Congressional Record, Volume 142 Issue 109 (Tuesday, July 23, 1996)

[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 109 (Tuesday, July 23, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H8116-H8125]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATO ENLARGEMENT FACILITATION ACT OF 1996

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
bill (H.R. 3564) to amend the NATO Participation Act of 1994 to
expedite the transition to full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization of emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, as
amended.
The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 3564

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``NATO Enlargement
Facilitation Act of 1996''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has played an essential role in guaranteeing the
security, freedom, and prosperity of the United States and
its partners in the Alliance.
(2) The NATO Alliance is, and has been since its inception,
purely defensive in character, and it poses no threat to any
nation. The enlargement of the NATO Alliance to include as
full and equal members emerging democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe will serve to reinforce stability and security
in Europe by fostering their integration into the structures
which have created and sustained peace in Europe since 1945.
Their admission to NATO will not threaten any nation.
America's security, freedom, and prosperity remain linked to
the security of the countries of Europe.
(3) The sustained commitment of the member countries of
NATO to a mutual defense has made possible the democratic
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. Members of the
Alliance can and should play a critical role in addressing
the security challenges of the post-Cold War era and in
creating the stable environment needed for those emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to successfully
complete political and economic transformation.
(4) The United States continues to regard the political
independence and territorial integrity of all emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe as vital to
European peace and security.
(5) NATO has enlarged its membership on 3 different
occasions since 1949.
(6) Congress has sought to facilitate the further
enlargement of NATO at an early date by enacting the NATO
Participation

[[Page H8117]]

Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928
note) and the NATO Participation Act Amendments of 1995
(section 585 of Public Law 104-107).
(7) The Partnership for Peace, created in 1994 under
American leadership, has fostered cooperation between NATO
and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and offers a
path to future membership in the Alliance and a permanent
security relationship between participants in the Partnership
for Peace and members of NATO.
(8) As new members of NATO assume the responsibilities of
Alliance membership, the costs of maintaining stability in
Europe will be shared more widely. The concurrent assumption
of greater responsibility and development of greater
capabilities by the European members of NATO in pursuit of a
European security and defense identity will further reinforce
burdensharing. Facilitation of the enlargement process will
require current members of NATO, and the United States in
particular, to demonstrate the political will needed to build
on successful ongoing programs such as the Warsaw Initiative
and the Partnership for Peace by making available the
resources necessary to supplement efforts prospective new
members are themselves undertaking.
(9) New members will be full members of the Alliance,
enjoying all rights and assuming all the obligations under
the Washington Treaty.
(10) In order to assist emerging democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe that have expressed interest in joining NATO
to be prepared to assume the responsibilities of NATO
membership, the United States should encourage and support
efforts by such countries to develop force structures and
force modernization priorities that will enable such
countries to contribute to the full range of NATO missions,
including, most importantly, territorial defense of the
Alliance.
(11) Cooperative regional peacekeeping initiatives
involving emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe
that have expressed interest in joining NATO, such as the
Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, the Polish-Lithuanian Joint
Peacekeeping Force, and the Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping
Force, can make an important contribution to European peace
and security and international peacekeeping efforts, can
assist those countries preparing to assume the
responsibilities of possible NATO membership, and accordingly
should receive appropriate support from the United States.
(12) NATO remains the only multilateral security
organization capable of conducting effective military
operations and preserving security and stability of the Euro-
Atlantic region.
(13) NATO is an important diplomatic forum and has played a
positive role in defusing tensions between members of the
Alliance and, as a result, no military action has occurred
between two Alliance member states since the inception of
NATO in 1949.
(14) The process of enlarging NATO to include emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should be a
continuing process and progress toward the admission of
additional emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe
will depend on the degree to which these countries meet the
criteria set forth in section 203(d)(3) of the NATO
Participation Act of 1994.
(15) Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and
human rights is an integral aspect of genuine security, and
in evaluating requests for membership in NATO, the human
rights records of the emerging democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe should be evaluated in light of the
obligations and commitments of these countries under the
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act.
(16) A number of Central and Eastern European countries
have expressed interest in NATO membership, and have taken
concrete steps to demonstrate this commitment; including
their participation in Partnership for Peace activities.
(17) Democratic civilian control of defense forces is an
essential element in the process of preparation for those
states interested in possible NATO membership.
(18) The security and economic stability of the Caucasus
region is important to the United States, and the countries
of the Caucasus region should not be precluded from future
membership in NATO. The United States should continue to
promote policies that encourage economic and fiscal reforms,
private sector growth, and political reforms in the Caucasus
region.
(19) In recognition that not all countries which have
requested membership in NATO will necessarily qualify at the
same pace, the accession date for each new member may vary.
(20) The process of NATO enlargement entails the consensus
agreement of the governments of all 16 NATO members and
ratification in accordance with their constitutional
procedures.
(21) The provision of additional NATO transition assistance
should include those emerging democracies most ready for
closer ties with NATO and should be designed to assist other
countries meeting specified criteria of eligibility to move
forward toward eventual NATO membership.
(22) Lasting security and stability in Europe requires not
only the military integration of emerging democracies of
Central and Eastern Europe into existing European structures,
but also the eventual economic and political integration of
these countries into existing European structures.
(23) The Congress of the United States finds that Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic have made the most progress
toward achieving the stated criteria and should be eligible
for the additional assistance described in this bill.
(24) The evaluation of future membership in NATO for
emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should be
based on the progress of those nations in meeting criteria
for NATO membership, which require enhancement of NATO's
security and the approval of all NATO members.

SEC. 3. UNITED STATES POLICY.

It should be the policy of the United States--
(1) to join with the NATO allies of the United States to
adapt the role of the NATO Alliance to the post-Cold War
world;
(2) to actively assist the emerging democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe in their transition so that such countries
may eventually qualify for NATO membership;
(3) to ensure that all countries in Central and Eastern
Europe are fully aware of the costs and responsibilities of
NATO membership, including the obligation set forth in
Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty that new members be
able to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic
area, and further to ensure that all countries admitted to
NATO are capable of assuming those costs and
responsibilities; and
(4) to work to define a constructive and cooperative
political and security relationship between an enlarged NATO
and the Russian Federation.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING FURTHER ENLARGEMENT
OF NATO.

It is the sense of the Congress that in order to promote
economic stability and security in Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Moldova, and
Ukraine--
(1) the United States should continue to support the full
and active participation of these countries in activities
appropriate for qualifying for NATO membership;
(2) the United States Government should continue to use all
diplomatic means available to press the European Union to
admit as soon as possible any country which qualifies for
membership; and
(3) the United States Government and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization should continue to support military
exercises and peacekeeping initiatives between and among
these nations and members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

SEC. 5. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND
LITHUANIA.

In view of the forcible incorporation of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania into the Soviet Union in 1940 under the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the refusal of the United States
and other countries to recognize that incorporation for over
50 years, it is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have valid historical
security concerns that must be taken into account by the
United States; and
(2) Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should not be
disadvantaged in seeking to join NATO by virtue of their
forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union.

SEC. 6. DESIGNATION OF COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR NATO
ENLARGEMENT ASSISTANCE.

(a) In General.--The following countries are designated as
eligible to receive assistance under the program established
under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994
and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to
section 203(d) of such Act: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic.
(b) Authority to Designate Other Countries Not Precluded.--
The process of enlarging NATO to include emerging democracies
in Central and Eastern Europe should not stop with the
admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as full
members of the NATO Alliance. Accordingly, the designation of
countries pursuant to subsection (a) shall not be deemed to
preclude the designation by the President of other Central
and Eastern European countries pursuant to section 203(d) of
the NATO Participation Act of 1994 as eligible to receive
assistance under the program established under section 203(a)
of such Act.

SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT
ASSISTANCE.

(a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated
$60,000,000 for fiscal year 1997 for the program established
under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994.
(b) Availability.--Of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by subsection (a)--
(1) not less than $20,000,000 shall be available for the
subsidy cost, as defined in section 502(5) of the Credit
Reform Act of 1990, of direct loans pursuant to the authority
of section 203(c)(4) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994
(relating to the ``Foreign Military Financing Program'');
(2) not less than $30,000,000 shall be available for
assistance on a grant basis pursuant to the authority of
section 203(c)(4) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994
(relating to the ``Foreign Military Financing Program''); and
(3) not more than $10,000,000 shall be available for
assistance pursuant to the authority of section 203(c)(3) of
the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (relating to international
military education and training).

[[Page H8118]]

(c) Rule of Construction.--Amounts authorized to be
appropriated under this section are authorized to be
appropriated in addition to such amounts as otherwise may be
available for such purposes.

SEC. 8. REGIONAL AIRSPACE INITIATIVE AND PARTNERSHIP FOR
PEACE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

(a) In General.--Funds described in subsection (b) are
authorized to be made available to support the implementation
of the Regional Airspace Initiative and the Partnership for
Peace Information Management System, including--
(1) the procurement of items in support of these programs;
and
(2) the transfer of such items to countries participating
in these programs, which may include Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Ukraine, and Bulgaria.
(b) Funds Described.--Funds described in this subsection
are funds that are available--
(1) during any fiscal year under the NATO Participation Act
of 1994 with respect to countries eligible for assistance
under that Act; or
(2) during fiscal year 1997 under any Act to carry out the
Warsaw Initiative.

SEC. 9. EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.

(a) Priority Delivery.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the delivery of excess defense articles under the
authority of section 203(c) (1) and (2) of the NATO
Participation Act of 1994 and section 516 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 shall be given priority to the maximum
extent feasible over the delivery of such excess defense
articles to all other countries except those countries
referred to in section 541 of the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995
(Public Law 103-306; 108 Stat. 1640).
(b) Cooperative Regional Peacekeeping Initiatives.--The
Congress encourages the President to provide excess defense
articles and other appropriate assistance to cooperative
regional peacekeeping initiatives involving emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that have expressed
an interest in joining NATO in order to enhance their ability
to contribute to European peace and security and
international peacekeeping efforts.

SEC. 10. MODERNIZATION OF DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

The Congress endorses efforts by the United States to
modernize the defense capability of Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and any other countries designed by the
President pursuant to section 203(d) of the NATO
Participation Act of 1994, by exploring with such countries
options for the sale or lease to such countries of weapons
systems compatible with those used by NATO members, including
air defense systems, advanced fighter aircraft, and
telecommunications infrastructure.

SEC. 11. TERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY.

(a) Termination of Eligibility.--The eligibility of a
country designated pursuant to section 6(a) or pursuant to
section 203(d) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 may be
terminated upon determination by the President that such
country no longer meets the criteria set forth in section
203(d)(3) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994.
(b) Notification.--At least 15 days before terminating the
eligibility of any country pursuant to subsection (a), the
President shall notify the congressional committees specified
in section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in
accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming
notifications under that section.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Gilman] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] will
each be recognized for 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks and include extraneous materials.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to bring before the House H.R. 3564, the
NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act.
Almost 7 years have passed since the revolutions of 1989 swept
communism from most of Central and Eastern Europe. Since that date, the
emerging democracies of that region have waited patiently to be invited
into Western political, economic and security structures.
This bill stands for the proposition that neither we nor the emerging
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe can afford to wait any
longer. Only by taking this step now can we ensure that the democratic
gains of the last 7 year are not going to be reversed.
After today's vote, it is hoped that we will never hear again that
the Congress does not support NATO enlargement. We will support it.
Indeed, for more than 2 years now, we have been criticizing the
administration for moving too slowly to enlarge NATO.
On February 20 of this year, I wrote to the President urging him to
implement the NATO Participation Act which we enacted into law almost 2
years ago, and I recommended in particular the designation of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic as the first countries eligible to
receive assistance under that act. Earlier this year, the President
rejected our recommendations.
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record my exchange of correspondence
with the President:

Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives,
Washington, DC, February 20, 1996.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: On February 12th, you signed into law
Public Law 104-107, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996.
Section 585 of this law amends the NATO Participation Act of
1994 (title II of Public Law 103-447) to facilitate use by
you of the authorities provided by the NATO Participation Act
to assist the transition to full NATO membership of certain
Central and Easter European countries emerging from communist
domination.
In addition, section 585 expresses the sense of the
Congress that, within 60 days of enactment, you should
designate the first Central and Eastern European countries
eligible to receive transition assistance under the NATO
Participation Act.
As the principal author of the NATO Participation Act, I
have been disappointed by the fact that, over fifteen months
after the enactment of that Act, the Administration has yet
to utilize the authority provided by the Act to expedite
expansion of the NATO alliance. In light of the revisions to
that Act made by section 585 of Public Law 104-107, as well
as section 585's call on you to designate the first countries
eligible to receive assistance under the Act, I urge you to
move quickly to designate Central and Eastern European
countries to receive assistance under the Act. In particular,
I urge that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic be so
designated.
Prompt designation by you of, at a minimum, Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic as eligible countries will
send a powerful signal to these countries of the
determination of both the Congress and your Administration to
expand NATO at an early date. It also will permit you to
begin providing additional forms of assistance to facilitate
the transition of these countries to full NATO membership.
I am convinced that the United States can no longer afford
to delay deciding which Central and Eastern European
countries will be the first admitted to NATO. We are already
to the point where some are beginning to ask not whether it
is too early to expand NATO, but rather whether it is too
late. Further delay can only heighten the risk that the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe will feel abandoned
by the West and will consider departing from the path of
reform on which they embarked in 1989.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman.
____

The White House,

Washington, DC, May 9, 1996.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter on the
admission of new members to NATO. I am aware of your
considerable efforts in support of NATO enlargement,
including co-authorship of the NATO Participation Act, and I
value your views on how to achieve our mutual goal. I have
made this one of my top foreign policy priorities and will
ensure that it remains at the top of NATO's agenda. As a
result of U.S. leadership, NATO's enlargement is in progress
and will happen.
At my initiative, NATO began a process in January 1994 that
will result in the admission of new members to the Alliance.
By taking in new members from among Europe's new democracies,
NATO can help lock in the very substantial progress that has
been made there in instituting democratic and market economic
reforms. Enlargement will serve to erase the illegitimate
lines of the Cold War and provide the security underpinning
for a growing, undivided transatlantic community.
We have already made solid, steady progress, at a pace that
reflects the many substantial security commitments and
practical preparations necessary to admit new members to the
Alliance. Last fall, NATO completed its study on the
mechanisms and rationale of enlargement and presented the
results to our partners in Central Europe and the New
Independent States. In December, NATO agreed to move into a
second phase of the process consisting of intensified
preparations by both NATO and aspiring members. Practically,
this means detailed, individual consultations between NATO
and self-identified candidates and an enhanced program of
preparatory activities, conducted nationally and through the
Partnership for Peace. Eleven partners, (Albania, Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) have thus far asked to
participate in this phase.

[[Page H8119]]

Allies have agreed that NATO enlargement's second phase
will run through 1996 and that our Foreign Ministers will
address next steps at the North Atlantic Council in December.
I agree that we must maintain the momentum of the NATO
enlargement process. It is my objective that, as Secretary
Christopher recently told his Central European
counterparts, NATO will move to greater specificity on the
question of enlargement's ``who and when'' at the December
meeting and its immediate follow-on.
As NATO moves ahead, my Administration is pursuing a
comprehensive strategy to ensure that enlargement succeeds.
The first element for success lies in building and
maintaining a durable Allied consensus in support of
enlargement. Admission of any new member to NATO, precisely
because of the seriousness of the security commitments
involved, must have the full support of all of its current
members. We must be careful that actions we undertake in
support of the enlargement process do not have the
inadvertent effect of undermining Allied consensus and
thereby slowing progress.
A second element needed for success is to place NATO
enlargement in the context of a broad, balanced and
integrated approach to increasing stability and security
throughout the transatlantic area by building a cooperative
security structure in Europe. This includes a revitalized
NATO, support for enlargement of the European Union,
strengthening the OSCE and enhanced cooperation with other
states not immediately aspiring to NATO membership or who may
not be in the initial group of states invited to begin
accession talks with the Alliance. It also includes a strong
and productive relationship between the Alliance and Russia,
given the key role Russia can play in shaping a stable and
secure Europe.
A third element critical for success is encouraging
prospective members to prepare seriously for the full range
of military and political responsibilities they will need to
assume if and when they become members. Aspiring Allies need
adequate time to prepare for these obligations. NATO, too,
faces a major task in preparing itself for enlargement. We
have already begun a comprehensive review of the internal
adjustments NATO must make to admit new Allies.
To their credit, partners have not waited to be
``designated'' as eligible for membership before undertaking
the basic reforms and preparations we have made clear they
must pursue. The prospect of NATO membership has proven to be
a most powerful incentive for both domestic reform and the
resolution of ethnic and territorial conflict. Your
legislation specifically urges me to designate Poland, the
Czech Republic and Hungary as eligible for assistance under
the NATO Participation Act. These countries are indeed making
substantial progress and I agree they will be strong
candidates for early NATO membership when the Alliance
decides to move forward. At this stage, however, writing into
law a narrow list of countries eligible for special
assistance could reduce our ability to work with other
emerging democracies that are also making significant
progress but may not be immediately eligible for
assistance under the NATO Participation Act.
I firmly believe that my comprehensive strategy is the best
means for carrying NATO's enlargement process through to a
successful conclusion. Proof that it is working can be seen
in the significant improvement in the ability of some partner
forces to undertake joint missions with NATO, including in
IFOR. Our clear sense is that the eleven partners
participating in the second phase of the enlargement process
understand and support our policy of steady, deliberate
progress toward enlargement and in no way feel ``abandoned by
the West'' or are considering ``departing from the path of
reform,'' as you suggest. On the contrary, they are actively
and enthusiastically engaged in the second phase of the
enlargement process, which, as I noted earlier, will
culminate in decisions by NATO Foreign Ministers in December
on important next steps in the process.
My Administration is committed to continued close
cooperation with you. I welcome your efforts to build
bipartisan Congressional support both for the continuing
engagement of the United States in Europe and for this
Administration's commitment to bringing new members into the
Alliance. Secretary Christopher echoed my own sentiments when
he said in Prague that we are determined to keep faith with
the nations of this region and to open the door that Stalin
shut when he said no to the Marshall Plan. No European nation
should ever again be forced to occupy a buffer zone between
great powers or be abandoned to the sphere of influence of
another.
We look forward to working you on this historic task.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.

It was only after I received this letter from the President that I
introduced the measure that is before us today. This measure finally
implements the NATO Participation Act, and I am gratified that the
administration has, upon careful reflection, decided not to oppose this
legislation. I continue to believe, however, that enactment of this
legislation is essential if we wish to keep the pressure on the
administration for prompt NATO enlargement.
Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to vote for H.R. 3564.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume,
and I rise in support of H.R. 3564.
Mr. Speaker, I commend Chairman Gilman for his leadership in bringing
this bill to the House floor.
This bill helps us to begin the debate on what will become one of the
most important foreign policy issues facing the United States--the
question of NATO enlargement. Are we prepared to commit American lives
and treasure to defend new NATO countries? I am impressed with how
casually we are considering this issue. I am afraid that this bill is
driven by domestic politics more than it should be.
But, I appreciate Chairman Gilman's efforts to put this important
issue before us.
At the outset I want to make clear what this bill does and does not
do.
This bill takes two basic steps: It finds that three countries--
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--have made the most progress
toward achieving the criteria of NATO membership; and makes these three
countries eligible for up to $60 million in military assistance--
grants, loans, and training--to help them in the enlargement process.
Just as significant is what this bill does not do: It does not
prejudice U.S. or NATO policy by stating that any specific country
should be admitted to NATO; it establishes no date certain for the
entry of new members into NATO.
This bill is a distinct improvement over H.R. 7, considered by the
House in early 1995, as well as other efforts to dictate the nature and
the timetable of NATO enlargement.
There is some common ground between the administration and the
sponsors of this bill.
The administration agrees that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic have made more progress than others toward NATO membership.
The administration supports the authorization of military assistance
to help these countries prepare for NATO membership.
The only differences are technical. The administration opposes
earmarking assistance for these countries through the NATO
Participation Act, which undercuts flexibility in the use of assistance
funds intended for a wider range of Partnership for Peace countries.
I intend to vote for this bill for three reasons.
First, this bill supports current U.S. policy: enlarging NATO will
help integrate the democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe
into the Western family of nations.
Second, this bill highlights that NATO enlargement is a gradual and
deliberate process. That process will evolve over several months and
years: A NATO meeting in December 1996, will prepare the way for a NATO
summit in 1997, at which certain countries will be named and accession
talks begin; accession talks will likely take a year or two; and NATO
governments must then approve, by consensus, the accession agreements;
all 16 NATO governments must then ratify those agreements, which will
require parliamentary approval.
So, as a practical matter, the actual enlargement of NATO is several
years down the road. That is the prudent course.
Third, this bill contains several important findings on NATO
enlargement: It states that NATO membership is not a free ride; that
prospective members must be able to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area and assume the costs and responsibilities of NATO
membership; it sets out that enlargements will require agreement of all
16 NATO states; it notes the important role of Partnership for Peace in
the enlargement process and in fostering cooperation between NATO and
the states of Central Europe; and it states that lasting security and
stability in Europe requires not just military steps but economic and
political integration, especially the integration of Central and East
Europe into the European Union.

I intend to vote for this bill, but I have many questions about NATO
enlargement, and I want to state them briefly:

[[Page H8120]]

I have no doubt that NATO enlargement will advance the interests of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, but how will it advance United
States interests?
Why is NATO enlargement necessary, when the threat to peace and
security in Central and Eastern Europe has never been less?
Will NATO enlargement increase stability and security if NATO admits
some countries--but not others countries--in Central and Eastern
Europe? Or does it risk new lines of confrontation in Europe,
especially if Russia believes that NATO enlargement is a new policy of
containment?
Are the American people prepared to undertake the financial and
security obligations that NATO enlargement will entail?
This bill may authorize a modest amount of funds, but we should not
set a precedent where we pay countries to meet the conditions of NATO
membership.
Should we undertake these obligations? A Congressional Budget Office
study estimates that NATO enlargement could cost $60 to $125 billion
over a 15-year period, with the United States paying $5 to $19 billion.
Are we ready to provide a United States nuclear guarantee, and commit
American soldiers to the security of Slovakia or Slovenia?
It is clear what NATO can do for new members--but what will they
contribute to NATO? So far, we don't have good answers to many of these
questions.
I also share the administration's concerns about earmarking
assistance, and undercutting flexibility to provide assistance to all
Partnership for Peace countries.
I would hope that some compromise on this issue is possible as the
legislative process moves forward.
Now, in the course of this debate, we will hear criticism that the
administration is dragging its feet on NATO enlargement. That criticism
is way off the mark. Whether you support or oppose NATO enlargement,
let's be clear here: The administration is driving the train. The
question of enlargement is a NATO's agenda only because the United
States has made it such a high priority. Yet, any decision on
enlargement must be by NATO consensus. The United States cannot dictate
the outcome. Leadership is not the same as arm-twisting. A successful
outcome on NATO enlargement will require the support of all NATO
members.
In conclusion, I see common ground between this bill and
administration policy, other than on details of a funding mechanism.
Both agree that three countries in Central and Eastern Europe have made
the most progress toward NATO membership. Both agree that a modest
amount of military assistance should be provided to them to help in
this process. This bill is the first step in what I hope will be a full
debate on the merits of NATO enlargement.
I support the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Indiana
[Mr. Hamilton], the ranking minority member, for his supporting
arguments on behalf of the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr.
Bereuter], the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific of our Committee on International Relations.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, as original cosponsor of this legislation,
and as a leader of this body's delegation to the North Atlantic
Assembly, this Member rises in strong support of the NATO Enlargement
Facilitation Act.
This Member would commend the distinguished gentleman from New York
[Mr. Gilman], the chairman of the Committee on International Relations,
for his leadership in promoting this important national security
legislation. In addition, this Member would pay tribute to the former
majority leader of the other body, the distinguished former Senator
from Kansas, Mr. Dole. It is clear that, were it not for the leadership
of Senator Dole, we would not be considering this visionary legislation
today.
Mr. Speaker, there has been a great deal of confusion, both in this
body as well as among the countries and interested parties in Eastern
and Central Europe, about what this legislation really does. In order
to produce or eliminate any confusion, this Member would like to take a
moment and attempt to succinctly explain what this legislation will do
and what it will not do.
First, contrary to what has frequently been said, this legislation
would not admit new countries into NATO; that is something that can be
done only with the parliamentary concurrence of all 16 Members of NATO.
The legislation does, however, take appropriate note of the three
Central European countries Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary,
which have made the greatest strides toward qualifying for NATO
membership. For these nations, the legislation sets forth a modest
training and assistance package to help them acquire some of the
infrastructure items that are essential for NATO membership, for
example, air defense radars, and telecommunications infrastructure.

{time} 1130

The legislation also recognizes that there are other Central European
nations which have taken positive steps for Partnership for Peace. That
is true of Eastern European nations as well. These countries may at
some future date also be qualified for NATO membership.
Second, this legislation does not establish new ideological or
strategic lines or boundaries across Europe. The nations of Eastern and
Central Europe, particularly those which are not cited in the first
tier of eligibility, are understandably worried that they would have
the option of NATO membership permanently closed to them. Some nations
fear that they will be caught on the wrong side of a new Iron Curtain,
forever excluded from the closer cooperation with the West.
H.R. 3564 does not set those rigid boundaries. The lessons of Yalta
must not be forgotten. We fully recognize that NATO is likely to
continue to enlarge in the future, but only when aspiring members are
able to fulfill the conditions of membership and capable of
contributing to the common defense.
Third, H.R. 3564 is not an open-ended promise of eventual NATO
membership to interested Eastern and to Central European nations. The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not a social club or paper
organization; rather it is the most successful collective defensive
organization in the history of mankind. It is perhaps inevitable that
some nations, which have expressed an interest in NATO, may fail to
meet the basic criteria for membership, but this is in part also
somewhat of a self-qualification process.
The nations which have adopted free markets and adopted a full range
of truly democratic institutions and practices will be more likely to
be considered for membership. Those countries which fail to liberalize
their economies or fail to become real democracies or repress their
citizens are unlikely to enter NATO.
In addition, of course, NATO membership will only be offered to those
nations which are willing to assume the shared cost and defense
responsibilities of the alliance.
Last, this legislation should not be seen to threaten Russia or any
other nation. The NATO alliance remains a defensive alliance. The
Russian leadership must understand that NATO will not launch unprovoked
attacks against a peaceful neighbor. The far more serious threat to
Russian interest is internal instability and instability along her
borders.

It is desperately important for the Russian people that its
government complete fundamental economic and political reforms, but
these reforms will be impossible if it is constantly threatened with
civil war and political instability along its borders. Thus, the
stability that NATO can project into Central and Eastern Europe should
be helpful to Russian economic modernization and to its political
stability.
Mr. Speaker, it most assuredly is true that the nature of some of the
security challenges which face the NATO alliance have fundamentally
changed since the days of the cold war. At that earlier time, defending
Europe from Soviet or Warsaw Pact attack was

[[Page H8121]]

NATO's paramount mission. Now projecting stability and democracy
eastward is perhaps the most important function that the alliance can
serve.
Where once the Warsaw Pact enforced an involuntary order, now in too
many places there is merely a power vacuum. No one wants to return to a
time when border conflicts, aggressive nationalism, ethnic divisions,
and political intrigue was the norm in Eastern and Central Europe.
But it is clear that could well reemerge unless stability is
projected into the region. It should be obvious that NATO is the best
instrument to fill that power vacuum, and it can do so in a
nonthreatening manner.
Mr. Speaker, as the body completes consideration of the NATO
Enlargement Act, this Member would remind his colleagues that we are
considering very serious future treaty commitments. As this Member
already has noted, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the most
successful defensive alliance in the history of the world. Its success
is anchored in the article 5 commitment North Atlantic Treaty, which
states that an attack against one is an attack against all. Members
must acknowledge that the admission of a new nation to NATO means that
this nation will go to war to defend that country. Thus, this Congress
should voice its support for NATO expansion in the months and years
ahead only after careful consideration, and only if specific expansions
are in the U.S. national interest. By passage of this act, we are
moving forward to facing these future decisions on countries which can
better prepare themselves to take on the full responsibilities of NATO
membership.
This Member believes it is indeed in the national interest to expand
NATO for those nations which meet all the criteria for membership. A
carefully crafted policy of NATO enlargement can project stability into
a volatile region of the world without drawing new boundaries, and it
can do so in a way that should not undermine stability in Russia. By
providing basic assistance through H.R. 3564 to those nations which
have thus far made the greatest progress toward fulfilling the criteria
for membership in a defensive alliance among the democratic nations of
North America and Europe.
Mr. Speaker, it is not a question of whether NATO will expand, but
when it will expand. Clearly, the enactment of H.R. 3564 will speed the
day when NATO expands in a responsible, stabilizing manner. This Member
urges adoption of H.R. 3564.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
Member from Connecticut [Mr. Gejdenson].
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend both the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], the ranking member, and the gentleman from New
York, Chairman Gilman, for the action today.
My father was in the Polish army in the late 1930's, 1939, as the war
broke out. Poland, like Czechoslovakia first, saw both the Germans and
the Russians coming in and divide them. Then the Russians were pushed
back. The Germans took all of Poland. My father's entire family was
exterminated. The the Russians came in and took over, and the dark days
in Poland continued.
Czechoslovakia, of course, was Hitler's first grab with the Sudeten.
Then again, as the Germans were pushed back, the Russians took it and
imposed their terror on the Czech people for many years.
I think this legislation comes at the right time. There could have
been a debate prior to the election in the Soviet Union. We could have
argued at that point that, while the election was going on, we should
be a little cautions in doing anything that would impact the outcome.
The Soviet election, the Russian election is over. These countries,
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, are moving in the right
direction. If we needed to learn anything from history, it is that,
when we have the opportunity to put peace in place, we ought to take
that opportunity.
We have seen sufficient turmoil in the post-Soviet era to understand
that, just because the Soviet Union has come to an end, does not mean
that we are guaranteed peace on the European continent. The worst
horrors we have seen in Europe in the last 50 years occurred after the
fall of the Soviet Union in the former country of Yugoslavia as it
disintegrated.
I think this action will ensure stability. We need to work with the
Russians and others in the region to make sure that they understand
this is not a move to threaten anybody's sovereignty or security. This
is a move that hopefully will use the power and the strength of the
West to ensure stability in Eastern Europe and help build not just a
secure Eastern Europe but a more prosperous former Soviet bloc and that
goes as well for the Russians.
These people in particular, the Poles, the Hungarians, and the
Czechs, have suffered significantly throughout this century. This will
give them some of the security that they rightly demand.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to
the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Cox], the chairman of
the Republican Policy Committee.
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for
yielding.
The collapse of the Soviet empire is the most significant
geopolitical event of the second half of the 20th century. It marks an
enormous victory in the global struggle for freedom. Its direct
beneficiaries are the liberated peoples of Europe and Asia that
comprise the former captive nations so long dominated by the Warsaw
Pact.
Unlike NATO, which was organized to protect and defend its members
from Soviet expansionism, the Warsaw Pact subjugated its own member
states, as we saw when Warsaw Pact troops invaded Hungary and
Czechoslovakia to depose their governments and snuff out the people's
freedom.
The captive nations, whose people fought and struggled against
communism for so many dark years, deserve membership in NATO more than
any other people on earth. NATO membership will accelerate the growth
of their democracies and the pace of their economic reforms, and it
will make our own world more secure. History demonstrates that
democracies and free people do not threaten their neighbors.
This legislation is necessary now because action by the Clinton
administration is long overdue, because the window of opportunity will
not remain open forever. It has been 5 long years since the collapse of
the Soviet empire. Let us begin this process now, in Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic, and let us work with the Baltic nations and the
other former captive nations of central and economic Europe to expand
the family of democracies and the respecters and promoters of free
enterprise on our planet so that our world will indeed soon be a safer
place.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Johnston].
Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I know that I am chasing
windmills when it comes to this particular bill because it has a degree
of unanimity in this body, the State Department and the President. But,
probably for cathartic reasons, I must oppose the bill.
For the past 36 months, I have heard a chorus from this body, both
Democrats and Republicans, that we must cut foreign aid and foreign
assistance, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is the
lowest per capita contributor of foreign aid of all of the
industrialized countries in the world. I have also heard from this
podium that no American troops should be sent to Somalia, Rwanda,
Haiti, or Bosnia.
How many times have you heard that the United States cannot be the
policeman of the world?
Well, how many of you have read this bill? How many of you have read
the NATO Charter? How many of you have any idea what the expansion of
our military obligation will be when we expand NATO? Do you have any
idea of the cost of equipping these armies to bring them up to NATO
standards? You're talking about billions of dollars. The Marshall plan
will look like petty cash compared to this expansion.
Let me read from Congressional Research Service:

A Rand study concluded that a conservative estimate of NATO
expansion to include the Visegrad States, (that's Hungary,
Poland, and the Czech Republic) will require ten to fifty
billion dollars over 10 years, or as much as one hundred
billion dollars or more should more vigorous measures be
necessary to develop a strong defense posture.

In March 1996 CBO issued a report assessing cost of NATO enlargement
under five possible options ranging from assisting a new member engaged
in a border skirmish, or a conflict with a regional power to the
permanent stationing of forces and equipment of current member states
on the territory of

[[Page H8122]]

new members to prepare for a border conflict. The study assumed that
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia would be the initial
new members and would bear the brunt of the cost of military
modernization; that the cost would be spread over 1996-2010 and that
current allies would pay a percentage of modernization cost equal to
their proportionate share in NATO's Security Investment Program.
In such circumstances, cost at the low end for option 1 would be $60
billion with the United States share being $4.8 billion, and at the
high end, $125 billion with the United States share being $18.9
billion.

Once you start the expansion--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Repubic--politically, you cannot stop. In this bill you encourage
admission to NATO of the Baltic countries--Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania--to one previous Yugoslavian country, Slovenia, and the most
insulting and offensive to the Russians, two former Soviet Union
countries, Muldova and Ukraine.
Are you willing now to commit American soldiers to a border dispute
between Lithuania and Russia over the enclave of Kaliningrad? Are you
willing to send troops to Latvia because they have a fight with
Belarus? Are you willing to send troops to Ukraine because of a
conflict with Russia over the Black Sea fleet and Crimea? Think about
it.
Let me make it perfectly clear. I am not an isolationist. Serving on
the Foreign Affairs Committee for 8 years has given me a global view. I
wanted to send troops into Rwanda long before the slaughter there.
Serving on the Committee on International Relations has given me a
global view. But how can you give a blank check to the white Eastern
European nations and totally abandon black Africa?
This is a major step and one that should not be taken lightly.
I leave Congress in 5 months but I plan to come back and haunt you on
a yearly basis.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
No one is contemplating early NATO membership for Ukraine or Belarus,
perhaps not ever. And, indeed, we are willing to use American military
force when it is in the vital interest of the United States. Clearly,
instability in Central and Eastern Europe would be contrary to the
vital interests of the United States of America.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from
New Jersey [Mr. Smith], a member of the committee.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from
Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], my good friend, for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I commend Chairman Gilman for his leadership in ensuring
the timely consideration of H.R. 3564, the NATO Enlargement
Facilitation Act of 1996. As an original cosponsor of this legislation,
a strong advocate of NATO enlargement, and Chairman of the Helsinki
Commission, I have consistently emphasized the importance of human
rights in the expansion process. In addition, I am keenly interested in
encouraging states interested in NATO membership to take concrete steps
to strengthen civilian democratic control of the military.
During the International Relations Committee's consideration of this
important initiative, language which proposed on each of these aspects
of enlargement was approved with the Chairman Gilman's support, for
which I am grateful.
As a result, Mr. Speaker, the bill before us today includes an
unqualified statement that the protection and promotion of fundamental
freedoms and human rights are integral aspects of genuine security. The
legislation also makes clear that the human rights records of emerging
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe interested in joining NATO
should be evaluated in light of the obligations and commitments of
these countries under the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act. I would note that all 27
states of the Partnership for Peace [PfP] are participating States of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. That
membership has committed each to act in accordance with all OSCE
documents, including the Helsinki Final Act.
Mr. Speaker, the enlargement process provides an excellent
opportunity for countries desiring membership to demonstrate their
commitment to the shared values of NATO--including respect for human
rights--as well as their ability to fulfill the military and political
obligations expected of all member states. Prospective members should
meet the criteria set forth in the NATO Participation Act of 1994 and
other relevant legislation before they are admitted as full members of
NATO.
It is also important to recognize that the present process of
enlargement is taking place under significantly different circumstances
that existed when a limited number of states were added in the past.
Given the growing number of countries actively seeking full membership
in the alliance, it is essential to establish clear criteria which all
new members must meet.
Mr. Speaker, in recent days there has been some discussion about
including Croatia among the prospective recipients of assistance under
this legislation. To set the record straight, nothing in the pending
legislation precludes Croatia from receiving assistance provided that
country--or any other prospective recipient--meets a series of
criteria, including respect for human rights. I welcome the recent
decision of the OSCE to deploy a mission to Croatia and look forward to
the findings and recommendations of that group which could contribute
to establishing the conditions necessary for Zegreb to pursue eventual
membership in NATO. In the meantime, Croatia should press for inclusion
in the PfP, widely viewed as the first step toward possible NATO
membership.
Mr. Speaker, I wish to turn briefly to the issue of civilian
democratic control of the military. At the outset, let me say that the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have made tremendous strides in
overcoming the legacy of communism. Perhaps one of the most delicate
aspects of this transition has been establishing civilian control of
the military an important prerequisite for those wishing to join NATO.
Significant progress has been made in the emerging democracies leading
to increased transparency with respect to military activities and
budgets. Another key component, in my view, is the naming of a civilian
to serve as minister of defense. Beyond mere symbolism, this action
underscores the willingness of the military to subordinate itself to
the democratic civilian leadership--a fundamental aspect of democratic
society. I applaud those countries which have already undertaken this
important step and encourage others to pursue that course.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this
legislation as a demonstration of our determination to move NATO
expansion forward and our commitment to the people of East Central
Europe, including those from the Baltic States and Ukraine, as they
strive to overcome the legacy of communism and pursue democracy firmly
rooted in respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual.

{time} 1145

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar].
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar].
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hayworth). The gentleman from Minnesota
[Mr. Oberstar] is recognized for 2 minutes and 30 seconds.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlemen for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Speaker, this is important legislation for the reasons already
explained. Because it is important, I regret that it does not go a step
further and include, along with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic,
Slovenia.
Let me explain why. With only 8 percent of the population of former
Yugoslavia, Slovenia accounted for 19 percent of the country's gross
domestic product, one-third of its exports, one half of its dairy
production, 40 percent of all of its taxes.
The Slovenes, post election, have been a model of parliamentary
democracy. Local government has been expanded; 158 new municipalities
have been created, local elections held. They have received the highest
human rights respect status awarded by Amnesty International.

[[Page H8123]]

Inflation in the postwar, and it was only a 9-day war imposed by the
Serb Army, only 68 people died, the Slovenes let the Serb Army return
to its land without killing anyone, inflation was at 1,200 percent. It
is now down to under 9 percent. They have a $3 billion positive
international balance of payments. They have the 20th largest per
capita exporting country record.

Ninety percent of the former socialist economy has been privatized.
The banks have been privatized. They have balanced their budget.
Unemployment rate is down to around 7 percent. Slovenia, in short, is
Europe's best kept democratic secret.
When our Secretary of Defense, Mr. Perry, was in Slovenia recently,
he said, Slovenia has done very well in all standards for NATO
membership and is a strong candidate. Slovenia, he continued, can be a
model to other Eastern Bloc and Central European countries because of
its successful implementation of a democratic government, market
economy, and resolving disagreements with its neighbors.
I have discussed this matter with the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Gilman] and with our ranking member, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr.
Hamilton]. I appreciate their willingness to give consideration to
Slovenia at an appropriate time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. OBERSTAR. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to assure the gentleman that we have
reviewed Slovenia's progress and recognize it has made a significant
amount of progress. I want to assure the gentleman that in the
forthcoming session, providing we are all here, we will work toward
trying to allow Slovenia to become a member of NATO.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I very much appreciate the chairman's
interest, understanding and support for this initiative.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. OBERSTAR. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, Slovenia has made remarkable progress. We
recognize that. Their emergence has been so recent it did not receive
full consideration.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Fox] a member of the Committee on International
Relations.
Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of
H.R. 3564, the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, authored by
Chairman Gilman and Senator Dole.
One of America's most solemn obligations is to foster the growth of
democracy and freedom both at home and abroad. These goals have been
constants in American foreign policy since our Nation's birth--there
are no two goals more clearly in our national interest and consistent
with our national ideals. As Americans, we were all elated when the
Communist chokehold on Eastern Europe was lifted and the cold war was
won. Now we must do everything possible to encourage and protect the
fragile young democracies which are emerging in Eastern Europe.
This legislation ensures that the emerging democracies will remain
vital forces for freedom in Eastern Europe. This bill welcomes these
nations as allies by facilitating the entrance of Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic into NATO and also by providing assistance toward
NATO membership for Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia,
Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine.
Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Gilman for his outstanding leadership
and urge my colleagues to support this visionary legislation.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. Maloney].
Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the NATO Enlargement Facilitation
Act.
Mr. Speaker, it is difficult to imagine that less than a decade ago,
the world was a very different place.
We were in the icy grip of the cold war.
The Soviet Union was the menacing patron of repression across the
globe.
The winds of democracy and freedom had not yet begun to sweep over
Eastern and Central Europe.
All that has now changed.
And with this change, we should change NATO.
The bill before us recognizes that three Eastern European countries--
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--have made the most progress
with the criteria necessary for NATO inclusion.
As the Representative of Greenpoint, Brooklyn, one of the largest and
most dynamic communities of Polish-Americans in the Nation, I am
particularly pleased that this bill acknowledges Poland's extraordinary
transition to democracy.
The bill also authorizes up to $60 million to these countries to
facilitate the NATO expansion process.
It is critical that we recognize Poland's strategic value to the
West.
The admission of Poland into NATO will enhance United States
interests in Europe by bringing more stability and security to the
region.
I urge the adoption of the bill, and I urge the administration to
work with our allies to bring about the swift admission of Poland into
Europe's most important political and military institution--NATO.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio
[Mr. Hoke].
Mr. HOKE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the NATO Enlargement Act of
1996. NATO, for the past 45 years, has been the cornerstone of
stability in Europe and a critical element of our Nation's defense, it
is the bulwark of Western democracy and free-market economics. The
success of the alliance is without question.
But while I support expansion of NATO to include nations of Central
and Eastern Europe, it is my unshakable conviction that NATO membership
must only be granted to nations that make a fundamental commitment to
democracy, the rule of law, and free market economics.
NATO membership must not be granted willy-nilly to nations that fail
to make these commitments. Membership cannot be granted simply because
certain nations fear their neighbors or believe that membership will
enhance their prospects for democratic or economic progress or reform.
A major reason for the alliance's success has been its intolerance of
authoritarian or undemocratic regimes within its ranks. Although
democratic governments were overthrown by military juntas in Greece and
Turkey, both countries joined NATO as democracies and both countries
have reverted to democratic governments. Spain was not permitted to
join NATO until it demonstrated its commitment to parliamentary
democracy.
It also must be recognized that NATO is not anti-Russian. It is not
even anti-Communist per se. In fact, it is not intrinsically anti
anything. Rather, it is prodemocracy. NATO is and it always has been a
defensive alliance under which the protection of democracies and free
market economies could flourish.
Some formerly Communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe, such
as the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, have
clearly made the transition to free market democracies and should soon
easily qualify to join NATO, as this bill calls for.
In addition, the early inclusion of those nations will also be a very
powerful example and an incentive to encourage other Eastern European
nations, such as Romania, Ukraine, Slovenia, and the Republic of
Slovakia to hasten their unchangeable commitment to democratic
institutions.
NATO membership by these newly democratic nations will help secure
their place among the Central and Western European states. The
stability and fate of those nations are of vital importance to the
peace and security of Europe.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this important piece of
legislation.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Wolf].
Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, I want to express some reservations. I commend
the leadership on both sides for what they are trying to do. Eventually
these

[[Page H8124]]

countries ought to be part of NATO, no matter what Russia thinks.
However, I have some reservations. First, Poland. In Poland I wish
Lech Walesa was still the head. In Poland a former leading member of
the Polish Communist government is not the new prime minister. In
Hungary, foreign investors are concerned that socialism is coming back,
and many people who were Communists when we knew they were Communists
are now back in the government.
In Bulgaria, there are many Communists that have come back in
government and, hopefully, the democratic leaning party will win in the
upcoming election. In Romania, many of the same people that were in the
Ceausescu government are still part of the government. So I am
concerned about this.
Also I think if this does pass that we should lay the word down that
we expect all of these countries to respect human rights: freedom of
religion, freedom of worship, no antisemitism, freedom of movement, and
freedom of expression. I am concerned that perhaps we should wait and
hold out a little longer on NATO expansion to make sure these countries
really do join democracy, whereby they become eligible for NATO.
So I commend the gentlemen on both sides but I want to raise some
concerns. If communism comes back, these countries ought not be part of
NATO.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to express concern about H.R. 3564, the NATO
Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996. I have some serious reservations
about expanding this critical alliance at this time. Things are still
too uncertain in the newly democratic countries in Eastern and Central
Europe.
I support the concept of NATO expansion, but I think it's too early
to be changing the formula that has worked to preserve peace in Western
Europe for so long. More time need to pass to give these new
governments a chance to show that they are truly committed to
democracy, human rights, and being the kind of government necessary to
be a trustworthy partner in NATO.
I am encouraged by the progress I have seen since 1989. Some
countries are doing better than others, but for the most part we do not
see today the kinds of human rights abuses we saw in the pre-1989 ear.
Elections have taken place. Good constitutions have been put in place.
Rule-of-law is advancing. Individual freedoms--such as freedom of
expression, freedom of religion and freedom of association--are being
preserved. But, I agree with the words of University of Illinois
professor Ed Kolodziej, as reported on June 18 in an article in the
Christian Science Monitor, ``I don't think [these countries] are ripe
by a long shot.''
I am deeply concerned that in many countries in Eastern and Central
Europe, former communists are in some capacity in government. In
Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria former members of the Communist
party are in charge. In other countries, they are still politically
active. Some of them are reformed Communists; some of them are not. It
is crucial that we let enough time pass to be able to determine who is
who. Actions speak louder than words. We must be able to differentiate
clearly between those who are truly committed to democracy and those
who are only talking the talk before we commit to protect them.
Things are better, but they are not perfect. I have heard reports
that Hungarian Government representatives, at a conference in Budapest
during the first week of July, adopted a provocative declaration on the
status of Hungarians abroad causing concern for its neighbors. While I
remain concerned over the state of Hungarian minority communities in
Europe, this declaration illustrated a regrettable insensitivity toward
Hungary's neighbors. There are still reports that high-profile
individuals, journalists and foreigners are subject to surveillance by
security agents in Romania.
When new countries join NATO, they are full-fledged partners. They
are entitled to all of our military secrets and the full protection of
the United States. I just do not think that the American people are
ready for new commitments overseas when we can barely get support for
current ones. We currently have 22,000 American troops doing a great
job bringing peace to Bosnia, but I know this is not a popular idea
with the American people. Would there be the support to send troops to
Poland or Hungary or Romania to help governments with former Communists
in power?
I don't think so. Not right now. Not before democracy has been tested
and tried in Central and Eastern Europe and Communists no longer have
influence.
So, Mr. Speaker, I support the concept of NATO expansion, but I don't
think we should do it now. It's too early.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Alabama [Mr. Callahan], chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs.
(Mr. CALLAHAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
I think many of my colleagues know my philosophy about Members of
Congress involving themselves in foreign affairs to the extent that we
try to dictate policy. But it is my understanding of this bill that we
are not dictating policy. We are strongly suggesting to NATO and to the
administration that they encourage the acceptance of three countries
and that they expand NATO.
I might say that there is an avenue now through the Partnership for
Peace where NATO can be expanded. But I think it is high time, like
some of you, that we do expand NATO, that we do expedite the process,
because a lot of countries have been waiting a lot of time in order to
be included in there.
It is my personal philosophy that we ought to include all nations
over there, because if you are going to have a successful NATO, it
simply says that one of these nations will not attack another. If it
does take place, then those nations that are a part of NATO will defend
it. So if all of them were included, it would seem to me that we would
have the best of all worlds. But we must begin with the process.
The NATO people must recognize that this process should start. It
should have started a lot sooner than that. So we are not dictating to
the administration. We are not dictating to NATO. We are simply saying
that it is time to move on, that these three nations, specifically
mentioned in here as suggestions, have been waiting a long time, that
their acceptance would be an enhancement. I would encourage my
colleagues to vote in favor of this measure.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CALLAHAN. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman's comments gives us an
opportunity to recognize that we are not barring membership for any
country through this resolution, but we are providing an infrastructure
and training assistance program, a modest one, by authorizing it as a
part of this proposed act.
I thank the gentleman for giving me a chance to remind our colleagues
that we are not dictating NATO membership for any country, only
facilitating assistance to these three countries that seem to have done
an outstanding job in preparing for NATO membership. I thank the
gentleman for yielding to me.

{time} 1200

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hayworth). The gentleman from New York
is recognized for 2 minutes.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, in concluding our debate today I would like
to note that support for this measure has grown rapidly since we first
introduced it several months ago. We now have 37 co-sponsors, almost
evenly divided between Members of the majority and the minority. The
bill has been warmly endorsed by the coalitions representing the 23
million Americans of Central and Eastern European descent. They wrote
to me stating that from their point of view this is the most important
legislation we will consider this year.
And finally just this morning we received word that the
administration has decided to show its support behind the bill. The
administration states, and I quote: ``The administration welcomes
congressional support for the enlargement of NATO as reflected in H.R.
3564.''
Accordingly, I appreciate the support of my colleagues and look
forward to early approval of the measure.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguised chairman, the

[[Page H8125]]

gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], for yielding to me. Earlier
Croatia was mentioned as a possible addition to the names of the
countries that might eventually qualify for the assistance program we
are authorizing by this resolutions when they moved to a greater degree
of democracy and respect for human rights. That certainly is possible.
Slovenia was also mentioned as a country that ought to be considered,
and I fully agree that it ought to be considered for the assistance
program.
Something that has not been mentioned is the recent improvements in
democracy, economic reform, and human rights that has taken place in
that nation which was formerly part of Yugoslavia, now called the
Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia [FYROM]. Its progress and
potential for advancement into the front ranks for consideration for
NATO membership are also to be recognized.
I thank the gentleman for recognizing me for this purpose.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the NATO
Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, H.R. 3564.
This legislation reflects strong bipartisan support in the U.S.
Congress for welcoming the new democracies of Eastern and Central
Europe into NATO when they are prepared to meet the responsibilities of
membership. And it authorizes necessary assistance to help these new
democracies prepare for NATO membership.
As cochairman of the Baltic freedom caucus in Congress, I
particularly commend to my colleagues the provisions of H.R. 3564
relating to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. H.R. 3564 states that it is
the sense of Congress that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have valid
historical security concerns that must be taken into account by the
United States, and the Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia should not be
disadvantaged in seeking to join NATO by virtue of their forcible
incorporation into the Soviet Union. H.R. 3564 also names Lithuania,
Lativa, and Estonia as countries which should participate in the
Regional Airspace Initiative and the Partnership for Peace Information
Management System.
The fledgling Baltic democracies, still struggling to overcome the
effects of 50 years of communist domination, have made great efforts to
prepare themselves for NATO membership. They are reforming their armies
and instituting civilian controls and Democratic values. They have
proven their ability to cooperate in multilateral efforts through the
Baltic battalion. They have participated in Partnership For Peace
training exercises. And they have contributed troops to the NATO-led
operation in Bosnia, where they have earned the respect of their NATO
allies and suffered in loss of their young soldiers.
U.S. policy in Eastern and Central Europe should be based on two
goals: First, to support the security of the new democracies in the
Baltics, Eastern and Central Europe; and second, to create a climate of
trust in our relations with Russia, so it understands that the West has
no hostile intentions toward Russia's territory or its people.
Expanding NATO membership at the appropriate time will enhance U.S.
security, and strengthen democracy and free market reforms throughout
Central and Eastern Europe. An expanded NATO, carefully crafted, can
secure the peace for generations to come.
As a cosponsor of H.R. 3564, I urge my colleagues to support and pass
the NATO Facilitation Act of 1996.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hayworth). The question is on the motion
offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] that the House
suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3564, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor
thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

general leave

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
on the subject of the measure just considered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, is it still appropriate for a request for
the yeas and nays to be ordered?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to a demand for the yeas
and nays?
There was no objection.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5, rule I, and the
Chair's prior announcement further proceedings on this motion will be
postponed.

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