[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 97 (Thursday, June 27, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7128-S7141]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Amendment No. 4367
Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I want to express my thanks to the
distinguished Senator from Georgia. We have some difference of opinion
over the NATO expansion amendment. The Senator has gone out of his way
to advise me that he was going to offer it, and out of consideration,
to let me have a copy in advance. And he also was kind enough to adjust
the time of which he would offer it on the floor to fit my schedule. I
was tied up in a meeting on Afghanistan I was chairing, and I could not
be here. I think he exhibits exceptional courtesy. I want to express my
thanks to the Senator from Georgia for his consideration.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator very much. I look forward to working
with him. As I mentioned, I have not spoken on this subject yet. But as
I talked to the Senator from Colorado and the Senator from Arizona, it
is my intent in this amendment, and the intent of all of us, not to
tilt this amendment one way or the other, but, rather, to ask the
questions that need to be asked before we make this very important
decision about expanding an alliance where we extend article V
protection. And article V protection includes nuclear protection. That
is a very serious matter.
I think we have not started nor has the administration thought
through nor has NATO thought through some of the tough questions here.
We all have an obligation to do that. This could be a matter before the
Senate for ratification of the expansion of the treaty next year.
So it is my intent to have questions that are tough questions, the
hard questions, but also fair questions, on both sides. I invite my
colleagues that may perceive that this is a tilt, one way or the other,
to work on the language. And I would certainly be amenable to taking a
look at their suggestions.
So Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be
temporarily laid aside. We will continue to work on it. So we are open
for amendment. I know Senator Thurmond and I, as managers of this bill,
encourage people to come down with relevant amendments on the defense
matter.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the amendment is laid aside.
Mr. NUNN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 4367
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in the interest of time, while we are
waiting on an amendment to be presented, I will go ahead and make my
remarks on the amendment which was pending and which has been
temporarily laid aside.
This amendment has been offered on behalf of myself, Senator
Hutchison, Senator Bradley, Senator Kassebaum, and Senator Cohen. I
note at the outset this amendment is not intended to prejudice the case
for or against NATO enlargement or even the pace at which NATO might
enlarge.
The amendment requires the President to submit a report on NATO
enlargement to the Senate Armed Services Committee and their
counterpart committee in the House at the same time that the President
submits the budget request for fiscal year 1998 to the Congress.
This amendment is designed to provide the information that will
stimulate a comprehensive and informed discussion in the Congress on
this important matter. If there are questions that are not in this
amendment that people on the other side of the aisle or this side think
should be added, I certainly would be receptive to that.
Mr. President, there have been a number of editorials and op-ed
pieces favoring a rapid pace for NATO enlargement. These pieces
generally focus on two aspects. First, on the positive side, the need
for greater security for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic so they
can continue on the road toward democratization and free market
economies. On the second side is the need to ensure that Russia does
not have a veto over the process by which NATO decides to enlarge.
There have also been a number of editorials and op-ed pieces opposing
NATO enlargement. These opposition pieces tend to focus on the
potential that NATO enlargement would have to produce the very thing
that we are trying to prevent; namely, a Russian military threat to
European security and also the impact it would have on Ukraine, Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia if those nations were not included in the first
stage of NATO enlargement.
What is missing, however, are a number of other issues that are
directly involved in NATO enlargement that have not been discussed in
the various commentary on either side of the issue and that need to be
carefully considered. This amendment provides for the President's
report to comprehensively discuss a host of issues. In the interest of
time, I will mention only a few of the issues for purposes of
illustration.
What would the cost be for NATO enlargement and who would pay these
costs? Certainly that is a question the American people are entitled to
have us debate and actually examine and present. There ought to be at
least some projection of that by the administration and by NATO.
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Incidentally, the Congressional Budget Office has concluded a study
on the cost of defending the Visegrad countries--that is Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and Poland--over the 15-year period from 1996 through
2010. That study concludes that the cost would range from $61 billion
to $125 billion. Whatever part of that range you choose, this is a
substantial amount of money. It seems to me the Senate of the United
States is not performing its duty if we do not tell the administration
we want an answer to this question, at least their best projection,
before they make a commitment committing this country, which, of
course, would have to then be ratified by the Senate.
A second question: Since article V of the North Atlantic Treaty
provides for a NATO member nation to treat an attack on one as an
attack on all, what is the general strategy that NATO would adopt to
defend the potential new member nations, including defense against a
possible nuclear threat? Do we deploy forces? If so, are our allies
prepared to join us in that deployment? Would it be American troops in
those host countries without allies, or will allies join? Which allies
are willing to join? These are questions that have to be answered.
The third question: The North Atlantic Council recently decided to
create more deployable headquarters and more mobile forces to mount
non-article V operations, as well as traditional collective defense
missions and to develop a European defense identity within the
alliance. The question is whether the enlargement of NATO should
proceed prior to NATO's reorganization of its military command
structure and the completion of the other actions required to carry out
these decisions. How is the enlargement going to impact these kinds of
fundamental changes in NATO beginning to prepare itself to operate out
of an area, and vice versa?
The next question is whether an enlarged NATO can continue to
function on a consensus; that is, a basis of unanimous consent, before
major decisions are made. Here on the Senate floor we operate by
unanimous consent. We know sometimes that is difficult. If we expand
NATO, will we have a two-thirds rule, three-fourths rule, or say any
nation, including one of the new nations that may come into NATO, would
be able to veto any decision of NATO? That is a fundamental question
that NATO, it seems to me, has to answer.
Another question regards the relationship of prospective new NATO
members to the European Union and what the impact that gaining NATO
membership would have on the possibility and timing of such nations
gaining associate and then full membership in the European Union. What
is the plan of the European Union? My impression of some of the
countries is the main thing they need now is not a military protective
shield but rather an economic expansion, economic trade opportunity and
the ability to trade with the European nations and with other nations
in the world. What are the Europeans going to do about opening the
European Community to these nations? I know the administration is going
to have to give their best estimate on this. Certainly we cannot speak
for the Europeans. But at least it is something we ought to consider
very strongly.
There is another very important part of this expansion that has not
been talked about. What about the Conventional Forces Treaty? If we
expand NATO enlargement, do we have to really do that treaty over?
Because basically, the CFE Treaty allocated forces and tanks and
artillery based on the two alliances that then existed. If part of that
alliance now is on the other side, what does that do to the CFE Treaty?
Of course, we hope at some point we will be able to say there are no
sides in Europe, that they are all basically working together in peace,
but I am not sure we have arrived at that point at this point in time.
The next question: The anticipated impact of NATO enlargement on
Russian foreign and defense policies, including the emphasis Russia
would place on defense planning on nuclear weapons. This at least has
to be contemplated. Are we going to basically be prepared to respond if
the Russians decide that they are going to go back to deploying
tactical nuclear weapons because they do not have conventional defenses
and if they perceive this enlargement as being a threat? I am hoping
they will not have that perception as we move forward in this regard,
but it has to be carefully considered because it will affect
tremendously our response and the cost and the question of deploying
American forces. All of these are important questions that need
answers.
Another question: The impact a NATO enlargement would have on the
political, economic, and security well-being of the nations, such as
Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, if they are not included in
the first stage of NATO enlargement.
Mr. President, this is a sampling of the issues that the President
would report on. I stress once again that this amendment was not
drafted and is not designed to prejudice the case either for or against
NATO enlargement or the pace of NATO enlargement, but it does require
the administration to begin to think through important issues and
questions, tough questions in my view, and lay them out on the table.
They need to be on the table so that the Congress and the American
people can start to consider the matter of NATO enlargement in a
comprehensive and informed manner.
If there are other questions that need to be added to this amendment
that some Members are concerned about, I would be pleased to consider
that language and to work with my colleagues on that.
Finally, I would note that the ultimate question that the Senate will
have to address with respect to the ratification of any agreement to
enlarge NATO, and that both the Senate and House will have to address
with respect to the funding of the costs associated with NATO
enlargement, is the question of extending our nuclear umbrella over any
new NATO members.
Mr. President, this is an extraordinarily serious decision, and I
hope that a comprehensive report by the President, which is called for
in this amendment, would provide much of the information needed for the
debate on that question, and, most important, I hope it will stimulate
the kind of in-depth thinking that we need to have on this issue.
Mr. President, I know that my colleagues who have cosponsored this--
Senators Hutchison, Bradley, Kassebaum and Cohen--would like to speak
on this subject at some point as we consider it. At this point in time,
I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on this amendment, I think it is
unfortunate timing to start with. Russian elections are coming up in
barely a week. We all know the incredible sensitivity that issues like
these have during a political campaign. I am not sure if a debate on
the floor of the Senate concerning the enlargement of NATO is
appropriate at this time.
Let me also say, Mr. President, that I have given a cursory review to
some of the provisions of the bill. I appreciate the fact that the
Senator from Georgia would be agreeable to other questions, but I also
suggest that there are questions that are raised here that really have
no answer, or have a very negative connotation.
Here are just a few examples:
The extent to which the European Union has opened its markets to
prospective new NATO members?
What would that have to do with membership in NATO? That is none of
our business. I do not know how you answer this question, or how
anybody in the Pentagon could answer this.
The relationship of Russia with NATO, including Russia's
participation in the Partnership for Peace Program and NATO's strategic
dialog with Russia?
That is related as to how we approach Russia, related to who is
conducting our foreign policy and foreign affairs. I can give the
Senator right now several different scenarios in which they would all
be the right answer, depending on what happened.
The anticipated impact of NATO enlargement on Russian foreign and
defense policies, including in particular the implementation of START
I, the ratification of START II, and the emphasis placed in defense
planning on nuclear weapons.
I say to the Senator from Georgia, again, that is directly related to
who
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the President of the United States is, who the President of Russia is,
who the Defense Minister of Russia is, and our relations with Russia
over time. To ask that question, in my view--there is no answer to it
because it is directly related to events, as to who the President of
Russia is. I say right now, if Mr. Zyuganov wins the election, you will
have one answer; if Mr. Yeltsin wins, you will have another answer.
They will be dramatically different.
I still do not understand the effect that the gaining of membership
in NATO by a nation would have on the possibility and timing of that
nation gaining associate membership and subsequently full membership in
the European Union. Again, that eludes me, as to what membership in the
European Union has to do with membership in NATO.
Let me pursue it.
The extent to which prospective new NATO members are committed to
protecting the rights of all of their citizens, including national
minorities.
Should we now have a review of present members of NATO and how they
treat the rights of their citizens, including minorities?
The extent to which prospective new NATO members have established
democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of
their armed forces, including parliamentary oversight of military
affairs and appointment of civilians to senior defense positions, and
the rule of law.
I would suspect strongly that unless they were in compliance with
those, there would be no prospect of them being engaged.
The strategy by which attacks on prospective new NATO member nations
would be deterred, and, if deterrence fails, defended, including
whether the strategy would be based on conventional forces or on
nuclear capabilities. If based on conventional forces, the extent to
which the strategy would be based on host nation forces and the extent
to which it would be based on NATO reinforcement.
I say to the Senator from Georgia, it would be the same policy that
applies to every nation that is a member of NATO and would be directly
related to the crisis and situation at the time. If there is a ground
attack in one part of NATO that could be countered by conventional
forces, then, clearly, you do not launch a hydrogen bomb.
The thrust of these questions, I say to the Senator from Georgia, or
of these requirements, whether they are intended to or not, would,
frankly, to the uninitiated, portray a situation where the United
States of America is departing from our traditional position and role
in Europe, which is to abide by the fundamental premise of NATO, which
is that an attack on one is an attack on all; and that, with the
expansion of NATO, I say to the Senator, cannot be violated. And the
response is directly dictated by the kind of attack, the kind of threat
it is, and the commitment on the part of the United States and our
allies is directly related to that.
If the Senator from Georgia can envision every possible scenario that
would be an attack on a new member or old member of NATO, then fine.
But I do not see how anyone has the kind of clairvoyance to know
exactly what that would be.
So the fundamental premise of NATO, as I understand it, of the
Atlantic Alliance is that, if one nation is attacked, then all are
attacked, and all will join in response to that attack. But nowhere in
NATO doctrine do I see an ironclad, dictated response to an attack,
because it depends on the kind of attack; it depends on what the threat
is. If it can be countered, obviously, by a short-term conventional
response, that is fine. But if there is a nuclear attack, clearly,
there is a nuclear response, as well.
Mr. NUNN. If the Senator will yield, I want to ask something on
another subject. I have a meeting to try to move this bill along back
here in the other room. It is one of those things that happens to all
of us. I need to be in two places at one time. But I know the Senator
from South Carolina would like for me to give my first priority to
working out some agreements to move the bill along.
I would like to thank the Senator for yielding and say that I support
the Harkin amendment. He will bring that up when he gets the floor.
That has been cleared on both sides, I believe. I will be available to
Senator Thurmond in Senator Daschle's office, if I am needed.
Mr. McCAIN. Could I say, first of all, I understand the concerns that
the Senator from Georgia has. I believe he is correct and that these
questions must be answered. There has to be a clear definition of
exactly what the United States is going to do.
What I ask the Senator is, perhaps we can sit down and maybe simplify
these questions to some degree, so that we can get answers to the
questions, but in a realistic fashion, and one that might be agreeable
to this side. Would that be all right?
Mr. NUNN. I would be glad to work on that with my friend from Arizona
and my friend from Colorado. The amendment is temporarily laid aside.
I just ask this. I do not intend to have a second-degree amendment to
it. I informed people that I was planning on doing that, and I wanted
to accord other Senators a chance. I only ask that there not be a
second-degree amendment while we have not laid it aside and are working
in good faith on it.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Georgia. Again, I appreciate
what the Senator from Georgia is trying to find out. Those facts are
going to have to be made known to the U.S. Senate and the American
people prior to any two-thirds vote on the floor of the Senate that
would accompany enlargement.
I am worried with setting a stage that might in some ways prejudge in
a negative fashion what I think is critical for the future of the
spirit of Europe.
Mr. President, earlier I stated on the floor when discussing Senator
Helms' amendment concerning the expression of sorrow over the tragedy
that took place in Saudi Arabia that I had heard that the Secretary of
State was going to Syria. That is not the case. I retract that remark.
I do think that I will stick to my previous statement, though, that
24 times he has been in Damascus, which is probably sufficient for some
period of time. I do believe that the Secretary of State is doing a
dedicated job. He is a fine and outstanding man, and in no way do I
mean my remarks to be in any way a diminution of the very outstanding
and dedicated work that the Secretary of State has done.
Mr. President, I believe that the Senator from Colorado who has a
second-degree amendment with the Senator from Georgia, and perhaps we
can craft an amendment and make changes in the amendment which
hopefully would more narrowly focus the questions and be able to move
forward with this very important amendment.
I want to state again. It is not healthy at this point for the U.S.
Senate to debate the issue of the expansion of NATO with Russian
elections coming up in just a few days.
I hope we can do whatever we can to avoid that at this time.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
Amendment No. 4177, As Modified
(Purpose: To provide for defense burdensharing)
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 4177, and I send a
modification to the desk and ask that it be considered at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Iowa (Mr. Harkin), for himself, Mr. Kerry,
Mr. Conrad, Mr. Lautenberg, and Mr. Dorgan, proposes an
amendment numbered 4177, as modified.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1044. DEFENSE BURDENSHARING.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Although the Cold War has ended, the United States
continues to spend billions of dollars to promote regional
security and to make preparations for regional contingencies.
(2) United States defense expenditures primarily promote
United States national security interests; however, they also
significantly contribute to the defense of our allies.
(3) In 1993, the gross domestic product of the United
States equaled $6,300,000,000,000,
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while the gross domestic product of other NATO member
countries totaled $7,200,000,000,000.
(4) Over the course of 1993, the United States spent 4.7
percent of its gross domestic product on defense, while other
NATO members collectively spent 2.5 percent of their gross
domestic product on defense.
(5) In addition to military spending, foreign assistance
plays a vital role in the establishment and maintenance of
stability in other nations and in implementing the United
States national security strategy.
(6) This assistance has often prevented the outbreak of
conflicts which otherwise would have required costly military
interventions by the United States and our allies.
(7) From 1990-1993, the United States spent $59,000,000,000
in foreign assistance, a sum which represents an amount
greater than any other nation in the world.
(8) In 1995, the United States spent over $10,000,000,000
to promote European security, while European NATO nations
only contributed $2,000,000,000 toward this effort.
(9) With a smaller gross domestic product and a larger
defense budget than its European NATO allies, the United
States shoulders an unfair share of the burden of the common
defense.
(10) Because of this unfair burden, the Congress previously
voted to require United States allies to bear a greater share
of the costs incurred for keeping United States military
forces permanently assigned in their countries.
(11) As a result of this action, for example, Japan now
pays over 75 percent of the nonpersonnel costs incurred by
United States military forces permanently assigned there,
while our European allies pay for less than 25 percent of
these same costs. Japan signed a new Special Measures
Agreement this year which will increase Japan's contribution
toward the cost of stationing United States troops in Japan
by approximately $30,000,000 a year over the next five years.
(12) These increased contributions help to rectify the
imbalance in the burden shouldered by the United States for
the common defense.
(13) The relative share of the burden of the common defense
still falls too heavily on the United States, and our allies
should dedicate more of their own resources to defending
themselves.
(b) Efforts To Increase Allied Burdensharing.--The
President shall seek to have each nation that has cooperative
military relations with the United States (including security
agreements, basing arrangements, or mutual participation in
multinational military organizations or operations) take one
or more of the following actions:
(1) Increase its financial contributions to the payment of
the nonpersonnel costs incurred by the United States
Government for stationing United States military personnel in
that nation, with a goal of achieving the following
percentages of such costs:
(A) By September 30, 1997, 37.5 percent.
(B) By September 30, 1998, 50 percent.
(C) By September 30, 1999, 62.5 percent.
(D) By September 30, 2000, 75 percent.
An increase in financial contributions by any nation under
this paragraph may include the elimination of taxes, fees, or
other charges levied on United States military personnel,
equipment, or facilities stationed in that nation.
(2) Increase its annual budgetary outlays for national
defense as a percentage of its gross domestic product by 10
percent or at least to a level commensurate to that of the
United States by September 30, 1997.
(3) Increase its annual budgetary outlays for foreign
assistance (to promote democratization, economic
stabilization, transparency arrangements, defense economic
conversion, respect for the rule of law, and internationally
recognized human rights) by 10 percent or at least to a level
commensurate to that of the United States by September 30,
1997.
(4) Increase the amount of military assets (including
personnel, equipment, logistics, support and other resources)
that it contributes, or would be prepared to contribute, to
multinational military activities worldwide, including United
Nations or regional peace operations.
(c) Authorities to Encourage Actions by United States
Allies.--In seeking the actions described in subsection (b)
with respect to any nation, or in response to a failure by
any nation to undertake one or more of such actions, the
President may take any of the following measures:
(1) Reduce the end strength level of members of the Armed
Forces assigned to permanent duty ashore in that nation.
(2) Impose on that nation taxes, fees, or other charges
similar to those that such nation imposes on United States
forces stationed in that nation.
(3) Reduce (through rescission, impoundment, or other
appropriate procedures as authorized by law) the amount the
United States contributes to the NATO Civil Budget, Military
Budget, or Security Investment Program.
(4) Suspend, modify, or terminate any bilateral security
agreement the United States has with that nation.
(5) Reduce (through rescission, impoundment or other
appropriate procedures as authorized by law) any United
States bilateral assistance appropriated for that nation.
(6) Take any other action the President determines to be
appropriate as authorized by law.
(d) Report on Progress in Increasing Allied
Burdensharing.--Not later than March 1, 1997, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on--
(1) steps taken by other nations to complete the actions
described in subsection (b);
(2) all measures taken by the President, including those
authorized in subsection (c), to achieve the actions
described in subsection (b); and
(3) the budgetary savings to the United States that are
expected to accrue as a result of the steps described under
paragraph (1).
(e) Report on National Security Bases for Forward
Deployment and Burdensharing Relationships.--(1) In order to
ensure the best allocation of budgetary resources, the
President shall undertake a review of the status of elements
of the United States Armed Forces that are permanently
stationed outside the United States. The review shall include
an assessment of the following:
(A) The alliance requirements that are to be found in
agreements between the United States and other countries.
(B) The national security interests that support
permanently stationing elements of the United States Armed
Forces outside the United States.
(C) The stationing costs associated with the forward
deployment of elements of the United States Armed Forces.
(D) The alternatives available to forward deployment (such
as material prepositioning, enhanced airlift and sealift, or
joint training operations) to meet such alliance requirements
or national security interests, with such alternatives
identified and described in detail.
(E) The costs and force structure configurations associated
with such alternatives to forward deployment.
(F) The financial contributions that allies of the United
States make to common defense efforts (to promote
democratization, economic stabilization, transparency
arrangements, defense economic conversion, respect for the
rule of law, and internationally recognized human rights).
(G) The contributions that allies of the United States make
to meeting the stationing costs associated with the forward
deployment of elements of the United States Armed Forces.
(H) The annual expenditures of the United States and its
allies on national defense, and the relative percentages of
each nation's gross domestic product constituted by those
expenditures.
(2) The President shall submit to Congress a report on the
review under paragraph (1). The report shall be submitted not
later than March 1, 1997, in classified and unclassified
form.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I also ask that Senators Conrad,
Lautenberg, and Dorgan be added as cosponsors.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I believe, as modified, this amendment is
agreeable to the managers. It has been worked out. I thank them. I
thank the manager and the ranking members for their help in working
this out. I thank also my colleagues for their cooperation in working
out this important proposal.
Basically, what this amendment, which passed the House recently by a
vote of 353 to 62, would do is begin to ask our allies in Europe to pay
a fairer share of the costs for their own defense. The CBO says this
amendment would save taxpayers up to $11.3 billion over the next 6
years. I personally think we need to go even further in reducing the
taxpayer subsidy for Europe and Japan's defense, but this is a major
step in the right direction. It is a victory for deficit reduction and
the American taxpayers.
Again, I thank the managers for their cooperation.
Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment on behalf of myself, and
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Lautenberg, and Mr.
Dorgan that calls on our NATO allies to share more of the burden for
maintaining stability in Europe and their own defense. This amendment
is nearly identical to one on the House Department of Defense
authorization bill that was agreed to by a strong bipartisan vote of
353 to 62 on May 14. The CBO has scored our amendment as saving $11.3
billion over the next 6 years.
It is time we stopped asking American taxpayers to underwrite the
security of our European allies. We are all justifiably proud of the
role American played in rebuilding Europe after World War II. The
Marshall plan stands as a monument to American generosity and concern
for our fellow citizens around the world.
We not only helped our wartime allies, but we aided our former
enemies as they rebuilt their war-torn societies. Aiding our former
enemies to restore
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their society is the true mark of American generosity.
But that was then, and this is now. Times have changed.
Germany and Japan are no longer prostrate, exhausted from years of
all-out war. Far from it. Germany and Japan are now economic giants,
providing significant competition to the United States across a broad
spectrum of industries.
After World War II, we were justified in stationing troops in Europe
and Japan to restore basic order, to provide the security necessary for
vibrant economies to flourish and grow. But now it is time for our
allies to take over the cost of their own defense. Not only has the
threat of world domination by the Soviet Union evaporated, but our
allies now have the financial means and internal stability to provide
their own defense.
In 1991 Japan agreed to pay for 75 percent of the costs of stationing
United States troops on Japanese soil by this year, excluding salaries
of United States servicemen and women, and United States civilian
contractors. Mr. President, Japan has done what it promised. Our total
nonpersonnel cost there is $5.8 billion and Japan contributes $4.6
billion or 79 percent. That contribution should increase further, but
they are making progress.
Why can't our NATO allies pick up a larger share of their defense
burden? This amendment allows them to increase their contributions in
one or more of 4 areas to meet the goal of increased burden sharing.
The NATO allies' four options are:
First, gradually increasing their contributions over 4 years to 75
percent of the nonpersonnel costs incurred by U.S. military forces
stationed on their soil. They currently contribute about 25 percent of
the $8 billion annual costs.
Second, increasing their defense spending as a percentage of GDP by
10 percent or at least to a level equal to that of the United States by
September 30, 1997. Although U.S. defense spending is declining, the
spending by the NATO Allies is declining more rapidly. This provision
prevents the United States from picking up the growing difference in
defense spending.
Third, increasing their budgetary outlays for foreign assistance by
10 percent or to a level equal to that of the United States. This
provision gives the NATO allies a nonmilitary mechanism to contribute
to the security of Europe.
Fourth, increasing their contributions of military assets to
multinational, United Nations, or regional peace operations. This
provision will prevent the United States from having to bear an unfair
amount of the responsibility in future peacekeeping missions.
Mr. President, I reiterate, our NATO Allies can choose any
combination of the above options to meet the requirements of this
amendment. They need not do all four.
Should our NATO Allies miss the targets specified above, the
President is authorized by this amendment to do one or more of the
following:
First, reduce the levels of troops stationed in NATO countries.
Second, impose taxes or fees similar to those that other nations
impose on the U.S. forces stationed in the foreign nation.
Third, reduce through rescission, impoundments or line-item veto, the
amount the United States contributes to the NATO budget or other
bilateral aid accounts.
Fourth, take any other action that is currently authorized by law to
make our NATO allies pick up a fair share of the defense burden.
Mr. President, this amendment also requires the President to report
to Congress by March 1, 1997, the progress that has been made in
achieving the goals enumerated here. This deadline is set so that we
may review the progress in time for next years' Defense authorization
bill.
This is indeed a very modest amendment. I think we should go much
further to reduce the American taxpayers' subsidy for Europe and
Japan's defense. As we work to balance our budget and reduce the debt,
I do not think we can justify any subsidy. But this is a reasonable
first step to that end.
Mr. President, this amendment has been endorsed by Taxpayers for
Common Sense and Citizens Against Government Waste. Let me read a
couple of paragraphs from their letters.
Taxpayers for Common Sense:
As the United States attempts to rein in its defense
budget, it is no longer acceptable for the U.S. taxpayer to
pay the lion's share for keeping American troops in Europe.
While the Japanese Government pays over 75 percent of all
non-personnel costs for American military bases in Japan, our
wealthy European allies typically make a collective
contribution of less than 25 percent. We support your
amendment's call for a 75 percent contribution standard.
Citizens Against Government Waste:
This amendment, which would require host countries to pay
75 percent of nonpersonnel costs, is essential to maintaining
a strong and cost-effective military partnership with our
allies around the world. If enacted, this proposal would save
taxpayers $11.3 billion by 2002.
As the United States continues to define its role in the
post-Cold War era, we must realize that we can no longer
afford to bear the brunt of maintaining a large presence
overseas. However, we do recognize that American strength is
necessary to maintain peace and cooperation worldwide. Your
amendment successfully addresses both issues.
The 104th Congress' clear mission is to eliminate
unnecessary spending, while ensuring that vital obligations,
such as protecting our national security, are fulfilled. Your
amendment is a vital part of that mission. Not only does it
provide for continued international cooperation, but it also
saves the taxpayers billions of dollars.
Your amendment makes a fundamental contribution to the
debate on the Defense Authorization and its passage is an
important step toward achieving a balanced budget. We
strongly urge its adoption by the Senate.
Our amendment is also supported by the State Department and the
Defense Department. Let me read from their respective statements:
State Department:
We support this amendment because it supports U.S. policy
objectives in achieving equitable responsibility sharing of
global security interests with our allies. This amendment
does not tie the hands of the Administration in the execution
of U.S. policy. This amendment does allow the President the
flexibility in pursuing different avenues in attaining the
same objective without undermining the credibility of the
United States commitments to our allies. It recognizes that
one formula does not fit every allied country or every region
and permit[s] our allies to choose to contribute on an
equitable basis tailored to their own political, economic,
cultural, and historical perspectives.
Department of Defense:
After detailed review, analysis and consideration of the
provisions in the amendment, the Department believes it
provides a solid basis upon which to proceed in future
discussions and negotiations with our allies around the world
to attain greater Responsibility Sharing in defense and
security issues of common concern.
This amendment has the overwhelming support of the House, and the
support of the administration. If you agree that our allies are now
sufficiently strong economically to pay a fair share for their
security, then I urge that you also support this amendment. I ask
unanimous consent that the letters of support be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Position Paper on Proposed Burdensharing Amendment to H.R. 3230
description of the bill
The amendment to the DoD Authorization Bill calls on our
allies to equitably share in the roles, risks,
responsibilities as well as costs in global security. The
amendment recognizes that the United States continues to pay
an unfair share of the ``common defense burden'' and calls
for our allies to take one or more of four actions to
increase their contributions to share equitably in global
responsibility sharing.
These four actions include: increased cost-sharing with
established goals of 37.5%, 50%, 62.5%, and 75% by September
30 of each successive year starting in 1997; or increasing
national defense budgets by 10% or comparable to the U.S. by
September 30, 1997; or increase its annual budget for foreign
assistance by 10% or at least to a level commensurate to that
of the U.S. by September 30, 1997; or increase the amount of
military assets that it contributes, or would be prepared to
contribute, to multinational military activities worldwide,
including United Nations or regional peace operations.
The amendment also provides authority for the President to
take certain actions with our allies should they not meet any
of the four obligations above. Although threatening and
punitive in nature, these actions are non-binding.
The amendment does direct the President to submit an annual
report to Congress not later than March 1, 1997 in classified
and unclassified from reviewing the effects of our allies
compliance to our responsibility sharing initiatives.
[[Page S7133]]
department position
We support this amendment because it supports U.S. policy
objectives in achieving equitable responsibility sharing of
global security interests with our allies. This amendment
does not tie the hands of the Administration in the execution
of U.S. policy. This amendment does allow the President the
flexibility in pursuing different avenues in attaining the
same objective without undermining the credibility of the
United States commitments to our allies. It recognizes that
one formula does not fit every allied country or every region
and permits our allies to choose to contribute on an
equitable basis tailored to their own political, economic,
cultural, and historical perspectives.
talking points and background to support the department's position
We agree with the findings of this amendment that the
United States continues to pay a higher cost for global
defense compared to that of our allies. We also acknowledge
that many of our allies are sharing equitably in the global
responsibilities of defense while others are beginning to
assume increased roles, risks, and responsibilities.
We support this amendment because it supports U.S. policy
objectives in achieving equitable responsibility sharing of
mutual global security interests. This amendment does not tie
the hands of the President, allowing him the flexibility in
pursuance of those goals while maintaining the credibility of
the United States commitments to our allies.
We believe that by working together with Congress on this
issue, U.S. interests are preserved and that the basis for
our policy or responsibility sharing serves the best security
interests of our country and that of our allies in promoting
peace, stability, democracy, and free-market economies.
We note with concern, however, that rigid percentage cost-
sharing goals by specified dates are incompatible with
recently concluded and highly favorable cost-sharing
agreements. We ask that only one small change to the
amendment be incorporated.
____
Potential Amendment
(Prepared by Mike Walsh)
service affected
US military forces and activities around the world.
amendment number
Amendment 102 to H.R. 3230
statement of amendment
Amendment consists of four parts: Findings, which detail
discrepancies Congress perceives between US and allied
defense spending and resource allocation, generally
concluding that the US continues to bear greater defense
burden than allies, and that they should do more to defend
themselves; Efforts to Increase Allied Burdensharing, which
provides President latitude to seek increased allied
contributions in four areas (i.e., cost sharing, defense
spending, foreign assistance, military assets to
multinational military activities); Authorities to Encourage
Allies, which provides President with authority to take
specific actions to obtain allied compliance (i.e., wide
range of options, including withdrawals, impositions, funding
or program rescissions, suspensions, terminations, reductions
or similar actions); and Revised Reporting Requirements,
stipulating reporting on relevant measures and actions by
allies to determine compliance.
DOD Position
The Department generally supports the amendment, but has
some reservations about specific provisions, discussed below
[After detailed review, analysis and consideration of the
provisions in the amendment, the Department believes it
provides a solid basis upon which to proceed in future
discussions and negotiations with our allies around the world
to attain greater Responsibility Sharing in defense and
security issues of common concern. The Department has long
sought such an orientation, as it offers us the most latitude
in seeking greater contributions. Additionally, provisions in
this amendment establish the basis for a renewed Executive-
Legislative consensus on determining progress in these
matters, another long-sought goal.] The Department is
concerned however, with a couple of provisions in the
amendment. In paragraph (b) Efforts, sub-paragraph (1),
Congress proposes adopting a specific schedule of financial
contributions by allies between 1997-2000. We have not found
this to be a viable approach to attain the goals the
Department and Congress want to reach. We recommend deleting
the schedule and instead substituting language (consistent
with the other parts of this section) that encourages
``greater allied equity in sharing roles, risks,
responsibilities, and costs for global security''. This will
afford President more flexibility and options for attaining
increased contributions from various sources. We also
recommend, in paragraph (d) Reports, that these two new
reporting requirements be combined into a single report, due
15 April each year, and that these reporting requirements
supersede current burdensharing reporting requirements (see
PL 98-525, FY85 DOD Authorization Act, Title X, Section 1002,
et seq.), which are both obsolete and inconsistent with the
intention of this amendment. The Department urges Congress to
consider favorably these minor adjustments.
____
Save U.S. Taxpayer up to $11.3 Billion--Support ``Burdensharing''
Amendment
Taxpayers for Common Sense,
Washington, DC, June 25, 1996.
Dear Senators Harkin and Kerry: Taxpayers for Common Sense
is please to support your ``burdensharing'' amendment to the
FY97 Defense Authorization Bill. This amendment takes an
important step towards reducing the $16 billion direct cash
subsidy paid each year to our allies for their national
defense. As you know, the House passed this amendment during
consideration of the Defense Authorization.
As the United States attempts to rein in its defense
budget, it is no longer acceptable for the U.S. taxpayer to
pay the lion's share for keeping American troops in Europe.
While the Japanese government pays over 75% of all non-
personnel costs for American military bases in Japan, our
wealthy European allies typically make a collective
contribution of less than 25%. We support your amendment's
call for a 75% contribution standard.
Despite the end of the Cold War and a steadily decreasing
defense budget, the U.S. still spends more on defense than
all of its allies. For example, while Japan spends 1.1% of is
GDP on defense and European nations average 2.5%, the U.S.
spends 4.7% of its GDP on defense. The American taxpayer
cannot afford to continue subsidizing our allies defense
budgets. Not only are taxpayers asked to shoulder higher
defense spending and increased deficits, but as consumers and
producers they face a competitive disadvantage from countries
whose economies do not bear the full cost of defending their
own territories.
This year's amendment gives the President and the Secretary
of Defense more than a year to negotiate increased
contributions from our allies who benefit from the 200,000
U.S. troops stationed abroad. If those contributions do not
increase, the amendment provides options for pressuring our
allies to increase their contributions through measures such
as a reduction of troops and/or a recession of bilateral aid
and NATO appropriations.
The Congressional Budget Office projects potential six year
outlay savings, from the amendment, to be around $11.3
billion. These savings are significant and would provide a
welcome relief to overburdened American taxpayers. We urge
all members of the Senate to support your amendment.
Sincerely,
Jill Lancelot,
Legislative Director.
____
Council for Citizens Against
Government Waste,
Washington, DC, June 25, 1996.
Hon. Tom Harkin,
Hon. John Kerry,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senators Harkin and Kerry: On behalf of the 600,000
members of the Council for Citizens Against Government Waste,
I am writing to endorse the Harkin/Kerry amendment to the FY
1997 National Defense Authorization Act, S. 1745. This
amendment, which would require host countries to pay 75
percent of nonpersonnel costs, is essential to maintaining a
strong and cost-effective military partnership with out
allies around the world. If enacted, this proposal would save
taxpayers $11.3 billion by 2002.
This amendment won overwhelming bipartisan support in the
House by a vote of 353-62. It deserves the same in the Senate
this year.
As the United States continues to define its role in the
post-cold War era, we must realize that we can no longer
afford to bear the brunt of maintaining a large presence
overseas. However, we do recognize that American strength is
necessary to maintain peace and cooperation worldwide. Your
amendment successfully addresses both issues.
The 104th Congress' clear mission is to eliminate
unnecessary spending, while ensuring that vital obligations,
such as protecting our national security, are fulfilled. Your
amendment is a vital part of that mission. Not only does it
provide for continued international cooperation, but is also
saves the taxpayers billions of dollars.
Your amendment makes a fundamental contribution to the
debate on the Defense Authorization and its passage is an
important step toward achieving a balanced budget. We
strongly urge its adoption by the Senate.
Sincerely,
Tom Schatz,
President.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment
offered by the Senator from Iowa and Massachusetts. I appreciate their
efforts to craft an amendment that would provide a number of actions
that our allies could take to increase their contributions to defense
burdensharing.
I agree that the United States pays an unfair share of the common
defense
[[Page S7134]]
burden and our allies should do more. This amendment would provide the
United States with a basis by which to achieve agreements with our
allies to increase their share of costs for defense.
Let me emphasize that U.S. forces are deployed overseas to advance
U.S. security interests. Although we seek common efforts with our
allies to secure peace and promote U.S. interests abroad, we do not
always necessarily agree on how those interests are to be advanced.
As a result, I am not comfortable with the notion that one action an
ally could take to increase its cost share would be to increase its
peacekeeping or humanitarian activities--that would be considered of
equal value to an ally increasing its participation in coalition
operations or increasing its defense budget.
Would Congress be satisfied if an ally agreed to increase its
contributions to foreign assistance, and at the same time, reduce its
defense expenditures? This would be counter to our efforts to get our
allies to contribute more for global and regional security. Our
objective should be to get our allies to agree to increase their
efforts in all areas.
With those remarks, I recommend that my colleagues adopt the
amendment.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague
Senator Harkin in offering an amendment which seeks to relieve the
American taxpayer of some of the enormous burden of defending our
allies.
This amendment is straightforward. It requires the President to seek
increased contributions from countries which have cooperative military
relations with the United States. It requires the President to
negotiate agreements under which our allies will be responsible for
bearing a greater share of the common defense burden.
The end of the cold war has signaled the need for us to reevaluate
our spending priorities. Despite the end of the cold war, the United
States continues to pay an unfair share of the costs of defending our
allies. American taxpayers should no longer be responsible for the
lion's share of the common defense burden.
According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's data for
1993, we spent 20.1 percent of our budget on military expenditures,
while European NATO nations spent only 6.2 percent of their combined
budgets. That's $1,153 per capita spent by the United States on
military expenditures compared to $419 per capita spent by our European
NATO allies.
It is simply time for the United States to negotiate a better deal,
and this amendment represents a positive step in that direction.
The amendment allows the President to negotiate an increase in our
allies' contributions in four areas. First, the President may require
an ally to gradually increase its contributions to 75 percent of the
nonpersonnel costs incurred by our forces stationed on its soil.
Second, the President may require a host country to increase its
defense spending as a percentage of its GDP by 10 percent or at least
to a level equal to that of the United States. Third, the President may
negotiate for a foreign country to increase its budgetary outlays for
foreign assistance by 10 percent or to a level commensurate with the
United States. Finally, the President may choose to require an ally to
increase its contributions of military assets to multinational, United
Nations, or regional peace operations.
Although far from perfect, our agreement with Japan is a good example
of what the President would be required to negotiate under this
amendment. Currently, Japan pays for 79 percent, of nonpersonnel costs
incurred by stationing troops on its soil. The administration recently
negotiated an agreement under which Japan will increase its
contributions by approximately $30 million a year over the next 5
years. This is an pretty good deal compared to the meager 24 percent
that our European NATO allies contribute to the nonpersonnel costs the
United States incurs in Europe.
Budget estimates for fiscal year 1996-97 reveal that the United
States will incur $8 billion in nonpersonnel costs in Europe and that
our NATO allies will only contribute $2 billion of that amount. I think
this is an outrage.
This amendment would remedy this situation by requiring the President
to negotiate a better deal.
Mr. President, critics of this amendment may argue that it will
compromise U.S. troop presence and global national security interests.
This just isn't the case. If this amendment is implemented, and I hope
it will be, the United States will continue to pay enormous amounts to
defend collective security interests. We will still spend billions
defending our allies.
This amendment provides the flexibility necessary to preserve our
commitments to our allies. It allows the President to accommodate each
country's unique economic, political, and military situation while
creating a more equitable balance of the common defense burden. Each of
our allies has different capabilities and limitations to sharing the
costs of the common defense. This amendment recognizes these
differences and gives the President flexibility needed to secure
greater participation by our allies.
Mr. President, American taxpayers deserve a better deal. If
implemented, this amendment would be a solid starting point for
requiring our allies to chip in more for the common defense. It would
send a clear message to our citizens that we are committed to relieving
them of some of the enormous burden of defending our allies. This
initiative is long overdue, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask that the yeas and nays be vitiated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is their objection to the amendment?
Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4177), as modified, was agreed to.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Amendment No. 4367
Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, one of the items that I want to draw the
Senate's attention to with regard to the Nunn amendment is really the
astounding story of the United State's history with regard to central
Europe since the Iron Curtain fell down.
I think a decade ago, or two decades ago Americans, would be amazed
to think that the Iron Curtain could fall and that the world could
change as it has.
I do not know whether Members remember watching the television
coverage of President Reagan in Berlin talking about how in the future
Russian leaders would tear down that wall. But I confess my thoughts
were that the wonderful Irishman was engaging in wishful rhetoric,
perhaps more than a serious prediction. Lo and behold, the President
turned out to be more than correct, and his words were prophetic.
I think more shocking than his statements was the fact that the wall
came down and that the Soviet Union dissolved. However, even more
shocking is the way this country has treated the central European
governments.
I simply do not know of a place in the world where Americans are more
popular than central Europe; more popular than they are in America at
times even.
But, Mr. President, you cannot be in central Europe and not
experience the warmth of people who love, admire, and respect freedom
and independence, who are grateful to the United States for championing
freedom and independence, who want to be like Americans in many, many
ways.
I think to most Americans would be shocked if they realized how we
have treated those people who looked at us so eagerly and with so much
affection, and so much thanks and so much hope of making their
countries like America; so much hope of bringing freedom to their
countries.
What are the facts? The facts are that when the Iron Curtain fell and
those countries developed new governments, we did not react to them as
we had reacted to Western Europe at the end of World War II.
I will remind Senators what happened. At the end of World War II when
[[Page S7135]]
Western Europe had problems, we did a couple of things because of
concern about their future and the future of the freedom and democracy
there.
First, we opened our markets to them and ensured that they had a way
to earn their way out of the incredible destruction and poverty that
they were in.
The second thing we brought forth was assistance to them to provide
the emergency needs and help give them a boost to get things started
again.
Mr. President, I do not think anyone would doubt that those efforts
were helpful. We can debate whether or not we did too much, or too
little, whether we gave it to the right or wrong country, whether we
gave it the right way or the wrong way. Those are legitimate questions
and ought to be debated. The key point is we came forward at a time of
need and we ensured that their spark of freedom survived and grew, and
democracy is greater and stronger in the world because we did it.
I hope that the distinguished Senator who offers this amendment and
others who may be tempted to join him will look at the contrast of how
the Central Europeans were treated versus the way the Western Europeans
were treated, where we came forward and opened our markets to them and
gave them a chance to earn their way out of the dire circumstances they
were in. The Western European powers said they were going to study for
5 or 10 or 20 years whether or not Central European countries will be
let into Common Market.
Western European countries went through hell. When they went through
hell, we opened our markets to them. Now Western Europe says they are
going to study for a long, long period of time whether they will let
Central European countries into the Common Market.
That is not right. It is in our interest, in the interest of freedom-
loving people around the world to see Central Europe do well. To think
of selfish subsidies and self-interests at a time when we ought to be
opening the world of opportunity to them is wrong.
Second, when Western Europe was threatened, we joined our arms with
them. We offered them NATO, and we volunteered to stand side by side
with them and not only carry our share of the burden, but to do even
more. And what did the Western European countries do? When Central
Europe asked to join NATO, they decided to study it.
This Congress has acted on this issue. Three years ago, we passed the
NATO Participation Act I, and it was meant to address the questions
that are brought up in the amendment of Senator Nunn and others. It was
done because the administration was dragging its feet and turning its
back on the cry of those free people for help and assistance and
participation.
These are proud people. They are not coming and asking for a handout.
They are coming and asking to be our friends, to be our comrades, to be
our allies, and to stand with us--in the words of Americans, to pledge
their lives and their sacred honor in a joint enterprise with us.
I suppose you can turn the back of your hand to people like that, but
I think they at least deserve an answer. What this country has done and
what some Western European countries have done is turn their back on
them, not even given them the courtesy of an answer.
It was this Senator's belief, and I know it is not shared by all
Senators that the administration was very slow to respond to the
situation in Central Europe. As Western Europe and the United States
have been slow to embrace the freedom-loving people of Central Europe,
the forces of totalitarianism in those countries have had a new boost
of strength at the ballot box.
I have listened to Ambassadors and Members of Parliament from
countries all across Central Europe. They ask me, where we should be
aligned? Who should we be close to? Who do we work with? Where is our
future? And they are shocked to find that America and Western Europe
are slow to embrace them and slow to want them to be part of us. They
want to go West. They want to be part of the free world. They want to
stand up with us to protect against totalitarianism.
These people, who love Americans so much, are confused and puzzled at
our slowness in allowing them to stand with us in NATO and are almost
mystified at the slowness and reluctance of the Europeans to allow them
into the Common Market. It is almost as if all these years we thought
of them as an enemy, and when they want to join our side, we will not
let them.
Some people have said we have to consider the cost. We have to figure
out whether it is in our interest. We have to look at this detail and
that detail and this detail.
That was 5 years ago. Three years ago, we finally passed a bill that
required those things to be addressed, the NATO Participation Act I,
because the administration had not done its work and because this
Congress had not done its work. Last year, we passed the NATO
Participation Act II to urge the project on further.
I want Members to ask themselves this: Toward the end of World War II
there was something of a coup or an overthrow of the Government in
Italy. Italy, which had been fighting against us and with the Nazis,
switched sides, declared war on Germany and joined the Allies' cause.
How much did it cost to have Italy join us? Was it to our advantage
to have hundreds of thousands of troops that had been fighting us to
change sides and join us? I suppose some people could come and say we
ought to have studied that seriously. But I do not think it would take
too many people very long to figure out that it is much better to have
hundreds of thousands of troops that were opposed to you on your side.
Is it an advantage to have Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary
on our side, pledged to help defend our freedom with the potential of
very valuable bases and hundreds of thousands of service men and women
willing to help defend our freedom rather than the other side? I do not
think, with all due respect, it takes a genius to figure out that is a
plus, not a minus.
Reference is made here to a study as to what could be spent in terms
of the defense of that area. Mr. President, you can spend any amount
you want. The question comes back to two things. Is it better to have
them on our side rather than opposed to us? Of course. And maybe most
importantly of all, what is the cost if we do not do it? How do they
react to the slap in the face that says, ``We do not want to stand with
you''?
What is the cost if we again fail to recognize that area as part of
the sphere of influence of other powers? I submit to Members that the
cost is very heavy, indeed, and far outweighs any other.
Last, let me simply say this. I do not know how any American can
review the history of what went on when the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany invaded Poland and free men and women failed to understand that
our freedom was in part dependent on their freedom. I do not know how
we can ignore that history. I do not know how anyone could ignore what
happened when this country guaranteed the freedom of the Polish
underground if they would negotiate with the Soviets and then refused
to even speak up on their behalf when they were arrested and tried and
sentenced to death, even though we had asked them to surrender. I do
not know how any American can look at the history of what happened in
the cold war and see the flame of freedom snuffed out in Poland during
the 1940's by the Soviets and not feel a twinge of horror that another
40 or 50 years of enslavement followed.
I do not know how we as a country can turn our back on freedom in
central Europe, and so I look forward to working with the Senator from
Georgia. I hope very much this can be resolved, but I do know one
thing. I do know that stalling and delay in endless reports and endless
studies and a Mississippi literacy test to get into NATO are not the
answer.
Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise, I might say with regret, to
oppose the amendment introduced by the Senator from Georgia, now
temporarily laid aside. I rise with regret because I have such respect
for the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Nunn. But on this issue I
respectfully disagree. I associate myself with the eloquent remarks of
the Senator from Colorado. The questions
[[Page S7136]]
raised by the amendment introduced by the Senator from Georgia and
others are important questions. They go to the heart of this great
opportunity, challenge, and debate that is coming on the question of
NATO enlargement.
I certainly agree this body has to consider all these questions. But
I feel very strongly that this is not the right time nor is it the
right bill on which to carry out this debate. Let me state clearly from
the outset where I stand. I believe a strong transatlantic partnership
serves America's interests. For reasons of history and economy, war or
instability in Europe inevitably harms American interests. In this
century alone, the United States has fought two world wars and the cold
war, all of which had their origins in Europe.
Today, we are involved in a conflict in the former Yugoslavia,
keeping the peace, helping to provide the ground on which a country can
regain its feet after the slaughter and aggression it suffered, in
Europe. There, as part of an international implementation force, we are
again expressing what is a basic fact of American history, which is
that what happens in Europe matters to us. That is part of what NATO is
all about.
We are now developing a consensus, slowly, methodically--too slowly,
frankly, for some, including this Senator--but a consensus moving
forward, nonetheless, in the United States and with our allies and
like-minded countries of Europe, on the future of the North Atlantic
alliance, this extraordinarily successful alliance often referred to as
the most successful defensive alliance in the history of the world. In
fact, NATO did deter Soviet aggression, the prospect of Soviet
aggression westward into Europe throughout the course of the cold war.
I hope, over the coming months, we will be able to work together,
Democrats and Republicans, the President and Congress, to advance the
adaptation as well as the enlargement of NATO to meet the challenges of
the post-cold-war world.
The amendment before us raises questions. But I do think it also
expresses the underlying skepticism of its sponsors about either the
idea of enlarging NATO or the pace of NATO enlargement. The amendment,
however, does not express the views of many of us in this body who have
thought through the same issues and come, respectfully, to a different
conclusion. That is why I rise in opposition to the amendment.
In my view, we must look to the future and expand the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in two significant ways. I think we need to deepen
this great partnership to develop a reliable coalition of like-minded
countries to share the burdens of maintaining international security
and we need to enlarge NATO by admitting new democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe to full membership.
I believe we should enlarge NATO for two basic reasons. The first I
will call moral. Senator Brown referred to this. Throughout the cold
war, we promised these nations our support to achieve freedom and
democracy. The millions of people who come together to form these
nations were forced to live under the yoke of Soviet dictatorship. And
we reached out to them and tried to give them encouragement during
those years. We referred to them as ``captive nations.'' That is a term
that seems so wonderfully dated today. Today they are no longer
captive. They are free and independent. They are working their way to
strengthen democracy, market economies, freedom, full expression,
better lives for their citizens. The question is whether we will
remember this promise we made to them, that if only they would persist
through the dark years of Soviet domination, Communist domination, we
would greet them, we would embrace them, we would stand with them. So I
think we owe these people the opportunity to join with us in this
alliance of free nations.
The second reason I believe NATO should be expanded is strategic. By
enlarging NATO to include the free and democratic states in Central and
Eastern Europe, we can help to ensure the stability and security of
Europe. NATO is often viewed as a defensive alliance, because of the
cold war history, an alliance to defend its members against the threat,
that then existed, of Soviet movement across Western Europe. The fact
is, NATO from the beginning, and particularly today in the post-cold-
war world, has a second and I would say today much more important
purpose, which is to serve as a body in which the potential conflicts
among its members are moderated and defused. That is the role it has
played and that is the role it will continue to play, once these
fledgling democracies and market economies of Central and Eastern
Europe reach the plateau which will be established, at which they can
join NATO. That is the role NATO will play for them as well.
Secretary General Solana, the Secretary General of NATO, was here
earlier this week and he made a very important point, which is that one
of the standards for membership in NATO will be not only the extent to
which human rights are recognized in the potential NATO member, not
only the extent its market economy is flourishing, not only its
military capacity to participate in the NATO alliance, et cetera, but
also the extent to which it has eliminated conflicts with its
neighbors. That is a precondition of joining NATO. Conflicts between,
for instance, Hungary and Romania over the rights of ethnic
minorities--it seems to me one of the preconditions of membership in
NATO will be for those countries, if they are to be considered, to
resolve those conflicts. And that is a perfect indication of the way in
which NATO has had an internal purpose, to preserve stability in
Europe. It is important to remember that the members of NATO have, in a
very profound sense, given up the use or threat of force in
relationship to each other. That is clearly at the heart of our hopes
for continued stability in Europe in the post-cold-war world.
While some Russians view NATO enlargement as a threat, NATO is a
defensive alliance. NATO, as an organization to maintain the peace
among its own members, does not pose any risk to Russian security. We
are going to have to work hard to make this point to some of those
among our friends in Russia. We have to work hard, but we can do it, to
make it clear that NATO already has established and wants to build on a
friendly and peaceful relationship with the new post-cold-war Russia.
The NATO enlargement process is moving forward, thanks to leadership
from President Clinton, Secretary General Solana, and a host of leaders
in both parties in this country. Senator Dole is, obviously, a strong
supporter of NATO enlargement, and others in Europe are strong
supporters as well. The study agreed to by the NATO defense ministers
last December provides, I think, a generally sound basis for the
admission of new members. This is not moving precipitously, it is
moving very methodically--in fact too slowly for some of us. The
individualized dialogues with interested countries, an important stage
in the process, are now underway.
Mr. President, I am concerned that the amendment offered by the
Senator from Georgia to mandate yet another study would have the effect
of delaying the NATO enlargement process already underway.
The requirements of the study in the amendment before us seem to
emphasize only the costs and commitments that the United States would
undertake and the anticipated impact on Russia. These questions, if I
may say so with respect, seem to be the questions of an attorney in a
courtroom leading the witness.
In another sense, Senator Brown has referred to this as a literacy
test, as a pre-civil-rights-era literacy test that used to be applied
to respective African-American voters in the South with the intention
of denying them the opportunity to vote. I am afraid the effect of
these questions will lead to a conclusion that there are not going to
be any countries joining NATO in the near future, and that is a result
that I am opposed to.
It is possible, as has been suggested by the Senator from Colorado
and the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from Georgia, that
discussions can be carried on that would alter or at least broaden the
nature of the questions. Some of these questions ought to ask about the
positive effects, of which there are many, in expanding NATO: standing
true to American principles of human rights that we expressed so often
during the cold war, creating a kind of burdensharing for ourselves
that NATO has represented.
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NATO for us, more and more, means that we are not going to be called
on to be the sole policeman of the world. Remember what happened in the
gulf war. We did not have to fight that conflict alone; our allies from
NATO were with us. They are with us in Bosnia today. Years into the
future, as we worry about continued security and stability in the
Middle East and in Asia, I think our allies in NATO will provide an
opportunity to share the burdens and cost of world leadership that the
United States would otherwise be called upon to expend.
The point is this: The process is underway under which Ministers of
the member nations of NATO will meet in December to make some key
decisions about how to enlarge the alliance. We cannot forego that
opportunity while we await the results of another study.
I will say two things. Perhaps it is worth trying to alter these
questions to make them more balanced. My preference, frankly, is that
this amendment be defeated, because I think it confuses an ongoing
process. In some ways, it begins to tie the hands of the President and
the executive branch. These are all questions that, should there be a
decision in NATO to enlarge, will come back to this floor for a great
debate, because no one can automatically be added to NATO without the
Senate of the United States--this body--being asked to ratify an
amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty alliance by a two-thirds vote.
So I say these questions are preliminary.
The first choice would be we defeat the amendment. Second, perhaps we
could work on some questions and withdraw others to make it a more
balanced series of questions.
Third, I hope we make it clear, and I hope within the text of the
amendment that these questions are not intended to delay in any way the
process that is now going on in NATO, meeting in December, a presumed
summit to occur sometime in the first 6 months of 1997, to formally
continue the process of NATO enlargement.
If we are going to go forward in the spirit of compromise, let us
make it clear it is not intended to inhibit the President or his
designees in any way in what they will do between now and when the
study will come forward.
I see other colleagues on the floor. I have spoken at length. It is
an important issue. It is an issue we are going to debate and we ought
to debate in the interest of our national security. Respectfully, I do
not think this is the right time to have this debate or adopt this
resolution, and I will vote against it, certainly, as it is before us
at the current time.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
Mr. SIMON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I join in questioning this amendment. I say
to my colleague from Georgia, for whom I have great respect--I notice
the Senate staffers were asked by Washingtonian magazine which Senator
retiring would be missed the most, and the person who came out first in
that contest was Sam Nunn. I agree with that assessment.
I was home grabbing a bite to eat. We just live about 10 minutes from
here, and I heard Senator Nunn speak and Senator McCain. I hope the
Senator from Colorado will forgive me, but as soon as he got up to
speak, I got in my car to come down here and heard the end of Senator
Lieberman's comments.
The point that Senator McCain made that this is ill-timed, I think,
is appropriate, and I hope my colleague from Georgia will think about
deferring this amendment until we get to the foreign ops bill after the
election.
This is an emotional issue in Russia. You can argue that it should
not be an emotional issue, but the people in Russia were told year
after year after year by the propaganda machine that NATO represents a
military threat, and even though the Soviet dictatorial apparatus is
gone, that fear of NATO is there. It is an emotional issue in Russia.
For those who say, ``Well, emotions shouldn't govern decisions on
foreign relations,'' take a look at--and I know many of my colleagues
will disagree with me on this--take a look at what the United States is
doing vis-a-vis Cuba. Our policy in Cuba is clearly a reaction to
national passion rather than national interest. We could not have
devised a policy ultimately that is more favorable to Castro than the
policy that we designed. So in Russia, you have an emotional reaction
to NATO.
The amendment that is before us is tilted. There is just no question
about it. I have enough confidence in the Senator from Georgia that if
this were to be withdrawn and then some of us get together before we
have the foreign ops bill and try to fashion something, I think we can
do it.
I will add here, I think there are ways of defusing this a little bit
in Eastern Europe. The President of the Parliament of Belarus was here
about 10 days ago and visited with me. One of the things he said to me
was, ``I hope you don't permit NATO to be expanded. It's a very
emotional issue in Belarus.''
I said, ``What if we were to say that nuclear weapons could not be
based in any of the additional countries that come into NATO?"
He said, ``That would be a very different thing. That would make it
much more acceptable.''
Frankly, because nuclear weapons can reach anyplace in a matter of
minutes today, militarily it is not necessary.
I think some compromises can be worked out. Let me just add, for
anyone from the Russian Embassy who is interested who may be listening,
I think this is in the best long-term interest of Russia. Yes, I am
concerned about Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary and the other
Central European governments.
I had the privilege, some of you may recall, of being the chief
sponsor of the bill to provide aid for Poland in 1989, right after the
change there. It has been dramatic. I have been in touch with the
situation in Poland for some time. They have fears. Whether they are
legitimate or not, that is a matter of judgment, but they have fears of
their neighbor to the east.
Ultimately, the great threat that Russia faces militarily is from
China, not from the West. I hope when we have a more stable democracy
in Russia--and Russia is moving in that direction, clearly--I hope
Russia can become a member of NATO. But I think to adopt this amendment
right now is not in our interest.
Frankly, I do not think even having a vote on this amendment right
now is in our interest. I think--and I again have a huge respect for my
colleague from Georgia, who is one of the giants of this body--but I
think it would be much better to consider this after the Russian
election, the runoff election, which is not that many days off. But if
we have to vote, I will vote for a substitute or vote against this
amendment. I yield the floor.
Mr. BRADLEY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment
offered by the Senator from Georgia. I think this amendment is vitally
important to prevent us from precipitously going down the path of NATO
expansion without considering the consequences.
This amendment forces us to ask the who and the when, to take a hard
look at the consequence of NATO's expansion before we leap. I and many
in this body are absolutely thrilled by the dramatic geopolitical
changes in the last several years. The end of communism as far as an
active, vital, dominant force in the landmass of the Soviet Union is a
startling development. The breakup of the Soviet Union itself was a
startling development.
When the cold war ended, it thrust the United States, Russia, the
former republics of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and
our NATO allies all into uncharted waters.
As long as the Soviet Union existed, the United States-Soviet rivalry
was defined as an era in fundamentally ideological terms. It was the
prominent feature of the international system in a bipolar world, and
it was the primary justification for NATO, one of the two treaties--the
other with Japan--that governed our sovereign commitments to allies
around the world, commitments that required us to send American troops
to defend the nations with whom we had made the treaty.
Now the Soviet Union no longer exists. We are in a period of
transition. As a result, NATO in particular is redefining its role in
the world, in a world without the Soviet Union, which was the pretext
for its founding. But just as NATO is trying to redefine its role in
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the world, so Russia itself is struggling to redefine its future. It is
in the midst of that redefinition period now, in the midst of a
Presidential election.
In early May, I was in Moscow. I arrived the day that there were
30,000 or 40,000 supporters of Mr. Zyuganov in the streets, with red
flags, pictures of Lenin, the whole thing, parading for their
candidate. That same day I drove past the park and saw a candidate up
on a big platform speaking, with great speakers, and four our five
generals with ribbons standing next to him.
I said, ``Who's that?'' They said, ``Zyuganov.'' I said, ``Stop.'' I
and a Republican colleague melded into the crowd. I know the Chair
might think it is difficult for me to meld into any crowd, but we did
so. And I asked our interpreter, ``What is he saying?'' The interpreter
said, ``He has just said that the German-Israeli-American conspiracy to
destroy Russia will not succeed if I am elected President.'' To which
my response was, ``Well, at least we were third.''
Indeed, he did not make a successful showing in the Presidential
election. The first round has been held. Mr. Zyuganov and Mr. Yeltsin
are in a final runoff that will be decided in the next several days.
Russia is in a period of redefinition. It is beginning to say--will
it cast its lot more in the direction of democracy, market reform,
moving into integration into the world economic and political system,
or will it once again retreat to a more isolationist position in the
world?
So the Presidential elections in Russia are very much about all this.
As Russia defines itself internally, what kind of system it wants, what
kind of democracy it wants, Russia will also continue to redefine
itself in relation to both the West and the East. It has grave concerns
and worries about China. It is very concerned about Turkish influence
in a lot of the Central Asian republics.
It has much less concern about the West. The war of ideology is over.
There is no reason for them to fear the West. We know that. They see
where their geopolitical worries are, to the south and to the east.
They are now in the process of not only redefining themselves
internally but also externally. In this process the nature of those
relationships are not a foregone conclusion.
The Eastern European countries that are seeking NATO membership are
also in a process of transition. They have turned their backs on Soviet
Russian influence and are firmly allying themselves with the West. We
welcome that. We want them to be integrated into the West. We want them
to become a member of the European Community. We want them to be a part
of a Western future. They want to integrate as quickly as possible to
get the economic benefits as well as the promise of greater security.
So, Mr. President, as we consider NATO's expansion against this
backdrop of sweeping change, of redefinition in the West as well as the
East, I think we have to be honest about what we hope and what we can
realistically expect to accomplish.
First, on the issue of increased security and stability, the primary
rationale voiced by the proponents of NATO enlargement is that it will
increase security and stability in Europe.
How that can be accomplished, though, in real terms has yet to be
explained. Achieving stability is a long-term process that will require
strategic dialogue with all parties. It will also require the
completion of the fundamental economic and political reform process
that the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are still
undergoing. This is not going to happen overnight. It is far from
certain that NATO's immediate expansion will promote either of those
tasks.
In fact, NATO expansion is likely to cut off or possibly even
polarize a strategic dialog between the West and Russia about Turkey or
about Asia or about where they perceive their threats coming from.
Further, NATO enlargement is not an automatic guarantee of security,
particularly, as this amendment suggests, as many important questions
related to membership enlargement of NATO have yet to be answered,
particularly with regard to the effect that enlargement will have on
NATO itself, including its nuclear posture and its security guarantees.
Indeed, an expanded NATO is probably no more likely to respond
militarily to an invasion of Eastern Europe than an unexpanded NATO.
If we consider these countries sufficiently vital to our interest,
the West will act without a treaty; if we do not consider them vital,
no treaty is going to force a President to send American troops into
the region.
Nor will NATO's expansion guarantee the vital political and economic
reform that is a prerequisite to security. You can have a lot of
military armor deployed forward, a nuclear deterrent, and if you have
an economy crumbling, because the comparative advantages available in
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia cannot bring full fruit because the
Western Europeans will block all their products from being imported
into the markets of the West, it is a hollow victory.
In fact, one might argue that NATO expansion enlargement may hinder
such reform by encouraging the diversion of limited resources in these
countries to military modernization rather than to economic
development.
Mr. President, it is important we also try to think through before we
take this step. The amendment, I think, forces this thinking process.
What does it say about Russia? We have to be honest about the role of
Russia, both in our motivation toward expanding NATO and in our
assessment of the potential stabilizing or destabilizing effect of
enlargement.
First, the motivation. Despite protestations to the contrary by some
policymakers and NATO itself in its enlargement study, fears of Russian
aggressiveness are clearly a significant motivating force behind NATO
expansion. That is a legitimate feeling on the part of the peoples of
Eastern Europe because they were dominated, occupied, by a Soviet Army
for 45 years. Naturally, they have a fear, but to assuage those fears,
do we want to jump headlong before we consider some of the larger
strategic questions?
I think this fear of Russian aggressiveness is obviously the case for
these Eastern European countries seeking enlargement immediately. It
could very well be the motivating force for many Western policymakers.
What is the effect? While NATO's own study and others downplay the
effect of NATO expansion on Russia, it is clear to even the most casual
observer that NATO's enlargement is viewed as a threat by Russia,
particularly given that those who would expand NATO are seeking to do
so because of their fears of Russian aggressiveness reasserting itself
as if it were a genetic quality.
Russia's view of NATO expansion is not surprising when one looks at
the post-cold-war world from a Russian vantage point. Russia has been
stripped of its empire, gone the way of new republics, new countries,
and is but one of 15 countries--the largest, but one of 15--in the
former Soviet space. By expanding the West's military bloc--and that is
what NATO is, that is why it was formed, that is what its primary
funding is, let's be honest--by expanding the West's military bloc
along its borders, Russia could not help but feel boxed in by an
organization whose primary aim for most of its existence has been to
act as a shield against a potentially aggressive Soviet Union.
If expansion is accelerated, a threatened and increasingly
nationalistic Russia may further isolate itself from the West, and the
prophecy about Russian aggressiveness could easily become a self-
fulfilling one. I think that is unlikely because of the economic
circumstance in Russia.
However, immediate NATO expansion enlargement gives a pretext for
those who would play on those fears and those who would stir that pot.
We need to think about this and ask some tough questions.
If expansion is accelerated, a threatened and increasingly
nationalistic Russia may further, as I said, isolate itself from the
rest of the world. The hopes of Russia's implementation of START I or
the ratification of START II would become increasingly remote. Tensions
could increase. NATO's immediate enlargement will not solve our
security concerns. Indeed, I believe it is very possible that it could
heighten them.
Rather than isolating Russia, we should seek to engage Russia and
others in a long-term strategic dialog about what they perceive to be
their
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security concerns. If we engage that dialog without a precipitous
action of enlargement in that dialog, it will become clear that their
concerns are more oriented toward China and to the Turkish activity in
the former republics of central Asia than it is to the West,
particularly NATO, particularly Western Europe, and certainly Eastern
Europe.
Mr. President, I think we should work to reduce the threat of nuclear
weapons by ensuring implementation of START I and START II, but I have
some reservations about precipitously expanding NATO at the expense of
our own national security. Our consideration of these concerns is not,
as proponents of enlargement like to argue, the result of Russia
bullying the United States or NATO. It is in our own self-interest to
consider the impact that enlargement would have on Russia. It is in our
own interest to do this. If the purpose of NATO expansion is to
increase security, our security, obviously, its destabilizing impact on
Russian-NATO and Russian-United States relations need to be a part of
that analysis.
What about the effect on NATO and U.S. participation in NATO?
Finally, we have to be honest about the effect of enlargement, as I
said, on NATO itself and on the increased responsibilities it will
entail for the United States.
Enlargement could have significant repercussions for how NATO
operates. I do not think these issues have been actually explored. That
is really the purpose of the amendment of the distinguished Senator
from Georgia.
Enlargement will also require NATO to devote less energy to important
reforms, helping it to adopt to the realities of the post-cold-war
world, and the enlargement will impose even greater responsibilities
and costs on the United States without any serious assessment of
whether such responsibilities and costs are in the United States'
interest.
Mr. President, as the foregoing illustrates, NATO expansion is not an
easy issue. It is a quick fix, a form of what I call ``cold war lite,''
that is likely to cause a lot more harm than good. It is more a
leftover from cold war thinking than it is a rethinking of U.S.
security interests worldwide. It is more a predictable human response
to the call to assuage the worries and historical concerns of our
friends in Eastern Europe than it is a longer term view of how to
guarantee their security over time.
Mr. President, I have serious concerns about precipitously rushing
into NATO expansion. At a minimum, we should ask some difficult
questions and take the time to study the issue seriously. I think that
is precisely what the amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia
requires.
I support the amendment fully. It is his amendment to decide how to
pursue in the remaining hours. If he chooses to have a vote, I will be
for it. If he chooses to wait and have a vote a little bit later, I
will be for it then.
It is enormously important that we ask the questions before we leap
and find we have precipitated a response that will create less
security, not more security, for the very countries to whom the
enlargement is expected to give greater security.
So, Mr. President, I support the amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I know there is a good-faith effort to now
see if we can draft some additional language, or perhaps some
substitute language for some of this amendment. I am certainly pleased
to work with my friend from Arizona and others on that approach.
I am a bit curious, though, how a vote on an amendment that is asking
what it is going to cost to expand NATO and how much the American
taxpayers are going to pay--that that information is tilted. I do not
quite understand that logic. I really do not understand the logic that
says that we do not want to know what the strategy is going to be as we
expand the defense alliance that involves possible commitment of
American forces and the possible--in fact, automatic, if there is an
article V protection for full NATO members, an automatic basic nuclear
umbrella being extended, meaning that we are willing to, in an extreme
situation, use nuclear weapons, if we have to, to defend our allies.
That is a serious undertaking.
I am not sure why there is any reluctance to ask the President to
tell us what the strategy is. Is that something we do not want to know?
If he cannot give us the complete strategy, and if he says there are
certain contingencies, fine, that is what he will answer. But why
should we be afraid to ask the question? I am not sure why we would not
want to ask the question of whether it is going to involve
prepositioning American equipment and how much that is going to cost.
Why would we not want to know the answer to that?
I am not sure why we would not want to know the answer to whether air
forces are going to be involved, or whether there is going to be
forward stationing of ground forces. Are we really going to expand the
alliance and not ask ourselves those questions? I am puzzled.
I am not sure why we would not want to know the extent to which
prospective new NATO members have achieved, or are expected to achieve,
interoperability of their military equipment, air defense systems, and
command, control, and communications systems and conformity of military
doctrine with those of NATO.
That is the purpose of the Partnership for Peace. That is what they
have been doing for the last 3 years. Why are we reluctant to ask the
question? I am not sure why we would not want to know the extent to
which the new NATO members have established democratic institutions,
free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces,
including parliamentary oversight of military affairs and appointment
of civilians to senior defense position, and the rule of law.
Is there reluctance to find out or get the assessment of the
President of the United States sometime next year, giving him plenty of
time? This is not something we are going to have answers to tomorrow or
the next day. It is not going to come until January of next year.
One of our colleagues said that, of course, the answers would vary as
to whether Mr. Zyuganov is elected or Mr. Yeltsin is elected.
Precisely. I would assume that any President would take that into
account before they filed a report next January. If they did not, then
I would be amazed. Certainly, the circumstances will make a difference.
I do not know why we would not want to know the extent to which the
prospective new NATO members are committed to protecting the rights of
all of their citizens, including national minorities.
Is there someone that does not want to ask that question? Is that a
painful question to ask? I know the Senator from Connecticut made the
statement--and I think he is right--that one advantage of NATO is to
keep the countries from having armed conflict with each other.
Certainly, that is the case, I think, in the case of two allies, Greece
and Turkey. Their membership in NATO has helped prevent that--although
the animosities are, unfortunately, still present.
Why would we not want to know something about the treatment of
national minorities? It seems to me that was a fundamental question
that should have been asked by our allies and the United States of the
newly emerging states in the former Yugoslavia before we recognized
them. We should have asked the question about their treatment of
minorities and their respect for human rights and their rule of law.
Is there really a sentiment in the Senate that we do not want to know
the answer to that question, or we do not even want to ask it? Is that
tilting? It does not seem to me that it is.
Is there somebody who does not want to ask the question whether the
prospective new NATO members are in a position to further the
principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the
security of the North Atlantic area? Is that a painful question? Is
this some kind of inside-the-beltway steamroller that is going so
strong with people, having taken positions
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about NATO expansion and not asking these questions, that we cannot ask
them now? What is going on?
Are the American people not entitled to know what it is going to
cost? Are they entitled to know whether we are going to forward deploy
our forces? Are they entitled to know whether we are going to
preposition our equipment? Or are they at least entitled to have the
President tell the Congress what we are going to do in terms of
strategy? Some of it may be classified. Is that something that we are
going to do, put blinders on and say, let us charge out and see who can
take the strongest stance and expand NATO the quickest, without asking
questions? Is that what our colleagues are concerned about?
I know that there are people who have taken the position we should
expand NATO. I think there is a case that we should. I, myself, believe
we should expand NATO. I believe that the logical step, though, as the
Senator from New Jersey said so well, is to make sure that countries
which are not now under military threat secure their economy and their
political system.
I really find it a little puzzling that some of our European
colleagues could say it is too difficult to expand the European
Community. They need access to trade. What they need is markets. It is
too difficult to decide whether we are going to let new countries in
that grow vegetables and they might ship them across the border. It is
easier for the US. to extend a nuclear guarantee. I mean, we can be the
country that decides that question, but we do not want to ask the
question.
I mean, is it really harder to open up markets and let countries that
are newly emerging and need the markets--is it harder to give them
access than it is to extend a nuclear guarantee, saying that if there
is a war, we would go even to the extent, in extreme situations, of
using nuclear weapons?
Are we basically saying that politicians cannot deal with economic
issues; let us all turn it over to the military?
I favor a logical sequence of expansion of NATO. I think it makes all
sorts of sense as the European Community expands to take those new
members, and, if they meet NATO standards to give them serious
consideration for membership, then I think in most cases they would be
eligible for membership.
I also think if there is a threat that we ought to be willing to
respond to that threat where it makes sense militarily and where we can
be effective militarily. If the Russians elect an extremist or
nationalist who decides they are going to rebuild the threat against
Central Europe, of course, we ought to be alert to that. The difference
now though is that--in the cold war we may have had 15 days of warning
time or we may have had 3 months warning time of any kind of attack--
now all of our intelligence and military people would tell us we have
years of warning time; years of warning time before any kind of threat
to certainly some of the countries that we are talking about taking in.
Does anyone really not want to ask the question, and ask the
President to think before we agree to immediate expansion of NATO, of
the effect on Ukraine? If you look at the map, Ukraine geographically
may be the most vulnerable and may be the most important country to
retain its sovereignty. But if they are not going to be in the first
tier, not going to be part of NATO but we expand NATO and nationalism
kicks up in Russia in response to it and they start basically putting
pressure on Ukraine, are we ready to deal with that, or do we not want
to ask that question?
Is that one that is too hard to ask? Should we restrain ourselves and
not ask it because it might be a hard question?
What about the Baltics? What about the countries that have been
suppressed for years and years by the former Soviet Union that are now
not only building their own sovereignty but are doing pretty well in
democracy, and in their economy? If they get left out of the NATO
expansion in the first round, are they likely to come under real
pressure from a nationalistic kind of response in Russia? Is this
something we do not want to think about? Do we want to just say let us
not think about it?
Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to work out language. I think
there are some questions that can be added to this.
Certainly it seems to me that every question in here is relevant, and
every question in here I would be appalled if I did not think the
President of the United States leading our country as Commander in
Chief had thought through these questions before we make the final
decisions. I would be appalled if I did not think NATO had thought
through them.
I know they have not all been thought through now. I understand that.
But by the time NATO makes these decisions, if they do not ask
themselves these questions, and if our leadership in the Congress does
not ask these questions, and if the President does not ask these
questions, then we are not fulfilling our constitutional obligation to
the American people.
Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to work with people on this
amendment. I find it a little bit puzzling that the argument is being
made that this amendment asking the questions might place some adverse
effect on the Russian elections when we are asking the questions but a
NATO expansion amendment that pushes forward with it that is put on the
Foreign Relations appropriations bill today has no bearing.
One amendment--this one--asks the questions. How could that have an
adverse effect on the Russian elections when NATO let us expand quickly
and let us pick out the members by a legislative fiat amendment,
basically which is put on the Foreign Relations Committee bill the same
day? I find that also puzzling.
Mr. President, these are all questions that need to be asked. I will
not be here when this debate takes place next year, or whenever it
takes place, on the NATO expansion. But I will be watching the debate
as will other people all over this country, and I will certainly hope
that all of these questions would have not only been asked but also to
the best extent possible been answered.
You cannot forecast every scenario and every possible type of
conflict. But that does not mean you do not have a strategy.
Is the NATO strategy something we cannot talk about? For 45 years we
have had a strategy in NATO. The first report out of the U.S. Senate
was on NATO's strategy; a critique of it. It was not classified. We had
a strategy. We had a strategy of forward defense. America has had a
strategy for years not only of conventional deterrence in NATO that was
avowed, but we had a declared open strategy of being willing to use
nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack. That was not a
secret. Maybe somebody did not know it. But we had that as a strategy.
That was part of our strategy. If the NATO alliance were overwhelmed
with conventional weapons, we reserved the right by declaration of
being the first ones to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to
that. That was our strategy; an open declared strategy.
Now are we going to expand NATO and not have a strategy? Is that what
we are being told? If so, then I dissent.
NATO has to have a strategy. That is why when the politicians start
telling the military, ``OK. Folks, it is too hard to talk about
economic expansion. It is too hard to talk about access to markets.
Those are tough questions. But you go out and you expand and give these
military guarantees, and we are not going to ask any hard questions
about how you are going to do it.''
Well, if we ever have to do it, if there is ever a threat and we have
to respond, we will demand that our military have thought through that
strategy, and any of them who have not in leadership positions would be
properly criticized. They would not have fulfilled their duty, and they
know that. That is why they are busy scratching their heads with these
questions, and basically trying to figure some of them out when we may
be reluctant to even ask them to think about it.
Mr. President, I find it puzzling. But I am sure that we can continue
to work and perhaps work out some language on this. I can assure my
colleagues, if we do not work out language now, we will be revisiting
this issue this year because at least I am determined that we have a
framework--a kind of framework that the American people have every
right to expect of us where the Congress of the United States will be
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called on to ratify this treaty, this expansion of the NATO alliance.
We will be called on to ratify it, and I think our constituents--the
American people--have every right to expect that we will be asking
these questions and that President Clinton, or President Dole, or
whoever is President, when this decision is made will have asked and
have a projection of the answers to these kinds of questions.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Grams). The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I wanted to just talk for a moment or two
about the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Georgia dealing
with NATO expansion.
Obviously, the immediate step that both NATO and the United States
and Central Europe have talked about is the potential of the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary jointly. There are other countries that
wish to join as well, and in time they will be evaluated and pass the
standards that have already been developed.
While this amendment is put in the framework of asking a whole series
of new studies, I compare it to the old-style Mississippi literacy test
because it is this Senator's belief that they are designed to have the
same effect. That is to take on the pretense of a study or ascertaining
a fact, but in reality to simply flatly prohibit anyone from ever
entering.
I understand that is not the intent of the Senator from Georgia, and
I do not mean to attribute that intent to him, but that is my belief of
its impact.
I wanted to deal specifically with one of the issues raised, and that
is the cost. The amendment discusses a study done by the Congressional
Budget Office as to what it might cost to defend Central Europe. Mr.
President, the question is not the cost of defending Central Europe in
the event of a military conflict. With all due respect, it is the
difference in cost of defending Central Europe if they are part of NATO
and if they are not part of NATO.
You do not have to have a CPA to figure out this question. If 400,000
Polish troops are on your side instead of opposed to you, does it cost
more to defend Central Europe or does it cost less? That is why I feel
this the amendment is so ludicrous. Of course it is better to have
400,000 Polish troops on your side than opposed to you. Of course it is
in your interest to have the Czech Republic on your side rather than
opposed to you. Of course it is in your interest to have Hungary on
your side rather than opposed to you. Does a war cost less if they are
on your side than if they are opposed to you? Of course it does. This
is phrased in the terms of reference of the Congressional Budget
Office--how much more does it cost to do it?
That is stupidity. I am not referring to individuals. I am referring
to concept. The question is not what it costs to defend them. The
question is, what does it cost if we do not defend Central Europe? To
suggest that if you have more allies and more troops and more strength
it is more costly to defend that than with less is not a serious
question. To ask if it increases your cost to have a bigger enemy or a
smaller enemy, I do not think is a serious question.
Now, what is the question? The question is basically this. Do we want
to recognize a sphere of influence by Russia over the future fate and
defense policies of Central Europe? That is the real question that we
have to address. My sense is that if we are clear that they must be
masters of their own destiny, or at least have that option, we put the
question to rest. It would be solved. It would be decided. But if we
leave it open, as has happened the last 4 years, then we invite people
in countries that might want to control Central Europe to imagine that
we would sit idly by and allow them to dictate their future.
Mr. President, if there is a lesson that comes out of World War II,
it is that uncertainty as to your intentions can be devastating at
times. But I hope we will debate that issue, because a sphere of
influence is a reasonable debate. It is an important question. It may
be there are those who think giving others a control, a sphere of
influence over Central Europe is a wise policy that will placate them.
That may well be. There is a case to be made there, a debate to be had.
But to suggest it is less costly to have troops and allies based on the
other side than our side I do not believe is a serious question.
I must say, Mr. President, there is a suggestion here that somehow we
are going to be the ones to pay for the troops in Poland and pay for
the troops in Hungary and pay for the troops in the Czech Republic. No
one from those countries has suggested that. They have not asked for
it. We have not volunteered it. I do not think it makes any sense, nor
should it. But I do think it makes sense for them to be on our side and
not opposed to us.
We have talked about sharing surplus material with them as we do with
other countries around the world. But let me suggest that there is a
real plus in the development of joint material with those countries. It
helps develop a common bond, a bigger production base and more unity,
and I think it is worth pursuing. So I hope we will discuss the issue
and debate it and will move quickly on it. But I think it is a mistake
for us to hold out a hand of friendship and then not answer their
question when they ask to stand side by side with us. If we really want
someone else to have a sphere of influence over them, we ought to be
straightforward enough to say it. I think it would be a bad policy, but
we ought to be straightforward about it. But year after year after year
to say:
Oh yes, we want you as part of NATO but just not this year.
Well, when?
Well, maybe next year. Maybe the year after. We are certainly talking
about the year after that.
These are smart people. They are not foolish. If we treat them that
way they will understand what is happening to them and they will react.
Is it in our interests to give the back of our hand to people who want
to be our friends and allies, our comrades? I do not think so. But we
ought, at least, to be straightforward.
If the question is recognized sphere of influence of other countries
over them, we ought to at least face up to that. But if we think they
should have an opportunity to be independent and free, and this country
stood for that for a long, long time, and we think the addition of
their forces standing side-by-side with ours would make that more
likely to be realized, their freedom and long-term independence, then
we ought to get on with it. We should not play games. A 2- or 3-year
study on top of 4 or 5 years of study is not a way to decrease our
problems.
I yield the floor.
Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I am not sure what our state of affairs
is, but I wonder if I may speak as in morning business for 3 or 4
minutes.
Mr. NUNN. Yes, we are waiting on amendments. There is an amendment
pending, a NATO amendment, my amendment, but it is temporarily laid
aside so if anyone wants to bring a defense-related amendment in we
would welcome it.
In the meantime, we will all be fascinated with the Senator's
remarks.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I appreciate my friend from Georgia. I am sure he will
be fascinated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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