[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 96 (Wednesday, June 26, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6988-S7014]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in just a moment, Senator Lugar, myself, and 
Senator Domenici will explain this amendment. I know the chairman of 
the committee would like to make some comments on the amendment.
  At this point, I will yield the floor for whatever the chairman is 
prepared to say.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment 
offered by the Senators from Georgia, New Mexico, and Indiana, to 
authorize the establishment of an emergency assistance program to train 
and equip State and local authorities to respond to domestic terrorist 
use of weapons of mass destruction.
  The amendment would also expand authorities for the DOD and DOE 
cooperative threat reduction programs, as well as increase the funding 
for these programs.
  I have grave concerns about increasing the funding for DOD and DOE's 
cooperative threat reduction programs, as well as expanding the scope 
of the programs in DOD and DOE.
  Based on my review of the amendment and the new activities authorized 
by this amendment, DOD and DOE will require significant funding 
authority in the outyears to complete these programs.
  For example, how much money are we talking about in the defense bill 
to complete the program to replace the reactor cores at Tomsk 7 and 
Krasnoyarsk 26?
  How much money will it take to convert, or eliminate, the chemical 
and biological facilities in all the independent states of the former 
Soviet Union?
  We have not received any information from DOD, DOE, or the National 
Security Council on the budgetary impact of the increases for these two 
programs, or whether funds will be included in the future years defense 
plan for this program, as well as DOE plan.
  I would point out that none of the funds necessary for the increases 
in this amendment have been appropriated.
  Mr. President, I believe the efforts of the sponsors of this 
amendment are laudable. I do not question whether its appropriate, or 
not, to conduct these programs. I question whether its appropriate for 
the funds to come out of the defense budget for these foreign 
assistance programs.
  I would also point out that DOE has not even spent the funds 
authorized for it currently in the materials, protection, control and 
accountability account. The same is true for funds in DOD's program. 
Although DOD has done a better job at proposing to obligate funds.
  Clearly, with the recent terrorist events at the World Trade Center, 
in Oklahoma City, and in the Tokyo subway, we need to provide 
assistance to our State and local authorities to prepare them to 
provide emergency assistance, in the event a domestic terrorist WMD 
incident occurs.
  I think that we should provide more in the way of establishing this 
particular program, and providing a regional NBC emergency stockpile.
  I want to commend the senior Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner, 
for the work that he has done throughout the years to ensure that DOD, 
DOE and the intelligence community are conducting activities to prevent 
or combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I also want 
to commend him for his work in authoring the provisions in the last two 
defense bills that provided the authority for DOD to provide emergency 
assistance to State and local authorities in the event of a domestic 
terrorist WMD incident.
  I want to work with my colleagues, however, I want to emphasize my 
concerns about increasing funds in the DOD and DOE budget for 
cooperative threat reduction activities, for which there are no 
appropriations.
  Lastly, I would ask, is it wise for the United States to provide this 
type of assistance to Russia, while it continues to build SS-25's; 
continues to transfer nuclear technology and knowledge to Iran and 
China?
  Mr. President, in closing, I want to re-emphasize my support for the 
efforts of the sponsors to provide assistance to State and local 
authorities to respond to domestic terrorist use of WMD. I hope that we 
can increase the funding for this assistance in the conference.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to commend the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I particularly thank him for 
the references to the work he and I and others on the committee have 
done in previous years, which, in some respects, laid a modest 
foundation for the important additions that are presented in the 
amendment soon to be submitted by the senior Senator from Georgia.
  However, I share with the chairman the views that I have, which 
coincide with his, regarding these expenditures at this particular 
time. And in the course of the deliberation on this amendment, I shall 
address specific questions to the Senator from Georgia, the Senator 
from New Mexico and, indeed, the Senator from Indiana on the points the 
chairman has raised.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I first thank the chairman of the committee, 
as well as Senator Warner, for their support of this amendment. I am 
pleased that we are able to present it this evening and that we are 
likely to get a vote on it tomorrow.
  Mr. President, this amendment deals with one of the most urgent 
national security problems America faces today. That is the threat of 
attack on American cities and towns by terrorists, malcontents, or 
representatives of hostile powers using radiological, chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons.
  Mr. President, because Senator Lugar is on the floor, Senator 
Domenici is on the floor, and my statement will probably run 15 to 20 
minutes, I ask to be notified in 10 minutes, and then I intend to yield 
and complete my statement after they have made their remarks.
  If the Chair could notify me when 10 minutes expires.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will do so.
  Mr. NUNN. This threat is very different from the threat of nuclear 
annihilation with which our Nation and the world has dealt during the 
cold war. During the cold war, both we and the Soviet Union recognized 
that either side could destroy the other within about an hour, but only 
at the price of its own destruction.
  In the course of carrying out that mutual assured destruction, most 
of the rest of the civilized world would have been destroyed, in 
greater or lesser degree, as well. Today, this kind of

[[Page S6989]]

cataclysmic threat is greatly reduced. And if we are able to continue 
to implement START I and START II Treaties on both sides, reducing the 
number of warheads dramatically, it will be reduced further.
  Tragically, the end of the cold war, however, has not brought peace 
and stability, but rather has seemingly unleashed countless small 
bloody wars around the globe. The end of the cold war also encouraged a 
number of states that are hostile to the United States to try to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction and appropriate delivery means as 
an adjunct to their conventional military forces. They are motivated by 
two beliefs. One is that the possession of such weapons of mass 
destruction will advance regional status and power relative to 
neighboring and often rival states. Second is that they believe 
possession of weapons of mass destruction, coupled with the threat to 
use them, can both deter superpower states from interfering in regional 
conflicts and blackmail them into favorable courses of action.
  While here I am not speaking of nuclear weapons, I am including that. 
In many of these countries, probably a greater threat is the chemical 
and biological proliferation we now see going on.
  Finally, Mr. President, fanatics, small disaffected groups and 
subnational factions or movements who hold various grievances against 
governments, or against society, all have increasing access to, and 
knowledge about the construction of, weapons of mass destruction. Such 
individuals and groups are not likely to be deterred from using weapons 
of mass destruction by the classical threat of overwhelming 
retaliation.
  In many past instances of terrorism, we have not even known who the 
perpetrators were or where they were based. It is very hard to threaten 
retaliation when you do not know who did it or where they came from or 
where they were based. These groups are not deterred by the threat of a 
nuclear counterstrike. A national missile defense system, no matter how 
capable, is sometimes and often irrelevant to this kind of terrorism.
  The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which Senator Roth 
chairs, and I am the ranking Democrat on that committee, held a series 
of hearings over the last year on the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. We heard from representatives of the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities, the Defense Department, private industry, 
State and local governments, academia, as well as foreign officials.
  These witnesses described a threat that we cannot ignore and which we 
are virtually unprepared to handle. CIA Director John Deutch, for one, 
candidly observed that ``we have been lucky so far.''
  Mr. President, the release of deadly sarin gas in the Tokyo subway 
system should have been a warning bell for America. Prior to those 
attacks, this Aum Shrinkiyo sect that made this attack was unknown to 
the United States intelligence and was poorly monitored by Japanese 
authorities. The Aum Shrinkiyo sect actually conducted several test 
releases of lethal chemicals prior to the subway attack. Yet, their 
capacity to manufacture and store those chemicals was unknown to 
Japanese authorities, this in spite of the fact that they had over 
50,000 members in Russia. They were recruiting nuclear scientists. They 
owned a radio station in Vladivostok and tested sarin gas in Australia 
against sheep. In addition to many other things they have done, they 
were not on the radar screen.
  We received an even louder warning bell in the World Trade Center 
bombing which brought it home to America. It was here in the United 
States, not halfway around the world. The trial judge, at the 
sentencing of those responsible in that terrible terrorist incident, 
pointed to several factors that could have made the tragedy far worse.
  First, in an effort to get that tower to fall down over its twin 
tower next door, the killers wanted to park the truck in front of a key 
structural member of the outer corner of the building. But they could 
not find an empty parking space. So they went elsewhere.
  Second, the killers had access to chemicals to make lethal cyanide 
gas and, according to the judge, probably put them into the truck bomb. 
Fortunately, the chemicals appeared to have been vaporized by the force 
of the blast. Otherwise, the smoke and fumes that were drawn into and 
up through the tower would have been far more lethal.
  So, Mr. President, in all likelihood, it is very likely that the 
United States has already had, without really focusing on it, our first 
chemical attack by terrorists. That is the World Trade Center bombing. 
Fortunately, those chemicals did not activate.

  Mr. President, we had a third warning bell in the bombing of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. This showed yet 
again the ease of access to simple, widely available commercial 
products that when combined can create powerful explosions. This 
knowledge, and much more, is available today over the Internet for 
anyone who wants to tune in.
  The Department of Defense invested billions in the design and 
protection of binary chemical weapons. A binary chemical weapon 
contains two chemicals, each of which is harmless when used separately, 
and they are widely used industrial chemicals. Yet, when mixed 
together, they create lethal chemical weapons. You can find lists of 
the ingredients needed to make binary weapons on the Internet today.
  Now let me turn to the current state of our domestic efforts to deal 
with nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological attack.
  In recent years, several modest test exercises have been held. In one 
large exercise, the first hundred or so emergency response personnel--
police, firemen, medical personnel--arriving at the scene of the mock 
simulated disaster rushed headlong into the emergency scene and were 
promptly declared dead by the referees. In other words, the people who 
came to the rescue were among the first victims.
  In the second exercise, featuring both chemical and biological 
weapons, contaminated casualties brought to the nearest hospital were 
handled so carelessly by hospital personnel that within hours most of 
the staff were judged to have been killed or incapacitated by spreading 
contamination.
  Mr. President, my purpose is not to frighten the American people; it 
is to persuade the Congress and the American people that we face a new 
and severe national security threat for which all governments at all 
levels are woefully inadequately prepared. We must begin now to prepare 
what surely threatens us already. To do this effectively requires three 
things.
  First, it requires taking the expertise that has been built up over 
the years in both the Department of Defense and Department of Energy by 
successive defense budgets and making that expertise available--and 
rapidly available--to Federal, State, and local emergency preparedness 
and emergency response teams.
  The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy need to bring 
training to the other officials in our State, local, and Federal 
Government in the detection, recognition, containment, and treatment of 
acute crises arising from the use of some form of weapon of mass 
destruction to those on the front lines in our major metropolitan 
areas.
  DOD and DOE need to train them in the use of detection equipment and 
in the use of protective gear to avoid becoming casualties themselves. 
DOD needs to train emergency medical personnel in the appropriate 
treatment, for triage, and the administration of antibiotics.
  There is much to do, and doing it will require DOD and DOE funding. 
There is simply no other practical source of this kind of expertise. 
The time to do it is now and not after we suffer a great tragedy.
  I, like many of my colleagues, believe there is a high likelihood 
that a chemical or biological incident will take place on American soil 
in the next several years. We do not want to be in a posture of 
demanding to know why we were not prepared. We do not want a domestic 
Pearl Harbor.

  This training and equipping function is the heart of the amendment, 
but it is not the whole amendment. There are other parts of the 
amendment dealing with Customs and dealing with the stopping of these 
weapons of mass destruction at the source.
  At this point in time, I will reserve the remainder of my remarks, 
and I

[[Page S6990]]

yield the floor to my two partners in this endeavor, Senator Lugar and 
then Senator Domenici.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I might ask of the principal 
sponsor and two cosponsors about the availability of the three to 
respond to questions at an appropriate time this evening. I intend to 
pose a number of questions. I am quite anxious to join with these three 
distinguished Senators because I certainly wholeheartedly support the 
domestic portions of this legislation. But I would like to ask a 
question in terms of the overseas portion and designs, and I wonder if 
the Senators will be available.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I would be available, if we do not stay too late. It is 
pretty tough for me to answer questions if we stay too late.
  Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, when Chechen rebels placed a 30-pound 
package of radioactive material in a Moscow park last November, it 
marked the first act of nuclear terrorism in the post-cold-war era. 
Although the container was not equipped with the explosives needed to 
disperse the cesium, the Chechens demonstrated a credible terrorist 
threat to employ nuclear material attached to explosives as 
radiological dispersion devices in Russia.
  The act crossed a new threshold in terrorism. Demonstrating on 
Russian television the ability to penetrate Moscow's increased 
security, Chechen rebels were now in a position to panic the Russian 
public by issuing similar threats of radiological contaminants.
  Terrorism was alive and well in another part of the world at roughly 
the same time. The worldwide activities of the Japanese Dooms-Day Cult, 
the Aum Shrinkiyo were not on the radar screen of United States law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies before the sarin gas attack on 
the Tokyo subway last March. This is alarming, considering the cult 
accumulated over $1 billion in assets and established offices in six 
countries on four continents.
  Cult members actively recruited scientists and technical experts in 
Japan, Russia, and elsewhere in order to develop weapons of mass 
destruction. They succeeded in producing chemical weapons, including 
toxic chemical agents such as sarin, VX, and sodium cyanide; and they 
were in the process of developing biological weapons, including 
anthrax, botulism, and ``Q'' fever.
  We have since learned how much more devastating the attacks in Tokyo 
could have been if the cult had simply perfected their delivery 
systems. The arrest and subsequent interrogation of members of the 
Japanese cult has shed more light on the activities of the group, 
particularly with respect to the extent and nature of its efforts in 
the area of offensive biological agents.
  The Japanese cult conducted extensive research on the manufacture of 
offensive biological agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin, and 
tested their dispersal against specific targets on at least three 
occasions between 1990 and 1995.
  The dispersal incidents were attempts to test the effectiveness on 
humans of Aum-produced toxins and to judge whether they could be used 
as weapons. Although the cult's tests caused no known casualties, the 
relative ease with which the botulinum bacteria and anthrax spores were 
obtained and the need for only basic scientific knowledge to conduct 
research on biological agents suggests either Aum members still at 
large or other terrorist groups may be more successful in the future.
  We have also learned how close we have come to witnessing acts of 
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction directed toward the 
United States. Listen to the words of Judge Duffy in his sentencing 
statement before the perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing:

       The harm actually caused by the World Trade Center bombing 
     was enormous, but what is even more frightening is what was 
     intended by you and your cohorts . . . The bomb was big and 
     that's what you intended, but that's not quite all that was 
     intended . . . The evidence clearly indicated that you 
     attempted to enhance the destructive force of the (device) . 
     . . If the bomb had the explosive force that you envisioned, 
     placed as it was at the base of the north tower next to a 
     diagonal brace, you might have succeeded in your nefarious 
     plot to topple over the north tower into the south tower just 
     like a pair of dominoes.
       Had that happened, we'd be dealing with tens of thousands 
     of deaths and billions of dollars of damage, but death is 
     what you sought to cause. You had sodium cyanide around, and 
     I'm sure it was in the bomb. Thank God the sodium cyanide 
     burned instead of vaporizing. If the sodium cyanide had 
     vaporized, it is clear that what would have happened is the 
     cyanide gas would have been sucked into the north tower and 
     everybody in the north tower would have been killed.

  I say to my colleagues: Here we have three incidents involving 
materials and weapons of mass destruction--in Russia, in Japan, and in 
the United States. The fact that the destruction wrought by the 
attempted use of these materials was not more massive owes more to luck 
or accident than to prevention, deterrence, or consequence management.
  The threat of weapons of mass destruction is real, and it is now.
  As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian command 
and control society, a vast potential supermarket of weapons and 
materials of mass destruction is becoming increasingly accessible. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decay of the custodial 
system guarding the Soviet nuclear, chemical, and biological legacy has 
eliminated this proliferation chokepoint, since states and possibly 
even sub-state groups can now buy or steal what they previously had to 
produce on their own. This central fact has transformed the nature of 
the proliferation problem for the United States as well as the rest of 
the world.
  If this is a fair description of the nature of this threat, the 
prevailing view that there is today no direct threat to U.S. national 
security is dead wrong. It is my view that the risk of a nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapon detonation on American soil has 
increased. While the probability of large-scale nuclear war between the 
United States and Russia has mercifully decreased dramatically, the 
probability that one, or two, or a dozen weapons of mass destruction 
detonate in Russia, or Japan, or Europe, or the Middle East, or even 
the United States has increased.
  However, because this new threat comes in a form so unfamiliar, 
indeed, so radically different from prior experience, and because the 
instruments and policies to address it are so unlike the business our 
White House and national security establishments have pursued for 
decades, the American political leadership, the Congress, and the 
American people have great difficulty in awakening to this fact.
  But, let us be clear. Absent a U.S. response to this threat of 
leakage of weapons and materials of mass destruction that is as 
focused, serious, and vigorous as America's cold war strategy, 
Americans may have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear, 
chemical, or biological terrorism against American targets before this 
decade is out.
  To oversimplify, there are three main lines of defense against these 
emerging threats:
  The first is prevention and this must entail activities at the 
source.
  The second is deterrence and interdiction and involve efforts to stem 
the flow of illicit trade in these weapons and materials of death.
  The third line of defense is crisis and consequence management and 
involves greater efforts at domestic preparedness.
  As we have explored the weapons material leakage and proliferation 
problem, one point has become increasingly clear. If the United States 
is to have any chance of stopping the detonation of a weapon of mass 
destruction on our soil, prevention must start at the source, the 
weapons and materials depots and research institutions in the former 
Soviet Union.
  We have found that the former Soviet storage facilities are unsafe 
and insecure. We have learned that there are people and organizations 
in the world who are attempting to acquire these weapons and materials 
for terrorist purposes.
  The most direct line of defense against these dangers is negotiated, 
verified reductions in nuclear, chemical, and biological forces. It 
makes no sense to be for missile defenses and against the START 
treaties and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Likewise, defense 
spending that facilitates threat reduction in the former Soviet Union 
is a wise investment. This is the essence of the Nunn-Lugar or 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

[[Page S6991]]

  I favor a prudent approach to strengthening our third line of 
defense--namely crisis and consequence management, including defense 
against ballistic missiles--but not at the expense of shoring up the 
front lines of defense--namely, prevention and deterrence. It is 
important to point out that a ballistic or cruise missile is not the 
likely delivery vehicle a terrorist or rogue nation will use to attack 
the United States. Rather, a Ryder truck, an already proven form of 
delivery, or a minivan, is much more likely.
  Many refuse to believe that this type of drive-up nuclear, chemical, 
or biological attack is likely. I say it is the most likely. We must 
protect ourselves from missile attack, but at the same time, we must 
also be willing to expend the resources necessary to prevent, deter, 
and interdict this much simpler and more likely form of attack.
  In my view, the potential costs of ignoring the threats and problems 
associated with the spread of weapons of mass destruction are so 
enormous that they demand a national mission on par with the Manhattan 
Project--Manhattan II. We need to assemble the best minds, with massive 
resources, to come up with, in a relatively short period of time, the 
kinds of technical tools that will allow our policymakers to develop 
truly credible responses and plans in the areas of nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation.
  It will take time. But we can jump start that effort here in the 
Congress today. And that is the purpose of the amendment being offered 
by Senator Nunn, Senator Domenici, and myself.
  There are three basic elements or components to our amendment. The 
first component stems from the recognition that the United States 
cannot afford to rely on a policy of prevention and deterrence alone, 
and therefore must prudently move forward with mechanisms to enhance 
preparedness domestically not only for nuclear but chemical and 
biological incidents as well.
  The second component addresses the supply side of these materials, 
weapons and know-how in the states of the former Soviet Union and 
elsewhere. Building on our prior Nunn-Lugar/CTR experience, and 
recognizing that it is far more effective, and less expensive, to 
prevent WMD proliferation in the first place than to face such weapons 
on the battlefield or the school playground, our amendment includes 
countermeasures intended to firm up border and export controls, 
measures to promote and support counterproliferation research and 
development, and enhanced efforts to prevent the brain-drain of lethal 
know-how to rogue states and terrorist groups.
  The third and last major component stems from the recognition much of 
the current effort to deal with the NBC threat crosscuts numerous 
Federal departments and agencies and highlights the need for the 
creation of a national coordinator for nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation policy in order to provide a more strategic and 
coordinated vision and response.
  Let me deal briefly with each of these components.
  The first component of our amendment concerns domestic preparedness 
for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. Senator Nunn has 
described this part of the amendment and I will not repeat his 
explanation. Let me simply say that our hearings have demonstrated that 
the United States is woefully unprepared for domestic terrorist 
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Although recent 
Presidential decision directives address the coordination of both 
crisis and consequence management of a WMD incident, the Federal 
Government has done too little to prepare for a nuclear threat or 
nuclear detonation on American soil, and even less for a biological or 
chemical threat or incident.
  The second component of our amendment focuses on further constricting 
the supply side of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Nunn-Lugar or 
cooperative threat reduction program and related initiatives has sought 
to address the threat to United States security posed by the nuclear 
weapons, scientists, and materials of the former Soviet Union. The 
mission to secure these nuclear assets, as well as their chemical and 
biological equivalents, is unfinished.
  We week to capitalize on the progress achieved in dismantling nuclear 
weapons of the former Soviet states and in preventing the flight of 
weapons scientists over the past 5 years and to expand the core mission 
of the program so as to address strategically the emerging WMD threats 
that compromise our domestic security. The resources that will be 
required to implement programs proposed in the amendment are not 
intended to supplant, but rather to supplement, current Nunn-Lugar 
funding levels.
  More specifically:
  First, cooperative programs to improve the protection, control, and 
accounting of nuclear materials must be accelerated and expanded to 
encompass all of the nuclear facilities that handle sensitive nuclear 
materials and components.
  Second, the security of nuclear materials during transportation 
between nuclear facilities must receive greater attention. 
Transportation risks will grow as more nuclear warheads are 
disassembled and their materials are shipped to interim or permanent 
storage sites.
  Third, greater programmatic emphasis needs to be placed on 
safeguarding highly enriched uranium fuel used in Russian naval 
propulsion. We need to accelerate and expand our programs with the 
Russian Navy to encompass all unirradiated enriched uranium fuels used 
for ship propulsion.
  Fourth, we need to get on with the business of closing down plutonium 
production facilities in Russia. Russia agreed to a United States 
proposal to cease plutonium production for weapons but action has been 
stymied by the fact that the three reactors in question also produce 
heat and electricity. These reactors can be converted so that they can 
no longer produce weapons-grade plutonium while permitting them to 
continue to produce heat and electricity.
  Fifth, in order to expand our transparency program efforts with the 
Russians, we need to undertake new efforts to evaluate technologies and 
techniques to verify that weapons are being dismantled and to verify 
the quantities of nuclear materials from disassembled warheads.
  Sixth, in the area of securing weapons and materials, it is time to 
make a concerted effort at chemical and biological threat reduction. 
Opportunities do exist to secure materials that can be used to make 
chemical and biological weapons, and we need to determine the 
feasibility and priority of moving beyond nuclear threat reduction and 
beyond chemical-weapons demilitarization efforts to explore 
possibilities for improving security for chemical and biological 
weapons materials.

  Seventh and last, in addition to enhanced efforts to secure the 
weapons and materials of mass destruction, we must recognize that the 
combination of organized crime, porous borders, severe economic 
dislocation and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union has 
greatly increased the risk that lethal materials of mass destruction as 
well as the know-how for producing them can pass rather easily through 
the borders of the former Soviet Union.
  Although Nunn-Lugar programs have begun to offer training and 
equipment to establish controls on borders and exports throughout the 
former Soviet Union, much more needs to be done. Much of the training 
that is done by the U.S. Customs Service will lapse this year.
  The third component of the amendment focuses on the need for a 
national nonproliferation coordinator. There is a broad consensus that 
WMD proliferation is now, and will remain for the foreseeable future, 
the top threat to U.S. national security interests. Yet the American 
response to this proliferation threat remains scattered and unfocused.
  The present nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts include 
dozens of departments and agencies that have responsibilities in one 
way or another to protect the United States from such threats. This 
patchwork effort suffers from lack of coordination, overlap, and 
duplication. The very nature of the WMD threat demands not just the 
attention of our armed services and diplomatic corps, but also our law 
enforcement community, our scientific community, and our intelligence 
community.

[[Page S6992]]

  In my view, our Nation's nonproliferation effort is in need of a 
strategic and coordinated government-wide plan.
  In order to best address the crosscutting nature of the proliferation 
challenge, we propose to establish the position of the national 
nonproliferation coordinator who will be charged with coordinating 
policies and activities to combat the threat posed by WMD both 
domestically and internationally. The coordinator should have the 
authority to review the budgets of all agencies with programs in 
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and related areas of 
intelligence and law enforcement. The office of the coordinator should 
be augmented with nonproliferation and counterproliferation experts 
from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, Commerce, the 
intelligence community, and such other agencies as may contribute to 
the mission of the national coordinator.
  To support a comprehensive approach to nonproliferation, the national 
coordinator should chair a new committee on proliferation, crime, and 
terrorism, to be established within the National Security Council. That 
committee should include the Secretaries of State, Defense, Justice, 
Energy, the DCI, and other department and agency heads the President 
deems necessary. This committee within the National Security Council 
should serve as the focal point for all government nonproliferation, 
counterproliferation, law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism, 
and other efforts to combat threats to the United States posed by 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. President, it is time to go beyond a recitation of the threats 
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to start 
developing an appropriate strategic, coordinated response. We know what 
the threats and the problems are. We even have the knowledge and 
expertise to deal constructively with these threats.
  Difficult as it is, identifying a new challenge is the easier part of 
the problem. Summoning the political leadership, the political will and 
resources, and the support of the American people to act is harder 
still. Despite the threat of loose weapons of mass destruction and 
weapons-usable materials, will the political leadership of this 
country, including this Congress, step up to the plate?
  Or will this new threat be given the priority it deserves only on the 
morning after the first act of nuclear, chemical, or biological 
terrorism takes place on American soil? What will we wish we had done?
  This amendment represents our considered judgment as to the 
appropriate starting points for a national effort to deal with the 
threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We 
have held over 20 hearings during the course of the last year. We have 
worked with experts in the executive branch--in the law enforcement 
area, in the Energy Department, in our national laboratories. And we 
have consulted with officials at the State and local levels--with first 
responders who will be on the firing line if our efforts at prevention 
and deterrence should fail.
  Senator Nunn, Senator Domenici and I are convinced that the programs 
and measures outlined in the amendment are doable. And we ask for the 
support of our colleagues in agreeing to this amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I first want to indicate to my good 
friends, Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, how appreciative I am that we 
have been able to work together to put this comprehensive amendment 
before the U.S. Senate.
  While this is not a session this evening attended by very many 
Senators, I believe if this amendment is adopted tomorrow and if it 
remains part of the authorization bill and if it is signed by the 
President, then this will have been a red-letter day in the future of 
the United States and our people, because it appears to me that we 
ought to do everything we can to avoid a catastrophe that can occur in 
the United States with reference to a nuclear weapon being detonated 
here or a biological or chemical weapon, which I believe most experts 
say is probably more apt to happen and more dangerous today to 
America's future. If we can get our country started in a preventive 
program and in a coordinated program of using the finest talent we 
have, scientific and technological, to bear down on this issue, then I 
believe this will have been an extremely productive defense 
authorization bill.
  Having said that, I would like to make a part of the Record the 
following: a letter dated June 26 to myself from the Secretary of 
Energy. I will merely paraphrase it. The Secretary says:

       Finally, the amendment will improve both our near-term and 
     long-term work to prevent and counter the growing threat of 
     weapons of mass destruction to the United States. We look 
     forward to working with the Congress to address these 
     priority concerns . . .

  I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                      The Secretary of Energy,

                                    Washington, DC, June 26, 1996.
     Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Domenici: I am writing to state my strong 
     support for your efforts to enhance U.S. national security in 
     the face of the increasing threat posed by weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       The Amendment No. 4181 that you have proposed to the 
     Defense Authorization bill and published yesterday in the 
     Congressional Record would contribute significantly to our 
     ability to protect the American people and the world from 
     threats posed by unsafeguarded nuclear material.
       It would enable us to complete nuclear materials upgrades 
     on an urgent basis at key sites in Russia which were agreed 
     to between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister 
     Chernomyrdin since our budget was submitted. It would aid our 
     ability to fund our very successful ``Lab-to-Lab'' materials, 
     protection, control and accounting program which has been the 
     pace setter in gaining access to vulnerable sites in the 
     former Soviet Union where nuclear materials are stored and 
     are in need of security upgrades. Our progress in these areas 
     has outpaced available funding. The faster such sites are 
     secured, the less likely that weapons grade material will be 
     diverted to rogue states or terrorist groups. The costs of 
     prevention are far less than the costs of defending against 
     diverted material or coping with the potentially catastrophic 
     consequences of terrorist use of such material.
       The amendment also augments our Nuclear Emergency Search 
     Team, or NEST, capability to be transported quickly anywhere 
     in the United States or the world to deal with finding and 
     disarming a nuclear device.
       The amendment would leverage existing research and 
     development capabilities of the Department's National 
     Laboratories to better verify and secure U.S. and Russian 
     nuclear weapons pits awaiting disposition, and make full use 
     of DOE's capabilities to detect and counter nuclear smuggling 
     and other weapons of mass destruction.
       Finally, the amendment will improve both our near term and 
     long term work to prevent and counter the growing threat of 
     weapons of mass destruction to the United States. We look 
     forward to working with the Congress to address these 
     priority concerns of the Administration.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Hazel R. O'Leary.

  (Mr. LUGAR assumed the chair.)
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, on June 26, Senator Nunn received a 
letter--it was actually for all of us and for this amendment--from 
Defense Secretary Perry. I quote the last paragraph:

       Taken together, the amendment's provisions will result in 
     important improvements to the Defense Department's 
     capabilities to prevent and respond to the threats both here 
     and abroad posed by terrorists and weapons of mass 
     destruction.

  I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, June 26, 1996.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: I am writing to express my appreciation 
     and support for your efforts to improve our ability to 
     protect the American people, our troops and allies from the 
     threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and terrorists 
     who might use them.
       The amendment you have proposed to the Defense 
     Authorization bill on this issue would provide important 
     support to enhance our defense capabilities against these 
     threats. It would assist us in our efforts to improve our 
     domestic preparedness to prevent and, if necessary, deal with 
     a potential domestic terrorist incident involving weapons of 
     mass destruction. It would also strengthen our ongoing 
     efforts in Cooperative Threat Reduction and other programs to

[[Page S6993]]

     prevent proliferation by reducing and improving control over 
     such lethal weapons and materials at the source and 
     strengthening the international community's ability to 
     interdict them at borders.
       Taken together, the amendment's provisions will result in 
     important improvements in the Defense Department's 
     capabilities to prevent and respond to the threats both here 
     and aboard posed by terrorists and weapons of mass 
     destruction.
           Sincerely,
                                                 William J. Perry.

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, within the last 3 or 4 days, a very 
interesting report has been forthcoming. I believe it is a godsend for 
us. It is called ``A Nuclear Black Market,'' and it was a report issued 
under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. It is very significant, because many of the participants in 
this study have great credibility with many Senators with reference to 
issues of this type.
  Arnaud De Borchgrave, who many know as former editor of the 
Washington Times, was the project director of this report. I am not 
going to make it a part of the Record; I am merely going to suggest to 
those who wonder whether this amendment moves us in the right 
direction, I suggest if they want the recommendations of this group, 
headed by the person that I just talked about, under the auspices of a 
very reliable think-tank group and containing the following prognosis--
and if this does not sound something like the speeches just given by 
Senators Nunn and Lugar--let me share it with you.
  The prognosis says--and that is all I will read and urge that 
Senators or their staffs interested should read it--the prognosis says:

       In the near term, several key variables in the nuclear 
     smuggling equation appear likely to remain bad or may even 
     worsen. Barring an unlikely economic turnaround in the former 
     Soviet Union, struggling nuclear workers will continue to be 
     tempted to steal material. Disarray in the Russian military 
     is apt to worsen in the near term, threatening security at 
     nuclear weapons storage sites.
       The current trafficking situation shows a disturbing upward 
     trend. Substantial quantities of materials are likely to 
     remain at large, and the potential for an accident or use of 
     smuggled nuclear materials probably is increasing, partly as 
     a result of dismantling.
       By contrast, certain trends are favorable. Improvements in 
     the materials protection and controlled accounting in the 
     former Soviet Union are progressing slowly. The number of 
     deployed warheads and assembled weapons is shrinking and 
     facilities are consolidating. Transit states are beginning to 
     deploy technical detectors and are acquiring needed training 
     and experience. Meanwhile, the international community is 
     starting to respond to this severe challenge. Although any 
     prediction is tenuous, the situation seems likely to get 
     worse over the near term and will not improve unless 
     immediate security enhancements are made.

  Then one might be surprised to read the recommendations. The 
recommendations begin to sound like this bill. For that, I am very 
pleased, because the three of us and our staffs and an assemblage of 
experts, not including those who put this report together, have worked 
very hard in an effort to bring a comprehensive bill before the U.S. 
Senate tonight.
  So, Mr. President, after yesterday's bombing in Saudi Arabia, my 
colleagues do not need to be reminded of the devastation of a 
conventional bomb. I am not aware of any of my colleagues who had the 
opportunity to observe an above-ground nuclear blast, but I believe my 
colleagues recognize the devastation that such an explosion would have 
if a nuclear weapon were to explode in New York City or in Indianapolis 
or in Atlanta or in Chicago.
  We are less familiar, however, with the threat of chemical weapons, 
although we do have some experience from the Tokyo subway incident, 
which has been discussed thoroughly here tonight, from observing the 
use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, and from dealing with 
accidental chemical leaks in events such as railroad car derailments.

  I think very few of us are aware of what could happen if a rogue 
nation or group attacked the United States with a biological device. 
The device could very well be made in a laboratory the size of a 
kitchen.
  My colleagues recognize all the equipment necessary to culture a 
biological agent. Most of it can be found in a high school or college 
chemistry laboratory, or ordered, I might say, from a number of mail-
order houses in the United States and around the world.
  In that kitchen laboratory, the first drop of an agent would be 
cultured until it multiplied billions of times. To turn those germs 
into a weapon would be very straightforward. The biological agent would 
be placed in a container designed to open and disperse the material 
into the air, possibly with a small fan. The device would be most 
effective placed in locations of which significant airflows interact. 
And when that interacts with large numbers of people, they have almost 
a special place for this kind of destruction: A metro station, the air-
conditioning system of a large building, an airport.

  People passing through would breathe the agent into their lungs, 
where it would continue to multiply with every breath. The unknowing 
transporter would exhale some of the agent, to be breathed in by 
others. The first illness might not occur for several days. First, 
those directly exposed would start to die. Then their co-workers, their 
families, their friends would start to die.
  Initially hospitals would be overwhelmed, like we found when we have 
had viruses before, including the Ebola virus. The virus would flourish 
at the hospitals, turning them into killing grounds. I could go on.
  I do this because I truly think it is imperative that somehow we get 
the message to the policymakers of this country and ultimately to the 
people of this Nation that just as we amassed in the Manhattan project 
the greatest of our scientists with a mission, a mission to save 
America by developing the atomic bomb, it is imperative that we 
coordinate our best efforts and resources, our best scientists and 
technicians to lodge an attack on the impending potential disasters 
that can come from biological and chemical destruction and the forces 
that can be set forth and lay millions of people to waste.
  There are no easy answers. But there were not easy answers to some of 
these gigantic technical and scientific problems that we have faced in 
the past. The longer we sit by and assume it will all be taken care of 
because a lot of people are working on these kinds of issues, the 
longer we are being fooled. So we have put together a bill that 
addresses these issues on many fronts.
  Clearly, it addresses the issue of the nuclear black market. That has 
already been discussed in great detail. I merely want to say to 
Senators who might wonder whether it is in America's interests to 
negate this black market or whether it is in somebody else's interest, 
there can be no question, it is in our interest, the whole notion of a 
black market coming out of the Soviet Union, because they are 
dismantling, are in a state of disarray, building down their nuclear 
weapons, all of which contributes an enormous potential for the 
dissemination of those kinds of things from whence nuclear bombs can be 
made.
  It is in our interest that we continue, as difficult as it is, to put 
some resources into trying to tame that which is being loosed on the 
world through individual conduct in the Soviet Union and in some cases 
through organized conduct. The genie is out of the bottle there, but it 
behooves us to try to make that as small as humanly possible. And we 
can do better.
  If we adopt this amendment, and find the resources to fund it, it 
will be just another very positive stride in the direction of doing 
what is prudent for our people in reference to this very, very serious 
threat.
  It is kind of amazing and somewhat ironic that as we end the cold 
war, we turn loose a new hot substance. It is no longer necessarily the 
fleet of rockets aimed at us, but it is the tremendous inventory from 
plutonium to enriched uranium and everything in between that can be 
turned loose because a country cannot control its people and does not 
have the money to pay its scientists to keep working and do productive 
things. What a tremendous, difficult situation we are confronted with, 
difficult enough to do something serious about.
  This bill clearly takes some giant steps in the right direction. It 
directs the Department of Defense to create an emergency response team 
similar to the Department of Energy's nuclear emergency search team. 
This team

[[Page S6994]]

could be called upon to locate and deactivate chemical or biological 
devices or try to contain them once detonated.

  The amendment directs the Departments of Energy and Defense to 
develop new technologies to detect the production and transportation of 
these agents. Just think of how tough this one is. But if we do not 
tell our scientists to try to find ways to detect these devices and the 
places of their origin, then what chance do we have to make any real 
strides in inhibiting the devastating potential, a little piece of 
which I described in my early remarks.
  Metro medical strike teams are established. I will not go into great 
detail. Joint exercises are provided for, and an effort to help our 
local law enforcement, not take over, but to help them become more 
proficient in this potential and thus more able to be of help and be 
part of prevention rather than wait until something happens and then 
have the clamor that nobody knew what to do, nobody was trained.
  We are smart enough to know that these things can happen. Tonight my 
two colleagues have already explained how they have already happened 
and how close we have come in our own country to a major--to a major--
biological disaster in New York City.
  There is much more I could say tonight. Most of my remaining remarks 
would have to do with the former Soviet Union and certain programs that 
are working fairly well, some that we ought to enhance and make better. 
But I will not do that because between Senators Nunn and Lugar, they 
have touched on it. I am sure when Senator Nunn finishes his remarks 
tonight, since he has started in this arena in the former Soviet Union, 
he will make additional remarks about what we ought to be doing.
  I merely want to say that I got some very good education about this 
from some of our national laboratories. I participated in two national 
seminars hosted by Los Alamos National Laboratory, and in the last case 
by them and Harvard University, when they brought the best thinkers 
together to tell us about the reality of this situation.
  Are we pipe dreaming or is it real? If it is real, what should we be 
doing about it? From those kinds of contacts, I have arrived at the 
conclusion that if one is going to leave a legacy around here, one 
ought to leave a legacy in this area of calling this kind of problem to 
the attention of the policymakers and then doing something about it.
  If one would have been part of originating the Manhattan project, one 
might have been very proud of having a part in assembling this massive 
talent, managed in an appropriate way, to bring America the first 
atomic bomb. The same thing might be happening here, for our great 
scientists might permit us to evolve from this legislation into 
something that might really preserve and save literally millions of 
people and literally millions of Americans now and in the future.
  Now, let me turn to the threat of nuclear weapons. At its peak in 
1992, the Soviet Union possessed approximately 45,000 nuclear warheads 
and weapons grade nuclear material to fabricate thousands more.
  The Soviet Union also produced an unknown amount of highly enriched 
uranium for reactors and for their nuclear navy. That material is also 
weapons usable.
  While we will never know for certain how much of this material 
exists, the number 1,200 metric tons of weapons-usable material is 
frequently used.
  If one considers that a simple nuclear weapon requires 15 kilograms 
of highly enriched uranium and 4 kilograms of plutonium, there is 
enough weapons usable nuclear material in Russia to build more than 
63,000 nuclear weapons, each of which could fit in a briefcase.
  That material cannot be accounted for--the best concrete example we 
have is Project Sapphire.
  Project Sapphire occurred when the Government of Kazakhstan found 600 
kilograms--enough material for 32 nuclear weapons--of highly enriched 
uranium that had been inadvertently left in Kazakhstan when the Soviets 
left.
  Not only was 600 kilograms left behind, but the inventory of that 
material conducted according to Soviet measuring techniques was off by 
4 percent--enough to make almost two nuclear weapons.
  In the Sapphire case, the Department of Energy secured that material 
and transported it to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. But that case 
demonstrates how lacking inventory control systems are in the former-
Soviet Union.
  Even when the material is in dedicated storage facilities it 
represents a threat. At Chelyabinsk-65, bulk plutonium is stored in a 
warehouse with glass windows and a padlock on the door. Inside the 
facility are over 10,000 ingots of separated plutonium stored in 
thermos-sized containers--perfect for picking up and walking out.
  If the terrorists who tried to blow up the World Trade Center had 
used a nuclear weapon made of that weapons usable nuclear material, 
Manhattan--all the way up to Gramercy Park, would have disappeared. If 
such a device had been set off in Oklahoma City, most of Oklahoma City 
would have disappeared.
  The examples I have given are using a simple weapon design that is 
available over the Internet. If a rogue nation were to hire a Russian 
weapons designer and have access to the necessary material, that 
designer could build a sophisticated, multiple-stage weapon many times 
more powerful.
  My colleagues need to understand that the weapons used in Nagasaki 
and Hiroshima were much cruder designs than are easily available today. 
If a terrorist or rogue nation gains control of weapons usable nuclear 
material--they immediately become a nuclear power more advanced than 
the United States was when we bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We cannot 
let that happen.
  For the past 5 years, under the leadership of Senators Nunn and 
Lugar, Congress has provided $300-$400 million per year to address this 
problem. Unfortunately, when the original legislation authorizing that 
work was enacted in 1991, it included numerous restrictions on its use.
  I understand why those restrictions were put in place--when Nunn-
Lugar was first enacted, the hammer and sickle of the Soviet Empire 
still flew over Red Square. But there have been some real successes--a 
lot of which resulted from the less formal interactions of the 
Department of Energy with their counterparts in the Russian Ministry of 
Atomic Energy.
  It turns out that these scientists; ours at Los Alamos, Lawrence 
Livermore, and Sandia; and theirs at Arzamas, Tomsk, and Chelyabinsk; 
think alike. They have been following each other's work for years and 
have tremendous respect for one another. So when the Cold War ended, 
they started getting together and found they have a great deal in 
common.
  Out of those informal relationships have developed some very 
important programs.


             materials protection, control, and accounting

  The Department of Energy has already secured nuclear material at 35 
facilities in the former-Soviet Union. Those security systems include, 
cameras, gates, portal monitors, and tagging devices to track nuclear 
material.
  At the January Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting, six more sites were added 
to the list of sites to which DOE will have access to secure nuclear 
materials.
  Because these sites were only agreed to in January, funds were not 
included in the President's budget request. However, these sites are a 
top priority--one of the sites is Krasnoyarsk-26, one of the sites of 
Russia's remaining three plutonium production reactors.
  The amendment includes an additional $15,000,000 for the program.


                               lab-to-lab

  The close relationships developing between the national laboratories 
here and the Russian Institutes is the foundation of our success to 
date.
  Lab-To-Lab efforts are intentionally diverse. Currently, efforts are 
focusing on ways to safeguard and transport assembled Russian nuclear 
weapons.
  This amendment expands the Lab-To-Lab Program to include all the 
states of the former-Soviet Union and provides an additional 
$20,000,000.


      cooperation with russian navy on nuclear materials security

  Highly enriched uranium intended for naval propulsion can be used in 
nuclear weapons. To date, our material protection, control, and 
accounting efforts have focused on the Ministry of

[[Page S6995]]

Atomic Energy and have not involved the Russian Navy.
  Through the Lab-To-Lab Program, the Department of Energy has met with 
Russian naval officers. In April, a delegation of Russian naval 
officers visited Oak Ridge, Sandia, and Los Alamos to familiarize 
themselves with our protection, control, and accounting systems.
  In turn, Department of Energy officials have visited Murmansk and an 
agreement is now in place to secure fresh Russian naval fuel at two 
locations.
  The amendment includes $6,000,000 to initiate this work and expand to 
eventually include 10 to 15 locations and a navy-wide accounting 
system.


                     industrial partnering program

  Weapons usable nuclear material is a clear threat. However, if that 
material is combined with someone knowledgeable enough to build a 
sophisticated, multiple-state system, the threat increases 
dramatically.
  The Industrial Partnering Program seeks to bring together Russian 
nuclear scientists with U.S. industry to provide new careers so those 
individuals are less likely to be lured into the service of rogue 
nations or groups.
  U.S. companies benefit from the exceptional technical capabilities of 
these scientists and engineers, but we also gain the knowledge that at 
least some of these potentially dangerous people have found a way to 
feed their families without endangering our national security.
  Because the Armed Services Committee has already increased funding 
for IPP to $50,000,000 from $15,000,000, this legislation simply 
expands IPP's mandate to include facilities once used to produce 
biological and chemical weapons.


                         technology development

  The United States has to develop better means of detecting nuclear, 
biological, and chemical materials.
  Using current remote sensing technology, a chemical or biological 
weapons factory is almost impossible to differentiate from a fertilizer 
factory or a brewery. Our experience in Iraq demonstrates that, even in 
a country that allows International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, 
it is difficult to detect a covert nuclear program.
  The amendment includes an additional $20,000,000 to develop 
technologies so that we can assess whether our enemies are developing 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons capabilities.


                   plutonium reactor core conversion

  Unlike the United States, the reactors used to produce plutonium for 
Soviet nuclear weapons, also produced electricity to heat surrounding 
towns. Three of those reactors continue to operate and produce 
plutonium; two at Krasnyarsk-26 and one at Tomsk-7.
  Russia has refused to shut the reactors down because they are 
desperate for the electricity. However, the Russian Ministry of Atomic 
Energy has agreed to convert the cores of the three reactors so they no 
longer produce weapons grade plutonium.
  It is my understanding that the conversion will cost $70,000,000 to 
$90,000,000.
  The amendment includes $15,000,000 to complete the necessary design 
analysis and to begin procuring the necessary components.


  verification, conversion, and disposition of weapons grade material

  Russia is currently dismantling 2,000 warheads per year and storing 
the nuclear components in facilities one Russian advisor has referred 
to as ``an old warehouse''.
  The first priority must be to secure that material through the MPC&A 
Program but our long term objective must be the permanent disposition 
of that material.
  Recently Los Alamos National Laboratory won an R&D 100 award for a 
new technology that enables us, for the first time, to transform 
plutonium from weapons into non-weapons usable forms in a verifiable 
manner.
  This is a significant accomplishment because the Russians refuse to 
let us see the plutonium from their weapons since the shape of the 
plutonium is one of their most closely guarded secrets.
  However, the new ARIES technology will enable us to verifiably 
transform weapons grade plutonium, removed directly from a weapon, into 
an ingot of plutonium oxide or hydride unsuitable for weapons use.
  The amendment provides $10,000,000 to initiate a joint program in 
this area.


                        this is not foreign aid

  These are the programs we have determined are of the highest national 
security--they are not foreign aid.
  As a result of these programs, we will safely and permanently 
dismantle and inventory Russian nuclear weapons, and tie up their 
weapons expertise.
  When the original Nunn-Lugar legislation was enacted, it was 
accompanied by all sorts of requirements for certifications that Russia 
was meeting certain requirements. That logic is exactly backwards--we 
are undertaking these programs where they are in our national security 
interest and the Russian Federation is willing to cooperate.
  Again, I am very proud to be part of this amendment. We have worked 
very hard together on it. I am very grateful to the two Senators, the 
occupant of the chair and Senator Nunn, for letting me join you in this 
effort. I hope it does reach fruition. I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from New Mexico and my 
friend from Indiana who now occupies the chair. This has truly been a 
partnership. I say that the Senator from New Mexico has been really a 
part of this overall effort from the very beginning.
  I remember very well when we had the original Nunn-Lugar amendment on 
the floor and the Senator from New Mexico came and spoke up very 
vigorously in favor of that, as did the Senator from Virginia. The 
Senator from Virginia has been very helpful in this legislation from 
the very beginning.
  So the Senator from New Mexico has made immense contributions here 
and in the DOE lab program, the many other programs that the Department 
of Energy is involved in. And primarily it is the work of the Senator 
from New Mexico. So we are very proud to be partners in this endeavor, 
and it is truly a bipartisan endeavor.
  I know the Senator from Virginia would like to ask questions. I am 
going to abbreviate my concluding remarks.
  Mr. President, as I said earlier, this training and equipping 
function is the heart of this amendment, but not the whole amendment. 
Other parts of the amendment are designed to beef up our customs 
capability to try to interdict the smuggling of weapons of mass 
destruction and their components into the United States, and to provide 
the latest detection technology to customs officials. The best way to 
prevent a terrorist incident involving a nuclear, radiological, 
chemical, or biological weapon is to stop these dangerous materials at 
our ports and airfields and borders. While some equipment is available 
that is capable of detecting materials related to these weapons, this 
equipment is not yet widely deployed, and we must speed up the process. 
In addition, we must speed the development of new technologies that can 
detect nuclear, chemical, and biological materials before they reach 
the terrorist who will assemble them, or detect the materials in an 
assembled weapon before it can be set off. Better technology is 
essential to guard our borders, and it is essential for our domestic 
law enforcement.
  We are also concerned about interdicting supplies of dangerous 
materials across frontiers in Eastern Europe, the Caucusus, and along 
the southern flank of the former Soviet Union, where many newly-
independent states effectively have no customs capability. Therefore, 
the amendment provides modest funding for US customs to train 
counterparts in those countries, upon request.
  In addition, the amendment allocates some funds for expansion and 
continuation of the original Nunn-Lugar concept through programs run 
both by the Department of Energy and by the Department of Defense's 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We are seeking to expand these 
programs both in Russia, and, increasingly, in other states of the 
former Soviet Union. My cosponsors will describe these activities in 
more detail.
  Finally, there are three serious deficiencies in planning for 
contingencies. First is the lack of coordination of activities across 
the many Federal agencies who have some responsibility for some 
portions of the overall problem. Second is the lack of coordination of 
Federal agencies and activities with those of the states and 
municipalities

[[Page S6996]]

who will be first to bear the brunt of future attacks. Third is the 
lack of a national security funding mechanism to match the new national 
security missions in many of the Federal agencies whose actions must 
ultimately be integrated with those of DOD and DOE. To address these 
fundamental problems, this legislation establishes a coordinator in the 
office of the President to try to bring a degree of order to the 
fragmented responsibilities that exist today.
  With this introduction and description of the main purpose of the 
legislation, Mr. President, let me next give a brief section-by-section 
overview of the amendment.
  Title One focuses on the need to better train, equip and coordinate 
our emergency response personnel who are presently unprepared to deal 
with terrorist incidents involving nuclear, chemical or biological 
agents. Our bill makes efficient use of the expertise in our military 
and energy departments to train local officials to response to 
incidents involving WMD. Our hearings highlighted weaknesses in federal 
preparedness for WMD incidents, especially regarding coordination among 
agencies. Our legislation goes a long way toward improving this 
situation by establishing a chemical and biological response team, 
modeled after the Department of Energy's nuclear emergency search team. 
Such assistance and expertise could only be brought to bear if called 
up by civil authorities to implement the Federal disaster response 
plan, and would be limited by language that respects the proper 
demarcation between our military and civilian agencies. Keeping in mind 
these precautions, it is possible to apply our Nation's hard-won 
expertise in chemical and biological warfare to this urgent national 
security threat without infringing on our political traditions.

  Additionally, this legislation creates medical responses teams 
throughout the United States. These highly trained and deployable 
health care teams will assist the existing local resources in our 
cities and towns to respond to and mitigate a WMD incident.
  Title II includes countermeasures against the smuggling of WMD 
materials when they do leak from their source. This legislation 
supports efforts to tighten border security and export controls both at 
our boarders, and elsewhere on likely routes that these lethal 
materials might take through states of the former Soviet Union. It also 
supports research for development of technical means to detect the 
unauthorized transportation of these lethal materials. Finally, it 
recommends greater penalties for those criminals involved in smuggling 
of these materials.
  Title III builds upon the successes of the Nunn-Lugar program to 
address the full range of the proliferation threats to our country. The 
Nunn-Lugar/cooperative threat reduction programs focus on the problem 
at its source by improving safeguards on weapons, weapons materials, 
and expertise inside the FSU. Since its inception, this program had 
made an enormous contribution to improving the security of our Nation. 
As of June 1, Ukraine, which held far more nuclear weapons than any 
state other than the United States and Russia, is no longer a nuclear 
state. Kazakstan became nuclear free last year, and Belarus will become 
nuclear free by this fall. Our legislation provides funds to the 
Defense and Energy Departments in order to promote efforts at control 
of these weapons and materials, and conversion of facilities that 
produce them. I often ask the critics of these programs how much it is 
worth--in terms of our security--to destroy Soviet missiles and to 
dismantle their warheads, and to keep the resulting nuclear weapons 
materials out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations? How much 
did we spend to deter the use of these same missiles during the cold 
war?
  Finally, what is needed is a comprehensive strategy that encompasses 
the many facets of the proliferation threat. The time has come to adopt 
our Government to the complexities of the post cold war national 
security situation. WMD proliferation crosscuts numerous agencies and 
departments, including some such as the Customs Department, the FBI and 
the Department of Health and Human Services, that have not previously 
been recognized as having major responsibilities for national security. 
The convergence of proliferation with terrorism and organized crime, 
the growing awareness of the potential use of chemical and biological 
agents in a terrorist incident, further complicates the implementation 
of a comprehensive approach to this problem.
  Title IV establishes a national coordinator to pull together the 
different parts of our nonproliferation policy. The national 
coordinator would be appointed by the President to serve in the 
Executive Office of the President. He or she would oversee the senior 
directors for nonproliferation, counterproliferation, arms control, 
terrorism and global crime to assure that we remain focused, that our 
priorities receive consistent high-level attention, and that vital 
proliferation threats do not slip through the cracks.
  I am convinced that we must address this issue before the unthinkable 
happens. Can we afford to dismiss the possibility that another World 
Trade Center or Oklahoma City bombing could involve chemicals, 
biological organisms or radioactive materials? We do so at our peril. 
The trends are clear: more nations and groups are exploiting increased 
availability of information, technology, and materials to acquire mass 
destruction or mass terror capabilities. There is no reason to believe 
they are not willing to sue them. I have heard too many experts whose 
opinions and credentials I respect, tell me that it is not a question 
of if but only of when. I believe this legislation, while only a 
beginning, responds to a very urgent national security concern of our 
Nation.
  Mr. President, in essence, we have three different ways of trying to 
protect the American people from weapons of mass destruction in terms 
of proliferation.
  One way is the original Nunn-Lugar program, which is an effort to 
stop the material at its source, not to have the material, the 
scientists, the know-how come out of the former Soviet Union and spread 
all over the world, ending up threatening either the United States and 
our people or our allies. That is what we are beefing up here. We are 
trying to accelerate some of the good programs that are ongoing 
there. So that is step No. 1. Just as we have tried to stop drugs at 
their source, we are trying to prevent this proliferation from getting 
out of the former Soviet Union. That is not just Russia.

  I hear people talk about ``foreign assistance.'' This is not foreign 
assistance. We have other programs that are foreign assistance. This 
program is national security. It is in our national security interests 
not to have the Russian nuclear weapons, nuclear material, nuclear 
know-how, scientists all over the world ending up threatening both the 
United States and our military forces wherever they are deployed, but 
also threatening American people. This is in no way foreign assistance. 
As a matter of fact, there is no cash involved here. We are not 
furnishing cash to Russians. They do not have any way to convert this 
cash to their own defense programs that do not relate to this. They are 
basically being furnished equipment and know-how for a specific 
purpose. There is one cash provision, I believe, going to the Ukraine. 
That is the only one and that is subject to very strict accounting 
procedures.
  Stopping the proliferation at its source is the best, most 
productive, the most effective, the most efficient way of dealing with 
this problem. We ought to continue that effort as long as the window of 
opportunity is open. It remains open today in Russia and it remains 
open in Belarus, and it remains open in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. We have 
succeeded beyond what any of us thought was possible in this regard. 
Since September 1990, over 4,000 warheads have been removed from 
operational status in the former Soviet Union; over 1,000 missiles have 
been removed from launches; over 800 missile launchers and bombers have 
been destroyed; controls, safety guards and a myriad of nuclear 
facilities in Russia have been enhanced, adding new layers of defense 
against proliferation efforts.
  Outside of Russia, the most significant event, which I know the 
occupant of the Chair now, and I, believed at one time was not likely 
to happen, and that is the other countries that could have become 
nuclear powers--Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus--are no longer headed 
down that road. In Kazakhstan,

[[Page S6997]]

all the nuclear weapons have been removed. No nuclear hand on the 
trigger or finger on the trigger in Kazakhstan. About a week and a 
half, 2 weeks ago, the last nuclear warhead came out of the Ukraine. I 
have been informed by people in Belarus and my own officials that the 
last warhead will come out of Belarus this year. If nothing else, if 
nothing else, having one nuclear hand on the trigger, that is Russia, 
instead of four countries that we have to deal with and defend against 
and worry about is an enormous accomplishment.
  How much would we have paid during the cold war to basically find 
three countries that had weapons of mass destruction and be able to get 
rid of them? If the CIA or the Department of Defense had come in and 
said, ``If you will give us x number of dollars in our budget, we will 
guarantee you that we will get rid of the weapons in three countries 
that are now aimed at the United States,'' how much would we have paid 
for that? Ten billion dollars, $20 billion, $30 billion, $40 billion, 
$50 billion? Probably $60 billion or $70 billion. It would have been 
enormous. We spent trillions of dollars defending over the years. Now 
we have been able to accomplish this not because they were doing us a 
favor, but because these countries realized it was in their own best 
interests, their own national security interests to get rid of these 
weapons, to ship them back to Russia to keep them under central 
control.

  We were able to use these funds to give them the incentive and the 
priority and the reason to their own people, to their own legislative 
bodies, to help justify what was fundamentally in their interests. 
Stopping these weapons at their source is the No. 1 effective way. I am 
very much in favor of the other parts of this bill, but this is the 
most effective money we will spend. I hope everyone recognizes that. If 
you look at what has been accomplished, you can see that very clearly.
  The second way we are trying to deal with the problem is through the 
Customs Service. We are using, yes, DOD and DOE money to help the 
Customs Service beef up their capability to prevent weapons from coming 
into this country, so that the Customs Service is able to get from DOD 
and DOE the best technology we have to be able to detect weapons coming 
across the border--not just nuclear, but chemical and biological, as 
well. Also, we are beefing up the DOD-DOE work in finding better ways 
to detect these weapons.
  I have been briefed many times on this subject, most recently this 
last week, and it is very clear that even with all the work DOD and DOE 
have done, we still have a long way to go to find, really, effective 
state-of-the-art methods of detecting particularly chemical and 
biological weapons. We are better at nuclear detection than chemical 
and biological. Those are the threats that are more likely to happen. 
Not only detecting coming across the borders but detecting these in 
airports, ports and major cities where an attack may be suspected. That 
is the second way, beefing up customs.
  The other facet is customs will also, under this bill, be given a 
mandate and some money to help these other countries like Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, the southern countries in the former Soviet Union so that they 
will be able to beef up their own customs. These countries want to 
help, they want to be able to help prevent the spread of these weapons, 
but they do not have the know-how or the expertise. In many cases, they 
do not have the training, and they certainly do not have the equipment. 
This is the second way we are dealing with this problem.
  Finally, we are dealing with it by acknowledging that we have a 
serious and fundamental problem in terms of our cities, our States, 
particularly our metropolitan areas, in being able to, No. 1, detect 
the materials that may be used for attack against soft targets, against 
population centers, against airports, against major sporting events, 
whatever, to detect it and prevent it. Second, to be able to deal with 
it if it happened. We are woefully unprepared to deal with this kind of 
catastrophic act of terrorism if it occurs. There is no doubt about 
that.
  We have had before the permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and 
the occupant of the Chair has had similar hearings in his Foreign 
Relations Committee, and we have had hearings in the Subcommittee on 
Investigations, and there is no doubt the police departments, the fire 
departments, are on record as saying, ``We need help.'' That is what we 
are trying to do here.
  This will not solve the problem. This is a beginning. This is an 
effort to help train, probably first of all, some Federal people who 
can go out and train others. Probably we will have the FEMA people 
involved. They are not ready to do this now, but it is my hope that we 
will be able to phase DOD and DOE out of this kind of training for 
domestic law enforcement officials and firemen, sometime in the next 2 
to 3 years. They are the best source now, but perhaps the 
administration will decide with the flexibility they have been given to 
train the Federal emergency management people so they can continue this 
training in the future. Right now, we have no choice but to deal with 
the expertise we have, and that is in the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Energy. We are encouraging that.

  I know the Senator from Virginia, being a former Marine, would be 
very interested, and I know he is aware that the Marine Corps is 
beefing up a considerable amount of talents and capability now to be 
able to deal, as the NEST team does in the Department of Energy, with 
nuclear threat, to deal with the chemical and biological threat. The 
Department of Defense will make that decision as to who is the main 
resource there, but the Marine Corps is out front, and our special 
operation forces also very much are involved in this area. So we have 
some military capability there that is going to be developed.
  Mr. President, the only other thing I add, we are beefing up the 
research capabilities of both DOE and DOD. I emphasize that because we 
need better methods, we need better tools, we need better equipment, we 
need better protective gear and we need to do everything we can to 
bring our considerable technology to bear to deter and to prevent and 
to detect and finally to deal with this threat, if necessary.
  Rather than take more time now, I thank my colleagues. I thank the 
Senator from Virginia for his patience. I know he has some questions 
and I know they will be pertinent and relevant questions. Those should 
be answered here. I thank all of our colleagues and I thank the 
cosponsors of this amendment, Senator Biden, Senator Graham, Senator 
Specter, Senator Daschle, and others who will be speaking, I am sure, 
on this subject in the hours ahead.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I do join and commend the principal 
sponsors for their work product and for their many, many hours of labor 
devoted, together with staff, in preparing the amendment. I will ask 
some questions of my colleagues and I am certain they will see these in 
the spirit of constructive dialog.
  First, the joint DOD-DOE report on preparedness of the Government to 
respond to nuclear, chemical and biological incidents.
  That report, which was just issued recently--I think, in the last few 
weeks--recommended provided authority to establish a training program, 
authority to establish a chemical biological response team, and the 
establishment of a regional NBC stockpile, particularly for medical 
stockpiles and the like.
  Can the proponents of the amendment inform the Senate with respect to 
that report and the parallelism in the amendment and that report?
  Mr. President, I just learned of the report. It may well be that the 
sponsors have not had the opportunity to see it.
  Mr. NUNN. I will supplement it for the Record. I have not studied 
that report at this stage. We have had a number of hearings in our 
committee. We have heard from these same officials, such as the 
Department of Energy Secretary, and I believe the Senator from New 
Mexico put a letter in the Record from the Department of Energy and 
Secretary of Defense Perry endorsing this legislation.
  It is a strong endorsement for this effort from the DOE and DOD. So I 
am confident that this report, based on those endorsements, based on 
the numerous meetings we have had, and based on the testimony--I am 
sure this amendment would reinforce, supplement, and give impetus to 
the recommendations in that report. I would

[[Page S6998]]

have to supplement the Record on that particular answer because I have 
not had a chance to study the report itself.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is quite satisfactory. I will be glad 
to work with my colleagues.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I just wanted to say we put in the Secretary Perry 
letter.
  Mr. NUNN. Thank you.
  Mr. WARNER. My understanding is that the pending amendment includes 
authority for the Department of Defense to provide assistance to the 
Department of Justice. There was a comparable attempt made in the 
antiterrorism bill, but that was specifically dropped in the 
conference. Can my colleagues enlighten me on that problem?
  Again, Mr. President, I am perfectly understanding. Your amendment, 
Senator, has a provision for the Department of Defense to provide 
assistance to the Department of Justice. A similar effort was made in 
the antiterrorism bill, and that comparable provision was dropped in 
conference.
  Mr. NUNN. Yes. I talked to Senator Hatch about that this evening. I 
have also conversed with Senator Biden, and our staffs have been in 
touch with both of them. This provision we have in this bill is very 
close to the amendment that passed the Senate overwhelmingly and that 
was worked out carefully between Senator Hatch and myself and Senator 
Biden. It does provide an extraordinary circumstance that the DOE and 
DOD can help State and local officials. For instance, if there were a 
subway attack in New York, if the fire department and police department 
were overwhelmed with the chemical sarin gas, there would be the 
ability to ask for emergency assistance. Then the Departments of 
Defense and Justice--the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General--
could respond. It would have to be very narrowly prescribed 
circumstances, where they could respond to that situation only, in very 
unique circumstances, where the State and local governments and the 
normal law enforcement officials would not be capable of responding.

  So that provision is in this bill. It was dropped--the Senator from 
Virginia is correct--from the antiterrorism bill in conference. I think 
that was a fundamental mistake, a flaw. But it is a part of this 
legislation.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in essence, we have now renewed the 
attention of the Senate to the need for that provision.
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. Two years ago, Mr. President, the Congress authorized $10 
million for a joint DOD-FBI training program to assist the independent 
states of the former Soviet Union, the Baltics, and Eastern Europe to 
control the export of weapons of mass destruction.
  Is there a current status report on that program available, and, if 
so, at some appropriate time, could it be made a part of the Record?
  Mr. NUNN. I would also like to supplement that for the Record. 
Director Louis Freeh took a trip to the former Soviet Union, including 
Eastern Europe, and established liaison offices in a number of those 
countries. I also know that those countries were very anxious to have 
FBI cooperation. It also is clear that our Customs Service has liaison 
with their colleagues in these former Soviet Union countries, as well 
as all around the world. What we are trying to do here is give the 
Customs Service of this country the ability, the wherewithal, the 
mandate, and the funding to begin a much more vigorous program and that 
kind of coordination. That is where we stand on it, to the best of my 
knowledge.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. The costs of eliminating or 
converting chemical and biological facilities, as we know, are very 
high both here at home and indeed abroad in the former Soviet Union. 
What is the justification that we would provide to our taxpayers for 
authorizing funds for such activities in the former Soviet Union, and, 
particularly, why would we be authorizing an activity that would, in 
some respects, contravene our requirement under the CWT, which is to 
completely destroy the chemical facilities?
  Mr. NUNN. I do not know of any contradiction between this legislation 
and the Chemical Weapons Treaty. Perhaps the Senator could amplify on 
that question. In fact, everything in this would be aimed toward 
helping the former Soviet Union countries--not just Russia, but 
others--comply with their obligations under the arms control 
agreements, including chemical, but not limited to that.
  Mr. WARNER. The question dealt with the conversion as opposed to the 
destruction in the facility. I would suggest that, at some point, that 
be supplemented into the Record, if I might have that.
  Mr. NUNN. We can look at that. Basically, a facility that is 
converted, from my definition of conversion, would lose its ability to 
have any kind of production capability. That would be my definition of 
conversion. If a facility were being assisted in terms of conversion by 
any of the funding here, it would certainly be my view that that 
facility should not continue to produce chemical weapons. But we have a 
long way to go in that regard. There is nothing that I know of that is 
taking place in that kind of conversion. There has been some conversion 
with the nuclear facilities, particularly missile fields and that kind 
of thing.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, speaking for myself, although other 
colleagues and the chairman spoke earlier, I wholeheartedly support the 
portions of this amendment which relate to the domestic requirements 
here in the United States. I thought the Senator from New Mexico spoke 
most eloquently about the contingencies; indeed, all three Senators 
did, but I was particularly taken by the remarks of the Senator from 
New Mexico. I, likewise, studied these and have spoken on the floor of 
the Senate, and elsewhere, about my deep concern facing the United 
States in view of the simplicity, particularly in the area of chemical 
and biological, and about the creation of even very small weapons of 
mass destruction.
  My concerns with the amendment, however, are directly and primarily 
to the continued assistance to the former Soviet Union and the states 
therein. This is a substantial increase in spending, Mr. President, on 
this particular program. I point out that, according to my rough 
calculations here, we are in this bill for the cooperative threat, that 
is the CTR, with the Soviet Union, $327 million in DOD funds, $108 
million in DOE funds, and this amendment would add around another $143 
million to this sum.
  I think Members of the Senate are hopeful that this amendment will 
pass. We should address these expenditures either in conference, or at 
some point in time, to determine the capability of expending such large 
numbers. Would the Senator wish to comment on that? I stated them in 
the aggregate. I do not think either Senator that presented it 
mentioned the other parts of the bill.
  Mr. NUNN. If I could just elaborate on that last question, let me 
state that on the conversion and elimination what we have done in this 
amendment is provide flexibility because the Chemical Weapons Treaty 
has not entered into effect yet. So until that enters into effect there 
would be flexibility for us to assist in. But once it enters into 
effect, when and if it does--and, of course, we have not ratified it 
here in the Senate yet--at that stage the parties to that would be 
obligated to eliminate. And basically that elimination provision would 
be required. There would be no more conversion.
  But I think it is clear that we would not intend to help them convert 
unless they stopped production. But they could convert, stop 
production, and not eliminate. But once the treaty goes into effect 
they would have to eliminate.
  If I could elaborate just briefly because I have been handed the 
report that the Senator from Virginia alluded to between the Department 
of Energy and the Department of Defense signed by Walter Slocombe and 
Thomas Grumbly, Slocombe being Undersecretary of Defense, and Grumley 
being Undersecretary of Energy. And I think that is the one the Senator 
referred to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator give the date of the 
document?
  Mr. NUNN. This was June 13. So that is it. I will quote one paragraph 
which I think goes right to the point that I think the Senator was 
asking about, page 24 of the report, paragraph 3:

       The focus of efforts to significantly improve our ability 
     to manage the consequences of a terrorist incidence, however, 
     should be on the first response by local police, fire, and 
     rescue organizations. Local authorities need quick access to 
     NBC detection--that is nuclear, biological, chemical--

[[Page S6999]]

     and decontamination and transport equipment. When an 
     incidence involving NBC materials is suspected, lack of 
     timely arrival in well trained, community based teams, fully 
     equipped with the state of art equipment, could cost 
     thousands of lives in most communities today across the 
     Nation. These casualties would include unacceptable numbers 
     of irreplaceable emergency personnel.

  So I think the heart of what we are trying to do is also in this 
joint report. I think the report is entitled ``Preparedness and 
Response to a Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, Chemical Terrorist 
Attack.''
  Mr. WARNER. If I could just summarize that, as I understand for the 
proponents of the amendment, the objectives to the amendment are in 
parallel to, consistent and supportive of, the objectives in that 
report.
  Mr. NUNN. That is correct.
  I say to my friend from Virginia that in terms of the amount of money 
here it is not an insignificant sum. We are talking about a total 
amount under the Nunn-Lugar program thus far of $1.5 billion that has 
been spent.
  Mr. WARNER. Since the inception of the program.
  Mr. NUNN. Yes. This amendment tonight represents $235 million. It is 
not additional money to the DOD-DOE bill. It is shifting of funds 
within the bill.
  So this is not an increase in DOD-DOE funding. I happen to believe--
the Senator from Virginia may not share this; others may not--but I 
think it is clear and in that report that the CSIS just issued by Judge 
Webster, former head of the FBI and former head of the CIA--there is 
great respect for him I know in this body on both sides of the aisle, 
and for others on that very distinguished panel--they came to the 
conclusion, and I have come to this conclusion and stated it often, 
that this is our No. 1 one national security threat.

  In the era we are in, this is the No. 1 one security threat to 
American people; that is, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction--chemical, biological, nuclear, scientific know-how, and 
scientists themselves ending up in countries like Libya, Iran, Iraq.
  As the Senator from Virginia will recall, after World War II the 
biggest contest we had in the first stages of the cold war was who was 
going to get the German scientists, whether it would be the Soviet 
Union or the United States. We got more of them than they did. Much of 
our space age came from that.
  So we are in that unusual period of time when an empire has collapsed 
still containing 30,000 nuclear weapons, over 40,000 tons of chemical 
weapons, and no one knows how much in the way of biological weapons--
tens of thousands of scientists and technicians that know how to make 
these weapons, know how to make weapons of mass destruction, with many 
of those people not knowing where their next paycheck is coming from 
and how they are going to feed their families.
  So this is an unprecedented era that we are in. We have a window of 
opportunity now that may not be open very long, certainly not with all 
the countries there. We hope it will. But we could not have any 
assurance of that. While we have this window of opportunity open, I 
think that it is a priority expenditure in terms of helping them, 
focusing enough money, but not doing the job for them because they are 
spending far more of their money than we are. Ours is only a small 
part. It is seed money. But what it has succeeded in doing is it has 
focused their attention and helped them make this a priority.
  In the final analysis, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus are 
not doing us any favor and the other countries. They are going to take 
steps in their own national security interests. They are in very dire 
financial straits having cut back on their procurement budget in Russia 
by 80-some odd percent from the peak in that kind of condition. This 
kind of funding helps focus the attention and it gives us the ability 
to communicate with them. It opens them up for us telling them what we 
think about the threat, and it has an enormous psychological effect in 
terms of their capability.
  I recall Secretary Cheney said--not on this program but on the START 
II treaty when that one was signed, I believe under the Bush 
administration--he said then that he recommended that we give 
substantial amount of aid to Russia so they could accelerate the START 
II schedule, and take down those missiles on a more rapid pace. That 
probably is still good advice.
  So it is within that context that Secretary Cheney was saying this is 
our national security. And I would say this is a very small amount of 
money compared to the $260-some odd billion in our defense budget each 
year. This is a small amount of money if you compare it to almost any 
category of expenditure, and what we are getting for it. I think it may 
be the highest leverage defense money in terms of national security 
that we spend.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me reply. I want to make it very clear 
that the Senator from Virginia agrees entirely with the Senator's 
premise that this is the most serious national security threat posed 
against our Nation indeed, and I think the nations of the Western 
World. So I concur in that.

  I simply feel it necessary to ask these various questions so that we 
have a complete record before the Senate such as they can vote I think 
in a fully informed manner tomorrow. I agree. I shall not expand beyond 
that.
  I so stated my concern about weapons of mass destruction and about 
proliferation many, many times on the floor of this Senate, and I hope, 
may I say, for many years to come.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Let me go through three or four things that we are 
doing, and point out to the Senate and in a roundabout way respond to 
one of your questions.
  Some people are going to say that this is foreign aid. Right? This is 
not foreign aid as I see it. Let me cite a couple of these things we 
are doing and let us see what kind of aid it is: Materials protection 
control and accounting. What have we done and what are we going to do 
with the money?
  The Department of Energy has already secured nuclear materials at 35 
facilities in the former Soviet Union. Those security systems include 
cameras, gates, portal monitors, tagging devices to track nuclear 
materials. And in January when our Vice President met, six more sites 
were added to the list which the DOE will have access to secure these 
materials. Because these sites were only agreed upon in January, funds 
were not included in the President's budget request. We are including 
them here. And, obviously, that is another $15 million for that entire 
program.
  Then there is a lab-to-lab program. It was developed informally. But 
because the Soviet nuclear scientists trusted the scientists of our 
nuclear laboratories in some very strange way they would rather deal 
with those who made the bombs while they were making the bombs than 
they would with a bunch of politicians or a bunch of State Department 
people. And all of a sudden the lab-to-lab relationship grew into 
something that is very fundamental. They are working together. They are 
doing things that will cause those labs to move in peaceful ways 
instead of military ways to produce peaceful products instead of 
military products, and we are gaining from it. That is a $20-million 
investment.
  Is that foreign aid? It would appear to me that probably is the best 
kind of investment in national security that we could ever have. Not 
only what I have just described--but these great scientists who produce 
this nuclear capability in Russia are now friends with great American 
scientists. I mean that is sort of worth something even if they were 
not accomplishing the other things that they are.
  Then we have the cooperation with the Russian Navy on nuclear 
materials--a tough one, a huge undertaking, but if it works, and if we 
get it started, it is not giving anything to the Soviet Union. In a 
sense, they get something, but look what we get from it.
  We have an industrial partnering program that developed with a one-
time expenditure of $35 million. It is doing marvelously. Can you 
imagine private sector American companies working with Soviet 
institutions and American laboratory scientists to disengage Soviet 
scientists from producing nuclear proliferation? They are producing 
things for their domestic market and moving dramatically away from what 
they have been doing for all these years.
  Now, there are many more things that we are trying to do. We do not 
have enough money to do everything that is mentioned by our scientists 
and

[[Page S7000]]

military people. But I think the Senator asked some wonderful 
questions, and it is our responsibility here tonight to make sure our 
colleagues understand this is not foreign aid.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me press on with another question, 
perhaps the most troublesome one certainly from this Senator's 
standpoint, and that is, what do I say to the American taxpayer in 
reply to the following. It is my understanding as a member of the Armed 
Services Committee that Russia continues to develop and deploy a new 
generation of land-based ICBM's, follow-on to the SS-25, first. Second, 
Russia is pursuing a new generation of sea-launched ballistic missiles, 
follow-on to the SSN-20, second. Third, our intelligence community 
forecasts that the Russians are developing a new submarine for the 
purposes of sea-launched ballistic missiles.
  Now, by comparison, the United States currently has no plans for any 
follow-on strategic systems--land-based, sea-based, not a one. Money is 
a fungible product. Money in Russia in the defense budget goes to these 
programs. How do we answer to the American taxpayer, why are they 
pursuing their modernization program and the United States is not, and 
yet we will be called upon for these significant expenditures to 
hopefully pursue and continue the demilitarization of a number of their 
strategic programs? That is a question with which I conclude tonight's 
debate with my colleagues.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, that is a very good 
question, and the American people have every right to get an answer to 
that question.
  First of all, this program is much more broader than Russia, and we 
are encouraging in this amendment that it be broadened beyond the four 
former nuclear States, primarily to be focused on Kazakstan, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Russia, but we think, for instance, the border States with 
Iran and the southern tier of Russia are very important in terms of 
border control, in terms of lab work. They may not have nuclear weapons 
now but the know-how and the chemical weapons and those kinds of 
technologies are there.
  So, first of all, it is not just Russia. It is much broader than 
that.
  Second, I would say to the Senator from Virginia that, as he well 
knows, the whole thrust of American arms control efforts for years was 
to get the Russians, then the Soviet Union, to de-MIRV, to get rid of 
the multiple warheads and move to single warhead weapons. That was what 
we ended up getting in START I and START II under the two Republican 
Presidents, President Reagan and President Bush.

  That was the subject of an awful lot of debate on the MX, as you 
know. We felt that MIRV'd warheads had a chance of basically being used 
in a first strike, whereas single-warhead missiles, if you used one of 
them and you basically would be going after another single-warhead 
missile, therefore the ratio did not favor the offense, it did not 
favor the first strike--if we both had single warhead weapons. But if 
we had MIRV'd weapons, and they were vulnerable on a first strike and 
you could take 10 warheads and destroy 100 warheads by MIRVing and 
having them moved to different targets, then everybody was on more of 
an alert hair trigger.
  So the effort of U.S. arms control, beginning really with Senator 
Jackson's amendment in this Chamber back in SALT I, was to move towards 
de-MIRVing and getting rid of the Soviet very heavy missiles.
  That is what the Russians are now building, is the SS-25, a single-
warhead missile. It would be the ultimate paradox if we told them, 
after all these years arguing with them and getting them to move toward 
that weapon, that we now expect them not to de-MIRV and not to replace. 
That is a replacement missile for the de-MIRVing that we hope is going 
to take place under START I and START II.
  I would prefer that nobody in the world have weapons but us, but that 
is not the real world. I would say if you look at the U.S. expenditures 
in these areas the Senator has named compared to the Russian 
expenditures now, our expenditures overwhelm them both in submarines 
and submarine warfare and classified programs, as well as in our 
overall strategic deterrent.
  I think that is appropriate because we have a responsibility all over 
the world, our allies. We do not have any longer the same equation we 
had then. The Russians have cut back very substantially. I do not 
defend some of the expenditures they are making. For instance, we are 
very concerned about the underground facility. That has come out in the 
paper. I do not know the answer to that, and we are probing that now, 
as we should. But I would still say that we are gaining when we can get 
the Russians to take down weapons that are aimed towards us.
  I do not think the goal of this legislation can be or should be 
realistically to say to the Russians that we expect them to completely 
demilitarize. They have been a great power. One of these days they will 
be a great power again.
  I do not think that is in the cards. I do think we can demand they 
use the funds wisely, that we can demand that as long as we are giving 
them assistance, they be used for their purpose. And I think we can 
measure that purpose in a way to make sure it is in our national 
security interest.
  I see this as self-interest. If someone says, well, if the Russians 
were not getting these funds, then perhaps they would have to use their 
funds they are now using to build SS-25's or submarines for these 
purposes and thereby not build SS-25's and submarines. I think that 
would be very unlikely, based on anything I know about not just Russian 
history but about the history of any country, because no country is 
going to completely demilitarize. No country is going to put the 
control of warheads and dismantle warheads in front of what it 
perceives to be its own national security. We would not, and I think it 
is not realistic for us to expect them to completely demilitarize.
  I would say, though, that one of the original provisions of the Nunn-
Lugar amendment that has been certified by the President over and over 
again is that the Russians are living up to their arms control 
obligations, and that is a requirement of this amendment. If we find 
that they are breaching the arms control obligations, then the money is 
not supposed to be forthcoming. They either are in compliance or the 
President has to certify that they are intending to be in compliance, 
as in the case of the CFE Treaty where we know there have been 
problems, and so forth, but where they are moving forward.
  There are occasions where the Russians do things with this equipment 
that we loan them that we think breach the spirit of the agreement, and 
in those instances that have come to my attention where that has 
happened, where we have gotten in touch with them and we have 
complained about it, they have taken immediate and corrective steps on 
it.
  So we have to be vigilant. We have to be alert. We have to make sure 
that we understand all the time what is happening here, but again, 
while this window is open, I think it is very much in our fundamental 
national security interest to pursue it.
  The bottom line, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, is that we have 
had thousands of warheads dismantled. We have had thousands of missiles 
that were pointed at the United States and our cities and our targets 
which are no longer pointed toward us. We have had a tremendous 
decrease in the risk of nuclear war, and we have had three nuclear 
states give up their nuclear weapons voluntarily.

  In addition to that, we had Kazakhstan basically get in touch with us 
and tell us they had some weapons-grade uranium, highly enriched, that 
they would like to have us help them store safely and move out of that 
territory. That could have been sold for billions of dollars in places 
all over the globe. We use this Nunn-Lugar funding to help secure that, 
and that is no longer a threat.
  So I would say if we stop right now and put up a scorecard of how 
much we basically improved our national security compared to the amount 
of money we have spent, it would be my view, and I may be biased on 
this one--I do not think too biased, though--that this would be the 
most effective defense expenditure we have had in many years.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague. It is 
a debate he and I have had, I think, for about 3 years. On this very 
spot on the floor in years past, I posed this question.
  I also mentioned, for the Record, we well know the United States, 
likewise,

[[Page S7001]]

has destroyed a number of its missile launchers and so forth. But all 
at the expense of the American taxpayer.
  I just want to close out my comments tonight reading from a very 
interesting document called ``Worldwide Submarine Proliferation in the 
Coming Decade.''

       Today, for the first time, Russia's front-line submarines 
     are as quiet or quieter in some aspects than America's best. 
     Programs to provide still further reductions in radiated 
     noise are active today and expected to continue. By the year 
     2000, over half the remaining submarines in Russia will have 
     incorporated stealth technologies on a par with those of 
     modern Western submarines, and 20 percent of Russia's 
     nuclear-powered attack submarines will be quieter than the 
     U.S. Navy's front-line improved Los Angeles class SSN's.

  That, to me, represents a tremendous expenditure of money. I do not 
know what the threat is, other than I suppose to our U.S. submarine 
force, to require them to pursue that much expenditure in an area where 
the United States has been preeminent for these many years.
  Mr. President, I have no further questions at this time to propose to 
my distinguished colleagues. Therefore, I observe perhaps the debate on 
this amendment has concluded, and the Senate could now turn to 
conclusion of wrapup matters. Would that be correct?
  Mr. NUNN. I certainly think so. I appreciate very much the questions 
and comments of the Senator from Virginia this evening. Perhaps the 
Chair would like to make further remarks in answer to these questions, 
because no one has more knowledge in these areas than the Senator from 
Indiana, who is now presiding.
  Other than that, I think we are prepared to basically dispose of the 
amendments.
  Mr. WARNER. I will be happy to take the Chair if the Presiding 
Officer cares to speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair observes there have been important 
questions and excellent responses, and suggests we proceed on to 
wrapup.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time I advise my distinguished 
colleague there are several amendments on the pending bill, which I 
believe have been cleared and can be acted upon by the Senate, if the 
Senator from Georgia is prepared to proceed.


                           Amendment No. 4350

(Purpose: To express the sense of the Congres that the Secretary of the 
Navy should name one of the new attack submarines of the Navy the South 
                                Dakota)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe we are ready to proceed. The first 
amendment I have, I believe, is the Pressler-Daschle amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct. On behalf of Senators Pressler and 
Daschle, I offer an amendment that would express the sense of Congress 
that a submarine, one of the new attack submarine class, should be 
named the South Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Pressler, 
     for himself and Mr. Daschle, proposes an amendment numbered 
     4350.

  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 311, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following:

     SEC. 1072. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NAMING ONE OF THE NEW ATTACK 
                   SUBMARINE THE ``SOUTH DAKOTA''.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of the 
     Navy should name one of the new attack submarines of the Navy 
     the ``South Dakota''.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might inquire of staff, what is the 
definition of a new class of submarine? Is it the current 688's or 
Seawolf class? What is the new attack submarine? I think we ought to 
lay this aside until we get clarification.
  Being one who follows carefully matters of this nature, I suggest we 
lay this amendment aside and take it up later. I urge the sponsors of 
the amendment to advise the managers with respect to the meaning of the 
phrase ``new class of submarines,'' because that could apply to the 688 
class being completed, the Seawolf class, the contemplated class of new 
attack submarines which are the subject of discussion.
  I think we will just await a further time. I withdraw from further 
consideration the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 4350 is laid aside.


                           Amendment No. 4351

(Purpose: To extend the authority of the Secretary of the Army to carry 
out the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) initiative)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I offer an amendment which extends the 
Department of Defense authority to conduct the armament retooling and 
manufacturing support initiative for past fiscal year 1996.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4351.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle B of title I, add the following:

     SEC. 113. PERMANENT AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT ARMS INITIATIVE.

       Section 193(a) of the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing 
     Support Initiative Act of 1992 (subtitle H of title I of 
     Public Law 102-484; 10 U.S.C. 2501 note) is amended by 
     striking out ``During fiscal years 1993 through 1996,'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``During fiscal years 1993 through 
     1998''.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise to offer this amendment to extend 
the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support [ARMS] Initiative. The 
ARMS program is intended to provide assistance to DOD ammunition depots 
in order for them to retool so that they can produce a commercial 
product while maintaining the industrial capacity to support the 
National Security Strategy. By producing commercial and defense 
products, the depots are able to utilize any excess infrastructure and 
operate more efficiently. Since the initiation of this program several 
years ago, it has been a remarkably successful defense conversion 
program.
  Mr. President, the Committee recommended an authorization of $58.0 
million for this program this year. While this should be sufficient 
authority to continue the program, this amendment would ensure that 
there is no question regarding this authority.
  Mr. President, I ask my fellow Senators to support the ARMS program 
and vote to approve this amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge support of the amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. I urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4351) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4352

   (Purpose: To require a transfer to the Army of jurisdiction over 
certain lands in the Vernon Ranger District, Kisatchie National Forest, 
                               Louisiana)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Johnston and Breaux, I 
offer an amendment that would direct the Secretary of Agriculture to 
transfer 85,000 acres of the national forest in Louisiana to the 
Secretary of the Army for use in connection with training and maneuver 
activities in connection with Fort Polk, LA.
  I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other side of the 
aisle.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Johnston, for 
     himself and Mr. Breaux, proposes an amendment numbered 4352.

  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 2828. LAND TRANSFER, VERNON RANGER DISTRICT, KISATCHIE 
                   NATIONAL FOREST, LOUISIANA.

       (a) Transfer Pursuant to Administrative Agreement.--(1) Not 
     later than six months after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of 
     Agriculture shall enter into an agreement providing for the 
     transfer to the Secretary of the Army of administrative 
     jurisdiction over such portion of land currently owned by the 
     United States within the Vernon Ranger District of the 
     Kisatchie National Forest, Louisiana, as the Secretary of the 
     Army and the Secretary of Agriculture jointly determine 
     appropriate for military training activities in connection

[[Page S7002]]

     with Fort Polk, Louisiana. The agreement shall allocate 
     responsibility for land management and conservation 
     activities with respect to the property transferred between 
     the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Agriculture.
       (2) The Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of 
     Agriculture may jointly extend the deadline for entering into 
     an agreement under paragraph (1). The deadline may be 
     extended by not more than six months.
       (b) Alternative Transfer Requirement.--If the Secretary of 
     the Army and the Secretary of Agriculture fail to enter into 
     the agreement referred to paragraph (1) of subsection (a) 
     within the time provided for in that subsection, the 
     Secretary of Agriculture shall, at the end of such time, 
     transfer to the Secretary of the Army administrative 
     jurisdiction over property consisting of approximately 84,825 
     acres of land currently owned by the United States and 
     located in the Vernon Ranger District of the Kisatchie 
     National Forest, Louisiana, as generally depicted on the map 
     entitled ``Fort Polk Military Installation map'', dated June 
     1995.
       (c) Limitation on Acquisition of Private Property.--The 
     Secretary of the Army may acquire privately-owned land within 
     the property transferred under this section only with the 
     consent of the owner of the land.
       (d) Use of Property.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the 
     Secretary of the Army shall use the property transferred 
     under this section for military maneuvers, training and 
     weapons firing, and other military activities in connection 
     with Fort Polk, Louisiana.
       (2) The Secretary may not permit the firing of live 
     ammunition on or over any portion of the property unless the 
     firing of such ammunition on or over such portion is 
     permitted as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (e) Map and Legal Description.--(1) As soon as practicable 
     after the date of the transfer of property under this 
     section, the Secretary of Agriculture shall--
       (A) publish in the Federal Register a notice containing the 
     legal description of the property transferred; and
       (B) file a map and the legal description of the property 
     with the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the 
     Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, and the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, and 
     the Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) The maps and legal descriptions prepared under 
     paragraph (1) shall have the same force and effect as if 
     included in this subsection, except that the Secretary of 
     Agriculture may correct clerical and typographical errors in 
     the maps and legal descriptions.
       (3) As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, copies of the maps and legal descriptions 
     prepared under paragraph (1) shall be available for public 
     inspection in the following offices:
       (A) The Office of the Secretary of Agriculture.
       (B) Such offices of the United States Forest Service as the 
     Secretary of Agriculture shall designate.
       (C) The Office of the Commander of Fort Polk, Louisiana.
       (D) The appropriate office in the Vernon Parish Court 
     House, Louisiana.
       (f) Management of Property.--(1) If the transfer of 
     property under this section occurs under subsection (a), the 
     Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Agriculture shall 
     manage the property in accordance with the agreement entered 
     into under that subsection.
       (2)(A) If the transfer of property under this section 
     occurs under subsection (b), the Secretary of the Army and 
     the Secretary of Agriculture shall manage the property in 
     accordance with the management plan under subparagraph (B) 
     and the memorandum of understanding under subparagraph (C).
       (B)(i) For purposes of managing the property under this 
     paragraph, the Secretary of the Army shall, with the 
     concurrence of the Secretary of Agriculture, develop a plan 
     for the management of the property not later than two years 
     after the transfer of the property. The Secretary of the Army 
     shall provide for a period of public comment in developing 
     the plan in order to ensure that the concerns of local 
     citizens are taken into account in the development of the 
     plan. The Secretary of the Army may utilize the property 
     pending the completion of the plan.
       (ii) The Secretary of the Army shall develop and implement 
     the plan in compliance with applicable Federal law, including 
     the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
     1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).
       (iii) The plan shall provide for the management of the 
     natural, cultural, and other resources of the property, 
     including grazing, the management of wildlife and wildlife 
     habitat, recreational uses (including hunting and fishing), 
     and non-public uses of non-Federal lands within the property.
       (C)(i) For purposes of managing the property under this 
     paragraph, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of 
     Agriculture shall enter into a memorandum of understanding in 
     order to provide for--
       (I) the implementation of the management plan developed 
     under subparagraph (B); and
       (II) the management by the Secretary of Agriculture of such 
     areas of the property as the Secretary of the Army and the 
     Secretary of Agriculture designate for use for non-military 
     purposes.
       (ii) The Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of 
     Agriculture may amend the memorandum of understanding by 
     mutual agreement.
       (g) Reversion.--If at any time after the transfer of 
     property under this section the Secretary of the Army 
     determines that the property, or any portion thereof, is no 
     longer to be retained by the Army for possible use for 
     military purposes, jurisdiction over the property, or such 
     portion thereof, shall revert to the Secretary of Agriculture 
     who shall manage the property, or portion thereof, as part of 
     the Kisatchie National Forest.
       (h) Identification of Land for Transfer to Forest 
     Service.--The Secretary of Defense shall seek to identify 
     land equal in acreage to the land transferred under this 
     section and under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
     Defense that is suitable for transfer to the Secretary of 
     Agriculture for use by the Forest Service.

  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, it is with a great sense of urgency that 
I speak today with my good friend, the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. 
Breaux], to bring to the attention of my colleagues an extremely 
important issue in my State of Louisiana.
  Mr. President, since 1991, Fort Polk, Leesville, LA has been home to 
the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center, or the JRTC, and to 
elements of the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment. Fort Polk has the only 
combat training center in the continental United States dedicated to 
light infantry training. The National Training Center at Fort Irwin, 
CA, provides a somewhat comparable service to our men and women who 
train for armored units combat.
  Each year, some 50,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines arrive 
at Fort Polk for rotational training in infantry maneuvers and joint 
operations. This involves special operation training, counterinsurgency 
operations, live fire, brigade defense, and brigade counterattack. The 
training received is unique, not only because of the terrain at Fort 
Polk, with its tree-covered grassy areas which are indigenous to 
western Louisiana, but the total realism this sort of training 
provides. Even to the extent that there is a complete field hospital 
set up to attend to simulated wounds and casualties. Our soldiers are 
given a certain level of comfort, knowing that if they are injured in 
combat, that they will be evacuated and receive treatment, quickly and 
efficiently.
  Mr. President, I am proposing this amendment to increase the land 
area of Fort Polk, which will enable the Joint Readiness Training 
Center to train and maneuver over a larger land area. This is crucial 
to the continued usefulness of Fort Polk.
  Some may ask, why is it necessary to provide additional land to Fort 
Polk? The answer, Mr. President, is fairly simple.
  Fort Polk has a requirement for additional maneuver training lands to 
support its mission of conducting joint readiness training for Army 
rotational units as well as maintaining the combat readiness of units 
permanently home stationed at Fort Polk. Fort Polk and the JRTC 
currently have access to 40,000 acres of Forest Service land under an 
intensive-use permit but need additional access to the 45,000 acre 
limited-use permit parcel below it to meet its training requirements.
  The total of 85,000 acres will enable the JRTC to conduct its primary 
mission--training infantry soldiers. Longer range weapons and sensors 
are changing the nature of land warfare. Greater ranges are now covered 
by a smaller force. A brigade will now maneuver in the space once used 
by a division. Our military must keep abreast of these changes, to 
maintain the utmost efficiency and to protect our troops in the event 
of real combat.
  Some have raised concerns about how the Army would manage this new 
acreage. I submit that it would be substantially similar to how Fort 
Polk is currently managed, in full compliance with all laws and 
regulations. The Army has forest and land management plans for the 
Forest Service land it currently uses. When the transfer of land 
occurs, the Army will comply with all applicable Federal laws including 
NEPA. All existing land uses for fish and wildlife, hunting, cultural 
and natural resources management, forestry operations as well as 
private holdings will be followed.
  Fort Polk is a good neighbor and steward of the natural resources 
they manage. The fort has received a non-jeopardy opinion for both 
their recovery plan and their training plan regarding the red-cockaded 
woodpecker. In less than 3 years the woodpecker population has almost 
doubled. Fort Polk

[[Page S7003]]

manages the forest using an ecosystem management approach rather than a 
commercial approach, i.e., the goal is to maximize a balanced ecology, 
not profit. The fort has reduced sediment loading, mapped all wetlands, 
and is in compliance with the Clean Water and Scenic Stream Act.

  The fort is also a State Wildlife Management Area whose hunting 
seasons are adjusted to take into account training rotations. These 
practices will continue on the expansion area. An historic preservation 
plan has been completed and protection for known sites is in place. 
Curation facility meets State standards.
  The fort is the winner of numerous environmental awards: Louisiana 
Association of Conservation Districts Good Land Use Award--first time 
awarded to a Federal facility. Second place winner, Secretary of 
Defense Natural Resources Conservation Award. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Region VI Beneficial Re-Use Award. National Park 
Service, Southeast Region Preservation Award. Environmentalist of the 
Year, Dr. Charles H. Stagg, Fort Polk, LA.
  Let me go over some of the provisions of this amendment. Our 
amendment would provide 6 months for the Army and the Forest Service to 
come to an agreement on transfer of all or some portion of this 
property. The 6 months may be extended by another 6 months, by mutual 
agreement. The land transfers automatically if no agreement can be 
reached between the USDA and the Army.
  The amendment does not allow for any live firings on transferred 
land, except on that land currently used for that purpose. It directs 
the Department of the Army to develop a management plan, and provides 
for the return of the property to the Agriculture Department if the 
land is no longer used by the Army for training purposes. The 
legislation would prohibit the Army from condemning any private 
inholdings.
  This amendment has strong, broad support. The Army supports this 
initiative. There is overwhelming civic support, as the following 
communities and legislative bodies have passed resolutions supporting 
the transfer: Louisiana State Legislature; Vernon Parish, the local 
parish; Beauregard Parish; as well as the surrounding communities of 
Leesville, De Ridder, Alexandria, Pineville, Many, and Natchitoches.
  Mr. President, Fort Polk is very important to Louisiana and to the 
Nation's overall military readiness and the Louisiana delegation 
overwhelmingly supports the transfer. The land transfer is critical to 
the fort's mission, light infantry training, and its future. The U.S. 
Army needs to train its infantry brigades in the most realistic manner 
possible. The time for our soldiers to learn from their mistakes is 
while at the Joint Readiness Training Center, not while in harm's way. 
Additional land will give the JRTC the resources it needs to properly 
train our Armed Forces to the highest level of readiness.
  I ask unamious consent a letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of the Army to Mr. Lauffer of the Committee on Armed Services, be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                           Department of the Army,


                            Office of the Assistant Secretary,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 1996.
     George W. Lauffer,
     Deputy Staff Director, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 
         Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Lauffer: The Department of the Army supports the 
     legislation proposed by Senator J. Bennett Johnston, ``To 
     require a transfer to the Army of jurisdiction over certain 
     lands in the Vernon Range District, Kisatchie National 
     Forest, Louisiana.'' The transfer would provide the Army with 
     greater flexibility in accomplishing its training mission at 
     Fort Polk, Louisiana.
           Sincerely,

                                              Paul W. Johnson,

                            Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
                        (Installations and Housing) OASA (I, L&E).

  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment I 
offered with Senator Johnston transferring acreage in the Kisatchie 
National Forest to the Army at Fort Polk, LA. Fort Polk has a 
requirement for additional maneuver training lands to support its 
mission of conducting joint readiness training for Army rotational 
units as well as maintaining the combat readiness of units permanently 
home stationed at Fort Polk. Fort Polk, home of the Joint Readiness 
Training Center [JRTC], is very important to the Nation's overall 
military readiness and national security. It is the only place in the 
world where light infantry brigades are trained as a unit, complete 
with Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps units. Between 50,000 and 64,000 
troops are trained at Fort Polk every year. This amendment will enable 
Fort Polk to expand its training exercises while continuing its unique 
mission of providing our troops the best training possible.
  At the JRTC, our troops participate in training scenarios that help 
prepare them for all type of missions, including combat, and the 
terrain in the Kisatchie Forest provides our troops ideal training area 
for this purpose. We need to ensure that Fort Polk's unique role in 
training our soldiers continues. Our goal is to train our troops 
effectively and in an environmentally sensitive way. This is an 
important point. Some concerns have been about the environmental impact 
this transfer would have but if you look at the Army's record over the 
past 5 years, this criticism is unfounded. Fort Polk is a good neighbor 
and steward of the natural resources they manage. Fort Polk has 
received a nonjeopardy opinion for both their recovery plan and their 
training plan regarding the red-cockaded woodpecker on the JRTC. In 
less than 3 years the woodpecker population has almost doubled. Fort 
Polk has also won several awards for its conservation and preservation 
efforts around the JRTC. Additionally, if this transfer occurs, the 
Army would comply with all applicable Federal laws including National 
Environmental Policy Act [NEPA].
  This amendment would give the Forest Service and the Army 6 months to 
sit down and try to negotiate a transfer. Ideally, we would like this 
issue to be solved administratively and have both sides sit down and 
try to figure out a way to work this out. But if that can't happen, 
this amendment would automatically transfer the land. The JRTC can't 
wait a decade for this important transfer to happen. Additionally, the 
Secretary of Defense will seek to identify an equal number of acres, 
not required for military use, for conveyance to the Forest Service in 
exchange for this land. We also provide that if the Army no longer 
needs the land, it would be transferred back to the Forest Service.
  All existing land uses for fish and wildlife, hunting, and forestry 
operations would remain.
  I have also heard from private landowners who are concerned about the 
impact the transfer would have on them. Our amendment tries to address 
this concern by prohibiting the Army from expropriating any private 
property in the forest. The Army would still be able to enter into 
negotiations with willing sellers but could not condemn any private 
land.
  To address the concerns of these groups and others, this amendment 
also provides for a period of public comment when the Army develops a 
management plan to ensure that the concerns of the local citizens are 
taken into account.
  While there is some opposition to this transfer, there is also 
widespread support for it from the local communities. The transfer has 
been endorsed by the city councils in Leesville, DeRidder, Pineville, 
Many, Alexandria and Natchitoches, Beauregard Parish, the Vernon Parish 
Chamber of Commerce, and the Vernon Parish School Board. They 
understand that if the Army doesn't get this additional land, the 
future of Fort Polk and the surrounding communities could be affected. 
The fort has an annual economic impact in Louisiana of approximately 
$720 million.
  Mr. President, the bottom line is that our Army needs to train its 
infantry brigades in the most realistic manner possible. The time for 
our soldiers to prepare for combat and other situations is during 
training at the JRTC, not while in harms way. The additional land we 
are seeking will give the JRTC the resources it needs to properly train 
our Armed Forces and make them ready to meet military challenges when 
they arise.
  As importantly, we authorize this transfer with conditions attached 
which are sensitive to environmental and private property owners' 
needs. I

[[Page S7004]]

thank Senator Johnston for his leadership and I urge adoption of the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4352) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4353

   (Purpose: To authorize a land conveyance, Air Force Plant No. 85, 
                             Columbus, OH)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator DeWine, I offer an 
amendment which would authorize the conveyance of approximately 240 
acres from the former Air Force Plant No. 85 to the Columbus, OH, 
airport authority.
  I believe this amendment has been cleared.
  Mr. NUNN. It has been cleared. I urge the approval of the amendment. 
I urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. DeWine, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 4353.

  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title XXVIII, add the following:

     SEC. 2828. LAND CONVEYANCE, AIR FORCE PLANT NO. 85, COLUMBUS, 
                   OHIO.

       (a) Conveyance Authorized.--(1) Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the Secretary of the Air Force may instruct 
     the Administrator of General Services to convey, without 
     consideration, to the Columbus Municipal Airport Authority 
     (in this section referred to as the ``Authority'') all right, 
     title, and interest of the United States in and to a parcel 
     of real property, together with improvements thereon, at Air 
     Force Plant No. 85, Columbus, Ohio, consisting of 
     approximately 240 acres that contains the land and buildings 
     referred to as the ``airport parcel'' in the correspondence 
     from the General Services Administration to the Authority 
     dated April 30, 1996, and is located adjacent to the Port 
     Columbus International Airport.
       (2) If the Secretary does not have administrative 
     jurisdiction over the parcel on the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the conveyance shall be made by the Federal 
     official who has administrative jurisdiction over the parcel 
     as of that date.
       (b) Requirement for Federal Screening.--The Federal 
     official may not carry out the conveyance of property 
     authorized in subsection (a) unless the Federal official 
     determines, in consultation with the Administrator of General 
     Services, that no department or agency of the Federal 
     Government will accept the transfer of the property.
       (c) Condition of Conveyance.--The conveyance required under 
     subsection (a) shall be subject to the condition that the 
     Authority use the conveyed property for public airport 
     purposes.
       (d) Reversion.--If the Federal official making the 
     conveyance under subsection (a) determines that any portion 
     of the conveyed property is not being utilized in accordance 
     with subsection (c), all right, title, and interest in and to 
     such portion shall revert to the United States and the United 
     States shall have immediate right of entry thereon.
       (e) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal 
     description of the real property to be conveyed under 
     subsection (a) shall be determined by a survey satisfactory 
     to the Federal official making the conveyance. The cost of 
     the survey shall be borne by the Authority.
       (f) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Federal official 
     making the conveyance of property under subsection (a) may 
     require such additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the conveyance as such official considers appropriate to 
     protect the interests of the United States.

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, this amendment provides for the transfer 
of 240 acres from the U.S. Air Force to the Port Columbus International 
Airport. The Columbus Airport Authority is seeking this transfer for 
the purpose of constructing a new 10,250-foot south runway. This 
amendment has been cleared by both the majority and minority side of 
the Armed Services Committee, the Air Force, and the General Services 
Administration.
  I am pleased that Senator Glenn joins me in offering this amendment 
to facilitate this public benefit conveyance.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to endorse the amendment offered by 
my colleague from Ohio, Senator DeWine, and I ask unanimous consent 
that I be added as an original cosponsor. This amendment conveys to the 
Columbus Municipal Airport Authority approximately 240 acres of land 
owned by the Air Force. This parcel is part of an Air Force industrial 
facility which has operated at the site for a number of years. In 1988 
during consideration of the fiscal year 1989 Defense authorization 
bill, Congress directed that the entire parcel of more than 400 acres 
be sold, and the proceeds from the sale be used to pay for the 
environmental remediation of the property.
  As a result of the 1988 legislation, the Air Force and the General 
Services Administration entered into an agreement to sell the property 
in 1992, with GSA acting as the Government's property manager. However, 
the Air Force and its contractors continued to use the facility until 
1994. During this time, GSA made a determination after consulting with 
State and local authorities, that it would be in the best interest of 
all parties to divide the parcel into two pieces--a so-called 
industrial parcel and an airport parcel. GSA is currently marketing the 
industrial parcel and expects to complete the sale later this year. 
Since 1994 necessary actions, such as consultations with other Federal 
and DOD agencies, the State of Ohio Historical Preservation Office and 
some needed environmental remediation, have occurred.
  When this amendment was originally brought to my attention, I had 
some concerns. In particular, I was concerned that the amendment would 
disrupt the planned sale of the industrial parcel. I was also concerned 
that the airport parcel be screened for other Federal interest. It is 
my understanding that in the absence of the 1988 legislation, the 
airport parcel would be eligible for conveyance to the Columbus 
Municipal Airport Authority as a public benefit conveyance. The 
amendment now accomplishes the goal of a public benefit conveyance, 
under conditions of a satisfactory Federal screen, without affecting 
the sale of the industrial property. It is also my understanding that 
this amendment will not alter the fact that the Air Force is liable for 
the environmental remediation of the site.
  I am pleased to work with Senator DeWine on this amendment, and I 
congratulate him for offering it.
  Mr. WARNER. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4353) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4354

    (Purpose: To delete $25,000,000 from the North Atlantic Treaty 
 Organization Security Investment Program; to add $6,600,000 for phase 
II construction of the Consolidated Education Center at Fort Campbell, 
 KY; and to add $10,800,000 for phase III construction of the Western 
                        Kentucky Training Site)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe the next amendment will also have 
an amendment to it by Senator Warner on behalf of Senator McCain.
  On behalf of Senator Ford, I offer an amendment which would delete 
$25 million for the NATO Security Investment Program, to add $6.6 
million for phase II construction of the Consolidated Education Center 
at Fort Campbell, KY; and $10.8 million for phase 3 of the construction 
of the Western Kentucky Training Site.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Ford, proposes 
     an amendment numbered 4354.

  The amendment is as follows:
       In the table in section 2101(a), strike out the item 
     relating to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and insert in lieu 
     thereof the following:

Kentucky...........................  Fort Campbell........   $67,600,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

       Strike out the amount set forth as the total amount at the 
     end of the table in section 2101(a), and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``$363,050,000''.
       In section 2104(a), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), 
     strike out ``$1,894,297,000'' and insert in lieu thereof 
     ``$1,900,897,000''.
       In section 2104(a)(1), strike out ``$356,450,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$363,050,000''.
       In section 2502, strike out ``$197,000,000'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``$172,000,000''.
       In section 2601(1)(A), strike out ``$79,628,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$90,428,000''.

  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I have an amendment that will provide $6.6 
million for phase two construction of the

[[Page S7005]]

Consolidated Education Center at Fort Campbell, KY and provide $10.8 
million for phase three construction of the Western Kentucky Training 
Site.
  Not only are the costs of my amendments fully offset, but I know my 
colleagues will agree that because these two projects are already 
underway and because they represent an integral part of the training of 
our troops, continued funding is both appropriate and necessary.
  This Congress has already invested $14.5 million into phase one of 
Fort Campbell's Education Center. Funding for the final phase, phase 
two, will provide additional needed classrooms, office space, and 
additional parking. As many of you may know, Fort Campbell has the 
largest educational program of any division-level installation in 
Forces Command. Funding for this last phase will assure we can take a 
state-of-the-art education program out of World War II-era buildings.
  In addition, this Congress has dedicated funds to the first two 
phases of the Western Kentucky Training Site for a total of $11.1 
million. Because this is a five-phase project, providing funding for 
phase three is critical to keeping this project on time and on track 
for completion.
  The Western Kentucky training facility, in conjunction with the high-
technology training available at Fort Knox, puts Kentucky at the 
forefront of this country's military training. Last year, 16,000 
soldiers trained there. But those numbers represent just the beginning 
in a long line of soldiers who will receive the best state-of-the-art 
training this country has to offer.
  I believe this is an amendment my colleagues will have no trouble 
supporting.


                Amendment No. 4355 to Amendment No. 4354

 (Purpose: To provide that funds may not be obligated or expended for 
the project if the project is not included in the current future-years 
             defense program of the Department of Defense)

  Mr. WARNER. I send to the desk on behalf of Senator McCain an 
amendment to the Ford amendment, to provide the funds may not be 
obligated or expended until the Secretary of Defense certifies to 
Congress that the projects are included in current future-years defense 
program.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. McCain, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 4355 to amendment No. 4354.

  The amendment is as follows:
       At the end of the amendment, add the following:
       At the end of title XXVII, add the following:

     SEC. 2706. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN PROJECTS.

       (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
     may be obligated or expended for the military construction 
     project listed under subsection (b) until the Secretary of 
     Defense certifies to Congress that the project is included in 
     the current future-years defense program.
       (b) Covered Projects.--Subsection (a) applies to the 
     following military construction project:
       (1) Phase II, Construction, Consolidated Education Center, 
     Ft. Cambpell, KY.
       (2) Phase III, Construction, Western Kentucky Training 
     Site.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, as my colleagues know, I have consistently 
opposed funding for military construction projects that were not 
requested by the administration and which do not meet the Senate's 
criteria for consideration of unrequested military construction 
projects.
  Let me reiterate the criteria to which the Senate agreed 2 years ago. 
Each project not included in the administration's budget request is 
judged against four criteria, namely: (1) it is mission essential; (2) 
it is not inconsistent with any BRAC actions; (3) it is executable 
during the fiscal year; and (4) it is included in the Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP). In addition, there should be a reduction in 
some other defense program to offset the increased funding for each 
project.
  The bill before the Senate includes $600 million for unrequested 
military construction projects which, for the most part, meet the first 
four criteria. However, none of these projects were funded by an 
offsetting reduction in some other defense account. Therefore, they do 
not meet all of the Senate's established criteria.
  The amendment offered by my colleague from Kentucky, Senator Ford, as 
originally proposed, does not meet all five criteria. The amendment 
does include an offsetting reduction in another defense account, which 
makes it unique among the projects included in this bill. But according 
to information provided to the Committee by the Department of Defense, 
the project is not included in the current FYDP.
  I am pleased to note, however, that my colleague from Kentucky, 
Senator Ford, has agreed to accept an amendment to his amendment. The 
second-degree amendment would prohibit obligation of the funds for this 
project until the Secretary of Defense certifies that the project is in 
the FYDP. If that certification is received, the project will then meet 
all five of the Senate's criteria, and the funds will become available 
to proceed with the project.
  Mr. President, subject to the conditions stated in the modified 
amendment, I have no objection to including this military construction 
project in the authorization bill. I appreciate very much the 
opportunity to work with my colleague from Kentucky. His willingness to 
work together to resolve this matter is greatly appreciated, and I 
thank him for his understanding of my position with respect to military 
construction add-ons.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, members of this chamber have heard the 
Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee and me speak on several 
occasions in opposition to funding unrequested military construction 
projects. Once again, I rise to speak in opposition to this on-going 
practice. The amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky would add 
additional funds for phase II of an Education Center at Fort Campbell 
and phase III of the Western Kentucky Training Range for the Army 
National Guard. I would like to voice my opposition to this amendment 
and express my support for the Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee's 
second degree amendment which would require the Secretary of Defense to 
certify that these projects are in the military services' Future Years 
Defense Plan (FYDP) before obligating the construction funds.
  During the Committee's markup of the defense authorization bill, the 
two projects addressed in the amendment were screened by the services 
to determine if the projects met the Committee's criteria. The services 
indicated, at that time, that the projects were not in the FYDP. 
However,, I understand that different information regarding these 
projects has been made available to the Committee. Given the 
conflicting data on these projects, I believe it is appropriate, as the 
Senator from Arizona's amendment would require, for the Secretary of 
Defense to certify information on these projects before the funds are 
released.
  As I have stated before, I will continue to work with the Chairman of 
the Readiness Subcommittee to reverse the practice of adding millions 
of dollars to the budget for unrequested projects.
  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent to have the second-degree 
amendment adopted as well as the underlying amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments are agreed 
to.
  The amendment (No. 4355) was agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4354), as amended, was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4356

 (Purpose: To amend section 2821, relating to the transfer of lands at 
 Arlington National Cemetery, VA, in order to place conditions on the 
                       transfer of certain lands)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Robb and Warner, I 
offer an amendment which would modify section 2821 of S. 1745 to 
require the Secretaries of the Interior and the Army to submit 
summaries of the land-use plan, environmental assessment and cultural 
resources studies regarding the land transfer at Arlington Cemetery.
  I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other side.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

[[Page S7006]]

  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Robb, for 
     himself, and Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment numbered 4356.

  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike out subsection (a) of section 2821 and insert in 
     lieu thereof the following new subsection (a):
       (a) Requirement for Secretary of Interior To Transfer 
     Certain Section  29 Lands.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the 
     Secretary of the Interior shall transfer to the Secretary of 
     the Army administrative jurisdiction over the following lands 
     located in section 29 of the National Park System at 
     Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia:
       (A) The lands known as the Arlington National Cemetery 
     Interment Zone.
       (B) All lands in the Robert E. Lee Memorial Preservation 
     Zone, other than those lands in the Preservation Zone that 
     the Secretary of the Interior determines must be retained 
     because of the historical significance of such lands or for 
     the maintenance of nearby lands or facilities.
       (2)(A) The Secretary of the Interior may not make the 
     transfer referred to in paragraph (1)(B) until 60 days after 
     the date on which the Secretary submits to the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National 
     Security of the House of Representatives--
       (i) a summary of the document entitled ``Cultural Landscape 
     and Archaeological Study, Section 29, Arlington House, The 
     Robert E. Lee Memorial'';
       (ii) a summary of any environmental analysis required with 
     respect to the transfer under the National Environmental 
     Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.); and
       (iii) the proposal of the Secretary and the Secretary of 
     the Army setting forth the lands to be transferred and the 
     general manner in which the Secretary of the Army will 
     develop such lands after transfer.
       (B) The Secretary of the Interior shall submit the 
     information required under subparagraph (A) not later than 
     October 31, 1997.
       (3) The transfer of lands under paragraph (1) shall be 
     carried out in accordance with the Interagency Agreement 
     Between the Department of the Interior, the National Park 
     Service, and the Department of the Army, Dated February 22, 
     1995.
       (4) The exact acreage and legal descriptions of the lands 
     to be transferred under paragraph (1) shall be determined by 
     surveys satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior and the 
     Secretary of the Army.

  Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4356) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4357

  (Purpose: To authorize funding for the Corps surface-to-air missile 
 (SAM/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program at the level 
                      requested by the President)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment by Senator 
Lieberman from Connecticut that would authorize funding for the Corps 
surface-to-air missile, known as Corps SAM, at the level requested by 
the President. I am a cosponsor of this amendment. I believe it has 
been cleared on the other side of the aisle.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Lieberman, for 
     himself, and Mr. Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 4357.

  The amendment is as follows:
       At the end of subtitle C of title II add the following:

     SEC. 237. CORPS SAM/MEADS PROGRAM.

       (a) Funding.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated 
     under section 201(4)--
       (1) $56,200,000 is available for the Corps surface-to-air 
     missile (SAM/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) 
     program (PE63869C); and
       (2) $515,711,000 is available for Other Theater Missile 
     Defense programs, projects, and activities (PE63872C).
       (b) International Cooperation.--The Secretary of Defense 
     may carry out the program referred to in subsection (a) in 
     accordance with the memorandum of understanding entered into 
     on May 25, 1996, by the governments of the United States, 
     Germany, and Italy regarding international cooperation on 
     such program (including any amendments to the memorandum of 
     understanding).
       (c) Limitations.--Not more than $15,000,000 of the amount 
     available for the Corps SAM/MEADS program under subsection 
     (a) may be obligated until the Secretary of Defense submits 
     to the congressional defense committees the following:
       (1) An initial program estimate for the Corps SAM/MEADS 
     program, including a tentative schedule of major milestones 
     and an estimate of the total program cost through initial 
     operational capability.
       (2) A report on the options associated with the use of 
     existing systems, technologies, and program management 
     mechanisms to satisfy the requirement for the Corps surface-
     to-air missile, including an assessment of cost and schedule 
     implications in relation to the program estimate submitted 
     under paragraph (1).
       (3) A certification that there will be no increase in 
     overall United States funding commitment to the project 
     definition and validation phase of the Corps SAM/MEADS 
     program as a result of the withdrawal of France from 
     participation in the program.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I would like to propose an amendment to 
S. 1745 in order to correct an issue with important national security 
implications. Development of the corps-level surface to air theater 
missile defense system, called the Medium Extended Air Defense System 
[MEADS] is adversely affected by the current legislation. Unless the 
corrections, which I will describe in a moment, are made, the current 
provisions will likely halt the development of this important program.
  First, let me address the necessity for MEADS. There are currently 
under development a number of theater missile defense systems. However, 
no system, except for MEADS, protects front-line troops in the corps' 
maneuver area. Hence, MEADS will fulfill an existing, urgent U.S. 
operational requirement for a rapidly deployable, highly mobile, robust 
air defense system designed to protect maneuver forces and 
expeditionary forces of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Both services 
are in strong agreement on the need for protection against short- to 
medium-range ballistic missiles and the full spectrum of air-breathing 
threats--aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The 
urgency of the need for MEADS is testified to by the support of the 
Commanders-in Chief of Central Command, Atlantic Command, Korean 
Command and of course, the European Command/NATO. These operational 
commanders, as well as, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the 
Chief of Staff of the Army are all on the record documenting the 
urgency of the requirement for this system.
  It should be noted that this operational need will only become 
greater with time. Estimates of future threats include the increasing 
ability of both major and lesser powers, as well as, substate actors, 
to acquire and utilize the rapidly accessible and increasingly 
affordable ballistic and cruise missile technologies against our 
forward deployed units.
  The operational need for MEADS has been made clear by our allies. In 
addition to our partnership with Germany and Italy, in developing a 
theater missile defense system, for forward deployed, mobile forces, 
other nations have expressed a strong interest in purchasing such a 
system to meet their own security requirements.
  I must repeat this most essential point: no other planned theater 
missile defense system can satisfy operational requirements with 
respect to defending soldiers and marines deployed in the forward area 
of the theater.
  The MEADS system has additional advantages other than this most 
important operational requirement. It is the most cost-effective 
approach to meeting the operational requirements for forward coverage 
in the theater. Two U.S. industry teams, Hughes/Raytheon and Lockheed/
Martin/Loral, have been awarded contracts to participate in the first 
phase of the program, largely because their proposals effectively 
leverage technology used in current surface to air and air to air 
missile systems. Both of the U.S. industrial teams propose a system 
architecture based on proven components and technology.
  The program is further leveraged by participation of two key Allies, 
Italy and Germany. Both countries require a modern system to replace 
their aging HAWK systems. As a footnote, there are 22 additional 
nations currently employing HAWK. Those other users will require a 
replacement system during the next decade. Both partner countries 
provide technical capabilities that significantly enhance the MEADS 
Program's access to the world's best technology.
  As a result of the leveraging of technology and the significant 
contributions of Italy and Germany, the United States funding 
requirement for system development has been reduced from the

[[Page S7007]]

original $3.1 Billion baseline estimate to about $1.7 Billion. This 
accounting of costs does not include the revenue and employment 
benefits that will accrue due to the expected high demand for the 
purchase of this system.
  Given all of these benefits, the current bill does two disruptive 
things to the MEADS development program. It reduces the program 
authorization by $10.8 millions and it prohibits the United States from 
contributing above 50 percent of the funding among her allies. On the 
face of it, these bill items do not seem very damaging. However, the 
international nature of the program makes these problems quite 
damaging. The difficulties in the current bill are due, I believe, to 
costing assumptions that are no longer valid. The biggest change from 
last year's authorization bill is the withdrawal of France from the 
international agreement. However, the bill appears to have 
inadvertently placed cost constraints on the MEADS project as if France 
were still in the agreement. Let me now lay out some of the adverse 
consequences of the current bill's language.
  First, the proposed $10.8 million reduction in authorizations for 
fiscal year 1997 will mean greater overall costs to the U.S. for 
developing MEADS in the project definition-validation phase of the 
project. This is due to the obvious stretching out of the development 
time period.
  Second, and more importantly, Germany and Italy are committed to the 
MEADS Program at the highest levels of government. Neither country 
views any other system as a viable alternative to meeting its national 
requirements. As of May 28, 1996, Germany, Italy and the United States 
have formally agreed upon terms for the program and have signed an 
international agreement governing the initial program definition and 
validation phase of the program. Incidently, this satisfies the Armed 
Services Committee Report's requirement for a Memorandum of 
Understanding [MOU] among the Allies before funds are obligated.
  Of course the memorandum of agreement just described is much 
different than the one envisioned a year ago. The withdrawal of France 
from the partnership on MEADS means that the United States cannot meet 
the 50 percent ceiling on funding, required in the committee report, 
given the previously agreed upon percentages among the Allies on burden 
sharing. The restructuring--resulting from the withdrawal of France--
results in cost shares, now, of 60 percent for the United States, 25 
percent for Germany, and 15 percent for Italy. Previously planned on 
percentages were: 50 percent for United States, 20 percent for Germany, 
10 percent for Italy, and 20 percent for France. All countries in the 
international agreement have picked up some of the burden that was once 
assigned to France.
  At this point, I must make clear that the requirement for the Corps 
SAM capability is a unilateral one. The United States needs this 
capability now, and would need to fund now, with or without Allied 
participation. The benefits of the partnership are clear. Also, the 
higher percentage of costs now assumed by the United States also means 
an accompanying higher percentage of revenues gained from the sale of 
the weapon system to U.S. Allies.
  Paradoxically, restructuring of the program will actually reduce the 
U.S. cost for the PD/V phase of the program by $4 million, despite the 
percentage change that I just described. With the pull-out of France, 
the participating nations have adjusted the scope of the program so 
that the costs for the development phase are reduced. The reasons are 
reduced duplication and redundancies, and the elimination of French-
unique program requirements which are not demanded by the other 
participating countries.
  Because MEADS is the first major system new start the United States 
has attempted as a cooperative program in some time, it has received a 
great deal of attention around the world. Our friends and allies see 
MEADS as the litmus test of U.S. resolve to carry through on our 
promise to improve our record in armaments cooperation. MEADS 
demonstrates that our defense industry can work in concert with the 
defense industries of other nations.
  The committee's report sends a negative signal concerning MEADS. 
Difficulties in resolving this partnership will invariably impact on 
other future, international armament partnerships; our credibility will 
be damaged. Partnerships such as JSTARS for NATO are put at risk by the 
proposed actions with respect to MEADS.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended the program be 
reduced by $10.8 million, a reduction that makes the program outlined 
in the recently completed international agreement unexecutable. Given 
such a reduction, our Allied partners will almost certainly consider 
the MOU null and void. This, in combination with the 50 percent 
ceiling, is very debilitating for the success of further cooperative 
efforts.
  In sum, the legislative provisions in the current bill, unless 
corrected, will likely halt the international agreement on MEADS, halt 
MEADS development, and cause other international cooperative defense 
efforts to become suspect.
  I believe the amendment that I am proposing will address these issues 
while also addressing the Armed Services Committee's very valid 
concerns that cost overruns not emerge from the program. Instead of 
limitations on percentages with respect to burden sharing among the 
allies, I propose a spending cap, as outlined in the amendment. This 
spending cap meets the rightful concerns of the SASC that costs be 
controlled in the development of MEADS. The $10.8 million put back into 
the program in this amendment is offset by reducing funding in a catch-
all program entitled ``Other Theater Missile Defense programs, 
projects, and activities.''
  The amendment ensures that the United States complies with her 
obligations under the international agreement between the United 
States, Germany, and Italy. By doing so, we bolster our credibility 
among our allies, while maintaining the existence and effectiveness of 
an important defense development program for our front-line troops.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4358

(Purpose: To prohibit certain actions relating to the reorganization of 
            the Army ROTC pending a report on the Army ROTC)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Thurmond, Ford, 
Sarbanes, Breaux, Domenici, Santorum, Hollings, Warner, and Johnston, I 
offer an amendment that would prohibit the Secretary of the Army from 
closing any Reserve officer training corps units until a comprehensive 
study is complete and the results reported to the Congress of the 
United States.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond, 
     for himself, Mr. Ford, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Breaux, Mr. 
     Domenici, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Warner, and Mr. 
     Johnston, proposes an amendment numbered 4358.

  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 523. PROHIBITION ON REORGANIZATION OF ARMY ROTC CADET 
                   COMMAND OR TERMINATION OF SENIOR ROTC UNITS 
                   PENDING REPORT ON ROTC.

       (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the Secretary of the Army may not reorganize or 
     restructure the Reserve Officers Training Corps Cadet Command 
     or terminate any Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps units 
     identified in the Information for Members of Congress 
     concerning Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Unit 
     Closures dated May 20, 1996, until 180 days after the date on 
     which the Secretary submits to the congressional defense 
     committees the report described in subsection (b).
       (b) Report.--The report referred to in subsection (a) 
     shall--
       (1) describe the selection process used to identify the 
     Reserve Officer Training Corps units of the Army to be 
     terminated;
       (2) list the criteria used by the Army to select Reserve 
     Officer Training Corps units for termination;
       (3) set forth the specific ranking of each unit of the 
     Reserve Officer Training Corps of the Army to be terminated 
     as against all other such units;

[[Page S7008]]

       (4) set forth the authorized and actual cadre staffing of 
     each such unit to be termination for each fiscal year of the 
     10-fiscal year period ending with fiscal year 1996;
       (5) set forth the production goals and performance 
     evaluations of each Reserve Officer Training Corps unit of 
     the Army on the closure list for each fiscal year of the 10-
     fiscal year period ending with fiscal year 1996;
       (6) describe how cadets currently enrolled in the units 
     referred to in paragraph (5) will be accommodated after the 
     closure of such units;
       (7) describe the incentives to enhance the Reserve Officer 
     Training Corps program that are provided by each of the 
     colleges on the closure list; and
       (8) include the projected officer accession plan by source 
     of commission for the active-duty Army, the Army Reserve, and 
     the Army National Guard.
       (9) describe whether the closure of any ROTC unit will 
     adversely effect the recruitment of minority officer 
     candidates.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as an Army ROTC Program graduate and one 
who believes the program is vital to the national security of our 
Nation, I was disappointed to learn that the Army announced on May 20, 
1996, that it will terminate the program at 31 universities and 
colleges throughout the Nation, including two in South Carolina.
  I expect that many of my Senate colleagues have a strong affiliation 
for the ROTC Program and are prepared to speak to the merits of the 
program. I believe that many would echo the comments of Dr. Lee 
Vickers, the president of Francis Marion University who described the 
need for the ROTC Program as follows:

       Service to one's community and to the Nation as one of the 
     constituent values of the United States and one that is being 
     heard more and more frequently throughout the higher 
     education community these days. What more vital service can 
     there be than that discipline, skills, and service learned by 
     young men and young women fortunate enough to experience the 
     leadership training of the ROTC Program? No one can easily 
     deny the importance and the value of the present and future 
     citizen-soldiers leaders that the ROTC Program has produced 
     and continues to produce.

  Mr. President, it troubles me that the Army terminated programs, not 
only at Francis Marion University, but also at Presbyterian College, 
and its two satellite programs at Lander University and at New Berry 
College. According to U.S. News and World Report Presbyterian College 
ranked second among 117 regional liberal arts colleges in the South. A 
key contributor to that reputation has been the ROTC Program which was 
started in 1919 with the activation of the Scottish Highlander 
Battalion. For 77 years, ROTC has been a respected and integral part of 
campus life at Presbyterian College, sending graduates to every major 
military campaign since World War I. To date, Presbyterian College has 
graduated 14 general officers and one Medal of Honor recipient and 
currently more than 100 Presbyterian College graduates serve in 
uniform.
  Mr. President, when I asked the Army to tell me why these programs 
were being terminated, their answer was the requirements for 
commissioned officers has decreased and therefore the number of ROTC 
programs must be reduced. Although that answer may be rationale, the 
Army could not provide me with the criteria for selecting the ROTC 
programs to be terminated.
  My amendment would require the Army to provide a report detailing the 
selection criteria and other information to justify the closure of the 
31 ROTC units in 20 States. It would further require the Army to wait 
180 days after submitting the report before initiating any action to 
reorganize the ROTC Program.
  Mr. President, this is a reasonable amendment in view of the Army's 
action to terminate such an important program--a program that not only 
supports the security of our Nation but also impacts the lives of 
thousands of America's future leaders. I ask my Senate colleagues to 
show their support for the ROTC Program and adopt this amendment.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator Thurmond's 
amendment to the Defense Authorization bill to impose a temporary 
moratorium on college ROTC unit closures.
  The current guidelines will adversely affect several universities 
across the country, including Murray State University in Kentucky, 
where the Army ROTC program is schedule for closure at the end of the 
1996-97 school year.
  Murray State has a long and distinguished ROTC tradition. Since its 
inception in 1952, over 1,000 ROTC graduates have passed through the 
program. Many of those graduates went on to serve this country with 
great distinction and honor both in times of war and peace.
  Like ROTC programs across the country, the Army ROTC program at 
Murray State is not only an important component of the western Kentucky 
community, but of the entire armed services. And so, I urge my 
colleagues to support Senator Thurmond's amendment.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the 
president of Murray State University, Kern Alexander, be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                          Murray State University,


                                      Office of the President,

                                        Murray, KY, June 17, 1996.
     Hon. Wendell Ford,
     U.S. Senate, Senate Russell Office Bldg.,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Ford: The Department of the Army has recently 
     announced that the ROTC program at Murray State University 
     will be closed at the end of the 1996/1997 school year. I am 
     seeking your support and assistance in reversing this 
     decision.
       ROTC at Murray State University is an integral part of our 
     campus. With over a thousand graduates since 1952, our ROTC 
     program has a long and distinguished history. Many of the 
     Army officers commissioned through our program have served 
     their country with great honor in war and peace. It is 
     important to our country and our Army that future 
     commissioned officers understand and represent the regional 
     values of the soldiers that they will lead in the various 
     components of the Total Army.
       As described in the attached fact sheet, our ROTC program 
     has made a threefold enrollment increase in the last three 
     years and has every expectation of fulfilling the requisite 
     enrollment and commissioning goals in the future. We have 
     initiated several dynamic programs to improve recruiting and 
     retention.
       I understand that shrinking defense resources will require 
     the closure of several other regional ROTC programs to 
     include Southeast Missouri University and the University of 
     Tennessee at Martin. Given our historic support of ROTC, 
     close proximity to Fort Campbell, excellent ROTC support 
     facilities, and the academic excellence of our University, we 
     could easily accommodate students from these other schools. 
     In fact, we could easily become a primary commissioning 
     source for Army nurses, a commissioned officer specialty of 
     great demand.
       I have made a personal commitment to the support of ROTC 
     and intend to see the program flourish. I look forward to 
     your assurance of commitment to this proposal.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Kern Alexander,
                                                        President.

       Attachment.

                  Fact Sheet--Reasons to Keep MSU ROTC

       1. We serve 38 counties in Western Kentucky plus we receive 
     a large number of students from Northwest Tennessee, Southern 
     Illinois, Indiana, and Southwest Missouri.
       These students come to MSU for its high academic standing 
     (top quartile of small regional liberal arts universities by 
     U.S. News and World Report) as well as our rural setting.
       With the closure of University of Tennessee at Martin, a 
     large portion of West Tennessee and Western Kentucky would be 
     excluded from participation in ROTC in a regional university.
       MSU could cover both areas meeting the needs of rural 
     families coupled with our border county agreements to provide 
     in-state tuition.
       2. MSU has tripled its overall enrollment over the past 
     three years. We have commissioned nine lieutenants for the 
     past two years, project nine for the next school. Enrollment 
     numbers in ROTC have increased along with the enrollment 
     figures for the University due to the faculty taking 
     ownership of the program and recruiting.
       3. We have taken great strides toward attracting ROTC 
     students:
       Ten $1,000 dorm scholarships for ROTC scholarship students.
       Free room for all four-year ROTC scholarship students who 
     attend MSU.
       Ten guaranteed positions in our Nursing Program.
       Due to this good rapport between ROTC and Nursing we have 
     requested to be designated a Center for Nursing Excellence.
       Nursing elective credit for Nurse Summer Training Program.
       Academic Minor in ROTC.
       Process of gaining General Education Credit for ROTC 
     courses.
       Extensive promotion of ROTC in University publications, 
     brochures, and videos.
       4. No other class gives students the education in 
     leadership as does ROTC. We stress oral and written 
     communication, self-confidence, and development of leadership 
     skills.
       5. ROTC provides between $250,000-$300,000 annually to MSU 
     and the City of Murray in stipends, scholarships, salaries, 
     and operating and recruiting funds. This money is

[[Page S7009]]

     spent in restaurants, movie theaters, MSU's Bookstore, 
     electric company, gas stations, and in MSU's general 
     accounting office for tuition.
       6. ROTC attracts top notch students and provides national 
     marketing for MSU by having a program on campus. 
     Additionally, it helps attract and promotes solid academic 
     performance in athletes and minorities. (Currently 20% 
     female, 10% African American, and 15 athletes enrolled.)
       7. MSU has a strong tradition of providing officers for 
     four state National Guard units--Kentucky, Tennessee, 
     Illinois and Indiana. Additionally, numerous officers have 
     played significant roles in the U.S. Army Reserve--most 
     notable, Major General (Retired) Lindsay Freeman who was 
     Commander of the 100th Training Division out of Fort Knox, 
     Kentucky.
       8. Long tradition of ROTC at MSU:
       Has been an academic program since 1952.
       Commissioned over 1,039 officers.
       Produced three General officers.

  Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4358) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4359

 (Purpose: To provide service credit for service as senior ROTC cadets 
         and midshipmen in the Simultaneous Membership Program)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Byrd, I offer an 
amendment which would provide service credit for longevity and pay to 
individuals who simultaneously are senior ROTC cadets or midshipmen and 
members of the Selected Reserve under the Simultaneous Membership 
Program.
  I believe this amendment has been cleared on both sides of the aisle. 
I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Byrd, proposes 
     an amendment numbered 4359.

  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle A of title V add the following:

     SEC. 506. SERVICE CREDIT FOR SENIOR R.O.T.C. CADETS AND 
                   MIDSHIPMEN IN SIMULTANEOUS MEMBERSHIP PROGRAM.

       (a) Amendments to Title 10.--(1) Section 2106(c) of title 
     10, United States Code, is amended by striking out ``while 
     serving on active duty other than for training after July 31, 
     1990, while a member of the Selected Reserve'' and inserting 
     in lieu thereof ``performed on or after August 1, 1979, as a 
     member of the Selected Reserve''.
       (2) Section 2107(g) of such title is amended by striking 
     out ``while serving on active duty other than for training 
     after July 31, 1990, while a member of the Selected Reserve'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``performed on or after August 
     1, 1979, as a member of the Selected Reserve''.
       (3) Section 2107a(g) of such title is amended by inserting 
     ``, other than enlisted service performed after August 1, 
     1979, as a member of Selected Reserve'' after ``service as a 
     cadet or with concurrent enlisted service''.
       (b) Amendment to Title 37.--Section 205(d) of title 37, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking out ``that service 
     after July 31, 1990, that the officer performed while serving 
     on active duty'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``for service 
     that the officer performed on or after August 1, 1979.''.
       (c) Benefits Not To Accrue for Prior Periods.--No increase 
     in pay or retired or retainer pay shall accrue for periods 
     before the date of the enactment of this Act by reason of the 
     amendments made by this section.

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I propose an amendment that will modify 
Titles 10 and 37 of the United States Code. This amendment will correct 
a long-overlooked enlisted service period of selected military members. 
This amendment allows creditable service for military members who are 
serving, or have served as enlisted members of our National Guard and 
Reserve, while also earning a commission through the Simultaneous 
Membership Program [SMP]. Since the program's inception in 1979, a 
select number of enlisted soldiers have not received longevity credit 
for honorably performed duty that they so justly deserve. SMP cadets 
are enlisted soldiers with contracts and service obligations, they are 
deployable assets to their units, they are military occupational 
service qualified, and they are subject to all the regulations and 
reviews of any other enlisted soldier. this enlisted concurrent service 
must be creditable for all purposes. I urge my colleagues to support 
this worthy amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4359) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4360

 (Purpose: To authorize the Secretary of the Army to accept less than 
  full reimbursement of costs under the agreement for instruction of 
    civilian students at the Foreign Language Center of the Defense 
                          Language Institute)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Boxer, I offer an 
amendment which would authorize the Secretary of the Army to accept 
less than full reimbursement costs under the agreement for instruction 
of foreign students at the Foreign Language Center of the Defense 
Language Institute.
  I believe the amendment has been cleared by the other side.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct, Mr. President.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mrs. Boxer, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 4360.

  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle E of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 368. REIMBURSEMENT UNDER AGREEMENT FOR INSTRUCTION OF 
                   CIVILIAN STUDENTS AT FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTITUTE 
                   OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE.

       Section 559(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2776; 10 
     U.S.C. 4411 note) is amended by striking out ``on a cost-
     reimbursable, space-available basis'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``on a space-available basis and for such 
     reimbursement (whether in whole or in part) as the Secretary 
     considers appropriate''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4360) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to, and I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4361

(Purpose: To provide additional pension security for spouses and former 
spouses of civil service employees with respect to the military service 
                           of such employees)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Moseley-Braun, I offer 
an amendment which would provide that a former spouse of a military 
retiree whose military retired pay is part of a divorce settlement 
would continue to receive the amount of money directed by court order 
if the military retiree becomes an employee of the Federal Government 
and has military service count toward Civil Service retirement 
benefits.
  I believe the amendment has been cleared.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Ms. Moseley-Braun, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 4361.

  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 636. PREVENTION OF CIRCUMVENTION OF COURT ORDER BY 
                   WAIVER OF RETIRED PAY TO ENHANCE CIVIL SERVICE 
                   RETIREMENT ANNUITY.

       (a) Civil Service Retirement and Disability System.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (c) of section 8332 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(4) If an employee or Member waives retired pay that is 
     subject to a court order for which there has been effective 
     service on the Secretary concerned for purposes of section 
     1408 of title 10, the military service on which the retired 
     pay is based may be credited as service for purposes of this 
     subchapter only if, in accordance with regulations prescribed 
     by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the 
     employee or Member authorizes the Director to deduct and 
     withhold from the annuity payable to the employee or Member 
     under this subchapter, and to pay to the former spouse 
     covered by the court

[[Page S7010]]

     order, the same amount that would have been deducted and 
     withheld from the employee's or Member's retired pay and paid 
     to that former spouse under such section 1408.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Paragraph (1) of such subsection 
     is amended by striking ``Except as provided in paragraph 
     (2)'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraphs (2) 
     and (4)''.
       (b) Federal Employees' Retirement System.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (c) of section 8411 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(5) If an employee or Member waives retired pay that is 
     subject to a court order for which there has been effective 
     service on the Secretary concerned for purposes of section 
     1408 of title 10, the military service on which the retired 
     pay is based may be credited as service for purposes of this 
     chapter only if, in accordance with regulations prescribed by 
     the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the 
     employee or Member authorizes the Director to deduct and 
     withhold from the annuity payable to the employee or Member 
     under this subchapter, and to pay to the former spouse 
     covered by the court order, the same amount that would have 
     been deducted and withheld from the employee's or Member's 
     retired pay and paid to that former spouse under such section 
     1408.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Paragraph (1) of such subsection 
     is amended by striking ``Except as provided in paragraph (2) 
     or (3)'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraphs 
     (2), (3), and (5)''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a) 
     and (b) shall take effect on January 1, 1997.

  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, the amendment I am offering to the 
Department of Defense authorization bill would protect the military 
pension benefits awarded to a spouse upon divorce in cases where the 
retiree rolls the military pension into a civil service pension.
  The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act of 1982 
provides that a court may only treat a military retirees ``disposable'' 
retired pay as marital property, and award no more than 50 percent of 
that amount to the former spouse in a divorce. The definition of 
disposable retired pay includes, among other deductions, a government 
pension.
  The allowed deductions can leave former wives without pension 
benefits. For example, if an ex-husband leaves the military and enters 
the civil service, he can choose to waive his military retired pay and 
instead, have his military service counted in figuring his civilian 
retirement benefits. This leaves him without military retired pay and 
thus leaves his ex-wife without any of the pension benefits she was 
awarded by the court.
  This amendment would merely require the transfer of the court award 
to the Government retirement system at the same time as the military 
retirement credits are transferred to the Government retirement system.
  A woman's access to pension income determines, in no small part, the 
kind of life she will live in her older years. For a former military 
spouse, her access to her husband's pension can mean the difference 
between poverty and security.
  Women married to men serving in the military are often prevented from 
earning pensions of their own, because they must live on or near a 
base, transfer from location to location, or live overseas in order to 
keep their family together. These requirements lessen job opportunities 
and limit job tenure.
  Without working full-time, earning a decent salary, and spending many 
years at a particular job, it is nearly impossible to secure a pension 
at retirement. This amendment would provide women, divorced after many 
years of marriage, with a share of the pension earned during that 
marriage.
  On May 14, I introduced the ``Women's Pension Equity Act of 1996,'' 
as a first step toward making pension law simpler and more equitable 
for women. The bipartisan legislation begins to tackle the problems 
created by a pension system that is not designed for working women, 
either those in the workforce or in the home. This amendment is one 
piece of that legislation.
  In the population as a whole, women make up 60 percent of seniors 
over 65--but 75 percent of the elderly poor. Unmarried, widowed, and 
divorced women are particularly apt to be living in poverty. Nearly 
four times as many widows live in poverty as married women of the same 
age.
  Too many elderly women spend their retirement years in poverty 
because less than one-third of all female retirees have pensions, and 
the majority of those that do, earn less than $5,000 a year. Women who 
are widowed or divorced are particularly hard hit. The current pension 
laws are often confusing and illogical, and leave widows and divorced 
women without any of the pension benefits earned by their husbands over 
many years of marriage. It is estimated that nearly 80 percent of women 
who are poor as widows were not poor before their husbands died.
  I am keenly aware that we must address broader issues as well. And we 
will address them. We should focus on making participation in private 
pension plans easier, and not the game of roulette which all too often 
leaves people surprised at their retirement. This amendment is one step 
in the right direction, however, and I urge my colleagues to join me in 
supporting this amendment today.
  The women, now divorced, who have spent their lives married to men in 
the military, should not spend their retirement years in poverty 
because of a loophole in the law.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 4361) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


 Committee Amendments of the Select Committee on Intelligence, En Bloc

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendments to S. 1745, offered by the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
be considered and agreed to, en bloc, and considered original text for 
the purpose of further amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The committee amendments were agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4254

             (Purpose: To improve the committee amendments)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Thurmond be allowed to modify the committee amendments in more than one 
place with amendment No. 4254; that no further amendments be in order 
to the Intelligence Committee amendments; and that the Thurmond 
modification be deemed to be agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 4254) was deemed agreed to, as follows:

       On page 219, line 11, insert ``, for the Secretary's 
     consideration,'' after ``of Defense''.
       On page 223, strike out lines 1 and 2 and insert in lieu 
     thereof the following:
       ``(a) Establishment.--The National Imagery and Mapping 
     Agency is a combat support agency of the Department of 
     Defense and has significant national missions.
       On page 223, strike out line 17 and all that follows 
     through page 224, line 2 and insert in lieu thereof the 
     following:
       ``(3) If an officer of the armed forces is appointed to the 
     position of Director under this subsection, the position is a 
     position of importance and responsibility for purposes of 
     section 601 of this title and carries the grade of lieutenant 
     general, or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, vice 
     admiral.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, for approximately the last 7 weeks, the 
Armed Services Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence have 
been engaged in negotiations in an attempt to settle differences 
between the two committees on a range of intelligence reform measures 
in both the Defense authorization bill and the Intelligence 
authorization bill. I am pleased to report that most of our differences 
have been worked out. With regard to the Defense authorization bill, 
all our areas of difference have been completely settled.
  Mr. President, on May 13, 1996, S. 1745, the Defense authorization 
bill, was referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence on 
sequential referral. This unprecedented action has delayed 
consideration of the Defense authorization bill and, in my view, made 
it more difficult to work out sound compromises in a timely manner. 
Although I have been clear and consistent in expressing my willingness 
to negotiate, I have made it equally clear that I would not be coerced 
into accepting bad compromises simply because the Defense authorization 
bill had been taken hostage.
  The Intelligence Committee reported S. 1745 out of committee on June 
11, 1996, with a series of proposed amendments. With three relatively 
minor exceptions, I support the Intelligence

[[Page S7011]]

Committee's amendments. With regard to the three areas where I do not 
agree with the Intelligence Committee's amendments, we have nonetheless 
worked out agreements. It is my intention to offer three perfecting 
amendments to the package of Intelligence Committee amendments. These 
have been cleared with the Intelligence Committee. Overall, therefore, 
I believe that we have an acceptable agreement.
  Let me briefly describe the three areas that are the subject of the 
amendment that I will offer along with Senator Nunn.
  The Intelligence Committee amendment would strike several sections 
from the Defense authorization bill that do not relate directly to the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency. It also would insert a new section 
906 relating to the role of the Director of Central Intelligence in the 
appointment and evaluation of the heads of certain intelligence 
agencies within the Department of Defense. With one exception, I do not 
oppose these changes. The amendment offered by myself and Senator Nunn 
would modify the Intelligence Committee language having to do with 
performance evaluations. In my view the Director of Central 
Intelligence should not be in the business of writing performance 
evaluations for the heads of defense agencies. The DCI himself has 
confirmed that this would be inappropriate. The alternative that 
Senator Nunn and I have offered would allow the DCI to provide input 
for consideration by the Secretary of Defense in preparation for his 
annual evaluations of the Defense Department intelligence agency heads. 
This would make it clear that the authority to write such evaluations 
resides with the Secretary of Defense, but that the views of the DCI 
must be taken into account.

  The amendment offered by the Intelligence Committee makes a number of 
changes to the Armed Services Committee's reported legislation 
establishing the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. For the most 
part, these changes are the product of agreements that we have reached 
with the Select Committee over the last few weeks, with two exceptions. 
I will briefly describe these areas and the changes that the Thurmond/
Nunn amendment will make.
  First, the Intelligence Committee would strike the reference in the 
establishment clause to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency being a 
combat support agency. Since there are ambiguities regarding this issue 
in title 10 of the United States Code, and since the Department of 
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have insisted on NIMA being a 
combat support agency, the amendment that I am offering with Senator 
Nunn will restore the language on combat support to the establishment 
clause. Our amendment would also clarify that the new agency will also 
have ``significant national missions'' to make absolutely clear that it 
serves more than tactical military operations.
  Second, the Intelligence Committee proposes a waiver of the cap on 
three star general officers for the director of the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency, if the director is a military officer. The Armed 
Services Committee has a long standing position in opposition to 
providing waivers to this cap for defense agency heads. Senator Nunn 
and I simply propose to eliminate this waiver, while leaving the 
Intelligence Committee's language regarding the director otherwise 
unchanged.
  Mr. President, given that the amendment offered by Senator Nunn and 
myself is agreed to between the two committees, it would be my 
recommendation that the Intelligence Committee amendment, as modified 
also be adopted. I believe that Senator Nunn and I have proposed 
reasonable and justifiable adjustments to the Intelligence Committee 
amendment. It is my intention to oppose any effort to undermine the 
agreements that have been reached between the two committees, either on 
the floor or in conference.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the Select Committee on Intelligence has 
been engaged over the last year in an intense examination of the 
Intelligence Community and its role in the post-cold-war world. The 
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997 reflects the 
conclusions of the Committee and its proposals for renewal and reform 
of U.S. intelligence and I hope the Senate will have an opportunity to 
vote on these proposals in the near future. Similarly, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, as reported by the 
Armed Services Committee contained a number of intelligence reform 
provisions, including authorization for a major reorganization of the 
intelligence community through the creation of a new agency, the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, as well as a number of provisions 
directly conflicting with the committee's efforts this year to make 
substantial improvements in the management and operation of U.S. 
intelligence activities. In order to consider these provisions in the 
context of our overall reform effort, the Intelligence Committee sought 
referral of the Defense bill, pursuant to the Committee's charter, 
Senate Resolution 400.
  After careful review, including extensive discussions and 
negotiations at the staff and member level with the Armed Services 
Committee and with the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the committee voted to report the bill with amendments on June 
11--well before the expiration of the 30 days of session allotted in 
Senate Resolution 400 for consideration upon referral.


                         prior committee action

  These amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act, along 
with the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, S. 1718, 
reflect the conclusions this committee has reached through 6 years of 
efforts aimed at making the U.S. intelligence community operate more 
effectively, more efficiently, and with greater accountability in light 
of the significant changes in the world over the last decade. In 1994, 
this effort led Congress, at the urging of Senator Warner, Senator 
Graham, and others, to establish a Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community--the ``Aspin-Brown 
Commission''--to conduct a ``credible, independent, and objective 
review'' of U.S. intelligence. The Commission was given a deadline of 
March 1, 1996, with the expectation that its report would inform a 
legislative debate resulting in enactment of needed changes during this 
Congress.
  Armed with the Commission's report and enlightened by the committee's 
own examination, including numerous hearings, briefings, and 
interviews, the Select Committee on Intelligence voted on April 24, 
1996, to report S. 1718, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal 
year 1997, containing a number of measures to improve policy guidance 
to the intelligence community, strengthen the DCI's ability to manage 
the community on behalf of all intelligence consumers, and enhance the 
ability of the Congress and the American public to ensure that the 
secrecy necessary for the conduct of intelligence does not prevent the 
vigilance and oversight necessary for an effective democracy. The Armed 
Services Committee took the bill on a 30-day sequential referral as 
they have done every year since the establishment of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  On May 13, the Armed Services Committee reported out S. 1745, the 
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, which included 
a number of provisions for intelligence reorganization, including the 
creation of a new national imagery agency and a new structure for 
military intelligence under a Director of Military Intelligence [DMI]. 
The bill also included a number of other provisions that directly 
conflicted with the reform attempts of the Intelligence Committee 
contained in S. 1718. The Intelligence Committee requested referral of 
the bill to consider these intelligence provisions, pursuant to section 
3(b) of Senate Resolution 400, which provides for referral to the 
Committee of any legislation containing provisions within its 
jurisdiction for up to thirty days, not counting days on which the 
Senate is not in session.


               Discussions with Armed Services Committee

  During the weeks of negotiations that followed, the Intelligence 
Committee agreed to a number of changes in S. 1718 to address concerns 
raised by the Armed Services Committee about protecting the equities of 
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Notwithstanding 
that the objective of the reform provisions in S.

[[Page S7012]]

1718 was to improve the quality of intelligence provided to all 
consumers, including the Department of Defense, the Armed Services 
Committee did not want any change that might diminish the current 
authority of the Secretary of Defense, who now controls about 85 
percent of the intelligence community budget. The Intelligence 
Committee is concerned that the current arrangement, under which the 
Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for ensuring the 
nations intelligence needs are met effectively and efficiently yet has 
direct authority over only the CIA--which represents only a small 
portion of the intelligence budget--has led to problems. One clear 
example is the recent revelations regarding several billion dollars at 
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in funds that were never 
expended and were carried forward year after year.
  As the current DCI John Deutch, who was formerly Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, testified on April 24,

       [t]he Deputy Secretary of Defense has got a tremendous set 
     of issues covering a much larger range of resources--10 
     times--managing ten times the resources * * * of the whole 
     intelligence community. So to say that you are going to go to 
     the deputy--and I am not talking about personalities--and say 
     to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, why didn't you catch 
     this, he's going to say, well, I count on the DCI to keep 
     track of this and to let the Secretary of Defense know. So in 
     some sense, if we are going to say that the Director of 
     Central Intelligence does not view himself or herself as 
     being responsible for the NRO, fundamentally nobody will be.

  The Director of Central Intelligence is in a unique position to 
balance the cost and effectiveness of intelligence programs throughout 
the government. It makes sense to hold this person responsible for 
ensuring that the various elements of the intelligence community are 
more responsive to this national objective then to parochial, turf-
driven goals that too often typify bureaucracies. Yet he lacks the 
authority needed to accomplish this objective, particularly with regard 
to the intelligence elements within the Department of Defense. The DCI 
can be given enhanced authority without removing the elements of the 
intelligence community from the various agencies in which they reside 
or interfering with the ability of those agency heads to manage their 
departments, i.e., without creating a ``Department of Intelligence.'' 
The reform provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1997 were designed to accomplish this goal.
  This fundamental difference of opinion over the need to strengthen 
the authority of the DCI to match his responsibility as the overall 
manager of US intelligence made reaching consensus with the Armed 
Services Committee over its provisions in the DOD bill and the 
provisions in the Intelligence bill difficult. However, both sides made 
accommodations and ultimately resolved all but a few issues, agreeing 
to changes in both bills. On June 6, the Armed Services report S. 1718 
with amendments that reflected the consensus and one remaining area of 
disagreement. The next week, on June 11, the Intelligence Committee 
reported S.1745, the DOD Authorization bill, with amendments that 
similarly reflected the compromises reached with Armed Services 
Committee. Subsequently, the Armed Services Committee proposed some 
changes to our amendments, which we agreed to.
  The area of disagreement that remains is a provision in the 
Intelligence bill that gives the DCI the ability to make adjustments in 
the allocation of funds within the National Foreign Intelligence 
Program (NFIP) during the fiscal year to meet unexpected intelligence 
needs. Director Deutch, along with all former DCI's who testified 
before the Committee, publicly supported this enhanced authority as 
important to effective management of the national intelligence 
community. The DCI has the authority today to make the initial 
allocations within the NFIP in formulating the budget. However, when 
unforeseen requirements arise during the fiscal year and funds are 
available from a lower priority intelligence activity, the DCI does not 
have the authority to transfer those funds unless the affected agency 
head does not object. S. 1718 contained a provision to enhance the 
DCI's authority by shifting the burden to the affected agency to 
convince the President or his designee that the transfer is 
unwarranted. The Armed Services Committee objected to giving the DCI 
this authority and amended S. 1718 to delete the provision.

  With the exception of this reprogramming issue, the Committee 
believes the consensus reached by the two committees preserves 
significant elements of the reform effort and significantly enhances 
the ability of the DCI to manage intelligence activities. In addition, 
the Committee is comfortable that, with the changes agreed upon, the 
DCI will have the ability to ensure that a new National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency will be responsive to the needs of all national 
customers.
  Specifically, the amendments we have agreed upon to the National 
Defense Authorization Act will strike provisions that were in direct 
conflict with the reform efforts in the Intelligence Authorization Act, 
a number of which would have seriously hampered the ability of the 
Intelligence Community to function even under existing mechanisms. For 
example, our amendments strike a prohibition on any non-DOD employee 
obligating DOD funds. This provision, apparently intended to ensure the 
DCI did not gain any additional budget execution authority, would have 
restricted non-DOD employees detailed to DOD intelligence agencies, 
such as NRO, from managing contracts or performing numerous other tasks 
they now commonly perform. It also would have interfered with transfers 
of funds under the Economy Act, which take places regularly when one 
agency performs a function of common concern on behalf of another 
agency for reasons of efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, our 
amendments mandate a larger and more formal role for the DCI in the 
appointment and evaluation of the heads of the key national agencies: 
NSA, NRO, and the new NIMA.
  As I have noted, the Committee focused a good deal of effort on the 
provisions in the DOD bill that establish a new National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency--NIMA. Our amendments add statutory language giving the 
DCI clear authority to set imagery collection requirements and 
priorities, and to resolve conflicts among priorities. In addition, the 
Committee worked out language with Armed Services to ensure that NIMA's 
mission as stated in its establishment clause includes both combat 
support and its significant national missions. Finally, our Committee 
had concerns with the changes Armed Services had made to the provisions 
relating to the appointment and status of the Director of NIMA as 
worked out by the Administration. Our amendments restore the balance 
initially proposed by providing that (1) the Director of NIMA can be 
either a civilian or a military officer; and (2) that the Secretary of 
Defense must obtain the concurrence of the DCI, or note the non-
concurrence of the DCI, when recommending an individual to the 
President for appointment as Director of NIMA.
  The past few weeks have not been easy, but I believe they have 
produced a good outcome for U.S. intelligence and the nation and, based 
on assurances that the leadership of the Armed Services Committee will 
do likewise, I wish to state my commitment to joining my colleagues in 
supporting prompt disposition of both bills, opposing any effort to 
undermine the agreements we have struck, and fully supporting the 
Senate positions in our respective conferences.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the bill the Senate is now considering, S. 
1745, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, 
raises many issues essential to our national security. None are more 
important, however, than the Intelligence Committee's amendments 
regarding renewal and reform of the Nation's intelligence apparatus, 
intended to enable that apparatus to respond effectively to the 
security threats of today and tomorrow.
  The amendments under consideration were added to the bill when the 
Select Committee on Intelligence considered it on sequential referral. 
All of these amendments have been accepted by the Senate Armed Services 
Committee during the course of negotiations between our two committees 
regarding the intelligence provisions in S. 1745 and in S. 1718, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997.
  I would like to make special mention of the Intelligence Committee's 
proposed amendments to the provisions of

[[Page S7013]]

S. 1745 relating to the new National Imagery and Mapping Agency, or 
NIMA. NIMA would be created by consolidating nearly a dozen agencies or 
offices within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence 
Agency, including the Defense Mapping Agency, the Central Imagery 
Office, CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center, into a 
single agency within the Department of Defense. The creation of NIMA 
will reduce redundancies in the processing and analysis of imagery, 
ensure more challenging career opportunities for those in the imagery 
and mapping fields, and create an important synergy between mapping and 
imagery--allowing maps to leave the paper and attain all the benefits 
of today's digital technology.
  The creation of NIMA has been jointly proposed by the Director of 
Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The establishment of a single national imagery 
agency was also endorsed by the Brown Commission. Nevertheless, the 
creation of NIMA constitutes a major reorganization of U.S.C. 
intelligence activities and includes the transfer of several imagery-
related offices out of the CIA and into the Department of Defense. 
Accordingly, the Intelligence Committee focused considerable attention 
on the specific provisions in S. 1745 that would establish NIMA and 
define its responsibilities. We concluded that these provisions need to 
be modified in several key respects.
  Most important, the committee concluded that the role of the Director 
of Central Intelligence with respect to the tasking of imagery 
satellites should be clarified. The DCI must have clear authority to 
set imagery collection requirements and priorities, and to resolve 
conflicts among priorities. The DCI has such authority under existing 
executive orders and presidential decisions, but, in light of the 
establishment of NIMA as an agency of the Department of Defense, the 
Committee believes the DCI's authorities should be restated in statute. 
The committee has amended S. 1745 to include these authorities in both 
title 10, U.S. Code (together with other provisions establishing NIMA) 
and in the National Security Act of 1947 in title 50 (which specifies 
the DCI's authorities as director of the intelligence community).
  The committee also focused on the provisions of S. 1745 that define 
the responsibilities of NIMA to support intelligence consumers outside 
the Department of Defense. These provisions are especially important 
because with the consolidation of most of the imagery-related 
activities of the intelligence community into an agency within the 
Department of Defense there is a risk that the imagery needs of non-DOD 
customers might not be met. We concluded that the language of the 
provisions is sufficient to protect the interests of national consumers 
but that the provisions should be moved from title 10 to title 50, 
where they are more appropriately placed since they relate to the 
authorities of the DCI rather than the organization of the Department 
of Defense.
  The committee was also concerned that, as reported by the Armed 
Services Committee, the very first provision relating to NIMA in S. 
1745 would have stated that NIMA ``is a combat support agency of the 
Department of Defense.'' The term ``combat support agency'' was first 
used in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
of 1986 to describe certain DOD agencies that have wartime support 
functions and that are subject to periodic review by the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs with respect to their combat readiness. The four 
defense agencies designated by Congress as combat support agencies in 
10 U.S. 193 are the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Defense 
Mapping Agency.
  When Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it specifically 
declined to list the National Security Agency as a combat support 
agency because NSA serves customers outside the Department of Defense. 
Congress, however, subjected NSA to the same JCS review procedures as 
other combat support agencies but only with respect to its combat 
support functions. The Intelligence Committee believes that it would 
have been most appropriate to treat NIMA like NSA, i.e. not list NIMA 
as a combat support agency but subject it to JCS review with respect to 
its combat support functions. The Department of Defense and the Armed 
Services Committee, however, have insisted that NIMA be listed as a 
combat support agency because the Defense Mapping Agency was listed as 
a combat support agency.
  Given that the Defense Mapping Agency will comprise the largest 
activity within NIMA, the Intelligence Committee has agreed to have 
NIMA listed as a combat support agency in 10 U.S.C. 193 for purposes of 
JCS review (but only with respect to its combat support functions). But 
we continue to believe that it would be a mistake to establish NIMA as 
a combat support agency in the very first sentence, even if subsequent 
statutory provisions specifically state that NIMA also has national 
missions. The implication would be left that NIMA's primary purpose is 
to provide combat support, and the imagery support to other customers 
might suffer as a result.
  Accordingly, the Intelligence Committee reported S. 1745 with an 
amendment to the provision establishing NIMA that would delete the 
reference to NIMA's establishment as a combat support agency. The Armed 
Services Committee has proposed to reinsert the reference to NIMA's 
status as a combat support agency in the establishment provision but to 
add in the same sentence that NIMA has significant national missions. 
We would not object to this formulation because it emphasizes that NIMA 
has two equally important functions: combat support and support for 
national missions.
  Our Committee also had concerns regarding the provisions relating to 
the appointment and status of the Director of NIMA. The legislative 
package drafted by the Administration to create NIMA provided that (1) 
the Director of NIMA could be either a civilian or a military officer; 
and (2) that the Secretary of Defense must obtain the concurrence of 
the DCI, or note the non-concurrence of the DCI, when recommending an 
individual to the President for appointment as Director of NIMA. As 
reported by the Armed Services Committee, S. 1745 would have required 
that the Director of NIMA be a military officer and that the Secretary 
of Defense simply consult the DCI before recommending a nominee to the 
President. The Armed Services Committee's formulation would have 
prevented the President from appointing a civilian Director of NIMA 
(thus implying that NIMA performs exclusively military functions) and 
would have given the DCI only a minor voice in the appointment of the 
head of a critical national intelligence agency. The Armed Services 
Committee formulation was opposed by the DCI and by the Secretary of 
Defense. Accordingly, the two Committees agreed to amend the bill to 
revert to the Administration's proposal.
  Finally, the two Committees agreed to delete from S. 1745 a provision 
that would have prohibited the Inspector General of the Central 
Intelligence Agency from conducting any inspection, investigation, or 
audit of NIMA without the written consent of DOD Inspector General.
  We believe that, taken together, our amendments will help to clarify 
the responsibilities of the DCI with respect to the operation of NIMA 
and will serve to ensure that the imagery needs of consumers outside 
the Department of Defense are satisfied.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise to support the agreement worked out 
by the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees on the provisions of 
our respective bills pertaining to the creation of a new DoD agency, 
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency known as NIMA, and the renewal 
and reform of the intelligence community.
  By way of background, I want to note that the Armed Services and 
Intelligence Committees have been negotiating over a number of items in 
our respective authorization bills. In the course of these 
negotiations, a number of thorny issues have been settled and only one 
issue remains which relates to a provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization bill.
  I want to make note of one issue in particular that we have worked 
out. That issue relates to the establishment of a new Department of 
Defense agency, called the National Imagery and Mapping Agency or NIMA, 
which combines the Defense Mapping Agency, the

[[Page S7014]]

Central Imagery Office, and the National Photographic Interpretation 
Center. NIMA will provide imagery intelligence and mapping support to 
both the Department of Defense and other agencies of the Government.
  An issue arose concerning the designation of NIMA as a combat support 
agency. Under the agreement reached between our two committees, the new 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency will be designated in the agency's 
establishment clause as a combat support agency and it would also state 
that the Agency has significant national missions to meet the 
Intelligence Committee's concerns. Director Deutch, in a letter to 
Senator Thurmond dated June 6, 1996, stated in pertinent part that, and 
I quote, ``The essence of the NIMA concept for both the Intelligence 
Community and the Department of Defense is that NIMA be a combat 
support agency.'' I ask unanimous consent that the entire text of 
Director Deutch's letter to Senator Thurmond be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                   The Director of


                                         Central Intelligence,

                                     Washington, DC, June 6, 1996.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I write to underscore my previous 
     statements to the leadership of the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services concerning 
     legislation creating a National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
     (NIMA) and permitting the collection of foreign intelligence 
     on non-U.S. persons in support of U.S. law enforcement.
       The essence of the NIMA concept for both the Intelligence 
     Community and the Department of Defense is that NIMA be a 
     combat support agency. At the same time, it is equally 
     important that there be a clear statement of its national 
     mission and that the authorities of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence to manage and support the national mission of 
     NIMA be undiminished except as required to establish NIMA, 
     i.e., the transfer of operational control of CIA employees 
     and funds to NIMA. NIMA must be responsive to the direction 
     of the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in its 
     combat support role, but it must also follow the direction of 
     the DCI in matters of collection and tasking to satisfy 
     NIMA's national mission. NIMA resource issues obviously 
     affect both the military and national missions and, as the 
     Administration's legislative proposal makes clear, should be 
     decided jointly. I strongly affirm the statements I made on 
     these points during our meeting of May 23, 1996 including the 
     placement of statutory language in titles 10 and 50 of the 
     U.S. Code.
       I also believe, as I have indicated in our previous 
     conversations, that it is important to clarify the authority 
     of the Intelligence Community to provide assistance to law 
     enforcement agencies outside the United States by collecting 
     intelligence information on non-U.S. persons. Much progress 
     has been made in this area over the last few years, but I 
     believe it is important to give the Intelligence Community 
     clear statutory authority to provide such assistance so that 
     our agencies can work together in an efficient and effective 
     manner. Both the Intelligence Community and the Department of 
     Justice support the legislative clarification contained in 
     Sec. 715 of S. 1718.
       It is my strongly held view that the Intelligence Community 
     can provide important assistance to law enforcement agencies 
     outside the United States in a far more effective manner than 
     would be the case if law enforcement agencies were to expand 
     their activities into areas traditionally dealt with by the 
     Intelligence Community.
       For decades, the Intelligence Community, and the CIA in 
     particular, have developed close working relationships with 
     law enforcement agencies and intelligence services outside 
     the United States. This network of contacts and relationships 
     provides a rich environment from which information required 
     by U.S. law enforcement agencies can be gleaned. There is no 
     reason to replicate it with an extensive law enforcement 
     presence outside the United States. Indeed, such a presence 
     would be counterproductive because it would be confusing, 
     duplicative and undermine longstanding intelligence 
     relationships. It would permit local governments to play one 
     U.S. Government agency off against another and would lead, in 
     my view, to less information reaching the United States, not 
     more.
       If I can provide any additional information on these or 
     other matters, please do not hesitate to contact me directly.
       An original of this letter is also being sent to Ranking 
     Minority Member Nunn and to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of 
     the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
           Sincerely,
                                                      John Deutch.

  Mr. NUNN. I am pleased that we have been able to resolve our 
differences over the provisions in the Department of Defense 
authorization bill and I look forward to working with the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee on the one remaining issue 
relating to the Intelligence authorization bill. I urge the adoption of 
these amendments.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe that it is the judgment of the 
managers that all matters relating to this bill that can be concluded 
on this day have been concluded. The Senate may now proceed to address 
the remaining matters.
  Mr. NUNN. I concur with my friend from Virginia. I think we handled 
all the amendments we are able to handle now that have been cleared on 
both sides. We have a lot of amendments remaining, probably in the 
neighborhood of 50, 60 amendments on this bill. But there are an awful 
lot of them that are not relevant to this bill, and I hope they will be 
withdrawn or can be worked out. So I believe that today has been a 
productive day.
  We have stayed on the defense bill by and large. The amendment that 
we took up that was not relevant to the defense bill was worked out, 
agreed to, and supported overwhelmingly in this body. So I think it has 
been a good day. I know Chairman Thurmond has put in a lot of hard 
hours. The Senator from Virginia has put in a lot of hard hours. We are 
working together. I think we can make further progress tomorrow. And 
with good luck, cooperation, good spirit, good will, we can finish this 
bill tomorrow night, if all that happens.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just do not know how many times the good 
Senator from Georgia and I have stood here and wished the Senate well. 
Let us do it once again. I do so on behalf of the distinguished 
chairman, Senator Thurmond.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator. I can say, I have been here many times 
on defense bills when the light in the tunnel was not apparent at all, 
and I believe I saw a little glimmer earlier this evening.
  Mr. WARNER. I am sure we did. I think we should also commend the 
respective leaders, Mr. Lott and Mr. Daschle, because they indeed 
became engaged today to assist the matters.
  Mr. NUNN. I agree.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators have 
until the hour of 9:30 a.m., Thursday, in order to file second-degree 
amendments to the DOD bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________