[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 96 (Wednesday, June 26, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6971-S6984]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page S6971]]

        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

                              (Continued)


                           Amendment No. 4049

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is amendment No. 4049 
offered by the Senator from Arizona, [Mr. Kyl]. There are to be 90 
minutes of debate, equally divided, on the amendment.
  Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I and Senator 
McCain be allowed to proceed as in morning business for a total of 10 
minutes, 5 minutes each.
  Mr. EXON. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, the reason I am objecting to the other time 
is that we have tried to put this vote off until tomorrow, but that was 
not possible. We are going to have a vote, and I think we have an 
obligation to use up the hour and a half equally divided on this very, 
very important amendment, and then have a vote. Then there will be 
ample time after that, as I understand it, for all the morning business 
that anybody wants. I think we have an obligation to this body to move 
ahead in an orderly fashion.
  So, at this time, I will begin the debate. I yield myself what time I 
might need to begin the debate in opposition--and strong opposition, I 
might say--to the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. President, I wish to submit for the Record three letters that I 
have from various important people representing important organizations 
in strong opposition to the amendment offered. Mr. President, the basic 
situation that confronts us is that the Kyl amendment, regardless of 
how well-intentioned, could not possibly be offered at a worse time, as 
it would adversely affect the nuclear test ban treaty that, right now, 
is being negotiated in very tense, tedious negotiations in Geneva. The 
nations of the world have set June 28, which is Friday, as the deadline 
to come to some kind of an understanding.
  The President has left, or is about to leave, for a meeting of some 
of the heads of state of the important nations of the world. I would 
not be surprised at all if that would come up there. Here, back at the 
ranch, the U.S. Senate is trying to pass an amendment that is opposed 
by the President of the United States to give, supposedly, the 
President of the United States more power, if you will, more influence, 
if you will, with regard to resuming nuclear testing.
  After the end of the negotiations in Geneva, which we hope and pray, 
for the good of mankind, will be successful and, hopefully, eliminate 
nuclear tests underground or otherwise, because if the world continues 
to rely primarily, as far as we can see into the future, on more and 
more nuclear tests, then I say that mankind will be living under a 
shadow of ever-increasing numbers of nations becoming nuclear powers. 
That is what the nuclear test ban treaty that is being renegotiated 
right now is all about.
  So I simply say that regardless of how well-intentioned the amendment 
of the Senator from Arizona is, it could not possibly come at a worse 
time.
  Mr. President, I reference a letter from the National Security 
Council of June 19. In that letter the National Security Council said:
       Dear Senator Exon: You have requested the Administration's 
     views on the amendment offered by Senators Kyl and Reid 
     concerning nuclear testing and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty (CTBT). The Administration is strongly opposed to this 
     amendment.
       We believe that the amendment could not come at a worse 
     time. The States that are negotiating in the CTBT 
     negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva 
     have set a deadline of June 28--next Friday--to complete this 
     historic treaty. The amendment could be interpreted by some 
     CD states as signaling a possible U.S. intent to conduct a 
     round of nuclear testing after the CTBT is completed but 
     before it enters into force. The Administration has no such 
     plans or intentions, nor has it requested funding for any 
     such tests. Moreover, the amendment would relax the existing 
     legislative moratorium on U.S. testing just at the time the 
     only remaining state still conducting nuclear tests, China, 
     has announced that it will join the global moratorium in 
     September.

  I ask that the letter in its entirety be printed in the Record. It is 
signed by William C. Danvers, Special Assistant to the President for 
Legislative Affairs.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                    National Security Council,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 1996.
     Hon. J. James Exon,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Exon: You have requested the Administration's 
     views on the amendment offered by Senators Kyl and Reid 
     concerning nuclear testing and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty (CTBT). The Administration is strongly opposed to this 
     amendment.
       We believe that the amendment could not come at a worse 
     time. The states that are negotiating in the CTBT 
     negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva 
     have set a deadline of June 28--next Friday--to complete this 
     historic treaty. The amendment could be interpreted by some 
     CD states as signaling a possible U.S. intent to conduct a 
     round of nuclear testing after the CTBT is completed but 
     before it enters into force. The Administration has no such 
     plans or intentions, nor has it requested funding for any 
     such tests. Moreover, the amendment would relax the existing 
     legislative moratorium on U.S. testing just at the time the 
     only remaining state still conducting nuclear tests, China, 
     has announced that it will join the global moratorium in 
     September.
       As you know, we are confident that our Science-Based 
     Stockpile Stewardship will

[[Page S6972]]

     ensure that we can meet the challenge of maintaining the 
     reliability and safety of our nuclear inventory absent 
     nuclear testing. Nonetheless, because he considers this to be 
     a supreme national interest of the United States, the 
     President has pledged that after the CTBT enters into force, 
     he would be prepared to withdraw from the Treaty in the 
     event, however unlikely, that he was informed by the 
     Secretaries of Defense and Energy that a high level of 
     confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon 
     type critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be 
     certified. There is concern on the part of the amendment's 
     co-sponsors that if such a problem arose after September 30 
     but before the CTBT entered into force, current law would 
     prohibit remedial testing.
       If that were to occur, it is important to recognize that 
     one or more years would be required to prepare for any 
     resumption of nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. During 
     this time, we would be able to obtain the necessary funding 
     and legislative relief to carry out the necessary tests.
       In short, the Administration believes that the Kyl-Reid 
     Amendment is not only not necessary, but it also entails a 
     genuine risk of delaying or derailing the CTBT negotiations 
     just as we may well be poised to achieve a global ban on 
     nuclear testing.
           Sincerely,

                                           William C. Danvers,

                                              Special Assistant to
                            the President for Legislative Affairs.

  Mr. EXON. In addition to that, Mr. President, I have a statement from 
the Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary, who has the immediate 
responsibility in the whole area of nuclear testing and nuclear 
weapons.
  I quote from her statement:

       The nuclear weapons testing moratorium instituted by the 
     Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment has made a significant 
     contribution to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts. 
     During the duration of the moratorium, the US stockpile of 
     nuclear weapons has remained safe and reliable. There is no 
     requirement to resuming testing or even to plan to resume 
     testing for safety or reliability or any other purpose, at 
     this time. The Department of Energy, with the full support of 
     the Department of Defense, has embarked on an ambitious 
     stockpile stewardship program to ensure that the safety and 
     reliability of the stockpile is maintained into the 
     foreseeable future, without nuclear testing. One of the 
     elements of stockpile stewardship is maintaining the 
     readiness of the Nevada Test Site to resume testing if it is 
     in the supreme national interest of the United States to do 
     so. DOE is committed to maintaining this readiness, 
     consistent with Presidential direction. DOE has confidence in 
     the stockpile stewardship program and does not need the 
     authority that this amendment would provide.
       President Clinton has already outlined his commitment to 
     maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile 
     under the existing moratorium and under a comprehensive test 
     ban treaty. It is premature to make any statutory changes to 
     the existing moratorium legislation. Any changes should be 
     made only in the context of a negotiated and signed 
     comprehensive test ban treaty. Any changes in the current 
     statutory prohibition on underground nuclear weapons testing 
     at this time certainly does not help the negotiation process, 
     and could very well set it back. Achieving a comprehensive 
     test ban treaty is a key to reducing the global nuclear 
     danger including proliferation of nuclear weapons and the 
     spread of nuclear terrorism.
  Mr. President, I also have a very short letter that I am going to 
read from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, dated June 19:

       Dear Senator Exon: Special Assistant to the President for 
     Legislative Affairs, William C. Danvers, has provided you the 
     Administration's reasons for opposing the Kyl/Reid amendment 
     to the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Bill.
       As I represent the lead agency in the Comprehensive Test 
     Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva, I want to emphasize 
     our belief that this amendment could undermine our efforts to 
     negotiate a Treaty that would end nuclear testing for all 
     time by suggesting a possible U.S. interest in resuming 
     testing before a CTBT enters into force, that does not, in 
     fact, exist.
       Since the end of President Eisenhower's tenure, the United 
     States has pursued a CTBT as a long-term goal. Now, when such 
     a treaty is in hand, we urge the members of the Senate to 
     oppose this amendment and to reaffirm our country's 
     longstanding bipartisan efforts to achieve a CTBT.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters I have 
referenced be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             Statement of Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary

       The nuclear weapons testing moratorium instituted by the 
     Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment has made a significant 
     contribution to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts. 
     During the duration of the moratorium, the US stockpile of 
     nuclear weapons has remained safe and reliable. There is no 
     requirement to resuming testing or even to plan to resume 
     testing for safety or reliability or any other purpose, at 
     this time. The Department of Energy, with the full support of 
     the Department of Defense, has embarked on an ambitious 
     stockpile stewardship program to ensure that the safety and 
     reliability of the stockpile is maintained into the 
     foreseeable future, without nuclear testing. One of the 
     elements of stockpile stewardship is maintaining the 
     readiness of the Nevada Test Site to resume testing if it is 
     in the supreme national interest of the United States to do 
     so. DOE is committed to maintaining this readiness, 
     consistent with Presidential direction. DOE has confidence in 
     the stockpile stewardship program and does not need the 
     authority that this amendment would provide.
       President Clinton has already outlined his commitment to 
     maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile 
     under the existing moratorium and under a comprehensive test 
     ban treaty. It is premature to make any statutory changes to 
     the existing moratorium legislation. Any changes should be 
     made only in the context of a negotiated and signed 
     comprehensive test ban treaty. Any changes in the current 
     statutory prohibition on underground nuclear weapons testing 
     at this time certainly does not help the negotiation process, 
     and could very well set it back. Achieving a comprehensive 
     test ban treaty is a key to reducing the global nuclear 
     danger including proliferation of nuclear weapons and the 
     spread of nuclear terrorism.
                                                                    ____

                                                 U.S. Arms Control


                                       and Disarmament Agency,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 1996.
     Hon. J. James Exon,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Senator Exon: Special Assistant to the President for 
     Legislative Affairs, William C. Danvers, has provided you the 
     Administration's reasons for opposing the Kyl/Reid amendment 
     to the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Bill.
       As I represent the lead agency in the Comprehensive Test 
     Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva, I want to emphasize 
     our belief that this amendment could undermine our efforts to 
     negotiate a Treaty that would end nuclear testing for all 
     time by suggesting a possible U.S. interest in resuming 
     testing before a CTBT enters into force, that does not, in 
     fact, exist.
       Since the end of President Eisenhower's tenure, the United 
     States has pursued a CTBT as a long-term goal. Now, when such 
     a treaty is in hand, we urge the members of the Senate to 
     oppose this amendment and to reaffirm our country's 
     longstanding bipartisan efforts to achieve a CTBT.
           Sincerely,
                                                    John D. Holum,
                                                         Director.

  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Washington.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise to join the Senator from Nebraska 
in opposing the Kyl amendment. This amendment seeks to impede years of 
work to curb nuclear weapons proliferation and to ultimately resume the 
U.S. nuclear weapons testing program. The United States has not tested 
a nuclear weapon in the Nevada desert since late 1992; a nuclear 
silence of nearly 4 years. Thanks to the bipartisan leadership of 
Senator Hatfield and Senator Exon, the United States has been able to 
play a leadership role in the international drive to negotiate a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament.
  I want to commend Senator Exon for his statesmanship on this issue. 
Sometimes known as a defense hawk, the Senator from Nebraska took this 
issue on after careful study several years ago. As far as I know, 
Senator Exon is one of the few Senators to actually visit the Nevada 
test site. Few in this body known as much about our nuclear weapons 
program and the arguments for and against nuclear testing as Senator 
Exon.
  Strangely, as the July 28 deadline for reaching agreement on a 
comprehensive test ban treaty approaches, the U.S. Senate is 
considering an amendment to undo years of work to combat nuclear 
proliferation. Strangely, as President Clinton travels to the G-7 
meeting in France to increase the pressure on our allies to reach 
agreement on a CTBT, the Senate is considering an amendment to 
undermine the President of the United States.
  The proponents argue that their amendment will not interfere with 
negotiations. With all due respect, I strongly disagree with my 
colleagues claims regarding this amendment. The mere fact that the 
Senate is having this debate threatens the delicate talks now in the 
crucial final stages at the Conference on Disarmament. The proponents 
of this amendment did not support the Hatfield-Mitchell-Exon test ban 
moratorium legislation and I am sure they will lead the fight on the

[[Page S6973]]

Senate floor against Senate ratification of a comprehensive test ban 
treaty.
  The Senate has debated this issue at length on numerous 
occasions. The arguments against resuming nuclear weapons testing are 
as valid today as they were when 57 Senators voted to impose the 
nuclear weapons testing moratorium.

  The administration has sent clear messages to the Senate in 
opposition to the Kyl amendment. John Holum, the Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency in a letter addressing the Kyl amendment 
states:

       I want to emphasize our belief that this amendment could 
     undermine our efforts to negotiate a Treaty that would end 
     nuclear testing for all time by suggesting a possible U.S. 
     interest in resuming testing before the CTBT enters into 
     force, that does not, in fact exist.

  Hazel O'Leary, the Secretary of Energy, issued the following 
statement:

       The nuclear weapons testing moratorium instituted by the 
     Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment has made a significant 
     contribution to the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts. 
     During the duration of the moratorium, the U.S. stockpile of 
     nuclear weapons has remained safe and reliable. There is no 
     requirement to resuming testing or even to plan to resume 
     testing for safety or reliability or any other purpose, at 
     this time.

  Finally, let me share with my colleagues a quote from another letter 
on the Kyl amendment from the National Security Council. The NSC letter 
states:

       The Administration believes that the Kyl-Reid amendment is 
     not only not necessary, but it also entails a genuine risk of 
     delaying or derailing the CTBT negotiations just as we may 
     well be poised to achieve a global ban on nuclear testing.

  The United States has conducted more than 1,000 nuclear weapons 
tests. Our nuclear weapons program and technological superiority is 
unequaled anywhere in the world. There simply is no sound argument in 
my mind to approve the Kyl legislation and repeal important provisions 
of the existing nuclear testing moratorium legislation. It is a giant 
step backward into an era of nuclear expansion and nuclear uncertainty.

  Mr. President, we should listen to the words of ACDA Director John 
Holum, chief U.S. negotiator at the Conference on Disarmament. Some 
time ago, while addressing the Conference on Disarmament, Director 
Holum eloquently stated:

       From the very first atomic blast at Alamagordo, mankind has 
     been struggling to recapture the ferocious beast unleashed 
     there. Since then, thousands of women and men of good will 
     and intellect----

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mrs. MURRAY. I ask the Senator from Nebraska for 2 additional minutes 
to finish my statement.
  Mr. EXON. I yield 2 more minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 2 additional 
minutes.
  Mrs. MURRAY. I continue the quote.

       Since then, thousands of women and men of good will and 
     intellect have pursued--passionately, painstakingly--the 
     compelling mission of our age. Working together, let us 
     rededicate ourselves to this mission: To shepherd this beast 
     back into its cage--to bring what was unleashed in a blinding 
     blast of heat in the New Mexico desert to a fitting end in 
     the cool atmosphere of reason in Geneva--to ensure that the 
     first half century of nuclear explosions is the last.

  Mr. President, in the next few days, this country may be in a 
position to celebrate the successful completion of more than 30 years 
of work to end nuclear testing worldwide. To do this, we must defeat 
the Kyl amendment. We must turn back the few in this country who 
continue to believe this Nation must go down the path of nuclear 
expansion and exploration. I strongly urge my colleagues to support the 
Hatfield motion to table the Kyl amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from 
Nebraska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. I would just like about 2\1/2\ minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. KYL. I yield time to the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized 
for 3 minutes.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, last week the Senator from Arizona 
proposed an amendment that would authorize the President to conduct 
underground nuclear weapons tests after October 1, 1996, if the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not been ratified by the United 
States.
  I want to emphasize once again, this amendment does not promote 
nuclear weapons testing. The amendment does not advocate opposition to 
concluding a comprehensive test ban. In order to conduct an underground 
nuclear test, the President would have to submit a report to the 
Congress detailing justification for the test and the Congress could 
take actions to stop any test.
  Mr. President, at some future date, if the President were to 
determine sometime that he needed to conduct an underground nuclear 
test for reason of safety and reliability of the stockpile and withdrew 
from a comprehensive test ban treaty, he would not be able to conduct a 
test. I do not believe we should wait for a situation of that nature to 
arise and then try to pass legislation in the Congress.

  Mr. President, I voted against the Exon-Hatfield-Mitchell legislation 
in August 1992. We must ensure that our aging nuclear weapons are safe 
and reliable. A moratorium on testing and certainly a comprehensive 
test ban will not guarantee the safety and reliability of our nuclear 
deterrent forces.
  Once again, I support the amendment offered by the distinguished 
Senator from Arizona and urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment.
  I yield the floor, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me take a moment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair.
  I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee 
for that strong statement in support of our amendment. The chairman 
spoke in support of our amendment when we first laid it down a week 
ago, and his arguments, I thought, were very persuasive at that time. I 
very much appreciate his support, and I join him in hoping that our 
colleagues will defeat this motion to table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? If neither side yields time, 
time runs equally off both sides.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from 
Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 6 
minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. I thank my friend from Nebraska.
  Mr. President, the 37-member-nation conference on disarmament has 
been meeting in Geneva for 3 years to negotiate a verifiable 
comprehensive test ban treaty. This has long been the expressed goal of 
the United States and the world community as a whole.
  The reason it is so important relates to the issue of proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. If we can stop nuclear testing, we will have struck 
a major blow against additional nations gaining nuclear weapons because 
they will be denied the ability to test and to verify the performance 
and capability of new weapons.
  We have already tested the safety and the reliability and the 
performance and the capability of our weapons. But additional nations 
seeking to become nuclear weapons powers will be denied the weapons 
testing which we have had, and that will make it more difficult for 
other nations to become nuclear weapons States. That is a major blow 
against proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  The signing of a comprehensive test ban treaty will be one of the 
most significant steps that we can take against a major threat which is 
emerging in this world, which is terrorist States gaining possession 
and control of weapons of mass destruction.
  We are right on the verge of achieving this goal, and I think it is 
unthinkable for the Senate to take an action here tonight or any other 
time which would pull the rug out from under our

[[Page S6974]]

negotiators in Geneva, undermining our efforts to obtain something 
which has been long sought by this Nation, which is that comprehensive 
test ban.

  How does this language do that? It does it because it says that 
between the signing of the agreement and the agreement entering into 
force, the President can submit a report to the Congress, and unless 
the Congress disapproves, then the President can undertake testing. 
What that does is put into place in American law an effort to test 
during the critical period between signing of the treaty and the treaty 
entering into force.
  That action of looking for a possible way to undermine a treaty which 
has been signed violates article XVIII of the Vienna Convention of the 
law of treaties, which is that once a treaty is signed, nations are 
obligated to refrain from actions which would defeat the object and the 
purpose of the treaty prior to its entry into force.
  That is article XVIII. We adhere to the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention. We adhere to that convention. And I want to repeat it 
because this is the nub of the issue. This language which is being 
offered puts us in the position of trying to find a way out from an 
agreement which we are about to sign, an agreement which has long been 
sought by the nations of the world, an effort to reduce the number of 
nuclear weapons in the world and particularly the number of new States 
having nuclear weapons.
  We are obligated by international law once we sign that treaty, which 
we intend to do, to refrain from action--and I repeat, to refrain from 
action--which would defeat the object and the purpose of the treaty 
prior to its entry into force.
  So here is the Senate being offered language which goes exactly in 
the opposite direction, which will make it easier for us to defeat the 
object of a treaty which we are about to sign. We are pleading with 
nations of the world to sign this agreement. We are pleading with India 
to sign this agreement. We have just persuaded China to sign this 
agreement. And now the Senate is being offered language which says, oh, 
but the United States is looking to find away around an agreement which 
we are trying to get other nations to sign. That is the problem with 
this amendment. That is why this amendment pulls the rug out from under 
our negotiators. It is why this amendment undermines the effort of this 
administration and others to gain a comprehensive test ban which will 
strike a major blow against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  So let us not do that. Let us, instead, table this language and stay 
on the course we are on, which is to sign a comprehensive and 
verifiable test ban agreement and then to get other nations to sign the 
same agreement and, finally, to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons 
falling into the hands of States which would endanger the peace and 
security of the United States and the world.
  I congratulate Senator Exon on the effort which he has put forth, 
Senator Hatfield, and a number of other Senators, Senator Murray and 
others, who have so strongly and forcefully argued against the Kyl 
amendment. I hope it will be tabled.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that editorials from a number 
of papers across the country be printed in the Record, including an 
editorial from the Portland Press Herald entitled ``Chance for Test Ban 
May Be Now or Never,'' an editorial from the San Francisco Chronicle, 
May 14, entitled ``Nuclear Test Ban Talks Enter the Home Stretch,'' an 
editorial from the Boston Globe entitled ``Toward the Test Ban,'' and 
editorials from the New York Times and the Washington Post entitled ``A 
Nuclear Test Ban Within Reach'' and ``40 Years Later.''
  These editorials and many others across the country are urging us to 
stay on the course we are on to get a comprehensive test ban treaty 
signed. This amendment which is pending and which will hopefully be 
tabled, will undermine the effort that has been so brilliantly made 
over the years to try to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons.
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

          [From the Portland (ME) Press Herald, May 13, 1996]

        Today in Geneva--Chance for Test Ban May be Now or Never

       It may be now or never for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
     The latest round of negotiations, beginning today in Geneva, 
     is just that important. The 37-nation Conference on 
     Disarmament no longer has the luxury of time in concluding 
     what could be the most important arms control agreement of 
     the past 50 years. Unless a consensus draft treaty is 
     concluded by the time this session ends on June 28, the cruel 
     reality is there may never be one.
       The world will have stepped away from the nuclear brink 
     with the end of the Cold War, then edged back up to the 
     abyss. That would be tragic, with the negotiating nations so 
     near agreement.
       The delegates have only a narrow opening in which to 
     complete their monumental work, putting an end to nuclear 
     weapons testing in the air, under ground and in the sea. The 
     support Russia now shows for ending ``all nuclear 
     explosions,'' under President Boris Yeltsin, may not be there 
     after the June presidential election. Fall elections in the 
     United States and the current elections in India further 
     complicate matters. China, meanwhile, is expected to detonate 
     two or three nuclear devices sometime this year. (It says it 
     will stop testing when the treaty is concluded.)
       Two fortuitous developments may make concluding a treaty 
     simpler that it might have been at the beginning of the year. 
     First, the Australian government tried to cut through all the 
     minor differences among the negotiating nations and present a 
     model draft treaty to the session that ended March 29. Now, 
     Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, Conference on Disarmament 
     president, has composed a ``chairman's text'' for the current 
     session intended to move delegates toward common positions.
       The United States, Great Britain and France agreed last 
     fall a ``zero yield'' treaty, prohibiting nuclear weapons 
     tests of any size, should be the goal. Russia added its 
     agreement at the G-8 summit meeting in Moscow last month. 
     Only China, of the five declared nuclear states, wants to 
     continue to allow ``peaceful nuclear explosions,'' but is 
     expected ultimately to yield on the point.
       If the delegates can be persuaded to stick close to the 
     Ramaker text, making major changes only as they feel 
     compelled, a consensus draft can be concluded over the next 
     seven weeks. If that were submitted to the U.N. General 
     Assembly for initialing in September, a treaty could be 
     signed shortly after.
       Beginning today, let the world resolve this is an 
     opportunity it will not let fail.
                                                                    ____


            [From the San Francisco Chronicle, May 14, 1996]

             Nuclear Test Ban Talks Enter the Home Stretch

       One of the oldest, most ambitious goals of nuclear arms 
     controllers, the 40-year-old dream of a comprehensive nuclear 
     test ban treaty, is tantalizingly close to realization. After 
     two years of negotiation, representatives of the 38-nation 
     Conference on Disarmament regrouped in Geneva yesterday for 
     the final six-week round of talks aimed at banning all 
     nuclear tests, which would effectively halt the development 
     and deployment of new, advanced nuclear weapons.
       If approved and ratified by all nations, the 50-year-old 
     race to build bigger and better nuclear weapons would be 
     over; and membership in the nuclear weapons club would be 
     closed.
       Never before have so many nations been so close to 
     agreement. Yet for the effort to succeed, the United States 
     and the other nuclear weapons states--France, Britain, Russia 
     and China--and several key ``threshold'' states, especially 
     India, must focus extraordinary attention on resolving the 
     final sticking points. Should they fail, this narrow window 
     of opportunity could be lost for years to come--and lost with 
     it would be the world's best hope for ending the global 
     spread of nuclear weapons. At this point, four of the five 
     declared nuclear powers (and virtually all the other states) 
     support the Clinton administration's position on the question 
     of what, exactly, the treaty would ban: all nuclear 
     explosions of any size. The holdout is China, which insists 
     on the right to conduct so-called peaceful nuclear explosions 
     (PNEs), which are indistinguishable from weapons tests.
       China has won no support from any quarter on the non-
     weapons-related tests and is thus considered likely to drop 
     this condition. But China and some other states have also 
     tied the question of when, and if, the treaty would enter 
     into force to whether the threshold states--India, Pakistan 
     and Israel--sign on. And India is stubbornly holding out on 
     an unrealistic insistence that the treaty include a time-
     bound pledge of complete nuclear disarmament. There are a 
     handful of other hurdles, but they are relatively minor 
     compared to the Indian disarmament demand and the question of 
     entry into force. Over the next six weeks, it is essential 
     that President Clinton, personally, make resolution of these 
     disputes a top policy priority.
       The key is to persuade the holdouts that a complete nuclear 
     test ban is in their self-interest because it constrains 
     their neighbors as much as themselves and blocks the costly 
     dynamic of regional nuclear arms races. Even Iran has bowed 
     to this logic and become a key backer of the treaty.
       Time is of the essence. When the conference chair tables a 
     new draft text later

[[Page S6975]]

     this month, everyone must give a little, take a little and 
     climb on board.
                                                                    ____


                 [From the Boston Globe, June 6, 1996]

                          Toward the Test Ban

       The sword of Damocles invoked by John Kennedy remained 
     suspended throughout the Cold War. But since the superpower 
     balance of nuclear terror has vanished, the first lines of 
     defense against nuclear war have become the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
     being drafted this month in Geneva.
       After four decades of Herculean labors, a test ban treaty 
     is on the verge of completion. A promising text drawn up by 
     the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty, 
     Dutch Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, effaces Beijing's disingenuous 
     efforts to preserve the possibility of ``peaceful'' nuclear 
     tests. The Ramaker draft also discards India's equally 
     disingenuous attempt to make a test ban conditional on the 
     prior achievement of complete nuclear disarmament by a given 
     date. Both these loopholes would have had the effect of 
     sabotaging a comprehensive test ban.
       In the Ramaker test, however, there is one article that 
     looms as a deal-breaker. It is called the entry-into-force 
     provision, and it requires that 37 countries hosting key 
     verification stations or laboratories must ratify the test 
     ban treaty before it can enter into force.
       This is a formula for granting veto power to at least 37 
     states. It would also create an incentive for those states to 
     demand a price for ratification. In particular, it would 
     bestow on India--the ``threshold'' country expected to balk 
     at ratifying the treaty--an ability to prevent the test ban 
     from ever being implemented.
       A preferred solution would be to require a set number of 
     ratifications--on the order of 60 or 65 as in the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention--before the treaty enters into force. In 
     this way, the possibilities for delay and blackmail would be 
     removed, and instead of having veto power, India would come 
     under international pressure to join a treaty that had 
     already entered into force.
       President Clinton, who has fought admirably for a test ban, 
     should make an all-out effort to persuade the nuclear powers 
     to clear the final hurdle.
                                                                    ____


                [From the New York Times, June 7, 1996]

                    A Nuclear Test Ban Within Reach

       For the past 40 years, diplomats have dreamed of 
     negotiating a treaty that would ban all nuclear weapons 
     tests. Such an accord could significantly slow the nuclear 
     arms race, which has diverted hundreds of billions of dollars 
     from civilian needs and heightened the risk of nuclear 
     warfare.
       That dream is now closer to realization than ever before. 
     Yesterday China dropped its insistence on making an exception 
     for so-called ``peaceful nuclear explosions.'' That means all 
     five officially recognized nuclear powers--the United States, 
     Russia, Britain, France and China--now support a complete 
     test ban.
       Other differences remain among the 38 nations negotiating 
     in Geneva. They involve verification procedures, test site 
     inspections and how many countries must ratify the treaty 
     before it goes into effect. But acceptable compromises seem 
     within reach before the June 28 negotiating deadline. The 
     next three weeks will require an intensive push by the 
     Clinton Administration, which deserves credit for pressing 
     for completion of a treaty.
       The move toward a test ban is part of a broader global 
     bargaining process that last year produced an indefinite 
     renewal of the treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons 
     and technology. In exchange for permanently renouncing their 
     own nuclear ambitions, nations without nuclear weapons wanted 
     the nuclear powers to agree to cut back their weapons 
     research. Accordingly, Washington and the other nuclear 
     powers committed themselves to completing a total nuclear 
     test ban treaty this year. If a text is agreed on in Geneva 
     this month, it will be ready for signing at the United 
     Nations General Assembly in September.
       While the five nuclear powers agree on a complete ban, they 
     differ on what kind of intelligence information should 
     trigger a demand for on-site inspection and who should 
     have the power to dispatch inspectors.
       China and other third-world countries are uneasy about 
     using satellite intelligence systems they have not yet 
     developed, and want to rely on an international network of 
     more common seismic, sound and radiation detectors. It may be 
     possible to employ both types of intelligence.
       The United States also would like inspectors to be 
     dispatched as soon as treaty officials detect a possible 
     violation, while China would prefer requiring that such 
     decisions be approved by two-thirds of the countries 
     monitoring the treaty. A compromise requiring a simple 
     majority vote within 72 hours of an official request seems 
     within reach.
       The other remaining disagreement concerns when the treaty 
     will become effective. After the 38-nation negotiating 
     conference completes its work, the treaty will be offered to 
     all nations for signature and ratification. The five nuclear 
     powers, along with scores of other countries, are likely to 
     sign on. But some countries considered capable of making a 
     nuclear weapon may not. India strongly resists agreements, 
     and if India stays out, Pakistan may also refuse to sign. It 
     would be better if the two countries approved the treaty, but 
     if they decline, other nations should proceed without them. 
     The treaty and its verification provisions can be used to 
     detect and publicize any violations by these and other 
     holdout countries.
       With China's important concession and other moves toward 
     compromise, there is now a good chance for agreement by June 
     28. Washington should continue to fight for improved 
     verification and inspection provisions, while preparing for 
     reasonable compromises that may be necessary to secure this 
     long-sought barrier to the nuclear arms race.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Post, June 14, 1996]

                             40 Years Later

       Forty years after the effort to halt nuclear testing began, 
     a comprehensive test ban outlawing tests in the last 
     permitted environment, underground, is at last coming into 
     sight. The idea was so long in becoming reality because the 
     five declared nuclear powers found it more urgent to improve 
     than cap their arsenals, while others wanted to keep a 
     nuclear option open. Only when the Cold War ended and the 
     anxieties, alarms and ambitions feeding big-country bomb 
     programs diminished did a test ban become possible.
       For nuclear powers, a treaty--a prime American goal--
     amounts to restraint on qualitative weapons improvements: 
     arms control. For undeclared nuclear powers (there are three: 
     India, Pakistan and Israel) and for nuclear aspirants, a duly 
     ratified and enforced ban will bottle up programs of their 
     own: nonproliferation.
       In the latest phase, the parties at Geneva found themselves 
     with an unworkable text containing more than 1,000 national 
     objections. Chairman Iaap Ramaker of the Netherlands broke 
     the stalemate with his own text. The talks now going on are 
     focused on the equal-opportunity bruises he thus inflicted. 
     The aim is to complete a treaty by the end of June.
       China did well to abandon its insistence on a loophole for 
     ``peaceful'' tests. But China stood alone for that dodge, and 
     it is making trouble by brazenly continuing underground tests 
     even now and raising obstacles to future one-site 
     inspections. Its readiness to blunt the vital enforcement 
     edge of nonproliferation can only stir doubts about its 
     purposes.
       An even more difficult negotiating hurdle is the provision 
     on the treaty's entering into force. The United States, eager 
     to constrain the nuclear states' weapons, would have it go 
     into effect once the five declared states and a good group of 
     others are on board. But the other four declared states 
     support the chairman's demand that India, Pakistan and Israel 
     sign up right away. This proposal is worthy but impractical. 
     The treaty can't do everything for everybody; it can't for 
     instance, by itself ease the anxieties that animate those 
     three undeclared nuclear states.
       Testing was once widely thought of as the live fuse of an 
     ``arms race'' that had to be slowed to ensure the planet's 
     survival. Later, the idea of a test ban was set aside in a 
     mutual Soviet-American reliance for safety on nuclear 
     deterrence. The political agreements of the Reagan period 
     finally diminished the great-power nuclear risks. But a test 
     ban remains a useful tool for reducing the lingering risks, 
     especially of those nuclear weapons in or potentially in 
     irresponsible hands.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I advise my friend from Nebraska we only have 
two speakers on our side. We prefer to see what arguments are posited 
against the amendment and then respond to them at that time.
  Mr. EXON. I thank my colleague. I was just trying to divide the time 
to go back and forth.
  I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, we have been dealing with this subject here 
in the Senate for a long time. We started to get some agreement on 
these matters back as far as 1972 with the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, the SALT I interim agreements, START I and the START II 
Treaties, which came along a little bit later. These treaties first put 
a cap on the nuclear arms race.
  These were followed by some other agreements. In 1974 President Nixon 
got the Threshold Test Ban Treaty through and President Ford 
accomplished the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives Treaty in 1976.
  These were all great steps along the way. Many people thought, along 
the way, we would never get to a day when we would have a Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, where all nuclear explosives would not be tested 
anymore, that we would cap things at that point. But here we are, about 
to achieve it, just about to achieve it. Will we be able to make it? I 
do not really know at this point. But I do know this, the final stages 
of negotiating are underway right now with the CTBT.

[[Page S6976]]

  The administration has come out and given a very strong statement in 
a letter to Senator Exon that opposes this amendment because they feel, 
and I agree with them, that this amendment could not come at a worse 
time in these negotiations. The CTBT negotiations in the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva have a deadline of this Friday, the day after 
tomorrow, in which, by that time, we may be able to have a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for the first time since entering the 
nuclear age. It will, indeed, be a historic time if we accomplish that.
  This amendment we are considering here this evening could be 
interpreted by some of those States that are negotiating over there now 
as maybe a little subterfuge, as maybe we are not quite meaning what we 
are negotiating in Geneva. In fact, they may believe that we are 
pulling the rug out from under our negotiators at Geneva by even 
bringing this up for a vote. If this would happen to be agreed to, it 
would really be a tragic thing for our negotiators over there, because 
it would call into real doubt our intentions for the long-term future.
  The administration has no such plans or intentions to circumvent the 
provisions that they are negotiating over there. So I hope the people 
with whom we are negotiating are under no illusions about this and are 
not led astray in their thinking because of any proposal such as this 
amendment on the floor.
  The administration also has not requested any funding for any 
additional tests, so their intent is very clear. It is to go along with 
the way they have been negotiating in Geneva in good faith. Our allies 
and the people negotiating there should be assured of that. This has 
been in good faith.
  This amendment would, in effect, also relax the existing legislative 
moratorium just at the time when the only remaining state still 
conducting nuclear tests, China, has announced it will join the global 
moratorium in September.
  Three of us, Senator Feinstein, Senator Nunn, and myself, were in 
Beijing in January of this year. We brought this up to President Jiang 
Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China. We talked to him 
about what their view was on the CTBT. He said they are still 
negotiating on it, but if it was negotiated and went into effect by the 
end of the year, China would--in effect, they would make it a point to 
have all of their nuclear tests done by that time. That is exactly what 
they are planning to do. Because China has announced it will join the 
global moratorium in September.

  As to reliability of our stockpile, we are confident that, as they 
say in the letter from the White House, ``The Science-Based Stockpile 
Stewardship will ensure we can * * *''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. GLENN. Might I have 1 more minute?
  Mr. EXON. I yield 1 more minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 1 additional 
minute.
  Mr. GLENN. ``* * * meet the challenge of maintaining the reliability 
and safety of our nuclear inventory absent nuclear testing.'' They are 
convinced of that. These are our highest level people who deal with 
this.
  But the President has also assured us if there was any doubt of this, 
and it was brought to his attention, what he would do is say we have to 
come out of the treaty if there was any doubt about the safety of our 
stockpile or the reliability of it.
  With that kind of assurance, it seems to me the least we should do to 
show faith with our negotiators at Geneva is to make very, very certain 
we defeat this amendment tonight.
  Continuing the letter:

       There is a concern on the part of the cosponsors of the 
     amendment that, if such a problem arose after September 30 
     but before the CTBT entered into force, current law would 
     prohibit remedial testing.

  Mr. President, I do not accept such reasoning. We have quite a legacy 
of testing that gives us high confidence in our nuclear arsenal, a 
legacy backed up today and tomorrow by the Stockpile Stewardship 
program. And if we support our negotiators, rather than undercut them 
with initiatives that cast doubt on America's resolve to proceed with 
its commitment to a complete and total ban on all nuclear tests, our 
country's security will be all the better served.
       If that were to occur, it is important to recognize that 
     one or more years would be required to prepare for any 
     resumption of nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. During 
     this time, we would be able to obtain the necessary funding 
     and legislative relief to carry out the necessary test.
       In short, the Administration believes that the Kyl-Reid 
     Amendment is not only not necessary, but it also entails a 
     genuine risk of delaying or derailing the CTBT negotiations 
     just as we may well be poised to achieve a global ban on 
     nuclear testing.
           Sincerely,

                                           William C. Danvers,

                                          Special Assistant to the
                                President for Legislative Affairs.

  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered by the 
Senator from Arizona. Today, in Geneva, delegations from 60 countries 
are assembled to negotiate an agreement that leaders from around the 
world have dreamed of and worked toward for nearly 40 years. The goal 
is a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to outlaw nuclear testing around the 
world, and it is well within reach at long last. This amendment would 
clearly undermine that all-important strategy, and it ought to be 
defeated.
  The Kyl amendment also seeks to reverse the current U.S. moratorium 
on nuclear testing, which formed a solid basis for American leadership 
in the international effort to achieve a CTB. Our adoption of a 
moratorium convinced the four other declared nuclear weapons states 
that a Comprehensive Test Ban would serve their security interests. 
Britain, Russia, France, and China have all agreed in principle to a 
CTB that will ban all nuclear explosions, no matter how small.
  This amendment would make a mockery of this unanimous commitment. The 
United States and many other nations are now poised to cross the 
threshold into a world free from nuclear testing. This amendment would 
be a classic case of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory at this 
critical moment in the nuclear era.
  The proponents of the amendment claim that it gives the President the 
ability to ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear 
stockpile. But the nuclear stockpile is already safe and reliable. The 
JASON panel, a group of our most eminent nuclear experts, states this 
fact in its March 1995 report to the Secretary of Energy. The panel 
concluded that the United States can rely on the Clinton 
administration's stockpile stewardship program--developed by the 
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--to 
maintain high confidence in the reliability and safety of our nuclear 
stockpile. No further testing is needed.
  Thirty-three years ago, in his famous address at American University, 
President Kennedy called for the negotiation of a Comprehensive Test 
Ban, and ever since, Republicans and Democrats alike have worked to 
meet that great goal. Today, we are on the verge of success. Supporting 
the Comprehensive Test Ban is the single most important step the Senate 
can take to achieve a non-nuclear future. I urge my collegues to oppose 
the Kyl amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Time is running against both 
sides.
  The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I have just checked with the 
Parliamentarian. I believe there are 40 minutes left on that side. I 
have a net of 3 minutes left because I am reserving 10 minutes for 
Senator Hatfield under a previous arrangement.
  I guess I have been in debates in the U.S. Senate for a long, long 
time, but the other side, who are proposing the amendment, do not seem 
to want to talk. I do not quite understand. It certainly is not fair, 
under the usual procedures that we follow here, for one side to use up 
its time and then the other side sit in deafening silence when their 
time comes to talk.
  I suggest to the Chair, it would not be fair for the other side not 
to make their arguments for the proposition that they are trying to 
force on the United States of America.
  When you enter into time agreements, you expect some fair assumption 
of the responsibilities of the managers of the bill on both sides. This 
Senator has been here on the floor.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

[[Page S6977]]

  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am delighted to take some time. As I 
informed the Senator from Nebraska earlier, we had only two speakers 
remaining on our side. I knew the Senator from Nebraska had several 
speakers. I, therefore, wanted to give those speakers an opportunity to 
present the arguments against our amendment, which I had already 
explained in great detail when we first laid it down a week ago. I have 
been on the floor twice explaining it. I will do it again. I am happy 
to do it, because we are asking for something that is very modest, yet 
very important. I hope all the Senators who are watching will 
appreciate the fact it is important to defeat the motion to table that 
will be laid down.
  I think the easiest way to describe what this amendment does is to 
use this chart. If you go to the line above Kyl-Reid amendment, you see 
where we are today: the status quo, what the law provides with respect 
to nuclear testing. And that is what we are talking about today: the 
President's authority to conduct an underground nuclear test in the 
event that he should deem it necessary to do so.
  That authority expires, Mr. President, on September 30 of this year. 
When some say, ``Well, we may not have that big of a problem with the 
amendment, but we're concerned about the timing because we're engaged 
in these delicate negotiations''--I will come back to that in a 
minute--but the reason we raised the amendment now is because the 
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee said if you have 
amendments to the bill, lay them down now. Mine was the second 
amendment laid down, just following the instructions of the chairman.
  Secondly, we have to do this before September 30. As you know, we are 
not going to have that much in the way of legislative time.
  But third, I have already offered to the Senator from Nebraska, who I 
see now leaves the Chamber, but I made this offer before and I make it 
again. I am delighted to delay this vote until the evening of the 
28th--long after the day in Geneva has expired--because I have no 
intention of having this amendment have any effect whatsoever on the 
negotiations. It does not, it cannot, there is no relationship 
whatsoever, but for those who thought it might, I was perfectly willing 
to delay the vote, and I am still willing to do that.
  I will make that offer here again right now. Assuming we defeat the 
motion to table, I will be happy to have this amendment be the very 
last one considered before final action on the defense authorization 
bill, which I assume will be on Friday. Now let us go back to the 
explanation of the law.
  On September 30, there is only one basis for the President to conduct 
a nuclear test, and that is if another nation tests. Over the last 12 
months or so, we have seen France test, Russia may have tested--the 
intelligence is not clear on that--and China has conducted a test, and 
China has said it is going to conduct at least one more test.
  So those tests would give the President of the United States the 
authority to conduct nuclear tests until such time as the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] goes into force. That is what we have showing 
here. We do not know when that will be, if ever, but we presume it will 
occur, and so we just entered it on this line here.

  At that point, as the Senator from Nebraska said, there will not be 
any nuclear test, except in the extraordinary event of what is called 
the supreme national interest, which is an event very unlikely, if at 
all likely, to occur.
  So, in effect, the only thing that can cause the President to test 
after September 30 is if another nation tests.
  Now, is that a logical basis upon which the United States would 
conduct nuclear testing? The answer, of course, is no. Because France 
tested, does that therefore provide a reason for the United States to 
test? No. Even China's tests do not provide a reason for the United 
States to test.
  We have developed our nuclear arsenal. We have really only three 
reasons to test, Mr. President. The first is for the safety of our 
stockpile, to ensure that as weapons become 20 or 30 years old and 
begin to deteriorate--and they do deteriorate--that the safety of the 
weapons is not compromised, that the safety requirements of the people 
who handle the weapons is not compromised. I will return to that issue 
of safety in a moment.
  The second reason is reliability. Will they still work, or, as a 
result of this deterioration, does there come a point in time when we 
cannot assure the reliability of the stockpile? At that point, we do 
not have an adequate return, obviously.
  The third reason to test is to deal with a recent phenomenon: the 
problem of terrorism. We have just seen a terrible event occur in Saudi 
Arabia involving a bomb, and many people have suggested that perhaps 
the terrorist state's worst weapon is a nuclear bomb delivered by a 
truck. Today, we do not have a good way of dismantling that bomb, and 
the experts at our national laboratories believe that there may come a 
point in time when we have to understand how to dismantle such a 
weapon. We have to know how to do it, obviously, in advance, because we 
may have very little warning when the time comes.
  Do you shoot a laser at it? Do you overpower it with electrical 
voltage? What can you do to disarm that bomb? We may have to conduct 
some kind of low-level test to find that out.
  None of this, Mr. President, advances nuclear weapons in the world. 
As a matter of fact, it is all designed to reduce their use: the 
dismantling or disarming of a terrorist device, providing for total 
safety so no device would ever go off. These are defensive measures, if 
you will. We are not developing new nuclear weapons, and nobody is 
proposing to do that.
  But, effectively, after September 30, our ability to test, unless 
another country tests, will have been eliminated, terminated by the 
law, and that is what we are trying to prevent.
  What we are saying in our amendment is really very simple, and if you 
go below the line that says ``Kyl-Reid amendment,'' you will see what 
our amendment will do.
  We simply extend this September 30 deadline until such time as a CTBT 
goes into effect. At that point, you have an entirely different set of 
rules, but until that time, we continue to have the option of testing 
for stockpile safety and reliability purposes. We would not have to 
wait for another nation to test to have the ability to test.

  But importantly, we also added some other safeguards in our 
amendment. We provide in our amendment that the President will continue 
to report to the Congress on the stockpile and will provide a report on 
the necessity for any testing. Now, those reports are not required 
after September 30. And we provide that the President's authority to 
test after September 30 is subject to a veto by the Congress. If a 
majority of the Congress says ``no'' to a testing message by the 
President, then the President would not be allowed to test. So we 
tighten up the law after September 30, and I think that is a good thing 
for us to have done.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a brief question?
  Mr. KYL. Quickly; yes, I will yield.
  Mr. LEVIN. You said if a majority of Congress votes to disapprove the 
resolution----
  Mr. KYL. That is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is it not true the President could then veto that 
resolution?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I believe the answer to the question is that 
a veto would lie in the event that a majority of the Congress voted to 
disapprove the President's action.
  Mr. LEVIN. And if the President, in fact, submitted such a 
resolution, is it not very likely he would veto a resolution that a 
majority of the Congress passed?
  Mr. KYL. My guess is, if a majority of Congress voted that way, it 
would send a message to the President. This, in any event, is a 
restriction that does not exist under current law. Today, the President 
can simply say, ``I am going to test because France tested.''
  I just ask my friend from Michigan, is it not better to have some way 
for Congress to express itself in opposition, and if we adopt the 
resolution of disapproval, it does not happen, as opposed to the 
existing situation of which we have no ability to say to the President, 
``No, you can't do it''?
  Mr. LEVIN. For the reason I gave you a few moments ago, this would be

[[Page S6978]]

a very unsettling decision for Congress to make now that we are on the 
verge of achieving that test ban. My good friend from Arizona said a 
majority of Congress could vote to disapprove the resolution. I want to 
clarify, this is a joint resolution of disapproval, I believe, that is 
in the language, and that means the President could veto it, and any 
President who submitted such a resolution would presumably veto it, so 
it would, indeed, as a practical matter, take two-thirds of Congress to 
overturn such a resolution; would my friend agree with that?
  Mr. KYL. I appreciate the point the Senator makes. My only point is, 
any action by the Congress to disapprove the decision by the President 
to test in our amendment is more than the existing law, which is zero 
after September 30.
  Mr. President, I say to my friend from Michigan, we are trying to do 
what we can to allay concerns that a rogue President would simply 
decide to do something very foolish and Congress would not have any 
ability to deal with it.
  Let me go to some of the arguments that have been made. The first is 
the one that questions our timing here. I must say that I am baffled by 
this because, as I said, I made the offer to have the vote on this 
amendment after June 28.
  But let us look at that date June 28 again. According to the 
Washington Post and other news sources--I quote from the June 21 
editorial entitled ``Treaty in Trouble.'' I am not sure if this treaty 
is going to be approved on this Friday in any event, regardless of what 
we do. The editorial begins by saying:

       The bleak possibility arises that negotiations on a test 
     ban treaty may fall into a deepening deadline or--an even 
     more bitter prospect--produce a treaty that will languish and 
     not be put into effect.

  They point out this is because of a deadlock of the several nations 
of the world that do not have or may not have nuclear capability and 
are putting demands on the countries that do. They say, ``We will not 
sign up unless you disarm yourself totally.'' This is the country of 
India. Pakistan says, ``If India does not sign up, we do not sign up.'' 
So there is a significant question as to whether or not this treaty is 
going to be approved on Friday in any event. But let us assume that, in 
any event, it is voted on by Friday and is approved. I have already 
indicated that I am perfectly happy to have the vote on our amendment 
subsequent to that time.
  Third, and most important, this amendment has nothing whatsoever to 
do with the CTBT. Again, referencing the chart will make that point 
clear, we say that at such point in time as the CTBT enters into force, 
that is what controls. But we fill this hiatus after September 30, when 
the President cannot test for safety and reliability, by continuing the 
authority for the President to do that, again, unless Congress 
disapproves.
  For the life of me, I cannot understand why someone would want to tie 
our hands in this regard particularly where safety is concerned. We 
test everything else for safety, from the pistol that is issued to the 
troops to the airplanes that fly, to the ships and everything else. We 
test all of our other weapons all the time for safety and reliability. 
But we are saying we want to cover our eyes and not know whether the 
most complex and devastating weapons in the world are safe?
  Mr. President, what if we were talking about chemical weapons here, 
and there was a suggestion that a chemical or biological warhead was 
beginning to leak. Would we have a statute here that says, no, we do 
not want to worry about that because we want to do away with all 
chemical weapons? That is the same argument being made here. We want to 
do away with nuclear weapons, so we're not even going to test them, 
even if we conclude they might not be safe. It does not make sense. 
This amendment does not do anything to the CTBT. It simply continues 
the existing law until there is a CTBT.
  There is a letter from one of the administration officials that says, 
well, this could signal a possible intent to conduct tests. How? The 
administration has already said it is not going to conduct tests. No 
funding has been requested. It disclaims any interest in conducting 
tests. That ought to answer that.
  But in any event, if we had a dangerous weapon, would somebody in 
Britain--why should they be opposed to our testing to make sure that we 
could ensure the safety of our weapons, so that our personnel would not 
be irradiated, for example? What is so wrong with ensuring that we have 
that element of safety?
  Finally, I find a bit of an irony here with people who are commending 
the Chinese for joining the family of nations that want to do away with 
testing. The Chinese have already said that they are going to conduct 
another test.
  They are going to conduct another test. Let us say it is after 
September 30, 1996. The fact is, they can conduct a test until the CTBT 
goes into effect. There is nothing to prohibit the British from 
conducting a test or the French or the Russians. We would be the only 
nation of the declared nuclear powers that is saying, we alone will not 
test after September 30, no matter how long it takes to get to the 
CTBT. What if we do not have a CTBT for 10 years or 15 years? We and we 
alone would be prohibited from testing for safety purposes. How does 
that make any sense?
  More importantly, how could that cause people in Geneva to worry? 
They have the right to conduct tests. If we simply consider an 
amendment that would extend the President's authority beyond September 
30, that is going to somehow give people concern that they should not 
sign the treaty because maybe the United States is going to begin 
conducting tests again, when they have that very right? It does not 
seem to me that is a very sound argument, Mr. President.
  Finally, there was the suggestion that we have our stockpile 
stewardship program, it can handle the situation, we do not need to 
test, and that is what we are relying on. The problem is, this 
administration, while they say they do not need to test, that we can 
rely upon this stockpile stewardship program--which is essentially 
trying to, through computer analysis, determine if there are any 
problems with the stockpile, examine them from time to time, and 
otherwise try to take care of them in a way that they will not 
deteriorate, although they do deteriorate--but notwithstanding that 
being our policy, the administration is not funding it adequately. As a 
result, one wonders whether or not these weapons really are going to 
continue to be safe and reliable.
  If you are going to use the stockpile stewardship argument in 
opposition to the possibility of ever testing, then you darn well 
better have a good stockpile stewardship program. But this 
administration is not doing that.
  Hazel O'Leary, the Secretary of Energy, is responsible for the 
program. In testimony to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on April 16, 
the Secretary had this to say about the outyear funding for the 
stockpile stewardship:

       I think we all have reason to be concerned about the 
     outyears. It is in that area where I have no quarrel with 
     their concern. [The laboratory directors had expressed 
     concern for years.] I think we need to work together to 
     address that.

  The point had been made earlier that the funding that had been 
requested as the minimum level necessary, according to C. Bruce Tarter, 
of University of California's Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, was $4 
billion a year. Yet the President's request for this year is $3.7 
billion. So it would be nice to rely upon the stockpile stewardship; it 
would be even nicer if the administration, which allegedly opposes our 
amendment here, would properly fund the stockpile stewardship. I do not 
have a lot of confidence in that in that event.
  I am going to conclude at this point, Mr. President, by saying our 
amendment has no hidden agenda behind it. We are not seeking to engage 
in testing. It should not have any impact on the discussions that are 
occurring. As I said, I am willing to have the vote after that anyway. 
The only thing we are trying to do is preserve the ability of the 
President in that kind of emergency where he may need it to engage in 
some kind of low-level, underground testing to preserve the safety and 
reliability of our stockpile up until such time as the CTBT should go 
into force.

  I urge, Mr. President, that our colleagues who are watching and 
listening here support the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in 
his request that we vote no on the motion to table.

[[Page S6979]]

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH). Who yields time?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am happy to yield whatever time the 
distinguished Senator from Idaho, a member of the Armed Services 
Committee, needs.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
  I want to acknowledge the expertise of the Senator from Arizona.
  To me it is quite clear-cut and straightforward what the Senator is 
offering. The explanation that he has gone through, I think, has laid 
it appropriately before us. This amendment does not require or even 
foresee the need for the United States to begin testing nuclear weapons 
in the near future.
  What it does is put the United States on a level footing with the 
other signatory nations to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
or the CTBT. This amendment does nothing more than provide the 
President with the ability to resume testing if and only if he deems 
that the supreme national interest dictates such action.
  So what does this amendment do and what does it not do? It does not 
undermine ongoing CTBT negotiations. It does not require the United 
States to resume testing. It does not even encourage the resumption of 
testing.
  It does place four additional requirements on the President that must 
be met before testing could be reinitiated, four additional 
requirements.
  This amendment also clarifies a discrepancy between existing U.S. law 
and the treaty language regarding what is and what is not considered to 
be a nuclear test. Without this clarification, the treaty, when signed, 
would be in conflict with U.S. law.
  This amendment also gives the President authority that he says he 
needs to ensure our national defense.
  In his August 1995 statement regarding the CTBT, President Clinton 
identified the conditions that would cause the United States to resume 
nuclear testing. This amendment provides the President the flexibility 
to respond to such conditions should they arise, the conditions which 
the President outlined.
  This amendment is very narrow. It provides the United States rights 
that are equal to those of other CTBT signatory nations. It clarifies 
ambiguities in existing U.S. law. It reinstates important congressional 
reporting requirements, and it provides the President with the 
flexibility he says he needs to ensure our national defense. It does 
not promote the resumption of nuclear testing. It does not undermine 
the current negotiations. This is a prudent, I believe, a much needed 
provision.
  I ask the Senator from Arizona if he would respond to a question or 
two.
  Mr. KYL. I am happy to respond.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I ask the Senator from Arizona if he would clarify 
the key date of September 30 of this year. It is my understanding that 
on September 30 the provisions provided in the Hatfield-Exon measure 
expire.
  Mr. KYL. That is correct.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Now, there are what are termed ``declared nuclear 
states,'' and there are five of those, one of which is China. The 
Senator has indicated, and I have seen it elsewhere, that China has 
indicated that it is going to test again.
  What happens if they test after September 30? What happens if the 
Kyl-Reid amendment is in effect? What happens if the Kyl-Reid amendment 
is not in effect?
  Mr. KYL. This is an illustration of why this amendment would be 
useful. Without the Kyl amendment, first of all, the President would be 
able to conduct an unlimited number of underground nuclear tests just 
because China conducted a test. Second, the President has no obligation 
to inform the Congress, certainly not to get our consent. The Congress 
does not have any authority to disapprove of any such tests, and we 
would no longer after September 30, receive the reports on the safety 
and reliability of the stockpile that the President has always been 
required to send to the Congress.
  Conversely, if our amendment is adopted, first of all, the President 
is required by law to submit an annual report to the Congress that 
outlines the need for any underground nuclear test. We would have 90 
days to disapprove of that request, and we would indefinitely be 
entitled to receive reports on the safety and reliability of the 
stockpile.
  At a minimum, it seems to me, Mr. President, that Congress, if it is 
going to rely upon the stockpile stewardship program, should want to 
continue to receive reports from the President on the viability of the 
stockpile. Under existing law, that would cease to exist. Under our 
amendment, the President would be required to submit the reports.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Is it fair to say and is it accurate to say that with 
the Kyl-Reid amendment in place it is more restrictive on the 
conditions for nuclear testing?
  Mr. KYL. Yes, clearly it is, because without the Kyl-Reid amendment, 
if China tests, the President can test, period, end of story.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Without any involvement of Congress?
  Mr. KYL. Without any involvement by Congress or without any report.
  Under our amendment, Congress has the ability to say no, and the 
President would have to continue to submit a report to us and he would 
have to report to us on the necessity for an underground nuclear test. 
The requirement for the test would have to be based upon a stockpile 
stewardship issue--safety and reliability--rather than the mere fact 
that another nation decided to test, which obviously has no 
relationship to our stockpile.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I thank very much the Senator from Arizona for the 
clarification. Again, I think he has done a fine job of just laying it 
out in a very straightforward manner so we can understand what this is 
all about.
  I yield my time back to the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I inquire how much time remains.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 16 minutes 
remaining and the Senator from Nebraska has 14\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Vermont.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to this 
amendment. This is a very critical time in the history of the world. 
Whether we are going to be able to stop the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons is the most critical question that we face. We must work to 
provide for sanctions for those that do develop weapons. In order for 
us to have credibility, we have to be willing to accept the fact that 
we should not test. Otherwise, it is very difficult for us to convince 
others that they should not test.
  There has been a fair amount of discussion about the technical 
details of nuclear testing, both pro and con. I will not go over that 
ground, but I would like the Senators to step back and examine the big 
picture for a moment.
  The real question here is national security. One of the greatest 
threats to our national security is the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. We have been spending a lot of time recently discussing 
whether we should build extremely expensive systems that might in the 
distant future protect a fraction of the United States from a nuclear 
attack. We also know that it would be very hard to protect U.S. forces 
abroad from a nuclear attack.
  If nuclear capabilities proliferate to rogue nations, we will be very 
hard pressed to guarantee the safety of all Americans in the event of a 
nuclear attack. Clearly, the best way to prevent such an attack is to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the first place. That goes to 
the heart of this amendment.
  The administration is currently engaged in very sensitive 
negotiations to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Successful 
completion of a strong test ban treaty would do more to protect 
Americans from nuclear attack than any space shield currently being 
envisioned. The best way to make sure we are not a target of a nuclear 
weapon is to prevent the development of nuclear capabilities by more 
nations. That is what a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will do and 
attempt to do for us.
  Passage of the Kyl-Reid amendment would send exactly the wrong signal 
at a very sensitive time. The amendment says to the rest of the world 
that we are ready to consider a resumption of testing, just when we 
finally have

[[Page S6980]]

agreement among the major nuclear powers that it is time to put an end 
to nuclear tests.
  I urge my colleagues to resist this effort to overturn the Hatfield-
Mitchell legislation enacted 4 years ago, and to keep this country on 
the safer course of steady progress toward a comprehensive test ban.

  I yield the floor.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. President, there is obviously some serious misunderstanding here, 
because Senator Kyl has not correctly stated the existing law by 
suggesting that any other nuclear state could conduct a nuclear test 
after September 30, and before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is 
entered into, but the United States could not. This is simply not true.
  If any nation tests after September 30, the law stipulates that all 
restrictions on U.S. testing are limited. It is a basic tenet of the 
Hatfield-Mitchell-Exon law. The only effect of the law is that the 
United States will not be the first nation to test after September 30.
  Would Senator Kyl agree with this correction? I ask him to do it on 
his time because I am almost out of time.
  Senator Kyl has also said that his amendment would allow for a 
resumption of testing for ``safety and reliability'' reasons only. I 
say to my friend from Arizona, if he can show me where in his amendment 
it states the testing would have to be done for ``safety and 
reliability'' only. I have looked and I cannot find it.
  The way I read his amendment, a resumption of U.S. testing could be 
for any reason whatever.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me see if I can answer the question posed 
by the Senator from Nebraska who said I misstated the law. I have the 
law right here. I will quote it directly. This is Public Law 102-377: 
``No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United 
States after September 30, 1996 unless a foreign State conducts a 
nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United 
States nuclear testing is lifted.'' That is precisely what I said. 
After September 30, the only basis upon which we could conduct a test 
is unless another nation tests--exactly as it is stated up here.

  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten minutes.
  Mr. EXON. I ask the Senator from Oregon as to how much time he feels 
he will need.
  Mr. HATFIELD. About 4 minutes.
  Mr. EXON. I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Hatfield.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized for 4 
minutes.
  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Nebraska for 
yielding. I want to also say the Senator from Nebraska, Senator Exon, 
has been carrying the burden, pretty much, here on the floor on this 
issue of the Kyl amendment. I want to express my deep appreciation to 
the Senator for assuming that role. I am sorry I have not been able to 
be more helpful, but other duties have precluded me from engaging in 
more activity until now.
  Mr. President, our negotiators in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
conference are on the brink of success from many perspectives. The 
conference concludes at the end of this month, so in 3 days we will 
know if the goal that we have worked toward for 40 years will come to 
fruition. I am speaking of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has 
been a goal of mine for many years. When we passed the current 
moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992, we provided significant momentum 
toward the CTBT.
  I am very concerned that the amendment pending is characterized as a 
minor change in policy and a clarification of the original moratorium 
of testing which is current law. Let me be clear that this is not a 
simple change. This amendment will have the effect of completely 
undermining the baseline agreement reflected in that moratorium created 
in 1992 and the momentum for a CTBT. I think it sends a signal that 
somehow we are backing out or changing our mind on that moratorium--one 
that I worked 27 years to achieve.
  The current U.S. moratorium is a critical show of good faith to other 
countries with whom we are negotiating this treaty. To change our 
testing policy now, I think, will send shockwaves through the 
international arms control community at the most critical time of the 
CTBT negotiations.
  Not only is this amendment untimely, it is also, I believe, 
unnecessary. The President has extended the 1992 testing moratorium 
because he and his military advisers concluded that our nuclear arsenal 
is safe and reliable. Not even the scientists involved in nuclear 
testing are calling for underground tests to resume.
  More importantly, the President already has the ability to resume 
testing if he determines that it is in the Nation's supreme national 
interest. If we have a severe safety and reliability problem, even I 
would agree with the President in exercising this option.
  It seems to me that this debate would be more appropriate after the 
Conference on Disarmament concludes. The Senate will have the 
opportunity to debate this issue fully when the CTBT is presented to 
the Senate for ratification. And if the negotiations do fall apart and 
we are not able to get a treaty this year, the Congress can debate this 
issue then, or any time following.

  Any action now seems to me to be premature. For these reasons, I 
strenuously oppose the Kyl-Reid amendment and urge my colleagues who 
believe in the nonproliferation goal of achieving a Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty in 1996 to join me in opposing this amendment.
  At an appropriate time, I believe the authors of this amendment are 
aware that I will make a motion to table the amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote 
on or in relation to the Kyl amendment occur at the hour of 8:40 this 
evening, with Senator Exon in control of his previously allotted time, 
and any remaining time until 8:40 under the control of Senator Kyl.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. To clarify for all Senators, we will vote this 
evening at 8:40, and that is now set.
  Mr. NUNN. How much time is on each side? I did not get that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six-and-a-half minutes controlled by the 
Senator from Arizona, and 5 minutes controlled by the Senator from 
Nebraska.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from North 
Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the 
remarks made by the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Exon, and the remarks 
just made by Senator Hatfield from Oregon. I could not agree with them 
more. This is a critically important issue.
  This is exactly the wrong proposal. It is exactly the wrong time even 
to consider this proposal. What we have done in recent years to try to 
make certain that we do not see continued nuclear testing has just set 
the right course for the world, and the wrong vote tonight would send 
exactly the wrong signal at a time when so many countries are sitting 
down and hoping that by Friday we will achieve the result of never 
again seeing nuclear testing in this world.
  So I appreciate the leadership of the Senator from Nebraska and the 
others who have spoken against the Kyl amendment. I hope the Senate 
will support the motion to table.
  The Kyl amendment is part of a continuing assault on arms control. I 
would urge my colleagues to recall what has happened in this Congress.
  Recall that the Foreign Relations Committee stalled on the START II 
Treaty until the Senator from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman, began to 
filibuster an unrelated bill in order to force action on the treaty.
  Recall that the Senate majority throughout this Congress has been 
intent on building a star wars missile defense system that would 
violate the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of our arms 
control regime--which may be why the majority

[[Page S6981]]

desperately wants to knock that cornerstone out of the foundation.
  Recall that we still do not know when the Senate will act on the 
chemical weapons convention, which would break new ground by banning 
the use, production, and stockpiling of an entire class of weapons of 
mass destruction. That Convention has been on the Senate calendar for 
over 50 days now. I hope the majority leader will soon give us an 
indication of when the Senate will vote on that historic treaty.
  And we now have the Kyl amendment. Mr. President, 4 years ago 
Senators Hatfield, Mitchell, and Exon worked very hard to enact a law 
restricting nuclear testing by the United States. Hatfield-Exon-
Mitchell set us on a path to a moratorium on nuclear testing--which the 
law will prohibit after September 30, 1996. The only loophole under 
which the President can resume testing after then is if another nation 
tests first.
  The Kyl amendment would overturn the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell law. It 
would permit the President to start nuclear testing after September 30. 
The only loophole--the only way the President would not be allowed to 
resume testing--is if the Congress tells him not to.
  It's bad enough that the Kyl amendment would repeal a moratorium on 
nuclear testing that is now in the law. However, the international 
repercussions of this amendment are even worse.
  Mr. President, I hope the American people realize that American 
negotiators are literally working around the clock in Geneva as we 
speak in order to reach agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
There are 37 countries around the table at the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva, all trying to hammer out a nuclear test ban 
treaty. The planet has set itself a goal of agreeing on this treaty by 
this Friday, June 28. These talks are in their final, most sensitive 
stage.
  What is so stunning about the Kyl amendment is that it suggests that 
we allow renewed nuclear testing. And the Senator from Arizona is 
making this suggestion 2 days before the planet's self-imposed deadline 
for achieving a treaty to ban nuclear testing for all time.
  This treaty has been a goal of American foreign policy since the 
Eisenhower administration, and the Kyl amendment is urging that we 
allow nuclear testing again. As several of my colleagues have already 
observed, leaving aside the policy implications of the amendment, it is 
impossible to conceive of a worse time for this amendment to be 
offered.
  Mr. President, the United States has been working to lead the world 
toward a test ban agreement. Since 1993, when President Clinton decided 
to extend a testing moratorium, we have been leading by example. We 
have refrained from testing nuclear weapons. We have developed an 
ambitious stockpile stewardship program, which will ensure that our 
nuclear arsenal remains the safest in the world without testing.
  It is not difficult to picture the reaction of other nations if the 
Kyl amendment is approved. They will wonder why our arms control 
negotiators are urging them to compromise on a treaty in Geneva while 
at the same time the U.S. Senate is allowing the President to resume 
nuclear testing. How would we like it if the parliament of another 
country at the negotiating table began to consider loosening that 
country's restrictions on nuclear testing? We'd begin to question that 
country's sincerity at the talks. We'd begin to wonder whether that 
country intended to live up to its commitments. Well, that's how other 
nations are going to feel if this amendment passes.
  I urge my colleagues to vote to table the Kyl amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from North Dakota has 
expired.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. EXON. I yield such time as he may need to the Senator from 
Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will take a short time here. I will 
support the tabling motion on this amendment. I think this is not a 
necessary provision at this moment. I think it is certainly not timely. 
Senator Exon and Senator Hatfield offered their amendment in 1991. It 
is the law of the land. It prohibits further U.S. underground nuclear 
testing unless, after September 30 of this year, another country 
conducts an underground nuclear test. If another country does it, the 
Exon-Hatfield provision automatically expires.
  Moreover, the administration is in the final throes of negotiating a 
CTBT. President Clinton pledged that if there were problems with the 
U.S. weapons stockpile, he could exercise the supreme national interest 
clause in the treaty in order to take the necessary steps to protect 
our security.
  If adopted, it is my belief that this amendment, particularly with 
the timing, could make the negotiations of the CTBT harder rather than 
easier to conclude.
  So I urge my colleagues to support the Hatfield tabling motion when 
it is made.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me make what may be my concluding 
remarks.
  The Senator from Oregon, who will make a motion in just a moment, had 
two primary points. I would like to respond to both of them.
  The first is, he said we do not want to change our testing policy 
now. I know that is the thing that animates him most in this debate.
  I want to state to everybody here that there is no intention to do 
this. This amendment does not do it. It is the President who 
establishes a testing policy. There is not a word in this amendment 
that suggests that we ought to test, how we ought to test; nothing 
whatsoever. All we do in this amendment is to preserve existing law. So 
we are not going to change our policy by this law. We are going to 
preserve it. We are going to say that after September 30 the ability of 
the President to test, if he thinks it is necessary, would continue to 
exist until there is a CTBT. That will expire unless we extend his 
authority.
  There is one condition under which we would be allowed to test in the 
future, as the Senator from Nebraska has pointed out; that is, if 
another nation tests. That does not have anything to do with whether we 
ought to test unless we are trying to develop a new weapon, and nobody 
is suggesting that we would test for that reason.
  Listen to the words that I read of the President of the United 
States, Bill Clinton. Here is what he said he would need the authority 
to do under a test ban regime.
  August 11, 1995, his statement regarding the CTBT, his safeguard F 
specifically says:

       If the President of the United States is informed by the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, advised by 
     the Nuclear Weapons Council, Directors of the DOE's Nuclear 
     Weapons Laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic 
     Command that a high level of confidence in the safety and 
     reliability of a nuclear weapon type, which the two 
     Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent, 
     could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation 
     with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT 
     under the standards of the Supreme National Interest Clause, 
     if in order, to conduct whatever testing might be required.

  That is the authority that President Bill Clinton says he will need 
to have in the future. He will have that authority under the 
Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but he will not have 
that authority, ironically, prior to that time.
  So, ironically, the authority that he requests after the CTBT goes 
into effect, which would exist at this point, does not exist in the 
interim period of time after September 30. He would not have the 
ability to test for the reasons that he indicated in his statement.
  All we are trying to do by this amendment is to continue the existing 
law to give him that authority and to require that he report to the 
Congress. We add one thing and one thing only. Congress has a right to 
disapprove of his action by a majority vote of both Houses of the 
Congress. We thought that was a good thing, not a bad thing, if people 
are concerned about the President. But this President, Bill Clinton, 
has said he needs the authority to test.

  We simply continue that authority until the CTBT takes effect. It 
would be ironic, indeed, for the President to request the authority 
after the CTBT goes into effect but not before then.
  The second point made by the Senator from Oregon is the same point

[[Page S6982]]

that others have made. They wish that we did not have to debate this 
right now and have a vote on it prior to the 28th.
  I have said over and over again--I renew my offer to the 
distinguished ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, and to 
the Senator from Nebraska--I would be delighted to have a vote on my 
amendment. If we do not table it here, we can have a vote on this 
amendment after those negotiations in Geneva are concluded. They are to 
be concluded in Geneva on the 29th, by Friday. By the time we vote on 
Friday it would be nighttime in Geneva.
  Therefore, I would be pleased to enter into a unanimous-consent 
agreement that our vote be postponed until that time.
  I do not know what more I can do to demonstrate that we are not 
trying to influence what is going on over there. I understand that is 
the argument that has been brought up. But I fail to appreciate why our 
offer is not going to be accepted as a result of that.
  I reserve the remainder of my time. Those are my comments with 
respect to the Senator from Oregon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from Nebraska 
have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes fifty seconds.
  Mr. EXON. I yield myself that time, and then the Senator from Oregon 
will be in to offer the tabling motion.
  I want to take just a moment and thank my dear friend and colleague 
from Oregon, Senator Hatfield, for all of the staunch support and 
leadership that he has given. We have worked on this matter because we 
have a total joint understanding of just how critical the end to 
nuclear testing can be for mankind. It is absolutely essential that the 
United States continue to provide leadership in this area. Thanks once 
again to my friend from Oregon.
  Both the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Nebraska will 
conclude our careers in the U.S. Senate this year. Somebody else will 
have to take up from there if we are to continue. If we have not 
reached a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that is still a must.
  I simply say, Mr. President, that the U.S. President says the act is 
not needed now; the National Security Council, I have entered a letter 
to that effect; the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency says it is 
not necessary; the Secretary of Energy says it is not necessary; not 
only is it not necessary, but it could not come up at a worse time.
  I just hope that we will put this matter over by the tabling motion 
that is going to be offered.
  I would simply advise the Senate that, if for any reason the tabling 
motion does not prevail, there is going to be long and extended debate 
on this particular amendment.
  With that, Mr. President, I simply say put this off, keep mankind 
informed, do something about it next year and not now. It has no 
adverse effect whatsoever on the national security interests of the 
United States, or the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal.
  I thank the Chair. I yield back any time I have remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time of the Senator from Nebraska has 
expired.
  Mr. KYL. While we are waiting for the Senator from Oregon to arrive, 
Mr. President, I will conclude by saying that in an entire week of 
debate here, there has not been a new argument raised. The two primary 
arguments are that it would be good to put this vote over until the 
28th, which I would be happy to do; and, second, that the 
administration has not asked for this authority.
  But as I just quoted from the President of the United States, Bill 
Clinton, he explicitly said that he would have to have the authority to 
test if his advisers came to him and said that it was in the supreme 
national interest that he do so, as a result of which there will be a 
clause in the CTBT which allows the President to test under that 
circumstance.
  I have simply said that it would be ironic for us to have the ability 
to do that today, to have that ability under the CTBT but not to have 
that authority during the interim period of time, when the other 
declared nuclear nations do have that ability--mentioning one, for 
example, the nation of China, which has already indicated its intent to 
conduct just such a test.
  So it seems to me that nations that might be concerned about what the 
United States is doing ought to focus their energies more on a country 
like China. It is still developing its arsenal. We would only test, as 
the President himself has said, for the purpose of ensuring the safety 
and reliability of our stockpile.
  So this amendment does nothing more than extend the authority of the 
President up until the time there is a CTBT. It has no other effect 
than that.
  I urge my colleagues not to support the motion to table and to vote 
``no'' on the motion to table that I assume is about to be entered.
  Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jeffords). The Senate is awaiting the 
arrival of Senator Hatfield to make a motion to table.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I simply say I know the Senator from Oregon 
is about to come into the Chamber. In deference to the Senator from 
Oregon and his long service to this body, I would like to ask unanimous 
consent that we delay temporarily until the Senator from Oregon is able 
to come on the floor to offer the tabling motion.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the privileges of 
the floor be granted to Mr. Zack Davis, of my staff, for the time 
during which this measure is pending.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HATFIELD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I move to table the Kyl amendment, and I 
ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of 
the Senator from Oregon to lay on the table the amendment of the 
Senator from Arizona. On this question, the yeas and nays have been 
ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] and 
the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman] are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 53, nays 45, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 176 Leg.]

                                YEAS--53

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Conrad
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Specter
     Stevens
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--45

     Abraham
     Ashcroft
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     DeWine
     Faircloth
     Frahm
     Frist
     Gramm
     Grams
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johnston
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Reid
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Bingaman
     Bumpers
       
  The motion to table the amendment (No. 4049) was agreed to.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
motion was agreed to.
  Mr. EXON. I move to lay that motion on the table.

[[Page S6983]]

  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                                Tricare

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise in support of the subcommittee 
language regarding the TRICARE program and the alternative financing 
mechanism requested by DOD. I appreciate the cautious approach the 
subcommittee has taken. This alternative financing mechanism may have 
significant merit and it should be thoroughly tested and evaluated 
before it is fully implemented.
  The Tidewater area of Virginia, which is part of TRICARE Region 2, 
has long been the premier test site for DOD health care programs. The 
TRICARE Tidewater Demonstration Project ran from October 1, 1992 to 
September 30, 1995, and all of its initiatives continue to the present 
under the new TRICARE regulations that went into effect nationwide in 
October of 1995. A TRICARE Service Center has operated in Portsmouth, 
VA since October of 1992. A managed mental health program has been in 
place for at least a decade. TRICARE Extra has been in place since the 
beginning of the demonstration project and TRICARE Prime began to phase 
in during December of 1994. Today, more than 60,000 people are enrolled 
in TRICARE. It is significant to note that this has been accomplished 
without a Managed Care Support Contract.
  The lead agent for region 2 is the Portsmouth Naval Hospital, and all 
three services are well represented in the region, which also includes 
Langley AFB, Ft. Bragg, and Camp LeJeune. Their invaluable experience 
as the test bed for incorporating new ideas in DOD health care makes 
region 2 the ideal candidate for testing DOD's new funding approach to 
TRICARE. We should proceed cautiously with this new approach, as we 
endeavor to improve TRICARE. In this light, I would urge DOD to 
consider developing benchmarks by testing alternative methods of 
financing in region 2 in its current environment without a managed care 
support contract, and I will work toward this outcome in conference.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I too support the intent of the 
subcommittee language. DOD's alternative financing methods for the 
TRICARE Program may have significant merit, however, I also share 
Senator Warner's concerns that this new concept be fully tested and 
developed before it is implemented. Region 2 is obviously the most 
experienced and therefore the best qualified region to operate this 
test and I support Senator Warner's recommendation.


  BRAC Military Construction of Unaccompanied Enlisted Housing at Ft. 
                            Leonard Wood, MO

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, when the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission [BRAC] recommended closure of Fort McClellan, AL, and 
relocation of Fort McClellan's Military Police and Chemical Schools to 
Fort Leonard Wood, MO, that decision was based in part on the Defense 
Department's recommendation to the Commission that basic training being 
conducted at Ft. Leonard Wood be moved elsewhere in order to make room 
for the additional personnel and activities associated with MP and 
chemical training.
  Subsequent to the adoption by Congress and the President of the BRAC 
'95 recommendations, the Army changed its position and has now opted to 
keep basic training at Fort Leonard Wood. In this regard, I am 
concerned that the FY97 Defense Authorization bill contains $58 million 
in BRAC IV military construction funds for ``unaccompanied enlisted 
housing'' at Fort Leonard Wood, one of four projects totaling $118 
million in similar BRAC IV funding for that post. While it is possible 
that some of these funds are necessary to accommodate BRAC-directed 
moves, it is my understanding that this $58 million project is being 
undertaken partly to enable Fort Leonard Wood to continue to 
accommodate its existing basic training load.
  Mr. NICKLES. I would like to compliment my colleague from Oklahoma 
for his diligent attention to this issue, and make clear to the 
distinguished Chairman that I share his concerns. I would respectfully 
remind the Chairman that the Defense Department's recommendation to the 
Commission on this matter was based on the Army's stated intention to 
decrease the basic training load at Fort Leonard Wood and increase 
basic training at Fort Jackson, SC; Fort Knox, KY; and Fort Sill, OK. 
According to the Department's recommendations to BRAC, each of these 
installations was to receive 1,400-1,500 basic trainees from Fort 
Leonard Wood, approximately one basic training battalion each.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask that a copy of a letter from myself 
and Senator Nickles to GAO dated 20 June 1996 be printed in the Record 
at this point.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,
                                    Washington, DC, June 20, 1996.
     Mr. Richard Davis,
     Director, National Security Analysis, National Security and 
         International Affairs Divisions, U.S. General Accounting 
         Office, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Davis: The 1995 Defense Base Closure and 
     Realignment Commission's (BRAC) recommendations to close Ft. 
     McClellan, AL and move its Military Police (MP) and Chemical 
     Schools to Ft. Leonard Wood, MO, was based on the Defense 
     Department's recommendation that basic training activities at 
     Ft. Leonard Wood be moved elsewhere in order to make room for 
     the additional personnel and activities associated with MP 
     and Chemical training.
       Subsequent to the adoption of the BRAC 95 recommendations, 
     the Army changed its position and has now opted to keep basic 
     training at Ft. Leonard Wood. Specifically, at the time of 
     the BRAC decision, it was the Army's stated intention to 
     close out basic training at Ft. Leonard Wood and divide that 
     basic training among Forts Jackson, Knox, and Sill, each 
     receiving one basic training battalion of 1,400 to 1,500 
     soldiers.
       We are concerned that the FY97 Defense Authorization bill 
     contains $58 million in BRAC IV military construction funds 
     for ``unaccompanied enlisted housing'' at Fort Leonard Wood. 
     It is our understanding that this $58 million project is 
     being undertaken partly to enable Ft. Leonard Wood to keep 
     its basic training mission, even though the three posts 
     referred to above have existing capacity to accommodate Ft. 
     Leonard Wood's basic training student load. We ask that you 
     review this project against other alternatives available to 
     the Army at lower cost. Specifically, we ask that you:
       Review a complete list of the military construction 
     projects approved for or anticipated at Ft. Leonard Wood 
     during the five fiscal years beginning with FY97.
       Identify the current shortfall in unaccompanied enlisted 
     housing at Ft. Leonard Wood.
       Identify the current basic training student load at Ft. 
     Leonard Wood.
       Identify the number of unaccompanied enlisted housing 
     spaces that would become available at Ft. Leonard Wood if its 
     current basic training student load were to be relocated, in 
     whole or in part as originally proposed by the Department of 
     Defense.
       Review the number of personnel to be transferred from Ft. 
     McClellan to Ft. Leonard Wood in accordance with the BRAC 95 
     recommendations.
       Compare the number of unaccompanied enlisted personnel to 
     be transferred pursuant to such recommendations with the 
     number of unaccompanied enlisted housing spaces to be 
     constructed at Fort Leonard Wood using the $58 million 
     presently authorized by the FY97 Defense Authorization bill.
       Evaluate the availability of unaccompanied enlisted housing 
     at each of the posts identified by BRAC 95 as potential 
     locations for basic training currently being conducted at Ft. 
     Leonard Wood.
       Identify any military construction costs, if any, 
     associated with the transfer of a basic training battalion to 
     Forts Knox, Jackson, and Sill, respectively.
       Because the Joint Conference on the FY97 DOD Authorization 
     is likely to conclude by the end of next month, we need to 
     receive your report not later than July 20, 1996. Please 
     direct any questions to John Luddy of Senator Inhofe's staff, 
     at 202-224-1390. Thank you very much for your prompt 
     consideration of this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                  James M. Inhofe,
                                                     U.S. Senator.
                                                      Don Nickles,
                                                     U.S. Senator.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, would the chairman support my request that 
the General Accounting Office review this project, including the 
questions I have raised in this letter, and report back to this 
committee and to the House National Security Committee within 30 days?
  Mr. McCAIN. Like my colleague on the Armed Services Committee, I am a 
firm supporter of the BRAC process, and I am concerned that the Army's 
recommendations to the Commission may have caused it to make a decision 
based on false assumptions. I am particularly troubled that American 
taxpayers may be paying for unnecessary military housing when, as my 
colleague and the Department itself has

[[Page S6984]]

indicated, there is similar housing available at other installations. I 
would urge the chairman to lend his support to this inquiry.
  Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senators for bringing this matter to my 
attention, and I also appreciate Senator McCain's interest. I support 
this inquiry and would add that it is the committee's desire to receive 
a report from GAO within 30 days specifically to allow us to resolve 
this matter to our satisfaction prior to conference and final passage 
of the fiscal year 1997 DOD authorization bill.
  Mr. INHOFE. May I ask of the Armed Services Committee chairman and 
the Readiness Subcommittee chairman, respectively, if they will agree 
to consider modifying or eliminating this project during the joint 
conference on the fiscal year 1997 Department of Defense authorization 
bill, if the GAO's conclusions indicate that doing so would be in the 
best interest of the American taxpayer?
  Mr. THURMOND. I assure the Senator from Oklahoma that I will support 
such actions if warranted by the conclusions of General Accounting 
Office report.
  Mr. McCAIN. I concur with Senator Thurmond. I will look carefully at 
the results of the GAO study before agreeing to fund this project.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, the subject of Senator Inhofe's GAO request 
will be the unaccompanied noncommissioned officers barracks. This 
project was planned, programmed, and funded to house NCO's who will 
come to Fort Leonard Wood as a result of the BRAC decision to move the 
chemical warfare training school and military police school to Fort 
Leonard Wood from Fort McClellan which is scheduled to close.
  Current barracks space at FLW is designed for basic training students 
living four to a room with gang latrines--not for senior NCO's.
  Any connection between the new barracks and the totally separate 
issue of basic training housing is irrelevant since the BRAC was aware 
of the need for the new barracks when it made its decision.
  Even if there were space to renovate current barracks rather than 
build new barracks, the Corps of Engineers has already studied that 
option and deemed the extensive renovations required would not be cost 
effective.
  The result of this report for all its good intentions will be to 
subvert the decision of the BRAC Commission and will set an 
unacceptable precedent.


 military traffic management command's personal property reengineering 
                                program

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I applaud the efforts of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee to reform the Military Traffic Management Command's 
personal property reengineering program. I am concerned that MTMC's 
plan does not adequately address the concerns of the small moving 
companies, which comprise most of the industry. The Senate Armed 
Services Committee initiative establishes a working group of military 
and industry representatives to develop an alternative pilot program 
and requires the Government Accounting Office to review this revised 
plan.
  Mr. BOND. I also share Senator Stevens' concerns about the Department 
of Defense proposal to reengineer the personal property program and its 
associated impact on the small business community. While I support the 
Department's goals of improving the quality of personal property 
shipment and storage services to members of the military and their 
families, it should not be done at the expense of the small businesses 
which make up most of the moving industry.
  Mr. THURMOND. Thank you very much for your comments regarding this 
initiative. We included this provision because of concerns about how 
this reengineering proposal would cause a major restructuring of the 
moving industry. As you know, the majority of movers in the communities 
near our military bases are small businesses. My primary goal is to 
improve the quality of service that service members and their families 
receive when they move.
  Mr. STEVENS. I support reforming the current system to improve the 
quality of service and achieve cost reductions. However, I believe that 
the moving industry needs to participate in these discussions in a 
meaningful way. I believe that the fiscal year 1997 Defense 
authorization language will facilitate that process.
  Mr. BOND. I agree that reforming the current system can lead to 
improvement of service to our military members and their families and a 
reduction in costs to the Government. I am sure that the reforms to the 
Military Traffic Management Command's personnel property reeningeering 
program as instituted by the Senate Armed Services Committee will 
ensure that our military enjoys flexible, rapid, and efficient service 
as can only be found in a competitive environment.

                          ____________________