Congressional Record, Volume 142 Issue 96 (Wednesday, June 26, 1996)

[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 96 (Wednesday, June 26, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6971-S6984]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page S6971]]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

(Continued)

Amendment No. 4049

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is amendment No. 4049
offered by the Senator from Arizona, [Mr. Kyl]. There are to be 90
minutes of debate, equally divided, on the amendment.
Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I and Senator
McCain be allowed to proceed as in morning business for a total of 10
minutes, 5 minutes each.
Mr. EXON. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Who yields time?
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, the reason I am objecting to the other time
is that we have tried to put this vote off until tomorrow, but that was
not possible. We are going to have a vote, and I think we have an
obligation to use up the hour and a half equally divided on this very,
very important amendment, and then have a vote. Then there will be
ample time after that, as I understand it, for all the morning business
that anybody wants. I think we have an obligation to this body to move
ahead in an orderly fashion.
So, at this time, I will begin the debate. I yield myself what time I
might need to begin the debate in opposition--and strong opposition, I
might say--to the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. President, I wish to submit for the Record three letters that I
have from various important people representing important organizations
in strong opposition to the amendment offered. Mr. President, the basic
situation that confronts us is that the Kyl amendment, regardless of
how well-intentioned, could not possibly be offered at a worse time, as
it would adversely affect the nuclear test ban treaty that, right now,
is being negotiated in very tense, tedious negotiations in Geneva. The
nations of the world have set June 28, which is Friday, as the deadline
to come to some kind of an understanding.
The President has left, or is about to leave, for a meeting of some
of the heads of state of the important nations of the world. I would
not be surprised at all if that would come up there. Here, back at the
ranch, the U.S. Senate is trying to pass an amendment that is opposed
by the President of the United States to give, supposedly, the
President of the United States more power, if you will, more influence,
if you will, with regard to resuming nuclear testing.
After the end of the negotiations in Geneva, which we hope and pray,
for the good of mankind, will be successful and, hopefully, eliminate
nuclear tests underground or otherwise, because if the world continues
to rely primarily, as far as we can see into the future, on more and
more nuclear tests, then I say that mankind will be living under a
shadow of ever-increasing numbers of nations becoming nuclear powers.
That is what the nuclear test ban treaty that is being renegotiated
right now is all about.
So I simply say that regardless of how well-intentioned the amendment
of the Senator from Arizona is, it could not possibly come at a worse
time.
Mr. President, I reference a letter from the National Security
Council of June 19. In that letter the National Security Council said:
Dear Senator Exon: You have requested the Administration's
views on the amendment offered by Senators Kyl and Reid
concerning nuclear testing and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). The Administration is strongly opposed to this
amendment.
We believe that the amendment could not come at a worse
time. The States that are negotiating in the CTBT
negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva
have set a deadline of June 28--next Friday--to complete this
historic treaty. The amendment could be interpreted by some
CD states as signaling a possible U.S. intent to conduct a
round of nuclear testing after the CTBT is completed but
before it enters into force. The Administration has no such
plans or intentions, nor has it requested funding for any
such tests. Moreover, the amendment would relax the existing
legislative moratorium on U.S. testing just at the time the
only remaining state still conducting nuclear tests, China,
has announced that it will join the global moratorium in
September.

I ask that the letter in its entirety be printed in the Record. It is
signed by William C. Danvers, Special Assistant to the President for
Legislative Affairs.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

National Security Council,

Washington, DC, June 19, 1996.
Hon. J. James Exon,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Exon: You have requested the Administration's
views on the amendment offered by Senators Kyl and Reid
concerning nuclear testing and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). The Administration is strongly opposed to this
amendment.
We believe that the amendment could not come at a worse
time. The states that are negotiating in the CTBT
negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva
have set a deadline of June 28--next Friday--to complete this
historic treaty. The amendment could be interpreted by some
CD states as signaling a possible U.S. intent to conduct a
round of nuclear testing after the CTBT is completed but
before it enters into force. The Administration has no such
plans or intentions, nor has it requested funding for any
such tests. Moreover, the amendment would relax the existing
legislative moratorium on U.S. testing just at the time the
only remaining state still conducting nuclear tests, China,
has announced that it will join the global moratorium in
September.
As you know, we are confident that our Science-Based
Stockpile Stewardship will

[[Page S6972]]

ensure that we can meet the challenge of maintaining the
reliability and safety of our nuclear inventory absent
nuclear testing. Nonetheless, because he considers this to be
a supreme national interest of the United States, the
President has pledged that after the CTBT enters into force,
he would be prepared to withdraw from the Treaty in the
event, however unlikely, that he was informed by the
Secretaries of Defense and Energy that a high level of
confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon
type critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be
certified. There is concern on the part of the amendment's
co-sponsors that if such a problem arose after September 30
but before the CTBT entered into force, current law would
prohibit remedial testing.
If that were to occur, it is important to recognize that
one or more years would be required to prepare for any
resumption of nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. During
this time, we would be able to obtain the necessary funding
and legislative relief to carry out the necessary tests.
In short, the Administration believes that the Kyl-Reid
Amendment is not only not necessary, but it also entails a
genuine risk of delaying or derailing the CTBT negotiations
just as we may well be poised to achieve a global ban on
nuclear testing.
Sincerely,

William C. Danvers,

Special Assistant to
the President for Legislative Affairs.

Mr. EXON. In addition to that, Mr. President, I have a statement from
the Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary, who has the immediate
responsibility in the whole area of nuclear testing and nuclear
weapons.
I quote from her statement:

The nuclear weapons testing moratorium instituted by the
Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment has made a significant
contribution to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts.
During the duration of the moratorium, the US stockpile of
nuclear weapons has remained safe and reliable. There is no
requirement to resuming testing or even to plan to resume
testing for safety or reliability or any other purpose, at
this time. The Department of Energy, with the full support of
the Department of Defense, has embarked on an ambitious
stockpile stewardship program to ensure that the safety and
reliability of the stockpile is maintained into the
foreseeable future, without nuclear testing. One of the
elements of stockpile stewardship is maintaining the
readiness of the Nevada Test Site to resume testing if it is
in the supreme national interest of the United States to do
so. DOE is committed to maintaining this readiness,
consistent with Presidential direction. DOE has confidence in
the stockpile stewardship program and does not need the
authority that this amendment would provide.
President Clinton has already outlined his commitment to
maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile
under the existing moratorium and under a comprehensive test
ban treaty. It is premature to make any statutory changes to
the existing moratorium legislation. Any changes should be
made only in the context of a negotiated and signed
comprehensive test ban treaty. Any changes in the current
statutory prohibition on underground nuclear weapons testing
at this time certainly does not help the negotiation process,
and could very well set it back. Achieving a comprehensive
test ban treaty is a key to reducing the global nuclear
danger including proliferation of nuclear weapons and the
spread of nuclear terrorism.
Mr. President, I also have a very short letter that I am going to
read from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, dated June 19:

Dear Senator Exon: Special Assistant to the President for
Legislative Affairs, William C. Danvers, has provided you the
Administration's reasons for opposing the Kyl/Reid amendment
to the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Bill.
As I represent the lead agency in the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva, I want to emphasize
our belief that this amendment could undermine our efforts to
negotiate a Treaty that would end nuclear testing for all
time by suggesting a possible U.S. interest in resuming
testing before a CTBT enters into force, that does not, in
fact, exist.
Since the end of President Eisenhower's tenure, the United
States has pursued a CTBT as a long-term goal. Now, when such
a treaty is in hand, we urge the members of the Senate to
oppose this amendment and to reaffirm our country's
longstanding bipartisan efforts to achieve a CTBT.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters I have
referenced be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Statement of Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary

U.S. Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency,

Washington, DC, June 19, 1996.
Hon. J. James Exon,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Senator Exon: Special Assistant to the President for
Legislative Affairs, William C. Danvers, has provided you the
Administration's reasons for opposing the Kyl/Reid amendment
to the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Bill.
As I represent the lead agency in the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva, I want to emphasize
our belief that this amendment could undermine our efforts to
negotiate a Treaty that would end nuclear testing for all
time by suggesting a possible U.S. interest in resuming
testing before a CTBT enters into force, that does not, in
fact, exist.
Since the end of President Eisenhower's tenure, the United
States has pursued a CTBT as a long-term goal. Now, when such
a treaty is in hand, we urge the members of the Senate to
oppose this amendment and to reaffirm our country's
longstanding bipartisan efforts to achieve a CTBT.
Sincerely,
John D. Holum,
Director.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Washington.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise to join the Senator from Nebraska
in opposing the Kyl amendment. This amendment seeks to impede years of
work to curb nuclear weapons proliferation and to ultimately resume the
U.S. nuclear weapons testing program. The United States has not tested
a nuclear weapon in the Nevada desert since late 1992; a nuclear
silence of nearly 4 years. Thanks to the bipartisan leadership of
Senator Hatfield and Senator Exon, the United States has been able to
play a leadership role in the international drive to negotiate a
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament.
I want to commend Senator Exon for his statesmanship on this issue.
Sometimes known as a defense hawk, the Senator from Nebraska took this
issue on after careful study several years ago. As far as I know,
Senator Exon is one of the few Senators to actually visit the Nevada
test site. Few in this body known as much about our nuclear weapons
program and the arguments for and against nuclear testing as Senator
Exon.
Strangely, as the July 28 deadline for reaching agreement on a
comprehensive test ban treaty approaches, the U.S. Senate is
considering an amendment to undo years of work to combat nuclear
proliferation. Strangely, as President Clinton travels to the G-7
meeting in France to increase the pressure on our allies to reach
agreement on a CTBT, the Senate is considering an amendment to
undermine the President of the United States.
The proponents argue that their amendment will not interfere with
negotiations. With all due respect, I strongly disagree with my
colleagues claims regarding this amendment. The mere fact that the
Senate is having this debate threatens the delicate talks now in the
crucial final stages at the Conference on Disarmament. The proponents
of this amendment did not support the Hatfield-Mitchell-Exon test ban
moratorium legislation and I am sure they will lead the fight on the

[[Page S6973]]

Senate floor against Senate ratification of a comprehensive test ban
treaty.
The Senate has debated this issue at length on numerous
occasions. The arguments against resuming nuclear weapons testing are
as valid today as they were when 57 Senators voted to impose the
nuclear weapons testing moratorium.

The administration has sent clear messages to the Senate in
opposition to the Kyl amendment. John Holum, the Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency in a letter addressing the Kyl amendment
states:

I want to emphasize our belief that this amendment could
undermine our efforts to negotiate a Treaty that would end
nuclear testing for all time by suggesting a possible U.S.
interest in resuming testing before the CTBT enters into
force, that does not, in fact exist.

Hazel O'Leary, the Secretary of Energy, issued the following
statement:

The nuclear weapons testing moratorium instituted by the
Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment has made a significant
contribution to the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
During the duration of the moratorium, the U.S. stockpile of
nuclear weapons has remained safe and reliable. There is no
requirement to resuming testing or even to plan to resume
testing for safety or reliability or any other purpose, at
this time.

Finally, let me share with my colleagues a quote from another letter
on the Kyl amendment from the National Security Council. The NSC letter
states:

The Administration believes that the Kyl-Reid amendment is
not only not necessary, but it also entails a genuine risk of
delaying or derailing the CTBT negotiations just as we may
well be poised to achieve a global ban on nuclear testing.

The United States has conducted more than 1,000 nuclear weapons
tests. Our nuclear weapons program and technological superiority is
unequaled anywhere in the world. There simply is no sound argument in
my mind to approve the Kyl legislation and repeal important provisions
of the existing nuclear testing moratorium legislation. It is a giant
step backward into an era of nuclear expansion and nuclear uncertainty.

Mr. President, we should listen to the words of ACDA Director John
Holum, chief U.S. negotiator at the Conference on Disarmament. Some
time ago, while addressing the Conference on Disarmament, Director
Holum eloquently stated:

From the very first atomic blast at Alamagordo, mankind has
been struggling to recapture the ferocious beast unleashed
there. Since then, thousands of women and men of good will
and intellect----

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mrs. MURRAY. I ask the Senator from Nebraska for 2 additional minutes
to finish my statement.
Mr. EXON. I yield 2 more minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 2 additional
minutes.
Mrs. MURRAY. I continue the quote.

Since then, thousands of women and men of good will and
intellect have pursued--passionately, painstakingly--the
compelling mission of our age. Working together, let us
rededicate ourselves to this mission: To shepherd this beast
back into its cage--to bring what was unleashed in a blinding
blast of heat in the New Mexico desert to a fitting end in
the cool atmosphere of reason in Geneva--to ensure that the
first half century of nuclear explosions is the last.

Mr. President, in the next few days, this country may be in a
position to celebrate the successful completion of more than 30 years
of work to end nuclear testing worldwide. To do this, we must defeat
the Kyl amendment. We must turn back the few in this country who
continue to believe this Nation must go down the path of nuclear
expansion and exploration. I strongly urge my colleagues to support the
Hatfield motion to table the Kyl amendment.
Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from
Nebraska.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. I would just like about 2\1/2\ minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. THURMOND. I yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. KYL. I yield time to the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized
for 3 minutes.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, last week the Senator from Arizona
proposed an amendment that would authorize the President to conduct
underground nuclear weapons tests after October 1, 1996, if the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not been ratified by the United
States.
I want to emphasize once again, this amendment does not promote
nuclear weapons testing. The amendment does not advocate opposition to
concluding a comprehensive test ban. In order to conduct an underground
nuclear test, the President would have to submit a report to the
Congress detailing justification for the test and the Congress could
take actions to stop any test.
Mr. President, at some future date, if the President were to
determine sometime that he needed to conduct an underground nuclear
test for reason of safety and reliability of the stockpile and withdrew
from a comprehensive test ban treaty, he would not be able to conduct a
test. I do not believe we should wait for a situation of that nature to
arise and then try to pass legislation in the Congress.

Mr. President, I voted against the Exon-Hatfield-Mitchell legislation
in August 1992. We must ensure that our aging nuclear weapons are safe
and reliable. A moratorium on testing and certainly a comprehensive
test ban will not guarantee the safety and reliability of our nuclear
deterrent forces.
Once again, I support the amendment offered by the distinguished
Senator from Arizona and urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment.
I yield the floor, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me take a moment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair.
I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee
for that strong statement in support of our amendment. The chairman
spoke in support of our amendment when we first laid it down a week
ago, and his arguments, I thought, were very persuasive at that time. I
very much appreciate his support, and I join him in hoping that our
colleagues will defeat this motion to table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? If neither side yields time,
time runs equally off both sides.
Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from
Michigan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 6
minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. I thank my friend from Nebraska.
Mr. President, the 37-member-nation conference on disarmament has
been meeting in Geneva for 3 years to negotiate a verifiable
comprehensive test ban treaty. This has long been the expressed goal of
the United States and the world community as a whole.
The reason it is so important relates to the issue of proliferation
of nuclear weapons. If we can stop nuclear testing, we will have struck
a major blow against additional nations gaining nuclear weapons because
they will be denied the ability to test and to verify the performance
and capability of new weapons.
We have already tested the safety and the reliability and the
performance and the capability of our weapons. But additional nations
seeking to become nuclear weapons powers will be denied the weapons
testing which we have had, and that will make it more difficult for
other nations to become nuclear weapons States. That is a major blow
against proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The signing of a comprehensive test ban treaty will be one of the
most significant steps that we can take against a major threat which is
emerging in this world, which is terrorist States gaining possession
and control of weapons of mass destruction.
We are right on the verge of achieving this goal, and I think it is
unthinkable for the Senate to take an action here tonight or any other
time which would pull the rug out from under our

[[Page S6974]]

negotiators in Geneva, undermining our efforts to obtain something
which has been long sought by this Nation, which is that comprehensive
test ban.

How does this language do that? It does it because it says that
between the signing of the agreement and the agreement entering into
force, the President can submit a report to the Congress, and unless
the Congress disapproves, then the President can undertake testing.
What that does is put into place in American law an effort to test
during the critical period between signing of the treaty and the treaty
entering into force.
That action of looking for a possible way to undermine a treaty which
has been signed violates article XVIII of the Vienna Convention of the
law of treaties, which is that once a treaty is signed, nations are
obligated to refrain from actions which would defeat the object and the
purpose of the treaty prior to its entry into force.
That is article XVIII. We adhere to the provisions of the Vienna
Convention. We adhere to that convention. And I want to repeat it
because this is the nub of the issue. This language which is being
offered puts us in the position of trying to find a way out from an
agreement which we are about to sign, an agreement which has long been
sought by the nations of the world, an effort to reduce the number of
nuclear weapons in the world and particularly the number of new States
having nuclear weapons.
We are obligated by international law once we sign that treaty, which
we intend to do, to refrain from action--and I repeat, to refrain from
action--which would defeat the object and the purpose of the treaty
prior to its entry into force.
So here is the Senate being offered language which goes exactly in
the opposite direction, which will make it easier for us to defeat the
object of a treaty which we are about to sign. We are pleading with
nations of the world to sign this agreement. We are pleading with India
to sign this agreement. We have just persuaded China to sign this
agreement. And now the Senate is being offered language which says, oh,
but the United States is looking to find away around an agreement which
we are trying to get other nations to sign. That is the problem with
this amendment. That is why this amendment pulls the rug out from under
our negotiators. It is why this amendment undermines the effort of this
administration and others to gain a comprehensive test ban which will
strike a major blow against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

So let us not do that. Let us, instead, table this language and stay
on the course we are on, which is to sign a comprehensive and
verifiable test ban agreement and then to get other nations to sign the
same agreement and, finally, to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons
falling into the hands of States which would endanger the peace and
security of the United States and the world.
I congratulate Senator Exon on the effort which he has put forth,
Senator Hatfield, and a number of other Senators, Senator Murray and
others, who have so strongly and forcefully argued against the Kyl
amendment. I hope it will be tabled.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that editorials from a number
of papers across the country be printed in the Record, including an
editorial from the Portland Press Herald entitled ``Chance for Test Ban
May Be Now or Never,'' an editorial from the San Francisco Chronicle,
May 14, entitled ``Nuclear Test Ban Talks Enter the Home Stretch,'' an
editorial from the Boston Globe entitled ``Toward the Test Ban,'' and
editorials from the New York Times and the Washington Post entitled ``A
Nuclear Test Ban Within Reach'' and ``40 Years Later.''
These editorials and many others across the country are urging us to
stay on the course we are on to get a comprehensive test ban treaty
signed. This amendment which is pending and which will hopefully be
tabled, will undermine the effort that has been so brilliantly made
over the years to try to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons.
There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Portland (ME) Press Herald, May 13, 1996]

Today in Geneva--Chance for Test Ban May be Now or Never

It may be now or never for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
The latest round of negotiations, beginning today in Geneva,
is just that important. The 37-nation Conference on
Disarmament no longer has the luxury of time in concluding
what could be the most important arms control agreement of
the past 50 years. Unless a consensus draft treaty is
concluded by the time this session ends on June 28, the cruel
reality is there may never be one.
The world will have stepped away from the nuclear brink
with the end of the Cold War, then edged back up to the
abyss. That would be tragic, with the negotiating nations so
near agreement.
The delegates have only a narrow opening in which to
complete their monumental work, putting an end to nuclear
weapons testing in the air, under ground and in the sea. The
support Russia now shows for ending ``all nuclear
explosions,'' under President Boris Yeltsin, may not be there
after the June presidential election. Fall elections in the
United States and the current elections in India further
complicate matters. China, meanwhile, is expected to detonate
two or three nuclear devices sometime this year. (It says it
will stop testing when the treaty is concluded.)
Two fortuitous developments may make concluding a treaty
simpler that it might have been at the beginning of the year.
First, the Australian government tried to cut through all the
minor differences among the negotiating nations and present a
model draft treaty to the session that ended March 29. Now,
Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, Conference on Disarmament
president, has composed a ``chairman's text'' for the current
session intended to move delegates toward common positions.
The United States, Great Britain and France agreed last
fall a ``zero yield'' treaty, prohibiting nuclear weapons
tests of any size, should be the goal. Russia added its
agreement at the G-8 summit meeting in Moscow last month.
Only China, of the five declared nuclear states, wants to
continue to allow ``peaceful nuclear explosions,'' but is
expected ultimately to yield on the point.
If the delegates can be persuaded to stick close to the
Ramaker text, making major changes only as they feel
compelled, a consensus draft can be concluded over the next
seven weeks. If that were submitted to the U.N. General
Assembly for initialing in September, a treaty could be
signed shortly after.
Beginning today, let the world resolve this is an
opportunity it will not let fail.
____

[From the San Francisco Chronicle, May 14, 1996]

Nuclear Test Ban Talks Enter the Home Stretch

One of the oldest, most ambitious goals of nuclear arms
controllers, the 40-year-old dream of a comprehensive nuclear
test ban treaty, is tantalizingly close to realization. After
two years of negotiation, representatives of the 38-nation
Conference on Disarmament regrouped in Geneva yesterday for
the final six-week round of talks aimed at banning all
nuclear tests, which would effectively halt the development
and deployment of new, advanced nuclear weapons.
If approved and ratified by all nations, the 50-year-old
race to build bigger and better nuclear weapons would be
over; and membership in the nuclear weapons club would be
closed.
Never before have so many nations been so close to
agreement. Yet for the effort to succeed, the United States
and the other nuclear weapons states--France, Britain, Russia
and China--and several key ``threshold'' states, especially
India, must focus extraordinary attention on resolving the
final sticking points. Should they fail, this narrow window
of opportunity could be lost for years to come--and lost with
it would be the world's best hope for ending the global
spread of nuclear weapons. At this point, four of the five
declared nuclear powers (and virtually all the other states)
support the Clinton administration's position on the question
of what, exactly, the treaty would ban: all nuclear
explosions of any size. The holdout is China, which insists
on the right to conduct so-called peaceful nuclear explosions
(PNEs), which are indistinguishable from weapons tests.
China has won no support from any quarter on the non-
weapons-related tests and is thus considered likely to drop
this condition. But China and some other states have also
tied the question of when, and if, the treaty would enter
into force to whether the threshold states--India, Pakistan
and Israel--sign on. And India is stubbornly holding out on
an unrealistic insistence that the treaty include a time-
bound pledge of complete nuclear disarmament. There are a
handful of other hurdles, but they are relatively minor
compared to the Indian disarmament demand and the question of
entry into force. Over the next six weeks, it is essential
that President Clinton, personally, make resolution of these
disputes a top policy priority.
The key is to persuade the holdouts that a complete nuclear
test ban is in their self-interest because it constrains
their neighbors as much as themselves and blocks the costly
dynamic of regional nuclear arms races. Even Iran has bowed
to this logic and become a key backer of the treaty.
Time is of the essence. When the conference chair tables a
new draft text later

[[Page S6975]]

this month, everyone must give a little, take a little and
climb on board.
____

[From the Boston Globe, June 6, 1996]

Toward the Test Ban

The sword of Damocles invoked by John Kennedy remained
suspended throughout the Cold War. But since the superpower
balance of nuclear terror has vanished, the first lines of
defense against nuclear war have become the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
being drafted this month in Geneva.
After four decades of Herculean labors, a test ban treaty
is on the verge of completion. A promising text drawn up by
the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty,
Dutch Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, effaces Beijing's disingenuous
efforts to preserve the possibility of ``peaceful'' nuclear
tests. The Ramaker draft also discards India's equally
disingenuous attempt to make a test ban conditional on the
prior achievement of complete nuclear disarmament by a given
date. Both these loopholes would have had the effect of
sabotaging a comprehensive test ban.
In the Ramaker test, however, there is one article that
looms as a deal-breaker. It is called the entry-into-force
provision, and it requires that 37 countries hosting key
verification stations or laboratories must ratify the test
ban treaty before it can enter into force.
This is a formula for granting veto power to at least 37
states. It would also create an incentive for those states to
demand a price for ratification. In particular, it would
bestow on India--the ``threshold'' country expected to balk
at ratifying the treaty--an ability to prevent the test ban
from ever being implemented.
A preferred solution would be to require a set number of
ratifications--on the order of 60 or 65 as in the Chemical
Weapons Convention--before the treaty enters into force. In
this way, the possibilities for delay and blackmail would be
removed, and instead of having veto power, India would come
under international pressure to join a treaty that had
already entered into force.
President Clinton, who has fought admirably for a test ban,
should make an all-out effort to persuade the nuclear powers
to clear the final hurdle.
____

[From the New York Times, June 7, 1996]

A Nuclear Test Ban Within Reach

For the past 40 years, diplomats have dreamed of
negotiating a treaty that would ban all nuclear weapons
tests. Such an accord could significantly slow the nuclear
arms race, which has diverted hundreds of billions of dollars
from civilian needs and heightened the risk of nuclear
warfare.
That dream is now closer to realization than ever before.
Yesterday China dropped its insistence on making an exception
for so-called ``peaceful nuclear explosions.'' That means all
five officially recognized nuclear powers--the United States,
Russia, Britain, France and China--now support a complete
test ban.
Other differences remain among the 38 nations negotiating
in Geneva. They involve verification procedures, test site
inspections and how many countries must ratify the treaty
before it goes into effect. But acceptable compromises seem
within reach before the June 28 negotiating deadline. The
next three weeks will require an intensive push by the
Clinton Administration, which deserves credit for pressing
for completion of a treaty.
The move toward a test ban is part of a broader global
bargaining process that last year produced an indefinite
renewal of the treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons
and technology. In exchange for permanently renouncing their
own nuclear ambitions, nations without nuclear weapons wanted
the nuclear powers to agree to cut back their weapons
research. Accordingly, Washington and the other nuclear
powers committed themselves to completing a total nuclear
test ban treaty this year. If a text is agreed on in Geneva
this month, it will be ready for signing at the United
Nations General Assembly in September.
While the five nuclear powers agree on a complete ban, they
differ on what kind of intelligence information should
trigger a demand for on-site inspection and who should
have the power to dispatch inspectors.
China and other third-world countries are uneasy about
using satellite intelligence systems they have not yet
developed, and want to rely on an international network of
more common seismic, sound and radiation detectors. It may be
possible to employ both types of intelligence.
The United States also would like inspectors to be
dispatched as soon as treaty officials detect a possible
violation, while China would prefer requiring that such
decisions be approved by two-thirds of the countries
monitoring the treaty. A compromise requiring a simple
majority vote within 72 hours of an official request seems
within reach.
The other remaining disagreement concerns when the treaty
will become effective. After the 38-nation negotiating
conference completes its work, the treaty will be offered to
all nations for signature and ratification. The five nuclear
powers, along with scores of other countries, are likely to
sign on. But some countries considered capable of making a
nuclear weapon may not. India strongly resists agreements,
and if India stays out, Pakistan may also refuse to sign. It
would be better if the two countries approved the treaty, but
if they decline, other nations should proceed without them.
The treaty and its verification provisions can be used to
detect and publicize any violations by these and other
holdout countries.
With China's important concession and other moves toward
compromise, there is now a good chance for agreement by June
28. Washington should continue to fight for improved
verification and inspection provisions, while preparing for
reasonable compromises that may be necessary to secure this
long-sought barrier to the nuclear arms race.
____

[From the Washington Post, June 14, 1996]

40 Years Later

Forty years after the effort to halt nuclear testing began,
a comprehensive test ban outlawing tests in the last
permitted environment, underground, is at last coming into
sight. The idea was so long in becoming reality because the
five declared nuclear powers found it more urgent to improve
than cap their arsenals, while others wanted to keep a
nuclear option open. Only when the Cold War ended and the
anxieties, alarms and ambitions feeding big-country bomb
programs diminished did a test ban become possible.
For nuclear powers, a treaty--a prime American goal--
amounts to restraint on qualitative weapons improvements:
arms control. For undeclared nuclear powers (there are three:
India, Pakistan and Israel) and for nuclear aspirants, a duly
ratified and enforced ban will bottle up programs of their
own: nonproliferation.
In the latest phase, the parties at Geneva found themselves
with an unworkable text containing more than 1,000 national
objections. Chairman Iaap Ramaker of the Netherlands broke
the stalemate with his own text. The talks now going on are
focused on the equal-opportunity bruises he thus inflicted.
The aim is to complete a treaty by the end of June.
China did well to abandon its insistence on a loophole for
``peaceful'' tests. But China stood alone for that dodge, and
it is making trouble by brazenly continuing underground tests
even now and raising obstacles to future one-site
inspections. Its readiness to blunt the vital enforcement
edge of nonproliferation can only stir doubts about its
purposes.
An even more difficult negotiating hurdle is the provision
on the treaty's entering into force. The United States, eager
to constrain the nuclear states' weapons, would have it go
into effect once the five declared states and a good group of
others are on board. But the other four declared states
support the chairman's demand that India, Pakistan and Israel
sign up right away. This proposal is worthy but impractical.
The treaty can't do everything for everybody; it can't for
instance, by itself ease the anxieties that animate those
three undeclared nuclear states.
Testing was once widely thought of as the live fuse of an
``arms race'' that had to be slowed to ensure the planet's
survival. Later, the idea of a test ban was set aside in a
mutual Soviet-American reliance for safety on nuclear
deterrence. The political agreements of the Reagan period
finally diminished the great-power nuclear risks. But a test
ban remains a useful tool for reducing the lingering risks,
especially of those nuclear weapons in or potentially in
irresponsible hands.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I advise my friend from Nebraska we only have
two speakers on our side. We prefer to see what arguments are posited
against the amendment and then respond to them at that time.
Mr. EXON. I thank my colleague. I was just trying to divide the time
to go back and forth.
I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, we have been dealing with this subject here
in the Senate for a long time. We started to get some agreement on
these matters back as far as 1972 with the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, the SALT I interim agreements, START I and the START II
Treaties, which came along a little bit later. These treaties first put
a cap on the nuclear arms race.
These were followed by some other agreements. In 1974 President Nixon
got the Threshold Test Ban Treaty through and President Ford
accomplished the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives Treaty in 1976.
These were all great steps along the way. Many people thought, along
the way, we would never get to a day when we would have a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, where all nuclear explosives would not be tested
anymore, that we would cap things at that point. But here we are, about
to achieve it, just about to achieve it. Will we be able to make it? I
do not really know at this point. But I do know this, the final stages
of negotiating are underway right now with the CTBT.

[[Page S6976]]

The administration has come out and given a very strong statement in
a letter to Senator Exon that opposes this amendment because they feel,
and I agree with them, that this amendment could not come at a worse
time in these negotiations. The CTBT negotiations in the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva have a deadline of this Friday, the day after
tomorrow, in which, by that time, we may be able to have a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for the first time since entering the
nuclear age. It will, indeed, be a historic time if we accomplish that.
This amendment we are considering here this evening could be
interpreted by some of those States that are negotiating over there now
as maybe a little subterfuge, as maybe we are not quite meaning what we
are negotiating in Geneva. In fact, they may believe that we are
pulling the rug out from under our negotiators at Geneva by even
bringing this up for a vote. If this would happen to be agreed to, it
would really be a tragic thing for our negotiators over there, because
it would call into real doubt our intentions for the long-term future.
The administration has no such plans or intentions to circumvent the
provisions that they are negotiating over there. So I hope the people
with whom we are negotiating are under no illusions about this and are
not led astray in their thinking because of any proposal such as this
amendment on the floor.
The administration also has not requested any funding for any
additional tests, so their intent is very clear. It is to go along with
the way they have been negotiating in Geneva in good faith. Our allies
and the people negotiating there should be assured of that. This has
been in good faith.
This amendment would, in effect, also relax the existing legislative
moratorium just at the time when the only remaining state still
conducting nuclear tests, China, has announced it will join the global
moratorium in September.
Three of us, Senator Feinstein, Senator Nunn, and myself, were in
Beijing in January of this year. We brought this up to President Jiang
Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China. We talked to him
about what their view was on the CTBT. He said they are still
negotiating on it, but if it was negotiated and went into effect by the
end of the year, China would--in effect, they would make it a point to
have all of their nuclear tests done by that time. That is exactly what
they are planning to do. Because China has announced it will join the
global moratorium in September.

As to reliability of our stockpile, we are confident that, as they
say in the letter from the White House, ``The Science-Based Stockpile
Stewardship will ensure we can * * *''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. GLENN. Might I have 1 more minute?
Mr. EXON. I yield 1 more minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 1 additional
minute.
Mr. GLENN. ``* * * meet the challenge of maintaining the reliability
and safety of our nuclear inventory absent nuclear testing.'' They are
convinced of that. These are our highest level people who deal with
this.
But the President has also assured us if there was any doubt of this,
and it was brought to his attention, what he would do is say we have to
come out of the treaty if there was any doubt about the safety of our
stockpile or the reliability of it.
With that kind of assurance, it seems to me the least we should do to
show faith with our negotiators at Geneva is to make very, very certain
we defeat this amendment tonight.
Continuing the letter:

There is a concern on the part of the cosponsors of the
amendment that, if such a problem arose after September 30
but before the CTBT entered into force, current law would
prohibit remedial testing.

Mr. President, I do not accept such reasoning. We have quite a legacy
of testing that gives us high confidence in our nuclear arsenal, a
legacy backed up today and tomorrow by the Stockpile Stewardship
program. And if we support our negotiators, rather than undercut them
with initiatives that cast doubt on America's resolve to proceed with
its commitment to a complete and total ban on all nuclear tests, our
country's security will be all the better served.
If that were to occur, it is important to recognize that
one or more years would be required to prepare for any
resumption of nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. During
this time, we would be able to obtain the necessary funding
and legislative relief to carry out the necessary test.
In short, the Administration believes that the Kyl-Reid
Amendment is not only not necessary, but it also entails a
genuine risk of delaying or derailing the CTBT negotiations
just as we may well be poised to achieve a global ban on
nuclear testing.
Sincerely,

William C. Danvers,

Special Assistant to the
President for Legislative Affairs.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered by the
Senator from Arizona. Today, in Geneva, delegations from 60 countries
are assembled to negotiate an agreement that leaders from around the
world have dreamed of and worked toward for nearly 40 years. The goal
is a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to outlaw nuclear testing around the
world, and it is well within reach at long last. This amendment would
clearly undermine that all-important strategy, and it ought to be
defeated.
The Kyl amendment also seeks to reverse the current U.S. moratorium
on nuclear testing, which formed a solid basis for American leadership
in the international effort to achieve a CTB. Our adoption of a
moratorium convinced the four other declared nuclear weapons states
that a Comprehensive Test Ban would serve their security interests.
Britain, Russia, France, and China have all agreed in principle to a
CTB that will ban all nuclear explosions, no matter how small.
This amendment would make a mockery of this unanimous commitment. The
United States and many other nations are now poised to cross the
threshold into a world free from nuclear testing. This amendment would
be a classic case of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory at this
critical moment in the nuclear era.
The proponents of the amendment claim that it gives the President the
ability to ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
stockpile. But the nuclear stockpile is already safe and reliable. The
JASON panel, a group of our most eminent nuclear experts, states this
fact in its March 1995 report to the Secretary of Energy. The panel
concluded that the United States can rely on the Clinton
administration's stockpile stewardship program--developed by the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--to
maintain high confidence in the reliability and safety of our nuclear
stockpile. No further testing is needed.
Thirty-three years ago, in his famous address at American University,
President Kennedy called for the negotiation of a Comprehensive Test
Ban, and ever since, Republicans and Democrats alike have worked to
meet that great goal. Today, we are on the verge of success. Supporting
the Comprehensive Test Ban is the single most important step the Senate
can take to achieve a non-nuclear future. I urge my collegues to oppose
the Kyl amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Time is running against both
sides.
The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I have just checked with the
Parliamentarian. I believe there are 40 minutes left on that side. I
have a net of 3 minutes left because I am reserving 10 minutes for
Senator Hatfield under a previous arrangement.
I guess I have been in debates in the U.S. Senate for a long, long
time, but the other side, who are proposing the amendment, do not seem
to want to talk. I do not quite understand. It certainly is not fair,
under the usual procedures that we follow here, for one side to use up
its time and then the other side sit in deafening silence when their
time comes to talk.
I suggest to the Chair, it would not be fair for the other side not
to make their arguments for the proposition that they are trying to
force on the United States of America.
When you enter into time agreements, you expect some fair assumption
of the responsibilities of the managers of the bill on both sides. This
Senator has been here on the floor.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

[[Page S6977]]

Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am delighted to take some time. As I
informed the Senator from Nebraska earlier, we had only two speakers
remaining on our side. I knew the Senator from Nebraska had several
speakers. I, therefore, wanted to give those speakers an opportunity to
present the arguments against our amendment, which I had already
explained in great detail when we first laid it down a week ago. I have
been on the floor twice explaining it. I will do it again. I am happy
to do it, because we are asking for something that is very modest, yet
very important. I hope all the Senators who are watching will
appreciate the fact it is important to defeat the motion to table that
will be laid down.
I think the easiest way to describe what this amendment does is to
use this chart. If you go to the line above Kyl-Reid amendment, you see
where we are today: the status quo, what the law provides with respect
to nuclear testing. And that is what we are talking about today: the
President's authority to conduct an underground nuclear test in the
event that he should deem it necessary to do so.
That authority expires, Mr. President, on September 30 of this year.
When some say, ``Well, we may not have that big of a problem with the
amendment, but we're concerned about the timing because we're engaged
in these delicate negotiations''--I will come back to that in a
minute--but the reason we raised the amendment now is because the
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee said if you have
amendments to the bill, lay them down now. Mine was the second
amendment laid down, just following the instructions of the chairman.
Secondly, we have to do this before September 30. As you know, we are
not going to have that much in the way of legislative time.
But third, I have already offered to the Senator from Nebraska, who I
see now leaves the Chamber, but I made this offer before and I make it
again. I am delighted to delay this vote until the evening of the
28th--long after the day in Geneva has expired--because I have no
intention of having this amendment have any effect whatsoever on the
negotiations. It does not, it cannot, there is no relationship
whatsoever, but for those who thought it might, I was perfectly willing
to delay the vote, and I am still willing to do that.
I will make that offer here again right now. Assuming we defeat the
motion to table, I will be happy to have this amendment be the very
last one considered before final action on the defense authorization
bill, which I assume will be on Friday. Now let us go back to the
explanation of the law.
On September 30, there is only one basis for the President to conduct
a nuclear test, and that is if another nation tests. Over the last 12
months or so, we have seen France test, Russia may have tested--the
intelligence is not clear on that--and China has conducted a test, and
China has said it is going to conduct at least one more test.
So those tests would give the President of the United States the
authority to conduct nuclear tests until such time as the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] goes into force. That is what we have showing
here. We do not know when that will be, if ever, but we presume it will
occur, and so we just entered it on this line here.

At that point, as the Senator from Nebraska said, there will not be
any nuclear test, except in the extraordinary event of what is called
the supreme national interest, which is an event very unlikely, if at
all likely, to occur.
So, in effect, the only thing that can cause the President to test
after September 30 is if another nation tests.
Now, is that a logical basis upon which the United States would
conduct nuclear testing? The answer, of course, is no. Because France
tested, does that therefore provide a reason for the United States to
test? No. Even China's tests do not provide a reason for the United
States to test.
We have developed our nuclear arsenal. We have really only three
reasons to test, Mr. President. The first is for the safety of our
stockpile, to ensure that as weapons become 20 or 30 years old and
begin to deteriorate--and they do deteriorate--that the safety of the
weapons is not compromised, that the safety requirements of the people
who handle the weapons is not compromised. I will return to that issue
of safety in a moment.
The second reason is reliability. Will they still work, or, as a
result of this deterioration, does there come a point in time when we
cannot assure the reliability of the stockpile? At that point, we do
not have an adequate return, obviously.
The third reason to test is to deal with a recent phenomenon: the
problem of terrorism. We have just seen a terrible event occur in Saudi
Arabia involving a bomb, and many people have suggested that perhaps
the terrorist state's worst weapon is a nuclear bomb delivered by a
truck. Today, we do not have a good way of dismantling that bomb, and
the experts at our national laboratories believe that there may come a
point in time when we have to understand how to dismantle such a
weapon. We have to know how to do it, obviously, in advance, because we
may have very little warning when the time comes.
Do you shoot a laser at it? Do you overpower it with electrical
voltage? What can you do to disarm that bomb? We may have to conduct
some kind of low-level test to find that out.
None of this, Mr. President, advances nuclear weapons in the world.
As a matter of fact, it is all designed to reduce their use: the
dismantling or disarming of a terrorist device, providing for total
safety so no device would ever go off. These are defensive measures, if
you will. We are not developing new nuclear weapons, and nobody is
proposing to do that.
But, effectively, after September 30, our ability to test, unless
another country tests, will have been eliminated, terminated by the
law, and that is what we are trying to prevent.
What we are saying in our amendment is really very simple, and if you
go below the line that says ``Kyl-Reid amendment,'' you will see what
our amendment will do.
We simply extend this September 30 deadline until such time as a CTBT
goes into effect. At that point, you have an entirely different set of
rules, but until that time, we continue to have the option of testing
for stockpile safety and reliability purposes. We would not have to
wait for another nation to test to have the ability to test.

But importantly, we also added some other safeguards in our
amendment. We provide in our amendment that the President will continue
to report to the Congress on the stockpile and will provide a report on
the necessity for any testing. Now, those reports are not required
after September 30. And we provide that the President's authority to
test after September 30 is subject to a veto by the Congress. If a
majority of the Congress says ``no'' to a testing message by the
President, then the President would not be allowed to test. So we
tighten up the law after September 30, and I think that is a good thing
for us to have done.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a brief question?
Mr. KYL. Quickly; yes, I will yield.
Mr. LEVIN. You said if a majority of Congress votes to disapprove the
resolution----
Mr. KYL. That is correct.
Mr. LEVIN. Is it not true the President could then veto that
resolution?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I believe the answer to the question is that
a veto would lie in the event that a majority of the Congress voted to
disapprove the President's action.
Mr. LEVIN. And if the President, in fact, submitted such a
resolution, is it not very likely he would veto a resolution that a
majority of the Congress passed?
Mr. KYL. My guess is, if a majority of Congress voted that way, it
would send a message to the President. This, in any event, is a
restriction that does not exist under current law. Today, the President
can simply say, ``I am going to test because France tested.''
I just ask my friend from Michigan, is it not better to have some way
for Congress to express itself in opposition, and if we adopt the
resolution of disapproval, it does not happen, as opposed to the
existing situation of which we have no ability to say to the President,
``No, you can't do it''?
Mr. LEVIN. For the reason I gave you a few moments ago, this would be

[[Page S6978]]

a very unsettling decision for Congress to make now that we are on the
verge of achieving that test ban. My good friend from Arizona said a
majority of Congress could vote to disapprove the resolution. I want to
clarify, this is a joint resolution of disapproval, I believe, that is
in the language, and that means the President could veto it, and any
President who submitted such a resolution would presumably veto it, so
it would, indeed, as a practical matter, take two-thirds of Congress to
overturn such a resolution; would my friend agree with that?
Mr. KYL. I appreciate the point the Senator makes. My only point is,
any action by the Congress to disapprove the decision by the President
to test in our amendment is more than the existing law, which is zero
after September 30.
Mr. President, I say to my friend from Michigan, we are trying to do
what we can to allay concerns that a rogue President would simply
decide to do something very foolish and Congress would not have any
ability to deal with it.
Let me go to some of the arguments that have been made. The first is
the one that questions our timing here. I must say that I am baffled by
this because, as I said, I made the offer to have the vote on this
amendment after June 28.
But let us look at that date June 28 again. According to the
Washington Post and other news sources--I quote from the June 21
editorial entitled ``Treaty in Trouble.'' I am not sure if this treaty
is going to be approved on this Friday in any event, regardless of what
we do. The editorial begins by saying:

The bleak possibility arises that negotiations on a test
ban treaty may fall into a deepening deadline or--an even
more bitter prospect--produce a treaty that will languish and
not be put into effect.

They point out this is because of a deadlock of the several nations
of the world that do not have or may not have nuclear capability and
are putting demands on the countries that do. They say, ``We will not
sign up unless you disarm yourself totally.'' This is the country of
India. Pakistan says, ``If India does not sign up, we do not sign up.''
So there is a significant question as to whether or not this treaty is
going to be approved on Friday in any event. But let us assume that, in
any event, it is voted on by Friday and is approved. I have already
indicated that I am perfectly happy to have the vote on our amendment
subsequent to that time.
Third, and most important, this amendment has nothing whatsoever to
do with the CTBT. Again, referencing the chart will make that point
clear, we say that at such point in time as the CTBT enters into force,
that is what controls. But we fill this hiatus after September 30, when
the President cannot test for safety and reliability, by continuing the
authority for the President to do that, again, unless Congress
disapproves.
For the life of me, I cannot understand why someone would want to tie
our hands in this regard particularly where safety is concerned. We
test everything else for safety, from the pistol that is issued to the
troops to the airplanes that fly, to the ships and everything else. We
test all of our other weapons all the time for safety and reliability.
But we are saying we want to cover our eyes and not know whether the
most complex and devastating weapons in the world are safe?
Mr. President, what if we were talking about chemical weapons here,
and there was a suggestion that a chemical or biological warhead was
beginning to leak. Would we have a statute here that says, no, we do
not want to worry about that because we want to do away with all
chemical weapons? That is the same argument being made here. We want to
do away with nuclear weapons, so we're not even going to test them,
even if we conclude they might not be safe. It does not make sense.
This amendment does not do anything to the CTBT. It simply continues
the existing law until there is a CTBT.
There is a letter from one of the administration officials that says,
well, this could signal a possible intent to conduct tests. How? The
administration has already said it is not going to conduct tests. No
funding has been requested. It disclaims any interest in conducting
tests. That ought to answer that.
But in any event, if we had a dangerous weapon, would somebody in
Britain--why should they be opposed to our testing to make sure that we
could ensure the safety of our weapons, so that our personnel would not
be irradiated, for example? What is so wrong with ensuring that we have
that element of safety?
Finally, I find a bit of an irony here with people who are commending
the Chinese for joining the family of nations that want to do away with
testing. The Chinese have already said that they are going to conduct
another test.
They are going to conduct another test. Let us say it is after
September 30, 1996. The fact is, they can conduct a test until the CTBT
goes into effect. There is nothing to prohibit the British from
conducting a test or the French or the Russians. We would be the only
nation of the declared nuclear powers that is saying, we alone will not
test after September 30, no matter how long it takes to get to the
CTBT. What if we do not have a CTBT for 10 years or 15 years? We and we
alone would be prohibited from testing for safety purposes. How does
that make any sense?
More importantly, how could that cause people in Geneva to worry?
They have the right to conduct tests. If we simply consider an
amendment that would extend the President's authority beyond September
30, that is going to somehow give people concern that they should not
sign the treaty because maybe the United States is going to begin
conducting tests again, when they have that very right? It does not
seem to me that is a very sound argument, Mr. President.
Finally, there was the suggestion that we have our stockpile
stewardship program, it can handle the situation, we do not need to
test, and that is what we are relying on. The problem is, this
administration, while they say they do not need to test, that we can
rely upon this stockpile stewardship program--which is essentially
trying to, through computer analysis, determine if there are any
problems with the stockpile, examine them from time to time, and
otherwise try to take care of them in a way that they will not
deteriorate, although they do deteriorate--but notwithstanding that
being our policy, the administration is not funding it adequately. As a
result, one wonders whether or not these weapons really are going to
continue to be safe and reliable.
If you are going to use the stockpile stewardship argument in
opposition to the possibility of ever testing, then you darn well
better have a good stockpile stewardship program. But this
administration is not doing that.
Hazel O'Leary, the Secretary of Energy, is responsible for the
program. In testimony to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on April 16,
the Secretary had this to say about the outyear funding for the
stockpile stewardship:

I think we all have reason to be concerned about the
outyears. It is in that area where I have no quarrel with
their concern. [The laboratory directors had expressed
concern for years.] I think we need to work together to
address that.

The point had been made earlier that the funding that had been
requested as the minimum level necessary, according to C. Bruce Tarter,
of University of California's Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, was $4
billion a year. Yet the President's request for this year is $3.7
billion. So it would be nice to rely upon the stockpile stewardship; it
would be even nicer if the administration, which allegedly opposes our
amendment here, would properly fund the stockpile stewardship. I do not
have a lot of confidence in that in that event.
I am going to conclude at this point, Mr. President, by saying our
amendment has no hidden agenda behind it. We are not seeking to engage
in testing. It should not have any impact on the discussions that are
occurring. As I said, I am willing to have the vote after that anyway.
The only thing we are trying to do is preserve the ability of the
President in that kind of emergency where he may need it to engage in
some kind of low-level, underground testing to preserve the safety and
reliability of our stockpile up until such time as the CTBT should go
into force.

I urge, Mr. President, that our colleagues who are watching and
listening here support the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in
his request that we vote no on the motion to table.

[[Page S6979]]

Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH). Who yields time?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am happy to yield whatever time the
distinguished Senator from Idaho, a member of the Armed Services
Committee, needs.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
I want to acknowledge the expertise of the Senator from Arizona.
To me it is quite clear-cut and straightforward what the Senator is
offering. The explanation that he has gone through, I think, has laid
it appropriately before us. This amendment does not require or even
foresee the need for the United States to begin testing nuclear weapons
in the near future.
What it does is put the United States on a level footing with the
other signatory nations to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
or the CTBT. This amendment does nothing more than provide the
President with the ability to resume testing if and only if he deems
that the supreme national interest dictates such action.
So what does this amendment do and what does it not do? It does not
undermine ongoing CTBT negotiations. It does not require the United
States to resume testing. It does not even encourage the resumption of
testing.
It does place four additional requirements on the President that must
be met before testing could be reinitiated, four additional
requirements.
This amendment also clarifies a discrepancy between existing U.S. law
and the treaty language regarding what is and what is not considered to
be a nuclear test. Without this clarification, the treaty, when signed,
would be in conflict with U.S. law.
This amendment also gives the President authority that he says he
needs to ensure our national defense.
In his August 1995 statement regarding the CTBT, President Clinton
identified the conditions that would cause the United States to resume
nuclear testing. This amendment provides the President the flexibility
to respond to such conditions should they arise, the conditions which
the President outlined.
This amendment is very narrow. It provides the United States rights
that are equal to those of other CTBT signatory nations. It clarifies
ambiguities in existing U.S. law. It reinstates important congressional
reporting requirements, and it provides the President with the
flexibility he says he needs to ensure our national defense. It does
not promote the resumption of nuclear testing. It does not undermine
the current negotiations. This is a prudent, I believe, a much needed
provision.
I ask the Senator from Arizona if he would respond to a question or
two.
Mr. KYL. I am happy to respond.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I ask the Senator from Arizona if he would clarify
the key date of September 30 of this year. It is my understanding that
on September 30 the provisions provided in the Hatfield-Exon measure
expire.
Mr. KYL. That is correct.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Now, there are what are termed ``declared nuclear
states,'' and there are five of those, one of which is China. The
Senator has indicated, and I have seen it elsewhere, that China has
indicated that it is going to test again.
What happens if they test after September 30? What happens if the
Kyl-Reid amendment is in effect? What happens if the Kyl-Reid amendment
is not in effect?
Mr. KYL. This is an illustration of why this amendment would be
useful. Without the Kyl amendment, first of all, the President would be
able to conduct an unlimited number of underground nuclear tests just
because China conducted a test. Second, the President has no obligation
to inform the Congress, certainly not to get our consent. The Congress
does not have any authority to disapprove of any such tests, and we
would no longer after September 30, receive the reports on the safety
and reliability of the stockpile that the President has always been
required to send to the Congress.
Conversely, if our amendment is adopted, first of all, the President
is required by law to submit an annual report to the Congress that
outlines the need for any underground nuclear test. We would have 90
days to disapprove of that request, and we would indefinitely be
entitled to receive reports on the safety and reliability of the
stockpile.
At a minimum, it seems to me, Mr. President, that Congress, if it is
going to rely upon the stockpile stewardship program, should want to
continue to receive reports from the President on the viability of the
stockpile. Under existing law, that would cease to exist. Under our
amendment, the President would be required to submit the reports.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Is it fair to say and is it accurate to say that with
the Kyl-Reid amendment in place it is more restrictive on the
conditions for nuclear testing?
Mr. KYL. Yes, clearly it is, because without the Kyl-Reid amendment,
if China tests, the President can test, period, end of story.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Without any involvement of Congress?
Mr. KYL. Without any involvement by Congress or without any report.
Under our amendment, Congress has the ability to say no, and the
President would have to continue to submit a report to us and he would
have to report to us on the necessity for an underground nuclear test.
The requirement for the test would have to be based upon a stockpile
stewardship issue--safety and reliability--rather than the mere fact
that another nation decided to test, which obviously has no
relationship to our stockpile.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I thank very much the Senator from Arizona for the
clarification. Again, I think he has done a fine job of just laying it
out in a very straightforward manner so we can understand what this is
all about.
I yield my time back to the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. I inquire how much time remains.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 16 minutes
remaining and the Senator from Nebraska has 14\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from
Vermont.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to this
amendment. This is a very critical time in the history of the world.
Whether we are going to be able to stop the proliferation of nuclear
weapons is the most critical question that we face. We must work to
provide for sanctions for those that do develop weapons. In order for
us to have credibility, we have to be willing to accept the fact that
we should not test. Otherwise, it is very difficult for us to convince
others that they should not test.
There has been a fair amount of discussion about the technical
details of nuclear testing, both pro and con. I will not go over that
ground, but I would like the Senators to step back and examine the big
picture for a moment.
The real question here is national security. One of the greatest
threats to our national security is the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. We have been spending a lot of time recently discussing
whether we should build extremely expensive systems that might in the
distant future protect a fraction of the United States from a nuclear
attack. We also know that it would be very hard to protect U.S. forces
abroad from a nuclear attack.
If nuclear capabilities proliferate to rogue nations, we will be very
hard pressed to guarantee the safety of all Americans in the event of a
nuclear attack. Clearly, the best way to prevent such an attack is to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the first place. That goes to
the heart of this amendment.
The administration is currently engaged in very sensitive
negotiations to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Successful
completion of a strong test ban treaty would do more to protect
Americans from nuclear attack than any space shield currently being
envisioned. The best way to make sure we are not a target of a nuclear
weapon is to prevent the development of nuclear capabilities by more
nations. That is what a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will do and
attempt to do for us.
Passage of the Kyl-Reid amendment would send exactly the wrong signal
at a very sensitive time. The amendment says to the rest of the world
that we are ready to consider a resumption of testing, just when we
finally have

[[Page S6980]]

agreement among the major nuclear powers that it is time to put an end
to nuclear tests.
I urge my colleagues to resist this effort to overturn the Hatfield-
Mitchell legislation enacted 4 years ago, and to keep this country on
the safer course of steady progress toward a comprehensive test ban.

I yield the floor.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. President, there is obviously some serious misunderstanding here,
because Senator Kyl has not correctly stated the existing law by
suggesting that any other nuclear state could conduct a nuclear test
after September 30, and before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is
entered into, but the United States could not. This is simply not true.
If any nation tests after September 30, the law stipulates that all
restrictions on U.S. testing are limited. It is a basic tenet of the
Hatfield-Mitchell-Exon law. The only effect of the law is that the
United States will not be the first nation to test after September 30.
Would Senator Kyl agree with this correction? I ask him to do it on
his time because I am almost out of time.
Senator Kyl has also said that his amendment would allow for a
resumption of testing for ``safety and reliability'' reasons only. I
say to my friend from Arizona, if he can show me where in his amendment
it states the testing would have to be done for ``safety and
reliability'' only. I have looked and I cannot find it.
The way I read his amendment, a resumption of U.S. testing could be
for any reason whatever.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me see if I can answer the question posed
by the Senator from Nebraska who said I misstated the law. I have the
law right here. I will quote it directly. This is Public Law 102-377:
``No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United
States after September 30, 1996 unless a foreign State conducts a
nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United
States nuclear testing is lifted.'' That is precisely what I said.
After September 30, the only basis upon which we could conduct a test
is unless another nation tests--exactly as it is stated up here.

I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten minutes.
Mr. EXON. I ask the Senator from Oregon as to how much time he feels
he will need.
Mr. HATFIELD. About 4 minutes.
Mr. EXON. I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Hatfield.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized for 4
minutes.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Nebraska for
yielding. I want to also say the Senator from Nebraska, Senator Exon,
has been carrying the burden, pretty much, here on the floor on this
issue of the Kyl amendment. I want to express my deep appreciation to
the Senator for assuming that role. I am sorry I have not been able to
be more helpful, but other duties have precluded me from engaging in
more activity until now.
Mr. President, our negotiators in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
conference are on the brink of success from many perspectives. The
conference concludes at the end of this month, so in 3 days we will
know if the goal that we have worked toward for 40 years will come to
fruition. I am speaking of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has
been a goal of mine for many years. When we passed the current
moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992, we provided significant momentum
toward the CTBT.
I am very concerned that the amendment pending is characterized as a
minor change in policy and a clarification of the original moratorium
of testing which is current law. Let me be clear that this is not a
simple change. This amendment will have the effect of completely
undermining the baseline agreement reflected in that moratorium created
in 1992 and the momentum for a CTBT. I think it sends a signal that
somehow we are backing out or changing our mind on that moratorium--one
that I worked 27 years to achieve.
The current U.S. moratorium is a critical show of good faith to other
countries with whom we are negotiating this treaty. To change our
testing policy now, I think, will send shockwaves through the
international arms control community at the most critical time of the
CTBT negotiations.
Not only is this amendment untimely, it is also, I believe,
unnecessary. The President has extended the 1992 testing moratorium
because he and his military advisers concluded that our nuclear arsenal
is safe and reliable. Not even the scientists involved in nuclear
testing are calling for underground tests to resume.
More importantly, the President already has the ability to resume
testing if he determines that it is in the Nation's supreme national
interest. If we have a severe safety and reliability problem, even I
would agree with the President in exercising this option.
It seems to me that this debate would be more appropriate after the
Conference on Disarmament concludes. The Senate will have the
opportunity to debate this issue fully when the CTBT is presented to
the Senate for ratification. And if the negotiations do fall apart and
we are not able to get a treaty this year, the Congress can debate this
issue then, or any time following.

Any action now seems to me to be premature. For these reasons, I
strenuously oppose the Kyl-Reid amendment and urge my colleagues who
believe in the nonproliferation goal of achieving a Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty in 1996 to join me in opposing this amendment.
At an appropriate time, I believe the authors of this amendment are
aware that I will make a motion to table the amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote
on or in relation to the Kyl amendment occur at the hour of 8:40 this
evening, with Senator Exon in control of his previously allotted time,
and any remaining time until 8:40 under the control of Senator Kyl.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. To clarify for all Senators, we will vote this
evening at 8:40, and that is now set.
Mr. NUNN. How much time is on each side? I did not get that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six-and-a-half minutes controlled by the
Senator from Arizona, and 5 minutes controlled by the Senator from
Nebraska.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from North
Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the
remarks made by the Senator from Nebraska, Mr. Exon, and the remarks
just made by Senator Hatfield from Oregon. I could not agree with them
more. This is a critically important issue.
This is exactly the wrong proposal. It is exactly the wrong time even
to consider this proposal. What we have done in recent years to try to
make certain that we do not see continued nuclear testing has just set
the right course for the world, and the wrong vote tonight would send
exactly the wrong signal at a time when so many countries are sitting
down and hoping that by Friday we will achieve the result of never
again seeing nuclear testing in this world.
So I appreciate the leadership of the Senator from Nebraska and the
others who have spoken against the Kyl amendment. I hope the Senate
will support the motion to table.
The Kyl amendment is part of a continuing assault on arms control. I
would urge my colleagues to recall what has happened in this Congress.
Recall that the Foreign Relations Committee stalled on the START II
Treaty until the Senator from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman, began to
filibuster an unrelated bill in order to force action on the treaty.
Recall that the Senate majority throughout this Congress has been
intent on building a star wars missile defense system that would
violate the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of our arms
control regime--which may be why the majority

[[Page S6981]]

desperately wants to knock that cornerstone out of the foundation.
Recall that we still do not know when the Senate will act on the
chemical weapons convention, which would break new ground by banning
the use, production, and stockpiling of an entire class of weapons of
mass destruction. That Convention has been on the Senate calendar for
over 50 days now. I hope the majority leader will soon give us an
indication of when the Senate will vote on that historic treaty.
And we now have the Kyl amendment. Mr. President, 4 years ago
Senators Hatfield, Mitchell, and Exon worked very hard to enact a law
restricting nuclear testing by the United States. Hatfield-Exon-
Mitchell set us on a path to a moratorium on nuclear testing--which the
law will prohibit after September 30, 1996. The only loophole under
which the President can resume testing after then is if another nation
tests first.
The Kyl amendment would overturn the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell law. It
would permit the President to start nuclear testing after September 30.
The only loophole--the only way the President would not be allowed to
resume testing--is if the Congress tells him not to.
It's bad enough that the Kyl amendment would repeal a moratorium on
nuclear testing that is now in the law. However, the international
repercussions of this amendment are even worse.
Mr. President, I hope the American people realize that American
negotiators are literally working around the clock in Geneva as we
speak in order to reach agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
There are 37 countries around the table at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva, all trying to hammer out a nuclear test ban
treaty. The planet has set itself a goal of agreeing on this treaty by
this Friday, June 28. These talks are in their final, most sensitive
stage.
What is so stunning about the Kyl amendment is that it suggests that
we allow renewed nuclear testing. And the Senator from Arizona is
making this suggestion 2 days before the planet's self-imposed deadline
for achieving a treaty to ban nuclear testing for all time.
This treaty has been a goal of American foreign policy since the
Eisenhower administration, and the Kyl amendment is urging that we
allow nuclear testing again. As several of my colleagues have already
observed, leaving aside the policy implications of the amendment, it is
impossible to conceive of a worse time for this amendment to be
offered.
Mr. President, the United States has been working to lead the world
toward a test ban agreement. Since 1993, when President Clinton decided
to extend a testing moratorium, we have been leading by example. We
have refrained from testing nuclear weapons. We have developed an
ambitious stockpile stewardship program, which will ensure that our
nuclear arsenal remains the safest in the world without testing.
It is not difficult to picture the reaction of other nations if the
Kyl amendment is approved. They will wonder why our arms control
negotiators are urging them to compromise on a treaty in Geneva while
at the same time the U.S. Senate is allowing the President to resume
nuclear testing. How would we like it if the parliament of another
country at the negotiating table began to consider loosening that
country's restrictions on nuclear testing? We'd begin to question that
country's sincerity at the talks. We'd begin to wonder whether that
country intended to live up to its commitments. Well, that's how other
nations are going to feel if this amendment passes.
I urge my colleagues to vote to table the Kyl amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from North Dakota has
expired.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. EXON. I yield such time as he may need to the Senator from
Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will take a short time here. I will
support the tabling motion on this amendment. I think this is not a
necessary provision at this moment. I think it is certainly not timely.
Senator Exon and Senator Hatfield offered their amendment in 1991. It
is the law of the land. It prohibits further U.S. underground nuclear
testing unless, after September 30 of this year, another country
conducts an underground nuclear test. If another country does it, the
Exon-Hatfield provision automatically expires.
Moreover, the administration is in the final throes of negotiating a
CTBT. President Clinton pledged that if there were problems with the
U.S. weapons stockpile, he could exercise the supreme national interest
clause in the treaty in order to take the necessary steps to protect
our security.
If adopted, it is my belief that this amendment, particularly with
the timing, could make the negotiations of the CTBT harder rather than
easier to conclude.
So I urge my colleagues to support the Hatfield tabling motion when
it is made.
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me make what may be my concluding
remarks.
The Senator from Oregon, who will make a motion in just a moment, had
two primary points. I would like to respond to both of them.
The first is, he said we do not want to change our testing policy
now. I know that is the thing that animates him most in this debate.
I want to state to everybody here that there is no intention to do
this. This amendment does not do it. It is the President who
establishes a testing policy. There is not a word in this amendment
that suggests that we ought to test, how we ought to test; nothing
whatsoever. All we do in this amendment is to preserve existing law. So
we are not going to change our policy by this law. We are going to
preserve it. We are going to say that after September 30 the ability of
the President to test, if he thinks it is necessary, would continue to
exist until there is a CTBT. That will expire unless we extend his
authority.
There is one condition under which we would be allowed to test in the
future, as the Senator from Nebraska has pointed out; that is, if
another nation tests. That does not have anything to do with whether we
ought to test unless we are trying to develop a new weapon, and nobody
is suggesting that we would test for that reason.
Listen to the words that I read of the President of the United
States, Bill Clinton. Here is what he said he would need the authority
to do under a test ban regime.
August 11, 1995, his statement regarding the CTBT, his safeguard F
specifically says:

If the President of the United States is informed by the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, advised by
the Nuclear Weapons Council, Directors of the DOE's Nuclear
Weapons Laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command that a high level of confidence in the safety and
reliability of a nuclear weapon type, which the two
Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent,
could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation
with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT
under the standards of the Supreme National Interest Clause,
if in order, to conduct whatever testing might be required.

That is the authority that President Bill Clinton says he will need
to have in the future. He will have that authority under the
Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but he will not have
that authority, ironically, prior to that time.
So, ironically, the authority that he requests after the CTBT goes
into effect, which would exist at this point, does not exist in the
interim period of time after September 30. He would not have the
ability to test for the reasons that he indicated in his statement.
All we are trying to do by this amendment is to continue the existing
law to give him that authority and to require that he report to the
Congress. We add one thing and one thing only. Congress has a right to
disapprove of his action by a majority vote of both Houses of the
Congress. We thought that was a good thing, not a bad thing, if people
are concerned about the President. But this President, Bill Clinton,
has said he needs the authority to test.

We simply continue that authority until the CTBT takes effect. It
would be ironic, indeed, for the President to request the authority
after the CTBT goes into effect but not before then.
The second point made by the Senator from Oregon is the same point

[[Page S6982]]

that others have made. They wish that we did not have to debate this
right now and have a vote on it prior to the 28th.
I have said over and over again--I renew my offer to the
distinguished ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, and to
the Senator from Nebraska--I would be delighted to have a vote on my
amendment. If we do not table it here, we can have a vote on this
amendment after those negotiations in Geneva are concluded. They are to
be concluded in Geneva on the 29th, by Friday. By the time we vote on
Friday it would be nighttime in Geneva.
Therefore, I would be pleased to enter into a unanimous-consent
agreement that our vote be postponed until that time.
I do not know what more I can do to demonstrate that we are not
trying to influence what is going on over there. I understand that is
the argument that has been brought up. But I fail to appreciate why our
offer is not going to be accepted as a result of that.
I reserve the remainder of my time. Those are my comments with
respect to the Senator from Oregon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from Nebraska
have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes fifty seconds.
Mr. EXON. I yield myself that time, and then the Senator from Oregon
will be in to offer the tabling motion.
I want to take just a moment and thank my dear friend and colleague
from Oregon, Senator Hatfield, for all of the staunch support and
leadership that he has given. We have worked on this matter because we
have a total joint understanding of just how critical the end to
nuclear testing can be for mankind. It is absolutely essential that the
United States continue to provide leadership in this area. Thanks once
again to my friend from Oregon.
Both the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Nebraska will
conclude our careers in the U.S. Senate this year. Somebody else will
have to take up from there if we are to continue. If we have not
reached a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that is still a must.
I simply say, Mr. President, that the U.S. President says the act is
not needed now; the National Security Council, I have entered a letter
to that effect; the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency says it is
not necessary; the Secretary of Energy says it is not necessary; not
only is it not necessary, but it could not come up at a worse time.
I just hope that we will put this matter over by the tabling motion
that is going to be offered.
I would simply advise the Senate that, if for any reason the tabling
motion does not prevail, there is going to be long and extended debate
on this particular amendment.
With that, Mr. President, I simply say put this off, keep mankind
informed, do something about it next year and not now. It has no
adverse effect whatsoever on the national security interests of the
United States, or the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal.
I thank the Chair. I yield back any time I have remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time of the Senator from Nebraska has
expired.
Mr. KYL. While we are waiting for the Senator from Oregon to arrive,
Mr. President, I will conclude by saying that in an entire week of
debate here, there has not been a new argument raised. The two primary
arguments are that it would be good to put this vote over until the
28th, which I would be happy to do; and, second, that the
administration has not asked for this authority.
But as I just quoted from the President of the United States, Bill
Clinton, he explicitly said that he would have to have the authority to
test if his advisers came to him and said that it was in the supreme
national interest that he do so, as a result of which there will be a
clause in the CTBT which allows the President to test under that
circumstance.
I have simply said that it would be ironic for us to have the ability
to do that today, to have that ability under the CTBT but not to have
that authority during the interim period of time, when the other
declared nuclear nations do have that ability--mentioning one, for
example, the nation of China, which has already indicated its intent to
conduct just such a test.
So it seems to me that nations that might be concerned about what the
United States is doing ought to focus their energies more on a country
like China. It is still developing its arsenal. We would only test, as
the President himself has said, for the purpose of ensuring the safety
and reliability of our stockpile.
So this amendment does nothing more than extend the authority of the
President up until the time there is a CTBT. It has no other effect
than that.
I urge my colleagues not to support the motion to table and to vote
``no'' on the motion to table that I assume is about to be entered.
Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jeffords). The Senate is awaiting the
arrival of Senator Hatfield to make a motion to table.
Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I simply say I know the Senator from Oregon
is about to come into the Chamber. In deference to the Senator from
Oregon and his long service to this body, I would like to ask unanimous
consent that we delay temporarily until the Senator from Oregon is able
to come on the floor to offer the tabling motion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

Privilege of the Floor

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the privileges of
the floor be granted to Mr. Zack Davis, of my staff, for the time
during which this measure is pending.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HATFIELD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I move to table the Kyl amendment, and I
ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of
the Senator from Oregon to lay on the table the amendment of the
Senator from Arizona. On this question, the yeas and nays have been
ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] and
the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman] are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber who desire to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 53, nays 45, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 176 Leg.]

YEAS--53

Akaka
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Boxer
Bradley
Byrd
Chafee
Conrad
D'Amato
Daschle
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Exon
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Grassley
Harkin
Hatfield
Heflin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Kassebaum
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Nunn
Pell
Pressler
Pryor
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Simon
Specter
Stevens
Wellstone
Wyden

NAYS--45

Abraham
Ashcroft
Bond
Breaux
Brown
Bryan
Burns
Campbell
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Coverdell
Craig
DeWine
Faircloth
Frahm
Frist
Gramm
Grams
Gregg
Hatch
Helms
Hutchison
Inhofe
Johnston
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Reid
Roth
Santorum
Shelby
Simpson
Smith
Snowe
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner

NOT VOTING--2

Bingaman
Bumpers

The motion to table the amendment (No. 4049) was agreed to.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
motion was agreed to.
Mr. EXON. I move to lay that motion on the table.

[[Page S6983]]

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Tricare

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise in support of the subcommittee
language regarding the TRICARE program and the alternative financing
mechanism requested by DOD. I appreciate the cautious approach the
subcommittee has taken. This alternative financing mechanism may have
significant merit and it should be thoroughly tested and evaluated
before it is fully implemented.
The Tidewater area of Virginia, which is part of TRICARE Region 2,
has long been the premier test site for DOD health care programs. The
TRICARE Tidewater Demonstration Project ran from October 1, 1992 to
September 30, 1995, and all of its initiatives continue to the present
under the new TRICARE regulations that went into effect nationwide in
October of 1995. A TRICARE Service Center has operated in Portsmouth,
VA since October of 1992. A managed mental health program has been in
place for at least a decade. TRICARE Extra has been in place since the
beginning of the demonstration project and TRICARE Prime began to phase
in during December of 1994. Today, more than 60,000 people are enrolled
in TRICARE. It is significant to note that this has been accomplished
without a Managed Care Support Contract.
The lead agent for region 2 is the Portsmouth Naval Hospital, and all
three services are well represented in the region, which also includes
Langley AFB, Ft. Bragg, and Camp LeJeune. Their invaluable experience
as the test bed for incorporating new ideas in DOD health care makes
region 2 the ideal candidate for testing DOD's new funding approach to
TRICARE. We should proceed cautiously with this new approach, as we
endeavor to improve TRICARE. In this light, I would urge DOD to
consider developing benchmarks by testing alternative methods of
financing in region 2 in its current environment without a managed care
support contract, and I will work toward this outcome in conference.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I too support the intent of the
subcommittee language. DOD's alternative financing methods for the
TRICARE Program may have significant merit, however, I also share
Senator Warner's concerns that this new concept be fully tested and
developed before it is implemented. Region 2 is obviously the most
experienced and therefore the best qualified region to operate this
test and I support Senator Warner's recommendation.

BRAC Military Construction of Unaccompanied Enlisted Housing at Ft.
Leonard Wood, MO

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, when the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure
Commission [BRAC] recommended closure of Fort McClellan, AL, and
relocation of Fort McClellan's Military Police and Chemical Schools to
Fort Leonard Wood, MO, that decision was based in part on the Defense
Department's recommendation to the Commission that basic training being
conducted at Ft. Leonard Wood be moved elsewhere in order to make room
for the additional personnel and activities associated with MP and
chemical training.
Subsequent to the adoption by Congress and the President of the BRAC
'95 recommendations, the Army changed its position and has now opted to
keep basic training at Fort Leonard Wood. In this regard, I am
concerned that the FY97 Defense Authorization bill contains $58 million
in BRAC IV military construction funds for ``unaccompanied enlisted
housing'' at Fort Leonard Wood, one of four projects totaling $118
million in similar BRAC IV funding for that post. While it is possible
that some of these funds are necessary to accommodate BRAC-directed
moves, it is my understanding that this $58 million project is being
undertaken partly to enable Fort Leonard Wood to continue to
accommodate its existing basic training load.
Mr. NICKLES. I would like to compliment my colleague from Oklahoma
for his diligent attention to this issue, and make clear to the
distinguished Chairman that I share his concerns. I would respectfully
remind the Chairman that the Defense Department's recommendation to the
Commission on this matter was based on the Army's stated intention to
decrease the basic training load at Fort Leonard Wood and increase
basic training at Fort Jackson, SC; Fort Knox, KY; and Fort Sill, OK.
According to the Department's recommendations to BRAC, each of these
installations was to receive 1,400-1,500 basic trainees from Fort
Leonard Wood, approximately one basic training battalion each.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask that a copy of a letter from myself
and Senator Nickles to GAO dated 20 June 1996 be printed in the Record
at this point.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, June 20, 1996.
Mr. Richard Davis,
Director, National Security Analysis, National Security and
International Affairs Divisions, U.S. General Accounting
Office, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Davis: The 1995 Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission's (BRAC) recommendations to close Ft.
McClellan, AL and move its Military Police (MP) and Chemical
Schools to Ft. Leonard Wood, MO, was based on the Defense
Department's recommendation that basic training activities at
Ft. Leonard Wood be moved elsewhere in order to make room for
the additional personnel and activities associated with MP
and Chemical training.
Subsequent to the adoption of the BRAC 95 recommendations,
the Army changed its position and has now opted to keep basic
training at Ft. Leonard Wood. Specifically, at the time of
the BRAC decision, it was the Army's stated intention to
close out basic training at Ft. Leonard Wood and divide that
basic training among Forts Jackson, Knox, and Sill, each
receiving one basic training battalion of 1,400 to 1,500
soldiers.
We are concerned that the FY97 Defense Authorization bill
contains $58 million in BRAC IV military construction funds
for ``unaccompanied enlisted housing'' at Fort Leonard Wood.
It is our understanding that this $58 million project is
being undertaken partly to enable Ft. Leonard Wood to keep
its basic training mission, even though the three posts
referred to above have existing capacity to accommodate Ft.
Leonard Wood's basic training student load. We ask that you
review this project against other alternatives available to
the Army at lower cost. Specifically, we ask that you:
Review a complete list of the military construction
projects approved for or anticipated at Ft. Leonard Wood
during the five fiscal years beginning with FY97.
Identify the current shortfall in unaccompanied enlisted
housing at Ft. Leonard Wood.
Identify the current basic training student load at Ft.
Leonard Wood.
Identify the number of unaccompanied enlisted housing
spaces that would become available at Ft. Leonard Wood if its
current basic training student load were to be relocated, in
whole or in part as originally proposed by the Department of
Defense.
Review the number of personnel to be transferred from Ft.
McClellan to Ft. Leonard Wood in accordance with the BRAC 95
recommendations.
Compare the number of unaccompanied enlisted personnel to
be transferred pursuant to such recommendations with the
number of unaccompanied enlisted housing spaces to be
constructed at Fort Leonard Wood using the $58 million
presently authorized by the FY97 Defense Authorization bill.
Evaluate the availability of unaccompanied enlisted housing
at each of the posts identified by BRAC 95 as potential
locations for basic training currently being conducted at Ft.
Leonard Wood.
Identify any military construction costs, if any,
associated with the transfer of a basic training battalion to
Forts Knox, Jackson, and Sill, respectively.
Because the Joint Conference on the FY97 DOD Authorization
is likely to conclude by the end of next month, we need to
receive your report not later than July 20, 1996. Please
direct any questions to John Luddy of Senator Inhofe's staff,
at 202-224-1390. Thank you very much for your prompt
consideration of this matter.
Sincerely,
James M. Inhofe,
U.S. Senator.
Don Nickles,
U.S. Senator.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, would the chairman support my request that
the General Accounting Office review this project, including the
questions I have raised in this letter, and report back to this
committee and to the House National Security Committee within 30 days?
Mr. McCAIN. Like my colleague on the Armed Services Committee, I am a
firm supporter of the BRAC process, and I am concerned that the Army's
recommendations to the Commission may have caused it to make a decision
based on false assumptions. I am particularly troubled that American
taxpayers may be paying for unnecessary military housing when, as my
colleague and the Department itself has

[[Page S6984]]

indicated, there is similar housing available at other installations. I
would urge the chairman to lend his support to this inquiry.
Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senators for bringing this matter to my
attention, and I also appreciate Senator McCain's interest. I support
this inquiry and would add that it is the committee's desire to receive
a report from GAO within 30 days specifically to allow us to resolve
this matter to our satisfaction prior to conference and final passage
of the fiscal year 1997 DOD authorization bill.
Mr. INHOFE. May I ask of the Armed Services Committee chairman and
the Readiness Subcommittee chairman, respectively, if they will agree
to consider modifying or eliminating this project during the joint
conference on the fiscal year 1997 Department of Defense authorization
bill, if the GAO's conclusions indicate that doing so would be in the
best interest of the American taxpayer?
Mr. THURMOND. I assure the Senator from Oklahoma that I will support
such actions if warranted by the conclusions of General Accounting
Office report.
Mr. McCAIN. I concur with Senator Thurmond. I will look carefully at
the results of the GAO study before agreeing to fund this project.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, the subject of Senator Inhofe's GAO request
will be the unaccompanied noncommissioned officers barracks. This
project was planned, programmed, and funded to house NCO's who will
come to Fort Leonard Wood as a result of the BRAC decision to move the
chemical warfare training school and military police school to Fort
Leonard Wood from Fort McClellan which is scheduled to close.
Current barracks space at FLW is designed for basic training students
living four to a room with gang latrines--not for senior NCO's.
Any connection between the new barracks and the totally separate
issue of basic training housing is irrelevant since the BRAC was aware
of the need for the new barracks when it made its decision.
Even if there were space to renovate current barracks rather than
build new barracks, the Corps of Engineers has already studied that
option and deemed the extensive renovations required would not be cost
effective.
The result of this report for all its good intentions will be to
subvert the decision of the BRAC Commission and will set an
unacceptable precedent.

military traffic management command's personal property reengineering
program

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I applaud the efforts of the Senate Armed
Services Committee to reform the Military Traffic Management Command's
personal property reengineering program. I am concerned that MTMC's
plan does not adequately address the concerns of the small moving
companies, which comprise most of the industry. The Senate Armed
Services Committee initiative establishes a working group of military
and industry representatives to develop an alternative pilot program
and requires the Government Accounting Office to review this revised
plan.
Mr. BOND. I also share Senator Stevens' concerns about the Department
of Defense proposal to reengineer the personal property program and its
associated impact on the small business community. While I support the
Department's goals of improving the quality of personal property
shipment and storage services to members of the military and their
families, it should not be done at the expense of the small businesses
which make up most of the moving industry.
Mr. THURMOND. Thank you very much for your comments regarding this
initiative. We included this provision because of concerns about how
this reengineering proposal would cause a major restructuring of the
moving industry. As you know, the majority of movers in the communities
near our military bases are small businesses. My primary goal is to
improve the quality of service that service members and their families
receive when they move.
Mr. STEVENS. I support reforming the current system to improve the
quality of service and achieve cost reductions. However, I believe that
the moving industry needs to participate in these discussions in a
meaningful way. I believe that the fiscal year 1997 Defense
authorization language will facilitate that process.
Mr. BOND. I agree that reforming the current system can lead to
improvement of service to our military members and their families and a
reduction in costs to the Government. I am sure that the reforms to the
Military Traffic Management Command's personnel property reeningeering
program as instituted by the Senate Armed Services Committee will
ensure that our military enjoys flexible, rapid, and efficient service
as can only be found in a competitive environment.

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