[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 98 (Friday, June 28, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7292-S7295]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, we have been waiting for 2 months to move 
forward on critical health insurance reform legislation. During this 
time, Republicans have compromised again and again, each time in 
response to concerns raised by the White House and by some of my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle about medical savings 
accounts.
  Mr. President, we have been negotiating in good faith. We have 
addressed our colleagues' concerns about MSA on both the structure of 
the insurance plan and the structure of the savings account. We have 
limited the number of people eligible for the tax-free MSA. We have put 
forward proposals that are small enough to be considered demonstration 
projects. We have reduced the maximum contribution that can be made to 
an MSA. We have reduced the top range of the high deductible. In short, 
we have bent over backwards to accommodate the White House and some of 
our Democratic colleagues.
  Millions of Americans are counting on us to reach an agreement, 
counting on us to work together to get the job done here in Washington. 
Americans with preexisting conditions, Americans who are unable to 
afford health insurance, small businesses that cannot afford to offer 
their employees health insurance, millions of Americans need this bill, 
and they do not have the luxury of time in waiting through more games 
and more rhetoric.
  Legislating is about compromise. Americans want us to compromise and 
work together to get this legislation signed into law. We have 
compromised significantly. We do not have much time remaining for 
legislative business this year, and we have even less time for partisan 
games on this critical issue. So let us get together and work this out 
today or in the very immediate future.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are awaiting momentarily the 
distinguished majority leader and distinguished Democratic whip to 
address the Senate on a unanimous consent agreement.
  Seeing no Senator seeking recognition, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

[[Page S7293]]



        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, again, I want to say I appreciate the 
cooperation of the members of the Armed Services Committee on both 
sides of the aisle. The distinguished chairman, the distinguished 
Senator from Virginia, the Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn, and 
their staffs have all worked diligently.
  I must confess that at 11 o'clock last night, I had my doubts we 
would be standing here this afternoon. But the tempo was very different 
this morning, and a lot of really good work has been done to clear 
amendments and to get amendments agreed to on both sides of the aisle. 
So I really express my sincere appreciation to the members of the Armed 
Services Committee and to the staff and to the Democratic leader, for 
his leadership team and our leadership time who was worked to bring 
this bill to a conclusion.
  I think to complete action on this Department of Defense 
authorization bill is in the best interest of the country. It will 
allow us to move on in regular order to the appropriations bill. I hope 
by getting the authorization bill done first, we can avoid some of the 
conflicts we have run into in the past between the appropriations and 
authorization bills. I am pleased we have gotten it done.


                           Amendment No. 4433

(Purpose: To extend through fiscal year 1997 the prohibition on use of 
   funds to implement an international agreement concerning theater 
                        missile defense systems)

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that sections 231 
and 232 of the bill be stricken, and I now send to the desk an 
amendment inserting a new section, and ask the amendment be agreed to 
and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table. This new section 
deals with demarcation of theater missile defense systems between 
antiballistic systems.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott], for Mr. Thurmond, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 4433.

  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 237. EXTENSION OF PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO 
                   IMPLEMENT AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING 
                   THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS.

       Section 235(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 232) is 
     amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by inserting 
     ``or 1997'' after ``fiscal year 1996''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4433) was agreed to.


                      Modification of Section 233

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that section 233, 
regarding the ABM Treaty, be modified with the sense-of-the-Senate 
language I now send to the desk; and that the Foreign Relations 
Committee conduct hearings on the matter contained in section 233 
before the end of the session.
  While it is going to the desk, I want to say this is the proper thing 
to do. It is a serious matter as to how we deal with the question of 
multilateralization of treaties. I think the hearings are appropriate. 
I am glad to support this.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the section is so modified.
  The modification is as follows:

       Section 233 is modified to read as follows:

     SEC. 233. CONVERSION OF ABM TREATY TO MULTILATERAL TREATY.

       (a) Fiscal Year 1997.--It is the sense of the Senate that 
     during fiscal year 1997, the United States shall not be bound 
     by any international agreement entered into by the President 
     that would substantively modify the ABM Treaty, including any 
     agreement that would add one or more countries as signatories 
     to the treaty or would otherwise convert the treaty from a 
     bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; unless the 
     agreement is entered pursuant to the treaty making power of 
     the President under the Constitution.
       (b) Relationship to Other Law.--This section shall not be 
     construed as superseding section 232 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 
     108 Stat. 2701) for any fiscal year other than fiscal year 
     1997, including any fiscal year after fiscal year 1997.

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the majority 
leader, after notification of the Democratic leader, may proceed to the 
consideration of each of the following three bills; that they be 
considered in the following order, with no intervening business in 
order between the three bills; that no amendments or motions be in 
order to these bills:
  Defend America, which is S. 1635;
  A bill to be introduced by the Democratic leader, or his designee, on 
behalf of the President regarding national missile defense;
  And a bill to be introduced by Senator Nunn regarding national 
missile defense.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, with 
respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the majority leader and the 
Democratic leader will make every effort to obtain from the 
administration such facts and documents as requested by the chairman 
and ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, in 
order to pursue its work and hearings needed to develop a complete 
record for the Senate regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
Executive Calendar No. 12.
  With that in mind, I ask unanimous consent that the majority leader, 
after consultation with the Democratic leader, will, prior to September 
14, 1996, proceed to executive session to consider Calendar No. 12, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and the treaty be advanced through its 
various parliamentary stages, up to and including the presentation of 
the resolution of ratification; that all reported conditions and 
declarations be deemed agreed to; that there be two additional 
amendments to the resolution of ratification, to be offered by the 
majority leader or his designee, dealing with the subject matter of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention to be limited to 1 hour each, to be equally 
divided in the usual form; that no further conditions, amendments, 
declarations or understandings be in order; and there be 10 hours 
additional time for debate, to be equally divided in the usual form; 
and following the conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate 
proceed to the adoption of the resolution of ratification, all without 
further action or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Finally, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be advanced 
to third reading and final passage occur at 9:30 a.m. Wednesday, July 
10, 1996, and paragraph 4 of rule XII be waived.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I further state that if the resolution of 
ratification, with respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, is 
agreed to, then I will do my best to schedule the implementation 
legislation, if it is available, no later than early 1997.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. I wonder if the Democratic leader has any comments at this 
point.

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me just commend the distinguished 
majority leader. Like him, I was not very optimistic we would be able 
to get to this point. But I think it, again, demonstrates the interest 
on both sides in working together to accomplish a number of major 
legislative achievements this year, and this is a good one.
  This is an important issue. It is a bill that we needed to get done. 
The administration is very much in keeping with our desire to see the 
completion of this legislation in the nearest possible time.
  We have appropriations bills when we get back. I look forward to 
using the same approach as we try to address those as well. It will be 
my hope that during the month of July, we can do on appropriations what 
we have just done on this authorization bill.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I would like to confirm what, obviously, all 
Senators now know. There will be no further votes today. We will be 
back in session on Monday, July 8, during which time we will begin the 
debate that was outlined in the unanimous consent agreement with regard 
to minimum wage and small business tax provisions, to be followed on 
Tuesday by the TEAM Act. And then there will be a vote, as we just 
outlined, at 9:30 a.m.,

[[Page S7294]]

Wednesday of that week on the final passage of the DOD authorization 
bill.

  Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader is recognized.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask the majority leader, subject to an 
earlier discussion we had, for the interest of Senators, if we might be 
able to announce that the minimum wage vote would occur after the 
caucuses on Tuesday, and that debate on minimum wage take place that 
morning to accommodate traveling Senators and the debate on the issue, 
and then if there are votes, for them to be stacked at that point, 
2:15, we would be happy to do that.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I believe that we can work together on that, 
and agree now that we would not have a vote on the minimum wage issue 
until after the policy luncheons on Tuesday. However, my intent was to 
complete all of the debate on that on Monday, and then have the debate 
on the small business packages on Tuesday. You know, we can work that 
out as far as the debate time. And we may need to stack some votes, or 
we may need to go to other issues that morning. But at the very 
minimum, we can agree now there will not be a vote on that until after 
the luncheons. Then I would like to work with the minority leader on 
the time for the rest of the debate.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I am primarily interested in when the 
votes take place and also accommodating some Senators who want to be 
heard on minimum wage who will not be here on Monday. And if it were 
possible to accommodate them, to allow for additional comments on 
Tuesday morning, it would be very helpful.
  Mr. LOTT. As is always the case, just like we entered into having an 
agreement we would have a vote on that Wednesday and final passage 30 
minutes later so two Senators can be heard on issues they feel are 
important, I am sure we can work it out in a balanced way where there 
could be others that want to be heard on other subjects that morning. 
But we will work with the minority leader to make sure Senators have 
time to express their views.
  I thought the main thing was just to understand we would not have a 
vote until after the luncheon. But I want to maintain the flexibility 
of what we do earlier in the day, and after the vote, so we can get as 
much done on Tuesday as is at all possible. We will continue to work 
together on that.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the majority leader.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to address an issue of vital 
important to the U.S. Senate: whether the Senate should provide its 
advice and consent on any succession agreement regarding the ABM 
Treaty, especially an agreement that would convert the treaty from a 
bilateral agreement to a multilateral agreement. I would remind my 
colleagues that existing law requires any substantive modification of 
the ABM Treaty to be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.
  The administration has asserted that it would be inappropriate for 
the Senate to make a judgement about the substantive nature of any 
potential agreement at this point. But, if the Senate's treaty making 
role is to be protected, we must clearly establish our views now, 
especially since the implications of such an agreement are fairly clear 
already. To do otherwise would invite a major dispute with the 
executive branch in the near future and put the Senate in a position 
where its only recourse would be to attempt to prohibit the 
implementation of the agreement. In my view, multilateralization of the 
ABM Treaty clearly constitutes a substantive change. Let me briefly 
outline my reasons for coming to this conclusion.
  First of all, the fundamental circumstances that produced the treaty 
in the first place have changed. The ABM Treaty, more than any other 
arms control agreement, was a product of the bipolar cold war 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, we face strategic and political 
circumstances that are vastly different.
  Second, by having the Soviet Union succeeded, for purposes of the ABM 
Treaty, by some but not all of the independent States of the former 
Soviet Union, each possessing full and sovereign rights under the 
treaty, we would be changing, limiting, and extending certain rights 
and obligations previously possessed by the parties. This is all but a 
text book definition of a treaty amendment. U.S. rights would clearly 
be changed given the fact that the Standing Consultative Commission, 
the ABM Treaty's implementing body, would now be comprised of several 
parties, all of whom would need to consent to changes, clarifications, 
or amendments to the treaty.
  As the administration stated in a May 3, 1996, letter to Senator 
Nunn: ``Each Party will participate in implementing the treaty as a 
sovereign entity. This includes a full and equal voice in the SCC.'' 
When asked if the consent of all parties would be needed before the 
treaty could be amended, clarified, or interpreted, the administration 
answered: ``Yes. The U.S. has insisted on a decision-making mechanism 
in the SCC under which legally binding obligations would be adopted by 
consensus.'' In effect, the SCC would be transformed into a corporate 
body in which the United States would need to receive five, six, or 
more affirmative votes before the treaty could be amended. In addition, 
some of the new treaty partners would only have partial rights. Of the 
former Soviet States, presumably only Russia would be entitled to 
deploy an operational ABM system.
  Third, the actual functional mechanics of the ABM Treaty will be 
changed through multilateralization. The ABM Treaty is based largely on 
a geographical description of the United States and the Soviet Union. 
It states specifically that certain large phased array radars may only 
be located along the periphery of the territory of the parties. In the 
case of the former Soviet Union, however, some such radars are now 
located outside Russia. The so-called Scrunda radar in Latvia, for 
example, is on the territory of an independent country that has 
categorically rejected membership in the ABM Treaty. Clearly, any 
agreement that addresses the successorship issue will also have to 
redefine these geographic aspects of the treaty, which in and of 
themselves will constitute substantive amendments to the treaty. In 
this regard, the Senate will be as interested to see which States do 
not accede to the ABM Treaty as it will be to see which countries do 
accede.
  Mr. President, as we consider this important matter, which 
dramatically affects the Senate's constitutional prerogatives, let me 
also remind my colleagues of an important debate that took place in 
this Chamber several years ago regarding the so-called broad versus 
narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. On March 11, 12, and 13, 1987, 
the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, took to the 
floor to deliver a series of speeches criticizing the Reagan 
administration for having announced a new interpretation of the ABM 
Treaty. I do not wish to revisit the specific issues in that debate, 
only to remind my colleagues, especially on the other side of the 
aisle, how outraged they were at what appeared to be a challenge to the 
Senate's constitutional treaty-making role.
  On March 11, 1987, Senator Nunn stated that the State Department was 
directly challenging the Senate's constitutional role. ``This effect,'' 
he said, ``could carry over and may well produce a congressional 
backlash through its exercise of the power of the purse and the power 
to raise and support armies in a manner that would give the effect to 
the original meaning of the treaty as presented to the Senate.'' It is 
precisely such a backlash that we are seeking to avoid by including 
section 233 in the Defense authorization bill. The administration is 
proceeding down a very dangerous course and we are simply trying to 
ensure that the Senate plays a role before we arrive at a point of 
crisis.
  Why do I use such strong terms in describing the administration's 
present course? Let me be clear, Mr. President. The administration is 
not intending to submit any agreement to the Senate regarding ABM 
Treaty succession, even though such an agreement would constitute a 
fundamental departure from substance of the treaty presented to the 
Senate for advice and consent in 1972. In the same letter than I quoted 
from earlier, the administration makes clear that they are working on a 
memorandum of understanding on succession. What, I would ask, is the 
legal

[[Page S7295]]

standing of an MOU? How is it possible, given the major implications of 
such a change, that the administration is trying to modify a major arms 
control treaty with an MOU, as if this were some minor agreement with a 
close and reliable ally?
  Mr. President, I do not believe that one can avoid the conclusion 
that the administration is negotiating major changes to the ABM Treaty, 
that these changes constitute substantive modifications to the treaty 
and the rights and obligations of the parties, and that the Senate must 
be directly involved. In my view, this involvement must include advice 
and consent to any such agreement. The executive branch cannot simply 
change the entire context of a major arms control treaty and expect the 
Senate to stand idly by.
  The administration has sought to use various analogies to other cases 
in which the executive branch has not sought, and the Senate has not 
insisted upon, advice and consent on succession. The examples of the 
Conventional Forces in Europe and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
Treaties are frequently used.
  In the case of CFE, the Senate specifically recognized the impending 
breakup of the Soviet Union and adopted provisions taking this into 
account during the ratification debate. In fact, the Senate was so 
concerned about this issue with regard to CFE that it took great care 
to develop a condition to the resolution of ratification specifying 
procedures for adding new states parties and for evaluating the 
implications of the withdrawal of key newly independent states from the 
treaty. In the case of the ABM Treaty, no such provision has ever been 
made, since the ABM Treaty has always been viewed in a bipolar context. 
If anything, the case of the CFE Treaty argues for Senate advice and 
consent on any ABM Treaty succession agreement.
  In the case of the INF Treaty, in my view, the executive branch still 
should seek a formal protocol on succession. The only reason that this 
has not become a major issue is due to the fact that INF has already 
been fully implemented and there are no significant areas of 
contention. Unlike the ABM Treaty, there is little likelihood that the 
United States may require major amendments or clarifications to the INF 
Treaty.
  In the case of the START I Treaty, the succession agreement, known as 
the Lisbon Protocol, was in fact approved by the Senate as part of the 
overall ratification process. As in the case of CFE, START I was 
surrounded by major succession issues that the Senate had to address in 
a formal manner. I think it is fair to say that neither CFE or START I 
would have been approved by the Senate if not for the fact that the 
succession issues were thoroughly addressed as part of the ratification 
debate. In both cases the Bush administration correctly saw that a vote 
of the Senate was necessary.
  Mr. President, in summary, let me simply say that section 233 of the 
bill stands up for the prerogatives of the Senate. The fact that the 
administration is so opposed to it is very bothersome. This provision 
was approved by the committee on a bipartisan basis and I believe that 
the Senate should overwhelmingly endorse it.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to thank the leadership on both 
sides of the aisle on behalf of all members of the Armed Services 
Committee on both sides of the aisle. We simply would not have been 
able to achieve what we have just announced without strong, firm 
commitments by both leaders. Indeed, I commend the distinguished 
Democratic whip who, likewise, helped in the clearance of amendments.
  It is remarkable. I have served with many leaders. I will tell you, 
each time they arise to the challenge. And this time, indeed, both 
leaders did arise to the challenge. So I thank the leaders on both 
sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for third reading and was read 
the third time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, having worked with our distinguished 
chairman on the committee, I wish to compliment again his leadership in 
enabling this bill to come through and be acted upon by the Senate in a 
timely manner thereby putting us in the logical sequential order with 
the appropriations measure.
  I wish to congratulate the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Nunn. We 
have worked on bills for many years together. This will be the last 
that we have worked on together. I shall speak about his departure at a 
later time.
  I also wish to thank the staff on both sides who have diligently 
pursued efforts dramatically in the last 24 hours. I assure you we were 
here until after midnight last night.
  Also, I wish to thank the many colleagues on our committee who took 
an active role in this, and certainly Senator McCain with his usual 
help in trying to get this series of amendments through and also 
working with the group of us who dealt with the time agreement which I 
hope will soon be adopted by the Senate.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, after we call the roll next week, I will 
make some expressions of appreciation to those who were so helpful on 
this matter.
  One of them is the able Senator from Virginia who has done a 
magnificent service in the passage of this bill. I want to thank him.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I may proceed as 
in morning business for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________