[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 105 (Wednesday, July 17, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1299-E1300]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY BOARD ON ARMS PROLIFERATION POLICY

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, July 16, 1996

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, over many years the United States and the 
international community have made important progress in arms control, 
especially concerning weapons of mass destruction. But there has been 
little progress in controlling or containing the proliferation of 
conventional arms.
  Therefore, I welcome the recent report of the Presidential Advisory 
Board on Arms Proliferation Policy, issued on June 25. Its findings and 
recommendations provide fresh thinking on the question of conventional 
arms control, and merit careful study by both Congress and the 
executive branch. I commend the work of Dr. Janne E. Nolan, the Board's 
Chair and the Board's other members--Edward Randolph Jayne II, Ronald 
F. Lehman, David E. McGiffert, and Paul C. Warnke.
  I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues the report's 
summary and recommendations. The text follows:

                                Summary

       Advisory Boards such as ours invariably grapple with broad 
     mandates, changing circumstances, and widely diverse 
     interests concerned with the substance of Board charters. As 
     we have noted, our approach has been to review and offer 
     recommendations on both policy and process. We have 
     endeavored to review the Administration's current policies 
     regarding conventional arms control, and have commented only 
     where we concluded it appropriate. We are under no illusions 
     as to our limitations in addressing but a few of the myriad 
     interests and issues of great concern to the various parties 
     concerned with arms proliferation policy.
       At the core of our recommendations is our belief in the 
     value, indeed the necessity, of strong U.S. leadership in the 
     quest for more

[[Page E1300]]

     effective arms control in the nation's interest. This 
     leadership must come from the top, involving the President, 
     his Cabinet, and the Congress. As we have stated, within the 
     Executive Branch that initiative requires in the first 
     instance, more policy-oriented interagency coordination and 
     execution of policy, which in turn requires a strong focal 
     point of administration leadership. We believe that 
     leadership can and must come from the National Security 
     Council's long-standing interagency process. That NSC-led 
     process, in addition to selecting and implementing the kind 
     of advanced conventional arms restraint regime postulated 
     here, must also address the thorny question of governmental 
     process the Board has highlighted. There is no doubt that how 
     we make policy and how we make individual arms or technology 
     transfer decisions is absolutely critical to achieving U.S. 
     arms control goals.
       We believe that it is of great importance to reemphasize a 
     point about focus. The Board's recommendations for both 
     policy and process are built on a long-term commitment to 
     improvement and progress, rather than on any discrete 
     preferred regime or proposed organizational realignment. The 
     world struggles today with the implications of advanced 
     conventional weapons. It will in the future be confronted 
     with yet another generation of weapons, whose destructive 
     power, size, cost, and availability can raise many more 
     problems even than their predecessors today. These challenges 
     will require a new culture among nations, one that accepts 
     increased responsibility for control and restraint, despite 
     short-term economic and political factors pulling in other 
     directions. While the image of a ``journey'' has become 
     almost trite in today's culture, it is just such a concept 
     that perhaps best describes the strategy for success in 
     achieving necessary restraint on conventional arms and 
     strategic technologies, and the resulting increase in 
     international security.
       The Administration has in recent months, in parallel with 
     the Board's deliberations, taken steps such as the Wassenaar 
     Arrangement, which could be the key to more enduring and 
     comprehensive successes in restraint and control. Leaders in 
     the Administration and in the Congress should be heartened to 
     know that there is no shortage of individuals, in and out of 
     government, whose energy and commitment can contribute to the 
     ongoing effort. We are proud to have been a part of that 
     dialogue, and are committed to continuing our participation. 
     We summarize here the major recommendations put forward in 
     our report:
       Effective restraint requires international cooperation. 
     U.S. leadership is essential to this end.
       The fundamental principles of national security, 
     international and regional security, and arms control must be 
     the basis for international agreement. The inevitable 
     economic pressures that will confront individual states 
     should not be allowed to subvert these principles.
       Sustainable, multilateral negotiations over an issue as 
     controversial as arms transfers are best served by beginning 
     with modest objectives that can be expanded over time. The 
     Wassenaar Arrangement represents the most practical and 
     promising forum to date in which to address the dangers of 
     conventional weapons and technology proliferation.
       New international export control policies are needed for a 
     technology market where there are numerous channels of supply 
     and where many advanced technologies relevant to weapons 
     development are commercial in origin. This requires 
     augmenting controls on the supply of a technology, with a 
     greater emphasis on disclosing and monitoring end-use.
       U.S. arms transfer policy can and should be developed and 
     executed separate from policies for maintenance of the 
     defense industrial base. It is not only appropriate but 
     essential that the United States and other nations handle 
     legitimate domestic economic and defense industrial base 
     issues through such separate policies and actions, rather 
     than use them to abrogate or subvert arms control agreements 
     for particular weapons and technologies.
       Arms and weapons technology transfers should take place 
     without the price-distorting mechanism of government 
     subsidies or penalties. The R&D recoupment charge, which is 
     inconsistent with the federal government's treatment of sunk 
     investment costs in any other area of policy or budget 
     expenditure, should be eliminated. Arms exports should not 
     receive subsidized financing; rather, the effort should be to 
     eliminate such distortions internationally.
       There should not be governmental constraints on direct and 
     indirect offsets other than the review, under established 
     standards, of any arms/technology transfer involved. The 
     overall economic and employment impact of foreign trade is 
     highly positive, and any attempt to dictate or curtail 
     pricing, workshare, or ``countertrade'' agreements between 
     buyer and seller is counterproductive.
       The current fragmentation of U.S. government controls on 
     transfers leads to great inefficiency and uncertain policy 
     implementation, to the detriment of proliferation controls on 
     the one hand and to the disadvantage of legitimate U.S. 
     commerce on the other. Administration, information systems, 
     and routine decisionmaking should be consolidated. An 
     integrated management information system should be developed 
     as soon as possible for use by all agencies involved in the 
     export control process. In the longer run, statutory 
     revisions to integrate the entire process in a single office 
     should be pursued.
       Within the U.S. government, the NSC should give 
     substantially greater priority to leading and improving the 
     interagency arms export control process.
       The Administration should increase the intelligence 
     community's focus and capabilities to understand and monitor 
     conventional weapons and technologies developments and 
     transfers.

                          ____________________