[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 97 (Thursday, June 27, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7128-S7141]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                           Amendment No. 4367

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I want to express my thanks to the 
distinguished Senator from Georgia. We have some difference of opinion 
over the NATO expansion amendment. The Senator has gone out of his way 
to advise me that he was going to offer it, and out of consideration, 
to let me have a copy in advance. And he also was kind enough to adjust 
the time of which he would offer it on the floor to fit my schedule. I 
was tied up in a meeting on Afghanistan I was chairing, and I could not 
be here. I think he exhibits exceptional courtesy. I want to express my 
thanks to the Senator from Georgia for his consideration.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator very much. I look forward to working 
with him. As I mentioned, I have not spoken on this subject yet. But as 
I talked to the Senator from Colorado and the Senator from Arizona, it 
is my intent in this amendment, and the intent of all of us, not to 
tilt this amendment one way or the other, but, rather, to ask the 
questions that need to be asked before we make this very important 
decision about expanding an alliance where we extend article V 
protection. And article V protection includes nuclear protection. That 
is a very serious matter.
  I think we have not started nor has the administration thought 
through nor has NATO thought through some of the tough questions here. 
We all have an obligation to do that. This could be a matter before the 
Senate for ratification of the expansion of the treaty next year.
  So it is my intent to have questions that are tough questions, the 
hard questions, but also fair questions, on both sides. I invite my 
colleagues that may perceive that this is a tilt, one way or the other, 
to work on the language. And I would certainly be amenable to taking a 
look at their suggestions.
  So Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be 
temporarily laid aside. We will continue to work on it. So we are open 
for amendment. I know Senator Thurmond and I, as managers of this bill, 
encourage people to come down with relevant amendments on the defense 
matter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the amendment is laid aside.
  Mr. NUNN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 4367

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in the interest of time, while we are 
waiting on an amendment to be presented, I will go ahead and make my 
remarks on the amendment which was pending and which has been 
temporarily laid aside.
  This amendment has been offered on behalf of myself, Senator 
Hutchison, Senator Bradley, Senator Kassebaum, and Senator Cohen. I 
note at the outset this amendment is not intended to prejudice the case 
for or against NATO enlargement or even the pace at which NATO might 
enlarge.
  The amendment requires the President to submit a report on NATO 
enlargement to the Senate Armed Services Committee and their 
counterpart committee in the House at the same time that the President 
submits the budget request for fiscal year 1998 to the Congress.
  This amendment is designed to provide the information that will 
stimulate a comprehensive and informed discussion in the Congress on 
this important matter. If there are questions that are not in this 
amendment that people on the other side of the aisle or this side think 
should be added, I certainly would be receptive to that.
  Mr. President, there have been a number of editorials and op-ed 
pieces favoring a rapid pace for NATO enlargement. These pieces 
generally focus on two aspects. First, on the positive side, the need 
for greater security for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic so they 
can continue on the road toward democratization and free market 
economies. On the second side is the need to ensure that Russia does 
not have a veto over the process by which NATO decides to enlarge.
  There have also been a number of editorials and op-ed pieces opposing 
NATO enlargement. These opposition pieces tend to focus on the 
potential that NATO enlargement would have to produce the very thing 
that we are trying to prevent; namely, a Russian military threat to 
European security and also the impact it would have on Ukraine, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia if those nations were not included in the first 
stage of NATO enlargement.
  What is missing, however, are a number of other issues that are 
directly involved in NATO enlargement that have not been discussed in 
the various commentary on either side of the issue and that need to be 
carefully considered. This amendment provides for the President's 
report to comprehensively discuss a host of issues. In the interest of 
time, I will mention only a few of the issues for purposes of 
illustration.
  What would the cost be for NATO enlargement and who would pay these 
costs? Certainly that is a question the American people are entitled to 
have us debate and actually examine and present. There ought to be at 
least some projection of that by the administration and by NATO.

[[Page S7129]]

  Incidentally, the Congressional Budget Office has concluded a study 
on the cost of defending the Visegrad countries--that is Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and Poland--over the 15-year period from 1996 through 
2010. That study concludes that the cost would range from $61 billion 
to $125 billion. Whatever part of that range you choose, this is a 
substantial amount of money. It seems to me the Senate of the United 
States is not performing its duty if we do not tell the administration 
we want an answer to this question, at least their best projection, 
before they make a commitment committing this country, which, of 
course, would have to then be ratified by the Senate.

  A second question: Since article V of the North Atlantic Treaty 
provides for a NATO member nation to treat an attack on one as an 
attack on all, what is the general strategy that NATO would adopt to 
defend the potential new member nations, including defense against a 
possible nuclear threat? Do we deploy forces? If so, are our allies 
prepared to join us in that deployment? Would it be American troops in 
those host countries without allies, or will allies join? Which allies 
are willing to join? These are questions that have to be answered.
  The third question: The North Atlantic Council recently decided to 
create more deployable headquarters and more mobile forces to mount 
non-article V operations, as well as traditional collective defense 
missions and to develop a European defense identity within the 
alliance. The question is whether the enlargement of NATO should 
proceed prior to NATO's reorganization of its military command 
structure and the completion of the other actions required to carry out 
these decisions. How is the enlargement going to impact these kinds of 
fundamental changes in NATO beginning to prepare itself to operate out 
of an area, and vice versa?
  The next question is whether an enlarged NATO can continue to 
function on a consensus; that is, a basis of unanimous consent, before 
major decisions are made. Here on the Senate floor we operate by 
unanimous consent. We know sometimes that is difficult. If we expand 
NATO, will we have a two-thirds rule, three-fourths rule, or say any 
nation, including one of the new nations that may come into NATO, would 
be able to veto any decision of NATO? That is a fundamental question 
that NATO, it seems to me, has to answer.
  Another question regards the relationship of prospective new NATO 
members to the European Union and what the impact that gaining NATO 
membership would have on the possibility and timing of such nations 
gaining associate and then full membership in the European Union. What 
is the plan of the European Union? My impression of some of the 
countries is the main thing they need now is not a military protective 
shield but rather an economic expansion, economic trade opportunity and 
the ability to trade with the European nations and with other nations 
in the world. What are the Europeans going to do about opening the 
European Community to these nations? I know the administration is going 
to have to give their best estimate on this. Certainly we cannot speak 
for the Europeans. But at least it is something we ought to consider 
very strongly.
  There is another very important part of this expansion that has not 
been talked about. What about the Conventional Forces Treaty? If we 
expand NATO enlargement, do we have to really do that treaty over? 
Because basically, the CFE Treaty allocated forces and tanks and 
artillery based on the two alliances that then existed. If part of that 
alliance now is on the other side, what does that do to the CFE Treaty? 
Of course, we hope at some point we will be able to say there are no 
sides in Europe, that they are all basically working together in peace, 
but I am not sure we have arrived at that point at this point in time.
  The next question: The anticipated impact of NATO enlargement on 
Russian foreign and defense policies, including the emphasis Russia 
would place on defense planning on nuclear weapons. This at least has 
to be contemplated. Are we going to basically be prepared to respond if 
the Russians decide that they are going to go back to deploying 
tactical nuclear weapons because they do not have conventional defenses 
and if they perceive this enlargement as being a threat? I am hoping 
they will not have that perception as we move forward in this regard, 
but it has to be carefully considered because it will affect 
tremendously our response and the cost and the question of deploying 
American forces. All of these are important questions that need 
answers.

  Another question: The impact a NATO enlargement would have on the 
political, economic, and security well-being of the nations, such as 
Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, if they are not included in 
the first stage of NATO enlargement.
  Mr. President, this is a sampling of the issues that the President 
would report on. I stress once again that this amendment was not 
drafted and is not designed to prejudice the case either for or against 
NATO enlargement or the pace of NATO enlargement, but it does require 
the administration to begin to think through important issues and 
questions, tough questions in my view, and lay them out on the table. 
They need to be on the table so that the Congress and the American 
people can start to consider the matter of NATO enlargement in a 
comprehensive and informed manner.
  If there are other questions that need to be added to this amendment 
that some Members are concerned about, I would be pleased to consider 
that language and to work with my colleagues on that.
  Finally, I would note that the ultimate question that the Senate will 
have to address with respect to the ratification of any agreement to 
enlarge NATO, and that both the Senate and House will have to address 
with respect to the funding of the costs associated with NATO 
enlargement, is the question of extending our nuclear umbrella over any 
new NATO members.
  Mr. President, this is an extraordinarily serious decision, and I 
hope that a comprehensive report by the President, which is called for 
in this amendment, would provide much of the information needed for the 
debate on that question, and, most important, I hope it will stimulate 
the kind of in-depth thinking that we need to have on this issue.
  Mr. President, I know that my colleagues who have cosponsored this--
Senators Hutchison, Bradley, Kassebaum and Cohen--would like to speak 
on this subject at some point as we consider it. At this point in time, 
I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on this amendment, I think it is 
unfortunate timing to start with. Russian elections are coming up in 
barely a week. We all know the incredible sensitivity that issues like 
these have during a political campaign. I am not sure if a debate on 
the floor of the Senate concerning the enlargement of NATO is 
appropriate at this time.
  Let me also say, Mr. President, that I have given a cursory review to 
some of the provisions of the bill. I appreciate the fact that the 
Senator from Georgia would be agreeable to other questions, but I also 
suggest that there are questions that are raised here that really have 
no answer, or have a very negative connotation.
  Here are just a few examples:
  The extent to which the European Union has opened its markets to 
prospective new NATO members?
  What would that have to do with membership in NATO? That is none of 
our business. I do not know how you answer this question, or how 
anybody in the Pentagon could answer this.
  The relationship of Russia with NATO, including Russia's 
participation in the Partnership for Peace Program and NATO's strategic 
dialog with Russia?
  That is related as to how we approach Russia, related to who is 
conducting our foreign policy and foreign affairs. I can give the 
Senator right now several different scenarios in which they would all 
be the right answer, depending on what happened.
  The anticipated impact of NATO enlargement on Russian foreign and 
defense policies, including in particular the implementation of START 
I, the ratification of START II, and the emphasis placed in defense 
planning on nuclear weapons.
  I say to the Senator from Georgia, again, that is directly related to 
who

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the President of the United States is, who the President of Russia is, 
who the Defense Minister of Russia is, and our relations with Russia 
over time. To ask that question, in my view--there is no answer to it 
because it is directly related to events, as to who the President of 
Russia is. I say right now, if Mr. Zyuganov wins the election, you will 
have one answer; if Mr. Yeltsin wins, you will have another answer. 
They will be dramatically different.
  I still do not understand the effect that the gaining of membership 
in NATO by a nation would have on the possibility and timing of that 
nation gaining associate membership and subsequently full membership in 
the European Union. Again, that eludes me, as to what membership in the 
European Union has to do with membership in NATO.
  Let me pursue it.
  The extent to which prospective new NATO members are committed to 
protecting the rights of all of their citizens, including national 
minorities.
  Should we now have a review of present members of NATO and how they 
treat the rights of their citizens, including minorities?
  The extent to which prospective new NATO members have established 
democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of 
their armed forces, including parliamentary oversight of military 
affairs and appointment of civilians to senior defense positions, and 
the rule of law.
  I would suspect strongly that unless they were in compliance with 
those, there would be no prospect of them being engaged.
  The strategy by which attacks on prospective new NATO member nations 
would be deterred, and, if deterrence fails, defended, including 
whether the strategy would be based on conventional forces or on 
nuclear capabilities. If based on conventional forces, the extent to 
which the strategy would be based on host nation forces and the extent 
to which it would be based on NATO reinforcement.
  I say to the Senator from Georgia, it would be the same policy that 
applies to every nation that is a member of NATO and would be directly 
related to the crisis and situation at the time. If there is a ground 
attack in one part of NATO that could be countered by conventional 
forces, then, clearly, you do not launch a hydrogen bomb.
  The thrust of these questions, I say to the Senator from Georgia, or 
of these requirements, whether they are intended to or not, would, 
frankly, to the uninitiated, portray a situation where the United 
States of America is departing from our traditional position and role 
in Europe, which is to abide by the fundamental premise of NATO, which 
is that an attack on one is an attack on all; and that, with the 
expansion of NATO, I say to the Senator, cannot be violated. And the 
response is directly dictated by the kind of attack, the kind of threat 
it is, and the commitment on the part of the United States and our 
allies is directly related to that.
  If the Senator from Georgia can envision every possible scenario that 
would be an attack on a new member or old member of NATO, then fine. 
But I do not see how anyone has the kind of clairvoyance to know 
exactly what that would be.
  So the fundamental premise of NATO, as I understand it, of the 
Atlantic Alliance is that, if one nation is attacked, then all are 
attacked, and all will join in response to that attack. But nowhere in 
NATO doctrine do I see an ironclad, dictated response to an attack, 
because it depends on the kind of attack; it depends on what the threat 
is. If it can be countered, obviously, by a short-term conventional 
response, that is fine. But if there is a nuclear attack, clearly, 
there is a nuclear response, as well.
  Mr. NUNN. If the Senator will yield, I want to ask something on 
another subject. I have a meeting to try to move this bill along back 
here in the other room. It is one of those things that happens to all 
of us. I need to be in two places at one time. But I know the Senator 
from South Carolina would like for me to give my first priority to 
working out some agreements to move the bill along.
  I would like to thank the Senator for yielding and say that I support 
the Harkin amendment. He will bring that up when he gets the floor. 
That has been cleared on both sides, I believe. I will be available to 
Senator Thurmond in Senator Daschle's office, if I am needed.
  Mr. McCAIN. Could I say, first of all, I understand the concerns that 
the Senator from Georgia has. I believe he is correct and that these 
questions must be answered. There has to be a clear definition of 
exactly what the United States is going to do.
  What I ask the Senator is, perhaps we can sit down and maybe simplify 
these questions to some degree, so that we can get answers to the 
questions, but in a realistic fashion, and one that might be agreeable 
to this side. Would that be all right?
  Mr. NUNN. I would be glad to work on that with my friend from Arizona 
and my friend from Colorado. The amendment is temporarily laid aside.
  I just ask this. I do not intend to have a second-degree amendment to 
it. I informed people that I was planning on doing that, and I wanted 
to accord other Senators a chance. I only ask that there not be a 
second-degree amendment while we have not laid it aside and are working 
in good faith on it.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Georgia. Again, I appreciate 
what the Senator from Georgia is trying to find out. Those facts are 
going to have to be made known to the U.S. Senate and the American 
people prior to any two-thirds vote on the floor of the Senate that 
would accompany enlargement.
  I am worried with setting a stage that might in some ways prejudge in 
a negative fashion what I think is critical for the future of the 
spirit of Europe.
  Mr. President, earlier I stated on the floor when discussing Senator 
Helms' amendment concerning the expression of sorrow over the tragedy 
that took place in Saudi Arabia that I had heard that the Secretary of 
State was going to Syria. That is not the case. I retract that remark.
  I do think that I will stick to my previous statement, though, that 
24 times he has been in Damascus, which is probably sufficient for some 
period of time. I do believe that the Secretary of State is doing a 
dedicated job. He is a fine and outstanding man, and in no way do I 
mean my remarks to be in any way a diminution of the very outstanding 
and dedicated work that the Secretary of State has done.
  Mr. President, I believe that the Senator from Colorado who has a 
second-degree amendment with the Senator from Georgia, and perhaps we 
can craft an amendment and make changes in the amendment which 
hopefully would more narrowly focus the questions and be able to move 
forward with this very important amendment.
  I want to state again. It is not healthy at this point for the U.S. 
Senate to debate the issue of the expansion of NATO with Russian 
elections coming up in just a few days.
  I hope we can do whatever we can to avoid that at this time.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.


                    Amendment No. 4177, As Modified

            (Purpose: To provide for defense burdensharing)

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 4177, and I send a 
modification to the desk and ask that it be considered at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Iowa (Mr. Harkin), for himself, Mr. Kerry, 
     Mr. Conrad, Mr. Lautenberg, and Mr. Dorgan, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4177, as modified.

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the end of subtitle D of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1044. DEFENSE BURDENSHARING.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Although the Cold War has ended, the United States 
     continues to spend billions of dollars to promote regional 
     security and to make preparations for regional contingencies.
       (2) United States defense expenditures primarily promote 
     United States national security interests; however, they also 
     significantly contribute to the defense of our allies.
       (3) In 1993, the gross domestic product of the United 
     States equaled $6,300,000,000,000,

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     while the gross domestic product of other NATO member 
     countries totaled $7,200,000,000,000.
       (4) Over the course of 1993, the United States spent 4.7 
     percent of its gross domestic product on defense, while other 
     NATO members collectively spent 2.5 percent of their gross 
     domestic product on defense.
       (5) In addition to military spending, foreign assistance 
     plays a vital role in the establishment and maintenance of 
     stability in other nations and in implementing the United 
     States national security strategy.
       (6) This assistance has often prevented the outbreak of 
     conflicts which otherwise would have required costly military 
     interventions by the United States and our allies.
       (7) From 1990-1993, the United States spent $59,000,000,000 
     in foreign assistance, a sum which represents an amount 
     greater than any other nation in the world.
       (8) In 1995, the United States spent over $10,000,000,000 
     to promote European security, while European NATO nations 
     only contributed $2,000,000,000 toward this effort.
       (9) With a smaller gross domestic product and a larger 
     defense budget than its European NATO allies, the United 
     States shoulders an unfair share of the burden of the common 
     defense.
       (10) Because of this unfair burden, the Congress previously 
     voted to require United States allies to bear a greater share 
     of the costs incurred for keeping United States military 
     forces permanently assigned in their countries.
       (11) As a result of this action, for example, Japan now 
     pays over 75 percent of the nonpersonnel costs incurred by 
     United States military forces permanently assigned there, 
     while our European allies pay for less than 25 percent of 
     these same costs. Japan signed a new Special Measures 
     Agreement this year which will increase Japan's contribution 
     toward the cost of stationing United States troops in Japan 
     by approximately $30,000,000 a year over the next five years.
       (12) These increased contributions help to rectify the 
     imbalance in the burden shouldered by the United States for 
     the common defense.
       (13) The relative share of the burden of the common defense 
     still falls too heavily on the United States, and our allies 
     should dedicate more of their own resources to defending 
     themselves.
       (b) Efforts To Increase Allied Burdensharing.--The 
     President shall seek to have each nation that has cooperative 
     military relations with the United States (including security 
     agreements, basing arrangements, or mutual participation in 
     multinational military organizations or operations) take one 
     or more of the following actions:
       (1) Increase its financial contributions to the payment of 
     the nonpersonnel costs incurred by the United States 
     Government for stationing United States military personnel in 
     that nation, with a goal of achieving the following 
     percentages of such costs:
       (A) By September 30, 1997, 37.5 percent.
       (B) By September 30, 1998, 50 percent.
       (C) By September 30, 1999, 62.5 percent.
       (D) By September 30, 2000, 75 percent.

     An increase in financial contributions by any nation under 
     this paragraph may include the elimination of taxes, fees, or 
     other charges levied on United States military personnel, 
     equipment, or facilities stationed in that nation.
       (2) Increase its annual budgetary outlays for national 
     defense as a percentage of its gross domestic product by 10 
     percent or at least to a level commensurate to that of the 
     United States by September 30, 1997.
       (3) Increase its annual budgetary outlays for foreign 
     assistance (to promote democratization, economic 
     stabilization, transparency arrangements, defense economic 
     conversion, respect for the rule of law, and internationally 
     recognized human rights) by 10 percent or at least to a level 
     commensurate to that of the United States by September 30, 
     1997.
       (4) Increase the amount of military assets (including 
     personnel, equipment, logistics, support and other resources) 
     that it contributes, or would be prepared to contribute, to 
     multinational military activities worldwide, including United 
     Nations or regional peace operations.
       (c) Authorities to Encourage Actions by United States 
     Allies.--In seeking the actions described in subsection (b) 
     with respect to any nation, or in response to a failure by 
     any nation to undertake one or more of such actions, the 
     President may take any of the following measures:
       (1) Reduce the end strength level of members of the Armed 
     Forces assigned to permanent duty ashore in that nation.
       (2) Impose on that nation taxes, fees, or other charges 
     similar to those that such nation imposes on United States 
     forces stationed in that nation.
       (3) Reduce (through rescission, impoundment, or other 
     appropriate procedures as authorized by law) the amount the 
     United States contributes to the NATO Civil Budget, Military 
     Budget, or Security Investment Program.
       (4) Suspend, modify, or terminate any bilateral security 
     agreement the United States has with that nation.
       (5) Reduce (through rescission, impoundment or other 
     appropriate procedures as authorized by law) any United 
     States bilateral assistance appropriated for that nation.
       (6) Take any other action the President determines to be 
     appropriate as authorized by law.
       (d) Report on Progress in Increasing Allied 
     Burdensharing.--Not later than March 1, 1997, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on--
       (1) steps taken by other nations to complete the actions 
     described in subsection (b);
       (2) all measures taken by the President, including those 
     authorized in subsection (c), to achieve the actions 
     described in subsection (b); and
       (3) the budgetary savings to the United States that are 
     expected to accrue as a result of the steps described under 
     paragraph (1).
       (e) Report on National Security Bases for Forward 
     Deployment and Burdensharing Relationships.--(1) In order to 
     ensure the best allocation of budgetary resources, the 
     President shall undertake a review of the status of elements 
     of the United States Armed Forces that are permanently 
     stationed outside the United States. The review shall include 
     an assessment of the following:
       (A) The alliance requirements that are to be found in 
     agreements between the United States and other countries.
       (B) The national security interests that support 
     permanently stationing elements of the United States Armed 
     Forces outside the United States.
       (C) The stationing costs associated with the forward 
     deployment of elements of the United States Armed Forces.
       (D) The alternatives available to forward deployment (such 
     as material prepositioning, enhanced airlift and sealift, or 
     joint training operations) to meet such alliance requirements 
     or national security interests, with such alternatives 
     identified and described in detail.
       (E) The costs and force structure configurations associated 
     with such alternatives to forward deployment.
       (F) The financial contributions that allies of the United 
     States make to common defense efforts (to promote 
     democratization, economic stabilization, transparency 
     arrangements, defense economic conversion, respect for the 
     rule of law, and internationally recognized human rights).
       (G) The contributions that allies of the United States make 
     to meeting the stationing costs associated with the forward 
     deployment of elements of the United States Armed Forces.
       (H) The annual expenditures of the United States and its 
     allies on national defense, and the relative percentages of 
     each nation's gross domestic product constituted by those 
     expenditures.
       (2) The President shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     review under paragraph (1). The report shall be submitted not 
     later than March 1, 1997, in classified and unclassified 
     form.

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I also ask that Senators Conrad, 
Lautenberg, and Dorgan be added as cosponsors.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I believe, as modified, this amendment is 
agreeable to the managers. It has been worked out. I thank them. I 
thank the manager and the ranking members for their help in working 
this out. I thank also my colleagues for their cooperation in working 
out this important proposal.
  Basically, what this amendment, which passed the House recently by a 
vote of 353 to 62, would do is begin to ask our allies in Europe to pay 
a fairer share of the costs for their own defense. The CBO says this 
amendment would save taxpayers up to $11.3 billion over the next 6 
years. I personally think we need to go even further in reducing the 
taxpayer subsidy for Europe and Japan's defense, but this is a major 
step in the right direction. It is a victory for deficit reduction and 
the American taxpayers.
  Again, I thank the managers for their cooperation.
  Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment on behalf of myself, and 
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Lautenberg, and Mr. 
Dorgan that calls on our NATO allies to share more of the burden for 
maintaining stability in Europe and their own defense. This amendment 
is nearly identical to one on the House Department of Defense 
authorization bill that was agreed to by a strong bipartisan vote of 
353 to 62 on May 14. The CBO has scored our amendment as saving $11.3 
billion over the next 6 years.
  It is time we stopped asking American taxpayers to underwrite the 
security of our European allies. We are all justifiably proud of the 
role American played in rebuilding Europe after World War II. The 
Marshall plan stands as a monument to American generosity and concern 
for our fellow citizens around the world.
  We not only helped our wartime allies, but we aided our former 
enemies as they rebuilt their war-torn societies. Aiding our former 
enemies to restore

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their society is the true mark of American generosity.
  But that was then, and this is now. Times have changed.
  Germany and Japan are no longer prostrate, exhausted from years of 
all-out war. Far from it. Germany and Japan are now economic giants, 
providing significant competition to the United States across a broad 
spectrum of industries.
  After World War II, we were justified in stationing troops in Europe 
and Japan to restore basic order, to provide the security necessary for 
vibrant economies to flourish and grow. But now it is time for our 
allies to take over the cost of their own defense. Not only has the 
threat of world domination by the Soviet Union evaporated, but our 
allies now have the financial means and internal stability to provide 
their own defense.
  In 1991 Japan agreed to pay for 75 percent of the costs of stationing 
United States troops on Japanese soil by this year, excluding salaries 
of United States servicemen and women, and United States civilian 
contractors. Mr. President, Japan has done what it promised. Our total 
nonpersonnel cost there is $5.8 billion and Japan contributes $4.6 
billion or 79 percent. That contribution should increase further, but 
they are making progress.
  Why can't our NATO allies pick up a larger share of their defense 
burden? This amendment allows them to increase their contributions in 
one or more of 4 areas to meet the goal of increased burden sharing.
  The NATO allies' four options are:
  First, gradually increasing their contributions over 4 years to 75 
percent of the nonpersonnel costs incurred by U.S. military forces 
stationed on their soil. They currently contribute about 25 percent of 
the $8 billion annual costs.
  Second, increasing their defense spending as a percentage of GDP by 
10 percent or at least to a level equal to that of the United States by 
September 30, 1997. Although U.S. defense spending is declining, the 
spending by the NATO Allies is declining more rapidly. This provision 
prevents the United States from picking up the growing difference in 
defense spending.
  Third, increasing their budgetary outlays for foreign assistance by 
10 percent or to a level equal to that of the United States. This 
provision gives the NATO allies a nonmilitary mechanism to contribute 
to the security of Europe.
  Fourth, increasing their contributions of military assets to 
multinational, United Nations, or regional peace operations. This 
provision will prevent the United States from having to bear an unfair 
amount of the responsibility in future peacekeeping missions.
  Mr. President, I reiterate, our NATO Allies can choose any 
combination of the above options to meet the requirements of this 
amendment. They need not do all four.
  Should our NATO Allies miss the targets specified above, the 
President is authorized by this amendment to do one or more of the 
following:
  First, reduce the levels of troops stationed in NATO countries.
  Second, impose taxes or fees similar to those that other nations 
impose on the U.S. forces stationed in the foreign nation.
  Third, reduce through rescission, impoundments or line-item veto, the 
amount the United States contributes to the NATO budget or other 
bilateral aid accounts.
  Fourth, take any other action that is currently authorized by law to 
make our NATO allies pick up a fair share of the defense burden.
  Mr. President, this amendment also requires the President to report 
to Congress by March 1, 1997, the progress that has been made in 
achieving the goals enumerated here. This deadline is set so that we 
may review the progress in time for next years' Defense authorization 
bill.
  This is indeed a very modest amendment. I think we should go much 
further to reduce the American taxpayers' subsidy for Europe and 
Japan's defense. As we work to balance our budget and reduce the debt, 
I do not think we can justify any subsidy. But this is a reasonable 
first step to that end.
  Mr. President, this amendment has been endorsed by Taxpayers for 
Common Sense and Citizens Against Government Waste. Let me read a 
couple of paragraphs from their letters.
  Taxpayers for Common Sense:

       As the United States attempts to rein in its defense 
     budget, it is no longer acceptable for the U.S. taxpayer to 
     pay the lion's share for keeping American troops in Europe. 
     While the Japanese Government pays over 75 percent of all 
     non-personnel costs for American military bases in Japan, our 
     wealthy European allies typically make a collective 
     contribution of less than 25 percent. We support your 
     amendment's call for a 75 percent contribution standard.

  Citizens Against Government Waste:

       This amendment, which would require host countries to pay 
     75 percent of nonpersonnel costs, is essential to maintaining 
     a strong and cost-effective military partnership with our 
     allies around the world. If enacted, this proposal would save 
     taxpayers $11.3 billion by 2002.
       As the United States continues to define its role in the 
     post-Cold War era, we must realize that we can no longer 
     afford to bear the brunt of maintaining a large presence 
     overseas. However, we do recognize that American strength is 
     necessary to maintain peace and cooperation worldwide. Your 
     amendment successfully addresses both issues.
       The 104th Congress' clear mission is to eliminate 
     unnecessary spending, while ensuring that vital obligations, 
     such as protecting our national security, are fulfilled. Your 
     amendment is a vital part of that mission. Not only does it 
     provide for continued international cooperation, but it also 
     saves the taxpayers billions of dollars.
       Your amendment makes a fundamental contribution to the 
     debate on the Defense Authorization and its passage is an 
     important step toward achieving a balanced budget. We 
     strongly urge its adoption by the Senate.

  Our amendment is also supported by the State Department and the 
Defense Department. Let me read from their respective statements:
  State Department:

       We support this amendment because it supports U.S. policy 
     objectives in achieving equitable responsibility sharing of 
     global security interests with our allies. This amendment 
     does not tie the hands of the Administration in the execution 
     of U.S. policy. This amendment does allow the President the 
     flexibility in pursuing different avenues in attaining the 
     same objective without undermining the credibility of the 
     United States commitments to our allies. It recognizes that 
     one formula does not fit every allied country or every region 
     and permit[s] our allies to choose to contribute on an 
     equitable basis tailored to their own political, economic, 
     cultural, and historical perspectives.

  Department of Defense:

       After detailed review, analysis and consideration of the 
     provisions in the amendment, the Department believes it 
     provides a solid basis upon which to proceed in future 
     discussions and negotiations with our allies around the world 
     to attain greater Responsibility Sharing in defense and 
     security issues of common concern.

  This amendment has the overwhelming support of the House, and the 
support of the administration. If you agree that our allies are now 
sufficiently strong economically to pay a fair share for their 
security, then I urge that you also support this amendment. I ask 
unanimous consent that the letters of support be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    Position Paper on Proposed Burdensharing Amendment to H.R. 3230


                        description of the bill

       The amendment to the DoD Authorization Bill calls on our 
     allies to equitably share in the roles, risks, 
     responsibilities as well as costs in global security. The 
     amendment recognizes that the United States continues to pay 
     an unfair share of the ``common defense burden'' and calls 
     for our allies to take one or more of four actions to 
     increase their contributions to share equitably in global 
     responsibility sharing.
       These four actions include: increased cost-sharing with 
     established goals of 37.5%, 50%, 62.5%, and 75% by September 
     30 of each successive year starting in 1997; or increasing 
     national defense budgets by 10% or comparable to the U.S. by 
     September 30, 1997; or increase its annual budget for foreign 
     assistance by 10% or at least to a level commensurate to that 
     of the U.S. by September 30, 1997; or increase the amount of 
     military assets that it contributes, or would be prepared to 
     contribute, to multinational military activities worldwide, 
     including United Nations or regional peace operations.
       The amendment also provides authority for the President to 
     take certain actions with our allies should they not meet any 
     of the four obligations above. Although threatening and 
     punitive in nature, these actions are non-binding.
       The amendment does direct the President to submit an annual 
     report to Congress not later than March 1, 1997 in classified 
     and unclassified from reviewing the effects of our allies 
     compliance to our responsibility sharing initiatives.

[[Page S7133]]

                          department position

       We support this amendment because it supports U.S. policy 
     objectives in achieving equitable responsibility sharing of 
     global security interests with our allies. This amendment 
     does not tie the hands of the Administration in the execution 
     of U.S. policy. This amendment does allow the President the 
     flexibility in pursuing different avenues in attaining the 
     same objective without undermining the credibility of the 
     United States commitments to our allies. It recognizes that 
     one formula does not fit every allied country or every region 
     and permits our allies to choose to contribute on an 
     equitable basis tailored to their own political, economic, 
     cultural, and historical perspectives.


   talking points and background to support the department's position

       We agree with the findings of this amendment that the 
     United States continues to pay a higher cost for global 
     defense compared to that of our allies. We also acknowledge 
     that many of our allies are sharing equitably in the global 
     responsibilities of defense while others are beginning to 
     assume increased roles, risks, and responsibilities.
       We support this amendment because it supports U.S. policy 
     objectives in achieving equitable responsibility sharing of 
     mutual global security interests. This amendment does not tie 
     the hands of the President, allowing him the flexibility in 
     pursuance of those goals while maintaining the credibility of 
     the United States commitments to our allies.
       We believe that by working together with Congress on this 
     issue, U.S. interests are preserved and that the basis for 
     our policy or responsibility sharing serves the best security 
     interests of our country and that of our allies in promoting 
     peace, stability, democracy, and free-market economies.
       We note with concern, however, that rigid percentage cost-
     sharing goals by specified dates are incompatible with 
     recently concluded and highly favorable cost-sharing 
     agreements. We ask that only one small change to the 
     amendment be incorporated.
                                                                    ____


                          Potential Amendment

                        (Prepared by Mike Walsh)


                            service affected

       US military forces and activities around the world.


                            amendment number

       Amendment 102 to H.R. 3230


                         statement of amendment

       Amendment consists of four parts: Findings, which detail 
     discrepancies Congress perceives between US and allied 
     defense spending and resource allocation, generally 
     concluding that the US continues to bear greater defense 
     burden than allies, and that they should do more to defend 
     themselves; Efforts to Increase Allied Burdensharing, which 
     provides President latitude to seek increased allied 
     contributions in four areas (i.e., cost sharing, defense 
     spending, foreign assistance, military assets to 
     multinational military activities); Authorities to Encourage 
     Allies, which provides President with authority to take 
     specific actions to obtain allied compliance (i.e., wide 
     range of options, including withdrawals, impositions, funding 
     or program rescissions, suspensions, terminations, reductions 
     or similar actions); and Revised Reporting Requirements, 
     stipulating reporting on relevant measures and actions by 
     allies to determine compliance.


                              DOD Position

       The Department generally supports the amendment, but has 
     some reservations about specific provisions, discussed below 
     [After detailed review, analysis and consideration of the 
     provisions in the amendment, the Department believes it 
     provides a solid basis upon which to proceed in future 
     discussions and negotiations with our allies around the world 
     to attain greater Responsibility Sharing in defense and 
     security issues of common concern. The Department has long 
     sought such an orientation, as it offers us the most latitude 
     in seeking greater contributions. Additionally, provisions in 
     this amendment establish the basis for a renewed Executive-
     Legislative consensus on determining progress in these 
     matters, another long-sought goal.] The Department is 
     concerned however, with a couple of provisions in the 
     amendment. In paragraph (b) Efforts, sub-paragraph (1), 
     Congress proposes adopting a specific schedule of financial 
     contributions by allies between 1997-2000. We have not found 
     this to be a viable approach to attain the goals the 
     Department and Congress want to reach. We recommend deleting 
     the schedule and instead substituting language (consistent 
     with the other parts of this section) that encourages 
     ``greater allied equity in sharing roles, risks, 
     responsibilities, and costs for global security''. This will 
     afford President more flexibility and options for attaining 
     increased contributions from various sources. We also 
     recommend, in paragraph (d) Reports, that these two new 
     reporting requirements be combined into a single report, due 
     15 April each year, and that these reporting requirements 
     supersede current burdensharing reporting requirements (see 
     PL 98-525, FY85 DOD Authorization Act, Title X, Section 1002, 
     et seq.), which are both obsolete and inconsistent with the 
     intention of this amendment. The Department urges Congress to 
     consider favorably these minor adjustments.
                                                                    ____


   Save U.S. Taxpayer up to $11.3 Billion--Support ``Burdensharing'' 
                               Amendment


                                   Taxpayers for Common Sense,

                                    Washington, DC, June 25, 1996.
       Dear Senators Harkin and Kerry: Taxpayers for Common Sense 
     is please to support your ``burdensharing'' amendment to the 
     FY97 Defense Authorization Bill. This amendment takes an 
     important step towards reducing the $16 billion direct cash 
     subsidy paid each year to our allies for their national 
     defense. As you know, the House passed this amendment during 
     consideration of the Defense Authorization.
       As the United States attempts to rein in its defense 
     budget, it is no longer acceptable for the U.S. taxpayer to 
     pay the lion's share for keeping American troops in Europe. 
     While the Japanese government pays over 75% of all non-
     personnel costs for American military bases in Japan, our 
     wealthy European allies typically make a collective 
     contribution of less than 25%. We support your amendment's 
     call for a 75% contribution standard.
       Despite the end of the Cold War and a steadily decreasing 
     defense budget, the U.S. still spends more on defense than 
     all of its allies. For example, while Japan spends 1.1% of is 
     GDP on defense and European nations average 2.5%, the U.S. 
     spends 4.7% of its GDP on defense. The American taxpayer 
     cannot afford to continue subsidizing our allies defense 
     budgets. Not only are taxpayers asked to shoulder higher 
     defense spending and increased deficits, but as consumers and 
     producers they face a competitive disadvantage from countries 
     whose economies do not bear the full cost of defending their 
     own territories.
       This year's amendment gives the President and the Secretary 
     of Defense more than a year to negotiate increased 
     contributions from our allies who benefit from the 200,000 
     U.S. troops stationed abroad. If those contributions do not 
     increase, the amendment provides options for pressuring our 
     allies to increase their contributions through measures such 
     as a reduction of troops and/or a recession of bilateral aid 
     and NATO appropriations.
       The Congressional Budget Office projects potential six year 
     outlay savings, from the amendment, to be around $11.3 
     billion. These savings are significant and would provide a 
     welcome relief to overburdened American taxpayers. We urge 
     all members of the Senate to support your amendment.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Jill Lancelot,
     Legislative Director.
                                                                    ____

                                      Council for Citizens Against


                                             Government Waste,

                                    Washington, DC, June 25, 1996.
     Hon. Tom Harkin,
     Hon. John Kerry,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senators Harkin and Kerry: On behalf of the 600,000 
     members of the Council for Citizens Against Government Waste, 
     I am writing to endorse the Harkin/Kerry amendment to the FY 
     1997 National Defense Authorization Act, S. 1745. This 
     amendment, which would require host countries to pay 75 
     percent of nonpersonnel costs, is essential to maintaining a 
     strong and cost-effective military partnership with out 
     allies around the world. If enacted, this proposal would save 
     taxpayers $11.3 billion by 2002.
       This amendment won overwhelming bipartisan support in the 
     House by a vote of 353-62. It deserves the same in the Senate 
     this year.
       As the United States continues to define its role in the 
     post-cold War era, we must realize that we can no longer 
     afford to bear the brunt of maintaining a large presence 
     overseas. However, we do recognize that American strength is 
     necessary to maintain peace and cooperation worldwide. Your 
     amendment successfully addresses both issues.
       The 104th Congress' clear mission is to eliminate 
     unnecessary spending, while ensuring that vital obligations, 
     such as protecting our national security, are fulfilled. Your 
     amendment is a vital part of that mission. Not only does it 
     provide for continued international cooperation, but is also 
     saves the taxpayers billions of dollars.
       Your amendment makes a fundamental contribution to the 
     debate on the Defense Authorization and its passage is an 
     important step toward achieving a balanced budget. We 
     strongly urge its adoption by the Senate.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Tom Schatz,
                                                        President.

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment 
offered by the Senator from Iowa and Massachusetts. I appreciate their 
efforts to craft an amendment that would provide a number of actions 
that our allies could take to increase their contributions to defense 
burdensharing.
  I agree that the United States pays an unfair share of the common 
defense

[[Page S7134]]

burden and our allies should do more. This amendment would provide the 
United States with a basis by which to achieve agreements with our 
allies to increase their share of costs for defense.
  Let me emphasize that U.S. forces are deployed overseas to advance 
U.S. security interests. Although we seek common efforts with our 
allies to secure peace and promote U.S. interests abroad, we do not 
always necessarily agree on how those interests are to be advanced.
  As a result, I am not comfortable with the notion that one action an 
ally could take to increase its cost share would be to increase its 
peacekeeping or humanitarian activities--that would be considered of 
equal value to an ally increasing its participation in coalition 
operations or increasing its defense budget.
  Would Congress be satisfied if an ally agreed to increase its 
contributions to foreign assistance, and at the same time, reduce its 
defense expenditures? This would be counter to our efforts to get our 
allies to contribute more for global and regional security. Our 
objective should be to get our allies to agree to increase their 
efforts in all areas.
  With those remarks, I recommend that my colleagues adopt the 
amendment.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleague 
Senator Harkin in offering an amendment which seeks to relieve the 
American taxpayer of some of the enormous burden of defending our 
allies.
  This amendment is straightforward. It requires the President to seek 
increased contributions from countries which have cooperative military 
relations with the United States. It requires the President to 
negotiate agreements under which our allies will be responsible for 
bearing a greater share of the common defense burden.
  The end of the cold war has signaled the need for us to reevaluate 
our spending priorities. Despite the end of the cold war, the United 
States continues to pay an unfair share of the costs of defending our 
allies. American taxpayers should no longer be responsible for the 
lion's share of the common defense burden.
  According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's data for 
1993, we spent 20.1 percent of our budget on military expenditures, 
while European NATO nations spent only 6.2 percent of their combined 
budgets. That's $1,153 per capita spent by the United States on 
military expenditures compared to $419 per capita spent by our European 
NATO allies.
  It is simply time for the United States to negotiate a better deal, 
and this amendment represents a positive step in that direction.
  The amendment allows the President to negotiate an increase in our 
allies' contributions in four areas. First, the President may require 
an ally to gradually increase its contributions to 75 percent of the 
nonpersonnel costs incurred by our forces stationed on its soil. 
Second, the President may require a host country to increase its 
defense spending as a percentage of its GDP by 10 percent or at least 
to a level equal to that of the United States. Third, the President may 
negotiate for a foreign country to increase its budgetary outlays for 
foreign assistance by 10 percent or to a level commensurate with the 
United States. Finally, the President may choose to require an ally to 
increase its contributions of military assets to multinational, United 
Nations, or regional peace operations.
  Although far from perfect, our agreement with Japan is a good example 
of what the President would be required to negotiate under this 
amendment. Currently, Japan pays for 79 percent, of nonpersonnel costs 
incurred by stationing troops on its soil. The administration recently 
negotiated an agreement under which Japan will increase its 
contributions by approximately $30 million a year over the next 5 
years. This is an pretty good deal compared to the meager 24 percent 
that our European NATO allies contribute to the nonpersonnel costs the 
United States incurs in Europe.
  Budget estimates for fiscal year 1996-97 reveal that the United 
States will incur $8 billion in nonpersonnel costs in Europe and that 
our NATO allies will only contribute $2 billion of that amount. I think 
this is an outrage.
  This amendment would remedy this situation by requiring the President 
to negotiate a better deal.
  Mr. President, critics of this amendment may argue that it will 
compromise U.S. troop presence and global national security interests. 
This just isn't the case. If this amendment is implemented, and I hope 
it will be, the United States will continue to pay enormous amounts to 
defend collective security interests. We will still spend billions 
defending our allies.
  This amendment provides the flexibility necessary to preserve our 
commitments to our allies. It allows the President to accommodate each 
country's unique economic, political, and military situation while 
creating a more equitable balance of the common defense burden. Each of 
our allies has different capabilities and limitations to sharing the 
costs of the common defense. This amendment recognizes these 
differences and gives the President flexibility needed to secure 
greater participation by our allies.
  Mr. President, American taxpayers deserve a better deal. If 
implemented, this amendment would be a solid starting point for 
requiring our allies to chip in more for the common defense. It would 
send a clear message to our citizens that we are committed to relieving 
them of some of the enormous burden of defending our allies. This 
initiative is long overdue, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask that the yeas and nays be vitiated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is their objection to the amendment?
  Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4177), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.


                           Amendment No. 4367

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, one of the items that I want to draw the 
Senate's attention to with regard to the Nunn amendment is really the 
astounding story of the United State's history with regard to central 
Europe since the Iron Curtain fell down.
  I think a decade ago, or two decades ago Americans, would be amazed 
to think that the Iron Curtain could fall and that the world could 
change as it has.
  I do not know whether Members remember watching the television 
coverage of President Reagan in Berlin talking about how in the future 
Russian leaders would tear down that wall. But I confess my thoughts 
were that the wonderful Irishman was engaging in wishful rhetoric, 
perhaps more than a serious prediction. Lo and behold, the President 
turned out to be more than correct, and his words were prophetic.
  I think more shocking than his statements was the fact that the wall 
came down and that the Soviet Union dissolved. However, even more 
shocking is the way this country has treated the central European 
governments.
  I simply do not know of a place in the world where Americans are more 
popular than central Europe; more popular than they are in America at 
times even.
  But, Mr. President, you cannot be in central Europe and not 
experience the warmth of people who love, admire, and respect freedom 
and independence, who are grateful to the United States for championing 
freedom and independence, who want to be like Americans in many, many 
ways.
  I think to most Americans would be shocked if they realized how we 
have treated those people who looked at us so eagerly and with so much 
affection, and so much thanks and so much hope of making their 
countries like America; so much hope of bringing freedom to their 
countries.
  What are the facts? The facts are that when the Iron Curtain fell and 
those countries developed new governments, we did not react to them as 
we had reacted to Western Europe at the end of World War II.
  I will remind Senators what happened. At the end of World War II when

[[Page S7135]]

Western Europe had problems, we did a couple of things because of 
concern about their future and the future of the freedom and democracy 
there.
  First, we opened our markets to them and ensured that they had a way 
to earn their way out of the incredible destruction and poverty that 
they were in.
  The second thing we brought forth was assistance to them to provide 
the emergency needs and help give them a boost to get things started 
again.
  Mr. President, I do not think anyone would doubt that those efforts 
were helpful. We can debate whether or not we did too much, or too 
little, whether we gave it to the right or wrong country, whether we 
gave it the right way or the wrong way. Those are legitimate questions 
and ought to be debated. The key point is we came forward at a time of 
need and we ensured that their spark of freedom survived and grew, and 
democracy is greater and stronger in the world because we did it.
  I hope that the distinguished Senator who offers this amendment and 
others who may be tempted to join him will look at the contrast of how 
the Central Europeans were treated versus the way the Western Europeans 
were treated, where we came forward and opened our markets to them and 
gave them a chance to earn their way out of the dire circumstances they 
were in. The Western European powers said they were going to study for 
5 or 10 or 20 years whether or not Central European countries will be 
let into Common Market.
  Western European countries went through hell. When they went through 
hell, we opened our markets to them. Now Western Europe says they are 
going to study for a long, long period of time whether they will let 
Central European countries into the Common Market.
  That is not right. It is in our interest, in the interest of freedom-
loving people around the world to see Central Europe do well. To think 
of selfish subsidies and self-interests at a time when we ought to be 
opening the world of opportunity to them is wrong.
  Second, when Western Europe was threatened, we joined our arms with 
them. We offered them NATO, and we volunteered to stand side by side 
with them and not only carry our share of the burden, but to do even 
more. And what did the Western European countries do? When Central 
Europe asked to join NATO, they decided to study it.
  This Congress has acted on this issue. Three years ago, we passed the 
NATO Participation Act I, and it was meant to address the questions 
that are brought up in the amendment of Senator Nunn and others. It was 
done because the administration was dragging its feet and turning its 
back on the cry of those free people for help and assistance and 
participation.
  These are proud people. They are not coming and asking for a handout. 
They are coming and asking to be our friends, to be our comrades, to be 
our allies, and to stand with us--in the words of Americans, to pledge 
their lives and their sacred honor in a joint enterprise with us.
  I suppose you can turn the back of your hand to people like that, but 
I think they at least deserve an answer. What this country has done and 
what some Western European countries have done is turn their back on 
them, not even given them the courtesy of an answer.
  It was this Senator's belief, and I know it is not shared by all 
Senators that the administration was very slow to respond to the 
situation in Central Europe. As Western Europe and the United States 
have been slow to embrace the freedom-loving people of Central Europe, 
the forces of totalitarianism in those countries have had a new boost 
of strength at the ballot box.
  I have listened to Ambassadors and Members of Parliament from 
countries all across Central Europe. They ask me, where we should be 
aligned? Who should we be close to? Who do we work with? Where is our 
future? And they are shocked to find that America and Western Europe 
are slow to embrace them and slow to want them to be part of us. They 
want to go West. They want to be part of the free world. They want to 
stand up with us to protect against totalitarianism.
  These people, who love Americans so much, are confused and puzzled at 
our slowness in allowing them to stand with us in NATO and are almost 
mystified at the slowness and reluctance of the Europeans to allow them 
into the Common Market. It is almost as if all these years we thought 
of them as an enemy, and when they want to join our side, we will not 
let them.
  Some people have said we have to consider the cost. We have to figure 
out whether it is in our interest. We have to look at this detail and 
that detail and this detail.
  That was 5 years ago. Three years ago, we finally passed a bill that 
required those things to be addressed, the NATO Participation Act I, 
because the administration had not done its work and because this 
Congress had not done its work. Last year, we passed the NATO 
Participation Act II to urge the project on further.

  I want Members to ask themselves this: Toward the end of World War II 
there was something of a coup or an overthrow of the Government in 
Italy. Italy, which had been fighting against us and with the Nazis, 
switched sides, declared war on Germany and joined the Allies' cause.
  How much did it cost to have Italy join us? Was it to our advantage 
to have hundreds of thousands of troops that had been fighting us to 
change sides and join us? I suppose some people could come and say we 
ought to have studied that seriously. But I do not think it would take 
too many people very long to figure out that it is much better to have 
hundreds of thousands of troops that were opposed to you on your side.
  Is it an advantage to have Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary 
on our side, pledged to help defend our freedom with the potential of 
very valuable bases and hundreds of thousands of service men and women 
willing to help defend our freedom rather than the other side? I do not 
think, with all due respect, it takes a genius to figure out that is a 
plus, not a minus.
  Reference is made here to a study as to what could be spent in terms 
of the defense of that area. Mr. President, you can spend any amount 
you want. The question comes back to two things. Is it better to have 
them on our side rather than opposed to us? Of course. And maybe most 
importantly of all, what is the cost if we do not do it? How do they 
react to the slap in the face that says, ``We do not want to stand with 
you''?
  What is the cost if we again fail to recognize that area as part of 
the sphere of influence of other powers? I submit to Members that the 
cost is very heavy, indeed, and far outweighs any other.
  Last, let me simply say this. I do not know how any American can 
review the history of what went on when the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany invaded Poland and free men and women failed to understand that 
our freedom was in part dependent on their freedom. I do not know how 
we can ignore that history. I do not know how anyone could ignore what 
happened when this country guaranteed the freedom of the Polish 
underground if they would negotiate with the Soviets and then refused 
to even speak up on their behalf when they were arrested and tried and 
sentenced to death, even though we had asked them to surrender. I do 
not know how any American can look at the history of what happened in 
the cold war and see the flame of freedom snuffed out in Poland during 
the 1940's by the Soviets and not feel a twinge of horror that another 
40 or 50 years of enslavement followed.
  I do not know how we as a country can turn our back on freedom in 
central Europe, and so I look forward to working with the Senator from 
Georgia. I hope very much this can be resolved, but I do know one 
thing. I do know that stalling and delay in endless reports and endless 
studies and a Mississippi literacy test to get into NATO are not the 
answer.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise, I might say with regret, to 
oppose the amendment introduced by the Senator from Georgia, now 
temporarily laid aside. I rise with regret because I have such respect 
for the Senator from Georgia, Mr. Nunn. But on this issue I 
respectfully disagree. I associate myself with the eloquent remarks of 
the Senator from Colorado. The questions

[[Page S7136]]

raised by the amendment introduced by the Senator from Georgia and 
others are important questions. They go to the heart of this great 
opportunity, challenge, and debate that is coming on the question of 
NATO enlargement.
  I certainly agree this body has to consider all these questions. But 
I feel very strongly that this is not the right time nor is it the 
right bill on which to carry out this debate. Let me state clearly from 
the outset where I stand. I believe a strong transatlantic partnership 
serves America's interests. For reasons of history and economy, war or 
instability in Europe inevitably harms American interests. In this 
century alone, the United States has fought two world wars and the cold 
war, all of which had their origins in Europe.
  Today, we are involved in a conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 
keeping the peace, helping to provide the ground on which a country can 
regain its feet after the slaughter and aggression it suffered, in 
Europe. There, as part of an international implementation force, we are 
again expressing what is a basic fact of American history, which is 
that what happens in Europe matters to us. That is part of what NATO is 
all about.
  We are now developing a consensus, slowly, methodically--too slowly, 
frankly, for some, including this Senator--but a consensus moving 
forward, nonetheless, in the United States and with our allies and 
like-minded countries of Europe, on the future of the North Atlantic 
alliance, this extraordinarily successful alliance often referred to as 
the most successful defensive alliance in the history of the world. In 
fact, NATO did deter Soviet aggression, the prospect of Soviet 
aggression westward into Europe throughout the course of the cold war.
  I hope, over the coming months, we will be able to work together, 
Democrats and Republicans, the President and Congress, to advance the 
adaptation as well as the enlargement of NATO to meet the challenges of 
the post-cold-war world.
  The amendment before us raises questions. But I do think it also 
expresses the underlying skepticism of its sponsors about either the 
idea of enlarging NATO or the pace of NATO enlargement. The amendment, 
however, does not express the views of many of us in this body who have 
thought through the same issues and come, respectfully, to a different 
conclusion. That is why I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  In my view, we must look to the future and expand the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization in two significant ways. I think we need to deepen 
this great partnership to develop a reliable coalition of like-minded 
countries to share the burdens of maintaining international security 
and we need to enlarge NATO by admitting new democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe to full membership.
  I believe we should enlarge NATO for two basic reasons. The first I 
will call moral. Senator Brown referred to this. Throughout the cold 
war, we promised these nations our support to achieve freedom and 
democracy. The millions of people who come together to form these 
nations were forced to live under the yoke of Soviet dictatorship. And 
we reached out to them and tried to give them encouragement during 
those years. We referred to them as ``captive nations.'' That is a term 
that seems so wonderfully dated today. Today they are no longer 
captive. They are free and independent. They are working their way to 
strengthen democracy, market economies, freedom, full expression, 
better lives for their citizens. The question is whether we will 
remember this promise we made to them, that if only they would persist 
through the dark years of Soviet domination, Communist domination, we 
would greet them, we would embrace them, we would stand with them. So I 
think we owe these people the opportunity to join with us in this 
alliance of free nations.

  The second reason I believe NATO should be expanded is strategic. By 
enlarging NATO to include the free and democratic states in Central and 
Eastern Europe, we can help to ensure the stability and security of 
Europe. NATO is often viewed as a defensive alliance, because of the 
cold war history, an alliance to defend its members against the threat, 
that then existed, of Soviet movement across Western Europe. The fact 
is, NATO from the beginning, and particularly today in the post-cold-
war world, has a second and I would say today much more important 
purpose, which is to serve as a body in which the potential conflicts 
among its members are moderated and defused. That is the role it has 
played and that is the role it will continue to play, once these 
fledgling democracies and market economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe reach the plateau which will be established, at which they can 
join NATO. That is the role NATO will play for them as well.
  Secretary General Solana, the Secretary General of NATO, was here 
earlier this week and he made a very important point, which is that one 
of the standards for membership in NATO will be not only the extent to 
which human rights are recognized in the potential NATO member, not 
only the extent its market economy is flourishing, not only its 
military capacity to participate in the NATO alliance, et cetera, but 
also the extent to which it has eliminated conflicts with its 
neighbors. That is a precondition of joining NATO. Conflicts between, 
for instance, Hungary and Romania over the rights of ethnic 
minorities--it seems to me one of the preconditions of membership in 
NATO will be for those countries, if they are to be considered, to 
resolve those conflicts. And that is a perfect indication of the way in 
which NATO has had an internal purpose, to preserve stability in 
Europe. It is important to remember that the members of NATO have, in a 
very profound sense, given up the use or threat of force in 
relationship to each other. That is clearly at the heart of our hopes 
for continued stability in Europe in the post-cold-war world.
  While some Russians view NATO enlargement as a threat, NATO is a 
defensive alliance. NATO, as an organization to maintain the peace 
among its own members, does not pose any risk to Russian security. We 
are going to have to work hard to make this point to some of those 
among our friends in Russia. We have to work hard, but we can do it, to 
make it clear that NATO already has established and wants to build on a 
friendly and peaceful relationship with the new post-cold-war Russia.
  The NATO enlargement process is moving forward, thanks to leadership 
from President Clinton, Secretary General Solana, and a host of leaders 
in both parties in this country. Senator Dole is, obviously, a strong 
supporter of NATO enlargement, and others in Europe are strong 
supporters as well. The study agreed to by the NATO defense ministers 
last December provides, I think, a generally sound basis for the 
admission of new members. This is not moving precipitously, it is 
moving very methodically--in fact too slowly for some of us. The 
individualized dialogues with interested countries, an important stage 
in the process, are now underway.
  Mr. President, I am concerned that the amendment offered by the 
Senator from Georgia to mandate yet another study would have the effect 
of delaying the NATO enlargement process already underway.
  The requirements of the study in the amendment before us seem to 
emphasize only the costs and commitments that the United States would 
undertake and the anticipated impact on Russia. These questions, if I 
may say so with respect, seem to be the questions of an attorney in a 
courtroom leading the witness.
  In another sense, Senator Brown has referred to this as a literacy 
test, as a pre-civil-rights-era literacy test that used to be applied 
to respective African-American voters in the South with the intention 
of denying them the opportunity to vote. I am afraid the effect of 
these questions will lead to a conclusion that there are not going to 
be any countries joining NATO in the near future, and that is a result 
that I am opposed to.
  It is possible, as has been suggested by the Senator from Colorado 
and the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from Georgia, that 
discussions can be carried on that would alter or at least broaden the 
nature of the questions. Some of these questions ought to ask about the 
positive effects, of which there are many, in expanding NATO: standing 
true to American principles of human rights that we expressed so often 
during the cold war, creating a kind of burdensharing for ourselves 
that NATO has represented.

[[Page S7137]]

  NATO for us, more and more, means that we are not going to be called 
on to be the sole policeman of the world. Remember what happened in the 
gulf war. We did not have to fight that conflict alone; our allies from 
NATO were with us. They are with us in Bosnia today. Years into the 
future, as we worry about continued security and stability in the 
Middle East and in Asia, I think our allies in NATO will provide an 
opportunity to share the burdens and cost of world leadership that the 
United States would otherwise be called upon to expend.
  The point is this: The process is underway under which Ministers of 
the member nations of NATO will meet in December to make some key 
decisions about how to enlarge the alliance. We cannot forego that 
opportunity while we await the results of another study.
  I will say two things. Perhaps it is worth trying to alter these 
questions to make them more balanced. My preference, frankly, is that 
this amendment be defeated, because I think it confuses an ongoing 
process. In some ways, it begins to tie the hands of the President and 
the executive branch. These are all questions that, should there be a 
decision in NATO to enlarge, will come back to this floor for a great 
debate, because no one can automatically be added to NATO without the 
Senate of the United States--this body--being asked to ratify an 
amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty alliance by a two-thirds vote. 
So I say these questions are preliminary.
  The first choice would be we defeat the amendment. Second, perhaps we 
could work on some questions and withdraw others to make it a more 
balanced series of questions.
  Third, I hope we make it clear, and I hope within the text of the 
amendment that these questions are not intended to delay in any way the 
process that is now going on in NATO, meeting in December, a presumed 
summit to occur sometime in the first 6 months of 1997, to formally 
continue the process of NATO enlargement.
  If we are going to go forward in the spirit of compromise, let us 
make it clear it is not intended to inhibit the President or his 
designees in any way in what they will do between now and when the 
study will come forward.
  I see other colleagues on the floor. I have spoken at length. It is 
an important issue. It is an issue we are going to debate and we ought 
to debate in the interest of our national security. Respectfully, I do 
not think this is the right time to have this debate or adopt this 
resolution, and I will vote against it, certainly, as it is before us 
at the current time.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. SIMON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I join in questioning this amendment. I say 
to my colleague from Georgia, for whom I have great respect--I notice 
the Senate staffers were asked by Washingtonian magazine which Senator 
retiring would be missed the most, and the person who came out first in 
that contest was Sam Nunn. I agree with that assessment.
  I was home grabbing a bite to eat. We just live about 10 minutes from 
here, and I heard Senator Nunn speak and Senator McCain. I hope the 
Senator from Colorado will forgive me, but as soon as he got up to 
speak, I got in my car to come down here and heard the end of Senator 
Lieberman's comments.

  The point that Senator McCain made that this is ill-timed, I think, 
is appropriate, and I hope my colleague from Georgia will think about 
deferring this amendment until we get to the foreign ops bill after the 
election.
  This is an emotional issue in Russia. You can argue that it should 
not be an emotional issue, but the people in Russia were told year 
after year after year by the propaganda machine that NATO represents a 
military threat, and even though the Soviet dictatorial apparatus is 
gone, that fear of NATO is there. It is an emotional issue in Russia.
  For those who say, ``Well, emotions shouldn't govern decisions on 
foreign relations,'' take a look at--and I know many of my colleagues 
will disagree with me on this--take a look at what the United States is 
doing vis-a-vis Cuba. Our policy in Cuba is clearly a reaction to 
national passion rather than national interest. We could not have 
devised a policy ultimately that is more favorable to Castro than the 
policy that we designed. So in Russia, you have an emotional reaction 
to NATO.
  The amendment that is before us is tilted. There is just no question 
about it. I have enough confidence in the Senator from Georgia that if 
this were to be withdrawn and then some of us get together before we 
have the foreign ops bill and try to fashion something, I think we can 
do it.
  I will add here, I think there are ways of defusing this a little bit 
in Eastern Europe. The President of the Parliament of Belarus was here 
about 10 days ago and visited with me. One of the things he said to me 
was, ``I hope you don't permit NATO to be expanded. It's a very 
emotional issue in Belarus.''
  I said, ``What if we were to say that nuclear weapons could not be 
based in any of the additional countries that come into NATO?"
  He said, ``That would be a very different thing. That would make it 
much more acceptable.''
  Frankly, because nuclear weapons can reach anyplace in a matter of 
minutes today, militarily it is not necessary.
  I think some compromises can be worked out. Let me just add, for 
anyone from the Russian Embassy who is interested who may be listening, 
I think this is in the best long-term interest of Russia. Yes, I am 
concerned about Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary and the other 
Central European governments.

  I had the privilege, some of you may recall, of being the chief 
sponsor of the bill to provide aid for Poland in 1989, right after the 
change there. It has been dramatic. I have been in touch with the 
situation in Poland for some time. They have fears. Whether they are 
legitimate or not, that is a matter of judgment, but they have fears of 
their neighbor to the east.
  Ultimately, the great threat that Russia faces militarily is from 
China, not from the West. I hope when we have a more stable democracy 
in Russia--and Russia is moving in that direction, clearly--I hope 
Russia can become a member of NATO. But I think to adopt this amendment 
right now is not in our interest.
  Frankly, I do not think even having a vote on this amendment right 
now is in our interest. I think--and I again have a huge respect for my 
colleague from Georgia, who is one of the giants of this body--but I 
think it would be much better to consider this after the Russian 
election, the runoff election, which is not that many days off. But if 
we have to vote, I will vote for a substitute or vote against this 
amendment. I yield the floor.
  Mr. BRADLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment 
offered by the Senator from Georgia. I think this amendment is vitally 
important to prevent us from precipitously going down the path of NATO 
expansion without considering the consequences.
  This amendment forces us to ask the who and the when, to take a hard 
look at the consequence of NATO's expansion before we leap. I and many 
in this body are absolutely thrilled by the dramatic geopolitical 
changes in the last several years. The end of communism as far as an 
active, vital, dominant force in the landmass of the Soviet Union is a 
startling development. The breakup of the Soviet Union itself was a 
startling development.
  When the cold war ended, it thrust the United States, Russia, the 
former republics of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and 
our NATO allies all into uncharted waters.
  As long as the Soviet Union existed, the United States-Soviet rivalry 
was defined as an era in fundamentally ideological terms. It was the 
prominent feature of the international system in a bipolar world, and 
it was the primary justification for NATO, one of the two treaties--the 
other with Japan--that governed our sovereign commitments to allies 
around the world, commitments that required us to send American troops 
to defend the nations with whom we had made the treaty.
  Now the Soviet Union no longer exists. We are in a period of 
transition. As a result, NATO in particular is redefining its role in 
the world, in a world without the Soviet Union, which was the pretext 
for its founding. But just as NATO is trying to redefine its role in

[[Page S7138]]

the world, so Russia itself is struggling to redefine its future. It is 
in the midst of that redefinition period now, in the midst of a 
Presidential election.
  In early May, I was in Moscow. I arrived the day that there were 
30,000 or 40,000 supporters of Mr. Zyuganov in the streets, with red 
flags, pictures of Lenin, the whole thing, parading for their 
candidate. That same day I drove past the park and saw a candidate up 
on a big platform speaking, with great speakers, and four our five 
generals with ribbons standing next to him.

  I said, ``Who's that?'' They said, ``Zyuganov.'' I said, ``Stop.'' I 
and a Republican colleague melded into the crowd. I know the Chair 
might think it is difficult for me to meld into any crowd, but we did 
so. And I asked our interpreter, ``What is he saying?'' The interpreter 
said, ``He has just said that the German-Israeli-American conspiracy to 
destroy Russia will not succeed if I am elected President.'' To which 
my response was, ``Well, at least we were third.''
  Indeed, he did not make a successful showing in the Presidential 
election. The first round has been held. Mr. Zyuganov and Mr. Yeltsin 
are in a final runoff that will be decided in the next several days.
  Russia is in a period of redefinition. It is beginning to say--will 
it cast its lot more in the direction of democracy, market reform, 
moving into integration into the world economic and political system, 
or will it once again retreat to a more isolationist position in the 
world?
  So the Presidential elections in Russia are very much about all this. 
As Russia defines itself internally, what kind of system it wants, what 
kind of democracy it wants, Russia will also continue to redefine 
itself in relation to both the West and the East. It has grave concerns 
and worries about China. It is very concerned about Turkish influence 
in a lot of the Central Asian republics.
  It has much less concern about the West. The war of ideology is over. 
There is no reason for them to fear the West. We know that. They see 
where their geopolitical worries are, to the south and to the east. 
They are now in the process of not only redefining themselves 
internally but also externally. In this process the nature of those 
relationships are not a foregone conclusion.
  The Eastern European countries that are seeking NATO membership are 
also in a process of transition. They have turned their backs on Soviet 
Russian influence and are firmly allying themselves with the West. We 
welcome that. We want them to be integrated into the West. We want them 
to become a member of the European Community. We want them to be a part 
of a Western future. They want to integrate as quickly as possible to 
get the economic benefits as well as the promise of greater security.
  So, Mr. President, as we consider NATO's expansion against this 
backdrop of sweeping change, of redefinition in the West as well as the 
East, I think we have to be honest about what we hope and what we can 
realistically expect to accomplish.
  First, on the issue of increased security and stability, the primary 
rationale voiced by the proponents of NATO enlargement is that it will 
increase security and stability in Europe.
  How that can be accomplished, though, in real terms has yet to be 
explained. Achieving stability is a long-term process that will require 
strategic dialogue with all parties. It will also require the 
completion of the fundamental economic and political reform process 
that the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are still 
undergoing. This is not going to happen overnight. It is far from 
certain that NATO's immediate expansion will promote either of those 
tasks.

  In fact, NATO expansion is likely to cut off or possibly even 
polarize a strategic dialog between the West and Russia about Turkey or 
about Asia or about where they perceive their threats coming from.
  Further, NATO enlargement is not an automatic guarantee of security, 
particularly, as this amendment suggests, as many important questions 
related to membership enlargement of NATO have yet to be answered, 
particularly with regard to the effect that enlargement will have on 
NATO itself, including its nuclear posture and its security guarantees. 
Indeed, an expanded NATO is probably no more likely to respond 
militarily to an invasion of Eastern Europe than an unexpanded NATO.
  If we consider these countries sufficiently vital to our interest, 
the West will act without a treaty; if we do not consider them vital, 
no treaty is going to force a President to send American troops into 
the region.
  Nor will NATO's expansion guarantee the vital political and economic 
reform that is a prerequisite to security. You can have a lot of 
military armor deployed forward, a nuclear deterrent, and if you have 
an economy crumbling, because the comparative advantages available in 
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia cannot bring full fruit because the 
Western Europeans will block all their products from being imported 
into the markets of the West, it is a hollow victory.
  In fact, one might argue that NATO expansion enlargement may hinder 
such reform by encouraging the diversion of limited resources in these 
countries to military modernization rather than to economic 
development.
  Mr. President, it is important we also try to think through before we 
take this step. The amendment, I think, forces this thinking process. 
What does it say about Russia? We have to be honest about the role of 
Russia, both in our motivation toward expanding NATO and in our 
assessment of the potential stabilizing or destabilizing effect of 
enlargement.
  First, the motivation. Despite protestations to the contrary by some 
policymakers and NATO itself in its enlargement study, fears of Russian 
aggressiveness are clearly a significant motivating force behind NATO 
expansion. That is a legitimate feeling on the part of the peoples of 
Eastern Europe because they were dominated, occupied, by a Soviet Army 
for 45 years. Naturally, they have a fear, but to assuage those fears, 
do we want to jump headlong before we consider some of the larger 
strategic questions?
  I think this fear of Russian aggressiveness is obviously the case for 
these Eastern European countries seeking enlargement immediately. It 
could very well be the motivating force for many Western policymakers.
  What is the effect? While NATO's own study and others downplay the 
effect of NATO expansion on Russia, it is clear to even the most casual 
observer that NATO's enlargement is viewed as a threat by Russia, 
particularly given that those who would expand NATO are seeking to do 
so because of their fears of Russian aggressiveness reasserting itself 
as if it were a genetic quality.
  Russia's view of NATO expansion is not surprising when one looks at 
the post-cold-war world from a Russian vantage point. Russia has been 
stripped of its empire, gone the way of new republics, new countries, 
and is but one of 15 countries--the largest, but one of 15--in the 
former Soviet space. By expanding the West's military bloc--and that is 
what NATO is, that is why it was formed, that is what its primary 
funding is, let's be honest--by expanding the West's military bloc 
along its borders, Russia could not help but feel boxed in by an 
organization whose primary aim for most of its existence has been to 
act as a shield against a potentially aggressive Soviet Union.
  If expansion is accelerated, a threatened and increasingly 
nationalistic Russia may further isolate itself from the West, and the 
prophecy about Russian aggressiveness could easily become a self-
fulfilling one. I think that is unlikely because of the economic 
circumstance in Russia.
  However, immediate NATO expansion enlargement gives a pretext for 
those who would play on those fears and those who would stir that pot. 
We need to think about this and ask some tough questions.

  If expansion is accelerated, a threatened and increasingly 
nationalistic Russia may further, as I said, isolate itself from the 
rest of the world. The hopes of Russia's implementation of START I or 
the ratification of START II would become increasingly remote. Tensions 
could increase. NATO's immediate enlargement will not solve our 
security concerns. Indeed, I believe it is very possible that it could 
heighten them.
  Rather than isolating Russia, we should seek to engage Russia and 
others in a long-term strategic dialog about what they perceive to be 
their

[[Page S7139]]

security concerns. If we engage that dialog without a precipitous 
action of enlargement in that dialog, it will become clear that their 
concerns are more oriented toward China and to the Turkish activity in 
the former republics of central Asia than it is to the West, 
particularly NATO, particularly Western Europe, and certainly Eastern 
Europe.
  Mr. President, I think we should work to reduce the threat of nuclear 
weapons by ensuring implementation of START I and START II, but I have 
some reservations about precipitously expanding NATO at the expense of 
our own national security. Our consideration of these concerns is not, 
as proponents of enlargement like to argue, the result of Russia 
bullying the United States or NATO. It is in our own self-interest to 
consider the impact that enlargement would have on Russia. It is in our 
own interest to do this. If the purpose of NATO expansion is to 
increase security, our security, obviously, its destabilizing impact on 
Russian-NATO and Russian-United States relations need to be a part of 
that analysis.
  What about the effect on NATO and U.S. participation in NATO? 
Finally, we have to be honest about the effect of enlargement, as I 
said, on NATO itself and on the increased responsibilities it will 
entail for the United States.
  Enlargement could have significant repercussions for how NATO 
operates. I do not think these issues have been actually explored. That 
is really the purpose of the amendment of the distinguished Senator 
from Georgia.
  Enlargement will also require NATO to devote less energy to important 
reforms, helping it to adopt to the realities of the post-cold-war 
world, and the enlargement will impose even greater responsibilities 
and costs on the United States without any serious assessment of 
whether such responsibilities and costs are in the United States' 
interest.
  Mr. President, as the foregoing illustrates, NATO expansion is not an 
easy issue. It is a quick fix, a form of what I call ``cold war lite,'' 
that is likely to cause a lot more harm than good. It is more a 
leftover from cold war thinking than it is a rethinking of U.S. 
security interests worldwide. It is more a predictable human response 
to the call to assuage the worries and historical concerns of our 
friends in Eastern Europe than it is a longer term view of how to 
guarantee their security over time.
  Mr. President, I have serious concerns about precipitously rushing 
into NATO expansion. At a minimum, we should ask some difficult 
questions and take the time to study the issue seriously. I think that 
is precisely what the amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia 
requires.

  I support the amendment fully. It is his amendment to decide how to 
pursue in the remaining hours. If he chooses to have a vote, I will be 
for it. If he chooses to wait and have a vote a little bit later, I 
will be for it then.
  It is enormously important that we ask the questions before we leap 
and find we have precipitated a response that will create less 
security, not more security, for the very countries to whom the 
enlargement is expected to give greater security.
  So, Mr. President, I support the amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I know there is a good-faith effort to now 
see if we can draft some additional language, or perhaps some 
substitute language for some of this amendment. I am certainly pleased 
to work with my friend from Arizona and others on that approach.
  I am a bit curious, though, how a vote on an amendment that is asking 
what it is going to cost to expand NATO and how much the American 
taxpayers are going to pay--that that information is tilted. I do not 
quite understand that logic. I really do not understand the logic that 
says that we do not want to know what the strategy is going to be as we 
expand the defense alliance that involves possible commitment of 
American forces and the possible--in fact, automatic, if there is an 
article V protection for full NATO members, an automatic basic nuclear 
umbrella being extended, meaning that we are willing to, in an extreme 
situation, use nuclear weapons, if we have to, to defend our allies. 
That is a serious undertaking.
  I am not sure why there is any reluctance to ask the President to 
tell us what the strategy is. Is that something we do not want to know? 
If he cannot give us the complete strategy, and if he says there are 
certain contingencies, fine, that is what he will answer. But why 
should we be afraid to ask the question? I am not sure why we would not 
want to ask the question of whether it is going to involve 
prepositioning American equipment and how much that is going to cost. 
Why would we not want to know the answer to that?
  I am not sure why we would not want to know the answer to whether air 
forces are going to be involved, or whether there is going to be 
forward stationing of ground forces. Are we really going to expand the 
alliance and not ask ourselves those questions? I am puzzled.
  I am not sure why we would not want to know the extent to which 
prospective new NATO members have achieved, or are expected to achieve, 
interoperability of their military equipment, air defense systems, and 
command, control, and communications systems and conformity of military 
doctrine with those of NATO.
  That is the purpose of the Partnership for Peace. That is what they 
have been doing for the last 3 years. Why are we reluctant to ask the 
question? I am not sure why we would not want to know the extent to 
which the new NATO members have established democratic institutions, 
free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces, 
including parliamentary oversight of military affairs and appointment 
of civilians to senior defense position, and the rule of law.

  Is there reluctance to find out or get the assessment of the 
President of the United States sometime next year, giving him plenty of 
time? This is not something we are going to have answers to tomorrow or 
the next day. It is not going to come until January of next year.
  One of our colleagues said that, of course, the answers would vary as 
to whether Mr. Zyuganov is elected or Mr. Yeltsin is elected. 
Precisely. I would assume that any President would take that into 
account before they filed a report next January. If they did not, then 
I would be amazed. Certainly, the circumstances will make a difference.
  I do not know why we would not want to know the extent to which the 
prospective new NATO members are committed to protecting the rights of 
all of their citizens, including national minorities.
  Is there someone that does not want to ask that question? Is that a 
painful question to ask? I know the Senator from Connecticut made the 
statement--and I think he is right--that one advantage of NATO is to 
keep the countries from having armed conflict with each other. 
Certainly, that is the case, I think, in the case of two allies, Greece 
and Turkey. Their membership in NATO has helped prevent that--although 
the animosities are, unfortunately, still present.
  Why would we not want to know something about the treatment of 
national minorities? It seems to me that was a fundamental question 
that should have been asked by our allies and the United States of the 
newly emerging states in the former Yugoslavia before we recognized 
them. We should have asked the question about their treatment of 
minorities and their respect for human rights and their rule of law.
  Is there really a sentiment in the Senate that we do not want to know 
the answer to that question, or we do not even want to ask it? Is that 
tilting? It does not seem to me that it is.
  Is there somebody who does not want to ask the question whether the 
prospective new NATO members are in a position to further the 
principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area? Is that a painful question? Is 
this some kind of inside-the-beltway steamroller that is going so 
strong with people, having taken positions

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about NATO expansion and not asking these questions, that we cannot ask 
them now? What is going on?
  Are the American people not entitled to know what it is going to 
cost? Are they entitled to know whether we are going to forward deploy 
our forces? Are they entitled to know whether we are going to 
preposition our equipment? Or are they at least entitled to have the 
President tell the Congress what we are going to do in terms of 
strategy? Some of it may be classified. Is that something that we are 
going to do, put blinders on and say, let us charge out and see who can 
take the strongest stance and expand NATO the quickest, without asking 
questions? Is that what our colleagues are concerned about?
  I know that there are people who have taken the position we should 
expand NATO. I think there is a case that we should. I, myself, believe 
we should expand NATO. I believe that the logical step, though, as the 
Senator from New Jersey said so well, is to make sure that countries 
which are not now under military threat secure their economy and their 
political system.

  I really find it a little puzzling that some of our European 
colleagues could say it is too difficult to expand the European 
Community. They need access to trade. What they need is markets. It is 
too difficult to decide whether we are going to let new countries in 
that grow vegetables and they might ship them across the border. It is 
easier for the US. to extend a nuclear guarantee. I mean, we can be the 
country that decides that question, but we do not want to ask the 
question.
  I mean, is it really harder to open up markets and let countries that 
are newly emerging and need the markets--is it harder to give them 
access than it is to extend a nuclear guarantee, saying that if there 
is a war, we would go even to the extent, in extreme situations, of 
using nuclear weapons?
  Are we basically saying that politicians cannot deal with economic 
issues; let us all turn it over to the military?
  I favor a logical sequence of expansion of NATO. I think it makes all 
sorts of sense as the European Community expands to take those new 
members, and, if they meet NATO standards to give them serious 
consideration for membership, then I think in most cases they would be 
eligible for membership.
  I also think if there is a threat that we ought to be willing to 
respond to that threat where it makes sense militarily and where we can 
be effective militarily. If the Russians elect an extremist or 
nationalist who decides they are going to rebuild the threat against 
Central Europe, of course, we ought to be alert to that. The difference 
now though is that--in the cold war we may have had 15 days of warning 
time or we may have had 3 months warning time of any kind of attack--
now all of our intelligence and military people would tell us we have 
years of warning time; years of warning time before any kind of threat 
to certainly some of the countries that we are talking about taking in.
  Does anyone really not want to ask the question, and ask the 
President to think before we agree to immediate expansion of NATO, of 
the effect on Ukraine? If you look at the map, Ukraine geographically 
may be the most vulnerable and may be the most important country to 
retain its sovereignty. But if they are not going to be in the first 
tier, not going to be part of NATO but we expand NATO and nationalism 
kicks up in Russia in response to it and they start basically putting 
pressure on Ukraine, are we ready to deal with that, or do we not want 
to ask that question?
  Is that one that is too hard to ask? Should we restrain ourselves and 
not ask it because it might be a hard question?
  What about the Baltics? What about the countries that have been 
suppressed for years and years by the former Soviet Union that are now 
not only building their own sovereignty but are doing pretty well in 
democracy, and in their economy? If they get left out of the NATO 
expansion in the first round, are they likely to come under real 
pressure from a nationalistic kind of response in Russia? Is this 
something we do not want to think about? Do we want to just say let us 
not think about it?
  Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to work out language. I think 
there are some questions that can be added to this.
  Certainly it seems to me that every question in here is relevant, and 
every question in here I would be appalled if I did not think the 
President of the United States leading our country as Commander in 
Chief had thought through these questions before we make the final 
decisions. I would be appalled if I did not think NATO had thought 
through them.
  I know they have not all been thought through now. I understand that. 
But by the time NATO makes these decisions, if they do not ask 
themselves these questions, and if our leadership in the Congress does 
not ask these questions, and if the President does not ask these 
questions, then we are not fulfilling our constitutional obligation to 
the American people.
  Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to work with people on this 
amendment. I find it a little bit puzzling that the argument is being 
made that this amendment asking the questions might place some adverse 
effect on the Russian elections when we are asking the questions but a 
NATO expansion amendment that pushes forward with it that is put on the 
Foreign Relations appropriations bill today has no bearing.
  One amendment--this one--asks the questions. How could that have an 
adverse effect on the Russian elections when NATO let us expand quickly 
and let us pick out the members by a legislative fiat amendment, 
basically which is put on the Foreign Relations Committee bill the same 
day? I find that also puzzling.
  Mr. President, these are all questions that need to be asked. I will 
not be here when this debate takes place next year, or whenever it 
takes place, on the NATO expansion. But I will be watching the debate 
as will other people all over this country, and I will certainly hope 
that all of these questions would have not only been asked but also to 
the best extent possible been answered.
  You cannot forecast every scenario and every possible type of 
conflict. But that does not mean you do not have a strategy.
  Is the NATO strategy something we cannot talk about? For 45 years we 
have had a strategy in NATO. The first report out of the U.S. Senate 
was on NATO's strategy; a critique of it. It was not classified. We had 
a strategy. We had a strategy of forward defense. America has had a 
strategy for years not only of conventional deterrence in NATO that was 
avowed, but we had a declared open strategy of being willing to use 
nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack. That was not a 
secret. Maybe somebody did not know it. But we had that as a strategy. 
That was part of our strategy. If the NATO alliance were overwhelmed 
with conventional weapons, we reserved the right by declaration of 
being the first ones to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to 
that. That was our strategy; an open declared strategy.
  Now are we going to expand NATO and not have a strategy? Is that what 
we are being told? If so, then I dissent.
  NATO has to have a strategy. That is why when the politicians start 
telling the military, ``OK. Folks, it is too hard to talk about 
economic expansion. It is too hard to talk about access to markets. 
Those are tough questions. But you go out and you expand and give these 
military guarantees, and we are not going to ask any hard questions 
about how you are going to do it.''
  Well, if we ever have to do it, if there is ever a threat and we have 
to respond, we will demand that our military have thought through that 
strategy, and any of them who have not in leadership positions would be 
properly criticized. They would not have fulfilled their duty, and they 
know that. That is why they are busy scratching their heads with these 
questions, and basically trying to figure some of them out when we may 
be reluctant to even ask them to think about it.
  Mr. President, I find it puzzling. But I am sure that we can continue 
to work and perhaps work out some language on this. I can assure my 
colleagues, if we do not work out language now, we will be revisiting 
this issue this year because at least I am determined that we have a 
framework--a kind of framework that the American people have every 
right to expect of us where the Congress of the United States will be

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called on to ratify this treaty, this expansion of the NATO alliance. 
We will be called on to ratify it, and I think our constituents--the 
American people--have every right to expect that we will be asking 
these questions and that President Clinton, or President Dole, or 
whoever is President, when this decision is made will have asked and 
have a projection of the answers to these kinds of questions.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Grams). The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I wanted to just talk for a moment or two 
about the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Georgia dealing 
with NATO expansion.
  Obviously, the immediate step that both NATO and the United States 
and Central Europe have talked about is the potential of the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Hungary jointly. There are other countries that 
wish to join as well, and in time they will be evaluated and pass the 
standards that have already been developed.
  While this amendment is put in the framework of asking a whole series 
of new studies, I compare it to the old-style Mississippi literacy test 
because it is this Senator's belief that they are designed to have the 
same effect. That is to take on the pretense of a study or ascertaining 
a fact, but in reality to simply flatly prohibit anyone from ever 
entering.
  I understand that is not the intent of the Senator from Georgia, and 
I do not mean to attribute that intent to him, but that is my belief of 
its impact.
  I wanted to deal specifically with one of the issues raised, and that 
is the cost. The amendment discusses a study done by the Congressional 
Budget Office as to what it might cost to defend Central Europe. Mr. 
President, the question is not the cost of defending Central Europe in 
the event of a military conflict. With all due respect, it is the 
difference in cost of defending Central Europe if they are part of NATO 
and if they are not part of NATO.
  You do not have to have a CPA to figure out this question. If 400,000 
Polish troops are on your side instead of opposed to you, does it cost 
more to defend Central Europe or does it cost less? That is why I feel 
this the amendment is so ludicrous. Of course it is better to have 
400,000 Polish troops on your side than opposed to you. Of course it is 
in your interest to have the Czech Republic on your side rather than 
opposed to you. Of course it is in your interest to have Hungary on 
your side rather than opposed to you. Does a war cost less if they are 
on your side than if they are opposed to you? Of course it does. This 
is phrased in the terms of reference of the Congressional Budget 
Office--how much more does it cost to do it?
  That is stupidity. I am not referring to individuals. I am referring 
to concept. The question is not what it costs to defend them. The 
question is, what does it cost if we do not defend Central Europe? To 
suggest that if you have more allies and more troops and more strength 
it is more costly to defend that than with less is not a serious 
question. To ask if it increases your cost to have a bigger enemy or a 
smaller enemy, I do not think is a serious question.
  Now, what is the question? The question is basically this. Do we want 
to recognize a sphere of influence by Russia over the future fate and 
defense policies of Central Europe? That is the real question that we 
have to address. My sense is that if we are clear that they must be 
masters of their own destiny, or at least have that option, we put the 
question to rest. It would be solved. It would be decided. But if we 
leave it open, as has happened the last 4 years, then we invite people 
in countries that might want to control Central Europe to imagine that 
we would sit idly by and allow them to dictate their future.
  Mr. President, if there is a lesson that comes out of World War II, 
it is that uncertainty as to your intentions can be devastating at 
times. But I hope we will debate that issue, because a sphere of 
influence is a reasonable debate. It is an important question. It may 
be there are those who think giving others a control, a sphere of 
influence over Central Europe is a wise policy that will placate them. 
That may well be. There is a case to be made there, a debate to be had. 
But to suggest it is less costly to have troops and allies based on the 
other side than our side I do not believe is a serious question.
  I must say, Mr. President, there is a suggestion here that somehow we 
are going to be the ones to pay for the troops in Poland and pay for 
the troops in Hungary and pay for the troops in the Czech Republic. No 
one from those countries has suggested that. They have not asked for 
it. We have not volunteered it. I do not think it makes any sense, nor 
should it. But I do think it makes sense for them to be on our side and 
not opposed to us.
  We have talked about sharing surplus material with them as we do with 
other countries around the world. But let me suggest that there is a 
real plus in the development of joint material with those countries. It 
helps develop a common bond, a bigger production base and more unity, 
and I think it is worth pursuing. So I hope we will discuss the issue 
and debate it and will move quickly on it. But I think it is a mistake 
for us to hold out a hand of friendship and then not answer their 
question when they ask to stand side by side with us. If we really want 
someone else to have a sphere of influence over them, we ought to be 
straightforward enough to say it. I think it would be a bad policy, but 
we ought to be straightforward about it. But year after year after year 
to say:

  Oh yes, we want you as part of NATO but just not this year.
  Well, when?
  Well, maybe next year. Maybe the year after. We are certainly talking 
about the year after that.
  These are smart people. They are not foolish. If we treat them that 
way they will understand what is happening to them and they will react. 
Is it in our interests to give the back of our hand to people who want 
to be our friends and allies, our comrades? I do not think so. But we 
ought, at least, to be straightforward.
  If the question is recognized sphere of influence of other countries 
over them, we ought to at least face up to that. But if we think they 
should have an opportunity to be independent and free, and this country 
stood for that for a long, long time, and we think the addition of 
their forces standing side-by-side with ours would make that more 
likely to be realized, their freedom and long-term independence, then 
we ought to get on with it. We should not play games. A 2- or 3-year 
study on top of 4 or 5 years of study is not a way to decrease our 
problems.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I am not sure what our state of affairs 
is, but I wonder if I may speak as in morning business for 3 or 4 
minutes.
  Mr. NUNN. Yes, we are waiting on amendments. There is an amendment 
pending, a NATO amendment, my amendment, but it is temporarily laid 
aside so if anyone wants to bring a defense-related amendment in we 
would welcome it.
  In the meantime, we will all be fascinated with the Senator's 
remarks.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I appreciate my friend from Georgia. I am sure he will 
be fascinated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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