[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 96 (Wednesday, June 26, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6988-S7014]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in just a moment, Senator Lugar, myself, and
Senator Domenici will explain this amendment. I know the chairman of
the committee would like to make some comments on the amendment.
At this point, I will yield the floor for whatever the chairman is
prepared to say.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment
offered by the Senators from Georgia, New Mexico, and Indiana, to
authorize the establishment of an emergency assistance program to train
and equip State and local authorities to respond to domestic terrorist
use of weapons of mass destruction.
The amendment would also expand authorities for the DOD and DOE
cooperative threat reduction programs, as well as increase the funding
for these programs.
I have grave concerns about increasing the funding for DOD and DOE's
cooperative threat reduction programs, as well as expanding the scope
of the programs in DOD and DOE.
Based on my review of the amendment and the new activities authorized
by this amendment, DOD and DOE will require significant funding
authority in the outyears to complete these programs.
For example, how much money are we talking about in the defense bill
to complete the program to replace the reactor cores at Tomsk 7 and
Krasnoyarsk 26?
How much money will it take to convert, or eliminate, the chemical
and biological facilities in all the independent states of the former
Soviet Union?
We have not received any information from DOD, DOE, or the National
Security Council on the budgetary impact of the increases for these two
programs, or whether funds will be included in the future years defense
plan for this program, as well as DOE plan.
I would point out that none of the funds necessary for the increases
in this amendment have been appropriated.
Mr. President, I believe the efforts of the sponsors of this
amendment are laudable. I do not question whether its appropriate, or
not, to conduct these programs. I question whether its appropriate for
the funds to come out of the defense budget for these foreign
assistance programs.
I would also point out that DOE has not even spent the funds
authorized for it currently in the materials, protection, control and
accountability account. The same is true for funds in DOD's program.
Although DOD has done a better job at proposing to obligate funds.
Clearly, with the recent terrorist events at the World Trade Center,
in Oklahoma City, and in the Tokyo subway, we need to provide
assistance to our State and local authorities to prepare them to
provide emergency assistance, in the event a domestic terrorist WMD
incident occurs.
I think that we should provide more in the way of establishing this
particular program, and providing a regional NBC emergency stockpile.
I want to commend the senior Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner,
for the work that he has done throughout the years to ensure that DOD,
DOE and the intelligence community are conducting activities to prevent
or combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I also want
to commend him for his work in authoring the provisions in the last two
defense bills that provided the authority for DOD to provide emergency
assistance to State and local authorities in the event of a domestic
terrorist WMD incident.
I want to work with my colleagues, however, I want to emphasize my
concerns about increasing funds in the DOD and DOE budget for
cooperative threat reduction activities, for which there are no
appropriations.
Lastly, I would ask, is it wise for the United States to provide this
type of assistance to Russia, while it continues to build SS-25's;
continues to transfer nuclear technology and knowledge to Iran and
China?
Mr. President, in closing, I want to re-emphasize my support for the
efforts of the sponsors to provide assistance to State and local
authorities to respond to domestic terrorist use of WMD. I hope that we
can increase the funding for this assistance in the conference.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to commend the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I particularly thank him for
the references to the work he and I and others on the committee have
done in previous years, which, in some respects, laid a modest
foundation for the important additions that are presented in the
amendment soon to be submitted by the senior Senator from Georgia.
However, I share with the chairman the views that I have, which
coincide with his, regarding these expenditures at this particular
time. And in the course of the deliberation on this amendment, I shall
address specific questions to the Senator from Georgia, the Senator
from New Mexico and, indeed, the Senator from Indiana on the points the
chairman has raised.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I first thank the chairman of the committee,
as well as Senator Warner, for their support of this amendment. I am
pleased that we are able to present it this evening and that we are
likely to get a vote on it tomorrow.
Mr. President, this amendment deals with one of the most urgent
national security problems America faces today. That is the threat of
attack on American cities and towns by terrorists, malcontents, or
representatives of hostile powers using radiological, chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons.
Mr. President, because Senator Lugar is on the floor, Senator
Domenici is on the floor, and my statement will probably run 15 to 20
minutes, I ask to be notified in 10 minutes, and then I intend to yield
and complete my statement after they have made their remarks.
If the Chair could notify me when 10 minutes expires.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will do so.
Mr. NUNN. This threat is very different from the threat of nuclear
annihilation with which our Nation and the world has dealt during the
cold war. During the cold war, both we and the Soviet Union recognized
that either side could destroy the other within about an hour, but only
at the price of its own destruction.
In the course of carrying out that mutual assured destruction, most
of the rest of the civilized world would have been destroyed, in
greater or lesser degree, as well. Today, this kind of
[[Page S6989]]
cataclysmic threat is greatly reduced. And if we are able to continue
to implement START I and START II Treaties on both sides, reducing the
number of warheads dramatically, it will be reduced further.
Tragically, the end of the cold war, however, has not brought peace
and stability, but rather has seemingly unleashed countless small
bloody wars around the globe. The end of the cold war also encouraged a
number of states that are hostile to the United States to try to
acquire weapons of mass destruction and appropriate delivery means as
an adjunct to their conventional military forces. They are motivated by
two beliefs. One is that the possession of such weapons of mass
destruction will advance regional status and power relative to
neighboring and often rival states. Second is that they believe
possession of weapons of mass destruction, coupled with the threat to
use them, can both deter superpower states from interfering in regional
conflicts and blackmail them into favorable courses of action.
While here I am not speaking of nuclear weapons, I am including that.
In many of these countries, probably a greater threat is the chemical
and biological proliferation we now see going on.
Finally, Mr. President, fanatics, small disaffected groups and
subnational factions or movements who hold various grievances against
governments, or against society, all have increasing access to, and
knowledge about the construction of, weapons of mass destruction. Such
individuals and groups are not likely to be deterred from using weapons
of mass destruction by the classical threat of overwhelming
retaliation.
In many past instances of terrorism, we have not even known who the
perpetrators were or where they were based. It is very hard to threaten
retaliation when you do not know who did it or where they came from or
where they were based. These groups are not deterred by the threat of a
nuclear counterstrike. A national missile defense system, no matter how
capable, is sometimes and often irrelevant to this kind of terrorism.
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which Senator Roth
chairs, and I am the ranking Democrat on that committee, held a series
of hearings over the last year on the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. We heard from representatives of the intelligence and law
enforcement communities, the Defense Department, private industry,
State and local governments, academia, as well as foreign officials.
These witnesses described a threat that we cannot ignore and which we
are virtually unprepared to handle. CIA Director John Deutch, for one,
candidly observed that ``we have been lucky so far.''
Mr. President, the release of deadly sarin gas in the Tokyo subway
system should have been a warning bell for America. Prior to those
attacks, this Aum Shrinkiyo sect that made this attack was unknown to
the United States intelligence and was poorly monitored by Japanese
authorities. The Aum Shrinkiyo sect actually conducted several test
releases of lethal chemicals prior to the subway attack. Yet, their
capacity to manufacture and store those chemicals was unknown to
Japanese authorities, this in spite of the fact that they had over
50,000 members in Russia. They were recruiting nuclear scientists. They
owned a radio station in Vladivostok and tested sarin gas in Australia
against sheep. In addition to many other things they have done, they
were not on the radar screen.
We received an even louder warning bell in the World Trade Center
bombing which brought it home to America. It was here in the United
States, not halfway around the world. The trial judge, at the
sentencing of those responsible in that terrible terrorist incident,
pointed to several factors that could have made the tragedy far worse.
First, in an effort to get that tower to fall down over its twin
tower next door, the killers wanted to park the truck in front of a key
structural member of the outer corner of the building. But they could
not find an empty parking space. So they went elsewhere.
Second, the killers had access to chemicals to make lethal cyanide
gas and, according to the judge, probably put them into the truck bomb.
Fortunately, the chemicals appeared to have been vaporized by the force
of the blast. Otherwise, the smoke and fumes that were drawn into and
up through the tower would have been far more lethal.
So, Mr. President, in all likelihood, it is very likely that the
United States has already had, without really focusing on it, our first
chemical attack by terrorists. That is the World Trade Center bombing.
Fortunately, those chemicals did not activate.
Mr. President, we had a third warning bell in the bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. This showed yet
again the ease of access to simple, widely available commercial
products that when combined can create powerful explosions. This
knowledge, and much more, is available today over the Internet for
anyone who wants to tune in.
The Department of Defense invested billions in the design and
protection of binary chemical weapons. A binary chemical weapon
contains two chemicals, each of which is harmless when used separately,
and they are widely used industrial chemicals. Yet, when mixed
together, they create lethal chemical weapons. You can find lists of
the ingredients needed to make binary weapons on the Internet today.
Now let me turn to the current state of our domestic efforts to deal
with nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological attack.
In recent years, several modest test exercises have been held. In one
large exercise, the first hundred or so emergency response personnel--
police, firemen, medical personnel--arriving at the scene of the mock
simulated disaster rushed headlong into the emergency scene and were
promptly declared dead by the referees. In other words, the people who
came to the rescue were among the first victims.
In the second exercise, featuring both chemical and biological
weapons, contaminated casualties brought to the nearest hospital were
handled so carelessly by hospital personnel that within hours most of
the staff were judged to have been killed or incapacitated by spreading
contamination.
Mr. President, my purpose is not to frighten the American people; it
is to persuade the Congress and the American people that we face a new
and severe national security threat for which all governments at all
levels are woefully inadequately prepared. We must begin now to prepare
what surely threatens us already. To do this effectively requires three
things.
First, it requires taking the expertise that has been built up over
the years in both the Department of Defense and Department of Energy by
successive defense budgets and making that expertise available--and
rapidly available--to Federal, State, and local emergency preparedness
and emergency response teams.
The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy need to bring
training to the other officials in our State, local, and Federal
Government in the detection, recognition, containment, and treatment of
acute crises arising from the use of some form of weapon of mass
destruction to those on the front lines in our major metropolitan
areas.
DOD and DOE need to train them in the use of detection equipment and
in the use of protective gear to avoid becoming casualties themselves.
DOD needs to train emergency medical personnel in the appropriate
treatment, for triage, and the administration of antibiotics.
There is much to do, and doing it will require DOD and DOE funding.
There is simply no other practical source of this kind of expertise.
The time to do it is now and not after we suffer a great tragedy.
I, like many of my colleagues, believe there is a high likelihood
that a chemical or biological incident will take place on American soil
in the next several years. We do not want to be in a posture of
demanding to know why we were not prepared. We do not want a domestic
Pearl Harbor.
This training and equipping function is the heart of the amendment,
but it is not the whole amendment. There are other parts of the
amendment dealing with Customs and dealing with the stopping of these
weapons of mass destruction at the source.
At this point in time, I will reserve the remainder of my remarks,
and I
[[Page S6990]]
yield the floor to my two partners in this endeavor, Senator Lugar and
then Senator Domenici.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I might ask of the principal
sponsor and two cosponsors about the availability of the three to
respond to questions at an appropriate time this evening. I intend to
pose a number of questions. I am quite anxious to join with these three
distinguished Senators because I certainly wholeheartedly support the
domestic portions of this legislation. But I would like to ask a
question in terms of the overseas portion and designs, and I wonder if
the Senators will be available.
Mr. DOMENICI. I would be available, if we do not stay too late. It is
pretty tough for me to answer questions if we stay too late.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, when Chechen rebels placed a 30-pound
package of radioactive material in a Moscow park last November, it
marked the first act of nuclear terrorism in the post-cold-war era.
Although the container was not equipped with the explosives needed to
disperse the cesium, the Chechens demonstrated a credible terrorist
threat to employ nuclear material attached to explosives as
radiological dispersion devices in Russia.
The act crossed a new threshold in terrorism. Demonstrating on
Russian television the ability to penetrate Moscow's increased
security, Chechen rebels were now in a position to panic the Russian
public by issuing similar threats of radiological contaminants.
Terrorism was alive and well in another part of the world at roughly
the same time. The worldwide activities of the Japanese Dooms-Day Cult,
the Aum Shrinkiyo were not on the radar screen of United States law
enforcement and intelligence agencies before the sarin gas attack on
the Tokyo subway last March. This is alarming, considering the cult
accumulated over $1 billion in assets and established offices in six
countries on four continents.
Cult members actively recruited scientists and technical experts in
Japan, Russia, and elsewhere in order to develop weapons of mass
destruction. They succeeded in producing chemical weapons, including
toxic chemical agents such as sarin, VX, and sodium cyanide; and they
were in the process of developing biological weapons, including
anthrax, botulism, and ``Q'' fever.
We have since learned how much more devastating the attacks in Tokyo
could have been if the cult had simply perfected their delivery
systems. The arrest and subsequent interrogation of members of the
Japanese cult has shed more light on the activities of the group,
particularly with respect to the extent and nature of its efforts in
the area of offensive biological agents.
The Japanese cult conducted extensive research on the manufacture of
offensive biological agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin, and
tested their dispersal against specific targets on at least three
occasions between 1990 and 1995.
The dispersal incidents were attempts to test the effectiveness on
humans of Aum-produced toxins and to judge whether they could be used
as weapons. Although the cult's tests caused no known casualties, the
relative ease with which the botulinum bacteria and anthrax spores were
obtained and the need for only basic scientific knowledge to conduct
research on biological agents suggests either Aum members still at
large or other terrorist groups may be more successful in the future.
We have also learned how close we have come to witnessing acts of
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction directed toward the
United States. Listen to the words of Judge Duffy in his sentencing
statement before the perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing:
The harm actually caused by the World Trade Center bombing
was enormous, but what is even more frightening is what was
intended by you and your cohorts . . . The bomb was big and
that's what you intended, but that's not quite all that was
intended . . . The evidence clearly indicated that you
attempted to enhance the destructive force of the (device) .
. . If the bomb had the explosive force that you envisioned,
placed as it was at the base of the north tower next to a
diagonal brace, you might have succeeded in your nefarious
plot to topple over the north tower into the south tower just
like a pair of dominoes.
Had that happened, we'd be dealing with tens of thousands
of deaths and billions of dollars of damage, but death is
what you sought to cause. You had sodium cyanide around, and
I'm sure it was in the bomb. Thank God the sodium cyanide
burned instead of vaporizing. If the sodium cyanide had
vaporized, it is clear that what would have happened is the
cyanide gas would have been sucked into the north tower and
everybody in the north tower would have been killed.
I say to my colleagues: Here we have three incidents involving
materials and weapons of mass destruction--in Russia, in Japan, and in
the United States. The fact that the destruction wrought by the
attempted use of these materials was not more massive owes more to luck
or accident than to prevention, deterrence, or consequence management.
The threat of weapons of mass destruction is real, and it is now.
As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian command
and control society, a vast potential supermarket of weapons and
materials of mass destruction is becoming increasingly accessible. The
collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decay of the custodial
system guarding the Soviet nuclear, chemical, and biological legacy has
eliminated this proliferation chokepoint, since states and possibly
even sub-state groups can now buy or steal what they previously had to
produce on their own. This central fact has transformed the nature of
the proliferation problem for the United States as well as the rest of
the world.
If this is a fair description of the nature of this threat, the
prevailing view that there is today no direct threat to U.S. national
security is dead wrong. It is my view that the risk of a nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapon detonation on American soil has
increased. While the probability of large-scale nuclear war between the
United States and Russia has mercifully decreased dramatically, the
probability that one, or two, or a dozen weapons of mass destruction
detonate in Russia, or Japan, or Europe, or the Middle East, or even
the United States has increased.
However, because this new threat comes in a form so unfamiliar,
indeed, so radically different from prior experience, and because the
instruments and policies to address it are so unlike the business our
White House and national security establishments have pursued for
decades, the American political leadership, the Congress, and the
American people have great difficulty in awakening to this fact.
But, let us be clear. Absent a U.S. response to this threat of
leakage of weapons and materials of mass destruction that is as
focused, serious, and vigorous as America's cold war strategy,
Americans may have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear,
chemical, or biological terrorism against American targets before this
decade is out.
To oversimplify, there are three main lines of defense against these
emerging threats:
The first is prevention and this must entail activities at the
source.
The second is deterrence and interdiction and involve efforts to stem
the flow of illicit trade in these weapons and materials of death.
The third line of defense is crisis and consequence management and
involves greater efforts at domestic preparedness.
As we have explored the weapons material leakage and proliferation
problem, one point has become increasingly clear. If the United States
is to have any chance of stopping the detonation of a weapon of mass
destruction on our soil, prevention must start at the source, the
weapons and materials depots and research institutions in the former
Soviet Union.
We have found that the former Soviet storage facilities are unsafe
and insecure. We have learned that there are people and organizations
in the world who are attempting to acquire these weapons and materials
for terrorist purposes.
The most direct line of defense against these dangers is negotiated,
verified reductions in nuclear, chemical, and biological forces. It
makes no sense to be for missile defenses and against the START
treaties and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Likewise, defense
spending that facilitates threat reduction in the former Soviet Union
is a wise investment. This is the essence of the Nunn-Lugar or
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
[[Page S6991]]
I favor a prudent approach to strengthening our third line of
defense--namely crisis and consequence management, including defense
against ballistic missiles--but not at the expense of shoring up the
front lines of defense--namely, prevention and deterrence. It is
important to point out that a ballistic or cruise missile is not the
likely delivery vehicle a terrorist or rogue nation will use to attack
the United States. Rather, a Ryder truck, an already proven form of
delivery, or a minivan, is much more likely.
Many refuse to believe that this type of drive-up nuclear, chemical,
or biological attack is likely. I say it is the most likely. We must
protect ourselves from missile attack, but at the same time, we must
also be willing to expend the resources necessary to prevent, deter,
and interdict this much simpler and more likely form of attack.
In my view, the potential costs of ignoring the threats and problems
associated with the spread of weapons of mass destruction are so
enormous that they demand a national mission on par with the Manhattan
Project--Manhattan II. We need to assemble the best minds, with massive
resources, to come up with, in a relatively short period of time, the
kinds of technical tools that will allow our policymakers to develop
truly credible responses and plans in the areas of nonproliferation and
counterproliferation.
It will take time. But we can jump start that effort here in the
Congress today. And that is the purpose of the amendment being offered
by Senator Nunn, Senator Domenici, and myself.
There are three basic elements or components to our amendment. The
first component stems from the recognition that the United States
cannot afford to rely on a policy of prevention and deterrence alone,
and therefore must prudently move forward with mechanisms to enhance
preparedness domestically not only for nuclear but chemical and
biological incidents as well.
The second component addresses the supply side of these materials,
weapons and know-how in the states of the former Soviet Union and
elsewhere. Building on our prior Nunn-Lugar/CTR experience, and
recognizing that it is far more effective, and less expensive, to
prevent WMD proliferation in the first place than to face such weapons
on the battlefield or the school playground, our amendment includes
countermeasures intended to firm up border and export controls,
measures to promote and support counterproliferation research and
development, and enhanced efforts to prevent the brain-drain of lethal
know-how to rogue states and terrorist groups.
The third and last major component stems from the recognition much of
the current effort to deal with the NBC threat crosscuts numerous
Federal departments and agencies and highlights the need for the
creation of a national coordinator for nonproliferation and
counterproliferation policy in order to provide a more strategic and
coordinated vision and response.
Let me deal briefly with each of these components.
The first component of our amendment concerns domestic preparedness
for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. Senator Nunn has
described this part of the amendment and I will not repeat his
explanation. Let me simply say that our hearings have demonstrated that
the United States is woefully unprepared for domestic terrorist
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Although recent
Presidential decision directives address the coordination of both
crisis and consequence management of a WMD incident, the Federal
Government has done too little to prepare for a nuclear threat or
nuclear detonation on American soil, and even less for a biological or
chemical threat or incident.
The second component of our amendment focuses on further constricting
the supply side of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Nunn-Lugar or
cooperative threat reduction program and related initiatives has sought
to address the threat to United States security posed by the nuclear
weapons, scientists, and materials of the former Soviet Union. The
mission to secure these nuclear assets, as well as their chemical and
biological equivalents, is unfinished.
We week to capitalize on the progress achieved in dismantling nuclear
weapons of the former Soviet states and in preventing the flight of
weapons scientists over the past 5 years and to expand the core mission
of the program so as to address strategically the emerging WMD threats
that compromise our domestic security. The resources that will be
required to implement programs proposed in the amendment are not
intended to supplant, but rather to supplement, current Nunn-Lugar
funding levels.
More specifically:
First, cooperative programs to improve the protection, control, and
accounting of nuclear materials must be accelerated and expanded to
encompass all of the nuclear facilities that handle sensitive nuclear
materials and components.
Second, the security of nuclear materials during transportation
between nuclear facilities must receive greater attention.
Transportation risks will grow as more nuclear warheads are
disassembled and their materials are shipped to interim or permanent
storage sites.
Third, greater programmatic emphasis needs to be placed on
safeguarding highly enriched uranium fuel used in Russian naval
propulsion. We need to accelerate and expand our programs with the
Russian Navy to encompass all unirradiated enriched uranium fuels used
for ship propulsion.
Fourth, we need to get on with the business of closing down plutonium
production facilities in Russia. Russia agreed to a United States
proposal to cease plutonium production for weapons but action has been
stymied by the fact that the three reactors in question also produce
heat and electricity. These reactors can be converted so that they can
no longer produce weapons-grade plutonium while permitting them to
continue to produce heat and electricity.
Fifth, in order to expand our transparency program efforts with the
Russians, we need to undertake new efforts to evaluate technologies and
techniques to verify that weapons are being dismantled and to verify
the quantities of nuclear materials from disassembled warheads.
Sixth, in the area of securing weapons and materials, it is time to
make a concerted effort at chemical and biological threat reduction.
Opportunities do exist to secure materials that can be used to make
chemical and biological weapons, and we need to determine the
feasibility and priority of moving beyond nuclear threat reduction and
beyond chemical-weapons demilitarization efforts to explore
possibilities for improving security for chemical and biological
weapons materials.
Seventh and last, in addition to enhanced efforts to secure the
weapons and materials of mass destruction, we must recognize that the
combination of organized crime, porous borders, severe economic
dislocation and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union has
greatly increased the risk that lethal materials of mass destruction as
well as the know-how for producing them can pass rather easily through
the borders of the former Soviet Union.
Although Nunn-Lugar programs have begun to offer training and
equipment to establish controls on borders and exports throughout the
former Soviet Union, much more needs to be done. Much of the training
that is done by the U.S. Customs Service will lapse this year.
The third component of the amendment focuses on the need for a
national nonproliferation coordinator. There is a broad consensus that
WMD proliferation is now, and will remain for the foreseeable future,
the top threat to U.S. national security interests. Yet the American
response to this proliferation threat remains scattered and unfocused.
The present nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts include
dozens of departments and agencies that have responsibilities in one
way or another to protect the United States from such threats. This
patchwork effort suffers from lack of coordination, overlap, and
duplication. The very nature of the WMD threat demands not just the
attention of our armed services and diplomatic corps, but also our law
enforcement community, our scientific community, and our intelligence
community.
[[Page S6992]]
In my view, our Nation's nonproliferation effort is in need of a
strategic and coordinated government-wide plan.
In order to best address the crosscutting nature of the proliferation
challenge, we propose to establish the position of the national
nonproliferation coordinator who will be charged with coordinating
policies and activities to combat the threat posed by WMD both
domestically and internationally. The coordinator should have the
authority to review the budgets of all agencies with programs in
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and related areas of
intelligence and law enforcement. The office of the coordinator should
be augmented with nonproliferation and counterproliferation experts
from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, Commerce, the
intelligence community, and such other agencies as may contribute to
the mission of the national coordinator.
To support a comprehensive approach to nonproliferation, the national
coordinator should chair a new committee on proliferation, crime, and
terrorism, to be established within the National Security Council. That
committee should include the Secretaries of State, Defense, Justice,
Energy, the DCI, and other department and agency heads the President
deems necessary. This committee within the National Security Council
should serve as the focal point for all government nonproliferation,
counterproliferation, law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism,
and other efforts to combat threats to the United States posed by
weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. President, it is time to go beyond a recitation of the threats
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to start
developing an appropriate strategic, coordinated response. We know what
the threats and the problems are. We even have the knowledge and
expertise to deal constructively with these threats.
Difficult as it is, identifying a new challenge is the easier part of
the problem. Summoning the political leadership, the political will and
resources, and the support of the American people to act is harder
still. Despite the threat of loose weapons of mass destruction and
weapons-usable materials, will the political leadership of this
country, including this Congress, step up to the plate?
Or will this new threat be given the priority it deserves only on the
morning after the first act of nuclear, chemical, or biological
terrorism takes place on American soil? What will we wish we had done?
This amendment represents our considered judgment as to the
appropriate starting points for a national effort to deal with the
threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We
have held over 20 hearings during the course of the last year. We have
worked with experts in the executive branch--in the law enforcement
area, in the Energy Department, in our national laboratories. And we
have consulted with officials at the State and local levels--with first
responders who will be on the firing line if our efforts at prevention
and deterrence should fail.
Senator Nunn, Senator Domenici and I are convinced that the programs
and measures outlined in the amendment are doable. And we ask for the
support of our colleagues in agreeing to this amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I first want to indicate to my good
friends, Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, how appreciative I am that we
have been able to work together to put this comprehensive amendment
before the U.S. Senate.
While this is not a session this evening attended by very many
Senators, I believe if this amendment is adopted tomorrow and if it
remains part of the authorization bill and if it is signed by the
President, then this will have been a red-letter day in the future of
the United States and our people, because it appears to me that we
ought to do everything we can to avoid a catastrophe that can occur in
the United States with reference to a nuclear weapon being detonated
here or a biological or chemical weapon, which I believe most experts
say is probably more apt to happen and more dangerous today to
America's future. If we can get our country started in a preventive
program and in a coordinated program of using the finest talent we
have, scientific and technological, to bear down on this issue, then I
believe this will have been an extremely productive defense
authorization bill.
Having said that, I would like to make a part of the Record the
following: a letter dated June 26 to myself from the Secretary of
Energy. I will merely paraphrase it. The Secretary says:
Finally, the amendment will improve both our near-term and
long-term work to prevent and counter the growing threat of
weapons of mass destruction to the United States. We look
forward to working with the Congress to address these
priority concerns . . .
I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The Secretary of Energy,
Washington, DC, June 26, 1996.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Domenici: I am writing to state my strong
support for your efforts to enhance U.S. national security in
the face of the increasing threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction.
The Amendment No. 4181 that you have proposed to the
Defense Authorization bill and published yesterday in the
Congressional Record would contribute significantly to our
ability to protect the American people and the world from
threats posed by unsafeguarded nuclear material.
It would enable us to complete nuclear materials upgrades
on an urgent basis at key sites in Russia which were agreed
to between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin since our budget was submitted. It would aid our
ability to fund our very successful ``Lab-to-Lab'' materials,
protection, control and accounting program which has been the
pace setter in gaining access to vulnerable sites in the
former Soviet Union where nuclear materials are stored and
are in need of security upgrades. Our progress in these areas
has outpaced available funding. The faster such sites are
secured, the less likely that weapons grade material will be
diverted to rogue states or terrorist groups. The costs of
prevention are far less than the costs of defending against
diverted material or coping with the potentially catastrophic
consequences of terrorist use of such material.
The amendment also augments our Nuclear Emergency Search
Team, or NEST, capability to be transported quickly anywhere
in the United States or the world to deal with finding and
disarming a nuclear device.
The amendment would leverage existing research and
development capabilities of the Department's National
Laboratories to better verify and secure U.S. and Russian
nuclear weapons pits awaiting disposition, and make full use
of DOE's capabilities to detect and counter nuclear smuggling
and other weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, the amendment will improve both our near term and
long term work to prevent and counter the growing threat of
weapons of mass destruction to the United States. We look
forward to working with the Congress to address these
priority concerns of the Administration.
Sincerely,
Hazel R. O'Leary.
(Mr. LUGAR assumed the chair.)
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, on June 26, Senator Nunn received a
letter--it was actually for all of us and for this amendment--from
Defense Secretary Perry. I quote the last paragraph:
Taken together, the amendment's provisions will result in
important improvements to the Defense Department's
capabilities to prevent and respond to the threats both here
and abroad posed by terrorists and weapons of mass
destruction.
I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, June 26, 1996.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn: I am writing to express my appreciation
and support for your efforts to improve our ability to
protect the American people, our troops and allies from the
threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and terrorists
who might use them.
The amendment you have proposed to the Defense
Authorization bill on this issue would provide important
support to enhance our defense capabilities against these
threats. It would assist us in our efforts to improve our
domestic preparedness to prevent and, if necessary, deal with
a potential domestic terrorist incident involving weapons of
mass destruction. It would also strengthen our ongoing
efforts in Cooperative Threat Reduction and other programs to
[[Page S6993]]
prevent proliferation by reducing and improving control over
such lethal weapons and materials at the source and
strengthening the international community's ability to
interdict them at borders.
Taken together, the amendment's provisions will result in
important improvements in the Defense Department's
capabilities to prevent and respond to the threats both here
and aboard posed by terrorists and weapons of mass
destruction.
Sincerely,
William J. Perry.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, within the last 3 or 4 days, a very
interesting report has been forthcoming. I believe it is a godsend for
us. It is called ``A Nuclear Black Market,'' and it was a report issued
under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. It is very significant, because many of the participants in
this study have great credibility with many Senators with reference to
issues of this type.
Arnaud De Borchgrave, who many know as former editor of the
Washington Times, was the project director of this report. I am not
going to make it a part of the Record; I am merely going to suggest to
those who wonder whether this amendment moves us in the right
direction, I suggest if they want the recommendations of this group,
headed by the person that I just talked about, under the auspices of a
very reliable think-tank group and containing the following prognosis--
and if this does not sound something like the speeches just given by
Senators Nunn and Lugar--let me share it with you.
The prognosis says--and that is all I will read and urge that
Senators or their staffs interested should read it--the prognosis says:
In the near term, several key variables in the nuclear
smuggling equation appear likely to remain bad or may even
worsen. Barring an unlikely economic turnaround in the former
Soviet Union, struggling nuclear workers will continue to be
tempted to steal material. Disarray in the Russian military
is apt to worsen in the near term, threatening security at
nuclear weapons storage sites.
The current trafficking situation shows a disturbing upward
trend. Substantial quantities of materials are likely to
remain at large, and the potential for an accident or use of
smuggled nuclear materials probably is increasing, partly as
a result of dismantling.
By contrast, certain trends are favorable. Improvements in
the materials protection and controlled accounting in the
former Soviet Union are progressing slowly. The number of
deployed warheads and assembled weapons is shrinking and
facilities are consolidating. Transit states are beginning to
deploy technical detectors and are acquiring needed training
and experience. Meanwhile, the international community is
starting to respond to this severe challenge. Although any
prediction is tenuous, the situation seems likely to get
worse over the near term and will not improve unless
immediate security enhancements are made.
Then one might be surprised to read the recommendations. The
recommendations begin to sound like this bill. For that, I am very
pleased, because the three of us and our staffs and an assemblage of
experts, not including those who put this report together, have worked
very hard in an effort to bring a comprehensive bill before the U.S.
Senate tonight.
So, Mr. President, after yesterday's bombing in Saudi Arabia, my
colleagues do not need to be reminded of the devastation of a
conventional bomb. I am not aware of any of my colleagues who had the
opportunity to observe an above-ground nuclear blast, but I believe my
colleagues recognize the devastation that such an explosion would have
if a nuclear weapon were to explode in New York City or in Indianapolis
or in Atlanta or in Chicago.
We are less familiar, however, with the threat of chemical weapons,
although we do have some experience from the Tokyo subway incident,
which has been discussed thoroughly here tonight, from observing the
use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, and from dealing with
accidental chemical leaks in events such as railroad car derailments.
I think very few of us are aware of what could happen if a rogue
nation or group attacked the United States with a biological device.
The device could very well be made in a laboratory the size of a
kitchen.
My colleagues recognize all the equipment necessary to culture a
biological agent. Most of it can be found in a high school or college
chemistry laboratory, or ordered, I might say, from a number of mail-
order houses in the United States and around the world.
In that kitchen laboratory, the first drop of an agent would be
cultured until it multiplied billions of times. To turn those germs
into a weapon would be very straightforward. The biological agent would
be placed in a container designed to open and disperse the material
into the air, possibly with a small fan. The device would be most
effective placed in locations of which significant airflows interact.
And when that interacts with large numbers of people, they have almost
a special place for this kind of destruction: A metro station, the air-
conditioning system of a large building, an airport.
People passing through would breathe the agent into their lungs,
where it would continue to multiply with every breath. The unknowing
transporter would exhale some of the agent, to be breathed in by
others. The first illness might not occur for several days. First,
those directly exposed would start to die. Then their co-workers, their
families, their friends would start to die.
Initially hospitals would be overwhelmed, like we found when we have
had viruses before, including the Ebola virus. The virus would flourish
at the hospitals, turning them into killing grounds. I could go on.
I do this because I truly think it is imperative that somehow we get
the message to the policymakers of this country and ultimately to the
people of this Nation that just as we amassed in the Manhattan project
the greatest of our scientists with a mission, a mission to save
America by developing the atomic bomb, it is imperative that we
coordinate our best efforts and resources, our best scientists and
technicians to lodge an attack on the impending potential disasters
that can come from biological and chemical destruction and the forces
that can be set forth and lay millions of people to waste.
There are no easy answers. But there were not easy answers to some of
these gigantic technical and scientific problems that we have faced in
the past. The longer we sit by and assume it will all be taken care of
because a lot of people are working on these kinds of issues, the
longer we are being fooled. So we have put together a bill that
addresses these issues on many fronts.
Clearly, it addresses the issue of the nuclear black market. That has
already been discussed in great detail. I merely want to say to
Senators who might wonder whether it is in America's interests to
negate this black market or whether it is in somebody else's interest,
there can be no question, it is in our interest, the whole notion of a
black market coming out of the Soviet Union, because they are
dismantling, are in a state of disarray, building down their nuclear
weapons, all of which contributes an enormous potential for the
dissemination of those kinds of things from whence nuclear bombs can be
made.
It is in our interest that we continue, as difficult as it is, to put
some resources into trying to tame that which is being loosed on the
world through individual conduct in the Soviet Union and in some cases
through organized conduct. The genie is out of the bottle there, but it
behooves us to try to make that as small as humanly possible. And we
can do better.
If we adopt this amendment, and find the resources to fund it, it
will be just another very positive stride in the direction of doing
what is prudent for our people in reference to this very, very serious
threat.
It is kind of amazing and somewhat ironic that as we end the cold
war, we turn loose a new hot substance. It is no longer necessarily the
fleet of rockets aimed at us, but it is the tremendous inventory from
plutonium to enriched uranium and everything in between that can be
turned loose because a country cannot control its people and does not
have the money to pay its scientists to keep working and do productive
things. What a tremendous, difficult situation we are confronted with,
difficult enough to do something serious about.
This bill clearly takes some giant steps in the right direction. It
directs the Department of Defense to create an emergency response team
similar to the Department of Energy's nuclear emergency search team.
This team
[[Page S6994]]
could be called upon to locate and deactivate chemical or biological
devices or try to contain them once detonated.
The amendment directs the Departments of Energy and Defense to
develop new technologies to detect the production and transportation of
these agents. Just think of how tough this one is. But if we do not
tell our scientists to try to find ways to detect these devices and the
places of their origin, then what chance do we have to make any real
strides in inhibiting the devastating potential, a little piece of
which I described in my early remarks.
Metro medical strike teams are established. I will not go into great
detail. Joint exercises are provided for, and an effort to help our
local law enforcement, not take over, but to help them become more
proficient in this potential and thus more able to be of help and be
part of prevention rather than wait until something happens and then
have the clamor that nobody knew what to do, nobody was trained.
We are smart enough to know that these things can happen. Tonight my
two colleagues have already explained how they have already happened
and how close we have come in our own country to a major--to a major--
biological disaster in New York City.
There is much more I could say tonight. Most of my remaining remarks
would have to do with the former Soviet Union and certain programs that
are working fairly well, some that we ought to enhance and make better.
But I will not do that because between Senators Nunn and Lugar, they
have touched on it. I am sure when Senator Nunn finishes his remarks
tonight, since he has started in this arena in the former Soviet Union,
he will make additional remarks about what we ought to be doing.
I merely want to say that I got some very good education about this
from some of our national laboratories. I participated in two national
seminars hosted by Los Alamos National Laboratory, and in the last case
by them and Harvard University, when they brought the best thinkers
together to tell us about the reality of this situation.
Are we pipe dreaming or is it real? If it is real, what should we be
doing about it? From those kinds of contacts, I have arrived at the
conclusion that if one is going to leave a legacy around here, one
ought to leave a legacy in this area of calling this kind of problem to
the attention of the policymakers and then doing something about it.
If one would have been part of originating the Manhattan project, one
might have been very proud of having a part in assembling this massive
talent, managed in an appropriate way, to bring America the first
atomic bomb. The same thing might be happening here, for our great
scientists might permit us to evolve from this legislation into
something that might really preserve and save literally millions of
people and literally millions of Americans now and in the future.
Now, let me turn to the threat of nuclear weapons. At its peak in
1992, the Soviet Union possessed approximately 45,000 nuclear warheads
and weapons grade nuclear material to fabricate thousands more.
The Soviet Union also produced an unknown amount of highly enriched
uranium for reactors and for their nuclear navy. That material is also
weapons usable.
While we will never know for certain how much of this material
exists, the number 1,200 metric tons of weapons-usable material is
frequently used.
If one considers that a simple nuclear weapon requires 15 kilograms
of highly enriched uranium and 4 kilograms of plutonium, there is
enough weapons usable nuclear material in Russia to build more than
63,000 nuclear weapons, each of which could fit in a briefcase.
That material cannot be accounted for--the best concrete example we
have is Project Sapphire.
Project Sapphire occurred when the Government of Kazakhstan found 600
kilograms--enough material for 32 nuclear weapons--of highly enriched
uranium that had been inadvertently left in Kazakhstan when the Soviets
left.
Not only was 600 kilograms left behind, but the inventory of that
material conducted according to Soviet measuring techniques was off by
4 percent--enough to make almost two nuclear weapons.
In the Sapphire case, the Department of Energy secured that material
and transported it to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. But that case
demonstrates how lacking inventory control systems are in the former-
Soviet Union.
Even when the material is in dedicated storage facilities it
represents a threat. At Chelyabinsk-65, bulk plutonium is stored in a
warehouse with glass windows and a padlock on the door. Inside the
facility are over 10,000 ingots of separated plutonium stored in
thermos-sized containers--perfect for picking up and walking out.
If the terrorists who tried to blow up the World Trade Center had
used a nuclear weapon made of that weapons usable nuclear material,
Manhattan--all the way up to Gramercy Park, would have disappeared. If
such a device had been set off in Oklahoma City, most of Oklahoma City
would have disappeared.
The examples I have given are using a simple weapon design that is
available over the Internet. If a rogue nation were to hire a Russian
weapons designer and have access to the necessary material, that
designer could build a sophisticated, multiple-stage weapon many times
more powerful.
My colleagues need to understand that the weapons used in Nagasaki
and Hiroshima were much cruder designs than are easily available today.
If a terrorist or rogue nation gains control of weapons usable nuclear
material--they immediately become a nuclear power more advanced than
the United States was when we bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We cannot
let that happen.
For the past 5 years, under the leadership of Senators Nunn and
Lugar, Congress has provided $300-$400 million per year to address this
problem. Unfortunately, when the original legislation authorizing that
work was enacted in 1991, it included numerous restrictions on its use.
I understand why those restrictions were put in place--when Nunn-
Lugar was first enacted, the hammer and sickle of the Soviet Empire
still flew over Red Square. But there have been some real successes--a
lot of which resulted from the less formal interactions of the
Department of Energy with their counterparts in the Russian Ministry of
Atomic Energy.
It turns out that these scientists; ours at Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore, and Sandia; and theirs at Arzamas, Tomsk, and Chelyabinsk;
think alike. They have been following each other's work for years and
have tremendous respect for one another. So when the Cold War ended,
they started getting together and found they have a great deal in
common.
Out of those informal relationships have developed some very
important programs.
materials protection, control, and accounting
The Department of Energy has already secured nuclear material at 35
facilities in the former-Soviet Union. Those security systems include,
cameras, gates, portal monitors, and tagging devices to track nuclear
material.
At the January Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting, six more sites were added
to the list of sites to which DOE will have access to secure nuclear
materials.
Because these sites were only agreed to in January, funds were not
included in the President's budget request. However, these sites are a
top priority--one of the sites is Krasnoyarsk-26, one of the sites of
Russia's remaining three plutonium production reactors.
The amendment includes an additional $15,000,000 for the program.
lab-to-lab
The close relationships developing between the national laboratories
here and the Russian Institutes is the foundation of our success to
date.
Lab-To-Lab efforts are intentionally diverse. Currently, efforts are
focusing on ways to safeguard and transport assembled Russian nuclear
weapons.
This amendment expands the Lab-To-Lab Program to include all the
states of the former-Soviet Union and provides an additional
$20,000,000.
cooperation with russian navy on nuclear materials security
Highly enriched uranium intended for naval propulsion can be used in
nuclear weapons. To date, our material protection, control, and
accounting efforts have focused on the Ministry of
[[Page S6995]]
Atomic Energy and have not involved the Russian Navy.
Through the Lab-To-Lab Program, the Department of Energy has met with
Russian naval officers. In April, a delegation of Russian naval
officers visited Oak Ridge, Sandia, and Los Alamos to familiarize
themselves with our protection, control, and accounting systems.
In turn, Department of Energy officials have visited Murmansk and an
agreement is now in place to secure fresh Russian naval fuel at two
locations.
The amendment includes $6,000,000 to initiate this work and expand to
eventually include 10 to 15 locations and a navy-wide accounting
system.
industrial partnering program
Weapons usable nuclear material is a clear threat. However, if that
material is combined with someone knowledgeable enough to build a
sophisticated, multiple-state system, the threat increases
dramatically.
The Industrial Partnering Program seeks to bring together Russian
nuclear scientists with U.S. industry to provide new careers so those
individuals are less likely to be lured into the service of rogue
nations or groups.
U.S. companies benefit from the exceptional technical capabilities of
these scientists and engineers, but we also gain the knowledge that at
least some of these potentially dangerous people have found a way to
feed their families without endangering our national security.
Because the Armed Services Committee has already increased funding
for IPP to $50,000,000 from $15,000,000, this legislation simply
expands IPP's mandate to include facilities once used to produce
biological and chemical weapons.
technology development
The United States has to develop better means of detecting nuclear,
biological, and chemical materials.
Using current remote sensing technology, a chemical or biological
weapons factory is almost impossible to differentiate from a fertilizer
factory or a brewery. Our experience in Iraq demonstrates that, even in
a country that allows International Atomic Energy Agency inspections,
it is difficult to detect a covert nuclear program.
The amendment includes an additional $20,000,000 to develop
technologies so that we can assess whether our enemies are developing
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons capabilities.
plutonium reactor core conversion
Unlike the United States, the reactors used to produce plutonium for
Soviet nuclear weapons, also produced electricity to heat surrounding
towns. Three of those reactors continue to operate and produce
plutonium; two at Krasnyarsk-26 and one at Tomsk-7.
Russia has refused to shut the reactors down because they are
desperate for the electricity. However, the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy has agreed to convert the cores of the three reactors so they no
longer produce weapons grade plutonium.
It is my understanding that the conversion will cost $70,000,000 to
$90,000,000.
The amendment includes $15,000,000 to complete the necessary design
analysis and to begin procuring the necessary components.
verification, conversion, and disposition of weapons grade material
Russia is currently dismantling 2,000 warheads per year and storing
the nuclear components in facilities one Russian advisor has referred
to as ``an old warehouse''.
The first priority must be to secure that material through the MPC&A
Program but our long term objective must be the permanent disposition
of that material.
Recently Los Alamos National Laboratory won an R&D 100 award for a
new technology that enables us, for the first time, to transform
plutonium from weapons into non-weapons usable forms in a verifiable
manner.
This is a significant accomplishment because the Russians refuse to
let us see the plutonium from their weapons since the shape of the
plutonium is one of their most closely guarded secrets.
However, the new ARIES technology will enable us to verifiably
transform weapons grade plutonium, removed directly from a weapon, into
an ingot of plutonium oxide or hydride unsuitable for weapons use.
The amendment provides $10,000,000 to initiate a joint program in
this area.
this is not foreign aid
These are the programs we have determined are of the highest national
security--they are not foreign aid.
As a result of these programs, we will safely and permanently
dismantle and inventory Russian nuclear weapons, and tie up their
weapons expertise.
When the original Nunn-Lugar legislation was enacted, it was
accompanied by all sorts of requirements for certifications that Russia
was meeting certain requirements. That logic is exactly backwards--we
are undertaking these programs where they are in our national security
interest and the Russian Federation is willing to cooperate.
Again, I am very proud to be part of this amendment. We have worked
very hard together on it. I am very grateful to the two Senators, the
occupant of the chair and Senator Nunn, for letting me join you in this
effort. I hope it does reach fruition. I yield the floor.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from New Mexico and my
friend from Indiana who now occupies the chair. This has truly been a
partnership. I say that the Senator from New Mexico has been really a
part of this overall effort from the very beginning.
I remember very well when we had the original Nunn-Lugar amendment on
the floor and the Senator from New Mexico came and spoke up very
vigorously in favor of that, as did the Senator from Virginia. The
Senator from Virginia has been very helpful in this legislation from
the very beginning.
So the Senator from New Mexico has made immense contributions here
and in the DOE lab program, the many other programs that the Department
of Energy is involved in. And primarily it is the work of the Senator
from New Mexico. So we are very proud to be partners in this endeavor,
and it is truly a bipartisan endeavor.
I know the Senator from Virginia would like to ask questions. I am
going to abbreviate my concluding remarks.
Mr. President, as I said earlier, this training and equipping
function is the heart of this amendment, but not the whole amendment.
Other parts of the amendment are designed to beef up our customs
capability to try to interdict the smuggling of weapons of mass
destruction and their components into the United States, and to provide
the latest detection technology to customs officials. The best way to
prevent a terrorist incident involving a nuclear, radiological,
chemical, or biological weapon is to stop these dangerous materials at
our ports and airfields and borders. While some equipment is available
that is capable of detecting materials related to these weapons, this
equipment is not yet widely deployed, and we must speed up the process.
In addition, we must speed the development of new technologies that can
detect nuclear, chemical, and biological materials before they reach
the terrorist who will assemble them, or detect the materials in an
assembled weapon before it can be set off. Better technology is
essential to guard our borders, and it is essential for our domestic
law enforcement.
We are also concerned about interdicting supplies of dangerous
materials across frontiers in Eastern Europe, the Caucusus, and along
the southern flank of the former Soviet Union, where many newly-
independent states effectively have no customs capability. Therefore,
the amendment provides modest funding for US customs to train
counterparts in those countries, upon request.
In addition, the amendment allocates some funds for expansion and
continuation of the original Nunn-Lugar concept through programs run
both by the Department of Energy and by the Department of Defense's
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We are seeking to expand these
programs both in Russia, and, increasingly, in other states of the
former Soviet Union. My cosponsors will describe these activities in
more detail.
Finally, there are three serious deficiencies in planning for
contingencies. First is the lack of coordination of activities across
the many Federal agencies who have some responsibility for some
portions of the overall problem. Second is the lack of coordination of
Federal agencies and activities with those of the states and
municipalities
[[Page S6996]]
who will be first to bear the brunt of future attacks. Third is the
lack of a national security funding mechanism to match the new national
security missions in many of the Federal agencies whose actions must
ultimately be integrated with those of DOD and DOE. To address these
fundamental problems, this legislation establishes a coordinator in the
office of the President to try to bring a degree of order to the
fragmented responsibilities that exist today.
With this introduction and description of the main purpose of the
legislation, Mr. President, let me next give a brief section-by-section
overview of the amendment.
Title One focuses on the need to better train, equip and coordinate
our emergency response personnel who are presently unprepared to deal
with terrorist incidents involving nuclear, chemical or biological
agents. Our bill makes efficient use of the expertise in our military
and energy departments to train local officials to response to
incidents involving WMD. Our hearings highlighted weaknesses in federal
preparedness for WMD incidents, especially regarding coordination among
agencies. Our legislation goes a long way toward improving this
situation by establishing a chemical and biological response team,
modeled after the Department of Energy's nuclear emergency search team.
Such assistance and expertise could only be brought to bear if called
up by civil authorities to implement the Federal disaster response
plan, and would be limited by language that respects the proper
demarcation between our military and civilian agencies. Keeping in mind
these precautions, it is possible to apply our Nation's hard-won
expertise in chemical and biological warfare to this urgent national
security threat without infringing on our political traditions.
Additionally, this legislation creates medical responses teams
throughout the United States. These highly trained and deployable
health care teams will assist the existing local resources in our
cities and towns to respond to and mitigate a WMD incident.
Title II includes countermeasures against the smuggling of WMD
materials when they do leak from their source. This legislation
supports efforts to tighten border security and export controls both at
our boarders, and elsewhere on likely routes that these lethal
materials might take through states of the former Soviet Union. It also
supports research for development of technical means to detect the
unauthorized transportation of these lethal materials. Finally, it
recommends greater penalties for those criminals involved in smuggling
of these materials.
Title III builds upon the successes of the Nunn-Lugar program to
address the full range of the proliferation threats to our country. The
Nunn-Lugar/cooperative threat reduction programs focus on the problem
at its source by improving safeguards on weapons, weapons materials,
and expertise inside the FSU. Since its inception, this program had
made an enormous contribution to improving the security of our Nation.
As of June 1, Ukraine, which held far more nuclear weapons than any
state other than the United States and Russia, is no longer a nuclear
state. Kazakstan became nuclear free last year, and Belarus will become
nuclear free by this fall. Our legislation provides funds to the
Defense and Energy Departments in order to promote efforts at control
of these weapons and materials, and conversion of facilities that
produce them. I often ask the critics of these programs how much it is
worth--in terms of our security--to destroy Soviet missiles and to
dismantle their warheads, and to keep the resulting nuclear weapons
materials out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations? How much
did we spend to deter the use of these same missiles during the cold
war?
Finally, what is needed is a comprehensive strategy that encompasses
the many facets of the proliferation threat. The time has come to adopt
our Government to the complexities of the post cold war national
security situation. WMD proliferation crosscuts numerous agencies and
departments, including some such as the Customs Department, the FBI and
the Department of Health and Human Services, that have not previously
been recognized as having major responsibilities for national security.
The convergence of proliferation with terrorism and organized crime,
the growing awareness of the potential use of chemical and biological
agents in a terrorist incident, further complicates the implementation
of a comprehensive approach to this problem.
Title IV establishes a national coordinator to pull together the
different parts of our nonproliferation policy. The national
coordinator would be appointed by the President to serve in the
Executive Office of the President. He or she would oversee the senior
directors for nonproliferation, counterproliferation, arms control,
terrorism and global crime to assure that we remain focused, that our
priorities receive consistent high-level attention, and that vital
proliferation threats do not slip through the cracks.
I am convinced that we must address this issue before the unthinkable
happens. Can we afford to dismiss the possibility that another World
Trade Center or Oklahoma City bombing could involve chemicals,
biological organisms or radioactive materials? We do so at our peril.
The trends are clear: more nations and groups are exploiting increased
availability of information, technology, and materials to acquire mass
destruction or mass terror capabilities. There is no reason to believe
they are not willing to sue them. I have heard too many experts whose
opinions and credentials I respect, tell me that it is not a question
of if but only of when. I believe this legislation, while only a
beginning, responds to a very urgent national security concern of our
Nation.
Mr. President, in essence, we have three different ways of trying to
protect the American people from weapons of mass destruction in terms
of proliferation.
One way is the original Nunn-Lugar program, which is an effort to
stop the material at its source, not to have the material, the
scientists, the know-how come out of the former Soviet Union and spread
all over the world, ending up threatening either the United States and
our people or our allies. That is what we are beefing up here. We are
trying to accelerate some of the good programs that are ongoing
there. So that is step No. 1. Just as we have tried to stop drugs at
their source, we are trying to prevent this proliferation from getting
out of the former Soviet Union. That is not just Russia.
I hear people talk about ``foreign assistance.'' This is not foreign
assistance. We have other programs that are foreign assistance. This
program is national security. It is in our national security interests
not to have the Russian nuclear weapons, nuclear material, nuclear
know-how, scientists all over the world ending up threatening both the
United States and our military forces wherever they are deployed, but
also threatening American people. This is in no way foreign assistance.
As a matter of fact, there is no cash involved here. We are not
furnishing cash to Russians. They do not have any way to convert this
cash to their own defense programs that do not relate to this. They are
basically being furnished equipment and know-how for a specific
purpose. There is one cash provision, I believe, going to the Ukraine.
That is the only one and that is subject to very strict accounting
procedures.
Stopping the proliferation at its source is the best, most
productive, the most effective, the most efficient way of dealing with
this problem. We ought to continue that effort as long as the window of
opportunity is open. It remains open today in Russia and it remains
open in Belarus, and it remains open in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. We have
succeeded beyond what any of us thought was possible in this regard.
Since September 1990, over 4,000 warheads have been removed from
operational status in the former Soviet Union; over 1,000 missiles have
been removed from launches; over 800 missile launchers and bombers have
been destroyed; controls, safety guards and a myriad of nuclear
facilities in Russia have been enhanced, adding new layers of defense
against proliferation efforts.
Outside of Russia, the most significant event, which I know the
occupant of the Chair now, and I, believed at one time was not likely
to happen, and that is the other countries that could have become
nuclear powers--Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus--are no longer headed
down that road. In Kazakhstan,
[[Page S6997]]
all the nuclear weapons have been removed. No nuclear hand on the
trigger or finger on the trigger in Kazakhstan. About a week and a
half, 2 weeks ago, the last nuclear warhead came out of the Ukraine. I
have been informed by people in Belarus and my own officials that the
last warhead will come out of Belarus this year. If nothing else, if
nothing else, having one nuclear hand on the trigger, that is Russia,
instead of four countries that we have to deal with and defend against
and worry about is an enormous accomplishment.
How much would we have paid during the cold war to basically find
three countries that had weapons of mass destruction and be able to get
rid of them? If the CIA or the Department of Defense had come in and
said, ``If you will give us x number of dollars in our budget, we will
guarantee you that we will get rid of the weapons in three countries
that are now aimed at the United States,'' how much would we have paid
for that? Ten billion dollars, $20 billion, $30 billion, $40 billion,
$50 billion? Probably $60 billion or $70 billion. It would have been
enormous. We spent trillions of dollars defending over the years. Now
we have been able to accomplish this not because they were doing us a
favor, but because these countries realized it was in their own best
interests, their own national security interests to get rid of these
weapons, to ship them back to Russia to keep them under central
control.
We were able to use these funds to give them the incentive and the
priority and the reason to their own people, to their own legislative
bodies, to help justify what was fundamentally in their interests.
Stopping these weapons at their source is the No. 1 effective way. I am
very much in favor of the other parts of this bill, but this is the
most effective money we will spend. I hope everyone recognizes that. If
you look at what has been accomplished, you can see that very clearly.
The second way we are trying to deal with the problem is through the
Customs Service. We are using, yes, DOD and DOE money to help the
Customs Service beef up their capability to prevent weapons from coming
into this country, so that the Customs Service is able to get from DOD
and DOE the best technology we have to be able to detect weapons coming
across the border--not just nuclear, but chemical and biological, as
well. Also, we are beefing up the DOD-DOE work in finding better ways
to detect these weapons.
I have been briefed many times on this subject, most recently this
last week, and it is very clear that even with all the work DOD and DOE
have done, we still have a long way to go to find, really, effective
state-of-the-art methods of detecting particularly chemical and
biological weapons. We are better at nuclear detection than chemical
and biological. Those are the threats that are more likely to happen.
Not only detecting coming across the borders but detecting these in
airports, ports and major cities where an attack may be suspected. That
is the second way, beefing up customs.
The other facet is customs will also, under this bill, be given a
mandate and some money to help these other countries like Kazakhstan,
Belarus, the southern countries in the former Soviet Union so that they
will be able to beef up their own customs. These countries want to
help, they want to be able to help prevent the spread of these weapons,
but they do not have the know-how or the expertise. In many cases, they
do not have the training, and they certainly do not have the equipment.
This is the second way we are dealing with this problem.
Finally, we are dealing with it by acknowledging that we have a
serious and fundamental problem in terms of our cities, our States,
particularly our metropolitan areas, in being able to, No. 1, detect
the materials that may be used for attack against soft targets, against
population centers, against airports, against major sporting events,
whatever, to detect it and prevent it. Second, to be able to deal with
it if it happened. We are woefully unprepared to deal with this kind of
catastrophic act of terrorism if it occurs. There is no doubt about
that.
We have had before the permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and
the occupant of the Chair has had similar hearings in his Foreign
Relations Committee, and we have had hearings in the Subcommittee on
Investigations, and there is no doubt the police departments, the fire
departments, are on record as saying, ``We need help.'' That is what we
are trying to do here.
This will not solve the problem. This is a beginning. This is an
effort to help train, probably first of all, some Federal people who
can go out and train others. Probably we will have the FEMA people
involved. They are not ready to do this now, but it is my hope that we
will be able to phase DOD and DOE out of this kind of training for
domestic law enforcement officials and firemen, sometime in the next 2
to 3 years. They are the best source now, but perhaps the
administration will decide with the flexibility they have been given to
train the Federal emergency management people so they can continue this
training in the future. Right now, we have no choice but to deal with
the expertise we have, and that is in the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy. We are encouraging that.
I know the Senator from Virginia, being a former Marine, would be
very interested, and I know he is aware that the Marine Corps is
beefing up a considerable amount of talents and capability now to be
able to deal, as the NEST team does in the Department of Energy, with
nuclear threat, to deal with the chemical and biological threat. The
Department of Defense will make that decision as to who is the main
resource there, but the Marine Corps is out front, and our special
operation forces also very much are involved in this area. So we have
some military capability there that is going to be developed.
Mr. President, the only other thing I add, we are beefing up the
research capabilities of both DOE and DOD. I emphasize that because we
need better methods, we need better tools, we need better equipment, we
need better protective gear and we need to do everything we can to
bring our considerable technology to bear to deter and to prevent and
to detect and finally to deal with this threat, if necessary.
Rather than take more time now, I thank my colleagues. I thank the
Senator from Virginia for his patience. I know he has some questions
and I know they will be pertinent and relevant questions. Those should
be answered here. I thank all of our colleagues and I thank the
cosponsors of this amendment, Senator Biden, Senator Graham, Senator
Specter, Senator Daschle, and others who will be speaking, I am sure,
on this subject in the hours ahead.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I do join and commend the principal
sponsors for their work product and for their many, many hours of labor
devoted, together with staff, in preparing the amendment. I will ask
some questions of my colleagues and I am certain they will see these in
the spirit of constructive dialog.
First, the joint DOD-DOE report on preparedness of the Government to
respond to nuclear, chemical and biological incidents.
That report, which was just issued recently--I think, in the last few
weeks--recommended provided authority to establish a training program,
authority to establish a chemical biological response team, and the
establishment of a regional NBC stockpile, particularly for medical
stockpiles and the like.
Can the proponents of the amendment inform the Senate with respect to
that report and the parallelism in the amendment and that report?
Mr. President, I just learned of the report. It may well be that the
sponsors have not had the opportunity to see it.
Mr. NUNN. I will supplement it for the Record. I have not studied
that report at this stage. We have had a number of hearings in our
committee. We have heard from these same officials, such as the
Department of Energy Secretary, and I believe the Senator from New
Mexico put a letter in the Record from the Department of Energy and
Secretary of Defense Perry endorsing this legislation.
It is a strong endorsement for this effort from the DOE and DOD. So I
am confident that this report, based on those endorsements, based on
the numerous meetings we have had, and based on the testimony--I am
sure this amendment would reinforce, supplement, and give impetus to
the recommendations in that report. I would
[[Page S6998]]
have to supplement the Record on that particular answer because I have
not had a chance to study the report itself.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is quite satisfactory. I will be glad
to work with my colleagues.
Mr. DOMENICI. I just wanted to say we put in the Secretary Perry
letter.
Mr. NUNN. Thank you.
Mr. WARNER. My understanding is that the pending amendment includes
authority for the Department of Defense to provide assistance to the
Department of Justice. There was a comparable attempt made in the
antiterrorism bill, but that was specifically dropped in the
conference. Can my colleagues enlighten me on that problem?
Again, Mr. President, I am perfectly understanding. Your amendment,
Senator, has a provision for the Department of Defense to provide
assistance to the Department of Justice. A similar effort was made in
the antiterrorism bill, and that comparable provision was dropped in
conference.
Mr. NUNN. Yes. I talked to Senator Hatch about that this evening. I
have also conversed with Senator Biden, and our staffs have been in
touch with both of them. This provision we have in this bill is very
close to the amendment that passed the Senate overwhelmingly and that
was worked out carefully between Senator Hatch and myself and Senator
Biden. It does provide an extraordinary circumstance that the DOE and
DOD can help State and local officials. For instance, if there were a
subway attack in New York, if the fire department and police department
were overwhelmed with the chemical sarin gas, there would be the
ability to ask for emergency assistance. Then the Departments of
Defense and Justice--the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General--
could respond. It would have to be very narrowly prescribed
circumstances, where they could respond to that situation only, in very
unique circumstances, where the State and local governments and the
normal law enforcement officials would not be capable of responding.
So that provision is in this bill. It was dropped--the Senator from
Virginia is correct--from the antiterrorism bill in conference. I think
that was a fundamental mistake, a flaw. But it is a part of this
legislation.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in essence, we have now renewed the
attention of the Senate to the need for that provision.
Mr. NUNN. The Senator is correct.
Mr. WARNER. Two years ago, Mr. President, the Congress authorized $10
million for a joint DOD-FBI training program to assist the independent
states of the former Soviet Union, the Baltics, and Eastern Europe to
control the export of weapons of mass destruction.
Is there a current status report on that program available, and, if
so, at some appropriate time, could it be made a part of the Record?
Mr. NUNN. I would also like to supplement that for the Record.
Director Louis Freeh took a trip to the former Soviet Union, including
Eastern Europe, and established liaison offices in a number of those
countries. I also know that those countries were very anxious to have
FBI cooperation. It also is clear that our Customs Service has liaison
with their colleagues in these former Soviet Union countries, as well
as all around the world. What we are trying to do here is give the
Customs Service of this country the ability, the wherewithal, the
mandate, and the funding to begin a much more vigorous program and that
kind of coordination. That is where we stand on it, to the best of my
knowledge.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. The costs of eliminating or
converting chemical and biological facilities, as we know, are very
high both here at home and indeed abroad in the former Soviet Union.
What is the justification that we would provide to our taxpayers for
authorizing funds for such activities in the former Soviet Union, and,
particularly, why would we be authorizing an activity that would, in
some respects, contravene our requirement under the CWT, which is to
completely destroy the chemical facilities?
Mr. NUNN. I do not know of any contradiction between this legislation
and the Chemical Weapons Treaty. Perhaps the Senator could amplify on
that question. In fact, everything in this would be aimed toward
helping the former Soviet Union countries--not just Russia, but
others--comply with their obligations under the arms control
agreements, including chemical, but not limited to that.
Mr. WARNER. The question dealt with the conversion as opposed to the
destruction in the facility. I would suggest that, at some point, that
be supplemented into the Record, if I might have that.
Mr. NUNN. We can look at that. Basically, a facility that is
converted, from my definition of conversion, would lose its ability to
have any kind of production capability. That would be my definition of
conversion. If a facility were being assisted in terms of conversion by
any of the funding here, it would certainly be my view that that
facility should not continue to produce chemical weapons. But we have a
long way to go in that regard. There is nothing that I know of that is
taking place in that kind of conversion. There has been some conversion
with the nuclear facilities, particularly missile fields and that kind
of thing.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, speaking for myself, although other
colleagues and the chairman spoke earlier, I wholeheartedly support the
portions of this amendment which relate to the domestic requirements
here in the United States. I thought the Senator from New Mexico spoke
most eloquently about the contingencies; indeed, all three Senators
did, but I was particularly taken by the remarks of the Senator from
New Mexico. I, likewise, studied these and have spoken on the floor of
the Senate, and elsewhere, about my deep concern facing the United
States in view of the simplicity, particularly in the area of chemical
and biological, and about the creation of even very small weapons of
mass destruction.
My concerns with the amendment, however, are directly and primarily
to the continued assistance to the former Soviet Union and the states
therein. This is a substantial increase in spending, Mr. President, on
this particular program. I point out that, according to my rough
calculations here, we are in this bill for the cooperative threat, that
is the CTR, with the Soviet Union, $327 million in DOD funds, $108
million in DOE funds, and this amendment would add around another $143
million to this sum.
I think Members of the Senate are hopeful that this amendment will
pass. We should address these expenditures either in conference, or at
some point in time, to determine the capability of expending such large
numbers. Would the Senator wish to comment on that? I stated them in
the aggregate. I do not think either Senator that presented it
mentioned the other parts of the bill.
Mr. NUNN. If I could just elaborate on that last question, let me
state that on the conversion and elimination what we have done in this
amendment is provide flexibility because the Chemical Weapons Treaty
has not entered into effect yet. So until that enters into effect there
would be flexibility for us to assist in. But once it enters into
effect, when and if it does--and, of course, we have not ratified it
here in the Senate yet--at that stage the parties to that would be
obligated to eliminate. And basically that elimination provision would
be required. There would be no more conversion.
But I think it is clear that we would not intend to help them convert
unless they stopped production. But they could convert, stop
production, and not eliminate. But once the treaty goes into effect
they would have to eliminate.
If I could elaborate just briefly because I have been handed the
report that the Senator from Virginia alluded to between the Department
of Energy and the Department of Defense signed by Walter Slocombe and
Thomas Grumbly, Slocombe being Undersecretary of Defense, and Grumley
being Undersecretary of Energy. And I think that is the one the Senator
referred to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator give the date of the
document?
Mr. NUNN. This was June 13. So that is it. I will quote one paragraph
which I think goes right to the point that I think the Senator was
asking about, page 24 of the report, paragraph 3:
The focus of efforts to significantly improve our ability
to manage the consequences of a terrorist incidence, however,
should be on the first response by local police, fire, and
rescue organizations. Local authorities need quick access to
NBC detection--that is nuclear, biological, chemical--
[[Page S6999]]
and decontamination and transport equipment. When an
incidence involving NBC materials is suspected, lack of
timely arrival in well trained, community based teams, fully
equipped with the state of art equipment, could cost
thousands of lives in most communities today across the
Nation. These casualties would include unacceptable numbers
of irreplaceable emergency personnel.
So I think the heart of what we are trying to do is also in this
joint report. I think the report is entitled ``Preparedness and
Response to a Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, Chemical Terrorist
Attack.''
Mr. WARNER. If I could just summarize that, as I understand for the
proponents of the amendment, the objectives to the amendment are in
parallel to, consistent and supportive of, the objectives in that
report.
Mr. NUNN. That is correct.
I say to my friend from Virginia that in terms of the amount of money
here it is not an insignificant sum. We are talking about a total
amount under the Nunn-Lugar program thus far of $1.5 billion that has
been spent.
Mr. WARNER. Since the inception of the program.
Mr. NUNN. Yes. This amendment tonight represents $235 million. It is
not additional money to the DOD-DOE bill. It is shifting of funds
within the bill.
So this is not an increase in DOD-DOE funding. I happen to believe--
the Senator from Virginia may not share this; others may not--but I
think it is clear and in that report that the CSIS just issued by Judge
Webster, former head of the FBI and former head of the CIA--there is
great respect for him I know in this body on both sides of the aisle,
and for others on that very distinguished panel--they came to the
conclusion, and I have come to this conclusion and stated it often,
that this is our No. 1 one national security threat.
In the era we are in, this is the No. 1 one security threat to
American people; that is, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction--chemical, biological, nuclear, scientific know-how, and
scientists themselves ending up in countries like Libya, Iran, Iraq.
As the Senator from Virginia will recall, after World War II the
biggest contest we had in the first stages of the cold war was who was
going to get the German scientists, whether it would be the Soviet
Union or the United States. We got more of them than they did. Much of
our space age came from that.
So we are in that unusual period of time when an empire has collapsed
still containing 30,000 nuclear weapons, over 40,000 tons of chemical
weapons, and no one knows how much in the way of biological weapons--
tens of thousands of scientists and technicians that know how to make
these weapons, know how to make weapons of mass destruction, with many
of those people not knowing where their next paycheck is coming from
and how they are going to feed their families.
So this is an unprecedented era that we are in. We have a window of
opportunity now that may not be open very long, certainly not with all
the countries there. We hope it will. But we could not have any
assurance of that. While we have this window of opportunity open, I
think that it is a priority expenditure in terms of helping them,
focusing enough money, but not doing the job for them because they are
spending far more of their money than we are. Ours is only a small
part. It is seed money. But what it has succeeded in doing is it has
focused their attention and helped them make this a priority.
In the final analysis, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus are
not doing us any favor and the other countries. They are going to take
steps in their own national security interests. They are in very dire
financial straits having cut back on their procurement budget in Russia
by 80-some odd percent from the peak in that kind of condition. This
kind of funding helps focus the attention and it gives us the ability
to communicate with them. It opens them up for us telling them what we
think about the threat, and it has an enormous psychological effect in
terms of their capability.
I recall Secretary Cheney said--not on this program but on the START
II treaty when that one was signed, I believe under the Bush
administration--he said then that he recommended that we give
substantial amount of aid to Russia so they could accelerate the START
II schedule, and take down those missiles on a more rapid pace. That
probably is still good advice.
So it is within that context that Secretary Cheney was saying this is
our national security. And I would say this is a very small amount of
money compared to the $260-some odd billion in our defense budget each
year. This is a small amount of money if you compare it to almost any
category of expenditure, and what we are getting for it. I think it may
be the highest leverage defense money in terms of national security
that we spend.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me reply. I want to make it very clear
that the Senator from Virginia agrees entirely with the Senator's
premise that this is the most serious national security threat posed
against our Nation indeed, and I think the nations of the Western
World. So I concur in that.
I simply feel it necessary to ask these various questions so that we
have a complete record before the Senate such as they can vote I think
in a fully informed manner tomorrow. I agree. I shall not expand beyond
that.
I so stated my concern about weapons of mass destruction and about
proliferation many, many times on the floor of this Senate, and I hope,
may I say, for many years to come.
I yield the floor.
Mr. DOMENICI. Let me go through three or four things that we are
doing, and point out to the Senate and in a roundabout way respond to
one of your questions.
Some people are going to say that this is foreign aid. Right? This is
not foreign aid as I see it. Let me cite a couple of these things we
are doing and let us see what kind of aid it is: Materials protection
control and accounting. What have we done and what are we going to do
with the money?
The Department of Energy has already secured nuclear materials at 35
facilities in the former Soviet Union. Those security systems include
cameras, gates, portal monitors, tagging devices to track nuclear
materials. And in January when our Vice President met, six more sites
were added to the list which the DOE will have access to secure these
materials. Because these sites were only agreed upon in January, funds
were not included in the President's budget request. We are including
them here. And, obviously, that is another $15 million for that entire
program.
Then there is a lab-to-lab program. It was developed informally. But
because the Soviet nuclear scientists trusted the scientists of our
nuclear laboratories in some very strange way they would rather deal
with those who made the bombs while they were making the bombs than
they would with a bunch of politicians or a bunch of State Department
people. And all of a sudden the lab-to-lab relationship grew into
something that is very fundamental. They are working together. They are
doing things that will cause those labs to move in peaceful ways
instead of military ways to produce peaceful products instead of
military products, and we are gaining from it. That is a $20-million
investment.
Is that foreign aid? It would appear to me that probably is the best
kind of investment in national security that we could ever have. Not
only what I have just described--but these great scientists who produce
this nuclear capability in Russia are now friends with great American
scientists. I mean that is sort of worth something even if they were
not accomplishing the other things that they are.
Then we have the cooperation with the Russian Navy on nuclear
materials--a tough one, a huge undertaking, but if it works, and if we
get it started, it is not giving anything to the Soviet Union. In a
sense, they get something, but look what we get from it.
We have an industrial partnering program that developed with a one-
time expenditure of $35 million. It is doing marvelously. Can you
imagine private sector American companies working with Soviet
institutions and American laboratory scientists to disengage Soviet
scientists from producing nuclear proliferation? They are producing
things for their domestic market and moving dramatically away from what
they have been doing for all these years.
Now, there are many more things that we are trying to do. We do not
have enough money to do everything that is mentioned by our scientists
and
[[Page S7000]]
military people. But I think the Senator asked some wonderful
questions, and it is our responsibility here tonight to make sure our
colleagues understand this is not foreign aid.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me press on with another question,
perhaps the most troublesome one certainly from this Senator's
standpoint, and that is, what do I say to the American taxpayer in
reply to the following. It is my understanding as a member of the Armed
Services Committee that Russia continues to develop and deploy a new
generation of land-based ICBM's, follow-on to the SS-25, first. Second,
Russia is pursuing a new generation of sea-launched ballistic missiles,
follow-on to the SSN-20, second. Third, our intelligence community
forecasts that the Russians are developing a new submarine for the
purposes of sea-launched ballistic missiles.
Now, by comparison, the United States currently has no plans for any
follow-on strategic systems--land-based, sea-based, not a one. Money is
a fungible product. Money in Russia in the defense budget goes to these
programs. How do we answer to the American taxpayer, why are they
pursuing their modernization program and the United States is not, and
yet we will be called upon for these significant expenditures to
hopefully pursue and continue the demilitarization of a number of their
strategic programs? That is a question with which I conclude tonight's
debate with my colleagues.
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, that is a very good
question, and the American people have every right to get an answer to
that question.
First of all, this program is much more broader than Russia, and we
are encouraging in this amendment that it be broadened beyond the four
former nuclear States, primarily to be focused on Kazakstan, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Russia, but we think, for instance, the border States with
Iran and the southern tier of Russia are very important in terms of
border control, in terms of lab work. They may not have nuclear weapons
now but the know-how and the chemical weapons and those kinds of
technologies are there.
So, first of all, it is not just Russia. It is much broader than
that.
Second, I would say to the Senator from Virginia that, as he well
knows, the whole thrust of American arms control efforts for years was
to get the Russians, then the Soviet Union, to de-MIRV, to get rid of
the multiple warheads and move to single warhead weapons. That was what
we ended up getting in START I and START II under the two Republican
Presidents, President Reagan and President Bush.
That was the subject of an awful lot of debate on the MX, as you
know. We felt that MIRV'd warheads had a chance of basically being used
in a first strike, whereas single-warhead missiles, if you used one of
them and you basically would be going after another single-warhead
missile, therefore the ratio did not favor the offense, it did not
favor the first strike--if we both had single warhead weapons. But if
we had MIRV'd weapons, and they were vulnerable on a first strike and
you could take 10 warheads and destroy 100 warheads by MIRVing and
having them moved to different targets, then everybody was on more of
an alert hair trigger.
So the effort of U.S. arms control, beginning really with Senator
Jackson's amendment in this Chamber back in SALT I, was to move towards
de-MIRVing and getting rid of the Soviet very heavy missiles.
That is what the Russians are now building, is the SS-25, a single-
warhead missile. It would be the ultimate paradox if we told them,
after all these years arguing with them and getting them to move toward
that weapon, that we now expect them not to de-MIRV and not to replace.
That is a replacement missile for the de-MIRVing that we hope is going
to take place under START I and START II.
I would prefer that nobody in the world have weapons but us, but that
is not the real world. I would say if you look at the U.S. expenditures
in these areas the Senator has named compared to the Russian
expenditures now, our expenditures overwhelm them both in submarines
and submarine warfare and classified programs, as well as in our
overall strategic deterrent.
I think that is appropriate because we have a responsibility all over
the world, our allies. We do not have any longer the same equation we
had then. The Russians have cut back very substantially. I do not
defend some of the expenditures they are making. For instance, we are
very concerned about the underground facility. That has come out in the
paper. I do not know the answer to that, and we are probing that now,
as we should. But I would still say that we are gaining when we can get
the Russians to take down weapons that are aimed towards us.
I do not think the goal of this legislation can be or should be
realistically to say to the Russians that we expect them to completely
demilitarize. They have been a great power. One of these days they will
be a great power again.
I do not think that is in the cards. I do think we can demand they
use the funds wisely, that we can demand that as long as we are giving
them assistance, they be used for their purpose. And I think we can
measure that purpose in a way to make sure it is in our national
security interest.
I see this as self-interest. If someone says, well, if the Russians
were not getting these funds, then perhaps they would have to use their
funds they are now using to build SS-25's or submarines for these
purposes and thereby not build SS-25's and submarines. I think that
would be very unlikely, based on anything I know about not just Russian
history but about the history of any country, because no country is
going to completely demilitarize. No country is going to put the
control of warheads and dismantle warheads in front of what it
perceives to be its own national security. We would not, and I think it
is not realistic for us to expect them to completely demilitarize.
I would say, though, that one of the original provisions of the Nunn-
Lugar amendment that has been certified by the President over and over
again is that the Russians are living up to their arms control
obligations, and that is a requirement of this amendment. If we find
that they are breaching the arms control obligations, then the money is
not supposed to be forthcoming. They either are in compliance or the
President has to certify that they are intending to be in compliance,
as in the case of the CFE Treaty where we know there have been
problems, and so forth, but where they are moving forward.
There are occasions where the Russians do things with this equipment
that we loan them that we think breach the spirit of the agreement, and
in those instances that have come to my attention where that has
happened, where we have gotten in touch with them and we have
complained about it, they have taken immediate and corrective steps on
it.
So we have to be vigilant. We have to be alert. We have to make sure
that we understand all the time what is happening here, but again,
while this window is open, I think it is very much in our fundamental
national security interest to pursue it.
The bottom line, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, is that we have
had thousands of warheads dismantled. We have had thousands of missiles
that were pointed at the United States and our cities and our targets
which are no longer pointed toward us. We have had a tremendous
decrease in the risk of nuclear war, and we have had three nuclear
states give up their nuclear weapons voluntarily.
In addition to that, we had Kazakhstan basically get in touch with us
and tell us they had some weapons-grade uranium, highly enriched, that
they would like to have us help them store safely and move out of that
territory. That could have been sold for billions of dollars in places
all over the globe. We use this Nunn-Lugar funding to help secure that,
and that is no longer a threat.
So I would say if we stop right now and put up a scorecard of how
much we basically improved our national security compared to the amount
of money we have spent, it would be my view, and I may be biased on
this one--I do not think too biased, though--that this would be the
most effective defense expenditure we have had in many years.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague. It is
a debate he and I have had, I think, for about 3 years. On this very
spot on the floor in years past, I posed this question.
I also mentioned, for the Record, we well know the United States,
likewise,
[[Page S7001]]
has destroyed a number of its missile launchers and so forth. But all
at the expense of the American taxpayer.
I just want to close out my comments tonight reading from a very
interesting document called ``Worldwide Submarine Proliferation in the
Coming Decade.''
Today, for the first time, Russia's front-line submarines
are as quiet or quieter in some aspects than America's best.
Programs to provide still further reductions in radiated
noise are active today and expected to continue. By the year
2000, over half the remaining submarines in Russia will have
incorporated stealth technologies on a par with those of
modern Western submarines, and 20 percent of Russia's
nuclear-powered attack submarines will be quieter than the
U.S. Navy's front-line improved Los Angeles class SSN's.
That, to me, represents a tremendous expenditure of money. I do not
know what the threat is, other than I suppose to our U.S. submarine
force, to require them to pursue that much expenditure in an area where
the United States has been preeminent for these many years.
Mr. President, I have no further questions at this time to propose to
my distinguished colleagues. Therefore, I observe perhaps the debate on
this amendment has concluded, and the Senate could now turn to
conclusion of wrapup matters. Would that be correct?
Mr. NUNN. I certainly think so. I appreciate very much the questions
and comments of the Senator from Virginia this evening. Perhaps the
Chair would like to make further remarks in answer to these questions,
because no one has more knowledge in these areas than the Senator from
Indiana, who is now presiding.
Other than that, I think we are prepared to basically dispose of the
amendments.
Mr. WARNER. I will be happy to take the Chair if the Presiding
Officer cares to speak.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair observes there have been important
questions and excellent responses, and suggests we proceed on to
wrapup.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time I advise my distinguished
colleague there are several amendments on the pending bill, which I
believe have been cleared and can be acted upon by the Senate, if the
Senator from Georgia is prepared to proceed.
Amendment No. 4350
(Purpose: To express the sense of the Congres that the Secretary of the
Navy should name one of the new attack submarines of the Navy the South
Dakota)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe we are ready to proceed. The first
amendment I have, I believe, is the Pressler-Daschle amendment.
Mr. WARNER. That is correct. On behalf of Senators Pressler and
Daschle, I offer an amendment that would express the sense of Congress
that a submarine, one of the new attack submarine class, should be
named the South Dakota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Pressler,
for himself and Mr. Daschle, proposes an amendment numbered
4350.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 311, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following:
SEC. 1072. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NAMING ONE OF THE NEW ATTACK
SUBMARINE THE ``SOUTH DAKOTA''.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of the
Navy should name one of the new attack submarines of the Navy
the ``South Dakota''.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might inquire of staff, what is the
definition of a new class of submarine? Is it the current 688's or
Seawolf class? What is the new attack submarine? I think we ought to
lay this aside until we get clarification.
Being one who follows carefully matters of this nature, I suggest we
lay this amendment aside and take it up later. I urge the sponsors of
the amendment to advise the managers with respect to the meaning of the
phrase ``new class of submarines,'' because that could apply to the 688
class being completed, the Seawolf class, the contemplated class of new
attack submarines which are the subject of discussion.
I think we will just await a further time. I withdraw from further
consideration the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 4350 is laid aside.
Amendment No. 4351
(Purpose: To extend the authority of the Secretary of the Army to carry
out the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) initiative)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I offer an amendment which extends the
Department of Defense authority to conduct the armament retooling and
manufacturing support initiative for past fiscal year 1996.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] proposes an
amendment numbered 4351.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle B of title I, add the following:
SEC. 113. PERMANENT AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT ARMS INITIATIVE.
Section 193(a) of the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing
Support Initiative Act of 1992 (subtitle H of title I of
Public Law 102-484; 10 U.S.C. 2501 note) is amended by
striking out ``During fiscal years 1993 through 1996,'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``During fiscal years 1993 through
1998''.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise to offer this amendment to extend
the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support [ARMS] Initiative. The
ARMS program is intended to provide assistance to DOD ammunition depots
in order for them to retool so that they can produce a commercial
product while maintaining the industrial capacity to support the
National Security Strategy. By producing commercial and defense
products, the depots are able to utilize any excess infrastructure and
operate more efficiently. Since the initiation of this program several
years ago, it has been a remarkably successful defense conversion
program.
Mr. President, the Committee recommended an authorization of $58.0
million for this program this year. While this should be sufficient
authority to continue the program, this amendment would ensure that
there is no question regarding this authority.
Mr. President, I ask my fellow Senators to support the ARMS program
and vote to approve this amendment.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge support of the amendment.
Mr. WARNER. I urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4351) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4352
(Purpose: To require a transfer to the Army of jurisdiction over
certain lands in the Vernon Ranger District, Kisatchie National Forest,
Louisiana)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Johnston and Breaux, I
offer an amendment that would direct the Secretary of Agriculture to
transfer 85,000 acres of the national forest in Louisiana to the
Secretary of the Army for use in connection with training and maneuver
activities in connection with Fort Polk, LA.
I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other side of the
aisle.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Johnston, for
himself and Mr. Breaux, proposes an amendment numbered 4352.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title XXVIII, add the
following:
SEC. 2828. LAND TRANSFER, VERNON RANGER DISTRICT, KISATCHIE
NATIONAL FOREST, LOUISIANA.
(a) Transfer Pursuant to Administrative Agreement.--(1) Not
later than six months after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of
Agriculture shall enter into an agreement providing for the
transfer to the Secretary of the Army of administrative
jurisdiction over such portion of land currently owned by the
United States within the Vernon Ranger District of the
Kisatchie National Forest, Louisiana, as the Secretary of the
Army and the Secretary of Agriculture jointly determine
appropriate for military training activities in connection
[[Page S7002]]
with Fort Polk, Louisiana. The agreement shall allocate
responsibility for land management and conservation
activities with respect to the property transferred between
the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Agriculture.
(2) The Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of
Agriculture may jointly extend the deadline for entering into
an agreement under paragraph (1). The deadline may be
extended by not more than six months.
(b) Alternative Transfer Requirement.--If the Secretary of
the Army and the Secretary of Agriculture fail to enter into
the agreement referred to paragraph (1) of subsection (a)
within the time provided for in that subsection, the
Secretary of Agriculture shall, at the end of such time,
transfer to the Secretary of the Army administrative
jurisdiction over property consisting of approximately 84,825
acres of land currently owned by the United States and
located in the Vernon Ranger District of the Kisatchie
National Forest, Louisiana, as generally depicted on the map
entitled ``Fort Polk Military Installation map'', dated June
1995.
(c) Limitation on Acquisition of Private Property.--The
Secretary of the Army may acquire privately-owned land within
the property transferred under this section only with the
consent of the owner of the land.
(d) Use of Property.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the
Secretary of the Army shall use the property transferred
under this section for military maneuvers, training and
weapons firing, and other military activities in connection
with Fort Polk, Louisiana.
(2) The Secretary may not permit the firing of live
ammunition on or over any portion of the property unless the
firing of such ammunition on or over such portion is
permitted as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
(e) Map and Legal Description.--(1) As soon as practicable
after the date of the transfer of property under this
section, the Secretary of Agriculture shall--
(A) publish in the Federal Register a notice containing the
legal description of the property transferred; and
(B) file a map and the legal description of the property
with the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
Committee on Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, and
the Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives.
(2) The maps and legal descriptions prepared under
paragraph (1) shall have the same force and effect as if
included in this subsection, except that the Secretary of
Agriculture may correct clerical and typographical errors in
the maps and legal descriptions.
(3) As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment
of this Act, copies of the maps and legal descriptions
prepared under paragraph (1) shall be available for public
inspection in the following offices:
(A) The Office of the Secretary of Agriculture.
(B) Such offices of the United States Forest Service as the
Secretary of Agriculture shall designate.
(C) The Office of the Commander of Fort Polk, Louisiana.
(D) The appropriate office in the Vernon Parish Court
House, Louisiana.
(f) Management of Property.--(1) If the transfer of
property under this section occurs under subsection (a), the
Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Agriculture shall
manage the property in accordance with the agreement entered
into under that subsection.
(2)(A) If the transfer of property under this section
occurs under subsection (b), the Secretary of the Army and
the Secretary of Agriculture shall manage the property in
accordance with the management plan under subparagraph (B)
and the memorandum of understanding under subparagraph (C).
(B)(i) For purposes of managing the property under this
paragraph, the Secretary of the Army shall, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of Agriculture, develop a plan
for the management of the property not later than two years
after the transfer of the property. The Secretary of the Army
shall provide for a period of public comment in developing
the plan in order to ensure that the concerns of local
citizens are taken into account in the development of the
plan. The Secretary of the Army may utilize the property
pending the completion of the plan.
(ii) The Secretary of the Army shall develop and implement
the plan in compliance with applicable Federal law, including
the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).
(iii) The plan shall provide for the management of the
natural, cultural, and other resources of the property,
including grazing, the management of wildlife and wildlife
habitat, recreational uses (including hunting and fishing),
and non-public uses of non-Federal lands within the property.
(C)(i) For purposes of managing the property under this
paragraph, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of
Agriculture shall enter into a memorandum of understanding in
order to provide for--
(I) the implementation of the management plan developed
under subparagraph (B); and
(II) the management by the Secretary of Agriculture of such
areas of the property as the Secretary of the Army and the
Secretary of Agriculture designate for use for non-military
purposes.
(ii) The Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of
Agriculture may amend the memorandum of understanding by
mutual agreement.
(g) Reversion.--If at any time after the transfer of
property under this section the Secretary of the Army
determines that the property, or any portion thereof, is no
longer to be retained by the Army for possible use for
military purposes, jurisdiction over the property, or such
portion thereof, shall revert to the Secretary of Agriculture
who shall manage the property, or portion thereof, as part of
the Kisatchie National Forest.
(h) Identification of Land for Transfer to Forest
Service.--The Secretary of Defense shall seek to identify
land equal in acreage to the land transferred under this
section and under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Defense that is suitable for transfer to the Secretary of
Agriculture for use by the Forest Service.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, it is with a great sense of urgency that
I speak today with my good friend, the Senator from Louisiana [Mr.
Breaux], to bring to the attention of my colleagues an extremely
important issue in my State of Louisiana.
Mr. President, since 1991, Fort Polk, Leesville, LA has been home to
the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center, or the JRTC, and to
elements of the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment. Fort Polk has the only
combat training center in the continental United States dedicated to
light infantry training. The National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
CA, provides a somewhat comparable service to our men and women who
train for armored units combat.
Each year, some 50,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines arrive
at Fort Polk for rotational training in infantry maneuvers and joint
operations. This involves special operation training, counterinsurgency
operations, live fire, brigade defense, and brigade counterattack. The
training received is unique, not only because of the terrain at Fort
Polk, with its tree-covered grassy areas which are indigenous to
western Louisiana, but the total realism this sort of training
provides. Even to the extent that there is a complete field hospital
set up to attend to simulated wounds and casualties. Our soldiers are
given a certain level of comfort, knowing that if they are injured in
combat, that they will be evacuated and receive treatment, quickly and
efficiently.
Mr. President, I am proposing this amendment to increase the land
area of Fort Polk, which will enable the Joint Readiness Training
Center to train and maneuver over a larger land area. This is crucial
to the continued usefulness of Fort Polk.
Some may ask, why is it necessary to provide additional land to Fort
Polk? The answer, Mr. President, is fairly simple.
Fort Polk has a requirement for additional maneuver training lands to
support its mission of conducting joint readiness training for Army
rotational units as well as maintaining the combat readiness of units
permanently home stationed at Fort Polk. Fort Polk and the JRTC
currently have access to 40,000 acres of Forest Service land under an
intensive-use permit but need additional access to the 45,000 acre
limited-use permit parcel below it to meet its training requirements.
The total of 85,000 acres will enable the JRTC to conduct its primary
mission--training infantry soldiers. Longer range weapons and sensors
are changing the nature of land warfare. Greater ranges are now covered
by a smaller force. A brigade will now maneuver in the space once used
by a division. Our military must keep abreast of these changes, to
maintain the utmost efficiency and to protect our troops in the event
of real combat.
Some have raised concerns about how the Army would manage this new
acreage. I submit that it would be substantially similar to how Fort
Polk is currently managed, in full compliance with all laws and
regulations. The Army has forest and land management plans for the
Forest Service land it currently uses. When the transfer of land
occurs, the Army will comply with all applicable Federal laws including
NEPA. All existing land uses for fish and wildlife, hunting, cultural
and natural resources management, forestry operations as well as
private holdings will be followed.
Fort Polk is a good neighbor and steward of the natural resources
they manage. The fort has received a non-jeopardy opinion for both
their recovery plan and their training plan regarding the red-cockaded
woodpecker. In less than 3 years the woodpecker population has almost
doubled. Fort Polk
[[Page S7003]]
manages the forest using an ecosystem management approach rather than a
commercial approach, i.e., the goal is to maximize a balanced ecology,
not profit. The fort has reduced sediment loading, mapped all wetlands,
and is in compliance with the Clean Water and Scenic Stream Act.
The fort is also a State Wildlife Management Area whose hunting
seasons are adjusted to take into account training rotations. These
practices will continue on the expansion area. An historic preservation
plan has been completed and protection for known sites is in place.
Curation facility meets State standards.
The fort is the winner of numerous environmental awards: Louisiana
Association of Conservation Districts Good Land Use Award--first time
awarded to a Federal facility. Second place winner, Secretary of
Defense Natural Resources Conservation Award. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Region VI Beneficial Re-Use Award. National Park
Service, Southeast Region Preservation Award. Environmentalist of the
Year, Dr. Charles H. Stagg, Fort Polk, LA.
Let me go over some of the provisions of this amendment. Our
amendment would provide 6 months for the Army and the Forest Service to
come to an agreement on transfer of all or some portion of this
property. The 6 months may be extended by another 6 months, by mutual
agreement. The land transfers automatically if no agreement can be
reached between the USDA and the Army.
The amendment does not allow for any live firings on transferred
land, except on that land currently used for that purpose. It directs
the Department of the Army to develop a management plan, and provides
for the return of the property to the Agriculture Department if the
land is no longer used by the Army for training purposes. The
legislation would prohibit the Army from condemning any private
inholdings.
This amendment has strong, broad support. The Army supports this
initiative. There is overwhelming civic support, as the following
communities and legislative bodies have passed resolutions supporting
the transfer: Louisiana State Legislature; Vernon Parish, the local
parish; Beauregard Parish; as well as the surrounding communities of
Leesville, De Ridder, Alexandria, Pineville, Many, and Natchitoches.
Mr. President, Fort Polk is very important to Louisiana and to the
Nation's overall military readiness and the Louisiana delegation
overwhelmingly supports the transfer. The land transfer is critical to
the fort's mission, light infantry training, and its future. The U.S.
Army needs to train its infantry brigades in the most realistic manner
possible. The time for our soldiers to learn from their mistakes is
while at the Joint Readiness Training Center, not while in harm's way.
Additional land will give the JRTC the resources it needs to properly
train our Armed Forces to the highest level of readiness.
I ask unamious consent a letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Army to Mr. Lauffer of the Committee on Armed Services, be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Department of the Army,
Office of the Assistant Secretary,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1996.
George W. Lauffer,
Deputy Staff Director, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Lauffer: The Department of the Army supports the
legislation proposed by Senator J. Bennett Johnston, ``To
require a transfer to the Army of jurisdiction over certain
lands in the Vernon Range District, Kisatchie National
Forest, Louisiana.'' The transfer would provide the Army with
greater flexibility in accomplishing its training mission at
Fort Polk, Louisiana.
Sincerely,
Paul W. Johnson,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Housing) OASA (I, L&E).
Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment I
offered with Senator Johnston transferring acreage in the Kisatchie
National Forest to the Army at Fort Polk, LA. Fort Polk has a
requirement for additional maneuver training lands to support its
mission of conducting joint readiness training for Army rotational
units as well as maintaining the combat readiness of units permanently
home stationed at Fort Polk. Fort Polk, home of the Joint Readiness
Training Center [JRTC], is very important to the Nation's overall
military readiness and national security. It is the only place in the
world where light infantry brigades are trained as a unit, complete
with Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps units. Between 50,000 and 64,000
troops are trained at Fort Polk every year. This amendment will enable
Fort Polk to expand its training exercises while continuing its unique
mission of providing our troops the best training possible.
At the JRTC, our troops participate in training scenarios that help
prepare them for all type of missions, including combat, and the
terrain in the Kisatchie Forest provides our troops ideal training area
for this purpose. We need to ensure that Fort Polk's unique role in
training our soldiers continues. Our goal is to train our troops
effectively and in an environmentally sensitive way. This is an
important point. Some concerns have been about the environmental impact
this transfer would have but if you look at the Army's record over the
past 5 years, this criticism is unfounded. Fort Polk is a good neighbor
and steward of the natural resources they manage. Fort Polk has
received a nonjeopardy opinion for both their recovery plan and their
training plan regarding the red-cockaded woodpecker on the JRTC. In
less than 3 years the woodpecker population has almost doubled. Fort
Polk has also won several awards for its conservation and preservation
efforts around the JRTC. Additionally, if this transfer occurs, the
Army would comply with all applicable Federal laws including National
Environmental Policy Act [NEPA].
This amendment would give the Forest Service and the Army 6 months to
sit down and try to negotiate a transfer. Ideally, we would like this
issue to be solved administratively and have both sides sit down and
try to figure out a way to work this out. But if that can't happen,
this amendment would automatically transfer the land. The JRTC can't
wait a decade for this important transfer to happen. Additionally, the
Secretary of Defense will seek to identify an equal number of acres,
not required for military use, for conveyance to the Forest Service in
exchange for this land. We also provide that if the Army no longer
needs the land, it would be transferred back to the Forest Service.
All existing land uses for fish and wildlife, hunting, and forestry
operations would remain.
I have also heard from private landowners who are concerned about the
impact the transfer would have on them. Our amendment tries to address
this concern by prohibiting the Army from expropriating any private
property in the forest. The Army would still be able to enter into
negotiations with willing sellers but could not condemn any private
land.
To address the concerns of these groups and others, this amendment
also provides for a period of public comment when the Army develops a
management plan to ensure that the concerns of the local citizens are
taken into account.
While there is some opposition to this transfer, there is also
widespread support for it from the local communities. The transfer has
been endorsed by the city councils in Leesville, DeRidder, Pineville,
Many, Alexandria and Natchitoches, Beauregard Parish, the Vernon Parish
Chamber of Commerce, and the Vernon Parish School Board. They
understand that if the Army doesn't get this additional land, the
future of Fort Polk and the surrounding communities could be affected.
The fort has an annual economic impact in Louisiana of approximately
$720 million.
Mr. President, the bottom line is that our Army needs to train its
infantry brigades in the most realistic manner possible. The time for
our soldiers to prepare for combat and other situations is during
training at the JRTC, not while in harms way. The additional land we
are seeking will give the JRTC the resources it needs to properly train
our Armed Forces and make them ready to meet military challenges when
they arise.
As importantly, we authorize this transfer with conditions attached
which are sensitive to environmental and private property owners'
needs. I
[[Page S7004]]
thank Senator Johnston for his leadership and I urge adoption of the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4352) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4353
(Purpose: To authorize a land conveyance, Air Force Plant No. 85,
Columbus, OH)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator DeWine, I offer an
amendment which would authorize the conveyance of approximately 240
acres from the former Air Force Plant No. 85 to the Columbus, OH,
airport authority.
I believe this amendment has been cleared.
Mr. NUNN. It has been cleared. I urge the approval of the amendment.
I urge its adoption.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. DeWine,
proposes an amendment numbered 4353.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of title XXVIII, add the following:
SEC. 2828. LAND CONVEYANCE, AIR FORCE PLANT NO. 85, COLUMBUS,
OHIO.
(a) Conveyance Authorized.--(1) Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Secretary of the Air Force may instruct
the Administrator of General Services to convey, without
consideration, to the Columbus Municipal Airport Authority
(in this section referred to as the ``Authority'') all right,
title, and interest of the United States in and to a parcel
of real property, together with improvements thereon, at Air
Force Plant No. 85, Columbus, Ohio, consisting of
approximately 240 acres that contains the land and buildings
referred to as the ``airport parcel'' in the correspondence
from the General Services Administration to the Authority
dated April 30, 1996, and is located adjacent to the Port
Columbus International Airport.
(2) If the Secretary does not have administrative
jurisdiction over the parcel on the date of the enactment of
this Act, the conveyance shall be made by the Federal
official who has administrative jurisdiction over the parcel
as of that date.
(b) Requirement for Federal Screening.--The Federal
official may not carry out the conveyance of property
authorized in subsection (a) unless the Federal official
determines, in consultation with the Administrator of General
Services, that no department or agency of the Federal
Government will accept the transfer of the property.
(c) Condition of Conveyance.--The conveyance required under
subsection (a) shall be subject to the condition that the
Authority use the conveyed property for public airport
purposes.
(d) Reversion.--If the Federal official making the
conveyance under subsection (a) determines that any portion
of the conveyed property is not being utilized in accordance
with subsection (c), all right, title, and interest in and to
such portion shall revert to the United States and the United
States shall have immediate right of entry thereon.
(e) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal
description of the real property to be conveyed under
subsection (a) shall be determined by a survey satisfactory
to the Federal official making the conveyance. The cost of
the survey shall be borne by the Authority.
(f) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Federal official
making the conveyance of property under subsection (a) may
require such additional terms and conditions in connection
with the conveyance as such official considers appropriate to
protect the interests of the United States.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, this amendment provides for the transfer
of 240 acres from the U.S. Air Force to the Port Columbus International
Airport. The Columbus Airport Authority is seeking this transfer for
the purpose of constructing a new 10,250-foot south runway. This
amendment has been cleared by both the majority and minority side of
the Armed Services Committee, the Air Force, and the General Services
Administration.
I am pleased that Senator Glenn joins me in offering this amendment
to facilitate this public benefit conveyance.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to endorse the amendment offered by
my colleague from Ohio, Senator DeWine, and I ask unanimous consent
that I be added as an original cosponsor. This amendment conveys to the
Columbus Municipal Airport Authority approximately 240 acres of land
owned by the Air Force. This parcel is part of an Air Force industrial
facility which has operated at the site for a number of years. In 1988
during consideration of the fiscal year 1989 Defense authorization
bill, Congress directed that the entire parcel of more than 400 acres
be sold, and the proceeds from the sale be used to pay for the
environmental remediation of the property.
As a result of the 1988 legislation, the Air Force and the General
Services Administration entered into an agreement to sell the property
in 1992, with GSA acting as the Government's property manager. However,
the Air Force and its contractors continued to use the facility until
1994. During this time, GSA made a determination after consulting with
State and local authorities, that it would be in the best interest of
all parties to divide the parcel into two pieces--a so-called
industrial parcel and an airport parcel. GSA is currently marketing the
industrial parcel and expects to complete the sale later this year.
Since 1994 necessary actions, such as consultations with other Federal
and DOD agencies, the State of Ohio Historical Preservation Office and
some needed environmental remediation, have occurred.
When this amendment was originally brought to my attention, I had
some concerns. In particular, I was concerned that the amendment would
disrupt the planned sale of the industrial parcel. I was also concerned
that the airport parcel be screened for other Federal interest. It is
my understanding that in the absence of the 1988 legislation, the
airport parcel would be eligible for conveyance to the Columbus
Municipal Airport Authority as a public benefit conveyance. The
amendment now accomplishes the goal of a public benefit conveyance,
under conditions of a satisfactory Federal screen, without affecting
the sale of the industrial property. It is also my understanding that
this amendment will not alter the fact that the Air Force is liable for
the environmental remediation of the site.
I am pleased to work with Senator DeWine on this amendment, and I
congratulate him for offering it.
Mr. WARNER. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4353) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4354
(Purpose: To delete $25,000,000 from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Security Investment Program; to add $6,600,000 for phase
II construction of the Consolidated Education Center at Fort Campbell,
KY; and to add $10,800,000 for phase III construction of the Western
Kentucky Training Site)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe the next amendment will also have
an amendment to it by Senator Warner on behalf of Senator McCain.
On behalf of Senator Ford, I offer an amendment which would delete
$25 million for the NATO Security Investment Program, to add $6.6
million for phase II construction of the Consolidated Education Center
at Fort Campbell, KY; and $10.8 million for phase 3 of the construction
of the Western Kentucky Training Site.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Ford, proposes
an amendment numbered 4354.
The amendment is as follows:
In the table in section 2101(a), strike out the item
relating to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
Kentucky........................... Fort Campbell........ $67,600,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strike out the amount set forth as the total amount at the
end of the table in section 2101(a), and insert in lieu
thereof ``$363,050,000''.
In section 2104(a), in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
strike out ``$1,894,297,000'' and insert in lieu thereof
``$1,900,897,000''.
In section 2104(a)(1), strike out ``$356,450,000'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``$363,050,000''.
In section 2502, strike out ``$197,000,000'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``$172,000,000''.
In section 2601(1)(A), strike out ``$79,628,000'' and
insert in lieu thereof ``$90,428,000''.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I have an amendment that will provide $6.6
million for phase two construction of the
[[Page S7005]]
Consolidated Education Center at Fort Campbell, KY and provide $10.8
million for phase three construction of the Western Kentucky Training
Site.
Not only are the costs of my amendments fully offset, but I know my
colleagues will agree that because these two projects are already
underway and because they represent an integral part of the training of
our troops, continued funding is both appropriate and necessary.
This Congress has already invested $14.5 million into phase one of
Fort Campbell's Education Center. Funding for the final phase, phase
two, will provide additional needed classrooms, office space, and
additional parking. As many of you may know, Fort Campbell has the
largest educational program of any division-level installation in
Forces Command. Funding for this last phase will assure we can take a
state-of-the-art education program out of World War II-era buildings.
In addition, this Congress has dedicated funds to the first two
phases of the Western Kentucky Training Site for a total of $11.1
million. Because this is a five-phase project, providing funding for
phase three is critical to keeping this project on time and on track
for completion.
The Western Kentucky training facility, in conjunction with the high-
technology training available at Fort Knox, puts Kentucky at the
forefront of this country's military training. Last year, 16,000
soldiers trained there. But those numbers represent just the beginning
in a long line of soldiers who will receive the best state-of-the-art
training this country has to offer.
I believe this is an amendment my colleagues will have no trouble
supporting.
Amendment No. 4355 to Amendment No. 4354
(Purpose: To provide that funds may not be obligated or expended for
the project if the project is not included in the current future-years
defense program of the Department of Defense)
Mr. WARNER. I send to the desk on behalf of Senator McCain an
amendment to the Ford amendment, to provide the funds may not be
obligated or expended until the Secretary of Defense certifies to
Congress that the projects are included in current future-years defense
program.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. McCain,
proposes an amendment numbered 4355 to amendment No. 4354.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of the amendment, add the following:
At the end of title XXVII, add the following:
SEC. 2706. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN PROJECTS.
(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act
may be obligated or expended for the military construction
project listed under subsection (b) until the Secretary of
Defense certifies to Congress that the project is included in
the current future-years defense program.
(b) Covered Projects.--Subsection (a) applies to the
following military construction project:
(1) Phase II, Construction, Consolidated Education Center,
Ft. Cambpell, KY.
(2) Phase III, Construction, Western Kentucky Training
Site.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, as my colleagues know, I have consistently
opposed funding for military construction projects that were not
requested by the administration and which do not meet the Senate's
criteria for consideration of unrequested military construction
projects.
Let me reiterate the criteria to which the Senate agreed 2 years ago.
Each project not included in the administration's budget request is
judged against four criteria, namely: (1) it is mission essential; (2)
it is not inconsistent with any BRAC actions; (3) it is executable
during the fiscal year; and (4) it is included in the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP). In addition, there should be a reduction in
some other defense program to offset the increased funding for each
project.
The bill before the Senate includes $600 million for unrequested
military construction projects which, for the most part, meet the first
four criteria. However, none of these projects were funded by an
offsetting reduction in some other defense account. Therefore, they do
not meet all of the Senate's established criteria.
The amendment offered by my colleague from Kentucky, Senator Ford, as
originally proposed, does not meet all five criteria. The amendment
does include an offsetting reduction in another defense account, which
makes it unique among the projects included in this bill. But according
to information provided to the Committee by the Department of Defense,
the project is not included in the current FYDP.
I am pleased to note, however, that my colleague from Kentucky,
Senator Ford, has agreed to accept an amendment to his amendment. The
second-degree amendment would prohibit obligation of the funds for this
project until the Secretary of Defense certifies that the project is in
the FYDP. If that certification is received, the project will then meet
all five of the Senate's criteria, and the funds will become available
to proceed with the project.
Mr. President, subject to the conditions stated in the modified
amendment, I have no objection to including this military construction
project in the authorization bill. I appreciate very much the
opportunity to work with my colleague from Kentucky. His willingness to
work together to resolve this matter is greatly appreciated, and I
thank him for his understanding of my position with respect to military
construction add-ons.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, members of this chamber have heard the
Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee and me speak on several
occasions in opposition to funding unrequested military construction
projects. Once again, I rise to speak in opposition to this on-going
practice. The amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky would add
additional funds for phase II of an Education Center at Fort Campbell
and phase III of the Western Kentucky Training Range for the Army
National Guard. I would like to voice my opposition to this amendment
and express my support for the Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee's
second degree amendment which would require the Secretary of Defense to
certify that these projects are in the military services' Future Years
Defense Plan (FYDP) before obligating the construction funds.
During the Committee's markup of the defense authorization bill, the
two projects addressed in the amendment were screened by the services
to determine if the projects met the Committee's criteria. The services
indicated, at that time, that the projects were not in the FYDP.
However,, I understand that different information regarding these
projects has been made available to the Committee. Given the
conflicting data on these projects, I believe it is appropriate, as the
Senator from Arizona's amendment would require, for the Secretary of
Defense to certify information on these projects before the funds are
released.
As I have stated before, I will continue to work with the Chairman of
the Readiness Subcommittee to reverse the practice of adding millions
of dollars to the budget for unrequested projects.
Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent to have the second-degree
amendment adopted as well as the underlying amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments are agreed
to.
The amendment (No. 4355) was agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4354), as amended, was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4356
(Purpose: To amend section 2821, relating to the transfer of lands at
Arlington National Cemetery, VA, in order to place conditions on the
transfer of certain lands)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Robb and Warner, I
offer an amendment which would modify section 2821 of S. 1745 to
require the Secretaries of the Interior and the Army to submit
summaries of the land-use plan, environmental assessment and cultural
resources studies regarding the land transfer at Arlington Cemetery.
I believe this amendment has been cleared on the other side.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
[[Page S7006]]
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Robb, for
himself, and Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment numbered 4356.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out subsection (a) of section 2821 and insert in
lieu thereof the following new subsection (a):
(a) Requirement for Secretary of Interior To Transfer
Certain Section 29 Lands.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the
Secretary of the Interior shall transfer to the Secretary of
the Army administrative jurisdiction over the following lands
located in section 29 of the National Park System at
Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia:
(A) The lands known as the Arlington National Cemetery
Interment Zone.
(B) All lands in the Robert E. Lee Memorial Preservation
Zone, other than those lands in the Preservation Zone that
the Secretary of the Interior determines must be retained
because of the historical significance of such lands or for
the maintenance of nearby lands or facilities.
(2)(A) The Secretary of the Interior may not make the
transfer referred to in paragraph (1)(B) until 60 days after
the date on which the Secretary submits to the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National
Security of the House of Representatives--
(i) a summary of the document entitled ``Cultural Landscape
and Archaeological Study, Section 29, Arlington House, The
Robert E. Lee Memorial'';
(ii) a summary of any environmental analysis required with
respect to the transfer under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.); and
(iii) the proposal of the Secretary and the Secretary of
the Army setting forth the lands to be transferred and the
general manner in which the Secretary of the Army will
develop such lands after transfer.
(B) The Secretary of the Interior shall submit the
information required under subparagraph (A) not later than
October 31, 1997.
(3) The transfer of lands under paragraph (1) shall be
carried out in accordance with the Interagency Agreement
Between the Department of the Interior, the National Park
Service, and the Department of the Army, Dated February 22,
1995.
(4) The exact acreage and legal descriptions of the lands
to be transferred under paragraph (1) shall be determined by
surveys satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of the Army.
Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4356) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4357
(Purpose: To authorize funding for the Corps surface-to-air missile
(SAM/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program at the level
requested by the President)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment by Senator
Lieberman from Connecticut that would authorize funding for the Corps
surface-to-air missile, known as Corps SAM, at the level requested by
the President. I am a cosponsor of this amendment. I believe it has
been cleared on the other side of the aisle.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Lieberman, for
himself, and Mr. Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 4357.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title II add the following:
SEC. 237. CORPS SAM/MEADS PROGRAM.
(a) Funding.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
under section 201(4)--
(1) $56,200,000 is available for the Corps surface-to-air
missile (SAM/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
program (PE63869C); and
(2) $515,711,000 is available for Other Theater Missile
Defense programs, projects, and activities (PE63872C).
(b) International Cooperation.--The Secretary of Defense
may carry out the program referred to in subsection (a) in
accordance with the memorandum of understanding entered into
on May 25, 1996, by the governments of the United States,
Germany, and Italy regarding international cooperation on
such program (including any amendments to the memorandum of
understanding).
(c) Limitations.--Not more than $15,000,000 of the amount
available for the Corps SAM/MEADS program under subsection
(a) may be obligated until the Secretary of Defense submits
to the congressional defense committees the following:
(1) An initial program estimate for the Corps SAM/MEADS
program, including a tentative schedule of major milestones
and an estimate of the total program cost through initial
operational capability.
(2) A report on the options associated with the use of
existing systems, technologies, and program management
mechanisms to satisfy the requirement for the Corps surface-
to-air missile, including an assessment of cost and schedule
implications in relation to the program estimate submitted
under paragraph (1).
(3) A certification that there will be no increase in
overall United States funding commitment to the project
definition and validation phase of the Corps SAM/MEADS
program as a result of the withdrawal of France from
participation in the program.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I would like to propose an amendment to
S. 1745 in order to correct an issue with important national security
implications. Development of the corps-level surface to air theater
missile defense system, called the Medium Extended Air Defense System
[MEADS] is adversely affected by the current legislation. Unless the
corrections, which I will describe in a moment, are made, the current
provisions will likely halt the development of this important program.
First, let me address the necessity for MEADS. There are currently
under development a number of theater missile defense systems. However,
no system, except for MEADS, protects front-line troops in the corps'
maneuver area. Hence, MEADS will fulfill an existing, urgent U.S.
operational requirement for a rapidly deployable, highly mobile, robust
air defense system designed to protect maneuver forces and
expeditionary forces of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Both services
are in strong agreement on the need for protection against short- to
medium-range ballistic missiles and the full spectrum of air-breathing
threats--aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The
urgency of the need for MEADS is testified to by the support of the
Commanders-in Chief of Central Command, Atlantic Command, Korean
Command and of course, the European Command/NATO. These operational
commanders, as well as, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the
Chief of Staff of the Army are all on the record documenting the
urgency of the requirement for this system.
It should be noted that this operational need will only become
greater with time. Estimates of future threats include the increasing
ability of both major and lesser powers, as well as, substate actors,
to acquire and utilize the rapidly accessible and increasingly
affordable ballistic and cruise missile technologies against our
forward deployed units.
The operational need for MEADS has been made clear by our allies. In
addition to our partnership with Germany and Italy, in developing a
theater missile defense system, for forward deployed, mobile forces,
other nations have expressed a strong interest in purchasing such a
system to meet their own security requirements.
I must repeat this most essential point: no other planned theater
missile defense system can satisfy operational requirements with
respect to defending soldiers and marines deployed in the forward area
of the theater.
The MEADS system has additional advantages other than this most
important operational requirement. It is the most cost-effective
approach to meeting the operational requirements for forward coverage
in the theater. Two U.S. industry teams, Hughes/Raytheon and Lockheed/
Martin/Loral, have been awarded contracts to participate in the first
phase of the program, largely because their proposals effectively
leverage technology used in current surface to air and air to air
missile systems. Both of the U.S. industrial teams propose a system
architecture based on proven components and technology.
The program is further leveraged by participation of two key Allies,
Italy and Germany. Both countries require a modern system to replace
their aging HAWK systems. As a footnote, there are 22 additional
nations currently employing HAWK. Those other users will require a
replacement system during the next decade. Both partner countries
provide technical capabilities that significantly enhance the MEADS
Program's access to the world's best technology.
As a result of the leveraging of technology and the significant
contributions of Italy and Germany, the United States funding
requirement for system development has been reduced from the
[[Page S7007]]
original $3.1 Billion baseline estimate to about $1.7 Billion. This
accounting of costs does not include the revenue and employment
benefits that will accrue due to the expected high demand for the
purchase of this system.
Given all of these benefits, the current bill does two disruptive
things to the MEADS development program. It reduces the program
authorization by $10.8 millions and it prohibits the United States from
contributing above 50 percent of the funding among her allies. On the
face of it, these bill items do not seem very damaging. However, the
international nature of the program makes these problems quite
damaging. The difficulties in the current bill are due, I believe, to
costing assumptions that are no longer valid. The biggest change from
last year's authorization bill is the withdrawal of France from the
international agreement. However, the bill appears to have
inadvertently placed cost constraints on the MEADS project as if France
were still in the agreement. Let me now lay out some of the adverse
consequences of the current bill's language.
First, the proposed $10.8 million reduction in authorizations for
fiscal year 1997 will mean greater overall costs to the U.S. for
developing MEADS in the project definition-validation phase of the
project. This is due to the obvious stretching out of the development
time period.
Second, and more importantly, Germany and Italy are committed to the
MEADS Program at the highest levels of government. Neither country
views any other system as a viable alternative to meeting its national
requirements. As of May 28, 1996, Germany, Italy and the United States
have formally agreed upon terms for the program and have signed an
international agreement governing the initial program definition and
validation phase of the program. Incidently, this satisfies the Armed
Services Committee Report's requirement for a Memorandum of
Understanding [MOU] among the Allies before funds are obligated.
Of course the memorandum of agreement just described is much
different than the one envisioned a year ago. The withdrawal of France
from the partnership on MEADS means that the United States cannot meet
the 50 percent ceiling on funding, required in the committee report,
given the previously agreed upon percentages among the Allies on burden
sharing. The restructuring--resulting from the withdrawal of France--
results in cost shares, now, of 60 percent for the United States, 25
percent for Germany, and 15 percent for Italy. Previously planned on
percentages were: 50 percent for United States, 20 percent for Germany,
10 percent for Italy, and 20 percent for France. All countries in the
international agreement have picked up some of the burden that was once
assigned to France.
At this point, I must make clear that the requirement for the Corps
SAM capability is a unilateral one. The United States needs this
capability now, and would need to fund now, with or without Allied
participation. The benefits of the partnership are clear. Also, the
higher percentage of costs now assumed by the United States also means
an accompanying higher percentage of revenues gained from the sale of
the weapon system to U.S. Allies.
Paradoxically, restructuring of the program will actually reduce the
U.S. cost for the PD/V phase of the program by $4 million, despite the
percentage change that I just described. With the pull-out of France,
the participating nations have adjusted the scope of the program so
that the costs for the development phase are reduced. The reasons are
reduced duplication and redundancies, and the elimination of French-
unique program requirements which are not demanded by the other
participating countries.
Because MEADS is the first major system new start the United States
has attempted as a cooperative program in some time, it has received a
great deal of attention around the world. Our friends and allies see
MEADS as the litmus test of U.S. resolve to carry through on our
promise to improve our record in armaments cooperation. MEADS
demonstrates that our defense industry can work in concert with the
defense industries of other nations.
The committee's report sends a negative signal concerning MEADS.
Difficulties in resolving this partnership will invariably impact on
other future, international armament partnerships; our credibility will
be damaged. Partnerships such as JSTARS for NATO are put at risk by the
proposed actions with respect to MEADS.
The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended the program be
reduced by $10.8 million, a reduction that makes the program outlined
in the recently completed international agreement unexecutable. Given
such a reduction, our Allied partners will almost certainly consider
the MOU null and void. This, in combination with the 50 percent
ceiling, is very debilitating for the success of further cooperative
efforts.
In sum, the legislative provisions in the current bill, unless
corrected, will likely halt the international agreement on MEADS, halt
MEADS development, and cause other international cooperative defense
efforts to become suspect.
I believe the amendment that I am proposing will address these issues
while also addressing the Armed Services Committee's very valid
concerns that cost overruns not emerge from the program. Instead of
limitations on percentages with respect to burden sharing among the
allies, I propose a spending cap, as outlined in the amendment. This
spending cap meets the rightful concerns of the SASC that costs be
controlled in the development of MEADS. The $10.8 million put back into
the program in this amendment is offset by reducing funding in a catch-
all program entitled ``Other Theater Missile Defense programs,
projects, and activities.''
The amendment ensures that the United States complies with her
obligations under the international agreement between the United
States, Germany, and Italy. By doing so, we bolster our credibility
among our allies, while maintaining the existence and effectiveness of
an important defense development program for our front-line troops.
Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4358
(Purpose: To prohibit certain actions relating to the reorganization of
the Army ROTC pending a report on the Army ROTC)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Thurmond, Ford,
Sarbanes, Breaux, Domenici, Santorum, Hollings, Warner, and Johnston, I
offer an amendment that would prohibit the Secretary of the Army from
closing any Reserve officer training corps units until a comprehensive
study is complete and the results reported to the Congress of the
United States.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Thurmond,
for himself, Mr. Ford, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Breaux, Mr.
Domenici, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Warner, and Mr.
Johnston, proposes an amendment numbered 4358.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle C of title V, add the following:
SEC. 523. PROHIBITION ON REORGANIZATION OF ARMY ROTC CADET
COMMAND OR TERMINATION OF SENIOR ROTC UNITS
PENDING REPORT ON ROTC.
(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Secretary of the Army may not reorganize or
restructure the Reserve Officers Training Corps Cadet Command
or terminate any Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps units
identified in the Information for Members of Congress
concerning Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Unit
Closures dated May 20, 1996, until 180 days after the date on
which the Secretary submits to the congressional defense
committees the report described in subsection (b).
(b) Report.--The report referred to in subsection (a)
shall--
(1) describe the selection process used to identify the
Reserve Officer Training Corps units of the Army to be
terminated;
(2) list the criteria used by the Army to select Reserve
Officer Training Corps units for termination;
(3) set forth the specific ranking of each unit of the
Reserve Officer Training Corps of the Army to be terminated
as against all other such units;
[[Page S7008]]
(4) set forth the authorized and actual cadre staffing of
each such unit to be termination for each fiscal year of the
10-fiscal year period ending with fiscal year 1996;
(5) set forth the production goals and performance
evaluations of each Reserve Officer Training Corps unit of
the Army on the closure list for each fiscal year of the 10-
fiscal year period ending with fiscal year 1996;
(6) describe how cadets currently enrolled in the units
referred to in paragraph (5) will be accommodated after the
closure of such units;
(7) describe the incentives to enhance the Reserve Officer
Training Corps program that are provided by each of the
colleges on the closure list; and
(8) include the projected officer accession plan by source
of commission for the active-duty Army, the Army Reserve, and
the Army National Guard.
(9) describe whether the closure of any ROTC unit will
adversely effect the recruitment of minority officer
candidates.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as an Army ROTC Program graduate and one
who believes the program is vital to the national security of our
Nation, I was disappointed to learn that the Army announced on May 20,
1996, that it will terminate the program at 31 universities and
colleges throughout the Nation, including two in South Carolina.
I expect that many of my Senate colleagues have a strong affiliation
for the ROTC Program and are prepared to speak to the merits of the
program. I believe that many would echo the comments of Dr. Lee
Vickers, the president of Francis Marion University who described the
need for the ROTC Program as follows:
Service to one's community and to the Nation as one of the
constituent values of the United States and one that is being
heard more and more frequently throughout the higher
education community these days. What more vital service can
there be than that discipline, skills, and service learned by
young men and young women fortunate enough to experience the
leadership training of the ROTC Program? No one can easily
deny the importance and the value of the present and future
citizen-soldiers leaders that the ROTC Program has produced
and continues to produce.
Mr. President, it troubles me that the Army terminated programs, not
only at Francis Marion University, but also at Presbyterian College,
and its two satellite programs at Lander University and at New Berry
College. According to U.S. News and World Report Presbyterian College
ranked second among 117 regional liberal arts colleges in the South. A
key contributor to that reputation has been the ROTC Program which was
started in 1919 with the activation of the Scottish Highlander
Battalion. For 77 years, ROTC has been a respected and integral part of
campus life at Presbyterian College, sending graduates to every major
military campaign since World War I. To date, Presbyterian College has
graduated 14 general officers and one Medal of Honor recipient and
currently more than 100 Presbyterian College graduates serve in
uniform.
Mr. President, when I asked the Army to tell me why these programs
were being terminated, their answer was the requirements for
commissioned officers has decreased and therefore the number of ROTC
programs must be reduced. Although that answer may be rationale, the
Army could not provide me with the criteria for selecting the ROTC
programs to be terminated.
My amendment would require the Army to provide a report detailing the
selection criteria and other information to justify the closure of the
31 ROTC units in 20 States. It would further require the Army to wait
180 days after submitting the report before initiating any action to
reorganize the ROTC Program.
Mr. President, this is a reasonable amendment in view of the Army's
action to terminate such an important program--a program that not only
supports the security of our Nation but also impacts the lives of
thousands of America's future leaders. I ask my Senate colleagues to
show their support for the ROTC Program and adopt this amendment.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator Thurmond's
amendment to the Defense Authorization bill to impose a temporary
moratorium on college ROTC unit closures.
The current guidelines will adversely affect several universities
across the country, including Murray State University in Kentucky,
where the Army ROTC program is schedule for closure at the end of the
1996-97 school year.
Murray State has a long and distinguished ROTC tradition. Since its
inception in 1952, over 1,000 ROTC graduates have passed through the
program. Many of those graduates went on to serve this country with
great distinction and honor both in times of war and peace.
Like ROTC programs across the country, the Army ROTC program at
Murray State is not only an important component of the western Kentucky
community, but of the entire armed services. And so, I urge my
colleagues to support Senator Thurmond's amendment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the
president of Murray State University, Kern Alexander, be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Murray State University,
Office of the President,
Murray, KY, June 17, 1996.
Hon. Wendell Ford,
U.S. Senate, Senate Russell Office Bldg.,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Ford: The Department of the Army has recently
announced that the ROTC program at Murray State University
will be closed at the end of the 1996/1997 school year. I am
seeking your support and assistance in reversing this
decision.
ROTC at Murray State University is an integral part of our
campus. With over a thousand graduates since 1952, our ROTC
program has a long and distinguished history. Many of the
Army officers commissioned through our program have served
their country with great honor in war and peace. It is
important to our country and our Army that future
commissioned officers understand and represent the regional
values of the soldiers that they will lead in the various
components of the Total Army.
As described in the attached fact sheet, our ROTC program
has made a threefold enrollment increase in the last three
years and has every expectation of fulfilling the requisite
enrollment and commissioning goals in the future. We have
initiated several dynamic programs to improve recruiting and
retention.
I understand that shrinking defense resources will require
the closure of several other regional ROTC programs to
include Southeast Missouri University and the University of
Tennessee at Martin. Given our historic support of ROTC,
close proximity to Fort Campbell, excellent ROTC support
facilities, and the academic excellence of our University, we
could easily accommodate students from these other schools.
In fact, we could easily become a primary commissioning
source for Army nurses, a commissioned officer specialty of
great demand.
I have made a personal commitment to the support of ROTC
and intend to see the program flourish. I look forward to
your assurance of commitment to this proposal.
Sincerely,
Kern Alexander,
President.
Attachment.
Fact Sheet--Reasons to Keep MSU ROTC
1. We serve 38 counties in Western Kentucky plus we receive
a large number of students from Northwest Tennessee, Southern
Illinois, Indiana, and Southwest Missouri.
These students come to MSU for its high academic standing
(top quartile of small regional liberal arts universities by
U.S. News and World Report) as well as our rural setting.
With the closure of University of Tennessee at Martin, a
large portion of West Tennessee and Western Kentucky would be
excluded from participation in ROTC in a regional university.
MSU could cover both areas meeting the needs of rural
families coupled with our border county agreements to provide
in-state tuition.
2. MSU has tripled its overall enrollment over the past
three years. We have commissioned nine lieutenants for the
past two years, project nine for the next school. Enrollment
numbers in ROTC have increased along with the enrollment
figures for the University due to the faculty taking
ownership of the program and recruiting.
3. We have taken great strides toward attracting ROTC
students:
Ten $1,000 dorm scholarships for ROTC scholarship students.
Free room for all four-year ROTC scholarship students who
attend MSU.
Ten guaranteed positions in our Nursing Program.
Due to this good rapport between ROTC and Nursing we have
requested to be designated a Center for Nursing Excellence.
Nursing elective credit for Nurse Summer Training Program.
Academic Minor in ROTC.
Process of gaining General Education Credit for ROTC
courses.
Extensive promotion of ROTC in University publications,
brochures, and videos.
4. No other class gives students the education in
leadership as does ROTC. We stress oral and written
communication, self-confidence, and development of leadership
skills.
5. ROTC provides between $250,000-$300,000 annually to MSU
and the City of Murray in stipends, scholarships, salaries,
and operating and recruiting funds. This money is
[[Page S7009]]
spent in restaurants, movie theaters, MSU's Bookstore,
electric company, gas stations, and in MSU's general
accounting office for tuition.
6. ROTC attracts top notch students and provides national
marketing for MSU by having a program on campus.
Additionally, it helps attract and promotes solid academic
performance in athletes and minorities. (Currently 20%
female, 10% African American, and 15 athletes enrolled.)
7. MSU has a strong tradition of providing officers for
four state National Guard units--Kentucky, Tennessee,
Illinois and Indiana. Additionally, numerous officers have
played significant roles in the U.S. Army Reserve--most
notable, Major General (Retired) Lindsay Freeman who was
Commander of the 100th Training Division out of Fort Knox,
Kentucky.
8. Long tradition of ROTC at MSU:
Has been an academic program since 1952.
Commissioned over 1,039 officers.
Produced three General officers.
Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4358) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4359
(Purpose: To provide service credit for service as senior ROTC cadets
and midshipmen in the Simultaneous Membership Program)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Byrd, I offer an
amendment which would provide service credit for longevity and pay to
individuals who simultaneously are senior ROTC cadets or midshipmen and
members of the Selected Reserve under the Simultaneous Membership
Program.
I believe this amendment has been cleared on both sides of the aisle.
I urge the adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Byrd, proposes
an amendment numbered 4359.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle A of title V add the following:
SEC. 506. SERVICE CREDIT FOR SENIOR R.O.T.C. CADETS AND
MIDSHIPMEN IN SIMULTANEOUS MEMBERSHIP PROGRAM.
(a) Amendments to Title 10.--(1) Section 2106(c) of title
10, United States Code, is amended by striking out ``while
serving on active duty other than for training after July 31,
1990, while a member of the Selected Reserve'' and inserting
in lieu thereof ``performed on or after August 1, 1979, as a
member of the Selected Reserve''.
(2) Section 2107(g) of such title is amended by striking
out ``while serving on active duty other than for training
after July 31, 1990, while a member of the Selected Reserve''
and inserting in lieu thereof ``performed on or after August
1, 1979, as a member of the Selected Reserve''.
(3) Section 2107a(g) of such title is amended by inserting
``, other than enlisted service performed after August 1,
1979, as a member of Selected Reserve'' after ``service as a
cadet or with concurrent enlisted service''.
(b) Amendment to Title 37.--Section 205(d) of title 37,
United States Code, is amended by striking out ``that service
after July 31, 1990, that the officer performed while serving
on active duty'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``for service
that the officer performed on or after August 1, 1979.''.
(c) Benefits Not To Accrue for Prior Periods.--No increase
in pay or retired or retainer pay shall accrue for periods
before the date of the enactment of this Act by reason of the
amendments made by this section.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I propose an amendment that will modify
Titles 10 and 37 of the United States Code. This amendment will correct
a long-overlooked enlisted service period of selected military members.
This amendment allows creditable service for military members who are
serving, or have served as enlisted members of our National Guard and
Reserve, while also earning a commission through the Simultaneous
Membership Program [SMP]. Since the program's inception in 1979, a
select number of enlisted soldiers have not received longevity credit
for honorably performed duty that they so justly deserve. SMP cadets
are enlisted soldiers with contracts and service obligations, they are
deployable assets to their units, they are military occupational
service qualified, and they are subject to all the regulations and
reviews of any other enlisted soldier. this enlisted concurrent service
must be creditable for all purposes. I urge my colleagues to support
this worthy amendment.
Mr. WARNER. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4359) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4360
(Purpose: To authorize the Secretary of the Army to accept less than
full reimbursement of costs under the agreement for instruction of
civilian students at the Foreign Language Center of the Defense
Language Institute)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Boxer, I offer an
amendment which would authorize the Secretary of the Army to accept
less than full reimbursement costs under the agreement for instruction
of foreign students at the Foreign Language Center of the Defense
Language Institute.
I believe the amendment has been cleared by the other side.
Mr. WARNER. That is correct, Mr. President.
Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mrs. Boxer,
proposes an amendment numbered 4360.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle E of title III, add the following:
SEC. 368. REIMBURSEMENT UNDER AGREEMENT FOR INSTRUCTION OF
CIVILIAN STUDENTS AT FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTITUTE
OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE.
Section 559(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2776; 10
U.S.C. 4411 note) is amended by striking out ``on a cost-
reimbursable, space-available basis'' and inserting in lieu
thereof ``on a space-available basis and for such
reimbursement (whether in whole or in part) as the Secretary
considers appropriate''.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4360) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to, and I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4361
(Purpose: To provide additional pension security for spouses and former
spouses of civil service employees with respect to the military service
of such employees)
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Moseley-Braun, I offer
an amendment which would provide that a former spouse of a military
retiree whose military retired pay is part of a divorce settlement
would continue to receive the amount of money directed by court order
if the military retiree becomes an employee of the Federal Government
and has military service count toward Civil Service retirement
benefits.
I believe the amendment has been cleared.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Ms. Moseley-Braun,
proposes an amendment numbered 4361.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 636. PREVENTION OF CIRCUMVENTION OF COURT ORDER BY
WAIVER OF RETIRED PAY TO ENHANCE CIVIL SERVICE
RETIREMENT ANNUITY.
(a) Civil Service Retirement and Disability System.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (c) of section 8332 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(4) If an employee or Member waives retired pay that is
subject to a court order for which there has been effective
service on the Secretary concerned for purposes of section
1408 of title 10, the military service on which the retired
pay is based may be credited as service for purposes of this
subchapter only if, in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the
employee or Member authorizes the Director to deduct and
withhold from the annuity payable to the employee or Member
under this subchapter, and to pay to the former spouse
covered by the court
[[Page S7010]]
order, the same amount that would have been deducted and
withheld from the employee's or Member's retired pay and paid
to that former spouse under such section 1408.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Paragraph (1) of such subsection
is amended by striking ``Except as provided in paragraph
(2)'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraphs (2)
and (4)''.
(b) Federal Employees' Retirement System.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (c) of section 8411 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(5) If an employee or Member waives retired pay that is
subject to a court order for which there has been effective
service on the Secretary concerned for purposes of section
1408 of title 10, the military service on which the retired
pay is based may be credited as service for purposes of this
chapter only if, in accordance with regulations prescribed by
the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the
employee or Member authorizes the Director to deduct and
withhold from the annuity payable to the employee or Member
under this subchapter, and to pay to the former spouse
covered by the court order, the same amount that would have
been deducted and withheld from the employee's or Member's
retired pay and paid to that former spouse under such section
1408.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Paragraph (1) of such subsection
is amended by striking ``Except as provided in paragraph (2)
or (3)'' and inserting ``Except as provided in paragraphs
(2), (3), and (5)''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a)
and (b) shall take effect on January 1, 1997.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, the amendment I am offering to the
Department of Defense authorization bill would protect the military
pension benefits awarded to a spouse upon divorce in cases where the
retiree rolls the military pension into a civil service pension.
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act of 1982
provides that a court may only treat a military retirees ``disposable''
retired pay as marital property, and award no more than 50 percent of
that amount to the former spouse in a divorce. The definition of
disposable retired pay includes, among other deductions, a government
pension.
The allowed deductions can leave former wives without pension
benefits. For example, if an ex-husband leaves the military and enters
the civil service, he can choose to waive his military retired pay and
instead, have his military service counted in figuring his civilian
retirement benefits. This leaves him without military retired pay and
thus leaves his ex-wife without any of the pension benefits she was
awarded by the court.
This amendment would merely require the transfer of the court award
to the Government retirement system at the same time as the military
retirement credits are transferred to the Government retirement system.
A woman's access to pension income determines, in no small part, the
kind of life she will live in her older years. For a former military
spouse, her access to her husband's pension can mean the difference
between poverty and security.
Women married to men serving in the military are often prevented from
earning pensions of their own, because they must live on or near a
base, transfer from location to location, or live overseas in order to
keep their family together. These requirements lessen job opportunities
and limit job tenure.
Without working full-time, earning a decent salary, and spending many
years at a particular job, it is nearly impossible to secure a pension
at retirement. This amendment would provide women, divorced after many
years of marriage, with a share of the pension earned during that
marriage.
On May 14, I introduced the ``Women's Pension Equity Act of 1996,''
as a first step toward making pension law simpler and more equitable
for women. The bipartisan legislation begins to tackle the problems
created by a pension system that is not designed for working women,
either those in the workforce or in the home. This amendment is one
piece of that legislation.
In the population as a whole, women make up 60 percent of seniors
over 65--but 75 percent of the elderly poor. Unmarried, widowed, and
divorced women are particularly apt to be living in poverty. Nearly
four times as many widows live in poverty as married women of the same
age.
Too many elderly women spend their retirement years in poverty
because less than one-third of all female retirees have pensions, and
the majority of those that do, earn less than $5,000 a year. Women who
are widowed or divorced are particularly hard hit. The current pension
laws are often confusing and illogical, and leave widows and divorced
women without any of the pension benefits earned by their husbands over
many years of marriage. It is estimated that nearly 80 percent of women
who are poor as widows were not poor before their husbands died.
I am keenly aware that we must address broader issues as well. And we
will address them. We should focus on making participation in private
pension plans easier, and not the game of roulette which all too often
leaves people surprised at their retirement. This amendment is one step
in the right direction, however, and I urge my colleagues to join me in
supporting this amendment today.
The women, now divorced, who have spent their lives married to men in
the military, should not spend their retirement years in poverty
because of a loophole in the law.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 4361) was agreed to.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Committee Amendments of the Select Committee on Intelligence, En Bloc
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
amendments to S. 1745, offered by the Select Committee on Intelligence,
be considered and agreed to, en bloc, and considered original text for
the purpose of further amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The committee amendments were agreed to.
Amendment No. 4254
(Purpose: To improve the committee amendments)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator
Thurmond be allowed to modify the committee amendments in more than one
place with amendment No. 4254; that no further amendments be in order
to the Intelligence Committee amendments; and that the Thurmond
modification be deemed to be agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 4254) was deemed agreed to, as follows:
On page 219, line 11, insert ``, for the Secretary's
consideration,'' after ``of Defense''.
On page 223, strike out lines 1 and 2 and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
``(a) Establishment.--The National Imagery and Mapping
Agency is a combat support agency of the Department of
Defense and has significant national missions.
On page 223, strike out line 17 and all that follows
through page 224, line 2 and insert in lieu thereof the
following:
``(3) If an officer of the armed forces is appointed to the
position of Director under this subsection, the position is a
position of importance and responsibility for purposes of
section 601 of this title and carries the grade of lieutenant
general, or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, vice
admiral.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, for approximately the last 7 weeks, the
Armed Services Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence have
been engaged in negotiations in an attempt to settle differences
between the two committees on a range of intelligence reform measures
in both the Defense authorization bill and the Intelligence
authorization bill. I am pleased to report that most of our differences
have been worked out. With regard to the Defense authorization bill,
all our areas of difference have been completely settled.
Mr. President, on May 13, 1996, S. 1745, the Defense authorization
bill, was referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence on
sequential referral. This unprecedented action has delayed
consideration of the Defense authorization bill and, in my view, made
it more difficult to work out sound compromises in a timely manner.
Although I have been clear and consistent in expressing my willingness
to negotiate, I have made it equally clear that I would not be coerced
into accepting bad compromises simply because the Defense authorization
bill had been taken hostage.
The Intelligence Committee reported S. 1745 out of committee on June
11, 1996, with a series of proposed amendments. With three relatively
minor exceptions, I support the Intelligence
[[Page S7011]]
Committee's amendments. With regard to the three areas where I do not
agree with the Intelligence Committee's amendments, we have nonetheless
worked out agreements. It is my intention to offer three perfecting
amendments to the package of Intelligence Committee amendments. These
have been cleared with the Intelligence Committee. Overall, therefore,
I believe that we have an acceptable agreement.
Let me briefly describe the three areas that are the subject of the
amendment that I will offer along with Senator Nunn.
The Intelligence Committee amendment would strike several sections
from the Defense authorization bill that do not relate directly to the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency. It also would insert a new section
906 relating to the role of the Director of Central Intelligence in the
appointment and evaluation of the heads of certain intelligence
agencies within the Department of Defense. With one exception, I do not
oppose these changes. The amendment offered by myself and Senator Nunn
would modify the Intelligence Committee language having to do with
performance evaluations. In my view the Director of Central
Intelligence should not be in the business of writing performance
evaluations for the heads of defense agencies. The DCI himself has
confirmed that this would be inappropriate. The alternative that
Senator Nunn and I have offered would allow the DCI to provide input
for consideration by the Secretary of Defense in preparation for his
annual evaluations of the Defense Department intelligence agency heads.
This would make it clear that the authority to write such evaluations
resides with the Secretary of Defense, but that the views of the DCI
must be taken into account.
The amendment offered by the Intelligence Committee makes a number of
changes to the Armed Services Committee's reported legislation
establishing the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. For the most
part, these changes are the product of agreements that we have reached
with the Select Committee over the last few weeks, with two exceptions.
I will briefly describe these areas and the changes that the Thurmond/
Nunn amendment will make.
First, the Intelligence Committee would strike the reference in the
establishment clause to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency being a
combat support agency. Since there are ambiguities regarding this issue
in title 10 of the United States Code, and since the Department of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have insisted on NIMA being a
combat support agency, the amendment that I am offering with Senator
Nunn will restore the language on combat support to the establishment
clause. Our amendment would also clarify that the new agency will also
have ``significant national missions'' to make absolutely clear that it
serves more than tactical military operations.
Second, the Intelligence Committee proposes a waiver of the cap on
three star general officers for the director of the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency, if the director is a military officer. The Armed
Services Committee has a long standing position in opposition to
providing waivers to this cap for defense agency heads. Senator Nunn
and I simply propose to eliminate this waiver, while leaving the
Intelligence Committee's language regarding the director otherwise
unchanged.
Mr. President, given that the amendment offered by Senator Nunn and
myself is agreed to between the two committees, it would be my
recommendation that the Intelligence Committee amendment, as modified
also be adopted. I believe that Senator Nunn and I have proposed
reasonable and justifiable adjustments to the Intelligence Committee
amendment. It is my intention to oppose any effort to undermine the
agreements that have been reached between the two committees, either on
the floor or in conference.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the Select Committee on Intelligence has
been engaged over the last year in an intense examination of the
Intelligence Community and its role in the post-cold-war world. The
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997 reflects the
conclusions of the Committee and its proposals for renewal and reform
of U.S. intelligence and I hope the Senate will have an opportunity to
vote on these proposals in the near future. Similarly, the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, as reported by the
Armed Services Committee contained a number of intelligence reform
provisions, including authorization for a major reorganization of the
intelligence community through the creation of a new agency, the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, as well as a number of provisions
directly conflicting with the committee's efforts this year to make
substantial improvements in the management and operation of U.S.
intelligence activities. In order to consider these provisions in the
context of our overall reform effort, the Intelligence Committee sought
referral of the Defense bill, pursuant to the Committee's charter,
Senate Resolution 400.
After careful review, including extensive discussions and
negotiations at the staff and member level with the Armed Services
Committee and with the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the committee voted to report the bill with amendments on June
11--well before the expiration of the 30 days of session allotted in
Senate Resolution 400 for consideration upon referral.
prior committee action
These amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act, along
with the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, S. 1718,
reflect the conclusions this committee has reached through 6 years of
efforts aimed at making the U.S. intelligence community operate more
effectively, more efficiently, and with greater accountability in light
of the significant changes in the world over the last decade. In 1994,
this effort led Congress, at the urging of Senator Warner, Senator
Graham, and others, to establish a Commission on the Roles and
Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community--the ``Aspin-Brown
Commission''--to conduct a ``credible, independent, and objective
review'' of U.S. intelligence. The Commission was given a deadline of
March 1, 1996, with the expectation that its report would inform a
legislative debate resulting in enactment of needed changes during this
Congress.
Armed with the Commission's report and enlightened by the committee's
own examination, including numerous hearings, briefings, and
interviews, the Select Committee on Intelligence voted on April 24,
1996, to report S. 1718, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal
year 1997, containing a number of measures to improve policy guidance
to the intelligence community, strengthen the DCI's ability to manage
the community on behalf of all intelligence consumers, and enhance the
ability of the Congress and the American public to ensure that the
secrecy necessary for the conduct of intelligence does not prevent the
vigilance and oversight necessary for an effective democracy. The Armed
Services Committee took the bill on a 30-day sequential referral as
they have done every year since the establishment of the Select
Committee on Intelligence.
On May 13, the Armed Services Committee reported out S. 1745, the
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, which included
a number of provisions for intelligence reorganization, including the
creation of a new national imagery agency and a new structure for
military intelligence under a Director of Military Intelligence [DMI].
The bill also included a number of other provisions that directly
conflicted with the reform attempts of the Intelligence Committee
contained in S. 1718. The Intelligence Committee requested referral of
the bill to consider these intelligence provisions, pursuant to section
3(b) of Senate Resolution 400, which provides for referral to the
Committee of any legislation containing provisions within its
jurisdiction for up to thirty days, not counting days on which the
Senate is not in session.
Discussions with Armed Services Committee
During the weeks of negotiations that followed, the Intelligence
Committee agreed to a number of changes in S. 1718 to address concerns
raised by the Armed Services Committee about protecting the equities of
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Notwithstanding
that the objective of the reform provisions in S.
[[Page S7012]]
1718 was to improve the quality of intelligence provided to all
consumers, including the Department of Defense, the Armed Services
Committee did not want any change that might diminish the current
authority of the Secretary of Defense, who now controls about 85
percent of the intelligence community budget. The Intelligence
Committee is concerned that the current arrangement, under which the
Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for ensuring the
nations intelligence needs are met effectively and efficiently yet has
direct authority over only the CIA--which represents only a small
portion of the intelligence budget--has led to problems. One clear
example is the recent revelations regarding several billion dollars at
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in funds that were never
expended and were carried forward year after year.
As the current DCI John Deutch, who was formerly Deputy Secretary of
Defense, testified on April 24,
[t]he Deputy Secretary of Defense has got a tremendous set
of issues covering a much larger range of resources--10
times--managing ten times the resources * * * of the whole
intelligence community. So to say that you are going to go to
the deputy--and I am not talking about personalities--and say
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, why didn't you catch
this, he's going to say, well, I count on the DCI to keep
track of this and to let the Secretary of Defense know. So in
some sense, if we are going to say that the Director of
Central Intelligence does not view himself or herself as
being responsible for the NRO, fundamentally nobody will be.
The Director of Central Intelligence is in a unique position to
balance the cost and effectiveness of intelligence programs throughout
the government. It makes sense to hold this person responsible for
ensuring that the various elements of the intelligence community are
more responsive to this national objective then to parochial, turf-
driven goals that too often typify bureaucracies. Yet he lacks the
authority needed to accomplish this objective, particularly with regard
to the intelligence elements within the Department of Defense. The DCI
can be given enhanced authority without removing the elements of the
intelligence community from the various agencies in which they reside
or interfering with the ability of those agency heads to manage their
departments, i.e., without creating a ``Department of Intelligence.''
The reform provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997 were designed to accomplish this goal.
This fundamental difference of opinion over the need to strengthen
the authority of the DCI to match his responsibility as the overall
manager of US intelligence made reaching consensus with the Armed
Services Committee over its provisions in the DOD bill and the
provisions in the Intelligence bill difficult. However, both sides made
accommodations and ultimately resolved all but a few issues, agreeing
to changes in both bills. On June 6, the Armed Services report S. 1718
with amendments that reflected the consensus and one remaining area of
disagreement. The next week, on June 11, the Intelligence Committee
reported S.1745, the DOD Authorization bill, with amendments that
similarly reflected the compromises reached with Armed Services
Committee. Subsequently, the Armed Services Committee proposed some
changes to our amendments, which we agreed to.
The area of disagreement that remains is a provision in the
Intelligence bill that gives the DCI the ability to make adjustments in
the allocation of funds within the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP) during the fiscal year to meet unexpected intelligence
needs. Director Deutch, along with all former DCI's who testified
before the Committee, publicly supported this enhanced authority as
important to effective management of the national intelligence
community. The DCI has the authority today to make the initial
allocations within the NFIP in formulating the budget. However, when
unforeseen requirements arise during the fiscal year and funds are
available from a lower priority intelligence activity, the DCI does not
have the authority to transfer those funds unless the affected agency
head does not object. S. 1718 contained a provision to enhance the
DCI's authority by shifting the burden to the affected agency to
convince the President or his designee that the transfer is
unwarranted. The Armed Services Committee objected to giving the DCI
this authority and amended S. 1718 to delete the provision.
With the exception of this reprogramming issue, the Committee
believes the consensus reached by the two committees preserves
significant elements of the reform effort and significantly enhances
the ability of the DCI to manage intelligence activities. In addition,
the Committee is comfortable that, with the changes agreed upon, the
DCI will have the ability to ensure that a new National Imagery and
Mapping Agency will be responsive to the needs of all national
customers.
Specifically, the amendments we have agreed upon to the National
Defense Authorization Act will strike provisions that were in direct
conflict with the reform efforts in the Intelligence Authorization Act,
a number of which would have seriously hampered the ability of the
Intelligence Community to function even under existing mechanisms. For
example, our amendments strike a prohibition on any non-DOD employee
obligating DOD funds. This provision, apparently intended to ensure the
DCI did not gain any additional budget execution authority, would have
restricted non-DOD employees detailed to DOD intelligence agencies,
such as NRO, from managing contracts or performing numerous other tasks
they now commonly perform. It also would have interfered with transfers
of funds under the Economy Act, which take places regularly when one
agency performs a function of common concern on behalf of another
agency for reasons of efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, our
amendments mandate a larger and more formal role for the DCI in the
appointment and evaluation of the heads of the key national agencies:
NSA, NRO, and the new NIMA.
As I have noted, the Committee focused a good deal of effort on the
provisions in the DOD bill that establish a new National Imagery and
Mapping Agency--NIMA. Our amendments add statutory language giving the
DCI clear authority to set imagery collection requirements and
priorities, and to resolve conflicts among priorities. In addition, the
Committee worked out language with Armed Services to ensure that NIMA's
mission as stated in its establishment clause includes both combat
support and its significant national missions. Finally, our Committee
had concerns with the changes Armed Services had made to the provisions
relating to the appointment and status of the Director of NIMA as
worked out by the Administration. Our amendments restore the balance
initially proposed by providing that (1) the Director of NIMA can be
either a civilian or a military officer; and (2) that the Secretary of
Defense must obtain the concurrence of the DCI, or note the non-
concurrence of the DCI, when recommending an individual to the
President for appointment as Director of NIMA.
The past few weeks have not been easy, but I believe they have
produced a good outcome for U.S. intelligence and the nation and, based
on assurances that the leadership of the Armed Services Committee will
do likewise, I wish to state my commitment to joining my colleagues in
supporting prompt disposition of both bills, opposing any effort to
undermine the agreements we have struck, and fully supporting the
Senate positions in our respective conferences.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the bill the Senate is now considering, S.
1745, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997,
raises many issues essential to our national security. None are more
important, however, than the Intelligence Committee's amendments
regarding renewal and reform of the Nation's intelligence apparatus,
intended to enable that apparatus to respond effectively to the
security threats of today and tomorrow.
The amendments under consideration were added to the bill when the
Select Committee on Intelligence considered it on sequential referral.
All of these amendments have been accepted by the Senate Armed Services
Committee during the course of negotiations between our two committees
regarding the intelligence provisions in S. 1745 and in S. 1718, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997.
I would like to make special mention of the Intelligence Committee's
proposed amendments to the provisions of
[[Page S7013]]
S. 1745 relating to the new National Imagery and Mapping Agency, or
NIMA. NIMA would be created by consolidating nearly a dozen agencies or
offices within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence
Agency, including the Defense Mapping Agency, the Central Imagery
Office, CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center, into a
single agency within the Department of Defense. The creation of NIMA
will reduce redundancies in the processing and analysis of imagery,
ensure more challenging career opportunities for those in the imagery
and mapping fields, and create an important synergy between mapping and
imagery--allowing maps to leave the paper and attain all the benefits
of today's digital technology.
The creation of NIMA has been jointly proposed by the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The establishment of a single national imagery
agency was also endorsed by the Brown Commission. Nevertheless, the
creation of NIMA constitutes a major reorganization of U.S.C.
intelligence activities and includes the transfer of several imagery-
related offices out of the CIA and into the Department of Defense.
Accordingly, the Intelligence Committee focused considerable attention
on the specific provisions in S. 1745 that would establish NIMA and
define its responsibilities. We concluded that these provisions need to
be modified in several key respects.
Most important, the committee concluded that the role of the Director
of Central Intelligence with respect to the tasking of imagery
satellites should be clarified. The DCI must have clear authority to
set imagery collection requirements and priorities, and to resolve
conflicts among priorities. The DCI has such authority under existing
executive orders and presidential decisions, but, in light of the
establishment of NIMA as an agency of the Department of Defense, the
Committee believes the DCI's authorities should be restated in statute.
The committee has amended S. 1745 to include these authorities in both
title 10, U.S. Code (together with other provisions establishing NIMA)
and in the National Security Act of 1947 in title 50 (which specifies
the DCI's authorities as director of the intelligence community).
The committee also focused on the provisions of S. 1745 that define
the responsibilities of NIMA to support intelligence consumers outside
the Department of Defense. These provisions are especially important
because with the consolidation of most of the imagery-related
activities of the intelligence community into an agency within the
Department of Defense there is a risk that the imagery needs of non-DOD
customers might not be met. We concluded that the language of the
provisions is sufficient to protect the interests of national consumers
but that the provisions should be moved from title 10 to title 50,
where they are more appropriately placed since they relate to the
authorities of the DCI rather than the organization of the Department
of Defense.
The committee was also concerned that, as reported by the Armed
Services Committee, the very first provision relating to NIMA in S.
1745 would have stated that NIMA ``is a combat support agency of the
Department of Defense.'' The term ``combat support agency'' was first
used in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986 to describe certain DOD agencies that have wartime support
functions and that are subject to periodic review by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs with respect to their combat readiness. The four
defense agencies designated by Congress as combat support agencies in
10 U.S. 193 are the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Defense
Mapping Agency.
When Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it specifically
declined to list the National Security Agency as a combat support
agency because NSA serves customers outside the Department of Defense.
Congress, however, subjected NSA to the same JCS review procedures as
other combat support agencies but only with respect to its combat
support functions. The Intelligence Committee believes that it would
have been most appropriate to treat NIMA like NSA, i.e. not list NIMA
as a combat support agency but subject it to JCS review with respect to
its combat support functions. The Department of Defense and the Armed
Services Committee, however, have insisted that NIMA be listed as a
combat support agency because the Defense Mapping Agency was listed as
a combat support agency.
Given that the Defense Mapping Agency will comprise the largest
activity within NIMA, the Intelligence Committee has agreed to have
NIMA listed as a combat support agency in 10 U.S.C. 193 for purposes of
JCS review (but only with respect to its combat support functions). But
we continue to believe that it would be a mistake to establish NIMA as
a combat support agency in the very first sentence, even if subsequent
statutory provisions specifically state that NIMA also has national
missions. The implication would be left that NIMA's primary purpose is
to provide combat support, and the imagery support to other customers
might suffer as a result.
Accordingly, the Intelligence Committee reported S. 1745 with an
amendment to the provision establishing NIMA that would delete the
reference to NIMA's establishment as a combat support agency. The Armed
Services Committee has proposed to reinsert the reference to NIMA's
status as a combat support agency in the establishment provision but to
add in the same sentence that NIMA has significant national missions.
We would not object to this formulation because it emphasizes that NIMA
has two equally important functions: combat support and support for
national missions.
Our Committee also had concerns regarding the provisions relating to
the appointment and status of the Director of NIMA. The legislative
package drafted by the Administration to create NIMA provided that (1)
the Director of NIMA could be either a civilian or a military officer;
and (2) that the Secretary of Defense must obtain the concurrence of
the DCI, or note the non-concurrence of the DCI, when recommending an
individual to the President for appointment as Director of NIMA. As
reported by the Armed Services Committee, S. 1745 would have required
that the Director of NIMA be a military officer and that the Secretary
of Defense simply consult the DCI before recommending a nominee to the
President. The Armed Services Committee's formulation would have
prevented the President from appointing a civilian Director of NIMA
(thus implying that NIMA performs exclusively military functions) and
would have given the DCI only a minor voice in the appointment of the
head of a critical national intelligence agency. The Armed Services
Committee formulation was opposed by the DCI and by the Secretary of
Defense. Accordingly, the two Committees agreed to amend the bill to
revert to the Administration's proposal.
Finally, the two Committees agreed to delete from S. 1745 a provision
that would have prohibited the Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency from conducting any inspection, investigation, or
audit of NIMA without the written consent of DOD Inspector General.
We believe that, taken together, our amendments will help to clarify
the responsibilities of the DCI with respect to the operation of NIMA
and will serve to ensure that the imagery needs of consumers outside
the Department of Defense are satisfied.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise to support the agreement worked out
by the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees on the provisions of
our respective bills pertaining to the creation of a new DoD agency,
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency known as NIMA, and the renewal
and reform of the intelligence community.
By way of background, I want to note that the Armed Services and
Intelligence Committees have been negotiating over a number of items in
our respective authorization bills. In the course of these
negotiations, a number of thorny issues have been settled and only one
issue remains which relates to a provision in the Intelligence
Authorization bill.
I want to make note of one issue in particular that we have worked
out. That issue relates to the establishment of a new Department of
Defense agency, called the National Imagery and Mapping Agency or NIMA,
which combines the Defense Mapping Agency, the
[[Page S7014]]
Central Imagery Office, and the National Photographic Interpretation
Center. NIMA will provide imagery intelligence and mapping support to
both the Department of Defense and other agencies of the Government.
An issue arose concerning the designation of NIMA as a combat support
agency. Under the agreement reached between our two committees, the new
National Imagery and Mapping Agency will be designated in the agency's
establishment clause as a combat support agency and it would also state
that the Agency has significant national missions to meet the
Intelligence Committee's concerns. Director Deutch, in a letter to
Senator Thurmond dated June 6, 1996, stated in pertinent part that, and
I quote, ``The essence of the NIMA concept for both the Intelligence
Community and the Department of Defense is that NIMA be a combat
support agency.'' I ask unanimous consent that the entire text of
Director Deutch's letter to Senator Thurmond be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The Director of
Central Intelligence,
Washington, DC, June 6, 1996.
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I write to underscore my previous
statements to the leadership of the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services concerning
legislation creating a National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA) and permitting the collection of foreign intelligence
on non-U.S. persons in support of U.S. law enforcement.
The essence of the NIMA concept for both the Intelligence
Community and the Department of Defense is that NIMA be a
combat support agency. At the same time, it is equally
important that there be a clear statement of its national
mission and that the authorities of the Director of Central
Intelligence to manage and support the national mission of
NIMA be undiminished except as required to establish NIMA,
i.e., the transfer of operational control of CIA employees
and funds to NIMA. NIMA must be responsive to the direction
of the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in its
combat support role, but it must also follow the direction of
the DCI in matters of collection and tasking to satisfy
NIMA's national mission. NIMA resource issues obviously
affect both the military and national missions and, as the
Administration's legislative proposal makes clear, should be
decided jointly. I strongly affirm the statements I made on
these points during our meeting of May 23, 1996 including the
placement of statutory language in titles 10 and 50 of the
U.S. Code.
I also believe, as I have indicated in our previous
conversations, that it is important to clarify the authority
of the Intelligence Community to provide assistance to law
enforcement agencies outside the United States by collecting
intelligence information on non-U.S. persons. Much progress
has been made in this area over the last few years, but I
believe it is important to give the Intelligence Community
clear statutory authority to provide such assistance so that
our agencies can work together in an efficient and effective
manner. Both the Intelligence Community and the Department of
Justice support the legislative clarification contained in
Sec. 715 of S. 1718.
It is my strongly held view that the Intelligence Community
can provide important assistance to law enforcement agencies
outside the United States in a far more effective manner than
would be the case if law enforcement agencies were to expand
their activities into areas traditionally dealt with by the
Intelligence Community.
For decades, the Intelligence Community, and the CIA in
particular, have developed close working relationships with
law enforcement agencies and intelligence services outside
the United States. This network of contacts and relationships
provides a rich environment from which information required
by U.S. law enforcement agencies can be gleaned. There is no
reason to replicate it with an extensive law enforcement
presence outside the United States. Indeed, such a presence
would be counterproductive because it would be confusing,
duplicative and undermine longstanding intelligence
relationships. It would permit local governments to play one
U.S. Government agency off against another and would lead, in
my view, to less information reaching the United States, not
more.
If I can provide any additional information on these or
other matters, please do not hesitate to contact me directly.
An original of this letter is also being sent to Ranking
Minority Member Nunn and to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Sincerely,
John Deutch.
Mr. NUNN. I am pleased that we have been able to resolve our
differences over the provisions in the Department of Defense
authorization bill and I look forward to working with the Chairman and
Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee on the one remaining issue
relating to the Intelligence authorization bill. I urge the adoption of
these amendments.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe that it is the judgment of the
managers that all matters relating to this bill that can be concluded
on this day have been concluded. The Senate may now proceed to address
the remaining matters.
Mr. NUNN. I concur with my friend from Virginia. I think we handled
all the amendments we are able to handle now that have been cleared on
both sides. We have a lot of amendments remaining, probably in the
neighborhood of 50, 60 amendments on this bill. But there are an awful
lot of them that are not relevant to this bill, and I hope they will be
withdrawn or can be worked out. So I believe that today has been a
productive day.
We have stayed on the defense bill by and large. The amendment that
we took up that was not relevant to the defense bill was worked out,
agreed to, and supported overwhelmingly in this body. So I think it has
been a good day. I know Chairman Thurmond has put in a lot of hard
hours. The Senator from Virginia has put in a lot of hard hours. We are
working together. I think we can make further progress tomorrow. And
with good luck, cooperation, good spirit, good will, we can finish this
bill tomorrow night, if all that happens.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just do not know how many times the good
Senator from Georgia and I have stood here and wished the Senate well.
Let us do it once again. I do so on behalf of the distinguished
chairman, Senator Thurmond.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator. I can say, I have been here many times
on defense bills when the light in the tunnel was not apparent at all,
and I believe I saw a little glimmer earlier this evening.
Mr. WARNER. I am sure we did. I think we should also commend the
respective leaders, Mr. Lott and Mr. Daschle, because they indeed
became engaged today to assist the matters.
Mr. NUNN. I agree.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators have
until the hour of 9:30 a.m., Thursday, in order to file second-degree
amendments to the DOD bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________