[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 97 (Thursday, June 27, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7082-S7088]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask, on behalf of Senator Harkin, that 
Kevin Ayelsworth be accorded the privilege of the floor during debate 
on this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                        The Savannah River Site

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity, while 
we are in the process of trying to work matters out, so we do not waste 
the time of the Senate, to discuss the future of a facility that has 
long been a key component of our Nation's security, the Department of 
Energy Savannah River Site. I know my colleague, the chairman, the 
Senator from South Carolina, has been a devoted supporter of the work 
being done there for a long time.
  Located on the Savannah River in South Carolina along the Georgia/
South Carolina border and known locally as just Savannah River, this 
site is 16 miles from Augusta, GA, and 12 miles from Aiken, SC. The 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Thurmond, and 
I have worked together for over 23 years on issues related to Savannah 
River. He has really been the leader here. We have teamed together over 
the years to insure that the Savannah River complex meets the Nation's 
national security needs. Today, I want to address the future of that 
complex.
  The end of the cold war and the signing of two landmark strategic 
arms reduction treaties will produce dramatic reductions both in the 
future role of nuclear weapons in our Nation's national security 
planning, and in the size of our nuclear weapons stockpile. Moreover, 
the building momentum toward a comprehensive test ban treaty, if it 
occurs, could eliminate the design and production of new nuclear 
weapons with new military requirements. Thus, the Department of Energy 
has begun to reduce the size and complexity of its nuclear weapons 
production facilities. As part of this process, the Savannah River Site 
must adapt to the changing national security picture, and must broaden 
its long-standing focus beyond the production of nuclear weapons 
materials.
  At the close of World War II, the United States was the only nation 
in the world with the technological capability to design and build 
nuclear weapons--weapons which became an essential element of our 
national security and deterrent posture. In the early years of the 
Atomic Age, the technology was crude and the materials needed for these 
weapons were scarce. To remedy this situation, the United States 
embarked on a massive post-war effort to develop a nuclear weapons 
production complex that could design, test, build, modify, and 
disassemble nuclear weapons on an industrial scale, and that could 
produce all the necessary materials, such as plutonium, highly-enriched 
uranium, and tritium, in the quantities needed to support such a 
program. In the 1950's, the Atomic Energy Commission, built most of 
what we know today as the nuclear weapons production complex. This 
complex, scattered among 13 States and located on thousands of square 
miles, produced tens of thousands of nuclear warheads over the last 
half-century. These warheads were the very foundation of our deterrence 
strategy that, to date, has worked with no weapons being used--and 
thank God for that.

  One of the major facilities of the nuclear weapons production complex 
is the Savannah River Site. Savannah River consists of over 300 square 
miles on what was originally farmland in rural South Carolina. This 
land was acquired by the Atomic Energy Commission from over 1,600 
individual owners. Once acquired, the land was taken over by an army of 
construction workers. Building the facilities was a tremendous task 
that included relocating a small town. Even today, the remains of house 
foundations, sidewalks, and streets can still be seen.
  Most of the original production facilities at the site were built in 
just 2 years. These included: five nuclear materials production 
reactors; two areas for reprocessing and recovering the materials 
produced in the reactors; facilities for heavy water production; 
reactor fuel and reactor target facilities; and a large number of 
support facilities.
  E.I. du Pont Co. was asked both to build and to run the facility. Du 
Pont accepted the challenge, and for the sum of $1 per year, du Pont 
constructed and then operated Savannah River for 40 years. Today, a 
subsidiary of Westinghouse runs Savannah River for the Department of 
Energy.
  Over the last half-century, Savannah River and its 20,000 employees 
have played a major role in winning the cold war. But that 
confrontation is now over. As a result, Savannah River, like so many 
other defense facilities, must find new roles and a new future. What is 
the future of the Savannah River and what new missions are possible? 
How can the Nation best utilize the Savannah River Sites--unique 
talents of its skilled work `force and its large and easily accessible 
physical plant? How can Savannah River draw on its history, its skills, 
and lessons learned to make a substantial contribution to our national 
security for the next 50 years? These questions are important to the 
Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the communities in 
Georgia and South Carolina affected by the Savannah River complex, and, 
of course, those dedicated employees who work in that facility.

  I believe that there are at least three new and challenging missions 
for Savannah River: a cleanup technologies mission; an energy and 
environmental research mission; and a new national security mission.
  First, the Cleanup Mission. Over the past 50 years of operation, the 
Department of Energy's nuclear weapons production complex has generated 
enormous amounts of waste materials. This has led to extensive 
environmental contamination of the 17 facilities in 13 States that make 
up the complex. The challenges facing the Department of Energy as it 
moves to clean up this complex are enormous. Neither the exact cost nor 
the timetable for this cleanup is known, but most estimates have been 
in the hundreds of billions of dollars range, over decades of activity.
  Today, cleanup is complicated by the absence of agreed, legally-
binding cleanup standards. No one knows for sure what clean really 
means, or how much cleanup is enough. Identification of the extent of 
the contamination is

[[Page S7083]]

difficult, and most technologies for cleanup are either time-consuming, 
expensive, and not terribly efficient, or not yet invented, or some 
combination of the above.
  The Department of Energy has set a 30-year goal to complete the 
cleanup, but the former Office of Technology Assessment [OTA] suggested 
that that goal was unreachable. The OTA also found that, quote:

       The current regulatory process is not sufficient to 
     identify effectively urgent health-based remediation needs or 
     to comprehensively identify public health impacts.

  Thus, it is virtually impossible to make a reasoned assessment as to 
what should be cleaned up immediately and what can wait. In the absence 
of agreed cleanup standards, the political process tends to set 
priorities for cleanup funding--and this is not simply at Savannah 
River but throughout the whole Energy Department; it is one of our 
biggest problems--according to the squeaky wheel principle, rather than 
based on scientific and immediate needs.

  The success of Savannah River as one of DOE's production sites has 
not been without its costs. Like most industrial sites, and the other 
sites in the nuclear weapons production complex, Savannah River 
generated many waste streams from its operations, including large 
amounts of toxic, hazardous, and radioactive wastes in a variety of 
forms. Some of these materials were stored on-site, and some were 
disposed of at the site. Other wastes were simply discharged into the 
on-site environment. In some instances, the practices employed were 
fully acceptable at the time; in other instances, the urgency of 
production to meet cold war threats meant that little thought was given 
to the long-term consequences of certain production, storage, and 
disposal practices.
  Over time, huge amounts of hazardous wastes were generated and stored 
because there was no known method either to treat or to dispose of the 
waste. Unfortunately, when existing storage sites were filled, the 
usual practice was to build more waste storage areas. Little thought 
and less money went to identify ways to treat or dispose of the waste 
and to reduce the amounts of waste in storage. Thus, wastes continued 
to accumulate over the years. Today, Savannah River stores, in 
underground tanks, more than 34 million gallons of liquid, highly 
radioactive waste--enough to cover nearly 120 football fields 1 foot 
deep.
  The good news is that, earlier this year, DOE achieved startup of the 
Defense Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah River site. This new 
plant takes those highly radioactive liquid wastes from the tanks, 
mixes the waste with melted glass, and molds the cooled waste in glass 
cylinders glass logs. Although the glass logs are also highly 
radioactive, they are easier to handle, and ultimately transport to a 
high-level waste storage facility. The added advantage is that compared 
to the tanks, they will not leak. This process is known as 
``vitrification.''

  I am pleased that this new plant has finally started operation; it is 
a badly needed addition to cleanup technology. In this year's defense 
authorization bill, we have authorized an additional $15 million to 
accelerate the rate of production of the glass logs at this plant. At 
DOE's proposed long-term funding levels and planned operating rate, it 
would take until the year 2028--that is over 30 years--to vitrify just 
the liquid wastes stored in the tanks today. In my judgment, that is 
too long to have to rely on storage in underground tanks. It is my hope 
that future Congresses will fund this plant for operation at its 
maximum design rate, in which case, the storage tanks could be emptied 
about a decade sooner.
  Another of the potential cleanup missions for the Savannah River site 
has come into focus with the recent brief run of the H-canyon 
reprocessing facility. The H-canyon was restarted in order to reprocess 
an accumulation of surplus materials left throughout the plant complex 
when operations were suspended, supposedly temporarily. This brief 
operation of the H-canyon has removed radioactive and hazardous 
materials from numerous areas across the site and consolidated it with 
already stored waste. This has reduced hazards across the complex, 
improving worker health and safety in many plant locations.
  Last year, the Secretary of Energy announced that the Savannah River 
site had been designated to receive shipments of highly radioactive 
spent fuel from a number of foreign research reactors to which we had 
provided new fuel many years ago. This decision means that Savannah 
River will become a so-called temporary storage site for additional 
quantities of spent fuel. On nonproliferation policy grounds, this 
administration has refused to reprocess either this returning research 
reactor fuel or the large accumulation of spent fuel from the old 
reactors on site. Yet, I do not believe that we can allow the Savannah 
River site to continue to accumulate spent fuel while we wait--and 
wait--and wait--for some ultimate long-term spent- fuel storage plan to 
emerge.

  There are other options, and those options need to be addressed. 
Obviously, one option would be to begin reprocessing of spent fuel 
stored at Savannah River, followed by vitrification of the resulting 
liquid waste streams at a second Defense waste processing facility. A 
second facility would be a necessity. Even at full capacity, the DWPF 
plant that just opened will take too long, in my judgment, to rid the 
site of the already stored liquid wastes, with all their hazards of 
leakage and accident. We dare not add to those risks by reprocessing 
spent fuel, and then storing new liquid wastes in the old tanks being 
emptied. I believe DOE will soon have to consider seriously this 
reprocessing option. The administration will also have to carefully 
weigh the impact of reprocessing on U.S. nonproliferation policy 
against the growing reluctance of States and their citizens to be 
burdened with additional radioactive and hazardous wastes, particularly 
when brought from abroad, and this is certainly true in Georgia, and I 
think also in South Carolina.
  Savannah River faces a massive cleanup challenge, apart from the 
liquid storage challenge. In just the last 2 years, the Energy 
Department has spent over a billion dollars at Savannah River on 
environmental restoration and waste management activities. Between 1991 
and 1997, it will have spent between $3.5 and $4.5 billion for cleanup 
activities at Savannah River. Unfortunately, much of this money will be 
spent on managing the storage of the accumulated wastes, not on 
cleaning up waste sites. These funds are just the tip of a total 
cleanup iceberg at Savannah River that will probably take decades--and 
additional billions of dollars--to complete.
  In carrying out this long-term cleanup, we need to focus on more than 
the ultimate goal of restoring the land and water at Savannah River to 
a more acceptable condition. We also must focus on developing more 
cost-effective technologies with which to carry out the cleanup in 
future years. This is enormously important. If we do not develop new 
technologies, there will not be enough money in the Treasury to clean 
up all this, plus the other sites all over the country. From the 
perspective of cleanup technologies, Savannah River is already ahead of 
many of the other Department of Energy facilities. For that reason, 
Savannah River has the potential to make positive contributions, not 
only to ongoing cleanup activities at other sites, but also to new 
waste treatment technologies that will allow us to avoid a repeat of 
the experiences of the last 50 years.
  For example, horizontal drilling methods, borrowed from the oil 
drilling industry and used at Savannah River, have succeeded for the 
first time in removing volatile contaminants from soils. This project 
was so successful that the Department of Energy was able to remove the 
contaminants 11 times more quickly than by previous cleanup methods.
  Much of the hazardous material contaminating Savannah River is not 
radioactive. The nonradioactive hazardous materials are for the most 
part solvents and other materials commonly used in industrial 
operations. Savannah River has been, and should continue to be, a test 
bed for new, innovative cleanup and waste treatment methodologies. 
Industry does not have the same ability and latitude as Savannah River 
to develop and test innovative cleanup and waste treatment 
technologies. This unique Savannah River capability should be fully 
utilized.
  The requirement to clean up the water and the land at Savannah River

[[Page S7084]]

also presents the opportunity to develop new, environmentally sound, 
manufacturing and waste treatment technologies. The development of an 
environmental restoration and waste management research center at 
Savannah River would contribute significantly to increased efficiency 
in remediation technologies. Development of environmental technologies 
like these would greatly assist the United States in restoring its 
reputation as the world's environmental leader.


             The Environmental and Energy Research Mission

  When Savannah River was under construction in the 1950's, the AEC was 
concerned about the safety of the surrounding population, particularly 
in the event of an accident. As a result, the reactors and other 
production facilities are located in the center of the site, and occupy 
only 5 percent of the total site area. Surrounding these production 
facilities is a large, relatively untouched natural area. This buffer 
zone, designed to protect the public, has also protected a broad array 
of wildlife, including five currently endangered species.
  The seeds of change to support an environmental and energy research 
mission were planted back in 1972 when, to protect this rich buffer 
zone, the AEC designated the Savannah River site as the Nation's first 
national environmental research park. Today, Savannah River is home to 
the Savannah River Ecology Laboratory, a major environmental research 
center operated by the University of Georgia. The laboratory should 
serve as one foundation for this major new and positive mission for 
Savannah River. The physical attributes of the site, coupled with the 
unique expertise of the Savannah Ecology Laboratory, make Savannah 
River an ideal choice for energy and ecology research.
  Mr. President, development of environmentally sound energy sources is 
one important key to the ability of the United States to remain 
competitive in manufacturing. Greater energy independence is also 
critically important to our national security interests. 
Environmentally sound, renewable energy production can simultaneously 
reduce the Nation's dependence on foreign oil and ensure that we need 
not risk exploring for oil in environmentally sensitive coastal and 
offshore areas.
  Savannah River's size and location make it a unique site in the 
southeastern United States for development of solar energy research, 
for clean coal research, and as a possible research park for nuclear 
power and the next generation of nuclear power reactors.
  The Ecology Laboratory is a leader in the study of radiation and its 
effects on the environment, and thus is a natural player in the quest 
to identify environmentally sound energy sources. This special 
capability, coupled with the exceptional technical skills of the 
Savannah River work force, presents a rare opportunity for 
environmentally sound energy research.


                     The National Security Missions

  The third mission, of course, is the national security mission. In 
the search for new missions, Savannah River must not lose sight of its 
traditional national security mission, which will continue for the 
foreseeable future. But this mission must be carried out in an 
environmentally sound manner.
  The continuing national security mission for Savannah River is built 
around tritium. Tritium is a key ingredient in U.S. nuclear weapons. 
Tritium gas decays over time, and, thus, the tritium in our nuclear 
weapons must be replaced at regular intervals. Tritium formerly was 
produced in reactors at Savannah River, but tritium production ended 
with the shutdown of those reactors in the late 1980's. Since the 
number of U.S. nuclear weapons has been declining as a result of START 
agreements, Savannah River has been able to recover and recycle the 
tritium from retired nuclear weapons. This recovered tritium has then 
been reused in the weapons remaining in the stockpile. These efforts 
have allowed the United States to postpone new production for some 
time. But that time will run out in the next few years.
  New production of tritium will be needed early in the next decade, 
possibly as early as 2005. That means that a source of new tritium 
production must be identified in the next year or two. As a Nation, we 
must ensure that, once the current excess inventory of tritium is 
depleted, we have in place a new, safe, and highly reliable source of 
tritium. With its special tritium-handling capacity, newly constructed 
tritium handling facilities and longstanding expertise, Savannah River 
will remain a key player in preserving our nuclear arsenal.
  Location of an accelerator for new tritium production capacity at 
Savannah River would be a natural and logical complement to the 
existing tritium handling and loading capacity already located there.
  Another feasible, and probably more cost-effective, option would be 
to produce tritium in an existing commercial reactor, either through 
purchase of irradiation services or through purchase by DOE of an 
existing commercial reactor, to be operated by a contractor. In this 
option, the tritium targets would be shipped to Savannah River, where 
it would be recovered and made ready for the inventory. If this option 
were selected, Plant Vogtle, owned by the Georgia Power Co. and located 
directly across the Savannah River from the Savannah River site, would 
be a leading candidate. DOE will select the technology for new tritium 
production at the end of 1998.

  All of these options have to be weighed both to their advantages and 
disadvantages.
  In the meantime, the DOE has to develop a nearer term contingency 
capability in the event of a national emergency. This contingency 
capability will be provided through the use of commercial reactors. 
Expanded tritium extraction capability will have to be constructed at 
Savannah River to support this contingency capability. The Defense 
Authorization bill reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee 
contains funding to begin the design process for this new tritium 
extraction facility.
  In the years to come, whatever technology is selected in 1998 by the 
Department of Energy, Savannah River will continue to play the lead 
role in ensuring that all nuclear weapons remaining in the United 
States inventory have an assured supply of tritium.
  Savannah River should also play a new role in an emerging area of 
national security. The end of the cold war and the negotiations of new 
arms control agreements means that both this country and the Russian 
Federation are about to embark on the most massive drawdown and 
dismantlement of nuclear weapons in history. This process introduces 
new problems for the weapons complex. As nuclear weapons are 
dismantled, the fissionable materials remaining--plutonium and 
uranium--must be safely and reliably accounted for and stored pending 
permanent disposal. Long-term storage of these materials raises a 
number of environmental, proliferation, as well as, of course, 
political issues. Of course, these issues are extremely difficult.
  New, innovative, peaceful uses for these fissile materials, 
particularly plutonium, must be developed. Savannah River, long a 
production site for plutonium, has the specialized skills to help 
identify methods to account for, to use for nonweapons purposes, or to 
destroy plutonium. Savannah River should play a key role in the 
dismantlement process through the identification, development, and 
demonstration of reuse and/or destruction technologies for plutonium. 
This is quite a challenge, but the challenge must be met.


                               Next Steps

  Savannah River's new course must emerge over the coming years. A new 
course for the Savannah River site can only be successful with the 
participation and support of the communities surrounding the site, the 
States of Georgia and South Carolina, the Department of Energy and its 
operating contractor, the environmental and regulatory communities, and 
the Congress. I have outlined this morning a number of suggestions for 
the future of the Savannah River site, and I look forward to working 
with all of these important players, and particularly with the chairman 
of this committee, Senator Thurmond, who is an expert and really 
understands the challenges there, in defining, shaping, and 
implementing the future missions of the Savannah River site--``The 
second 50 years.''
  Mr. President, that completes my remarks. In accordance with my 
agreement, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

[[Page S7085]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBB addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, if no other Senator is desiring to take the 
floor at this particular moment, I would like to speak on an amendment 
that I have filed at the desk but do not plan to offer until the 
current matter is resolved.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.


                           Amendment No. 4363

  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, the amendment that I have filed at the desk 
is number 4363. It is designed to bring more discipline to the manner 
in which we authorize and appropriate military programs. Each year we 
receive from the administration a request for authorization of defense 
programs for the upcoming fiscal year. That request is the product of a 
lengthy and thorough process at the Department of Defense, Department 
of Energy, the Office of Management and Budget, the White House, and 
many other Federal agencies, to forge the best military force possible 
in the face of some rather severe fiscal constraints.
  The process of building DOD's budget is an enormously complicated 
process. It is unique in scope among Government departments. It 
involves at least 2 years of preparation explicitly for one fiscal 
year's budget submission. It involves hundreds of thousands of manhours 
by experts throughout the defense community. It involves careful 
analysis, computer modeling, war-gaming, tradeoffs, and compromise. It 
is not a process that we in the Congress should take lightly. We have 
extraordinary expertise here in the Senate among both Members and 
staff, but I believe we would be naive to ignore the complexity and 
delicate nature of maintaining a defense program that best serves the 
national interests.
  Mr. President, I am not suggesting that we defer carte blanche to the 
Department of Defense. I am suggesting that we exercise considerable 
caution in making significant changes to the request, especially in the 
areas of military equipment and construction, areas where Members are 
particularly inclined to make adds which may have nothing to do with 
national security.
  Mr. President, this year alone the committee has added more than $13 
billion to the administration's fiscal year 1997 request. I support 
most of that increase because I believe we are not doing enough to 
modernize and replace our aging weapons inventory. I am very much 
concerned that too much of that increase, almost $2.2 billion by one 
estimate, involves programs not requested by the administration, not 
mentioned by any of the services in their so-called wish list for 
priority items that did not make the budget request and not even a part 
of DOD's long-range 5-year plan.
  To this effect, I am offering this sense-of-the-Senate resolution, 
along with the distinguished Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, that 
urges the Senate, to the extent practicable, to authorize military 
equipment and to appropriate military equipment only if that equipment 
is, first, in the administration's request; or second, in the long-
range plans of the Department of Defense; or third, in a supplemental 
request issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military 
departments, the National Guard Bureau, or the Reserve chiefs, after 
the initial request is made.
  If an item meets one or more of these criteria, we would be assured 
that at a minimum it is something that the military believes that it 
needs either now or in the future if more funds were available. If an 
item cannot meet these minimal criteria, then I think at the very least 
it deserves very careful and critical examination.
  Mr. President, this amendment, when formally offered, does not state 
that the Senate should never authorize requests that did not meet these 
criteria. I am not urging that we advocate our legislative 
responsibilities by deferring without question to the Department. 
Indeed, the reason I voted against the amendment offered yesterday that 
would have deleted all spending not specifically requested by the 
Department is that I thought it could be interpreted as a complete 
abdication of legislative responsibility, and I did not want to go that 
far.
  Rather, the amendment that I have filed at the desk calls for the 
Senate Armed Services Committee to include a separate section in the 
committee report, and it will be amended to include similar language to 
affect the appropriating committee, that would provide a detailed 
national security justification for any equipment that does not meet 
the criteria.
  The amendment also calls for a separate section in the Armed Services 
Committee report, justifying any military construction projects that do 
not meet the military construction project criteria that was set forth 
by my good friend from Arizona in the fiscal year 1995 defense 
authorization bill. Similar language will be inserted to effect the 
appropriations process.

  Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I am happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. NUNN. I have not studied the amendment, and I would like to look 
at it more. I suggest, and I believe the Senator may have said this, if 
this applies to the authorization committee, it certainly should also 
apply to the appropriation committee.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I say to the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia that the current language does not, but I have included in my 
remarks an intent to modify the amendment when formally taken up so 
that both the authorizing and the appropriating committees would be 
affected by the language. It is very much in concert with the intent 
long expressed in the leadership provided by the distinguished Senator 
from Georgia and many others who have worked long and hard with the 
military committees, both the authorizing and the appropriating 
committees.
  Mr. President, the criteria that I am referring to, the inspiration 
for this particular amendment, call for the Senate to authorize only 
those military construction projects that are in the request in the 
DOD's future years defense plan and that meet other important criteria 
or similarly are affected by the appropriations process. Those criteria 
have already served the national interest well by substantially 
curtailing the authorization of construction projects not requested by 
the department.
  In an era when defense dollars are becoming tougher to find, while 
our sources are stretched thin overseas, it seems to me critical that 
we exercise extraordinary prudence and foresight in avoiding the 
expenditure of taxpayer dollars for purposes other than those 
recommended by the Department of Defense. By highlighting these items 
in the committee report, we increase the visibility of these add-ons 
and ensure that they are fully justified in and evaluated by the 
Congress and the public at large.
  Let me be clear, Mr. President, all of us have at one time or another 
requested projects that do not meet the criteria established in this 
amendment, myself included. But if these are projects that we feel 
strongly about in terms of their national security value, we ought to 
be prepared to have those items highlighted as adds in the committee 
report and defend them on their merit.
  Let me make a comment about the National Guard and Reserves. We are 
all aware of the DOD's perpetual unwillingness to adequately fund Guard 
and Reserve equipment and military construction accounts. Too often, 
without congressional leadership, the Guard and Reserves would be using 
outmoded equipment and operating out of tents.
  The criteria set forth in this amendment include any requests from 
the National Guard Bureau and the Reserve components. In addition, much 
of the Guard and Reserve equipment and military construction we 
authorize each year is, in fact, in the future year's defense plan of 
the Department of Defense, but we just do not see it.

  To remedy this, I introduced an amendment, along with my 
distinguished senior colleague from Virginia, Senator Warner, that was 
agreed to yesterday to require in permanent law the submission to 
Congress of the

[[Page S7086]]

DOD's future plan, or FYDP, for the Guard and Reserves. The DOD is 
currently required to submit its FYDP only for the active forces. That 
amendment will, at a minimum, allow the Congress to make more informed 
judgments about what should be added for Guard and Reserve forces.
  All of the men and women of our Armed Forces--active, Reserve, and 
Guard--deserve to have equipment and facilities that meet their needs. 
In short, Mr. President, we owe it to them to avoid authorizing those 
items that the Department of Defense has shown no interest in now or in 
the future, or appropriating those items which the Department of 
Defense has shown no interest in now or for the future, and to have the 
courage explicitly to highlight debate and justify any such items that 
we decide to go ahead with and authorize.
  With that, Mr. President, at the appropriate time, I will modify the 
amendment at the desk, and I will urge its adoption. I suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                       1996 Atlanta Olympic Games

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, over the course of recent weeks, there has 
been growing interest and excitement in the 1996 Atlanta Olympic games. 
This has been highlighted by the Olympic torch relay across the country 
and here at the U.S. Capitol last week. It was further enhanced by the 
electrifying record-breaking runs at the Olympic trials held this past 
weekend. The Centennial Olympic games begin in less than 4 weeks and 
will be held principally in Atlanta. However, additional venues are 
scattered throughout the State of Georgia as well as Florida, Alabama, 
Tennessee, and the District of Columbia.
  All in all, more than 10,000 athletes and 2 million spectators from 
around the world will participate in the games, making this event the 
largest peacetime gathering in history. By comparison, the Atlanta 
games will be approximately twice the size of the Los Angeles Olympics 
in terms of the number of participants and spectators.
  In addition, Atlanta will host athletes from 197 countries around the 
globe. That is an additional 57 countries from those 140 which 
participated in the 1984 games.
  To give my colleagues a point of reference, particularly for the 
football fans among them, the Atlanta Olympic games will be the 
equivalent of one city hosting six Super Bowl games each day for 17 
days straight.
  So it is a Super Bowl times six each day for 17 days. That is quite 
an undertaking.
  Not surprisingly, such an event as the centennial games is too big 
for any single municipal or State government to take care of the safety 
and security without appropriate help from the Federal Government.
  Those who won the selection of Atlanta as the Olympic venue 
understood at the beginning that they would be responsible for 
providing the cost of putting on the games, and they are spending about 
$1.5 billion to do so. They should not and did not, however, plan to 
pay the bill to guarantee the security of millions of visitors from all 
over the world and all of the athletes in an era of terrorism. In the 
era of modern terrorism, safety for an event of this type simply cannot 
be guaranteed without help from the Federal Government. So if you 
remove the Federal Government from the scene, there would be no venue 
in America, in my opinion, that could host international games, 
certainly not of this magnitude.
  Mr. President, I support appropriate Department of Defense assistance 
for the Atlanta Olympics. My friend, Senator Coverdell, and I have 
supported this funding, and we have done so vigorously, and many of our 
colleagues, in fact a vast majority on the floor of the Senate and in 
the House, have joined us.
  This is not simply because it is Atlanta. I supported similar funding 
and support for the Olympic games at Lake Placid in 1980 and Los 
Angeles in 1994, the PanAmerican games in Indianapolis in 1987 and the 
Special Olympics in New Haven in 1995, as well as other international 
contests hosted by the United States. It simply has to be done. It is 
one of those elements of national security that is very, very 
important, and it must be defined as national security because no city 
or State can possibly deal with the kind of threats of terrorism we 
have in the world today.
  For events of such magnitude, the Congress has long authorized the 
use of military personnel and equipment--in carefully prescribed 
circumstances--to be used in support of these events. In some cases, 
this support requires full reimbursement, and in some cases--such as 
security activities--there is no reimbursement requirement. For the 
Atlanta games, Federal support for the Olympics and Paralympics has 
been a bipartisan effort from day one under the Bush administration. 
This bipartisan effort has continued through the years as the Congress 
has provided the appropriate authorization and appropriation to support 
the games in both Republican and Democratic administrations, both 
Republican and Democratic Congresses.
  Unfortunately, there have been a number of glaringly inaccurate or 
misleading reports about support provided to the Atlanta Olympics.
  I think it is important, before we have an Olympic amendment which we 
are going to have which hopefully will be worked out, it is important 
to have some background here because our friends in Utah, Senator Hatch 
and Senator Bennett, are going to be faced with the same kind of 
challenges in terms of security in the years ahead as they prepare for 
the Winter Olympics which has already been awarded to that State and to 
our country.
  Some of these accounts have questioned in particular the 
appropriateness of Department of Defense personnel and equipment being 
used to provide security and security-related support for the Atlanta 
Olympic games.
  I realize that an important part of our democracy is public scrutiny 
of government actions. Elected officials and others in government must 
be held accountable for their actions. It is entirely appropriate for 
the public, the news media, and Members of Congress to ask the tough 
questions about stewardship of public funds and resources.

  However, the media and the Congress have a responsibility to provide 
the public with facts--not half-truths, innuendo, and unsubstantiated 
opinion without factual foundation. Given the numerous inaccuracies 
contained in many of the media and congressional statements regarding 
the Olympics, I rise today to provide what the news commentator Paul 
Harvey called the rest of the story.
  In 1991, Congress authorized the Department of Defense to provide 
personnel and logistics support for the Centennial Olympic games as 
well as the Paralympics--the inspiring competition of some 4,000 
disabled athletes from 102 counties who have overcome a handicap to 
become a world-class athlete. Believe me, these are, indeed, world 
class athletics. The Paralympics take place 11 days after the 
conclusion of the Olympics, although they are not under the direction 
or direct auspices of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games 
[ACOG]. In other words, they are not under ACOG, but it will take place 
in many of the same venues and will be in the Atlanta vicinity.
  Taxpayer-funded DOD support for the Olympics is provided for 
functions to protect the safety of participants and spectators in four 
States and the District of Columbia. Requests for DOD services have 
been jointly compiled over a 4-year period of study by security 
personnel and others representing over 50 local, State, and Federal 
Government agencies. The DOD and the military services reviewed these 
requests and accepted only those they considered appropriate for 
security and security-related support. DOD can provide non-security 
support for special events on a reimbursable basis--and, DOD is doing 
so for the Atlanta Olympic and Paralympic games. Where DOD has a unique 
capability not readily available elsewhere they have been providing 
some of the support on a reimbursable basis.
  This is not a comprehensive list of everything that has been said, 
but it is my best effort to deal with some of the

[[Page S7087]]

more egregious accounts or distortions that I have come across about 
the Olympics and the Paralympics and the facts that respond to these 
allegations which have been, in some cases, misleading and in other 
cases completely false.
  This is an up-to-date list as of today, but I must say the critics of 
the Atlanta Committee on the Olympic games seem to come up with new 
allegations as fast as old ones are refuted. Let me just deal with a 
few of them today because I think it is important for the record to be 
straight. I certainly think it is important as we consider a later 
amendment, and also as Senator Hatch and Senator Bennett deal with the 
security requests that will be forthcoming for the games that will be 
held in Utah.
  Misleading report No. 1: DOD has acceded to all requests from ACOG 
and State and local law enforcement groups without making measured 
judgments of what type of military-related assistance is justified and 
appropriate. That is the charge. Fact: DOD received numerous requests 
for assistance from ACOG and law enforcement agencies which DOD 
considered inappropriate for military personnel to execute and these 
were denied. For example, request for DOD to: operate magnetometers at 
entry points--request denied; guard local communications and power 
infrastructure--request denied; provide security support at the 
International Press Center, Centennial Park, International Olympic 
Committee Headquarters, and VIP hotels--request denied.
  Neither I nor DOD would contend that these requests were frivolous. 
It is simply that within the scope of available resources and the best 
analysis of the type of security threat that requires U.S. military 
help, careful judgments were made from the perspective of stewardship 
of resources and the proper use of military personnel.
  Misleading report No. 2: That $13,325 spent by DOD was wasted on what 
a May 7, 1996 Washington Post article described, ``something called 
aviation planning and landing zones.'' That is the charge. Fact: DOD 
spent this sum for aerial surveys to determine the best locations to 
bring in military or law enforcement helicopters in an emergency. We 
must remember that the majority of the Olympic events will occur within 
a 3-mile area in downtown Atlanta, which has restricted airspace and 
will be flooded with Olympic participants and spectators. Route 
planning for emergency airlift situations is a critical security 
function and does not require the DOD to be reimbursed. It is my great 
hope that medical teams, hostage rescue forces or explosive ordnance or 
chemical/biological teams will not be called upon to fly into an event 
area. However, if they are, this prudent planning will save time and 
perhaps precious lives in an emergency.
  Misleading report No. 3: Military personnel will be used to drive 
buses and vans to transport spectators to the Olympic Games. Fact: 
Military personnel will not drive spectator buses and vans. Military 
personnel will be used to transport athletes and law enforcement 
officials moving between the Olympic Village and event venues. This has 
been a part of the security plan since its inception. Of the 1,058 
military drivers provided to support the Olympics, 419 will remain in 
Atlanta after the Olympics to provide support to the Paralympic 
athletes. The Justice Department and the FBI subsequently determined 
that this function is a valid and essential part of the comprehensive 
security plan. This was the recommendation of our top law enforcement 
officials as to what was needed for security. While some may want to 
second-guess or Monday morning quarterback this decision, I certainly 
am not one of those. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a 
letter from the Assistant Attorney General of the United States 
concerning the use of military drivers at the Olympics be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                              Office of the Deputy


                                             Attorney General,

                                   Washington, DC, March 27, 1996.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     U.S. Senate, Senate Dirksen Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: The Department of Justice (DOJ) is 
     pleased to respond to your inquiry concerning the Department 
     of Defense (DOD) reprogramming as it relates to security 
     issues for the Olympic Games in Atlanta. Security for the 
     Olympics will be provided by a combination of federal, state 
     and local law enforcement, private guards, volunteers, and 
     DOD personnel. It is the opinion of this Department that the 
     DOD component is critical to the safety of the Games. We have 
     reviewed the reprogramming submission and concur in DOD's 
     assessment that the requested functions all are essential. 
     These include venue and route security, EOD support, vehicle 
     and package sanitization, athlete bus drivers, and 
     administrative support for the DOD personnel. It is 
     imperative that each of these functions, especially military 
     drivers for athlete buses, be included in the reprogramming 
     as they have been included in DOD support requests from the 
     outset and have been approved through various stages of 
     review.
       This reprogramming will play a vital role in providing a 
     secure environment for the Olympics and ensuring the public 
     safety of the visitors to and residents of the Atlanta area.
       Of course, DOJ staff are available to provide more 
     information to members of Congress on the Department's 
     position on this issue should they so desire.
           Sincerely,
                                                Jamie S. Gorelick.

  Mr. NUNN. I find it ironic that these recent press accounts would 
make light of this security mission. We need look no further than the 
bombings in Egypt, Israel and the recent one in Saudi Arabia as well as 
other nations to realize that buses and other transportation hubs are 
frequent targets of terrorists. It would be unthinkable for security 
personnel to ignore this prospect in Atlanta. The use of military 
personnel in driving the buses has many advantages. These include the 
fact that the danger of infiltration of the driver pool is virtually 
eliminated in comparison to the danger of using volunteer or commercial 
drivers. In addition, military personnel are both disciplined and 
reliable--all personnel are specially trained in varying degrees for 
performance in combat or other difficult circumstances.
  Once again, prudent planning and precaution in this security arena 
may make the difference between life and death, and here I, for one, 
will defer to the experts in security who felt this was an essential 
security need.
  Misleading report No. 4: DOD personnel will be assigned to wash the 
Olympic buses. Fact: DOD personnel will not be washing buses. In fact, 
ACOG has established and paid for a vehicle wash and transportation 
staging facility located at Fort Gillem in Atlanta. ACOG employees and 
Olympic volunteers will operate the facility to wash the Olympic buses. 
At the conclusion of the Olympic and Paralympic games, this facility 
and improvements, valued at $108,000, will be donated to the U.S. 
Army--providing a continuous benefit to activities and personnel at 
Fort Gillem.
  Misleading report No. 5, and this one has popped up over and over 
again. It almost seems to be one that cannot be put to rest. The State 
of Georgia has charged DOD over $100,000 for military personnel to 
obtain State-issued commercial drivers licenses. Fact: The State of 
Georgia has not charged DOD anything for the testing and licensing of 
the military drivers. The military determined that for its own 
requirements--liability, interstate travel, etc.--it would be prudent 
to obtain commercial licenses for their personnel. General Tilelli of 
U.S. Army Forces Command [FORSCOM] stated for the record before the 
Armed Services Committee on July 11, 1996, ``the Georgia Department of 
Safety is providing testing and licenses for military drivers stationed 
in Georgia and supporting the Olympics at no cost to DOD.'' GAO 
confirmed this information in a June 14 report which stated that the 
358 DOD drivers from bases in Georgia will obtain Georgia-issued 
commercial drivers licenses at no cost to DOD as agreed to in a 
Memorandum of Agreement of May 14, 1996 between the Department of the 
Army and the Georgia Department of Public Safety.
  Earlier disinformation contending that Georgia was charging for 
commercial licenses may have given the impression that the State of 
Georgia is nickel and diming the Federal Government to death over the 
Olympics. In fact, the State is leaning over backward to accommodate 
the military, as well they should. I also would like to point out that 
the State of Georgia is spending more than $72 million of its own funds 
on Olympic security, including the salaries of law officers who will

[[Page S7088]]

be assigned to full-time Olympic security duties. Not counting state 
prison guards, some 73 percent of all State of Georgia employees who 
have law enforcement credentials will be assigned to the Olympics. This 
is not just Atlanta, but the whole State. So almost 75 percent of all 
credentialed law enforcement officials will be used by Georgia in the 
Olympics.
  Misleading report No. 6: DOD personnel will be watering the Olympic 
field hockey fields. That is the charge. Fact: DOD personnel will not 
be watering Olympic playing fields. Media accounts have led the public 
to believe that DOD personnel engaged in this activity, conjuring an 
image of teams of soldiers acting as laborers with garden hoses. In 
fact, one television news reader asked, ``doesn't the military know 
that water won't make artificial turf grow?'' This claim is simply not 
true. This watering equipment was requested for use during the games 
because local water department officials and the Atlanta fire chief 
feared that water pressure in their municipal water system would fall 
to dangerous levels under the known demand to dispense 4,500 gallons of 
water over a field in a 7 minute period twice during each competition. 
DOD will provide four 50,000 gallon water bladders, two 20,000 gallon 
water bladders, and six water pumps which will be used to water three 
Olympic field hockey fields. As GAO noted in its June 14 letter to 
Senator McCain that military personnel will operate the bladders and 
``ACOG personnel will operate the above ground watering systems 
distributing water on the fields . . . in accordance with Field Hockey 
International Federation rules.'' The military uses this equipment to 
store and distribute water to its personnel in extreme environments, 
and similar equipment was used in Operations Desert Storm and Desert 
Shield. As a matter of fact, similar equipment was used when we had the 
huge floods in Georgia and we had whole cities that could not be 
supplied with water, where people literally had no water to drink. DOD 
came in that emergency and helped, as they have with other floods 
around the country. A similar DOD bladder system was tested for the 
Olympics in 1995 at a cost of $11,884 for setting up and operating the 
system.
  The important thing here, as with other nonsecurity activities, 
expenses to the military are reimbursed. ACOG reimbursed the costs in 
1995 and will reimburse all associated costs for the water system when 
it is used during the games. Any diligent reporter could have 
ascertained these facts before printing the misleading information.
  Misleading report No. 7: The Navy has contributed $39,750 worth of 
barges to support the Olympic yachting competion. Fact: The Navy has 
provided three barges for use at Olympic yachting competitions outside 
of Savannah, but not at taxpayer expense. ACOG reimbursed the DOD 
$39,750 in 1995 for the costs associated with the use of these barges. 
Again, a fact that could have been ascertained before the misleading 
reports were printed.
  Also ignored in the media reports was the fact that the yachting 
competition will take place in waters surrounding environmentally 
sensitive barrier islands. In total, 25 barges--3 from the Navy--will 
be used as spectator platforms in an effort to protect the sensitive 
coastal areas from irreparable damage. I am advised that the three Navy 
barges are over 45 years old, were in storage until they were brought 
up to a usable condition--at ACOG's expense--and were moved to Savannah 
by the Army's 7th Transportation Group at Fort Eustis, VA. The DOD 
Office of Special Events determined that movement of the barges by the 
Army was a non reimbursable expense. All other costs associated with 
the barges were deemed reimbursable by the Office of Special Events and 
were reimbursed by ACOG.
  Misleading report No. 8: DOD purchased ice chests for the Atlanta 
Police Department. Fact: DOD is not purchasing new ice chests for the 
police as the public has been led to believe. DOD will provide 35 
chests from current DOD stock inventory on a use and return basis. Once 
again, General Tilelli's responses to questions at the June 11 
Committee hearing confirmed that DOD will loan the stock coolers to the 
police. This is the stock of material that is retained by the Office of 
Special Events for just such use.
  Misleading report No. 9: DOD has provided nonsecurity support for the 
Atlanta Olympic games, but it has not been reimbursed. Fact: For the 
non security items that have been provided to date, ACOG has reimbursed 
DOD in full and will reimburse when any future nonsecurity support is 
provided. To date, ACOG and associated Olympic organizing committees 
have reimbursed DOD almost $600,000. Future reimbursements are expected 
to exceed $100,000.
  Misleading report No. 10: DOD constructed a new dining facility for 
athletes use during the Olympic games. Fact: DOD provided a relocatable 
facility at the Paralympic Athletes Village in support of the 
Paralympic games. After its use at the games, this relocatable facility 
will be transported to Blount Island, FL, to support maintenance 
activities for active duty Marines stationed at this facility. 
Personally, I am proud that our military is able to assist the 
Paralympics in this fashion.
  If anyone objects to this, let it be criticized in the effect of it 
being the Paralympics, not the Olympics. I believe our soldiers take 
great pride in participating in a project that assists athletes of such 
astounding, astounding great courage. Members of our military sadly are 
no strangers to the impact of injury or illness that some define as 
``incapacitating.'' But the Paralympic athletes have proved by their 
own performance and their tremendous courage that the definition of 
``incapacitated" needs reexamination by our society.

  Mr. President, I imagine there are other inaccurate accounts that 
have been publicly disseminated but have not come to my attention. I do 
not pretend that I am answering everything that has been in the media. 
I have not read it all. Unfortunately, it seems that many members of 
the media in this area have not taken the time to check the facts. I 
simply urge, when these other reports or charges come up, that someone 
check with the Department of Defense, check with the ACOG committee 
before they write these kinds of articles. Hopefully, in the weeks 
ahead, the critics will check some of the cynicism at the door and 
focus on the many good and positive stories associated with the 
aspirations and preparations involved with the Olympics and the 
Paralympics, a very special part of our modern history.
  Mr. President, I have previously asked that the attachment from the 
deputy attorney general that I alluded to be printed in the Record.
  Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
allowed to speak as in morning business for up to maybe 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________