[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 98 (Friday, June 28, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7292-S7295]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, we have been waiting for 2 months to move
forward on critical health insurance reform legislation. During this
time, Republicans have compromised again and again, each time in
response to concerns raised by the White House and by some of my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle about medical savings
accounts.
Mr. President, we have been negotiating in good faith. We have
addressed our colleagues' concerns about MSA on both the structure of
the insurance plan and the structure of the savings account. We have
limited the number of people eligible for the tax-free MSA. We have put
forward proposals that are small enough to be considered demonstration
projects. We have reduced the maximum contribution that can be made to
an MSA. We have reduced the top range of the high deductible. In short,
we have bent over backwards to accommodate the White House and some of
our Democratic colleagues.
Millions of Americans are counting on us to reach an agreement,
counting on us to work together to get the job done here in Washington.
Americans with preexisting conditions, Americans who are unable to
afford health insurance, small businesses that cannot afford to offer
their employees health insurance, millions of Americans need this bill,
and they do not have the luxury of time in waiting through more games
and more rhetoric.
Legislating is about compromise. Americans want us to compromise and
work together to get this legislation signed into law. We have
compromised significantly. We do not have much time remaining for
legislative business this year, and we have even less time for partisan
games on this critical issue. So let us get together and work this out
today or in the very immediate future.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are awaiting momentarily the
distinguished majority leader and distinguished Democratic whip to
address the Senate on a unanimous consent agreement.
Seeing no Senator seeking recognition, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
[[Page S7293]]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, again, I want to say I appreciate the
cooperation of the members of the Armed Services Committee on both
sides of the aisle. The distinguished chairman, the distinguished
Senator from Virginia, the Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn, and
their staffs have all worked diligently.
I must confess that at 11 o'clock last night, I had my doubts we
would be standing here this afternoon. But the tempo was very different
this morning, and a lot of really good work has been done to clear
amendments and to get amendments agreed to on both sides of the aisle.
So I really express my sincere appreciation to the members of the Armed
Services Committee and to the staff and to the Democratic leader, for
his leadership team and our leadership time who was worked to bring
this bill to a conclusion.
I think to complete action on this Department of Defense
authorization bill is in the best interest of the country. It will
allow us to move on in regular order to the appropriations bill. I hope
by getting the authorization bill done first, we can avoid some of the
conflicts we have run into in the past between the appropriations and
authorization bills. I am pleased we have gotten it done.
Amendment No. 4433
(Purpose: To extend through fiscal year 1997 the prohibition on use of
funds to implement an international agreement concerning theater
missile defense systems)
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that sections 231
and 232 of the bill be stricken, and I now send to the desk an
amendment inserting a new section, and ask the amendment be agreed to
and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table. This new section
deals with demarcation of theater missile defense systems between
antiballistic systems.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott], for Mr. Thurmond,
proposes an amendment numbered 4433.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title II, add the following:
SEC. 237. EXTENSION OF PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO
IMPLEMENT AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING
THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS.
Section 235(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 232) is
amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by inserting
``or 1997'' after ``fiscal year 1996''.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4433) was agreed to.
Modification of Section 233
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that section 233,
regarding the ABM Treaty, be modified with the sense-of-the-Senate
language I now send to the desk; and that the Foreign Relations
Committee conduct hearings on the matter contained in section 233
before the end of the session.
While it is going to the desk, I want to say this is the proper thing
to do. It is a serious matter as to how we deal with the question of
multilateralization of treaties. I think the hearings are appropriate.
I am glad to support this.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the section is so modified.
The modification is as follows:
Section 233 is modified to read as follows:
SEC. 233. CONVERSION OF ABM TREATY TO MULTILATERAL TREATY.
(a) Fiscal Year 1997.--It is the sense of the Senate that
during fiscal year 1997, the United States shall not be bound
by any international agreement entered into by the President
that would substantively modify the ABM Treaty, including any
agreement that would add one or more countries as signatories
to the treaty or would otherwise convert the treaty from a
bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; unless the
agreement is entered pursuant to the treaty making power of
the President under the Constitution.
(b) Relationship to Other Law.--This section shall not be
construed as superseding section 232 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337;
108 Stat. 2701) for any fiscal year other than fiscal year
1997, including any fiscal year after fiscal year 1997.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the majority
leader, after notification of the Democratic leader, may proceed to the
consideration of each of the following three bills; that they be
considered in the following order, with no intervening business in
order between the three bills; that no amendments or motions be in
order to these bills:
Defend America, which is S. 1635;
A bill to be introduced by the Democratic leader, or his designee, on
behalf of the President regarding national missile defense;
And a bill to be introduced by Senator Nunn regarding national
missile defense.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, with
respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the majority leader and the
Democratic leader will make every effort to obtain from the
administration such facts and documents as requested by the chairman
and ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, in
order to pursue its work and hearings needed to develop a complete
record for the Senate regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention,
Executive Calendar No. 12.
With that in mind, I ask unanimous consent that the majority leader,
after consultation with the Democratic leader, will, prior to September
14, 1996, proceed to executive session to consider Calendar No. 12, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and the treaty be advanced through its
various parliamentary stages, up to and including the presentation of
the resolution of ratification; that all reported conditions and
declarations be deemed agreed to; that there be two additional
amendments to the resolution of ratification, to be offered by the
majority leader or his designee, dealing with the subject matter of the
Chemical Weapons Convention to be limited to 1 hour each, to be equally
divided in the usual form; that no further conditions, amendments,
declarations or understandings be in order; and there be 10 hours
additional time for debate, to be equally divided in the usual form;
and following the conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate
proceed to the adoption of the resolution of ratification, all without
further action or debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Finally, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be advanced
to third reading and final passage occur at 9:30 a.m. Wednesday, July
10, 1996, and paragraph 4 of rule XII be waived.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I further state that if the resolution of
ratification, with respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, is
agreed to, then I will do my best to schedule the implementation
legislation, if it is available, no later than early 1997.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. I wonder if the Democratic leader has any comments at this
point.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me just commend the distinguished
majority leader. Like him, I was not very optimistic we would be able
to get to this point. But I think it, again, demonstrates the interest
on both sides in working together to accomplish a number of major
legislative achievements this year, and this is a good one.
This is an important issue. It is a bill that we needed to get done.
The administration is very much in keeping with our desire to see the
completion of this legislation in the nearest possible time.
We have appropriations bills when we get back. I look forward to
using the same approach as we try to address those as well. It will be
my hope that during the month of July, we can do on appropriations what
we have just done on this authorization bill.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I would like to confirm what, obviously, all
Senators now know. There will be no further votes today. We will be
back in session on Monday, July 8, during which time we will begin the
debate that was outlined in the unanimous consent agreement with regard
to minimum wage and small business tax provisions, to be followed on
Tuesday by the TEAM Act. And then there will be a vote, as we just
outlined, at 9:30 a.m.,
[[Page S7294]]
Wednesday of that week on the final passage of the DOD authorization
bill.
Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader is recognized.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask the majority leader, subject to an
earlier discussion we had, for the interest of Senators, if we might be
able to announce that the minimum wage vote would occur after the
caucuses on Tuesday, and that debate on minimum wage take place that
morning to accommodate traveling Senators and the debate on the issue,
and then if there are votes, for them to be stacked at that point,
2:15, we would be happy to do that.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I believe that we can work together on that,
and agree now that we would not have a vote on the minimum wage issue
until after the policy luncheons on Tuesday. However, my intent was to
complete all of the debate on that on Monday, and then have the debate
on the small business packages on Tuesday. You know, we can work that
out as far as the debate time. And we may need to stack some votes, or
we may need to go to other issues that morning. But at the very
minimum, we can agree now there will not be a vote on that until after
the luncheons. Then I would like to work with the minority leader on
the time for the rest of the debate.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I am primarily interested in when the
votes take place and also accommodating some Senators who want to be
heard on minimum wage who will not be here on Monday. And if it were
possible to accommodate them, to allow for additional comments on
Tuesday morning, it would be very helpful.
Mr. LOTT. As is always the case, just like we entered into having an
agreement we would have a vote on that Wednesday and final passage 30
minutes later so two Senators can be heard on issues they feel are
important, I am sure we can work it out in a balanced way where there
could be others that want to be heard on other subjects that morning.
But we will work with the minority leader to make sure Senators have
time to express their views.
I thought the main thing was just to understand we would not have a
vote until after the luncheon. But I want to maintain the flexibility
of what we do earlier in the day, and after the vote, so we can get as
much done on Tuesday as is at all possible. We will continue to work
together on that.
Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the majority leader.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to address an issue of vital
important to the U.S. Senate: whether the Senate should provide its
advice and consent on any succession agreement regarding the ABM
Treaty, especially an agreement that would convert the treaty from a
bilateral agreement to a multilateral agreement. I would remind my
colleagues that existing law requires any substantive modification of
the ABM Treaty to be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.
The administration has asserted that it would be inappropriate for
the Senate to make a judgement about the substantive nature of any
potential agreement at this point. But, if the Senate's treaty making
role is to be protected, we must clearly establish our views now,
especially since the implications of such an agreement are fairly clear
already. To do otherwise would invite a major dispute with the
executive branch in the near future and put the Senate in a position
where its only recourse would be to attempt to prohibit the
implementation of the agreement. In my view, multilateralization of the
ABM Treaty clearly constitutes a substantive change. Let me briefly
outline my reasons for coming to this conclusion.
First of all, the fundamental circumstances that produced the treaty
in the first place have changed. The ABM Treaty, more than any other
arms control agreement, was a product of the bipolar cold war
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, we face strategic and political
circumstances that are vastly different.
Second, by having the Soviet Union succeeded, for purposes of the ABM
Treaty, by some but not all of the independent States of the former
Soviet Union, each possessing full and sovereign rights under the
treaty, we would be changing, limiting, and extending certain rights
and obligations previously possessed by the parties. This is all but a
text book definition of a treaty amendment. U.S. rights would clearly
be changed given the fact that the Standing Consultative Commission,
the ABM Treaty's implementing body, would now be comprised of several
parties, all of whom would need to consent to changes, clarifications,
or amendments to the treaty.
As the administration stated in a May 3, 1996, letter to Senator
Nunn: ``Each Party will participate in implementing the treaty as a
sovereign entity. This includes a full and equal voice in the SCC.''
When asked if the consent of all parties would be needed before the
treaty could be amended, clarified, or interpreted, the administration
answered: ``Yes. The U.S. has insisted on a decision-making mechanism
in the SCC under which legally binding obligations would be adopted by
consensus.'' In effect, the SCC would be transformed into a corporate
body in which the United States would need to receive five, six, or
more affirmative votes before the treaty could be amended. In addition,
some of the new treaty partners would only have partial rights. Of the
former Soviet States, presumably only Russia would be entitled to
deploy an operational ABM system.
Third, the actual functional mechanics of the ABM Treaty will be
changed through multilateralization. The ABM Treaty is based largely on
a geographical description of the United States and the Soviet Union.
It states specifically that certain large phased array radars may only
be located along the periphery of the territory of the parties. In the
case of the former Soviet Union, however, some such radars are now
located outside Russia. The so-called Scrunda radar in Latvia, for
example, is on the territory of an independent country that has
categorically rejected membership in the ABM Treaty. Clearly, any
agreement that addresses the successorship issue will also have to
redefine these geographic aspects of the treaty, which in and of
themselves will constitute substantive amendments to the treaty. In
this regard, the Senate will be as interested to see which States do
not accede to the ABM Treaty as it will be to see which countries do
accede.
Mr. President, as we consider this important matter, which
dramatically affects the Senate's constitutional prerogatives, let me
also remind my colleagues of an important debate that took place in
this Chamber several years ago regarding the so-called broad versus
narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. On March 11, 12, and 13, 1987,
the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, took to the
floor to deliver a series of speeches criticizing the Reagan
administration for having announced a new interpretation of the ABM
Treaty. I do not wish to revisit the specific issues in that debate,
only to remind my colleagues, especially on the other side of the
aisle, how outraged they were at what appeared to be a challenge to the
Senate's constitutional treaty-making role.
On March 11, 1987, Senator Nunn stated that the State Department was
directly challenging the Senate's constitutional role. ``This effect,''
he said, ``could carry over and may well produce a congressional
backlash through its exercise of the power of the purse and the power
to raise and support armies in a manner that would give the effect to
the original meaning of the treaty as presented to the Senate.'' It is
precisely such a backlash that we are seeking to avoid by including
section 233 in the Defense authorization bill. The administration is
proceeding down a very dangerous course and we are simply trying to
ensure that the Senate plays a role before we arrive at a point of
crisis.
Why do I use such strong terms in describing the administration's
present course? Let me be clear, Mr. President. The administration is
not intending to submit any agreement to the Senate regarding ABM
Treaty succession, even though such an agreement would constitute a
fundamental departure from substance of the treaty presented to the
Senate for advice and consent in 1972. In the same letter than I quoted
from earlier, the administration makes clear that they are working on a
memorandum of understanding on succession. What, I would ask, is the
legal
[[Page S7295]]
standing of an MOU? How is it possible, given the major implications of
such a change, that the administration is trying to modify a major arms
control treaty with an MOU, as if this were some minor agreement with a
close and reliable ally?
Mr. President, I do not believe that one can avoid the conclusion
that the administration is negotiating major changes to the ABM Treaty,
that these changes constitute substantive modifications to the treaty
and the rights and obligations of the parties, and that the Senate must
be directly involved. In my view, this involvement must include advice
and consent to any such agreement. The executive branch cannot simply
change the entire context of a major arms control treaty and expect the
Senate to stand idly by.
The administration has sought to use various analogies to other cases
in which the executive branch has not sought, and the Senate has not
insisted upon, advice and consent on succession. The examples of the
Conventional Forces in Europe and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
Treaties are frequently used.
In the case of CFE, the Senate specifically recognized the impending
breakup of the Soviet Union and adopted provisions taking this into
account during the ratification debate. In fact, the Senate was so
concerned about this issue with regard to CFE that it took great care
to develop a condition to the resolution of ratification specifying
procedures for adding new states parties and for evaluating the
implications of the withdrawal of key newly independent states from the
treaty. In the case of the ABM Treaty, no such provision has ever been
made, since the ABM Treaty has always been viewed in a bipolar context.
If anything, the case of the CFE Treaty argues for Senate advice and
consent on any ABM Treaty succession agreement.
In the case of the INF Treaty, in my view, the executive branch still
should seek a formal protocol on succession. The only reason that this
has not become a major issue is due to the fact that INF has already
been fully implemented and there are no significant areas of
contention. Unlike the ABM Treaty, there is little likelihood that the
United States may require major amendments or clarifications to the INF
Treaty.
In the case of the START I Treaty, the succession agreement, known as
the Lisbon Protocol, was in fact approved by the Senate as part of the
overall ratification process. As in the case of CFE, START I was
surrounded by major succession issues that the Senate had to address in
a formal manner. I think it is fair to say that neither CFE or START I
would have been approved by the Senate if not for the fact that the
succession issues were thoroughly addressed as part of the ratification
debate. In both cases the Bush administration correctly saw that a vote
of the Senate was necessary.
Mr. President, in summary, let me simply say that section 233 of the
bill stands up for the prerogatives of the Senate. The fact that the
administration is so opposed to it is very bothersome. This provision
was approved by the committee on a bipartisan basis and I believe that
the Senate should overwhelmingly endorse it.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to thank the leadership on both
sides of the aisle on behalf of all members of the Armed Services
Committee on both sides of the aisle. We simply would not have been
able to achieve what we have just announced without strong, firm
commitments by both leaders. Indeed, I commend the distinguished
Democratic whip who, likewise, helped in the clearance of amendments.
It is remarkable. I have served with many leaders. I will tell you,
each time they arise to the challenge. And this time, indeed, both
leaders did arise to the challenge. So I thank the leaders on both
sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for third reading and was read
the third time.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, having worked with our distinguished
chairman on the committee, I wish to compliment again his leadership in
enabling this bill to come through and be acted upon by the Senate in a
timely manner thereby putting us in the logical sequential order with
the appropriations measure.
I wish to congratulate the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Nunn. We
have worked on bills for many years together. This will be the last
that we have worked on together. I shall speak about his departure at a
later time.
I also wish to thank the staff on both sides who have diligently
pursued efforts dramatically in the last 24 hours. I assure you we were
here until after midnight last night.
Also, I wish to thank the many colleagues on our committee who took
an active role in this, and certainly Senator McCain with his usual
help in trying to get this series of amendments through and also
working with the group of us who dealt with the time agreement which I
hope will soon be adopted by the Senate.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, after we call the roll next week, I will
make some expressions of appreciation to those who were so helpful on
this matter.
One of them is the able Senator from Virginia who has done a
magnificent service in the passage of this bill. I want to thank him.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I may proceed as
in morning business for 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________