[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 109 (Tuesday, July 23, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H8103-H8104]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       INTRODUCING THE WHITE HOUSE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1996

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 
12, 1995, the gentleman from New Hampshire [Mr. Bass] is recognized 
during morning business for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, I am here to talk about a bill I am going to 
introduce establishing an inspector general for the White House, but I 
cannot help beginning by making a comment concerning the remarks of my 
friend from Texas a second ago.
  As they say in poker, the cards speak, and the fact is that those 
television stations would not have removed those ads from the air if 
they had said what the real record shows. What Newt Gingrich said at 
that point was, and I quote,

       Okay, what do you think the Health Care Financing 
     Administration is? That's HCFA. It is a centralized 
     government bureaucracy, it is everything we are telling Boris 
     Yeltsin to get rid of. No, we do not get rid of it in round 
     one because we do not think that is politically smart, but we 
     do it through a transition. We believe it is going to wither 
     on the vine.

  Now what does that mean? That means that the choice here is whether 
we protect, improve, and preserve Medicare or whether we protect a 
Federal bureaucracy. That is the issue before us today, and we plan to 
move forward.
  Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the White House Inspector General 
Act of 1996, to establish an Office of Inspector General in the 
Executive Office of

[[Page H8104]]

the President. The White House IG, like other IG's in the executive 
branch, would serve as the principal watchdog of White House financial 
management procedures and fiscal resources. This legislation would 
provide the President with an essential tool for rooting out waste, 
fraud, and abuse in the White House.
  As many of my colleagues know, the Inspector General Act of 1978 
established offices of inspector general within certain Federal 
departments and agencies to protect the integrity of Federal programs 
and resources. Inspectors general are appointed without regard to 
political affiliation and solely on the basis of a strong background in 
accounting, auditing, or financial management. They are provided the 
authority and independence to perform audits and investigations in 
order to combat waste, fraud, and abuse.
  More specifically, the three principal responsibilities of inspector 
general are, first, to conduct audits and investigations relating to 
Federal programs and operations; second, to issue recommendations that 
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of Federal programs and 
operations; and, third, to keep agency heads and Congress fully 
informed of problems and deficiencies in Federal program administration 
and operations.
  Today 61 Federal entities have an inspector general, including all 14 
Cabinet departments. Of these 61 IG's, 29 are appointed by the 
President subject to Senate confirmation and the remaining 32, 
primarily in smaller agencies, are selected by their agency heads. The 
Presidentially appointed IG's have a total of 10,000 staff and an 
aggregate budget of approximately $900 million.
  According to information gathered by the Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, funding for IG's is indeed a sound investment. In 
1994, IG investigations and audits led to over 14,000 successful 
criminal and civil prosecutions. Furthermore, IG's returned $1.9 
billion in investigative recoveries to the U.S. Treasury and made 
efficiency recommendations that could save a total of $24 billion.
  As I mentioned previously, IG's have significant authority and 
independence to conduct their audits and investigations. They have 
direct access to all records and information of the agency, and possess 
the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths for taking testimony.
  With regard to their independence, IG's have full control over hiring 
and managing their own staff and resources. Moreover, they can be 
removed only by the President or the agency head who appointed them, 
and the President or agency head must communicate his reason to 
Congress when exercising this authority.
  As I already mentioned, my legislation will establish an Office of 
Inspector General for the Executive Office of the President. The White 
House IG would be appointed by the President and could be removed 
without cause by the President. All the provisions of the Inspector 
General Act of 1978 would apply to the White House IG, but the bill 
also includes special provisions relating to sensitive information in 
matters that would protect the constitutional prerogatives and 
operational effectiveness of the Presidency.
  The first exemption assures that the White House IG will not 
interfere in areas relating to policy, intelligence or national 
security interests, similar to the IG's in the defense area, in 
defense-related departments. The second broad exemption assures that 
the White House IG does not hinder the President in carrying out his 
constitutional responsibilities.
  Under the IG Act of 1978, agency heads are strictly prohibited from 
obstructing an IG audit or investigation. However, under my bill the 
President would have the authority to prohibit the White House IG from 
conducting an audit or investigation.
  I do hope my colleagues will join me in cosponsoring this important 
piece of legislation.

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