[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 97 (Thursday, June 27, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7074-S7080]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 9:30 
a.m. having arrived, the Senate will now resume consideration of S. 
1745, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1745) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1997 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

       Pending:
       Nunn-Lugar amendment No. 4349, to authorize funds to 
     establish measures to protect the security of the United 
     States from proliferation and use of weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       Warner (for Pressler-Dashcle) amendment No. 4350, to 
     express the sense of the Congress on naming one of the new 
     attack submarines the ``South Dakota''.


                           Amendment No. 4349

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 10 
minutes of debate equally divided on amendment No. 4349.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, what is the pending amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is No. 4349.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Hatch 
be added as a cosponsor to the pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we had a good debate last night after most 
Members had gone home and after all the votes had been cast for the 
day. But, nevertheless, I hope some of our colleagues and their staff--
and, indeed, the American people--heard some of that debate because, to 
me, this is an enormously important subject and a very important 
amendment.
  This amendment is sponsored by Senator Lugar, myself, Senator 
Domenici, Senator Biden, Senator Gramm, Senator Hatch, and others.
  It has three major thrusts.
  First, it recognizes that one of our most serious national security 
threats is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--not just 
nuclear weapons but also chemical and biological weapons.
  Just this week ``The Nuclear Black Market'' report came out by the 
Global Organized Crime Project, which is chaired by William Webster, 
former head of the FBI and CIA, with the project Director Arnaud de 
Borchgrave.
  That publication made it very clear in the findings of this very 
distinguished group of Americans with considerable national security 
experience.
  Quoting from that report:

       The most serious national security threat facing the United 
     States, its allies, and its interests is the theft of nuclear 
     weapons or weapons-usable materials from the former Soviet 
     Union. The consequences of such a theft--measured in terms of 
     politics, economics, diplomacy, military response, and public 
     health and safety--would be catastrophic.

  Arnaud de Borchgrave said at the press conference:

       We have concluded that we're faced now with as big a threat 
     as any we faced during the cold war, when the balance of 
     terror kept the peace for almost half a century.

  We also have a quote that makes it clear that the foundation for this 
amendment is based on some of the findings in this report, as well as 
extensive hearings.
  We had reports from the Harvard group headed by Graham Allison; 
reports from the Monterey Institute, and others.
  So this is not the only report. This is the most recent and, I think, 
one of the more thorough reports that has been done on this subject.
  But this report says:

       A layered defense against nuclear trafficking is essential. 
     Countermeasures must continue to emphasize securing warheads 
     and

[[Page S7075]]

     materials at the source because there are few opportunities 
     for detecting, interdicting, and neutralizing these materials 
     once they are beyond the source site. . . . [A]ttention and 
     resources must be directed toward post-theft measures as 
     well.
       The magnitude of the problem, especially in Russia, remains 
     enormous. The greatest need is for a sustained effort with 
     sufficient resources and a clear, long-term vision of what 
     needs to be accomplished.

  So, Mr. President, we are trying to have three thrusts forward with 
this amendment. One is to beef up the Nunn-Lugar legislation which 
already is helping contain these weapons of mass destruction at their 
source;
  Second, we want to beef up the Customs Department so that they can 
protect our borders better and also help the former Soviet states--not 
just Russia but all those states--protect their borders from this 
dangerous material and know-how leaking out;
  And, third, to make sure that we are prepared here at home.
  We are not prepared at home now. We need a major thrust forward to 
help our cities, to help our States to use certain National Guard 
units, to use the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense to 
train and equip over a period of time our State and local law 
enforcement officials so that we will be able to deal with this kind of 
crisis, if it occurs, and that we will be able to prevent it from 
occurring in the first place.
  So that is the essence of the amendment. I know that Senator Domenici 
and Senator Lugar will also want to speak on this. We have a very short 
period of time.
  I urge approval of the amendment. I reserve any time I have 
remaining.
  Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I commend to the Senate this morning an 
amendment that I believe will make a historic difference in American 
security, and it is our security we are talking about, the security of 
Americans, who would like relief from the possibilities of an ICBM 
attack in nuclear, chemical, or biological terms coming out of the 
former Soviet Union--or out of any country, for that matter--which 
might jeopardize it and who want some assurance that we here in the 
United States are prepared to coordinate the remarkable work of our 
Department of Defense in historic research efforts to combat potential 
difficulties for American personnel from biological, chemical, or 
nuclear attack that might be transferred to local officials who will 
work with these people.
  All of these objectives are approached. They will never be fully 
achieved, but clearly the passage of this amendment will bring a 
greater sense of security to all Americans that our Government works, 
that we have talented people in our military and in our civilian 
components of government at all levels that will make a difference in 
the safety of Americans.
  For these reasons, I commend this amendment. I am hopeful it will 
have very strong support in the Senate this morning.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment is of critical importance 
to the security of the United States and its allies: The proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction. In my remarks on the Senate floor on 
April 17, 1996, I addressed this issue stating that we can no longer 
afford to treat this proliferation as some merely hypothetical threat.
  The United States could soon be at risk from long-range Taepo Dong II 
missiles now being developed by North Korea. We have also seen evidence 
of Saddam Hussein's biological weapons program confirmed by Saddam's 
son-in-law who defected from Iraq last year. We have seen China sell 
missiles and other nuclear technology to Pakistan, and a tremendous 
missile race between India and Pakistan on the subcontinent. Finally, 
we have seen the murderous activities of the Supreme Truth cult in 
Japan, which was responsible for a poison gas attack that injured more 
than 5,500 Tokyo subway passengers.
  As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and as chairman of 
the Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, I have long been 
concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I 
believe the administration was correct when it stated in the most 
recent edition of ``A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement'' that ``weapons of mass destrucion--nuclear, biological, 
and chemical--along with their associated delivery systems, pose a 
major threat to our security.''
  I also believe that the administration has not done nearly enough to 
prevent the spread of these weapons. In my view, Mr. President, we have 
a tremendously unwieldy U.S. Government bureaucracy for combatting 
proliferation. By my estimate, some 96 departments, agencies and other 
organizations have some responsibility in this area. Mechanisms for 
effectively integrating the activities of the Department of State, 
Defense, Justice, Treasury, and Commerce, to name just a few, are 
lacking. Given the complexity of the tasks involved, the need for 
marshaling resources from many agencies, and the necessarily protracted 
nature of these efforts, the failure to assign clear and empowered 
leadership has impeded the U.S. effort.
  It was for that reason that I introduced legislation on April 17, 
1996, that would create a high-level commission, appointed by the White 
House and the Congress, to conduct a governmentwide study of the 
complex organizational structure charged with combatting proliferation. 
Members of this commission would also be responsible for providing 
Congress and the President with a set of recommendations designed to 
improve U.S. Government performance, and reduce the amount of 
unnecessary duplication by the various agencies involved.
  As I indicated in my remarks last April, I examined closely a number 
of possible organizational changes. One option, I noted, was the 
creation of a high-level czar, such as the drug czar empowered to 
coordinate activities against drug trafficking. I also mentioned that I 
have considered the creation of a high-level position on the National 
Security Council [NSC] staff. I was very pleased, therefore, to find 
while reviewing the Nunn-Lugar amendment now under consideration by the 
Senate that my distinguished colleagues advocated the creation of both 
a ``national coordinator on nonproliferation,'' and a new standing NSC 
committee on nonproliferation, composed of the Secretary of Defense, 
State, Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, and other cabinet-level officials. This committee, 
chaired by the national coordinator, would be responsible for reviewing 
and coordinating all Federal programs, policies, and directives 
relating to proliferation.
  Mr. President, I believe that this legislation is a critically 
important step in our efforts to improve the ability of the United 
States to combat proliferation. Creating a single body with overall 
responsibility for this critical national security responsibility is a 
step in the right direction.
  U.S. efforts to combat proliferation are not well organized. 
Significant institutional and organization changes in the U.S. 
Government are required if the United States is to improve its ability 
to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I want to strongly support this 
initiative and to commend Senators Nunn and Lugar, as well as Senator 
Domenici, for their continued strong leadership in this area vital to 
our national security.
  The single greatest threat to American soil today is that nuclear, 
chemical or biological weapons will be used against us by terrorist 
organizations or other rogue entities. Perhaps the supreme irony of the 
cold war's end is that while the risk that America will be devastated 
from coast to coast has abated, the prospects that a weapon of mass 
destruction will in fact detonate on our soil have grown substantially.
  The threats today are much more complex, and our response must be 
more complex as well. In plain terms, it is no longer enough that 
America's defenses be strong--they must also be smart, agile, flexible, 
and intuitive.
  The Senate, for example, has yet to consent to ratify the Chemical 
Weapons Convention that President Bush negotiated. I think we should do 
so without delay. It is another of the many tools we need to meet the 
diverse new threats to our security.
  For several years, we have been engaged in the Nunn-Lugar program to 
help secure and destroy weapons of

[[Page S7076]]

mass destruction at their source in parts of the former Soviet Union. 
This program has been successful, and I believe it should be expanded 
while that is still possible.
  Today we are considering the so-called Nunn-Lugar II program. While 
the existing program seeks to contain dangerous weapons material at its 
source, this new proposal would put in place mechanisms to deal with 
material that leaks.
  This amendment would let us help strengthen the export control 
regimes of countries that are the source of much of the weapons 
material. It is in our interest to help countries like Russia to keep 
weapons material inside their borders and out of international 
commerce.
  The amendment also would strengthen our own border controls to help 
keep illicit weapons material out of the United States.
  Finally, it would put in place a coordinated effort to ensure that 
the public safety personnel in communities across America know how to 
respond in the terrible event of a nuclear, chemical or biological 
incident.
  I hope this contingency planning is never needed, but I support this 
amendment in case it is.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to express my intention to vote in 
favor of the amendment offered by my colleagues, Senators Nunn, Lugar, 
and Domenici, concerning America's actions to alleviate threats to our 
country's security coming from Russia and from terrorists. This is 
important legislation, perhaps one of the most significant provisions 
in this entire bill, and I think it deserves some high praise and a few 
cautionary notes.
  First, the praise. I cannot think of a better investment in America's 
security than working to reduce the number of weapons of mass 
destruction that could be targeted or used against our country. The 
assistance provided in this bill aims at enhancing the security of 
controls over materials in the former Soviet Union that are associated 
with such weapons, and reducing the amounts of these materials. It is 
to me without doubt a sound public investment.
  The bill provides funds for improving the material protection, 
control, and accounting of materials that could be used in nuclear 
weapons--material that someday could otherwise either be illicitly 
exported to dozens of countries around the world or even targeted 
against the United States. It just makes sense to enhance controls over 
these materials.
  The bill also provides funds for improving the means to verify the 
dismantlement of nuclear warheads, a functions that is vital if we are 
to have the confidence to proceed with deep cuts of United States and 
Russian strategic arsenals under the START process.
  The bill contains a program aiming at the total elimination of the 
production of plutonium in Russian for use in weapons. I regret, 
however, that the amendment contains a provision (sec. 1332(a)(2)(C)) 
that also encourages Russia to convert this plutonium into nonweapons 
uses, which to me looks like a green light to a larger U.S. role in 
encouraging large scale stockpiling and transportation in plutonium for 
dubious commercial purposes. This is, in other words, a friendly pat on 
the back for the plutonium economy in Russia.
  I am not at all confident that the United States, any of our friends 
in Europe and Japan, and indeed any country on earth--not just the 
countries in the former Soviet Union--has truly adequate capabilities 
not just to protect but even to track or account for the disturbingly 
large amounts of weapon-useable nuclear materials that are floating 
around the world in the civilian sector. This is not the type of trade 
we should be promoting, either directly or indirectly.
  It is quite easy to stereotype this problem--as many of the findings 
of this particular amendment regrettably do--as one that is limited to 
Russia, rogue nations, rogue regimes, fanatic third world dictators, 
maniacal terrorists, and underworld gangsters. But the problem is of 
course much more complex than this caricature indicates. As I have 
stated many times before, the problem of controlling these materials 
and getting them out of world commerce is truly global in scope. 
Plutonium and highly enriched uranium can be made into devastating 
city-busting nuclear weapons even if they do not come from facilities 
in the former Soviet Union--the national origin of such materials is 
less significant than their potential availability for illicit uses 
and, surely, the ability of our country and international organizations 
to keep close track of the precise location and disposition of such 
materials.

  If anybody of my colleagues doubts that the problem of tracking such 
materials is exclusively a Russian problem, I would encourage each and 
every Member to read closely the recent work of the General Accounting 
Office on this subject.
  On December 27, 1994, GAO issued a report entitled, ``U.S. 
International Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities Are Limited,'' 
which reached the following conclusions concerning the system--called 
NMMSS or the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System--used 
by our government to track U.S. nuclear materials that are exported to 
other countries. Listen to what GAO had to say about America's own 
system for nuclear material tracking--

       The United States relies primarily on the NMMSS to track 
     the nuclear materials exported to foreign countries. However, 
     this system does not have all the information needed to track 
     the specific current location (facility) and status of all 
     nuclear materials of U.S. origin that are supplied to foreign 
     countries. For example, the system does not track exported 
     U.S. nuclear materials that are moved from facility to 
     facility within countries, nor does it show the current 
     status of the nuclear materials (e.g., irradiated, 
     unirradiated, fabricated, burned up, or reprocessed). Thus, 
     the NMMSS may not contain correct data on where (at which 
     facility) these materials are located within foreign 
     countries or on their current status.

  OK, so that was the situation in 1994. In August 1995, GAO released 
another report bearing a now-familiar title: ``Poor Management of 
Nuclear Materials Tracking System Makes Success Unlikely.'' This report 
found that the Department of Energy, ``has not implemented any of the 
recommendations contained in our prior report and has no plans to do 
so.'' According to GAO, ``Due to its lack of sound planning, DoE does 
not know if the [NMMSS] system will fulfill the needs of its major 
users or be cost-effective.''
  Well how about 1996? On May 29, 1996, I received a letter from GAO 
commenting once again on the U.S. system for tracking nuclear materials 
abroad. Here is what GAO had to say: ``We continue to believe that the 
nuclear materials tracking system is significantly limited in its 
ability to track nuclear materials internationally and that the 
replacement system faces a high probability of failure because it has 
not been completely developed and tested.'' This letter is available 
from GAO as document B-271592, 5/29/96.
  Let us keep in mind what we are talking about here. The Department of 
Energy described the NMMSS system in a news release dated June 27, 
1994, as follows: ``* * * it is the official record used to maintain 
compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty.''

  So are these limitations in America's ability to track nuclear 
materials of recent origin? Hardly. GAO issued a report on August 2, 
1982--that is almost 14 years ago--bearing the title, ``Obstacles to 
U.S. Ability to Control and Track Weapons-Grade Uranium Supplied 
Abroad.'' Then on January 14, 1985, GAO issued another report entitled, 
``The U.S. Nuclear Materials Information System Can Improve Service to 
Its User Agencies,'' once again documenting numerous shortcomings in 
America's own system of nuclear materials accounting.
  My point here is to emphasize that we should not be deluding 
ourselves that the amendment before us today will address the kinds of 
problem that GAO has been documenting or almost two decades in 
America's ability to monitor global--I repeat, global--tracking of 
nuclear materials. Scenarios involving so-called loose nukes just 
flowing out of Russia make for great speeches and play well in the 
media, but they offer just too simplistic an approach for understanding 
a vastly more complex and, once again, more global threat.
  I would like to turn now to the second highly positive feature of 
this bill, its emphasis on the need for greater attention to the 
problem of domestic preparedness to cope with incidents involving the 
use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists 
inside the United States. This

[[Page S7077]]

year's hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has 
adequately and competently documented the scope of this threat as well 
as America's lack of preparedness to deal with it. It may be that 
history will record that the sums provided in this bill to correct this 
problem were, if anything, inadequate to the job, given the magnitude 
of the challenges that lie ahead. Nevertheless, the authors of this 
legislation deserve credit for having spotted a key deficiency in 
America's responses to the global weapons proliferation threat and for 
taking some concrete steps to correct the problem.
  I regret that the bill merely contains hortatory language about 
increasing the penalties for offenses relating to the importation, 
attempted importation, exportation, and attempted exportation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials or technologies. 
Even this hortatory language, moreover, does not include the Atomic 
Energy Act in its list of relevant laws that need to be reexamined. The 
Atomic Energy Act is the law that governs America's foreign trade in 
nuclear equipment and materials.
  There is also nothing in this bill encouraging the Government to make 
use of the reward authorities that were created in the Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, which as I understand it, the 
State Department is reluctant to implement. In this respect, I would 
like to comment briefly on a letter dated March 18, 1996, that I have 
received from Mr. Andrew Fois, and Assistant Attorney General in the 
Justice Department, addressing the subject of the payment of Government 
rewards for information about illicit transfers of nuclear materials or 
nuclear weapons. My specific inquiry focused on the record of the U.S. 
Government in implementing the Atomic Weapons and Special Nuclear 
Materials Rewards Act of 1955. The Justice Department's response states 
that: ``The FBI has not promulgated special guidelines addressing the 
payment of rewards for information pursuant to the Atomic Weapons and 
Special Nuclear Materials Rewards Act.'' The letter goes on to say: 
``The FBI is not aware of any previous payment of a reward for 
information relating to the illicit transfer of nuclear materials or 
weapons.'' Furthermore, the letter adds, ``The FBI has not utilized the 
nuclear trafficking information rewards authority because the 
opportunity to do so has not arisen.'' The letter also indicates some 
concern that the act of offering rewards ``might generate a `market' 
which does not now exist, and would not resolve any existing problem.''

  It might come as somewhat of a surprise to most observers that the 
United States has not used a rewards authority which has been on the 
statute books for 41 years, almost as long as the entire existence of 
the Nuclear Age. I only hope that it does not take a catastrophic 
nuclear explosion or act of terrorism involving radiological weapons to 
inspire a reexamination of this longstanding Government practice of 
neglecting a potentially useful tool against both nuclear weapons 
proliferation and terrorism. I believe that rewards will have to play a 
role dealing with these threats.
  It seems to me pretty ironic to watch all these heroic efforts now 
underway to enhance our preparedness to deal with future weapons of 
mass destruction threats here at home, without recognizing the need for 
the U.S. Government to obtain information about the nature of these 
threats. It is a regrettable fact of life, one that may well reflect a 
less admirable feature of human nature, that obtaining such information 
sometimes does require the payment of rewards.
  The final subject I would like to address today concerns subtitle D 
of the bill, which will create a ``National Coordinator for 
Nonproliferation Matters''--in other words, a de facto nonproliferation 
czar. I am not at all enthusiastic about this proposal and believe that 
its best feature might well turn out to be its sunset clause, which 
relieves the President of having such a post after September 30, 1999.
  I do not dispute the need for greater coordination between the 
various agencies in many areas relating to nonproliferation policy. The 
recent hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, for 
example, revealed serious lack of coordination at both the Federal-
State-local levels and at the interagency level. I suspect that one 
could add to this list, coordination between the Executive and 
Congress, or even the organization of Congress for dealing with these 
threats, but such topics were omitted from the scope of this bill.
  I find it rather extraordinary that the so-called Committee on Non-
Proliferation would be composed of such agencies as Commerce, Treasury, 
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency--but not the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, the entity within our Government that has an 
explicit statutory nonproliferation mission. This amendment might have 
offered an excellent opportunity to enhance the role of ACDA in our 
Government, but instead the agency was not even cited in this portion 
of the amendment. I am very disappointed by the structure of this 
committee.

  The function of the coordinator also gives me some serious concerns. 
Though the word ``czar'' is not used in descriptions of this office, it 
is an apt term. Nonproliferation, after all, is a unbelievably complex 
activity. It involves intelligence matters. It involves diplomacy. It 
involves export controls which touch upon--or occasionally are even 
driven by--commercial considerations. It involves extremely technical 
issues. It involves the weighing of competing values and policy 
priorities. It involves coordinating the activities of many diverse 
organizations throughout our Government and our military. It involves 
research and analysis. It involves a huge number of Government 
contractors, subcontractors, laboratories, think tanks, academic 
establishments, consultants, and the media. And it involves Congress.
  So when we create a coordinator in charge of what we call 
nonproliferation we are talking about quite a lot--hence the notion of 
a czar.
  With such an expansive authority, one would have perhaps expected 
that any such individual occupying such a post would be expected to be 
accountable to the public for that person's actions. But there is no 
provision in his bill for Senate confirmation of this official. 
Moreover, as a member of the National Security Council, it is doubtful 
that Congress could even succeed in inveigling such individual to come 
to Capitol Hill to testify on the activities of that office. Honestly, 
as a former chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs and 
present ranking member of that committee, I think it is absolutely 
essential for individuals inside our Government with such sweeping 
authorities to be held strictly accountable to Congress and the public.
  Will the so-called coordinator prove to be a zealous advocate of 
commercial uses of plutonium? Will the coordinator come to this office 
with a disposition that proliferation only has military solutions? Will 
this coordinator place commercial considerations ahead of America's 
global nonproliferation treaty obligations? Will this coordinator take 
the view that proliferation is merely a problem dealing with so-called 
rogue regimes instead of a genuinely global threat? Will this 
coordinator simply be ignored by the current or future President by 
means of an internal organizational mechanism worked outside the NSC? 
Will this coordinator have adequate staff, budget, and control over 
budgets to give the individual the ability to perform the ostensible 
coordinating functions that the office is supposed to have under this 
legislation?
  These are just some of the too-many unanswered questions concerning 
the nonproliferation czar.
  Overall, however, I must support this legislation because of the good 
it does. I will work to address the shortcomings in this amendment the 
best I can and am optimistic that, without doubt, this legislation is 
in the overall interest of our country.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I commend my colleagues, Senators Nunn, 
Lugar, and Domenici, for developing this amendment which is a good 
first step in addressing the principal security threat facing the 
citizens of the United States today. I am pleased to join them in 
sponsoring this important antiterrorism proposal. I have always been in 
favor of the wise use of taxpayers' funds and this amendment meets that 
test. We have to be prepared to combat terrorism.

[[Page S7078]]

  Currently we have precious few means to deal with the threat of a 
terrorist attack of any kind, let alone nuclear, chemical, or 
biological terrorism. This amendment focuses on that vacuum.
  Events from Oklahoma City to Tokyo show that there is a major 
security risk in the ordinary--a rental truck or a subway. Training 
local emergency officials to recognize the signs of weapons of mass 
destruction in these mundane circumstances will help prevent these 
insidious attacks in the first place. Further training will allow local 
officials to ameliorate the impact should such a tragedy occur.
  Mr. President, this is the right amendment at the right time for the 
people of Iowa and the United States. If my colleagues care about 
protecting Americans on American soil, I urge them to support this 
amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, once again, I congratulate the Senators 
from Georgia, New Mexico, and Indiana, on their efforts to craft an 
amendment to authorize the establishment of an emergency assistance 
program to train and equip State and local authorities to respond to 
domestic terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.
  I want to reiterate my concerns with parts of the amendment that 
would increase funding and expand authorities for the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program, both in DOD and in DOE.
  I trust that the sponsors will provide us with information on the 
justification for these new activities and the impact on the DOD future 
years defense plan and DOE as soon as possible. The sponsors submitted 
letters from the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy in 
support of this new initiative last night. I assume that the sponsors 
will provide us with copies of these two letters as well.
  Mr. President, I have urged the sponsors of this amendment to 
consider a few recommendations that would enlist the assistance of the 
National Academy of Sciences in developing the emergency assistance 
program; that would specifically authorize a chemical-biologial 
emergency response team; and, that would specifically authorize funding 
for a regional NBC emergency stockpile from which the State and local 
authorities could draw in an emergency.
  Lastly, I want to mention just a few other concerns I have with this 
amendment. There are no appropriations for these new initiatives. The 
amendment contains a broad transfer authority that would allow funds to 
be transferred from accounts within the defense budget, as well as from 
within the defense activities portion of the energy budget, for the two 
CTR programs.
  I am also concerned with language in the amendment that would promote 
the import of foreign weapons-grade material to the United States for 
storage. Currently, the Department of Energy is not prepared, nor does 
it have the ability to accept more weapons-grade material.
  Mr. President, once again, the efforts of the sponsors of this 
amendment are laudable. However, we are not merely talking about 
increasing funding for the two cooperative threat reduction programs. 
We are expanding the scope of activities within those two programs. I 
would ask the sponsors of the amendment to provide the committee with 
information on how much money Russia is contributing for these efforts?
  The amendment broadens the authority of the program to include all 
the independent states of the former Soviet Union. However, the bulk of 
the funding in this amendment is specifically going toward activities 
with Russia.
  I support the efforts of the sponsors of this amendment to combat 
terrorism. We need to provide assistance to our State and local 
authorities so that they are prepared to respond to terrorist incidents 
where weapons of mass destruction are used.
  We will work together in the conference to enlist the support of the 
National Academy of Sciences, increase the funding for the emergency 
assistance program, and provide the regional NBC emergency stockpile.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I voted for the Nunn-Lugar amendment, 
but there are provisions included in that amendment that are quite 
troubling for me.
  Obviously, like every Member of this body, I am deeply concerned 
about the need for the United States to be fully prepared to protect 
our people from the threat of terrorist attacks, particularly those 
involving weapons of mass destruction.
  The amendment contains provisions to provide military assistance to 
State and local officials responsible for crisis management to deal 
with nuclear, chemical, or biological emergencies. This assistance 
includes areas such as locating, neutralizing, dismantling, and 
disposing of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and generally 
supporting State and local preparedness to deal with potential 
emergencies in this area. I support these provisions as they take the 
proper approach of having the Federal Government provide training and 
technical assistance to local entities who might face these disasters.
  I am also very strongly in support of efforts to reduce the worldwide 
threat of nuclear weapons getting into the hands of potential 
terrorists, and the amendment contains important provisions aimed at 
helping reduce these threats. In particular, the Nunn-Lugar program, 
which is aimed at dismantling of Russian nuclear warheads and 
converting the plutonium removed from those warheads into other forms 
that are not likely to be used for weapons is critical to reducing the 
threat of misuse of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union. The 
provisions in the amendment build upon and expand this program to help 
make this Nation and the world safer from this threat.
  However, there is one section of the amendment that I do not support. 
Section 1313 of subtitle A of the amendment contains provisions 
relating to military assistance to civilian law enforcement officials 
in emergency situations involving weapons of mass destruction. I have 
long expressed my opposition to the concept underlying these 
provisions. This language is based upon provisions included in the 
antiterrorism bill considered by the Senate last year. When the 
terrorism bill was voted on in the Senate, I expressed my opposition to 
those provisions and indicated that I could not support such an 
exception to the posse comitatus law, the 1878 statute which limits the 
role of the military in domestic law enforcement activities. I 
fundamentally do not believe that we should give the military arrest 
powers within the United States. If the military needs to be involved 
in a domestic investigation, I believe that civilian law enforcement 
officials should be present and available to make any arrests needed. 
If authority is needed to detain an individual until a civilian law 
enforcement official arrives, arguments can be made for that authority, 
but that does not justify, in my view, granting a direct power to make 
an arrest by the military under any type of circumstances.
  The amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia does make an 
improvement in the language considered last year. It provides that the 
military does not have the power to make such an arrest unless the 
action is considered necessary for the immediate protection of human 
life, and civilian law enforcement officials are not capable of taking 
the action. The provision relating to the unavailability of civilian 
personnel is a step in the right direction; however, I remain 
fundamentally opposed to the military taking a direct arrest role. 
Moreover, the decision as to whether a civilian law enforcement 
official is capable of taking action, under this amendment, would 
clearly be made by the military official involved. Thus, the military 
itself is vested with the decisionmaking power as to whether such an 
arrest should be carried out by military personnel rather than civilian 
law enforcement.
  Although I support the other important provisions of this amendment, 
I want the record to show that for the reasons stated I do not support 
this provision which would permit the military to arrest individuals 
within the United States.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise as an original cosponsor of the 
proposed amendment by Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici to better 
protect our Nation against the threat posed by weapons of mass 
destruction. Here is a Defend America Act that we should all support 
because, unlike the bill which bears that title, this amendment 
responds to a clear and present threat.
  In my mind, the possibility that weapons of mass destruction could be

[[Page S7079]]

acquired by rogue states, criminal organizations, or individual 
terrorists and used against American targets is the single greatest 
security threat to our Nation in the post-cold war world. I commend my 
distinguished colleagues from Georgia and Indiana for their tireless 
resolve in exposing the potential magnitude of this threat, and for 
their diligence in crafting legislation that addresses it head on.
  The legislative package has four important sections that together 
make up a comprehensive and strategic response to the threat of weapons 
of mass destruction.
  First, the amendment would improve our domestic preparedness. This is 
really the last line of defense against weapons of mass destruction. In 
the horrible case that our prevention and non-proliferation efforts 
fail, we need to be prepared to deal with a biological, chemical, or 
nuclear emergency here in the United States.
  The amendment includes an important counter-terrorism provision to 
authorize the Department of Defense to provide badly needed training 
and advice to local, State, and Federal officials. These are the men 
and women who would be the first to respond to a nuclear, chemical, or 
biological emergency.
  The extensive hearings held by the Senator from Georgia earlier this 
year demonstrated that police and fire departments in our cities are 
not trained and equipped to detect or contain biological or chemical 
agents used in a terror attack. Indeed, local officials would be 
risking their own safety while attempting to respond to such an attack.
  At present, only the Armed Services have the expertise and equipment 
needed in locating, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of such 
weapons or deadly material. Only the military can impart this 
desperately needed training on the urgent basis that it is required.
  This bill, moreover, gives the Armed Forces the authority to actually 
assist law enforcement if, God forbid, we should ever face an emergency 
involving a chemical or biological weapon.
  This is a provision that I worked hard on last year with Senator Nunn 
on the Anti-Terrorism Act. The provision was included in the Senate 
version of the act but taken out by Members in the House of 
Representatives. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment provides an 
opportunity to restore this important anti-terrorism measure.
  Right now, the Armed Forces have the authority to provide assistance 
when it comes to a nuclear attack. But that authority does not extend 
to an emergency situation involving a chemical or biological weapon of 
mass destruction.
  It should.
  This is a carefully tailored provision. It doesn't give the military 
the power to make arrests or to conduct searches or seizures--unless 
necessary for the immediate protection of human life.
  What it does is make sure that--if we were ever faced with such a 
nightmare--the people who are best trained, best equipped and most 
capable will be on the scene assisting our State and locals.
  Mr. President, I want to make clear for the record that I intend to 
seek additional vehicles to restore the other two key provisions 
excluded from the Anti-Terrorism Act--those dealing with wiretapping 
and prohibiting information on the Internet about making bombs.
  The second section of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment addresses our 
ability to interdict weapons of mass destruction before they reach U.S. 
soil. The Department of Defense would provide to the U.S. Customs 
Service specialized training and equipment capable of detecting weapons 
of mass destruction. Additional funds for the Departments of Defense 
and Energy would help develop new technologies to better detect such 
weapons and material.
  Mr. President, the border controls throughout the former Soviet Union 
are notoriously weak. This amendment also seeks to assist the Customs 
officials of these countries in improving their ability to detect and 
interdict nuclear weapons or material.
  The third area this amendment addresses is the need to continue the 
important work of the Nunn-Lugar programs that over the past 4 years 
have quietly worked to enhance the security of all Americans by 
dismantling nuclear weapons and protecting material at its source in 
the former Soviet Union. These prevention programs form our first line 
of defense.
  Mr. President, in many ways the world has never seemed a safer place 
in which to live for our citizens. Our democratic way of life prevailed 
over totalitarian communist ideology in the cold war; Soviet nuclear 
missiles no longer point at American cities; we are the undisputed 
world power.
  But these events should not give us a false sense of security. Russia 
and other States of the former Soviet Union are literally strewn with 
nuclear weapons and material. By some estimates there is at present 
enough nuclear material in the former Soviet Union to make over 100,000 
weapons. It only takes a tiny fraction of this abundant supply, finding 
its way into the wrong hands to wreak unspeakable damage.
  We also know that there is demand for such material by, among others, 
dangerous rogue States, such as Iran and Libya. Once they have secured 
the requisite nuclear material, the rest is relatively easy. Bomb 
designs are not difficult to find. Transport of a device to its 
intended target in an open society such as ours is painfully simple, as 
terrorists have demonstrated in New York and Oklahoma City.
  The centralized Soviet system that prevented the possible theft or 
diversion of these tons of fissile material no longer exists. We 
regularly hear stories of nuclear facilities with no perimeter fences, 
no security monitors, and workers who have not been paid in months.
  The key challenges before the United States and Russia are to develop 
an accounting system for all nuclear material in the former Soviet 
union, to physically protect this material in a limited number of 
sites, to safely dispose of excess nuclear weapons and material, to 
prevent theft and smuggling of nuclear material, and to prevent former 
Soviet nuclear experts from selling their know-how to rogue states or 
terrorists.
  These are exactly the challenges that the Nunn-Lugar programs 
address. The Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program has 
provided safe storage and security monitors at nuclear facilities in 
Russia. The Industrial Partnership Program has found productive 
employment for thousands of former Soviet technicians with the know-how 
to build nuclear weapons. These programs have proven effective and 
should be expanded.
  Under the amendment, funds would be provided to the Department of 
Energy to verify the dismantlement of Russian nuclear warheads and 
convert the plutonium removed from the warheads. Funds also would be 
provided to convert the remaining three weapons-grade plutonium reactor 
cores in Russia. Clearly, such efforts are in the interest of the 
United States.
  The fourth section of the amendment creates a nonproliferation 
coordinator, who will chair a committee on nonproliferation, and report 
to the President. The many levels of the threat posed by weapons of 
mass destruction do not fit neatly into our current bureaucratic 
structure. There are a plethora of agencies with some connection to the 
problem--including Justice, Energy, Commerce, Treasury--which do not 
immediately come to mind as traditional national security departments.
  The coordinator would ensure a clear, comprehensive U.S. policy 
toward proliferation, terrorism, and global crime. By bringing together 
these diverse agencies to form a common policy, we will be able to use 
their specific strengths and expertise in combating the greatest 
security threat to our Nation.
  I wish to add that although the amendment does not require it, I 
believe that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency must play a 
central role in the coordinator's activities.
  Mr. President, the question will undoubtedly be asked as to whether 
we can afford to add funds for these efforts? I believe that we cannot 
afford not to.
  Over the last 5 years, funding for the Nunn-Lugar program has totaled 
$1.5 billion--an average of $300 million per year, or about one-tenth 
of 1 percent of our annual defense budget. The amendment today could 
lead to an additional expenditure of $235 million in the next fiscal 
year. These are meager sums

[[Page S7080]]

when compared to the magnitude of the threat we face. This is not a 
giveaway program for Russia and other independent states of the former 
Soviet Union. These expenditures serve our interests.
  Mr. President, we are already on borrowed time. We are fortunate that 
an attack involving weapons of mass destruction has not yet occurred on 
U.S. soil. But we cannot continue to rely on fate to prevent the 
proliferation of these deadly weapons.
  This amendment offers us a substantive means to act, prevent, and 
prepare against the menace of weapons of mass destruction. I urge its 
adoption.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now is on agreeing to amendment 
No. 4349. The yeas and nays having been ordered, the clerk will call 
the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Missouri [Mr. 
Ashcroft], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. Bond], and the Senator from 
Arizona [Mr. McCain] are necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Frist). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 96, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 177 Leg.]

                                YEAS--96

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frahm
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Ashcroft
     Bond
     Bumpers
     McCain
  The amendment [No. 4349] was agreed to.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to, and I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


               Unanimous-Consent Agreement--Cloture Vote

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the cloture 
vote to begin immediately be postponed to occur later today at a time 
to be determined by the two leaders.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, it is 
the hope of the leadership the Senate can reach a consent agreement 
that will limit the number of amendments that remain in order to the 
DOD authorization bill.
  While these negotiations are continuing and an effort is being made 
to identify the amendments that are serious and need to be offered and 
dealt with or voted on, we are trying to suspend the cloture vote to 
give us time to get this list worked up. If we can, then the cloture 
vote will not be necessary and could be vitiated.
  So I urge the Senators to come forward now. It is Thursday morning. 
We would like to finish up before too late tonight, but if we do not, 
we will be here tomorrow.
  Mr. THURMOND. I wish to thank the majority leader for the statement 
he has made, and I am in accord with him.
  Mr. GREGG. Will the leader yield?
  Mr. LOTT. I yield.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I would like to note for the Record, 
Senators Bond and Ashcroft were unavoidably absent at the last vote due 
to the attendance of the funeral of Congressman Emerson.
  Mr. LOTT. I yield the floor.
  Mr. PRYOR addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, may I inquire of the Chair as to what the 
pending business is of the Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is the Warner amendment 
No. 4350.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Warner 
amendment be temporarily set aside.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object--Mr. 
President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The legislative clerk continued with the call of the roll.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Bill Parlett, 
a congressional fellow in my office, be granted floor privileges during 
the consideration of the Department of Defense authorization bill, S. 
1745, and that immediately after the approval of this unanimous consent 
request we go back into a quorum call.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank Senator Pryor and Senator Helms for 
their forbearance and consideration in allowing the quorum call to be 
called off. I promise that I will reinstitute the quorum call upon the 
completion of my remarks.

                          ____________________