[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 113 (Monday, July 29, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9016-S9027]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           THE DRUG EPIDEMIC

  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, as I have said many times on the floor, 
we are in the midst of a drug epidemic in the United States of enormous 
proportions that are not yet, I do not believe, fully comprehended. 
Drug use among our youth has doubled in the last 36 months, ending 12 
years of a continued decline in drug use.

  Mr. President, this administration, unfortunately, has to come to 
terms with this issue because it is pretty clear that its decision to 
shut down the drug office, to shut down interdiction efforts, to 
dramatically curtail the war on drugs, and to the change policy 
regarding rehabilitation has had some very, very uncomfortable 
consequences.
  What does it mean when you say drug use has ``doubled''? Does that 
mean two more people use it? No. What it means is there are 2 million 
American families who have fallen victim to the tragic consequences of 
involving themselves in drugs.
  Mr. President, in a moment I am going to yield to the distinguished 
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, the senior Senator from Utah. But 
let me say that among the data we are now discovering is the fact that 
our youth currently do not see drugs as a threat to them. How could 
that be? How could it be that the vast majority of youngsters no longer 
see that as a threat to them? Therefore, they are not concerned about 
it. Therefore, they use it more freely. Therefore, twice the number use 
it today.
  I just have to say that over the last several months, this cavalier 
attitude from the President's press secretary and others and the 
revelation about drug use in the White House itself--I mean, everybody 
understands the White House is a bully pulpit. If that pulpit is 
sanctioning, or appears to be sanctioning, or appears to be minimizing 
the serious effects of drug use, it should not be surprising that our 
young people do not understand the consequences.
  I am afraid that what has surfaced over the last several weeks--the 
word that comes to mind is ``cavalier''--is that it is not really 
important, that message has created a very, very serious repercussion 
in our country. It has to be turned around and changed quickly.
  Mr. President, with that opening statement, I yield up to 15 minutes 
to the distinguished Senator from Utah.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized for 15 
minutes.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Patrick 
Murphy, a detailee on my staff, be granted floor privileges for the 
remainder of this Congress.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, our Federal drug policy is at a crossroads. 
Unfortunately for Americans, drug control is not a national priority 
for the Clinton administration. For some time now I have been saying 
that President

[[Page S9017]]

Clinton has been AWOL--absent without leadership--in the war on drugs. 
Put another way, the Clinton White House has been MIA in the drug war--
mired in arrogance. Ineffectual leadership and failed Federal policies 
have combined with ambiguous cultural messages to generate changing 
attitudes among our young people and sharp, serious increases in 
youthful drug use.
  This is painfully evidenced by this chart on my right, which shows 
that after a 12-year steady decline in drug use by high school seniors, 
from 1980 to 1992, there has been a sharp increase in such drug use 
during the last 3 years. As you can see, the decline came from 1980 
downhill in every one of these categories, and in every one of the 
categories since 1992 drug use has started to go up sharply.
  Even more troubling is that this increase has been uniform as to 
those who have used drugs in the past month, in the past year, and 
those children trying drugs for the first time.
  No one is more responsible for our current dilemma than President 
Clinton. For more than 3 years, I have taken to the floor of the Senate 
to warn my colleagues and the Nation about the threat we face due to 
President Clinton's abdication of leadership in the war on drugs. What 
also troubles me is that a defeatist outlook in the drug war appears 
now to be supplemented by a softer attitude tolerating or excusing drug 
use.
  The Clinton administration has caused serious damage to this country 
as a direct result of failed policies and absent leadership in the war 
on drugs. Indeed, as one more manifestation of the administration's 
arrogance of power, we now know that the White House strong-armed the 
Secret Service into granting security passes for at least a dozen 
persons who had engaged in the recent use of, among other illegal 
drugs, crack cocaine and hallucinogens. In responding to questions 
concerning this matter, White House spokesman Mike McCurry disdainfully 
suggested that prior drug use was no big deal. What a terrible message 
to send to the country, especially to our young people. Where was 
President Clinton during this episode? Why didn't he admonish his 
spokesman? When will someone at the White House acknowledge that drug 
use is a big deal.
  To his credit, Mr. McCurry has expressed regret for having been so 
cavalier; but, it is quite telling that it was the President's 
spokesman who expressed this attitude of tolerance for drug use. 
Remember, this is the same President who named the stealth drug czar 
Lee Brown and Surgeon General Jocelyn Elders, a proponent of legalizing 
drugs.
  Let me be clear. I am not suggesting that people who experimented 
with drugs in their youth are categorically unfit for public service. 
But we should not make room at the policy table for those who have used 
drugs even as students and believe that their drug use was not a 
serious wrong, unfortunate step in their life. Nor should those who 
still use drugs or have recently done so be given a public trust 
especially in the White House. It is this mindset which will result in 
defeat.
  Both President Reagan and President Bush led from the front on this 
war, confronting our Nation's drug problems head on with positive 
results. As a Nation, we were committed to winning the war on drugs, 
and we were making gains. Since President Clinton has assumed office, 
his administration's campaign against drugs has been in full retreat, 
and America is now losing the war.
  During the Reagan and Bush era, the United States saw dramatic 
reductions in casual drug use. From 1977 to 1992, casual drug use was 
more than cut in half. Cocaine use fell by 79 percent, while monthly 
use fell from 2.9 million users in 1988 to 1.3 million in 1992. Such 
reductions were achieved not by hollow rhetoric but through sustained, 
visible use of the bully pulpit, increased quantities, a clear and 
quantifiable antidrug policy and, most important, strong Presidential 
leadership. Substantial investment of resources, coupled with the 
effective use of the bully pulpit, caused a strong reverberation of 
antidrug sentiment throughout this Nation.
  From his very first days in office, President Clinton was derailing 
the effective approaches of prior administrations. Although he promised 
to ``reinvent our drug control programs,'' and ``move beyond 
ideological debates,'' the President announced a new approach to drug 
policy, deemphasizing law enforcement and cutting interdiction. He 
called his approach a controlled shift. In hindsight, it has been an 
approach of reckless abdication. The Clinton administration renounced 
the proven policies of previous administrations and instead oversaw the 
following:
  Federal illegal drug caseloads were reduced by 10.3 percent from 
fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 1995;
  The Governmentwide interdiction budget was cut by 39 percent since 
1993;
  Supply reduction has been put in utter disarray, with a 53 percent 
drop in our ability to interdict and push back drug shipments in the 
drug transit zone;
  Between 1992 and 1994, cocaine seized by the Customs Service and 
Coast Guard dropped 70 percent and 71 percent, respectively.
  The National Drug Control Policy staff was cut from 147 to 25, but 
Congress did restore funding for adequate staffing levels this fiscal 
year, and with the President's approval finally admitted that they were 
wrong;
  The administration's fiscal year 1995 budget proposed to slash 621 
drug enforcement positions from the DEA, INS, FBI and Customs Service;
  From 1992 to 1995, the Drug Enforcement Administration lost 227 agent 
positions, more than 6 percent of its agent force;
  President Clinton signed legislation repealing mandatory minimums for 
some drug traffickers and dealers;
  And agreed to more than $230 million in cuts to drug education and 
prevention funds in 1993.
  It really is no surprise, therefore, that as the administration has 
turned a blind eye to this problem, drug dealers have flooded our 
Nation's streets with more illegal drugs and steadily declining prices.
  For example, as this next chart here reflects, the last several years 
have seen a dramatic drop in heroin prices. Since 1992, it has 
dramatically dropped. In fact, you can see it dropped very dramatically 
there, and then the purity, of course, has been going up. So the drop 
in heroin prices, combined with the dramatic increase in the purity of 
such heroin on the streets, has been catastrophic.

  The conclusion that can be drawn from these facts is clear. Supply is 
way up on our city streets resulting in more lethal drugs being 
available to our children at a much cheaper rate. Despite such glaring 
evidence, the Clinton administration continues to remain silent on 
addressing this problem.
  In short, since 1992, the bully pulpit has gathered dust, liberal 
soft-headed policies have been implemented, and a mentality of 
tolerance for drugs has taken root. As a result, almost every available 
indicator today shows the United States is losing our fight against 
drugs. Let us just consider some of the evidence.
  First, drugs are cheap and more available. Since 1993, the retail 
price of cocaine has dropped by more than 10 percent. The price of 
heroin has plummeted from $1,647 a gram in 1992 to $966 a gram in 
February 1996.
  Second, since President Clinton took office, the number of 12- to 17-
year-olds using marijuana has almost doubled--2.9 million kids compared 
with the 1992 level of 1.6 million. According to a most recent 
University of Michigan study, one in three high school seniors now 
smokes marijuana, and 48.4 percent of the class of 1995 had tried 
illegal drugs.
  You can see why I got so upset when Mr. McCurry made his comments. 
Now, to his credit, he has basically apologized for those, and I accept 
his apology. But it should never have happened to begin with. And it is 
this tolerance in the White House that is causing these problems. It 
comes through to these kids and to everybody else, it seems to me.
  Third, the number of cocaine and heroin-related emergency room 
admissions has jumped to historic levels. In the first half of 1995, 
cocaine-related emergency room cases were 65 percent above the level in 
the first half of 1991. Heroin admissions soared 120 percent over this 
same period of time.
  Fourth, methamphetamine use has soared with meth-related emergency 
room admissions in 1995 increasing by

[[Page S9018]]

more than 320 percent since 1991. And yet, I might add, someone on the 
other side of the aisle is blocking consideration of a bipartisan 
Hatch-Biden methamphetamine bill. I urge the President to call off his 
guardians of gridlock so we can pass this bill that is critical to this 
country.
  Fifth, LSD use has reached the highest rate since recordkeeping 
started in 1975. Fully 11.7 percent of the class of 1995 had tried it 
at least once.
  That is mind-boggling.
  The widespread increase in illegal drug use is not surprising when 
the relative ease in which these drugs are now brought across our 
borders is considered. Recent reports indicate that Mexican drug 
cartels are no longer interested in merely crossing our southern border 
to peddle their drugs. Ranchers along the Texas and New Mexico border 
are now finding themselves being forced to sell their border properties 
to these armed thugs. They are getting plenty of money for it. Why 
would they pay these exorbitant rates? But people are afraid not to 
sell to them for fear they will be killed.
  As a result, a virtual superhighway for illegal drug flow into this 
country is being created--some say has already been created.
  We are literally losing ground against drugs. In an effort to call 
attention to this disturbing development, I will be holding a hearing 
in the Judiciary Committee this Wednesday on precisely these points: 
What is happening on our southern border?
  Due to President Clinton's failure in the drug war, our children are 
at greater risk, our law enforcement efforts are strained more than 
ever, and our borders, it appears, are now being bought up by drug 
smugglers.
  To his credit, President Clinton named Gen. Barry McCaffrey as his 
new drug czar. General McCaffrey is a committed man. I have respect for 
him. But it may be too little too late. Such 11th hour tactics do not 
obviate one absolute truth: For the last 3 years, in the battle to 
regain our streets from the plague of illegal drugs, this 
administration has let our country down.
  The Nation must have effective moral leadership in this war against 
drugs. The President has turned back the clock 20 years in the drug 
war. He has hurt this Nation by his lack of leadership on this issue, 
and it is time to turn this retreat around.
  I again call on our President not just to join, but to lead an attack 
on illegal drugs and their use in this country.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary and a series of 
excerpts of relevant reports be printed in the Record. They are most 
informative. I urge my colleagues to read them.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                Summary


                              Key Findings

     Losing ground against drugs
       1. The number of 12-17 year-olds using marijuana increased 
     from 1.6 million in 1992 to 2.9 million in 1994.
       2. The number of individuals prosecuted for federal drug 
     violations dropped from 25,033 in 1992 to 23,114 in 1993, and 
     still lower to 21,905 in 1994--a 12 percent drop in just two 
     years.
       3. Street-level heroin is at a record level, even as the 
     price of a pure gram fell from $2,032 to $1,278 per gram 
     between February 1993 and February 1995.
     Setting the course: a national drug strategy
       1. Attitudes among teenagers about the dangers of drug use 
     are changing--for the worse. After more than a decade of 
     viewing drugs as dangerous, a new generation increasingly 
     sees no harm in using drugs.
       2. The President has abandoned the bully pulpit against 
     drugs and radically reduced the staff of the Office of 
     National Drug Control Policy from 147 to 25, rendering it 
     largely ineffectual.
     News conference from National Drug Policy Director McCaffrey
       1. Heroin's popularity continues to rise and inexperienced 
     dealers are selling dangerous mixtures called heroin 
     ``cocktails'' which have hospitalized more than 120 people in 
     May alone.
       2. Methamphetamine, Rohypnol, Ketamine, Quaaludes, and 
     ephedrine are drugs emerging as ``club drugs'' and continue 
     to rise in popularity among young adults.
     The Clinton administration's continuing retreat in the war on 
         drugs--Heritage Foundation
       1. The Clinton Administration's failure to appoint 
     effective leaders in key positions to articulate and enforce 
     a strong anti-drug message has seriously undercut drug 
     efforts.
       2. Former drug-policy Director Lee Brown attributes the 
     ``troubling'' decline in prosecutions to ``the policies of 
     the new U.S. Attorneys who de-emphasized prosecution of 
     small-scale drug offenders.''
     Adolescent drug use likely to increase again in '96--
         Partnership for a Drug-Free America
       1. Driven by increasingly lax attitudes about marijuana, 
     America's teenagers are seeing fewer risks and more personal 
     rewards in drug use. They are less likely to consider drug 
     use harmful and risky, more likely to believe that drug use 
     is widespread and tolerated, and feel more pressure to try 
     illegal drugs than teens did just 2 years ago.
     Journal of the Clandestine Laboratory Investigating Chemists 
         Association
       1. Numerous labs have been seized showing increasing 
     production of methamphetamines. Laboratory operators are 
     taking advantage of the fact that all sales of the 
     pseudoephedrine drug products, regardless of the quantity 
     involved, are completely unregulated.
     Drug use rises again in 1995 among American teens--The 
         University of Michigan
       1. Annual surveys of some 50,000 students in over 400 
     public and private secondary schools nationwide reveal that 
     in 1995, marijuana use continued the strong resurgence that 
     began in the early 1990s with increased use at all grade 
     levels. The proportion of eighth-graders taking any illicit 
     drug has almost doubled since 1991, has risen nearly two-
     thirds among 10th-graders since 1992, and has risen by nearly 
     half among 12th-graders.
     Preliminary estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network--
         Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
       1. Comparing the first half of 1995 with the first half of 
     1994, there was a 10 percent increase in drug-related 
     hospital emergency department episodes. Heroin-related 
     episodes increased by 27 percent, marijuana-related episodes 
     increased by 32 percent, and methamphetamine-related episodes 
     increased by 35 percent.
     Women and drugs--Wall Street Journal (June 6, 1996)
       1. Unfortunately, the gender gap among drug users is 
     quickly closing as women catch up with men when it comes to 
     smoking, drinking, and doing drugs.
                                                                    ____


 Losing Ground Against Drugs--A Report on Increasing Illicit Drug Use 
                        and National Drug Policy

(Prepared by Majority Staff, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senator 
                    Orrin G. Hatch, Utah, Chairman)


                              Introduction

       Through the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the United 
     States experienced dramatic and unprecedented reductions in 
     casual drug use.
       The number of Americans using illicit drugs plunged from 
     24.7 million in 1979 to 11.4 million in 1992. The so-called 
     ``casual'' use of cocaine fell by 79 percent between 1985 and 
     1992, while monthly cocaine use fell 55 percent between 1988 
     and 1992 alone--from 2.9 million to 1.3 million users.
       On the surface, little appears to have changed since 1992. 
     For the nation as a whole, drug use remains relatively flat. 
     The vast majority of Americans still do not use illegal 
     drugs.
       Unfortunately, this appearance is dangerously misleading. 
     Drug use has in fact experienced a dramatic resurgence among 
     our youth, a disturbing trend that could quickly return the 
     United States to the epidemic of drug use that characterized 
     the decade of the 1970s.
       Recent surveys, described in detail in this report, provide 
     overwhelming evidence of a sharp and growing increase in drug 
     use among young people:
       The number of 12-17 year-olds using marijuana increased 
     from 1.6 million in 1992 to 2.9 million in 1994. The category 
     of ``recent marijuana use'' increased a staggering 200 
     percent among 14-15 year-olds over the same period.
       Since 1992, there has been a 52 percent jump in the number 
     of high-school seniors using drugs on a monthly basis, even 
     as worrisome declines are noted in peer disapproval of drug 
     use.
       One in three high school seniors now smokes marijuana.
       Young people are actually more likely to be aware of the 
     health dangers of cigarettes than of the dangers of 
     marijuana.
       Nor have recent increases been confined to marijuana. At 
     least three surveys note increased use of inhalants and other 
     drugs such as cocaine and LSD.
       Drug use by young people is alarming by any standard, but 
     especially so since teen drug use is at the root of hard-core 
     drug use by adults. According to surveys by the Center on 
     Addiction and Substance Abuse, 12-17 year-olds who use 
     marijuana are 85 times more likely to graduate to cocaine 
     than those who abstain from marijuana. Fully 60 percent of 
     adolescents who use marijuana before age 15 will later use 
     cocaine. Conversely, those who reach age 21 without ever 
     having used drugs almost never try them later in life.
       Described another way, perhaps 820,000 of the new crop of 
     youthful marijuana smokers will eventually try cocaine. Of 
     these 820,000 who try cocaine, some 58,000 may end up as 
     regular users and addicts.
       The implications of public policy are clear. If such 
     increases are allowed to continue for

[[Page S9019]]

     just two more years, America will be at risk of returning to 
     the epidemic drug use of the 1970s. Should that happen, our 
     ability to control health care costs, reform welfare, improve 
     the academic performance of our school-age children, and 
     defuse the projected ``crime bomb'' of youthful super-
     predator criminals, will all be seriously compromised.
       With these thoughts in mind, I am pleased to present 
     ``Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on Increasing Illicit 
     Drug Use and National Drug Policy'' prepared at my direction 
     by the majority staff of the United States Senate Committee 
     on the Judiciary. This report examines trends in drug use and 
     the Clinton Administration's sometimes uneven response to 
     them, including the Administration's controversial policy of 
     targeting chronic, hardcore drug users. The report also 
     reviews the state of trends in use and availability. And, 
     finally, it evaluates the performance over the past three 
     years of our nation's criminal justice and interdiction 
     systems.
       The report finds Federal law enforcement under severe 
     strain just as the technical sophistication of drug 
     trafficking syndicates is reaching new heights. It finds that 
     the Administration's supply reduction policy is in utter 
     disarray, with a 53 percent drop in our ability to interdict 
     and push back drug shipments in the transit zone. The report 
     also finds increases in the purity of drugs and the number of 
     drug-related emergency room admissions of hard-core users.
       Federal drug policy is at a crossroads. Ineffectual 
     leadership and failed federal policies have combined with 
     ambiguous cultural messages to generate changing attitudes 
     among our young people and sharp increases in youthful drug 
     use.
       The American people recognize these problems and are 
     increasingly concerned: A Gallup poll released December 12, 
     1995 shows that 94 percent of Americans view illegal drug use 
     as either a ``crisis'' or a ``very serious problem.'' Their 
     concern, which I share, underscores the danger of 
     compromising our struggle against the drug trade. I look 
     forward to addressing the issues raised in this report in 
     future hearings of the United States Senate Committee on the 
     Judiciary.


                                overview

       For its first eight months in office, the Clinton 
     Administration's approach to the drug issue could best be 
     described as benign neglect. Then, in September 1993, the 
     Administration announced a new approach to drug policy, 
     promising to ``reinvent our drug control programs'' and 
     ``move beyond ideological debates.'' The new Administration 
     policy deemphasized law enforcement and shifted away from 
     interdiction, while promising dividends from treating hard-
     core drug users.
       Almost three years into the Administration, however, the 
     results of its early neglect, and subsequent policy 
     ``reinvention,'' are in. Drug use is up--dramatically so 
     among young people. Promised reductions in hard-core use--the 
     centerpiece of the Administration strategy--have failed to 
     materialize. New money to expand the nation's treatment 
     system has coincided with a projected decrease in treatment 
     ``slot.''
       Law enforcement efforts, mean-while, are not keeping pace 
     with the kingpins who run the drug trade, whose resources and 
     technical sophistication are increasing yearly. Prosecutorial 
     efforts appear to have stumbled as well, with a 12 percent 
     decline in prosecutions over just two years.
       Presidentially ordered interdiction cuts appear to have 
     resulted in an increased supply of drugs on American streets. 
     Illicit drugs are now available in greater quantities, at 
     higher purity, and at lower prices than ever before. The 
     Administration's strategy for coping with these problems is 
     predicated on a series of goals that one drug policy expert 
     described as ``merely an unprioritized list [that does 
     little] to direct policy.
       Viewed together, these factors paint a disturbing picture 
     of inattention to a serious and growing national threat.
                                                                    ____


    Preliminary Estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network, U.S. 
     Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service


                               highlights

       The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) is a national 
     probability survey of hospitals with emergency departments 
     conducted annually by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
     Services Administration (SAMHSA). The survey is designed to 
     collect data on emergency department episodes which are 
     directly related to the use of an illegal drug or non-medical 
     use of a legal drug. Analyses in this report focus primarily 
     on recent trends in drug-related episodes. Preliminary 
     estimates for the first half of 1995 are compared with data 
     from the first half of 1994. The major DAWN findings are:
       In the first half of 1995, there were 279,100 drug-related 
     hospital emergency department episodes representing an 
     increase of 10 percent from the first half of 1994 (252,600).
       An estimated 76,800 cocaine-related episodes were reported 
     in the first half of 1995 compared with 68,400 in the first 
     half of 1994, an increase of 12 percent.
       Cocaine-related episodes rose by 21 percent (from 26,100 to 
     31,500) among persons aged 35 years and older between the 
     first half of 1994 and the first half of 1995. A 17 percent 
     increase was observed among blacks (from 36,200 to 42,500).
       The number of heroin-related episodes increased by 27 
     percent between the first half of 1994 and the first half of 
     1995 (from 30,000 to 38,100).
       Between the first half of 1994 and the first half of 1995, 
     heroin-related episodes increased by 39 percent among whites 
     (from 10,800 to 15,000) and by 32 percent (from 16,100 to 
     21,100) among persons aged 35 years and older.
       Marijuana/hashish-related episodes rose from 19,100 in the 
     first half of 1994 to 25,200 in the first half of 1995, a 32 
     percent increase. Marijuana episodes usually occur in 
     combination with other substances, particularly alcohol and 
     cocaine.
       The number of methamphetamine (speed)-related episodes 
     increased by 35 percent (from 7,800 to 10,600) between the 
     first half of 1994 and the first half of 1995.


                              introduction

       This report contains preliminary data for the first 6 
     months of 1995 and final annual and semi-annual estimates of 
     drug-related emergency department episodes for 1988 through 
     1994, from the Drug Abuse Warning Network [DAWN], an ongoing 
     national survey of hospital emergency departments.
       Since the early 1970's, DAWN has collected information on 
     patients seeking hospital emergency department treatment 
     related to their use of an illegal drug or the nonmedical use 
     of a legal drug. The survey provides data that describe the 
     impact of drug use on hospital emergency departments in the 
     United States. Data are collected by trained reporters--
     nurses and other hospital personnel--who review medical 
     charts for indications--noted by hospital staff who treated 
     the patients--that drug use was the reason for the emergency 
     department visit. Thus, the accuracy of these reports depends 
     on the careful recording of this information by hospital 
     staff.
       To be included in DAWN, the person presenting to the 
     emergency department must be aged 6 years and older and meet 
     all four of the following criteria:
       The patient was treated in the hospital's emergency 
     department;
       The patient's presenting problem was induced by or related 
     to drug use, regardless of when the drug ingestion occurred;
       The case involved the nonmedical use of a legal drug or any 
     use of an illegal drug;
       The patient's reason for taking the substance included one 
     of the following: (1) dependence, (2) suicide attempt or 
     gesture, or (3) psychic effects.
       Hospitals eligible for DAWN are non-Federal, short-stay 
     general hospitals that have a 24-hour emergency department. 
     Since 1988, the DAWN emergency department data have been 
     collected from a representative sample of these hospitals 
     located throughout the coterminous United States, including 
     21 oversampled metropolitan areas. The data from this sample 
     are used to generate estimates of the total number of 
     emergency department drug episodes and drug mentions in all 
     such hospitals.
       Recently, SAMHSA conducted a thorough review of the 
     computer programs which produces the DAWN estimates. As a 
     result, corrections were made to the 1993 estimates that had 
     been previously released. Estimated presented in the last 
     DAWN release (Advance Report Number 11 ``Preliminary 
     Estimates from the DAWN--1994'') and in Annual Emergency 
     Department Data 1993 [Series 1, Number 13-A, DHHS Pub. No. 
     (SMA) 96-3080] and in this report are based on these 
     corrected programs. Because the impact on national estimates 
     was found to be small for 1992, those estimates were not 
     revised. However, the impact is significant for some 
     metropolitan areas and may be significant for selected drugs. 
     Thus, readers should use caution when comparing 1992 (and 
     earlier) estimates and 1993 (and later) estimates. See 
     Appendix I for details.
       Estimates from DAWN are released periodically in reports 
     such as this Advance Report, and are published in Annual 
     Reports which contain more detailed tables and a complete 
     description of the DAWN methodology (reference: Annual 
     Emergency Department Data 1993. Series I, Number 13-A. DHHS 
     Pub l. No. (SMA) 96-3080). 1995 estimates in this report are 
     preliminary because they are based on incomplete data and 
     adjustment factors from the previous year. Final estimates 
     for 1995 will be published later when all hospitals 
     participating in DAWN have submitted their data and when 
     additional ancillary data used in estimation become 
     available. The differences between preliminary and final 
     estimates are due to several factors: final estimates include 
     data from a small number of late-reporting hospitals; 
     additional hospitals are added to the sample and incorporated 
     into the final estimates; and data from the most current 
     listings of all eligible hospitals are used to produce the 
     final weights.
       The DAWN system also collects data on drug-related deaths 
     from a nonrandom sample of medical examiners. Data from 
     medical examiners are not included in this report. Medical 
     examiner data are published annually (reference: Annual 
     Medical Examiner Data 1994. Series I, Number 14-B. DDHS Pub. 
     No. (SMA) 96-3078).
                                                                    ____


              Setting the Course--A National Drug Strategy

 (By the Task Force on National Drug Policy, and convened by: Majority 
               Leader Bob Dole and Speaker Newt Gingrich)


                   task force on national drug policy

       Senator Charles Grassley, Co-Chair,
       Senator Orrin Hatch, Co-Chair,
       Senator Spence Abraham,

[[Page S9020]]

       Senator John Ashcroft,
       Senator Paul Coverdell,
       Senator Alfonse D'Amato,
       Senator Mike DeWine,
       Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison,
       Senator Olympia Snowe,
       Representative Henry Hyde, Co-Chair,
       Representative William Zeliff, Co-Chair,
       Representative Mike Forbes,
       Representative Ben Gilman,
       Representative Bill McCollum,
       Representative Rob Portman,
       Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
       Representative Clay Shaw,
       Representative J.C. Watts.


                           executive summary

       The facts are simple. After more than a decade of decline, 
     teenage drug use is on the rise. Dramatically. Every survey, 
     every study of drug use in America reconfirms this depressing 
     finding.
       What is even more disturbing is that attitudes among 
     teenagers about the dangers of drug use are also changing--
     for the worse. After more than a decade of viewing drugs as 
     dangerous, a new generation increasingly sees no harm in 
     using drugs.
       Just such a shift in attitudes engendered the last drug 
     epidemic in this country. The 1960s saw a significant 
     movement among many of the nation's intellectual leaders, 
     media gurus, and even some politicians that glorified drug 
     use. These attitudes influenced the thinking and decision 
     making of many of our young people. We are still living with 
     the consequences of the 1960s and 1970s attitudes in the form 
     of a long-term addict population and thousands of casualties, 
     including a staggering number of drug-addicted newborns and 
     many of our homeless.
       The American public recoiled at the social pathologies 
     associated with the illegal drug epidemic then, and recent 
     polls indicate that they are just as concerned today that we 
     are about to repeat history because we failed to learn our 
     lesson. Despite the fact that we made major inroads on 
     reducing drug use in the 1980s, the press and many others 
     have helped to create the idea that nothing works and that 
     our only policy options are the decriminalization or outright 
     legalization of drugs.
       The media turned their attention away from the drug issue 
     and have not returned to it in the last three years. The 
     Clinton Administration has downplayed the drug issue, 
     demoting it as a national priority and distancing the 
     President from it. The message that drug use was wrong was 
     de-emphasized, while interdiction and enforcement were 
     downplayed in order to concentrate on treatment. The result 
     has been to replace ``Just Say No'' with ``Just Say 
     Nothing.'' We are suffering the consequences.
       On December 13, 1995, Majority Leader Bob Dole and Speaker 
     of the House Newt Gingrich convened a bicameral Task Force on 
     National Drug Policy to break the silence. They asked the 
     Task Force to make recommendations on how Congress might, as 
     it has many times in the past, put drugs back on the national 
     agenda. This report is the result of the Task Force's 
     efforts. It reflects the results of town meetings, 
     discussions with experts, and meetings with leading treatment 
     and prevention organizations. This report represents a 
     beginning of effort not the conclusion.
       The Task Force's first and most important recommendation 
     calls for a serious national drug strategy. Recent 
     Administration strategies have been thin and they have 
     arguably failed to meet the clear statutory obligation that 
     specific and measurable objectives be included. Our national 
     strategy is incomplete and has focused efforts in areas that 
     have not worked. We need a more serious effort.
       Such a strategy does not have to re-invent the wheel. It 
     does need to do the right things with the right stuff. This 
     means a focus on prevention, law enforcement, and 
     interdiction. It means presidential leadership within the 
     Executive Branch and at large. It involves congressional 
     oversight of programs and support to effective, well-managed 
     efforts. It means a program that adds substance to rhetoric 
     and matches ends to means in a sustainable effort.
       A reinvigorated national drug strategy needs to focus on 
     five major elements:
       1. We need a sound interdiction strategy that employs our 
     resources in the transit zone, in the source countries of 
     Latin America, and near the borders to stop the flow of 
     illegal drugs. This means renewed efforts at US Customs, DEA, 
     INS, DoD, and the Coast Guard to identify the sources, 
     methods, and individuals involved in trafficking and going 
     after them and their assets.
       2. A renewed commitment to the drug effort requires a 
     serious international component that increases international 
     commitment to the full range of counter-drug activities. 
     These must involve efforts to prevent money laundering; to 
     develop common banking practices that prevent safe havens; 
     serious commitments to impose sanctions on countries that 
     fail to meet standards of cooperation; efforts to ensure 
     proper controls over precursor chemicals; and an 
     international convention on organized crime that develops 
     common approaches for targeting the main international 
     criminal organizations, their leaders and assets.
       3. US national drug strategy should also take steps to 
     ensure that drug laws are effectively enforced, particularly 
     that there be truth in sentencing for rug trafficking and 
     drug-related violent crimes.
       4. Prevention and education are critical elements in a 
     renewed strategy. There needs to be greater coordination and 
     effective oversight of Federal prevention and education 
     programs, which should involve the integration of disparate 
     drug programs in HHS, DoJ, and elsewhere under one authority. 
     This more integrated approach should focus on empowering 
     local communities and families, and must develop more 
     effective evaluation programs to determine which delivery 
     mechanisms are the best.
       5. Treatment must remain an important element to any 
     strategy, but more needs to be done to eliminate duplication 
     and waste. A renewed strategy needs to look at establishing 
     more effective evaluation techniques to determine which 
     treatment programs are the most successful. Accountability 
     must be a key element in our programs.
       We also need to look at the role of religious institutions 
     in our efforts to combat drug use. America cannot ignore the 
     link between our growing drug problem and the increase in 
     moral poverty in our lives.
       The members of the Task Force also note that even the best 
     strategy in the world is worth no more than the effort spent 
     on turning it into reality. Thus, the Administration and 
     Congress have a responsibility to develop and implement 
     sustained and sustainable programs. An effective effort, 
     however, must go beyond what the Executive and Congress can 
     do. A true national effort must involve parents, families, 
     schools, religious institutions, local and state governments, 
     civic groups, and the private sector.
       Finally, the Task Force members note that many of our 
     current social pathologies, in addition to drug use, arise 
     from causes directly related to a climate that disparages 
     essential moral and ethical principles of personal behavior. 
     Out of the best of intentions, we have pursued policies that 
     have replaced a sense of personal responsibility with 
     conscienceless self-esteem. In doing so, we have belittled 
     traditional family virtues and encouraged a cheapening of 
     social discourse. Our public places have become threatening 
     to decent people because of misplaced tolerance for 
     aggression and public incivility. Many of our children are 
     now having children, born out of wedlock into lives of 
     meanness and violence.
       In calling for a recommitment to sustained, coherent 
     efforts against drugs, the Task Force members recognize that 
     this effort is part of a larger struggle for the soul our 
     young people and our future. We reject the counsels of 
     despair that say that nothing can be done. That our only 
     recourse is to declare surrender and legalize drugs. We 
     recognize that the drug problem is a generational one. Every 
     year the country produces a new platoon of young people who 
     must be guided to responsible adulthood. A continuing, vital 
     anti-drug message sustained by meaningful prevention, law 
     enforcement and interdiction programs is part of the 
     responsibility our generation has to the next. This report is 
     a wake-up call to America to do its duty.
                                                                    ____



                                   The University of Michigan,

                                                December 11, 1995.

           Drug Use Rises Again in 1995 Among American Teens

       Ann Arbor.--The use of drugs among American secondary 
     school students rose again in 1995, continuing a trend that 
     began in 1991 among eighth-grade students, and in 1992 among 
     10th- and 12th-graders, according to scientists at the 
     University of Michigan.
       The proportion of eighth-graders taking any illicit drug in 
     the 12 months prior to the survey has almost doubled since 
     1991 (from 11 percent to 21 percent). Since 1992 the 
     proportion using any illicit drugs in the prior 12 months has 
     risen by nearly two-thirds among 10th-graders (from 20 
     percent to 33 percent) and by nearly half among 12th-graders 
     (from 27 to 39 percent.)
       The findings are from the Monitoring the Future Study, a 
     series of annual surveys of some 50,000 students in over 400 
     public and private secondary schools nationwide. The U-M 
     investigators who have directed the study for the 21 years of 
     its existence are social scientists Lloyd Johnston, Jerald 
     Dachman and Patrick C. Malley--all faculty at the U-M's 
     Survey Research Center. The work is supported by the National 
     Institute on Drug Abuse, one of the National Institutes of 
     Health in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
       In 1995, marijuana use, in particular, continued the strong 
     resurgence that began in the early 1990's, with increased use 
     at all three grade levels. Among eighth-graders, annual 
     prevalence (i.e., the proportion reporting any use in the 12 
     months prior to the survey) has risen to two-and-one-half 
     times its level in 1991, from 6 percent in 1991 to 16 percent 
     in 1995. Among 10th-graders, annual prevalence has nearly 
     doubled from the low point in use in 1992 of 15 percent to 29 
     percent in 1995; among 12th-graders annual prevalence has 
     increased by more than half, from the low point of 22 percent 
     in 1992 to 35 percent in 1995.
       ``Of particular concern in the continuing rise in daily 
     marijuana use,'' observes Johnston. Nearly one in 20 (4.6 
     percent) of today's high school seniors is a current daily 
     marijuana user, and roughly one in every 35 10th-graders (2.8 
     percent). Fewer than one in a hundred eight-graders use at 
     that level (0.8 percent). These rates have risen sharply as 
     overall marijuana use has increased.
       The investigators found that while marijuana use has shown 
     the sharpest increase, the use of a number of other illicit 
     drugs, including LSD, hallucinogens other than LSD, 
     amphetamines, stimulants, and inhalants, has also continued 
     to drift upward.

[[Page S9021]]

       The use of LSD continued to rise in all three grade levels 
     in 1995, continuing longer-term increases that began at least 
     as far back as 1991. The proportions reporting and LSD use in 
     the 12 months prior to the 1995 survey were 3 percent, 7 
     percent, and 8 percent for eighth-, 10th-, and 12th-graders, 
     respectively.
       Hallucinogens other than LSD, taken as a class, showed 
     smaller increases in 1995 at all three grade levels. The 
     annual prevalence rates for eighth-, 10th-, and 12th-graders 
     are considerably lower than for LSD: 2 percent, 3 percent, 
     and 4 percent, respectively.
       The longer-term rise in the use of amphetamine stimulants 
     continued in 1995 at the eighth- and 10th-grade levels, but 
     use leveled among 12th-graders. Annual prevalence rates are 9 
     percent, 12 percent, and 9 percent for grades eight, 10, and 
     12, respectively.
       The use of cocaine in any form continued a gradual upward 
     climb, though most of the one-year changes do not reach 
     statistical significance. The same is true for crack cocaine. 
     So far, at least, these increases have been very gradual. The 
     annual prevalence rates for use of cocaine in any form are 
     2.6 percent, 3.5 percent, and 4 percent for grades eight, 10, 
     and 12, respectively, while for crack use they are 1.6 
     percent, 1.8 percent, and 2.1 percent.
       Several other classes of illicit drugs also have been 
     showing very gradual increases since the early 1990s, 
     including tranquilizers and three drug classes reported only 
     for 12th-graders--barbiturates, ice (crystal 
     methamphetamine), and opiates other than heroin.
       Questions about heroin use have been in the study from the 
     beginning and have generally shown low (and for many years 
     among 12th-graders, stable) rates of use. However, use began 
     to rise after 1991 among 10th- and 12-graders, and after 1993 
     among eighth-graders, as well. There was a statistically 
     significant increase in annual heroin prevalence among 
     eighth-graders in 1994, and then among 12-graders in 1995. 
     All three grades showed some increase in both years. While 
     the annual prevalence rates for heroin remain quite low in 
     1995 compared to most other drugs, they are nevertheless two 
     to three times higher than they had been a few years ago. The 
     annual prevalence rates in 1995 are between 1.1 percent and 
     1.4 percent at all three grade levels.
       The small increase in heroin use in 1994 led the 
     investigators to distinguish in half of the 1995 
     questionnaires between two different methods for taking 
     heroin: with a needle and without a needle. Their hypothesis 
     was that non-injection forms of use (e.g., snorting or 
     smoking) may be accounting for the rise in overall use. 
     Consistent with this hypothesis, in 1995 a large proportion 
     of those reporting heroin use indicated that at least some of 
     their use involved a non-injection method of administration 
     (63 percent, 75 percent, and 89 percent of the past-year 
     heroin users in grades eight, 10, and 12, respectively) 
     Further, a substantial proportion indicated using heroin only 
     in a non-injectable form (32 percent, 45 percent, and 57 
     percent of the past-year heroin users for grades eight, 10, 
     and 12, respectively).
       ``Obviously this is not a runaway epidemic among teens, but 
     it should give rise to some caution,'' Johnston comments. 
     ``Many of these young users may be under the misconception 
     that they cannot become addicted to heroin if they use it in 
     a non-injectable form. The fact is that they can. In 
     Southeast Asia and other parts of the world there are many 
     thousands of opium smokers who are heavily addicted, and 
     heroin is simply a powerful derivative of opium.
       ``While these levels of illicit drug use are certainly 
     reason for concern,'' observes Johnston, ``it should be noted 
     that they are still well below the peak levels attained in 
     the late 1970s. We are in a relapse phase in the longer-term 
     epidemic, if you will, but it is certainly not something over 
     which society is powerless. Our great progress in the past at 
     lowering the rates of illicit drug use among our young people 
     is proof of that.'' To illustrate, between 1979 and 1992, the 
     proportion of 12th-graders reporting using any illicit drug 
     in the 12 months prior to the survey fell by half, from 54 
     percent to 27 percent.
       Alcohol use among American secondary students generally has 
     remained fairly stable in the past few years, though at rates 
     which most adults would probably consider to be unacceptably 
     high. (This remains true in 1995, although there has been 
     some small increase among 12th-graders over the past two 
     years.) In 1995 the proportions of students having five or 
     more drinks in a row during the two weeks preceding the 
     survey were 15 percent, 24 percent, and 30 percent for the 
     eighth-, 10th-, and 12th-graders, respectively.
                                                                    ____


    [From the Backgrounder, the Heritage Foundation, July 12, 1996]

  The Clinton Administration's Continuing Retreat in the War on Drugs

               (By John P. Walters and James F.X. O'Gara)


                               Highlights

       The Clinton Administration has a poor record in fighting 
     the war on drugs. Interdiction efforts and prosecution for 
     illegal drugs are down, illegal drug usage and emergency room 
     admissions are up. Part of the problem has been a failure in 
     personnel management: the inability or unwillingness to 
     appoint effective leaders in key positions to articulate and 
     enforce a strong anti-drug message, as well as inappropriate 
     reductions in staff at agencies dedicated to dealing with the 
     problem on the front lines.
       The President must exercise leadership on this issue and 
     use his bully pulpit to send an unambiguous anti-drug 
     message. Members of Congress also need to focus federal 
     efforts on law enforcement and interdiction programs that 
     work, and fund only those rehabilitation programs that have a 
     track record of success. One way Congress can do this is to 
     allow funding for drug counseling and drug rehabilitation 
     programs provided by religious organizations.
       America's illegal drug problem is complex and presents a 
     special challenge for policymakers in Congress and the White 
     House. But the complexity and the difficulty of the issue are 
     no excuse for ineffective policy and a lack of serious 
     effort.


                              Introduction

       The Clinton Administration continues to retreat in the war 
     on drugs. After a decade of consistent progress during the 
     Reagan and Bush Administrations, almost every available 
     indicator today shows the United States is losing--some would 
     say surrendering--in the prolonged struggle against illegal 
     drugs. Consider the evidence:
       Since President Clinton took office, the number of 12-to-
     17-years-olds using marijuana has almost doubled--2.9 million 
     compared with the 1992 level of 1.6 million.\1\ One in three 
     high school seniors now smokes marijuana, and 48.4 percent of 
     the Class of 1995 had tried drugs by graduation day.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       LSD use has reached the highest rate since record-keeping 
     started in 1975. Fully 11.7 percent of the Class of 1995 had 
     tried it at least once.\3\
       The number of cocaine-and heroin-related emergency room 
     admissions has jumped to historic levels. In the first half 
     of 1995, cocaine-related emergency room cases were 65 percent 
     above the level in the first half of 1991. Heroin admissions 
     soared 120 percent over the same period.\4\
       Methamphetamine use has turned into a major problem, 
     particularly in the Western United States. In the first half 
     of 1995, meth-related emergency room cases were up by 321 
     percent compared with the first half of 1991.\5\
       While there are many different reasons for this 
     deterioration in America's resistance to illegal drugs, part 
     of the explanation is a failure in federal policy. President 
     Clinton and his Administration have demonstrated little 
     leadership on the issue and have failed to send out an 
     unambiguous message of disapproval to young Americans. The 
     President's personnel appointments in this area have ranged 
     from the virtually invisible, as in the case of former ``drug 
     czar'' Lee Brown, to the embarrassing, as in the case of Dr. 
     Joycelyn Elders, former Surgeon General of the United States. 
     Staffing at the Office of National Drug Control Policy was 
     cut by 80 percent--from 147 to 25. Moreover, although the 
     President's election year budget reverses this cut and 
     requests major increases for drug law enforcement, his FY 
     1995 request would have eliminated 621 drug enforcement 
     positions.
       The Clinton Administration's policy initiatives have been 
     similarly ineffectual, especially their focus on hard core 
     drug users at the expense of stronger law enforcement and 
     interdiction. The evidence is in: Federal illegal drug 
     caseloads fell by 10.3 percent from FY 1992 to FY 1995; the 
     government-wide interdiction budget has been cut 39 percent 
     since 1993; the impact of interdiction programs has dropped 
     off sharply; and drug-related hospital emergency room 
     admissions have hit record levels.
       Instead of pursuing ineffectual anti-drug policies and 
     giving the impression that curbing drug use is not a 
     priority, the President and Congress should demonstrate 
     leadership in this deadly contest. If the United States is 
     serious about combating the infiltration of illegal drugs 
     across America's borders and into the nation's cities, towns, 
     neighborhoods, and schools, several steps need to be taken:
       The President must use the ``bully pulpit'' of his office 
     to send out a clear message that drug use is unacceptable.
       American must assist its allies in Latin America and 
     elsewhere in their efforts to take on the drug cartels.
       The President must propose budgetary, personnel, and policy 
     initiatives that make it absolutely clear that Washington 
     means business in curbing the flow of drugs into America.
       Congress should pass legislation to close loopholes that 
     result in excessively lenient sentences for marijuana 
     smugglers.
       Congress should continue to block the United States 
     Sentencing Commission's proposals to lower sentences for 
     crack cocaine dealers.
       Washington must get serious about promoting rehabilitation 
     that works, such as religion-based programs, instead of 
     simply funding programs that promise to rehabilitate drug 
     addicts and fail to deliver. Congress should re-evaluate all 
     treatment programs carefully. The basis of federal funding 
     for drug rehabilitation should be a clear track record of 
     success.
       America succeeded in reducing the rate of drug use, 
     especially among vulnerable teenagers, in the 1980s because 
     local efforts were reinforced by a serious program of law 
     enforcement, interdiction, and hard-headed demand reduction 
     policies, and because the Reagan and Bush Administrations 
     made it very clear that they were determined to win the war 
     against drugs. Unfortunately, the

[[Page S9022]]

     Clinton Administration has adopted a very different posture, 
     and America is now losing the war.


                       the failure of leadership

       The illegal drug problem is admittedly complex, but 
     complexity is no excuse for inaction. President Clinton began 
     derailing the successful approaches of prior administrations 
     from the earliest days of his presidency. After promising to 
     ``reinvent our drug control programs'' and ``move beyond 
     ideological debates,'' the President announced a new approach 
     to drug policy, de-emphasizing law enforcement and effecting 
     a ``controlled shift'' away from interdiction. More 
     important, in a message to Congress, he promised to ``change 
     the focus of drug policy by targeting chronic, hardcore drug 
     users.'' \6\ This ineffectual policy--the latest 
     manifestation of the liberals' commitment to a ``therapeutic 
     state'' in which government serves as the agent of personal 
     rehabilitation--seems to have been rejected even by the 
     President's new drug czar. General Barry McCaffrey, who has 
     moved to elevate the profile of prevention programs.
       Cuts in the interdiction system and the dismantling of 
     other programs with records of success have been accompanied 
     by the increased availability of drugs. Ironically, the 
     Clinton drug policy has been most harmful to its intended 
     beneficiaries--the very hard-core drug addicts who are 
     cycling through emergency rooms at record rates.
       The President's lack of visibility on the drug issue has 
     drawn criticism from prominent congressional supporters of 
     drug control programs, including leading Democrats in the 
     House and Senate. Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) admits he has 
     ``been openly critical of this President's silence.''\7\ And 
     Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY) has gone so far as to 
     declare, ``I've been in Congress over two decades, and I have 
     never, never, never found any Administration that been so 
     silent on this great challenge to the American people.''\8\
       In fact, since taking office, President Clinton has been 
     significantly engaged in only one aspect of the drug 
     problem--drugs in schools, which arguably is not even the 
     federal government's responsibility. In June 1995, Clinton 
     promised to veto any attempt by the 104th Congress to cut the 
     Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities program, which 
     Congress had evaluated and found to be ineffective. Bob 
     Peterson, former Michigan drug czar, described the program as 
     a ``slush fund,'' and even former ONDCP Director Lee Brown 
     acknowledged ``abuses of the program'' in testimony before a 
     House subcommittee.\9\''
       The Disturbing Change in the Trends. During the 1980s and 
     early 1990s, the United States experienced dramatic 
     reductions in casual drug use--reductions that were won 
     through increased penalties, strong presidential leadership, 
     and a clear national anti-drug message. Beyond the 
     substantial investment of resources, engaged commanders in 
     chief used the bully pulpit to change attitudes. Because 
     Ronald Reagan and George Bush visibly involved themselves in 
     the effort to combat illegal drugs, they helped rescue much 
     of a generation. Overall, casual drug use was cut by more 
     than half between 1977 and 1992. Casual cocaine use fell by 
     79 percent, while monthly use fell from 2.9 million users in 
     1988 to 1.3 million in 1992.\10\ Strong presidential 
     leadership had tangible effects.
       Against this backdrop of accomplishment, Bill Clinton 
     promised to get even tougher than his predecessors. Indeed, 
     while campaigning for the presidency, then-Governor Clinton 
     appeared to take an even harder line on illegal drugs than 
     Bush, declaring that ``President Bush hasn't fought a real 
     war on crime and drugs . . . [and] I will.'' On the link 
     between drugs and crime, Clinton said, ``We have a national 
     problem on our hands that requires a tough national 
     response.''\11\
       Despite the tough rhetoric, however, the President's 
     performance has been disappointing. Perhaps the first solid 
     indication that rhetoric and reality would not fit neatly in 
     the same policy box was the appointment of Dr. Joycelyn 
     Elders of Arkansas as Surgeon General of the United States. 
     Dr. Elders, among other things, offered the taxpayers the 
     tantalizing theory that legalization of drugs might 
     ``markedly reduce our crime rate'' without increasing drug 
     use.\12\ As for the President himself, his image of 
     rhetorical toughness was compromised on occasion by remarks 
     that could at best be described as indifferent, at worst as 
     flippant.\13\


                      downgrading the war on drugs

       The President's ill-considered public words have been 
     accompanied by a reduction in tangible resources and effort. 
     Within weeks of taking office, the Clinton Administration 
     announced that it would slash the Office of National Drug 
     Control Policy staff from 147 to 25. The President made the 
     Director of the Office a member of the Cabinet, but the move 
     was empty symbolism. This became painfully evident when his 
     new Director, former New York City Police Commissioner Lee P. 
     Brown, was observed to be virtually invisible during his two-
     and-one-half-year tenure. President Bush's Drug Policy 
     Director, William Bennett, told Congress that the Clinton 
     Administration cuts essentially would relegate the new 
     Director to the position of an office clerk.\14\
       Cuts in the drug czar's office prefigured much larger cuts 
     in federal enforcement and interdiction agencies. The 
     Administration's fiscal 1995 budget, for example, proposed to 
     slash 621 drug enforcement positions from the Drug 
     Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and 
     Naturalization Service (INS), Customs Service, FBI, and Coast 
     Guard.\15\ The DEA, America's only law enforcement agency 
     dedicated exclusively to fighting the drug trade, lost 227 
     agent positions between September 1992 and September 1995--
     more than 6 percent of its agent force.
       Declining Caseloads. Cuts in law enforcement paralleled 
     reduced drug case filings. The Administrative Office of the 
     U.S. Courts registered a 10.3 percent reduction in federal 
     case filings between FY 1992 and FY 1995, and the total 
     number of defendants indicted in these cases declined by 8.5 
     percent. The number of federal drug cases refused for 
     prosecution increased by 18.6 percent over the same period as 
     U.S. Attorneys pursued more investigations into health-care 
     fraud and other areas deemed to be of greater priority than 
     combating illegal drugs.
       In an April 26, 1995, letter to Senate Judiciary Committee 
     Chairman Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT), then-Drug Policy Director Lee 
     Brown attributed the ``troubling'' decline in prosecutions to 
     ``the policies of the new U.S. Attorneys who de-emphasized 
     prosecution of small-scale drug offenders.'' Director Brown 
     also quoted the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to 
     the effect that the change had been ``consistent with DOJ 
     policy''.
       Despite the abundance of data confirming the declining 
     trend in illegal drug prosecutions, Clinton Administration 
     officials have cited different figures, compiled by the 
     Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, to suggest that case 
     filings and defendants prosecuted actually rose 12.9 and 12.1 
     percent, respectively, between fiscal 1994 and fiscal 1995. 
     But even according to these figures, the number of drug 
     defendants prosecuted dropped for the three years prior to 
     1995, and remains 5.2 percent below the FY 1992 level.\16\
       In a textbook illustration of the laxness of Clinton 
     Administration drug policy, the Los Angeles Times revealed on 
     May 12, 1996, that hundreds of marijuana smugglers ``have 
     been allowed to go free after U.S. authorities arrested them 
     with substantial quantities of drugs at ports of entry in 
     California.'' \17\ Attorney General Janet Reno objected to 
     the article's claims, noting that the individuals in question 
     are ``punished'' by having their border crossing cards 
     confiscated. Ms. Reno added that prosecution may be 
     ``deferred'' only if five mitigating factors are present, a 
     claim that elicited this reaction from Bush Administration 
     Drug Enforcement Administration head Robert C. Bonner:
       Reno claims that only Mexican nationals qualify under the 
     leniency policy. This results in two standards of justice. 
     U.S. citizens are prosecuted, but Mexican nationals get a 
     free ride to Mexico.
       Another criterion is being caught with under 125 pounds of 
     marijuana. So, if you are smuggling ``only'' 100 pounds, with 
     a wholesale value of over $100,000, you meet one of the 
     criteria.
       Now, Reno also says that there must also be ``insufficient 
     evidence'' of knowledge and intent, but, of course, no one 
     should be prosecuted, regardless of citizenship or quantity, 
     if evidence of knowledge and intent are not present.\18\
       Dropping the Safeguards. The Clinton Administration began 
     to reduce America's drug interdiction efforts within a year 
     of the inaugural. On November 3, 1993, against the vehement 
     objections of senior Coast Guard officers, the National 
     Security Council issued a classified presidential memorandum 
     dictating a ``controlled shift'' of interdiction assets to 
     other functions. At the same time, flight hours in the so-
     called ``transit zone'' between the United States and South 
     America were cut by 50 percent, many interdiction aircraft 
     and helicopters were put into mothballs, ship ``steaming 
     days'' were cut by a third, and Department of Defense 
     detection and monitoring budgets were reduced by more than 
     half. Controlling for inflation, the aggregate government-
     wide drug interdiction budget has been cut 39 percent since 
     the last year of the Bush Administration.\19\
       The impact of these cuts was almost immediate: Between 1993 
     and 1994, U.S. interdiction forces experienced a 47 percent 
     drop in their ability to stop drug shipments from Latin 
     America. Cocaine seizures by the Customs Service and the 
     Coast Guard fell by 70 percent and 71 percent, respectively, 
     during the same period.\20\ Overall interdiction 
     effectiveness has dropped by a cumulative 64 percent between 
     1993 and 1996.\21\
       Some, including General McCaffrey, have attempted to argue, 
     against the evidence, that this reduced effectiveness was the 
     result of changing trafficker routes, not vastly diminished 
     levels of national effort. This argument is refuted by an 
     interdiction study commissioned by the Clinton Administration 
     itself. The study, performed for the Office of National Drug 
     Control Policy by the EBR Corporation, using conservative 
     assumptions, showed that restoring $500 million in assets to 
     the transit zone could cause seizures, jettisons, and 
     mission-aborts totaling 130 tons of cocaine per year. In 
     round terms, this means that restoring half the assets cut by 
     the Clinton Administration could result in the seizure or 
     disruption of more than the entire amount of cocaine seized 
     domestically every year.
       Stimulating Demand. Cuts in interdiction and law 
     enforcement have had additional consequences that should have 
     been predictable to anyone with even a modicum of 
     understanding of the basic economic laws of supply and 
     demand. Between 1993 and 1994--the first year of the 
     ``controlled shift'' away

[[Page S9023]]

     from interdiction--the retail price of a gram of cocaine 
     dropped from $123 to $104. Two years later, the price was 
     still a low $107 per gram. Heroin prices have fallen even 
     more sharply, from $1,647 per pure gram in 1992 to $966 per 
     gram in February 1996.\22\ The increased availability of such 
     relatively cheap drugs has helped drive hard-core drug use--
     as reflected in emergency room admissions--to record levels.
       While most drugs are produced in inaccessible regions 
     overseas, limiting the impact of U.S.-sponsored eradication 
     programs, the bulk of the marijuana consumed in the United 
     States is produced domestically. Domestic marijuana 
     eradication under the Bush Administration was highly 
     successful--so successful, in fact, that marijuana became 
     more expensive, ounce for ounce, than gold. Hawaiian 
     producers were forced to import marijuana to satisfy local 
     demand for the first time in recent history.
       The Clinton Administration, however, has deemphasized 
     marijuana eradication. There has been a 59 percent reduction 
     in cultivated plants destroyed since 1992.\23\ The drug 
     budget of the U.S. Park Service has been cut 22 percent from 
     the FY 1992 level,\24\ resulting in a 47 percent reduction in 
     plants eradicated by the Park Service. Once again, increases 
     in supply have fueled demand (use by 8th graders has 
     increased 184 percent since 1992) and caused prices to drop 
     (marijuana prices are at the lowest level in eight years).
       The ubiquitous availability of illegal drugs--de facto 
     legalization--is confirmed by the Administration's own data. 
     According to the latest White House report on drug use,\25\ 
     heroin is now so cheap and pure that it has ``driven new 
     demand and drawn some former addicts back into use.'' 
     Meanwhile, the availability of cocaine and crack is described 
     as ``high,'' and marijuana is ``plentiful and potent'' and 
     ``widely available'' in all areas of the country except 
     California.
       By making drugs more expensive, aggressive interdiction and 
     law enforcement efforts reduce use among particularly 
     vulnerable inner-city populations by forcing addicts to spend 
     their limited disposable income on a smaller quantity of 
     drugs.\26\ A cocaine addict named ``Joe,'' interviewed for a 
     book \27\ on the impact of cocaine, describes the phenomenon: 
     ``What keeps you from dying is you run out of money.'' 
     Conversely, paring back supply reduction programs hits 
     hardest those who are most heavily addicted and least able to 
     resist drug use.
       Rising Emergency Room Cases. This phenomenon is evident in 
     the record number of drug-related emergency room admissions 
     that have followed in the wake of the Clinton 
     Administration's cuts to enforcement and interdiction 
     programs. (It is instructive that these record increases have 
     occurred despite the Clinton strategy's stated concern for 
     hard-core addicts, the primary population captured by the 
     emergency room statistics.) Compared with the first half of 
     1994 (which was then the high water mark for drug-related 
     emergency room cases), cocaine-related emergencies have 
     increased 12 percent (from 68,400 to 76,800); heroin-related 
     episodes have risen 27 percent (from 30,000 to 38,100); 
     marijuana-related episodes have increased 32 percent (from 
     19,100 to 25,200); and methamphetamine cases have jumped by a 
     staggering 35 percent (from 7,800 to 10,600)
       Hard-core addicts deserve access to treatment, but 
     experience teaches that the typical addict will cycle through 
     the treatment system several times over a period of years 
     before getting off drugs, with many never reaching that goal. 
     A 1994 RAND study found that only 13 percent of heavy cocaine 
     users who receive treatment are either non-users or light 
     users at the end of a year. The study also found that 20 
     percent of heavy users continue to use drugs while in 
     treatment.\28\
       Getting serious about hard-core drug use ultimately 
     requires America to do more to fight youthful drug use: While 
     hard-core users are mostly beyond the reach of drug treatment 
     professionals, today's young people can be dissuaded from 
     going down the road that leads to hard-core addiction. In 
     fact, those who reach age 21 without using drugs almost never 
     try them later in life. Conversely, drug users almost always 
     start young, and almost invariably by smoking marijuana.\29\
       An About Face? With U.S. Army General Barry McCaffrey's 
     appointment as the new point man on drugs, the President 
     indicated he was reversing his decision to gut ONDCP and 
     discarding his misguided strategy of targeting hard-core 
     users. The editors of The Washington Post called the change 
     an ``about face.'' President Clinton was able to capitalize 
     on the installation of a tough-minded general; White House 
     aide Rahm Emmanuel was candid enough to say that the changes 
     were ``what the President believes will help us improve on 
     our record.'' \30\
       Given the Clinton Administration's previous track record, 
     however, it remains unclear whether Director McCaffrey's 
     appointment means a genuine change in course. His is a 
     managerial position that accords him little line authority, 
     and his policy accomplishments will depend largely on his 
     willingness and ability to take on the various empires of the 
     federal bureaucracy. This in turn will depend on the degree 
     to which he is supported by the President of the United 
     States.
       Unfortunately, early indications suggest that Director 
     McCaffrey may be reticent to test the President's commitment 
     to an effective anti-drug strategy. For instance, McCaffrey 
     recently sided with the Department of State in supporting a 
     determination that Mexico had ``cooperated fully'' with the 
     United States on drug control matters, even though the head 
     of the DEA objected that the government of Mexico had not 
     done enough to warrant that designation. This determination 
     was made even though the Administration could have waived the 
     sanctions that typically accompany decertification.
       This decision sounds a disturbing signal about the degree 
     of General McCaffrey's leverage on drug questions. The United 
     States imports 400 tons of cocaine annually, 70 percent of it 
     transshipped through Mexico. Yet Mexico's seizures have 
     slumped to roughly one-twentieth of the amount passing 
     through their country. Arrest figures are down significantly, 
     and the former president's brother, Raul Salinas, has been 
     arrested on suspicion of ``drug-related charges.'' Four 
     Mexican trafficking ``confederations,'' meanwhile, operate 
     with relative impunity. But President Clinton's statement 
     to Congress explained away Mexican inaction on the peso 
     crisis and declared weakly that President Zedillo's 
     administration has ``set the stage for action against the 
     major drug cartels in Mexico.'' \31\ For too long, the 
     U.S. has accepted at face value repeated Mexican promises 
     of future aggressive action against the drug trade. It is 
     time for such complacency to end.
       McCaffrey also appears to have had little positive impact 
     on recent high-level appointments. For example, on June 12, 
     1996, Patricia M. McMahon was nominated to serve as his 
     Deputy Director for Demand Reduction, a post that requires 
     Senate confirmation. A former Clinton campaign worker with 
     little substantive background in drug policy, Ms. McMahon's 
     appointment to a lower-level position was criticized by the 
     Washington Post in the early days of the Clinton 
     Administration as ``an example of continued political 
     patronage.'' \32\ Her principal contribution to the White 
     House drug office was to serve as the political operative who 
     carried out the slashing of the staff by 80 percent at the 
     start of the Administration.


                THE COMPONENTS OF A NEW ANTI-DRUG POLICY

       The President and Congress can retake the initiative in the 
     continuing struggle against drug use and the agents of the 
     criminal network that is exporting poison into America's 
     neighborhoods. But this cannot happen without the full 
     leadership of the President and his Administration.
       The Administration must take several decisive steps:
       Use the bully pulpit. When President George Bush gave the 
     first national primetime address of his presidency, it was on 
     the drug issue. By doing this, he followed the example of 
     visible and emphatic national leadership set by President 
     Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan. The national effort 
     against drugs--carried on by parents, young people, local 
     people, local religious leaders, neighbors, local law 
     enforcement, educators, medical personnel, and local 
     government officials--gains immeasurably from strong, visible 
     presidential support. But it is weakened considerably by the 
     perception of presidential indifference.
       Do more in Latin America. Fighting drugs at the source 
     makes sense. Federal authorities ought to be going after the 
     beehive, not just the bees. Foreign programs are also cheap 
     and effective.
       An example: America's chronically underfunded program in 
     Peru will cost just $16 million to run in FY 1996. But 
     targeting even that meager amount effectively can work. The 
     Peruvians have managed to shoot down or disable 20 trafficker 
     airplanes since March 1, 1995. Unfortunately Peruvian 
     President Fujimori's aggressive line on drugs actually caused 
     President Clinton to bar Peru from receiving radar tracking 
     data. That decision has badly damaged Peruvian-American 
     relations, but Fujimori has continued to work with the United 
     States, and much more can be done at very small cost. The 
     Peruvian air force currently uses obsolete A-37 jet trainers 
     from the 1950s. For $50 million, the United States could 
     equip the Peruvians with new tracker aircraft, improved 
     night-flyer gear, and spare parts. This is an opportunity to 
     save American lives by helping the Peruvians press their 
     attack on traffickers. In addition to helping countries like 
     Peru, the United States should make effective cooperation in 
     fighting drugs one of the most important requirements for 
     Latin nations seeking good diplomatic and economic relations.
       Set more sensible budget priorities. The Department of 
     Defense today is allowed to spend only 0.3 percent of its 
     budget on preventing the inflow of drugs. The U.S. military 
     cannot solve the drug problem, but it can make a profound 
     contribution to cutting the flow of drugs through 
     interdiction. The budget needs to reflect this national 
     priority.
       Reduce marijuana availability. The federal government 
     urgently needs to restore leadership to the fight against 
     marijuana production, trafficking, and use. Federal marijuana 
     penalties need to be stiffened, partly by eliminating the 
     loophole that allows marijuana smugglers to be treated far 
     more leniently than marijuana growers. Federal eradication 
     efforts need to be reinvigorated.
       Block lower crack sentences. Last year, the United States 
     Sentencing Commission proposed steep reductions in sentences 
     for crack dealers. Those changes were blocked by statute. In 
     its 1997 amendments cycle, the Sentencing Commission should 
     be blocked, and the Commission should be barred from 
     proposing changes in criminal penalties

[[Page S9024]]

     where Congress has established mandatory minimum sentences, 
     except in an advisory format that would require affirmative 
     congressional action before taking effect.
       Stop undercutting those drug treatment programs that do 
     work. Taxpayers have heard the stories about waiting lists 
     for drug treatment. Waiting lists are not fiction--they do 
     exist. On the other hand, one program that rarely has waiting 
     lists in Mitch Rosenthal's well-regarded Phoenix House, a 
     tough program where addicts spend 18-24 months literally 
     learning to live new lives. Programs like Phoenix House have 
     a proven track record dating back to 1967. But they are 
     unpopular with addicts because, to quote one analyst, ``a 
     residential program with constricted freedom, rigorous rules, 
     and enforced separation from drugs is the last place most 
     addicts want to find themselves, at least initially.'' \33\ 
     Nevertheless these approaches work. Yet taxpayers today pay 
     billions of dollars on drug treatment that allows the addicts 
     to decide for themselves how rigorous and how long their 
     treatment will be. Not surprisingly, this arrangement does 
     not work very well.
       In addition, while many faith-based treatment programs 
     report remarkable success with the addicted, their religious 
     character usually bars them from receiving government 
     treatment funds. In a break from current policy, 
     Representatives Jim Talent (R-MO) and J.C. Watts (R-OK) have 
     introduced a bill, the American Community Renewal Act of 1996 
     (HR 3467), which would allow the neighborhood groups, 
     including religious institutions, the same access to federal 
     funds that is enjoyed by other drug treatment and counseling 
     facilities. States also would be able to contract with these 
     drug treatment centers. Discrimination against effective 
     religiously based programs should end. Taxpayer funding for 
     drug treatment should be tied strictly to results, 
     religiously based programs should be eligible for funding, 
     and addicts who seek publicly funded treatment should be 
     required to enter rigorous programs and face real sanctions 
     if they fail to complete them.


                               conclusion

       The Clinton Administration has a poor record in fighting 
     the war on drugs. Interdiction efforts and prosecution for 
     illegal drugs are down, illegal drug usage and emergency room 
     admissions are up, and there has been an absence of credible 
     presidential leadership on this issue. Part of the problem 
     also has been a failure in personnel management: the 
     inability or unwillingness to appoint effective leaders in 
     key positions to articulate and enforce a strong anti-drug 
     message, as well as inappropriate reductions in staff at 
     agencies dedicated to dealing with the problem on the front 
     lines. With the appointment of General Barry McCaffrey 
     as Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
     this situation may improve, although the McMahon 
     appointment is far from encouraging.
       American taxpayers need and deserve presidential leadership 
     on this issue. Members of Congress also need to focus federal 
     efforts on law enforcement and interdiction programs that 
     work, and fund only those rehabilitation programs that have a 
     track record of success. One way Congress can do this is to 
     allow funding for drug counseling and drug rehabilitation 
     programs provided by religious organizations. Congress and 
     the states also should undertake a tough re-evaluation of 
     existing grant recipients to make sure that funding is going 
     to programs that work best in reducing dependency on illegal 
     drugs.
       America's illegal drug problem is complex and presents a 
     special challenge for policymakers in Congress and the White 
     House. But the complexity and the difficulty of the issue are 
     no excuse for ineffective policy and a lack of serious 
     effort.
       Prepared for the Heritage Foundation by John P. Walters 
     \34\ and James F.X. O'Gara.\35\


                               footnotes

     \1\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Preliminary 
     Estimates for the 1994 National Household Survey on Drug 
     Abuse, September 1995.
     \2\ University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, 
     Monitoring the Future, December 15, 1995.
     \3\ Ibid.
     \4\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Preliminary 
     Estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network, Advance Report 
     No. 14, May 31, 1996.
     \5\ Ibid.
     \6\ President Clinton's message accompanying Office of 
     National Drug Control Policy's National Drug Strategy, 
     February 1994, p. iii.
     \7\ Hearing before the Senate Caucus on International 
     Narcotics Control, April 25, 1996.
     \8\ CNN News, January 31, 1994.
     \9\ Hearing before House Subcommittee on National Security, 
     International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, April 7, 1995.
     \10\ See note 1, supra.
     \11\ The New York Times, March 26, 1993, referring to 
     previous Clinton statements. Unfortunately for the President, 
     his most memorable public statement in connection with the 
     drug issue still was ``I didn't inhale.''
     \12\ Wolfgang Munchau, ``Clinton's Team Split on Drugs,'' The 
     Times (London), December 8, 1993.
     \13\ In an interview with MTV, for example, when asked 
     whether he would ``inhale'' given the chance to ``do it over 
     again,'' Clinton merely provoked laughter: ``Sure, if I 
     could. I tried before.'' MTV interview, June 12, 1992.
     \14\ Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, October 
     20, 1993.
     \15\ Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug 
     Control Strategy: Budget Summary, February 1994.
     \16\ Prosecution figures are derived from the Executive 
     Office of U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) as well as the 
     Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO). The AO and 
     EOUSA numbers differ because the two entities practice a 
     different ``leading charge'' system; only the AO includes 
     misdemeanor cases; and the AO includes cases brought by 
     magistrate judges.
     \17\ H.G. Reza, ``Drug Runners Arrested at Border Often Go 
     Free; Smuggling: Crackdown Leads to More Seizures, but Jail 
     Overcrowding and Clashing Priorities Force Suspects; 
     Release,'' The Los Angeles Times, May 12, 1996, p 1.
     \18\ Robert C. Bonner, ``Clinton's Flawed Drug-Smuggling 
     Policy,'' San Diego Union-Tribune, June 4, 1996.
     \19\ In 1989 constant dollars, the interdiction budget 
     declined from $1.73 billion in FY 1992 to $1.05 billion in FY 
     1996.
     \20\ Customs cocaine seizures fell from 35.4 metric tons (mt) 
     in FY 1993 to 10.7 mt in FY 1994. Coast Guard cocaine 
     seizures fell from 15.4 mt in FY 1993 to 4.4 mt in FY 1994.
     \21\ The ``disruption rate'' is the total amount of cocaine 
     and marijuana that is seized, jettisoned, or ``aborted'' 
     (returned to the source country as a result of interdiction 
     or law enforcement presence). Data sheet from Joint 
     Interagency Task Force-East, Key West, Florida, April 26, 
     1996. The daily disruption rate fell from 435.1 kgs/day in 
     1993 to 228.7 kgs/day in 1994, and still further to 158.1 
     kgs/day during the first 15 weeks of 1996.
     \22\ U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement 
     Administration, and Abt Associates, Average Price and Purity 
     of Cocaine in the United States, Average Price and Purity of 
     Heroin in the United States, May 28, 1996.
     \23\ According to the Department of Justice, 3.04 million 
     cultivated plants were eradicated in 1995 compared to 7.49 
     million eradicated in 1992.
     \24\ The Park Service drug control budget was cut from $11.1 
     million in FY 1992 to $8.7 million in FY 1996.
     \25\ Office of National Drug Control Policy, Pulse Check: 
     National Trends in Drug Abuse, June 1996.
     \26\ For example, a 43 percent increase in cocaine prices in 
     1990 (the first such increase in five years) paralleled a 27 
     percent reduction in cocaine-related emergency room 
     admissions and overdoses (the first such reduction in 12 
     years).
     \27\ Eugene Richards, Cocaine True, Cocaine Blue (Aperture).
     \28\ C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling 
     Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs (Santa Monica, Cal.: 
     RAND, 1994).
     \29\ According to the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse 
     at Columbia University, 12- to 17-year-olds who use marijuana 
     are 85 times more likely to graduate to cocaine than those 
     who abstain from marijuana.
     \30\ Ann Devroy, ``About-Face; Clinton to Restore Staff He 
     Cut from Anti-Drug Office,'' The Washington Post, March 6, 
     1996, p. A15.
     \31\ Memorandum from the President of the United States to 
     the Secretary of State, Certification of Major Narcotics 
     Producing and Transit Countries, Statement of Explanation: 
     Mexico, March 1, 1996.
     \32\ Michael Isikoff, ``Drug Director Urged to Hire Hill 
     Aides; Memo Asked Director to `Do Something' for Congressman 
     Rangel,'' The Washington Post, August 19, 1993, p. A27.
     \33\ Sally Satel, ``Yes, Drug Treatment Can Work,'' City 
     Journal, Summer 1995.
     \34\ John P. Walters is President of the New Citizenship 
     Project, an organization created to advance a renewal of 
     American institutions and greater citizen control over 
     national life. During the Bush Administration, he served as 
     Acting Director and Deputy Director of the White House Office 
     of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).
     \35\ James F.X. O'Gara is Director of Research for the New 
     Citizenship Project. He previously served as drug policy 
     advisor to Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT), Chairman of the 
     Senate Judiciary Committee, and has served as assistant to 
     the Administrator for DEA for foreign policy matters.

  Mr. HATCH. I thank the distinguished Senator from Georgia for his 
leadership in this area, for being willing to get out here and talk 
about these issues. I have been talking about them for a long time. I 
am disappointed we have not made more headway, but it certainly has not 
been for lack of effort on the part of our friend from Georgia.
  I want to say in all honesty, we have to fight this war. We have to 
give it everything we have. We have to have leadership at the top. We 
do not have it right now but we are going to keep this pressure on 
until we get it, one way or the other.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I thank the Senator from Utah for, as he has 
acknowledged, long and diligent work in this arena. A lot of Americans 
can be particularly thankful for that work.
  Mr. HATCH. I thank my colleague.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I appreciate his remarks this morning. At this time I 
yield up to 10 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for up 
to 10 minutes.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Georgia for 
organizing this time to speak about this incredibly important issue. 
While we do not intend this to be an issue that is partisan in nature, 
as the Senator from Utah, the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, has just pointed out, although this is clearly a bipartisan 
effort, or should be, it is impossible to deal with the issue without, 
I think, criticizing some of the people who have been unable thus far, 
or unwilling, to fight this war on drugs, to level that criticism as a 
way of pointing out what needs to change.

  I would not be so willing to do this if President Clinton had not 
made this a partisan political issue in the first place. That is what 
angers me so much. We just saw the Senator from Utah, the distinguished 
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, point out that from

[[Page S9025]]

1980 to the end of 1992, during the time of Republican administrations, 
drug use on all fronts had declined dramatically. In the Presidential 
campaign of 1992, here is what then-candidate Bill Clinton had to say:

       [President Bush] hasn't fought a real war on crime and 
     drugs. I will.

  Maybe if he had not said that, maybe if he had not made that promise, 
I would not be so critical of him today for failing to keep that 
promise. But as the chart that Senator Hatch just showed us reveals, 
from the time that President Clinton took office, drug use among young 
people in all of the categories increased. So you saw during the entire 
time of the Reagan and Bush administrations drug use going down and 
then, when President Clinton took office, drug use sharply going up. 
That is why it angers me to go back and see statements like this during 
the campaign 4 years ago, when he criticized President Bush for not 
being tough on drugs, and said he would fight the war on drugs. He has 
not done it and that is why we are critical here today.
  It is not to try to throw barbs at the President, but to try to get 
him on board on this issue, because this is critical for the future of 
the United States and for our kids. Specifically, when usage of hard 
drugs among White House personnel was finally revealed in the media, 
after having been denied by Presidential spokesmen, we get the kind of 
reaction that Senator Hatch just pointed out, coming from the White 
House, that suggested that using drugs is no big deal. It was Leon 
Panetta 2 years ago who attacked House Speaker Newt Gingrich for his 
comment that the delay in the White House granting clearance to a large 
group of staffers might be in part due to drug use by some of the 
staffers.
  That was the information people had at the time, but it was not then 
confirmed. Here is what Leon Panetta said:

       We cannot do business here with a Speaker of the House who 
     is going to engage in these kind of unfounded allegations.

  The people at the White House at that time knew those were not 
unfounded allegations. Now, 2 years later, the news accounts report 
that in fact at least a dozen staffers were taken on board, over the 
objection of the FBI and Secret Service because of their hard core drug 
use. Now what do the spin meisters at the White House talk about? Of 
course they are no longer unfounded accusations. Now it is just the 
excuse that, well, everyone was doing it. Press Secretary Mike McCurry:

       I was a kid in the 1970's. You know, did I smoke a joint 
     from time to time? Of course, I did. And the FBI knows that, 
     and that was in my background file.

  The ``of course, I did'' is what bothers so many of us. The White 
House is the ultimate bully pulpit in the United States. The tone set 
there permeates our entire culture. Our young people look to the 
President for his leadership on issues, to set an example, to be a role 
model. When his chief spokesman tosses off his drug use with a mere 
cavalier ``of course, I did,'' inferring that everybody did, that 
suggests it is behavior that is acceptable. It is against the law and 
it is not acceptable behavior.
  So, when the people at the highest levels in the White House treat 
the issue so cavalierly, is it no wonder the young people in our 
country, who are obviously susceptible to this kind of language, treat 
it cavalierly as well? Yet this is the same White House that is 
blasting Senator Dole for his comments that not necessarily everyone is 
addicted to tobacco use. It seems to me there is a gross double 
standard here, at a minimum. But that at maximum, one might say, more 
important, for the young people in our country this administration has 
squandered the assets that had been brought to bear in the war on 
drugs, had squandered the success of the Bush and Reagan 
administrations when drug use was brought substantially down.
  Senator Hatch has pointed out many of the things that have occurred 
during this administration, like the drug czar's office staff being cut 
more than 80 percent. After a year of leaving the drug czar's office 
vacant, finally the President selected Lee Brown, who was only in 
office for a few months. His major initiative was to have ``Big League 
Chew'' bubble-gum removed from convenience store chains. It did not do 
much to fight the war on drugs.
  Then he appointed as our Nation's top health official Joycelyn 
Elders, who said ``[I] do feel we would markedly reduce our crime rate 
if drugs were legalized.'' In one sense I suppose if you remove all 
prohibitions on illegal activity, you reduce the illegal drug use rate, 
at least measured against what it was during the war on drugs, but that 
is obviously not the way to protect the future of America's children. 
Particularly since we understand that the use of drugs such as 
marijuana leads to the use of much harder drugs. That is why the 
President's reduction in requests for funding from interdiction to law 
enforcement have not been welcomed by the Congress, and why the 
Congress has wanted to fund those programs at a higher level.
  Just summarizing what Senator Hatch said a moment ago, with the 
reduction in the officers from FBI, INS, Customs Service and Coast 
Guard, they would have lost 621 drug enforcement agents had the 
Congress not put the funding back in. And he mentioned the fact we did 
not train special agents of the DEA in 1993. But when the Congress has 
finally insisted on increasing the drug interdiction effort, for 
example in the bill we just dealt with last week, we get emphasis--
indications from the White House that they will support those 
increases. I hope that is true.
  According to the Wall Street Journal, the Attorney General, Janet 
Reno, ``announced that she wanted to reduce the mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug trafficking * * *.'' Statistics released by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reveal that, although drug use 
is going up, the number of individuals prosecuted for Federal drug 
violations is going down. That is what we have to change. This de facto 
strategy of the administration in fighting drugs was to deemphasize 
interdiction, law enforcement and prevention and concentrate on 
treatment. Yet, as has been pointed out, treatment is not the answer to 
this problem. It is only one small piece of the puzzle. And a 1994 
study by the Rand Corp. found that 27 percent of hardcore drug users 
continued hardcore use while undergoing treatment. And fully 88 percent 
of them returned to hardcore drug use after treatment. So the 
recidivism rate was very, very high.
  Let me just hesitate here to make a point. In criticizing the 
administration's efforts here, again I do not intend to be partisan. 
There have been a lot of Democrats who have been equally critical. 
Senator Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
said:

       This President is silent on the matter. He has failed to 
     speak.

  Representative Charles Rangel, a Democrat from New York whose 
district has a very serious problem in this regard said:

       I've been in Congress for over two decades and I have 
     never, never, never seen a President who cares less about 
     this issue.

  So I am not just speaking from the perspective of a Republican, Mr. 
President. I am speaking as someone who cares about our future and who 
has noted it is people on both sides of the aisle who are deeply 
committed to fighting this war who are also critical of this 
administration.
  The chairman of the Judiciary Committee pointed out that marijuana 
use is up; that one in three high school seniors now uses marijuana. 
That is an astounding statistic. Why is it important? Because, as I 
said a moment ago, according to surveys by the Center on Addiction and 
Substance Abuse, 12- to 17-year-olds who use marijuana are 85 times 
more likely to graduate to cocaine than those who don't use marijuana.
  So those who argue that marijuana use, so-called ``soft drugs,'' are 
not important are ignoring scientific evidence that almost all of the 
people who use those kinds of drugs graduate to harder drugs. That is 
why it is so important to stop this drug use at that level.
  What can we do to recapture the initiative on this war on drugs? 
First of all, on interdiction, the action we just took last week, we 
have to see renewed efforts by Federal agencies responsible for 
fighting drugs to spend greater resources, identifying the sources, 
methods and individuals involved in trafficking.

[[Page S9026]]

  Enforcement I mentioned a moment ago. Drug prosecution under this 
administration has decreased. Those violating our drug laws must be 
prosecuted, and we have to make sure those who are profiting from the 
drug trade are severely punished.
  Finally, education and prevention. Kids need to learn and be 
constantly reminded that drugs are harmful, and that is where the 
President's bully pulpit comes in.
  They laughed at President Reagan and his wife when they said that we 
should ``just say no.'' I think they were making a big mistake. We know 
the President has to say no.
  Mr. President, I ask for 30 seconds more from the Senator from 
Georgia, since I know my time has expired.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I yield another minute to the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I appreciate that. That will enable me to 
make this final point.
  We are doing our part in Congress to revitalize this war on drugs. We 
just passed the Commerce, State, Justice appropriations bill, which 
will improve our enforcement and interdiction efforts. It increases the 
funding substantially. I think, however, once we have done this, the 
President is going to have to help us regain the initiative by 
demonstrating that the administration is just as concerned about this 
effort as is the Congress. Of course, another option is to elect a 
President who really seems to care about this effort. But that is 
another matter.
  Let me say in conclusion, this effort should be bipartisan. It has to 
be coordinated. The President and the Congress have to join in the 
effort, and we have to convince the younger people in our country that 
the trend of drug use that is now going up must be reversed if their 
future is going to be great and if the future of America is going to be 
great, because all Americans bear the cost of drug abuse through 
increased crime and increased taxes to pay for welfare and other social 
programs and all the other costs to society that can't be measured.
  It is time to resume the drug war. America's future is at stake.
  I commend the Senator from Georgia for taking this time so we can 
emphasize the issue and get on with this important effort.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Arizona 
will stay with us for just a moment.
  I would like to read an editorial that appeared in the Boston Globe 
on Tuesday, July 23. It relates to his remarks. It quotes Speaker 
Gingrich in December of 1994. He said on a television show:

       I had a senior law enforcement official tell me that, in 
     his judgment, up to a quarter of the White House staff, when 
     they first came in, had used drugs in the last 4 or 5 years.

  He said:

       Now, that's very serious. I'm not making any allegation 
     about any individual person, but it's very clear that they 
     had huge problems.

  It goes on. This editorial says:

       Then the sky fell in. ``We cannot do business here with a 
     Speaker of the House who is going to engage in these kinds of 
     unfounded allegations,'' fumed Panetta. He lashed Gingrich 
     for behaving like an out-of-control talk show host, for 
     making an absolutely false accusation, for trafficking in 
     smear and innuendo.
       George Stephanopoulos has labeled Gingrich 
     ``irresponsible.'' Hillary Clinton said, ``So unfair.'' Press 
     Secretary Dee Dee Myers called them ``reckless charges.''

  McCarthyism was alluded to. That was the beginning of the 
demonization of the Speaker. Let me ask this question of the Senator 
from Arizona. Don't you think these people owe him an apology?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am so glad that the Senator from Georgia 
has asked that question, because now that this has been reported on in 
the media 2 years after the fact and some people from the White House 
have, apparently, acknowledged that there is truth to these 
allegations, I think that every one of the people who smeared House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich not only owe him an apology--and it should be a 
very direct and specific apology--for the comments that the Senator 
from Georgia just read, but they owe an apology to the American people, 
because they, in smearing him, suggested that he was lying, that he was 
not telling the truth, that the allegations were unfounded, when, in 
fact, they either knew or should have known what was going on in the 
White House, why those clearances had not been granted. Therefore, it 
is they who were misleading the American public by suggesting that what 
he said was untrue.
  So I have been wondering for some time when we would receive an 
apology, and I think it is as important that the House Speaker receive 
an apology.
  I happened to see the Sunday morning talk show when Speaker Gingrich 
said what he said. I saw him say it, and I thought at the time, ``Boy, 
he was certainly careful how he repeated that allegation because it was 
all over the news media.''
  He was very careful in saying, ``Now, I'm not making allegations, 
this is what a high-ranking official told me, and if it is true, it's 
very bad.''
  Well, all of the qualifications went out the window when all the 
White House pack dogs immediately attacked him the next day suggesting 
he was the one who was some kind of wild accuser here.
  That is why I think the Senator from Georgia hits the nail right on 
the head when he suggests that each one of these people owes the 
Speaker a very specific apology. And if I can go further and suggest 
they should apologize for misleading the American people as well.

  Mr. COVERDELL. If the Senator will yield.

       On dozens of editorial pages--

  I am quoting--

     there were comparisons to the most infamous demon in American 
     history. The Georgia Republican's words, said Newsday, were 
     laced with the kind of innuendo which fueled McCarthy's witch 
     hunt. To Herblock, the Washington Post venerable cartoonist, 
     Gingrich was McCarthy, cruelly blackening reputations with a 
     broad brush.

  I think there are a lot of people who owe the Speaker an apology. 
This attack was very harmful to this gentleman, and you alluded to it. 
There is no way that all of these people in the White House could not 
have known about the problems they were having in getting White House 
clearance. I believe they not only owe him an apology, but they owe him 
an apology at the same level to which they leveled this attack: a 
public apology from all of them, not just one of them on their behalf.
  Mr. KYL. If the Senator from Georgia will yield for a moment, the 
point here is not to extract an apology for the sake of an apology, but 
rather, I think, to make a larger point.
  Clearly, when the Speaker of the House is vilified the way he was 
without good reason, and we know now incorrectly if not with animus, he 
is owed an apology. But the point of these attacks was to try to 
distract attention away from the specific charge and the problem that 
was being alluded to by the Speaker.
  That is where I think these people owe an apology to the American 
public, because they were trying to divert attention away from a 
condition, a problem, and it is very much like the way the 
administration has treated this drug war from the very beginning.
  It is basically a nonwar, and that is why drug use has gone up during 
this administration's tenure. They have to focus back on the fact that 
what they say matters. The way the President acts matters a great deal, 
especially to the young people in this country.
  He is the first really young new-generation President here. As a 
result, I think young people really look to President Clinton because 
he is younger than most of the Presidents have been in recent years. 
When they see him act in a relatively cavalier way, then they are going 
to pick up on that. That appears to be what is happening, if you look 
at the statistics.
  So again, while it is important to apologize to the Speaker, because 
what they said about him was extraordinarily unfair and inaccurate, I 
think it is more important, again, that they get back on track in 
fighting the war on drugs by apologizing to the country as a whole for 
trying to distract attention from the problem in the White House, 
trying to distract attention from what was going on here in their 
inadequate effort to fight the war on drugs and refocus attention on 
the very, very difficult nature of this problem.
  President Clinton has an extraordinarily great ability to be 
persuasive, to demonstrate that he cares about things. And if he were 
to mount the podium with the same sincerity that

[[Page S9027]]

Nancy Reagan and Ronald Reagan did and George and Barbara Bush to tell 
the young people of today why it is so destructive for them to begin 
this path of doing drugs, I think he could be enormously helpful. He 
could be so powerful in his appeal and reach to these young people.
  So instead of obfuscating the issue and accusing others of making too 
big a deal out of it, as they did with Speaker Gingrich, I think they 
ought to try to focus on what they can do to help. It would be a 
tremendous benefit if they would do that. I thank the Senator from 
Georgia.

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