated to serve as his
Deputy Director for Demand Reduction, a post that requires
Senate confirmation. A former Clinton campaign worker with
little substantive background in drug policy, Ms. McMahon's
appointment to a lower-level position was criticized by the
Washington Post in the early days of the Clinton
Administration as ``an example of continued political
patronage.'' \32\ Her principal contribution to the White
House drug office was to serve as the political operative who
carried out the slashing of the staff by 80 percent at the
start of the Administration.
THE COMPONENTS OF A NEW ANTI-DRUG POLICY
The President and Congress can retake the initiative in the
continuing struggle against drug use and the agents of the
criminal network that is exporting poison into America's
neighborhoods. But this cannot happen without the full
leadership of the President and his Administration.
The Administration must take several decisive steps:
Use the bully pulpit. When President George Bush gave the
first national primetime address of his presidency, it was on
the drug issue. By doing this, he followed the example of
visible and emphatic national leadership set by President
Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan. The national effort
against drugs--carried on by parents, young people, local
people, local religious leaders, neighbors, local law
enforcement, educators, medical personnel, and local
government officials--gains immeasurably from strong, visible
presidential support. But it is weakened considerably by the
perception of presidential indifference.
Do more in Latin America. Fighting drugs at the source
makes sense. Federal authorities ought to be going after the
beehive, not just the bees. Foreign programs are also cheap
and effective.
An example: America's chronically underfunded program in
Peru will cost just $16 million to run in FY 1996. But
targeting even that meager amount effectively can work. The
Peruvians have managed to shoot down or disable 20 trafficker
airplanes since March 1, 1995. Unfortunately Peruvian
President Fujimori's aggressive line on drugs actually caused
President Clinton to bar Peru from receiving radar tracking
data. That decision has badly damaged Peruvian-American
relations, but Fujimori has continued to work with the United
States, and much more can be done at very small cost. The
Peruvian air force currently uses obsolete A-37 jet trainers
from the 1950s. For $50 million, the United States could
equip the Peruvians with new tracker aircraft, improved
night-flyer gear, and spare parts. This is an opportunity to
save American lives by helping the Peruvians press their
attack on traffickers. In addition to helping countries like
Peru, the United States should make effective cooperation in
fighting drugs one of the most important requirements for
Latin nations seeking good diplomatic and economic relations.
Set more sensible budget priorities. The Department of
Defense today is allowed to spend only 0.3 percent of its
budget on preventing the inflow of drugs. The U.S. military
cannot solve the drug problem, but it can make a profound
contribution to cutting the flow of drugs through
interdiction. The budget needs to reflect this national
priority.
Reduce marijuana availability. The federal government
urgently needs to restore leadership to the fight against
marijuana production, trafficking, and use. Federal marijuana
penalties need to be stiffened, partly by eliminating the
loophole that allows marijuana smugglers to be treated far
more leniently than marijuana growers. Federal eradication
efforts need to be reinvigorated.
Block lower crack sentences. Last year, the United States
Sentencing Commission proposed steep reductions in sentences
for crack dealers. Those changes were blocked by statute. In
its 1997 amendments cycle, the Sentencing Commission should
be blocked, and the Commission should be barred from
proposing changes in criminal penalties
[[Page S9024]]
where Congress has established mandatory minimum sentences,
except in an advisory format that would require affirmative
congressional action before taking effect.
Stop undercutting those drug treatment programs that do
work. Taxpayers have heard the stories about waiting lists
for drug treatment. Waiting lists are not fiction--they do
exist. On the other hand, one program that rarely has waiting
lists in Mitch Rosenthal's well-regarded Phoenix House, a
tough program where addicts spend 18-24 months literally
learning to live new lives. Programs like Phoenix House have
a proven track record dating back to 1967. But they are
unpopular with addicts because, to quote one analyst, ``a
residential program with constricted freedom, rigorous rules,
and enforced separation from drugs is the last place most
addicts want to find themselves, at least initially.'' \33\
Nevertheless these approaches work. Yet taxpayers today pay
billions of dollars on drug treatment that allows the addicts
to decide for themselves how rigorous and how long their
treatment will be. Not surprisingly, this arrangement does
not work very well.
In addition, while many faith-based treatment programs
report remarkable success with the addicted, their religious
character usually bars them from receiving government
treatment funds. In a break from current policy,
Representatives Jim Talent (R-MO) and J.C. Watts (R-OK) have
introduced a bill, the American Community Renewal Act of 1996
(HR 3467), which would allow the neighborhood groups,
including religious institutions, the same access to federal
funds that is enjoyed by other drug treatment and counseling
facilities. States also would be able to contract with these
drug treatment centers. Discrimination against effective
religiously based programs should end. Taxpayer funding for
drug treatment should be tied strictly to results,
religiously based programs should be eligible for funding,
and addicts who seek publicly funded treatment should be
required to enter rigorous programs and face real sanctions
if they fail to complete them.
conclusion
The Clinton Administration has a poor record in fighting
the war on drugs. Interdiction efforts and prosecution for
illegal drugs are down, illegal drug usage and emergency room
admissions are up, and there has been an absence of credible
presidential leadership on this issue. Part of the problem
also has been a failure in personnel management: the
inability or unwillingness to appoint effective leaders in
key positions to articulate and enforce a strong anti-drug
message, as well as inappropriate reductions in staff at
agencies dedicated to dealing with the problem on the front
lines. With the appointment of General Barry McCaffrey
as Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy,
this situation may improve, although the McMahon
appointment is far from encouraging.
American taxpayers need and deserve presidential leadership
on this issue. Members of Congress also need to focus federal
efforts on law enforcement and interdiction programs that
work, and fund only those rehabilitation programs that have a
track record of success. One way Congress can do this is to
allow funding for drug counseling and drug rehabilitation
programs provided by religious organizations. Congress and
the states also should undertake a tough re-evaluation of
existing grant recipients to make sure that funding is going
to programs that work best in reducing dependency on illegal
drugs.
America's illegal drug problem is complex and presents a
special challenge for policymakers in Congress and the White
House. But the complexity and the difficulty of the issue are
no excuse for ineffective policy and a lack of serious
effort.
Prepared for the Heritage Foundation by John P. Walters
\34\ and James F.X. O'Gara.\35\
footnotes
\1\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Preliminary
Estimates for the 1994 National Household Survey on Drug
Abuse, September 1995.
\2\ University of Michigan Institute for Social Research,
Monitoring the Future, December 15, 1995.
\3\ Ibid.
\4\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Preliminary
Estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network, Advance Report
No. 14, May 31, 1996.
\5\ Ibid.
\6\ President Clinton's message accompanying Office of
National Drug Control Policy's National Drug Strategy,
February 1994, p. iii.
\7\ Hearing before the Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control, April 25, 1996.
\8\ CNN News, January 31, 1994.
\9\ Hearing before House Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, April 7, 1995.
\10\ See note 1, supra.
\11\ The New York Times, March 26, 1993, referring to
previous Clinton statements. Unfortunately for the President,
his most memorable public statement in connection with the
drug issue still was ``I didn't inhale.''
\12\ Wolfgang Munchau, ``Clinton's Team Split on Drugs,'' The
Times (London), December 8, 1993.
\13\ In an interview with MTV, for example, when asked
whether he would ``inhale'' given the chance to ``do it over
again,'' Clinton merely provoked laughter: ``Sure, if I
could. I tried before.'' MTV interview, June 12, 1992.
\14\ Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, October
20, 1993.
\15\ Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug
Control Strategy: Budget Summary, February 1994.
\16\ Prosecution figures are derived from the Executive
Office of U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) as well as the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO). The AO and
EOUSA numbers differ because the two entities practice a
different ``leading charge'' system; only the AO includes
misdemeanor cases; and the AO includes cases brought by
magistrate judges.
\17\ H.G. Reza, ``Drug Runners Arrested at Border Often Go
Free; Smuggling: Crackdown Leads to More Seizures, but Jail
Overcrowding and Clashing Priorities Force Suspects;
Release,'' The Los Angeles Times, May 12, 1996, p 1.
\18\ Robert C. Bonner, ``Clinton's Flawed Drug-Smuggling
Policy,'' San Diego Union-Tribune, June 4, 1996.
\19\ In 1989 constant dollars, the interdiction budget
declined from $1.73 billion in FY 1992 to $1.05 billion in FY
1996.
\20\ Customs cocaine seizures fell from 35.4 metric tons (mt)
in FY 1993 to 10.7 mt in FY 1994. Coast Guard cocaine
seizures fell from 15.4 mt in FY 1993 to 4.4 mt in FY 1994.
\21\ The ``disruption rate'' is the total amount of cocaine
and marijuana that is seized, jettisoned, or ``aborted''
(returned to the source country as a result of interdiction
or law enforcement presence). Data sheet from Joint
Interagency Task Force-East, Key West, Florida, April 26,
1996. The daily disruption rate fell from 435.1 kgs/day in
1993 to 228.7 kgs/day in 1994, and still further to 158.1
kgs/day during the first 15 weeks of 1996.
\22\ U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement
Administration, and Abt Associates, Average Price and Purity
of Cocaine in the United States, Average Price and Purity of
Heroin in the United States, May 28, 1996.
\23\ According to the Department of Justice, 3.04 million
cultivated plants were eradicated in 1995 compared to 7.49
million eradicated in 1992.
\24\ The Park Service drug control budget was cut from $11.1
million in FY 1992 to $8.7 million in FY 1996.
\25\ Office of National Drug Control Policy, Pulse Check:
National Trends in Drug Abuse, June 1996.
\26\ For example, a 43 percent increase in cocaine prices in
1990 (the first such increase in five years) paralleled a 27
percent reduction in cocaine-related emergency room
admissions and overdoses (the first such reduction in 12
years).
\27\ Eugene Richards, Cocaine True, Cocaine Blue (Aperture).
\28\ C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling
Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs (Santa Monica, Cal.:
RAND, 1994).
\29\ According to the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse
at Columbia University, 12- to 17-year-olds who use marijuana
are 85 times more likely to graduate to cocaine than those
who abstain from marijuana.
\30\ Ann Devroy, ``About-Face; Clinton to Restore Staff He
Cut from Anti-Drug Office,'' The Washington Post, March 6,
1996, p. A15.
\31\ Memorandum from the President of the United States to
the Secretary of State, Certification of Major Narcotics
Producing and Transit Countries, Statement of Explanation:
Mexico, March 1, 1996.
\32\ Michael Isikoff, ``Drug Director Urged to Hire Hill
Aides; Memo Asked Director to `Do Something' for Congressman
Rangel,'' The Washington Post, August 19, 1993, p. A27.
\33\ Sally Satel, ``Yes, Drug Treatment Can Work,'' City
Journal, Summer 1995.
\34\ John P. Walters is President of the New Citizenship
Project, an organization created to advance a renewal of
American institutions and greater citizen control over
national life. During the Bush Administration, he served as
Acting Director and Deputy Director of the White House Office
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).
\35\ James F.X. O'Gara is Director of Research for the New
Citizenship Project. He previously served as drug policy
advisor to Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT), Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, and has served as assistant to
the Administrator for DEA for foreign policy matters.
Mr. HATCH. I thank the distinguished Senator from Georgia for his
leadership in this area, for being willing to get out here and talk
about these issues. I have been talking about them for a long time. I
am disappointed we have not made more headway, but it certainly has not
been for lack of effort on the part of our friend from Georgia.
I want to say in all honesty, we have to fight this war. We have to
give it everything we have. We have to have leadership at the top. We
do not have it right now but we are going to keep this pressure on
until we get it, one way or the other.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. COVERDELL. I thank the Senator from Utah for, as he has
acknowledged, long and diligent work in this arena. A lot of Americans
can be particularly thankful for that work.
Mr. HATCH. I thank my colleague.
Mr. COVERDELL. I appreciate his remarks this morning. At this time I
yield up to 10 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for up
to 10 minutes.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Georgia for
organizing this time to speak about this incredibly important issue.
While we do not intend this to be an issue that is partisan in nature,
as the Senator from Utah, the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, has just pointed out, although this is clearly a bipartisan
effort, or should be, it is impossible to deal with the issue without,
I think, criticizing some of the people who have been unable thus far,
or unwilling, to fight this war on drugs, to level that criticism as a
way of pointing out what needs to change.
I would not be so willing to do this if President Clinton had not
made this a partisan political issue in the first place. That is what
angers me so much. We just saw the Senator from Utah, the distinguished
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, point out that from
[[Page S9025]]
1980 to the end of 1992, during the time of Republican administrations,
drug use on all fronts had declined dramatically. In the Presidential
campaign of 1992, here is what then-candidate Bill Clinton had to say:
[President Bush] hasn't fought a real war on crime and
drugs. I will.
Maybe if he had not said that, maybe if he had not made that promise,
I would not be so critical of him today for failing to keep that
promise. But as the chart that Senator Hatch just showed us reveals,
from the time that President Clinton took office, drug use among young
people in all of the categories increased. So you saw during the entire
time of the Reagan and Bush administrations drug use going down and
then, when President Clinton took office, drug use sharply going up.
That is why it angers me to go back and see statements like this during
the campaign 4 years ago, when he criticized President Bush for not
being tough on drugs, and said he would fight the war on drugs. He has
not done it and that is why we are critical here today.
It is not to try to throw barbs at the President, but to try to get
him on board on this issue, because this is critical for the future of
the United States and for our kids. Specifically, when usage of hard
drugs among White House personnel was finally revealed in the media,
after having been denied by Presidential spokesmen, we get the kind of
reaction that Senator Hatch just pointed out, coming from the White
House, that suggested that using drugs is no big deal. It was Leon
Panetta 2 years ago who attacked House Speaker Newt Gingrich for his
comment that the delay in the White House granting clearance to a large
group of staffers might be in part due to drug use by some of the
staffers.
That was the information people had at the time, but it was not then
confirmed. Here is what Leon Panetta said:
We cannot do business here with a Speaker of the House who
is going to engage in these kind of unfounded allegations.
The people at the White House at that time knew those were not
unfounded allegations. Now, 2 years later, the news accounts report
that in fact at least a dozen staffers were taken on board, over the
objection of the FBI and Secret Service because of their hard core drug
use. Now what do the spin meisters at the White House talk about? Of
course they are no longer unfounded accusations. Now it is just the
excuse that, well, everyone was doing it. Press Secretary Mike McCurry:
I was a kid in the 1970's. You know, did I smoke a joint
from time to time? Of course, I did. And the FBI knows that,
and that was in my background file.
The ``of course, I did'' is what bothers so many of us. The White
House is the ultimate bully pulpit in the United States. The tone set
there permeates our entire culture. Our young people look to the
President for his leadership on issues, to set an example, to be a role
model. When his chief spokesman tosses off his drug use with a mere
cavalier ``of course, I did,'' inferring that everybody did, that
suggests it is behavior that is acceptable. It is against the law and
it is not acceptable behavior.
So, when the people at the highest levels in the White House treat
the issue so cavalierly, is it no wonder the young people in our
country, who are obviously susceptible to this kind of language, treat
it cavalierly as well? Yet this is the same White House that is
blasting Senator Dole for his comments that not necessarily everyone is
addicted to tobacco use. It seems to me there is a gross double
standard here, at a minimum. But that at maximum, one might say, more
important, for the young people in our country this administration has
squandered the assets that had been brought to bear in the war on
drugs, had squandered the success of the Bush and Reagan
administrations when drug use was brought substantially down.
Senator Hatch has pointed out many of the things that have occurred
during this administration, like the drug czar's office staff being cut
more than 80 percent. After a year of leaving the drug czar's office
vacant, finally the President selected Lee Brown, who was only in
office for a few months. His major initiative was to have ``Big League
Chew'' bubble-gum removed from convenience store chains. It did not do
much to fight the war on drugs.
Then he appointed as our Nation's top health official Joycelyn
Elders, who said ``[I] do feel we would markedly reduce our crime rate
if drugs were legalized.'' In one sense I suppose if you remove all
prohibitions on illegal activity, you reduce the illegal drug use rate,
at least measured against what it was during the war on drugs, but that
is obviously not the way to protect the future of America's children.
Particularly since we understand that the use of drugs such as
marijuana leads to the use of much harder drugs. That is why the
President's reduction in requests for funding from interdiction to law
enforcement have not been welcomed by the Congress, and why the
Congress has wanted to fund those programs at a higher level.
Just summarizing what Senator Hatch said a moment ago, with the
reduction in the officers from FBI, INS, Customs Service and Coast
Guard, they would have lost 621 drug enforcement agents had the
Congress not put the funding back in. And he mentioned the fact we did
not train special agents of the DEA in 1993. But when the Congress has
finally insisted on increasing the drug interdiction effort, for
example in the bill we just dealt with last week, we get emphasis--
indications from the White House that they will support those
increases. I hope that is true.
According to the Wall Street Journal, the Attorney General, Janet
Reno, ``announced that she wanted to reduce the mandatory minimum
sentences for drug trafficking * * *.'' Statistics released by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reveal that, although drug use
is going up, the number of individuals prosecuted for Federal drug
violations is going down. That is what we have to change. This de facto
strategy of the administration in fighting drugs was to deemphasize
interdiction, law enforcement and prevention and concentrate on
treatment. Yet, as has been pointed out, treatment is not the answer to
this problem. It is only one small piece of the puzzle. And a 1994
study by the Rand Corp. found that 27 percent of hardcore drug users
continued hardcore use while undergoing treatment. And fully 88 percent
of them returned to hardcore drug use after treatment. So the
recidivism rate was very, very high.
Let me just hesitate here to make a point. In criticizing the
administration's efforts here, again I do not intend to be partisan.
There have been a lot of Democrats who have been equally critical.
Senator Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee,
said:
This President is silent on the matter. He has failed to
speak.
Representative Charles Rangel, a Democrat from New York whose
district has a very serious problem in this regard said:
I've been in Congress for over two decades and I have
never, never, never seen a President who cares less about
this issue.
So I am not just speaking from the perspective of a Republican, Mr.
President. I am speaking as someone who cares about our future and who
has noted it is people on both sides of the aisle who are deeply
committed to fighting this war who are also critical of this
administration.
The chairman of the Judiciary Committee pointed out that marijuana
use is up; that one in three high school seniors now uses marijuana.
That is an astounding statistic. Why is it important? Because, as I
said a moment ago, according to surveys by the Center on Addiction and
Substance Abuse, 12- to 17-year-olds who use marijuana are 85 times
more likely to graduate to cocaine than those who don't use marijuana.
So those who argue that marijuana use, so-called ``soft drugs,'' are
not important are ignoring scientific evidence that almost all of the
people who use those kinds of drugs graduate to harder drugs. That is
why it is so important to stop this drug use at that level.
What can we do to recapture the initiative on this war on drugs?
First of all, on interdiction, the action we just took last week, we
have to see renewed efforts by Federal agencies responsible for
fighting drugs to spend greater resources, identifying the sources,
methods and individuals involved in trafficking.
[[Page S9026]]
Enforcement I mentioned a moment ago. Drug prosecution under this
administration has decreased. Those violating our drug laws must be
prosecuted, and we have to make sure those who are profiting from the
drug trade are severely punished.
Finally, education and prevention. Kids need to learn and be
constantly reminded that drugs are harmful, and that is where the
President's bully pulpit comes in.
They laughed at President Reagan and his wife when they said that we
should ``just say no.'' I think they were making a big mistake. We know
the President has to say no.
Mr. President, I ask for 30 seconds more from the Senator from
Georgia, since I know my time has expired.
Mr. COVERDELL. I yield another minute to the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I appreciate that. That will enable me to
make this final point.
We are doing our part in Congress to revitalize this war on drugs. We
just passed the Commerce, State, Justice appropriations bill, which
will improve our enforcement and interdiction efforts. It increases the
funding substantially. I think, however, once we have done this, the
President is going to have to help us regain the initiative by
demonstrating that the administration is just as concerned about this
effort as is the Congress. Of course, another option is to elect a
President who really seems to care about this effort. But that is
another matter.
Let me say in conclusion, this effort should be bipartisan. It has to
be coordinated. The President and the Congress have to join in the
effort, and we have to convince the younger people in our country that
the trend of drug use that is now going up must be reversed if their
future is going to be great and if the future of America is going to be
great, because all Americans bear the cost of drug abuse through
increased crime and increased taxes to pay for welfare and other social
programs and all the other costs to society that can't be measured.
It is time to resume the drug war. America's future is at stake.
I commend the Senator from Georgia for taking this time so we can
emphasize the issue and get on with this important effort.
Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Arizona
will stay with us for just a moment.
I would like to read an editorial that appeared in the Boston Globe
on Tuesday, July 23. It relates to his remarks. It quotes Speaker
Gingrich in December of 1994. He said on a television show:
I had a senior law enforcement official tell me that, in
his judgment, up to a quarter of the White House staff, when
they first came in, had used drugs in the last 4 or 5 years.
He said:
Now, that's very serious. I'm not making any allegation
about any individual person, but it's very clear that they
had huge problems.
It goes on. This editorial says:
Then the sky fell in. ``We cannot do business here with a
Speaker of the House who is going to engage in these kinds of
unfounded allegations,'' fumed Panetta. He lashed Gingrich
for behaving like an out-of-control talk show host, for
making an absolutely false accusation, for trafficking in
smear and innuendo.
George Stephanopoulos has labeled Gingrich
``irresponsible.'' Hillary Clinton said, ``So unfair.'' Press
Secretary Dee Dee Myers called them ``reckless charges.''
McCarthyism was alluded to. That was the beginning of the
demonization of the Speaker. Let me ask this question of the Senator
from Arizona. Don't you think these people owe him an apology?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am so glad that the Senator from Georgia
has asked that question, because now that this has been reported on in
the media 2 years after the fact and some people from the White House
have, apparently, acknowledged that there is truth to these
allegations, I think that every one of the people who smeared House
Speaker Newt Gingrich not only owe him an apology--and it should be a
very direct and specific apology--for the comments that the Senator
from Georgia just read, but they owe an apology to the American people,
because they, in smearing him, suggested that he was lying, that he was
not telling the truth, that the allegations were unfounded, when, in
fact, they either knew or should have known what was going on in the
White House, why those clearances had not been granted. Therefore, it
is they who were misleading the American public by suggesting that what
he said was untrue.
So I have been wondering for some time when we would receive an
apology, and I think it is as important that the House Speaker receive
an apology.
I happened to see the Sunday morning talk show when Speaker Gingrich
said what he said. I saw him say it, and I thought at the time, ``Boy,
he was certainly careful how he repeated that allegation because it was
all over the news media.''
He was very careful in saying, ``Now, I'm not making allegations,
this is what a high-ranking official told me, and if it is true, it's
very bad.''
Well, all of the qualifications went out the window when all the
White House pack dogs immediately attacked him the next day suggesting
he was the one who was some kind of wild accuser here.
That is why I think the Senator from Georgia hits the nail right on
the head when he suggests that each one of these people owes the
Speaker a very specific apology. And if I can go further and suggest
they should apologize for misleading the American people as well.
Mr. COVERDELL. If the Senator will yield.
On dozens of editorial pages--
I am quoting--
there were comparisons to the most infamous demon in American
history. The Georgia Republican's words, said Newsday, were
laced with the kind of innuendo which fueled McCarthy's witch
hunt. To Herblock, the Washington Post venerable cartoonist,
Gingrich was McCarthy, cruelly blackening reputations with a
broad brush.
I think there are a lot of people who owe the Speaker an apology.
This attack was very harmful to this gentleman, and you alluded to it.
There is no way that all of these people in the White House could not
have known about the problems they were having in getting White House
clearance. I believe they not only owe him an apology, but they owe him
an apology at the same level to which they leveled this attack: a
public apology from all of them, not just one of them on their behalf.
Mr. KYL. If the Senator from Georgia will yield for a moment, the
point here is not to extract an apology for the sake of an apology, but
rather, I think, to make a larger point.
Clearly, when the Speaker of the House is vilified the way he was
without good reason, and we know now incorrectly if not with animus, he
is owed an apology. But the point of these attacks was to try to
distract attention away from the specific charge and the problem that
was being alluded to by the Speaker.
That is where I think these people owe an apology to the American
public, because they were trying to divert attention away from a
condition, a problem, and it is very much like the way the
administration has treated this drug war from the very beginning.
It is basically a nonwar, and that is why drug use has gone up during
this administration's tenure. They have to focus back on the fact that
what they say matters. The way the President acts matters a great deal,
especially to the young people in this country.
He is the first really young new-generation President here. As a
result, I think young people really look to President Clinton because
he is younger than most of the Presidents have been in recent years.
When they see him act in a relatively cavalier way, then they are going
to pick up on that. That appears to be what is happening, if you look
at the statistics.
So again, while it is important to apologize to the Speaker, because
what they said about him was extraordinarily unfair and inaccurate, I
think it is more important, again, that they get back on track in
fighting the war on drugs by apologizing to the country as a whole for
trying to distract attention from the problem in the White House,
trying to distract attention from what was going on here in their
inadequate effort to fight the war on drugs and refocus attention on
the very, very difficult nature of this problem.
President Clinton has an extraordinarily great ability to be
persuasive, to demonstrate that he cares about things. And if he were
to mount the podium with the same sincerity that
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Nancy Reagan and Ronald Reagan did and George and Barbara Bush to tell
the young people of today why it is so destructive for them to begin
this path of doing drugs, I think he could be enormously helpful. He
could be so powerful in his appeal and reach to these young people.
So instead of obfuscating the issue and accusing others of making too
big a deal out of it, as they did with Speaker Gingrich, I think they
ought to try to focus on what they can do to help. It would be a
tremendous benefit if they would do that. I thank the Senator from
Georgia.
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