[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 96 (Wednesday, June 26, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6949-S6960]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
The Senate continued with consideration of the bill.
Amendment No. 4345
(Purpose: To ensure that the total amount authorized to be appropriated
by the bill does not exceed the total amount of the authorizations of
appropriations reported by the Committee on Armed Services)
Mr. EXON. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon], for himself, Mr.
Kohl, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Levin, Mr. Dorgan, and Mr. Wellstone,
proposes an amendment numbered 4345.
Mr. EXON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
After section 3, insert the following:
SEC. 4. GENERAL LIMITATION.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the total
amount authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997
under the provisions to this Act is $263,362,000,000.
Mr. EXON. Madam President, there are several important cosponsors of
this amendment. One is on the floor at the present time. I simply
inquire of the Senator from Wisconsin--and I have agreed to yield him 7
minutes--if his time will allow him to wait, I will make opening
remarks. However, if the Senator is cramped for time, I will yield at
this juncture.
Mr. KOHL. Madam President, I will wait for the Senator from Nebraska
to deliver his opening remarks.
Mr. EXON. I thank my friend from Wisconsin for his usual courtesy.
Madam President, the amendment I have just sent to the desk is on
behalf of myself, Senator Bingaman, Senator Kohl, Senator Dorgan, and
Senator Levin. This amendment reduces--Madam President, reduces--the
total funding level in the bill by $4 billion. This would still allow,
I emphasize, this would still allow an increase--increase--in the
President's request of $9.0 billion. A $9 billion increase would be
allowed even if the Exon amendment is accepted. This is an increase of
$155 million --an increase of $155 million--above this year's funding
level.
To put that in perspective, I have a chart to which I will direct the
attention of the Senate. It is headed ``Comparison of the Fiscal Year
1997 Defense Spending Proposals.'' Billions of dollars are on the left
side, with the first graph showing $263.2 billion, which would be if we
had just taken the whole defense budget and froze it at last year's
level, $263.2 billion. Under the Exon proposal, from the standpoint of
last year, there would be an increase of something around $200 million
or up to $263.4 billion, an increase of about $200 million still going
up in national defense over last year's expenditures.
Compare that, if you will, with this big broad green graph on the
right. If we go with the defense authorization bill that is presently
before the Senate, we would balloon that to $267.4 billion for the same
time period of fiscal year 1997.
Madam President, this amendment is a modest attempt, and I underline
the word modest, a modest attempt to control Federal spending within
reason, reduce the budget deficit and eliminate wasteful spending.
The bill before the Senate contains some $4.6 billion more than the
Pentagon requested for fiscal year 1997 or for any of the next 5 years.
I think the Congress could easily be able to identify $4 billion,
either from this pork-barrel-laden $4.6 billion or from other sources
to meet the requirement of this amendment.
Madam President, we are debating legislation that increases the
Pentagon's request by a whopping $13 billion, nearly double last year's
increase of $7 billion. At a time when we are considering deep
reductions in Medicare, Medicaid, education, the environment, and other
programs, I find it absolutely astonishing that between last year and
this year we are proposing to give the Pentagon $20 billion more--to
give the Pentagon $20 billion more--than the Pentagon had requested.
Certainly in this case it is not the Pentagon that we can blame. The
Pentagon came forth in cooperation with the President with what I
thought was a workable program.
Madam President, I am under no illusion whatever. I understand the
dynamics and the politics of the situation. I understand that Congress
will, inevitably, increase this year's defense request, although it is
still uncertain whether the President will sign a bill calling for such
an excessive increase of $13 billion.
What this Senator from Nebraska is saying is, rather than $13
billion, maybe if the President recognizes that we just reduce that to
$9 billion over his request, there may be some chance of avoiding a
veto.
Before this Congress sanctions this $13 billion increase, I think we
should first examine how the majority proposes to spend it. For several
weeks we
[[Page S6950]]
have been hearing that most of the increase will be devoted to
accelerating acquisition of weapons systems that the Pentagon wanted in
future years but could not afford this year. If that were true, some of
the increase would almost seem reasonable under that argument.
We have since learned otherwise. According to the Defense Department
itself, of the $12 billion this bill adds for procurement, research and
development, the so-called modernization--that is a great term; for
modernization--$4.6 billion of that, or almost 40 percent was neither
in the Pentagon's 1997 request nor in its 5-year plan for 1997 through
the year 2001.
This second and last chart that I reference at this time I think
elaborates and demonstrates the size of this increase. As I have just
said, increases to the Pentagon's fiscal 1997 request for procurement
and research and development is vividly demonstrated here. $11.4
billion is the total; $4.6 billion was not even in DOD's 5-year plan.
That is some way for conservatives to budget. I simply say that the
budget request that was suggested by the Pentagon, and recommended and
approved by all of the people in the Pentagon, was aimed at long-range
budget planning that was realistic. And I might add, it was approved
and endorsed by the Secretary of Defense, the joint staff, and the
individual service chiefs, as the optimal way of allocating the roughly
$1.3 trillion that both parties agreed to spend on defense over the
next 5 years to fulfill our joint military requirements.
Madam President, I should also note that the Pentagon has calculated
that, over the next 5 years, increases for these items not in its 5-
year plan would cost $25 billion. Let me say that again, Madam
President. This plan that is being forced down the throat of the
Pentagon and the President would cost $25 billion above and beyond what
is already budgeted for. In essence, it amounts to an unfunded mandate
on the Pentagon.
To bring this point home, Madam President, I will read a letter dated
June 26 from John White, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, written to
Senator Daschle:
In response to your question with regard to the funding
levels contained in the FY 1997 Department of Defense
Authorization Bill, I want to assure you that the President's
defense budget and Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) as
submitted to the Congress is sufficient to meet the security
requirements of the Nation and to satisfy the policy
directions of the Administration. Three times in three years
the President has increased the level of resources made
available to the Department to support the Bottom Up Review.
We can achieve the objectives of the national security
strategy with the resources requested by the Administration.
I am particularly concerned that many of the proposed
increases contained in the Defense Bill now under
consideration are for systems or programs which are not
included in the Department's FYDP. These increases bring with
them funding tails for the outyears which could limit future
production of critical technologically advanced modernization
programs now in development.
Madam President, that drives home the point that I referenced just a
few moments ago about this $25 billion above and beyond what has
already been budgeted for. Let us look at some of these increases. Let
us look at some of the programs that these increases propose to
embrace. Remember, Madam President, none of them was in the Pentagon's
5-year plan. I am going to mention a few: $202 million for the Navy's
Distributed Surveillance System; $183 million for the Army's AH-64
Apache helicopter; $158 million for the Army Kiowa Warrior helicopter;
$234 million for Navy's F/A-18 C/D fighter; $107 million for the Air
Force's F-16 C/D; $205 million for the Air Force's WC-130.
There are some 100 examples, none of which are in the Pentagon's
comprehensive 5-year plan.
You can spend all day looking for them, and you will not find them.
They are an expensive collection of pet projects, congressional pork,
and outright wasteful spending. These increases are precisely the sort
of deficit and budget-busting spending that would be subject to the
line-item veto, if Congress had given that power to the President this
year, as we once voted for here in the U.S. Senate.
I ask unanimous consent that a complete list of these increases be
printed in the Record at this point.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
FISCAL YEAR 1997 SENATE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL: SUMMARY OF ADDS NOT
IN THE PENTAGON'S 5-YEAR PLAN
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of
Total adds Adds not total add
in bill in 5-year not in
plan FYDP
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVALUATION (RDT&E)
Army................................ 653 342 52
Navy................................ 1,717 685 40
Air Force........................... 555 160 29
Defense-Wide........................ 1,185 278 13
-----------------------------------
Total............................. 4,109 1,465 36
===================================
PROCUREMENT
Army................................ 2,269 1,053 \1\ 46
Navy................................ 3,357 506 \1\ 15
Air Force........................... 1,430 777 \1\ 54
Defense-Wide........................ 830 760 \1\ 92
-----------------------------------
Total............................. 7,885 3,095 39
===================================
Grand total....................... 11,994 4,560 \1\ 38
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Percent of total add not in 5-year plan.
Note: Prepared by Senate Budget Committee, based on DoD Comptroller
Data.
Fiscal year 1997 Senate defense authorization bill: List of adds not in
the Pentagon's 5-year plan
[In millions of dollars]
Research, Dev., Test & Evaluation (RDT&E)
Army:
Weapons and Munitions Technology............................ 20.0
Nautilus Thel............................................... 25.0
Tractor Red................................................. 3.5
Landmine Warfare and Barrier Advanced Technology............ 4.0
Tractor Dump................................................ 13.6
Armored System Modernization: Advanced Development.......... 12.0
Javelin..................................................... 4.5
Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence--Eng. Dev.... 61.8
Longbow: Engine Development................................. 12.0
Force XXI Initiatives....................................... 100.0
DoD High Energy Laser Test Facility......................... 21.7
Missile/Air Defense Product Improvement Program............. 55.0
Other Missile Product Improvement Programs.................. 9.0
---------
Subtotal, Army RDT&E.................................... 342.1
=========
Navy:
Surface/Aerospace Surveillance and Weapons Technology....... 9.0
Surface Ship Technology..................................... 6.0
Air Systems and Weapons Advanced Technology................. 7.5
Ship Propulsion System...................................... 8.0
Advanced Submarine Combat Systems Development............... 48.0
Advanced Submarine System Development....................... 60.0
Gun Weapon System Technology................................ 27.0
Other Helicopter Development................................ 11.0
Electronic Warfare Development.............................. 65.0
Aegis Combat System Engineering............................. 21.9
Arsenal Ship................................................ 147.0
Airborne Mine Countermeasures (MCM)......................... 10.0
Distributed Surveillance System............................. 202.0
Marine Corps Program Wide Support........................... 40.0
Joint Service Non-Lethal Weapons Technology Program......... 15.0
Acquisition Center of Excellence............................ 8.0
---------
Subtotal, Navy RDT&E.................................... 685.4
=========
Air Force:
Advanced Spacecraft Technology.............................. 75.0
Variable Stability In-Flight Simulator...................... 1.4
Rocket Systems Launch Program (Space)....................... 25.1
F-15E Squadrons............................................. 29.0
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles................... 10.0
Sensor Fused Weapons........................................ 19.1
---------
Subtotal, Air force RDT&E............................... 159.6
=========
Defense-Wide:
Anti-Satellite Program (ASAT)............................... 75.0
Tactical Technology......................................... 3.0
Materials and Electronics Technology........................ 15.0
Defense Nuclear Agency...................................... 12.0
Experimental Evaluation of Major Innovative Technologies.... 72.3
CALS Initiative............................................. 14.0
Environmental Security Technical Certification Plan......... 8.0
Boost Phase Intercept Theater Missile....................... 15.0
National Missile Defense-Dem/Val............................ 50.0
Other Theater Missile Defense/Follow-On TMD Activities-Demo. 10.7
Defense Support Activities.................................. 3.0
---------
[[Page S6951]]
Subtotal, Defense-wide RDT&E............................ 278.0
=========
Total, RDT&E............................................ 1,465.1
=========
Procurement
Army:
Aircraft:
C-XX (Medium Range) Aircraft.............................. 35.0
AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter............................ 183.0
CH-47 Cargo Helicopter Modifications (Multi-year Program). 52.3
Kiowa Warrior Helicopter.................................. 158.4
---------
Subtotal................................................ 428.7
=========
Missile:
Mobile Launcher Rocket Systems (MLRS)..................... 147.0
Patriot Modifications..................................... 12.0
Avenger Modifications..................................... 29.0
Dragon Modifications...................................... 25.0
---------
Subtotal................................................ 213.0
=========
Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles (W&TCV):
Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicles............... 50.8
Howitzer, Medium SP FT 155mm M109A6 (Modification)........ 61.2
M1 Abrams Tank (Modification)............................. 26.5
Medium Machine Guns (Modifications)....................... 20.0
---------
Subtotal................................................ 158.5
=========
Ammunition:
CTG Mortar 60mm Illum M721/M767........................... 7.0
CTG Mortar 60mm HE M720................................... 12.5
Proj Arty 155MM HE M795................................... 55.0
Selectable Lightweight Attack Munitions (SLAM)............ 3.0
Armament Retooling Manufacturing Support (ARMS)........... 58.0
---------
Subtotal................................................ 135.5
=========
Other:
Medium Truck Extended Service PGM (ESP) (PREV SLEP)....... 3.0
Inland Petroleum Distribution System...................... 33.0
Items less than $2 million (Construction Equipment)....... 54.0
Base Level Commercial Equipment........................... 27.0
---------
Subtotal................................................ 117.0
=========
Total, Army procurement................................. 1,052.7
=========
Navy:
Combat Aircraft and Weapons:
F/A-18C/D (Fighter) Hornet................................ 234.0
EA-6 Series............................................... 33.3
F-18 Series............................................... 50.0
H-53 Series............................................... 14.0
Tomahawk Modifications.................................... 14.4
---------
Subtotal................................................ 345.7
=========
Shipbuilding & Conversion: Oceanographic Ships--SWATH....... 45.0
---------
Subtotal................................................ 45.0
=========
Other: Oceanographic Support Equipment...................... 6.0
---------
Subtotal................................................ 6.0
=========
Marine Corps:
155mm CHG, Prop, Red Bag.................................. 24.0
155mm D864, Base Bleed.................................... 45.0
FUZE, ET, XM752........................................... 29.0
AN/TPQ-36 Fire Finder Radar Upgrade....................... 1.7
Trailers.................................................. 9.3
---------
Subtotal................................................ 109.0
=========
Total, Navy procurement................................. 505.7
=========
Air Force:
Aircraft:
F-16 C/D (Multi-year Program)............................. 107.4
WC-130.................................................... 204.5
B-1B...................................................... 56.5
AWACS Reengineering....................................... 109.0
Other Aircraft............................................ 21.2
DARP...................................................... 182.2
---------
Subtotal................................................ 680.8
=========
Missile:
HAVE NAP.................................................. 39.0
AGM-130 Powered GBU-15.................................... 40.0
Conventional ALCMs........................................ 15.0
Hard Target Smart FUZES................................... 2.0
---------
Subtotal................................................ 96.0
=========
Total, Air Force procurement............................ 776.8
=========
Defense-wide: National Guard & Reserve Equipment............ 759.8
=========
Total, Defense-wide procurement......................... 759.8
=========
Grand total, procurement................................ 3,095.0
=========
Grand total RDT&E....................................... 1,465.1
Grand total, procurement................................ 3,095.0
Super-total............................................. 4,560.1
Mr. EXON. Madam President, these programs, in the opinion of most
senior military leaders, are unnecessary. Even if the Pentagon had the
money, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs have said that
they would not fund these programs this year, not next year, not in
1999, not in the year 2000, and not in the year 2001.
Since both the administration and the Republican majority propose to
spend virtually the exact same amount on defense over the next 6 years,
funding these programs directly takes away from others that the
Pentagon says it needs. Is this a way to budget responsibly for our
national security? I suggest not. Is this a way we should spend the
taxpayer's hard-earned dollars? I think not.
Some of my colleagues will assert that some of these increases are
justified because they were included on one of the infamous wish lists
that the services circulated on Capitol Hill. But none of these service
lists was ever approved by the joint staff, who determines what is
necessary. They are the experts.
It seems to me that we should realize and recognize that the full
coordination with the services and our joint military needs should be
kept in mind when we implement our military strategy.
Over the past 40 years, Congress has worked hard in a bipartisan
manner to strengthen the joint capabilities of our armed services--
first, by unifying the command of the services under the Secretary of
Defense, and then by creating a strong joint staff and a strong
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This year's use of the wish
lists directly undermines 40 years of work by promoting the services'
parochial interests at the expense of our overall national defense
strategy.
Madam President, I believe my friend and colleague on the Armed
Services Committee, Senator Coats from Indiana, a dedicated Republican,
who has great knowledge of national defense issues, summarized the
situation well when he said at a conference on April 24, 1996:
Few priorities on the ``wish lists'' stress how the
programs can improve joint war-fighting capabilities. It
seems counterproductive that the services would work to a
consensus . . . only to deviate from this course during the
authorization cycle. . . Such lists are not effective ``gap
closers'' when they do not adhere to a logical, overreaching
defense plan.
So the fact that some of these increases in the defense authorization
bill were on a wish list is in reality no justification whatsoever for
Congress to fund them.
Madam President, how long can this Congress continue doling out
scarce discretionary funds to the Pentagon with this blank check
philosophy? As many have warned, spending of the taxpayers' dollars so
irresponsibly will undermine the public's confidence in the Congress as
well as erode its support for adequate funding for national defense.
We have heard many speeches about how we need to cut unnecessary
Government spending. This is an ideal opportunity for Senators to stand
up and do just that.
This amendment is reasonable. This amendment is moderate. I wish we
could do more. I am willing, although reluctantly, to give the Pentagon
this year an additional $9 billion for programs it did not request this
year. I am even willing to give the Pentagon an additional $600 million
so that it can fund so-called congressional priorities. But enough is
enough. Some sense of fiscal sanity is necessary.
Madam President, I simply say that the $4 billion in the cut that
myself and the others are proposing is going to be accepted, at least
in part, by a follow-on amendment that I understand will soon follow my
amendment offered by the two leaders of the Armed Services Committee,
by my distinguished friends, Senator Thurmond from South Carolina and
Senator Nunn from Georgia. What they are proposing to do is to take
roughly half of the cuts
[[Page S6952]]
that this Senator has proposed and reduce the Senate Armed Services
Committee bill from its $13 billion increase figure down to the budget
resolution figure of $11.4 billion. I salute them for that. It is a
step in the right direction.
The Exon amendment roughly cuts $2.4 billion below that to make an
overall reduction in the armed services authorization figure of $13
billion less $4 billion down to a $9 billion increase.
In a nutshell, that is the difference between what the Exon amendment
does and what is proposed to be done on a lesser scale by the chairman
and ranking member of the committee.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. EXON. I will be glad to yield in a moment.
I am even willing to give the Pentagon an additional $600 million so
that it can fund some of these so-called priorities. I want to
emphasize that. But I still say that we are going way too far.
I think that is such a reasonable amendment that I cannot imagine it
not being endorsed and accepted by the Senate as a whole.
In closing, I urge my colleagues to join me in saying ``no'' to some
of these wasteful increases to the Pentagon's request. They are unwise
and they are unaffordable in the budget climate that we find ourselves
in.
I urge all to vote ``yes'' on this amendment.
I yield the floor. I will be glad to yield for a question so long as
it is on his time.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I am glad to have this charged to time
under my control.
I have the greatest respect for my colleague. We have served together
on this committee many, many years, and his work on the Budget
Committee has been a tremendous benefit to our committee through the
years.
I would like to draw his attention to a document he is aware of, the
Congressional Budget Office document of May 15, 1996, in which on
page--does the Senator have one of these?
Mr. EXON. I do not have it.
Mr. WARNER. I will send it back so the Senator can examine it. But on
page 2, the Congressional Budget Office analyzes the outyears spending
subject to appropriations actions and proposed changes. The estimated
authorization level for fiscal 1997 is 268, and then they have a series
of zeros out here showing no tailing increase.
I will send this up to my distinguished colleague and allow him to
look it over. Maybe after he has had a chance to examine it, he can
respond to my question.
Mr. EXON. I will be glad to look at it and give you my explanation of
it.
I will simply point out that the Exon amendment still allows for a $9
billion increase over what the President and the Pentagon has
recommended. I would think, regardless of the technical details, that
most realize and recognize that such should be fully adequate given the
budget constraints that we face.
I yield 7 minutes to my colleague from Wisconsin.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I sent a document. It is right behind
the Senator. Will he have an opportunity to look at it and at the
conclusion of the remarks of the other colleagues perhaps he can
address that?
Mr. EXON. I will be glad to do that.
Mr. WARNER. My recollection is that the Senator from Nebraska
specifically talked about the outyear implications of this funding
request by our committee. It seems to me that this document attempts to
refute that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. KOHL. Thank you, Madam President.
Madam President, I am pleased to join my colleague from Nebraska in
offering this amendment to eliminate $4.0 billion in defense spending
for items that are not included in any of the next 5 year's defense
budgets. The Pentagon does not want or need these additional funds.
There is no reasonable rationale for Congress to provide them.
I have listened to the arguments that we need to be spending more on
defense because of a shortfall in procurement funding, and I have heard
the justifications for the $13 billion increase in budget authority
contained in this bill, on the grounds that we are only accelerating
projects the service chiefs have said they want and need. I say to my
colleagues who embrace these concerns--even though I have to say that I
am skepical--listen carefully to the details of this amendment. This
amendment targets the special interest projects and wasteful spending
in this bill which were not requested by the service chiefs.
There are more than 4 billion dollar's worth of projects in the bill
before us which were not requested by the service chiefs. There are
more than 4 billion dollar's worth of projects in the bill before us
that appear no where in the Pentagon's future years defense plan. They
are not priorities, and we cannot afford to be spending scarce taxpayer
dollars on programs that at best are marginal.
After our amendment is adopted, and I am hopeful it will be, the
defense authorization bill will still be $9 billion more than the
administration has requested.
I am weary of hearing how this defense budget compares to defense
budgets in previous years in real terms. Why do we not look at other
budget functions in real terms? The reason is that if we did, we would
realize that all domestic accounts are being cut in real terms. Many of
them deeply. Yet, the defense authorization bill before us would
increase defense spending $4.2 billion above last year's defense
budget. Only in Washington is an increase in defense spending a cut.
When we freeze education spending, we hear denials that we are actually
cutting education funding. It is just a freeze they say, the same as
last year. Well, in real terms we are cutting hundreds of domestic
programs that contribute to the well being of our society. We are
holding no one harmless in our effort to balance the budget.
Except defense.
How can we make a credible case to the American people that we are
serious about reducing the deficit when we continue to increase defense
spending? No one has made an effective case as to why we must be
spending more on weapons systems that have not been identified by the
service chiefs and are not in any of the next 5 year's defense plans.
And we certainly gave the services the opportunity to ask for this
funding.
Why is it that we cannot approach defense spending in the same way
that we approach any other spending? The services have been more than
forthcoming in telling us their requirements and identifying their
needs. Now it is our responsibility to determine how best to meet these
needs against all other competing requirements. This is how we fulfill
our responsibility to oversee the budget and set spending. For some
reason, however, we are reluctant to do so with defense.
We must ask ourselves over and over again: Is our defense spending
relevant to the threats of the future? Are the projects included in the
$4 billion we would cut in our amendment so crucial to our response to
these future threats? This amendment was carefully crafted to identify
those programs that do not meet even the most conservative
requirements. This amendment cuts $4 billion in programs we cannot
afford and should not buy.
Above all, let's remember that we are facing no major threats today.
When the American people talk today about insecurity, they are talking
about job security, personal security, and perhaps moral security. Even
the threats to our national security posed by episodes of regional
instability and conflict are less likely to be resolved with military
force, and more likely to be resolved through political or diplomatic
intervention. To be sure, we need a strong defense. We need to develop
a strategy and maintain a force structure to protect and advance our
interests in a constantly changing global environment. If we could
start over again and create a new force structure from scratch to meet
the challenges of this era, I am confident that we would have a leaner,
more mobile and more efficient force at far less cost.
I am puzzled by arguments that we must front load defense spending in
the early years of a 7-year plan because spending in the outyears
cannot be relied upon.
Madam President, the spending we vote for today--much of it devoted
to new procurement and new research and development projects--lays the
groundwork for increased spending down the
[[Page S6953]]
road. The spending proposed today ensures the reductions proposed for
the outyears will not occur. However, if we adopt this amendment and
cut $4 billion in spending in this year's budget, then we will be
eliminating $25 billion in unnecessary spending in future years.
Last year, we passed a defense budget that was $7 billion more than
what the Pentagon wanted. I came to the floor during last year's
defense authorization bill and offered a bipartisan amendment to cut
out that extra $7 billion, and we almost succeeded. That amendment was
endorsed by a variety of groups focused on deficit reduction and
included in the annual scores generated by the Council for a Livable
World and the Concord Coalition. And now, here we are, a year later,
considering a defense bill that adds $12.9 billion more than what the
Pentagon wants.
Is it any surprise that in the budget resolution we passed last week
we increase the deficit during the first 2 years of the plan? No one
has explained how we can afford to increase defense spending above even
the highest levels identified by the services and yet reduce the
deficit. We cannot continue to spare the Defense Department from the
deep regimen of cuts that we are asking the rest of our society to
absorb. The $4 billion that we propose to cut in this amendment is a
modest cut.
If we are committed to reducing the deficit and balancing our budget,
then we must make the hard votes. And I know for some this will be a
hard vote. However, I urge my colleagues to vote for this very
responsible approach to defense spending.
I yield the floor.
Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Madam President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COHEN. Madam President, as I listened to the arguments being
offered by my colleagues, it seems to me they start from the premise
that Congress really should not take any action which differs from that
of the requests sent up here by the administration. All we need do is
have the President of the United States send up a budget and what we
need to do is to look at the budget and either give it our stamp of
approval or withhold that stamp of approval; there is no room for
discretion. After all, if we were to add something, that would simply
be another pork barrel project, would it not, under the logic that is
being utilized by my colleagues who are offering this amendment? Why
should Congress have any role in this? After all, they are the experts
over there. The service chiefs, those who are involved in our military
personnel, they are the experts, so why should we have any role
whatsoever in terms of altering, increasing, or decreasing the spending
for our defense needs?
That is the position, it would seem to me, that those who are arguing
on behalf of this amendment are taking--that Congress really, any time
it makes a change in the Defense Department request, is simply adding
pork barrel spending.
I suggest, how about the Nunn-Lugar proposal? That will most likely
be added. Is that pork barrel? Or is that something that is
substantive, that will contribute to the national security interests of
this country?
What about when we add more funding for the C-17, to buy more of
them, so they can be produced at a more efficient rate and save
hundreds of millions of dollars. I suppose that is just pork barreling
as well. What about the V-22 replacing our aging helicopter aircraft
that are ferrying about our Marine Corps? I suppose that is pork
barrel, too. So the notion is somehow, whenever Congress adds funding,
whenever the Armed Services Committee adds funding for programs, that
is just simply pork barrel. And I suggest to you that is simply pure
nonsense. That is pure nonsense.
Also, it seems to me we would think that it is the requirements, the
military requirements that ought to determine how much we spend and to
drive policy. But, in fact, most of us know it is not the military
requirements that drive policy but, rather, it is the political
policies and the priorities established by the President that drive the
requirements.
Year after year, we have been listening to our military experts come
to the Congress and say, look, it is getting very thin. We are getting
to the ragged edge. Yes, we can carry out the mission, but it is
getting very difficult to do so. And we cannot give you assurances we
can do so in future years; it is getting that close.
I hear my colleagues talk about cuts in other programs. In terms of
percentage of real change in outlays between the years 1990 and 2002,
this chart shows domestic discretionary outlays going up almost 12.5
percent; national defense outlays decrease by almost 35 percent,
mandatory outlays increase 34.2 percent. So we can see where the
priorities are. Defense spending is coming down and discretionary
spending, mandatory entitlement programs are going up.
However, there is another issue I want to focus on, and that is the
issue of promises. This is something that is of concern to me. It has
been to a majority of our colleagues in the Senate and the House. We
have had promise after promise that we are going to deal with the
shortfalls that are coming next year.
In 1993, we were promised that defense procurement spending was going
to go up, and here is where it came out, where this green line is now.
It went down. We were promised by the President it was going to go up
again in 1995. It went down, saying wait until next year, a promise to
go up. It went down. In fact, it will not go up in procurement spending
until after the next term of either President Clinton or President Dole
expires. And so the absolute military necessities are being pushed out
into the year 2001, 2002, saying, well, we will get to it just like the
Red Sox are going to win the pennant next year and every time next year
comes by say, well, we cannot afford it.
Let me read to you what Admiral Owens, former Vice Chairman and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Oversight Council, had to say about the
administration's procurement plans for our Armed Forces. I am going to
read this. ``We are facing a procurement crisis.''
Here you can see that in 1993 the President's budget had
for procurement $62 billion. In 1994, procurement would be at
$64 billion. Of course, what really happens, it went down to
$48 billion. In 1995, the administration was projecting $55
billion. In fact, it was $46 billion. But then the
administration promised it was going to go up. And in 1996 we
are now down to $39 billion. And we keep promising and
promising ourselves it is going to go up. We have got to stop
promising and start doing business.
That is from a very highly respected member of the military. Stop
breaking promise after promise.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. COHEN. I yield myself an additional 3 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we will yield to the Senator such time as
he requires and charge it to me. I would like to ask the Senator a
question at the conclusion of his presentation.
Mr. COHEN. Madam President, shortly prior to his death, I had a
conversation with Admiral Boorda. We spoke initially on the phone and
then he came to my office because we went through this process. We said
look, we understand. You are under orders to come up to the Hill and
testify as to whether you can live with this particular budget. And
each time the military has done their duty as required apparently by
their obligations and they said, yes, we can live with what the
President has requested; he is our Commander in Chief; we can live with
this, this year for the first time they started sending other signals
that said ask us basically what we really need over and above what is
being requested.
And so we asked the question: If more money were added, what would
you request? Admiral Boorda sent a request to me that was in excess of
$7 billion, alone, for the Navy--$7.9 billion over and above the
President's request just for the Navy. And I told him it was completely
and wholly unrealistic. He said, look, we have a bow wave coming. I am
not going to be here. I am retiring. He would not be here when his
period for being CNO had expired and left the Navy, he said, but in the
year 2000, 2005, 2010, we have an enormous tidal wave of procurement
coming and, frankly, he did not see whether we could ever have the will
or spirit to measure up to the responsibilities to fund the programs.
So he said, I am
[[Page S6954]]
putting in my request. This is what I need.
So that is just one service. Here we are on the Senate floor saying
let's just take another $4 billion out totally across the board.
Madam President, I think that we have to get realistic about where we
are headed, that we know and everybody knows that by the year 2000
spending is going to have to go up dramatically in order to meet the
requirements of our military, or else what?
We can simply revise what we have to do throughout the world. We can
say, fine, we are not going to defend our interests in the Pacific. We
are not going to defend our interests in Europe or NATO. We are simply
going to shrink back to the continental United States.
We can do that. We can revise the Bottom-Up Review. We can say we are
not going to meet major regional contingencies, two of them
simultaneously, and say we will just meet one. We can do that, and it
will be a much more honest approach than what we are currently taking
because what we are doing today is saying, yes, we can meet the Bottom-
Up Review requirements when, in fact, we cannot--when, in fact, we are
holding out an illusion, when in fact many of the same personnel and
equipment required to fight in one particular regional conflict will be
required to fight in another.
So, it is time we get honest with ourselves and, if we do not want to
be the superpower, capable of extending our reach in various parts of
the globe, if we do not want to exercise military power and projection
in various parts of the globe, say so. But let us not go through this
routine, saying we will do it next year and next year and next year.
This year is an election year. This year it is more for education and
environment and other things. We will push the requirements of the
military out into future years, and we will let that generation deal
with the problem. We will not be here. We will be gone, be out of
office.
When we heard statements made--the Deputy Secretary of Defense has
issued a statement; Senator Warner has referred to it--that there is a
tail attached to this particular authorization, some $25 billion, we
said, ``Prove it to us. Where is the evidence it is $25 billion?'' They
have yet to submit an analysis that shows any justification for the $25
billion so-called tail. They issued a letter saying it is a $25 billion
add-on, and we have looked at the analysis and it does not hold up.
I will save that analysis for my other colleagues who wish to talk
about this particular matter, but it seems to me the Defense Department
has an obligation that goes beyond simply issuing letters at the last
moment saying it is $25 billion without any demonstration of the
analysis by which that judgment was rendered. I am here to say, when we
look at what they have done, what they do is say, if money is
requested, for example to close out an account, they will take the
amount requested--let us say it is $60 million--and they will stretch
it out $15 million a year for the next 4 years. That is completely
false. If you, in fact, spend more money to purchase equipment up
front--aircraft, ships--which they know will save money in the
outyears, they nonetheless add that as a total increase. If you look
closely--and they have admitted this--if you look closely at their
analysis, it will not hold up to scrutiny.
So, Mr. President, I hope this amendment will be rejected. We do know
Senator Nunn and others will be offering an amendment later that would
have a more modest reduction. But for us to come to the floor and say
this is simply pork barrel spending, unnecessary, the military did not
request it, therefore let us not add it, seems to me it undermines the
historic role of the U.S. Senate and that of the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
Mr. President, I hope this will be rejected and overwhelmingly so.
Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. COHEN. I yield for a question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kempthorne). The Senator from Virginia is
recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend my distinguished colleague. He
has very concisely and accurately reflected the facts.
I suggest he take another minute to include in his remarks that,
while he did meet with Admiral Boorda, Admiral Boorda was but one of
the entire set of Chiefs who came forward with the request that they
needed $60 billion, of which the President's budget only allowed $38
billion, and under the current projections, you would not reach the
level recommended by the Chiefs until the year 2001.
Mr. COHEN. Let me respond to my colleague. I only pointed to one
individual. I tried to point to what Admiral Boorda had to say to me as
an example. Here is just the Navy. Just for Navy programs he said, ``I
need another $7 to $8 billion to start meeting the obligations that are
mandated and that we will have to face in just a few short years.'' But
Admiral Boorda, like every other service chief, as such, realizes each
year we have to face this red line. It goes down to the green line, and
the green line drops to the blue line, and the blue line drops to the
orange line, and we do not get to it until the year 2000. He is saying,
``We cannot do this. It is a misrepresentation. It is a dereliction of
our responsibilities.''
That is just one service, the CNO. But now we have the Army, Air
Force, Marine Corps, and they similarly made requests saying if we are
really going to be measuring up to our responsibilities, we need more.
It was the figure that the Senator from Virginia has cited.
So I think we are not to be charged with simply pork barreling,
spending money wastefully. Whenever something happens in the world, we
are the ones to answer the 911 call. When there was a problem with
Taiwan and China, President Clinton did not hesitate. He is going to
send the troops, aircraft carriers--two of them, as a matter of fact.
If we are going to be spending for these programs and protecting the
lives of our young men and women who are dedicating them to the service
of this country, we better make sure they do not have aircraft that are
wearing out, they are not operating at tempos that cannot be sustained,
that we start doing what needs to be done in order to make sure we have
the finest capability we can possibly have.
I thank my friend for yielding me so much time.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Sea Power
Committee. Indeed, he did present Admiral Boorda's request to him and
now has supplemented it by the fact that all the Chiefs essentially are
in agreement on this.
Mr. President, I would like to add a comment or two of my own here.
This is the fourth attempt, I say to my good friends, the fourth
attempt to cut the defense budget that we have debated here on this
floor of the Senate within just the past 30, say, legislative days. All
previous attempts have been declined by the Senate. The arguments on
both sides are well known. We have shared them here today. I am not
sure why we are spending more time, indeed, on this issue, on this
important piece of legislation which is badly needed. The position of
the Senate is clear.
Now, the chairman, Chairman Thurmond, and the distinguished ranking
member--and I join with him in this effort--are going to come forward
to bring in a reduction, calculated at roughly $1.7 billion, to
reconcile this bill's overall spending with the budget resolution. That
is a responsible approach to reduction in spending, and it will have my
strongest support. Even with the increases in the defense budget made
by the Budget Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, the
defense budget will continue to decline in real terms in fiscal 1997.
We are not increasing defense spending with this bill before us. We are
simply slowing down--slowing down--the rate of reduction sent to the
Congress by the President of the United States.
Fiscal 1997 will mark the 12th consecutive year of declining defense
budgets. I am confident the pending measure will, likewise, be the
fifth effort to reduce this defense budget, which will be rejected by
the Senate on vote, and that the Senate will turn to the
recommendations of the chairman and the ranking member.
I yield the floor.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
member
[[Page S6955]]
of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from New Mexico.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me start by saying what I am sure is
true for all those speaking for this amendment and that is we agree
that the United States needs to maintain the most capable and effective
military anywhere in the world. But I rise to support Senator Exon's
amendment, his freeze amendment to trim spending in this defense
authorization bill to the same level as is in the current fiscal year
because I believe that kind of fiscal discipline is possible and
prudent and still allows us to maintain the most capable military on
the face of the planet.
The Pentagon is able to live with a freeze. We are outspending all of
our potential foes by at least a factor of 2. The foes that we most
often hear discussed when we are talking about defense issues are Iraq
and North Korea. Mr. President, both of those countries are bankrupt.
The combined defense budgets of both of those countries equal about 5
percent of our defense budget. We have allies in Europe, in Asia, whose
defense budgets also dwarf those of our potential foes.
Our colleagues who voted for the concurrent resolution last week are
asking our nondefense agencies to live with a freeze in discretionary
spending after the budgets of those same agencies were cut by more than
$10 billion last year.
The civilian agencies, those that we are asking to live with the
freeze, face huge challenges as this country prepares for the 21st
century--challenges of educating our children, preserving our
environment, of caring for our veterans, of enforcing our criminal
laws, of maintaining our transportation infrastructure, and developing
new technologies. But we have told those agencies that we must live
with a freeze this year, a $15 billion cut from the President's request
for funds for those agencies.
But, for the Pentagon, even with the cold war long over and security
challenges facing this country reduced to a level that would have been
inconceivable when I entered the Senate 14 years ago, our colleagues
propose a budget resolution to open up their purses for one last
spending spree, adding an additional $11.3 billion above what the
Pentagon requested for fiscal year 1997.
Senator Exon's amendment would cut a total of $4 billion in spending
from the bill. It would leave an increase of $9 billion for defense
spending above what the President requested. The level we are proposing
would fund every single add-on proposed by the committee that is
actually included in the Pentagon's future year defense program; that
is the long-range planning document that the Pentagon works off. This
bill is going to have to be trimmed by $1.7 billion, as several
Senators have already indicated. We know that. Senator Exon essentially
proposes an additional $3.2 billion cut. From my experience on the
committee during the last 14 years, I am sure that the conferees can
find $4 billion in low-priority add-ons to eliminate in the conference.
Mr. President, Senator Exon's amendment is almost identical in
magnitude to the one that was offered by Congressmen Shays and Neumann
2 weeks ago to the House defense appropriations bill. Their amendment
received 60 Republican votes. I hope that Senator Exon's amendment will
be similarly attractive to some of the Republican Senators who are
committed to deficit reduction this year. It is our intention that this
reduction in spending authority would be used to reduce the Federal
budget deficit which is projected to increase in 1997 under both the
budget plan passed by Congress last year and the one submitted by the
President earlier this year.
Mr. President, I honestly believe that this bill could be cut even
more than the $4 billion Senator Exon proposes and with no adverse
effect on our security.
There is an advertisement that appeared in the New York Times the
other day on the 23d of June, on Sunday, by a group of business leaders
pointing out that the last sacred cow in our budget needs to also share
in this burden of budget cuts.
I think that is good advice. I hope we will follow that advice. I
believe most Americans would like to see us hold the line on defense
spending at the President's request, and I urge my colleagues to adopt
the Exon amendment and do so.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just wish at some point in time, the
distinguished Senator from Nebraska will reply to the question of the
Senator from Virginia relative to the CBO letter which I posed, but
that can be done at his convenience. I think we should allow our
colleague from Michigan to proceed. That is perfectly agreeable to the
Senator from Virginia.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to a very distinguished
member of the Armed Services Committee who has sat next to me on that
committee for 18 years, the Senator from Michigan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 8
minutes.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we, indeed, have had an enjoyable 18 years.
I thank my good friend from Nebraska. And we have been joined by our
good friend from Virginia in that 18 years as well. We may disagree on
this, but we are close friends, indeed.
I rise in support of the Exon amendment. I want to emphasize
something which Senator Bingaman just said. The so-called cut which is
proposed in this amendment would leave an increase of $9 billion above
the President's budget request; $9 billion would be left in this bill
above that which the administration asked for and the Defense
Department signed off on.
The majority of the Armed Services Committee added $13 billion. Over
$4 billion of that is not even in the 5-year defense plan, the future
years defense plan of the Defense Department. The Defense Department
has no plan for over $4 billion of the add-ons, so that the Exon
amendment, in cutting $4 billion, is cutting an amendment which is
actually slightly less than the amount which the Defense Department has
absolutely no plans for in its budget projection.
It is one thing to be strong, and we all want to be strong on the
Armed Services Committee, and I think every Member of this body wants
the United States to be the strongest Nation in the world. We are
spending 2\1/2\ times more than Russia, 100 times more than China, and
40 percent of the world's defense expenditures are being spent by the
United States. So, yes, we want to be strong, but we do not want to
throw money away, even in the defense budget, even in the name of
defense.
This budget that came out of the Armed Services Committee, in adding
$13 billion to the administration request, which had been signed off on
by the uniformed military, is throwing money at problems and adding
items that have not been requested by the military, adding items not in
the defense plan for the future and, as a matter of fact, Mr.
President, adding items that were not even in these wish lists which we
solicited from the military.
What the Armed Services Committee did is we asked each of the
services: ``If we had additional funds for you, what would you spend
the money on?"
Very obviously, the services said, ``Oh, we'd spend it for this, we'd
spend it for that, we'd spend it for something else.'' Any agency of
Government would do that.
What we did in soliciting these wish lists from each separate
department--an Army wish list, a Marines wish list, a Navy wish list
and Air Force wish list--what we did is violate the very rules of
jointness and discipline which we ourselves, as an Armed Services
Committee, very proudly put into law a few years back, called
Goldwater-Nichols.
We require jointness. We require the military services to come
together and to scrub their requests together and to jointly request
funds, so they are not pitted off against each other, so they do not
compete with each other up here. They first scrub their requests
together and jointly come here and say, ``We've gone through a process;
we've gone through a joint requirements process. This is the uniformed
military
[[Page S6956]]
joint request.'' That is what the budget request is.
But on these wish lists that were submitted to us and that we
solicited, on these wish lists, we just ask each of the services,
``What is your wish? What are your wishes?''--violating the very rules
of jointness and discipline which we ourselves had installed just a few
years back. Of course, they came in with billions of dollars. There is
no surprise in that.
Admiral Owens' name was invoked here. What Admiral Owens has also
told us, in addition to worrying about some of the future
modernization--and we all have concerns in that area--but what Admiral
Owens said in testimony before the committee was that, while
procurement should ideally be at the level of $60 billion per year,
Congress should not add the money on top of the defense budget
request--should not add the money on top of the defense budget request.
Instead, he said, the Pentagon should work to save the money
internally from reduced infrastructure. We have had a reduced size for
the military. We have bases which have been closed. He testified in
front of our committee that the Pentagon should make savings which
would allow the modernization to occur at a rate of $60 billion per
year, the procurement at the rate of $60 billion per year, and that
these moneys should come from reduced infrastructure--base closure,
privatization, and so forth. That is the No. 2 person at the Pentagon
speaking to us. That is not on the civilian side; that is on the
uniform side.
We have actually added items here that, again, are not even on the
wish list. We have added money for F-16's, a couple extra F-16's. Why
not? That is only $50 million. Those are not even on the Air Force wish
list. That is above what the Air Force added on their wish list. How
about some more helicopters? Why not? We want to be strong. Add some
more helicopters. The trouble is that the so-called Kiowa Warriors are
not even on the wish list. They are not in the budget. They are not in
the 5-year plan. They are not in the wish list we solicited.
But do we have a right to add this money? Of course we do. The
Senator from Maine is absolutely right; we have a right to add any more
funds we want or to subtract any more funds. But should we have some
requirement, some logic, some compelling purpose, some jointness in
this process that the military come together and say, ``Yes, we want to
spend an additional $120 million on the extra Kiowa Warriors''? I hope
so. We cannot just paint these requests as being, ``Well, it's defense,
therefore, they must be needed.''
We have a responsibility with taxpayers' dollars to look at what we
are adding this $120 million for. This budget coming out of our
committee does not meet that responsibility; $4 billion-plus that is
not even in the future defense plans of the military, not justified.
Let us take a look at the Kiowa Warrior. That is the OH-58 scout
helicopter called the Kiowa Warrior, the AHIP's. That is the add-on by
the committee.
They were there in Desert Storm. But we used Apaches instead to
perform the function which the OH-58's were supposed to perform. The
OH-58's could not even keep up with the Apaches, so to perform their
functions we had to use Apaches. So let us add on OH-58's instead. Just
add them on because it is the defense budget, and paint it defense,
label it defense, and then everybody is going to be told, ``Don't cut
it. It's the national security of our Nation.''
The Pentagon already consumes nearly 40 percent of the world's
military budget, and we spend nearly as much as all of our allies
combined. The United States spends 100 times as much annually as Iraq,
the largest spender among nations the Pentagon considers potential
threats. Even as other Federal agencies continue to take sharp cuts in
high-priority programs that directly contribute to the immediate and
long-term security of Americans, including crime-fighting, education
and environmental protection, the committee added billions not
requested by the Department of Defense, and in many cases not even
included by the services on the wish lists solicited by the Committee.
On top of the fact that this authorization has resorted to using ad
hoc wish lists from the services in order to decide where to spend the
extra $13 billion, is the fact that the DOD financial systems necessary
to account for the expenditure of this money are broken. We still
haven't gotten a handle on it.
The General Accounting Office [GAO] in fact, says that ``the
Department does not yet have adequate financial management processes in
place to produce the information it needs to support its decision.''
``No military service or other major DOD component,'' says GAO, ``has
been able to withstand the scrutiny of an independent financial
statement audit.''
But the committee's action would add another $13 billion to the pot
without any concern for financial mismanagement issues.
If the Department of Housing and Urban Development or the Department
of Health and Human Services were the subject of the same type of
reports on their financial management systems that we're getting from
the DOD inspector general and GAO and the DOD Comptroller, himself, we
would never be adding wish list money to their programs.
The GAO describes DOD's financial management problems as ``serious''
and ``pervasive.'' GAO in testimony late last year listed the key
problems as follows:
Serious problems in accounting for billions of dollars in
annual disbursements.
Breakdowns in the Department's ability to protect its
assets from fraud, waste and abuse.
Continuing problems in reliably reporting on the cost of
its operations.
As long as Congress adds money like this, the Department will not
have adequate incentive to solve these financial management problems.
No major corporation in the United States would approve a subsidiary's
budget at a wish list level if the subsidiary suffered from financial
management failures like the Department of Defense.
While the committee is critical of the level of procurement spending
in the President's defense budget request, its answer is simply to add
more money, much of which is not for the items that the Pentagon wants.
This is a poor choice for several reasons.
First, Adm. William Owens, the former Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council [JROC] testified to the committee at its first hearing this
year that while DOD is seeking to increase its procurement funds,
Congress should not add the money on top of the defense budget.
Instead, he said that the Defense Department needs to create savings
from within its own programs to provide additional funds for
procurement. The Secretaries of the Military Departments provided
valuable testimony in support of that notion. But the committee did not
pursue this avenue. Instead, it simply added money to the budget
request, reducing incentives for the Department to operate more
efficiently.
Second, the committee's addition of nearly $13 billion is consistent
with last year's congressional budget resolution, which added $7
billion in fiscal year 1996, and suggested a $13 billion add this year.
But that budget resolution frontloads the defense increases in the
nearterm and shortchanges the department in the out-years. After the
year 2000, the budget resolution would provide the Pentagon with less
money than planned in the President's future years defense plan, and
could substantially underfund the programs that the committee says it
supports.
In fiscal year 2001, the President's budget plan for the defense
budget would be $2.5 billion above the current budget resolution
number. And for fiscal year 2002, the President's defense budget figure
is $7.9 billion higher than the budget resolution plan. So in those 2
years alone, the budget resolution would be more than $10 billion less
than the President's defense budget plan.
The President's budget request and outyear plans provide a more
stable and sustainable funding profile, while the plan of the
congressional majority would jeopardize the long-term health and
stability of defense funding. And the committee's spending priorities
are not the same as those of the Pentagon, so by funding other items,
the committee is funneling resources away from the programs that the
Joint Chiefs and the Defense Secretary say are most needed.
[[Page S6957]]
The Defense Department is in an unusual position among Federal
agencies by virtue of its budget and the length of its future budgeting
plans. Six-year plans are required. When inflation rises above the
expected level, the Defense Department gets an upward inflation
adjustment. But when inflation is lower than expected, DOD gets a large
share of the dividend to plow back into additional programs. This year,
DOD experienced a $45 billion lower inflation estimate. While some $15
billion went back to the Treasury, the other $31.5 billion went to the
military to spend over 6 years. This fact was not even taken into
account by the committee in its addition of $13 billion.
While Congress has criticized the military for inter-service rivalry,
this bill's significant funding increases for the unfunded projects of
the services actually fuels such rivalry by providing items that could
not gain approval in the jointly oriented budget review by the Joint
Chiefs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We should not be
surprised if the services compete with each other for additional
funds--a result we should not be encouraging.
Mr. President, I think it is important to put the issue of defense
spending in some context. I have a chart that shows the levels of
defense spending for about 15 nations, including the United States.
Some of these nations are our allies, some are not allies and not
adversaries, and some we consider adversaries. These figures are from
1994 because that is the most recent year for which we have data on
these countries, and they are in constant 1993 dollars. Here is how
defense spending stacks up among these countries:
First, it is no surprise that we spend more than any of the other
nations. With spending of some $278 billion, we outspend Russia by two
one-half times. I would point out that Russian defense spending is
declining quite rapidly still. We outspend China by a factor of 10. We
sometimes hear people caution that China is the coming military power
to keep a watch on. We should remember that our spending dwarfs that of
China by ten times.
The next group of countries on the list represents our allies with
significant defense expenditures. I would note that the country in this
group with the highest spending is Japan, which spends less than one-
sixth as much as the United States. These are major allies who would be
partners in any conflict affecting their interests, whether in Europe
or in Asia. Together they spent almost $190 billion in 1994.
The United States spends almost one one-half times as much as all
these allies combined. And they would be partners with us in many
conflict situations, so their spending should be considered a
supplement to our own.
Finally, there is the category of nations with interests inimical to
our own, sometimes called rogue nations, most of which are suspected or
known to be pursuing ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction
programs. This includes North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and
Cuba. All together, their spending totals almost $14 billion, which is
nearly 20 times less than what the United States alone spends. So our
spending is massively higher than all these nations combined.
This is just to keep in perspective the fact that our military
spending is far greater than that of the nations about which we are
concerned, and our military capabilities are also far greater.
I thank the Chair and I thank my good friend from Nebraska.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I again solicit from our distinguished
colleague from Nebraska a reply with reference to my observations about
the CBO report, a copy of which he now has.
Mr. EXON. I am glad to reply. I have only 4 minutes left for closing
remarks.
Mr. WARNER. How much time does the Senator from Virginia have?
Mr. EXON. Will the Senator yield me time to answer?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 22 minutes 42
seconds.
Mr. WARNER. I am happy to have my friend reply on my time.
Mr. EXON. I thank the Senator.
I think the Senator asks a very legitimate question. We have checked
with the comptroller at the Pentagon for the answer. The answer is
quite obvious when you recognize that when we look at the various
charts here, we are talking about direct spending and indirect
spending.
Certainly, the funding tail that I referenced is a very real thing.
The Congressional Budget Office, in making their cost estimates, looks
at direct spending. And then there is indirect spending. The initial
airplanes, helicopters, ships, and so forth that we have, as far as the
chart that the Senator referenced is concerned, is right. But that
would contemplate, I would say to my friend from Virginia, that we
would buy this additional equipment and then we would not use it.
So, at least primarily, the difference between what the Senator has
referenced as zero in his chart does not address what the Pentagon
tells us, the comptroller at the Pentagon, who, I think we both agree
since we know him and trust him, says that the problem that you have is
that not all of the direct and indirect spending expenditures for this
equipment have been considered. Therefore, the Pentagon has done that
analysis, which is not part of the CBO cursory review. They conclude
that it will take $25 million more, if we go ahead and purchase the
equipment, and then use it, than is included in the budget. This, I
think, can best be described as an indirect spending impact that has a
very definite effect on the budget of the Pentagon.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I draw your attention to the title that
says, ``Spending Subject to Appropriations Action.'' So it seems to me
it is both direct and indirect. I think the most that can be made of
this argument is that we come to a draw. Clearly, the comptroller of
the Department of Defense, as you say, is a very distinguished former
staff member of the Armed Services Committee, in whom we repose a lot
of confidence.
Mr. EXON. That is correct.
Mr. WARNER. They say one thing; the Congressional Budget Office says
the other. They are diametrically opposed on this question of the tail
spending. I think that is the most that can be stated out of this
debate. It is kind of like that great statement, ``If you take the
economists and you lay them end to end all around the Earth, they still
don't reach a conclusion.'' Is that not right, Senator?
Mr. EXON. No, that is not right. I reply on the Senator's time. I
happen to have the feeling that the comptroller at the Pentagon is a
very honest, straightforward individual.
Mr. WARNER. I am not questioning his integrity.
Mr. EXON. I am glad we straightened that out.
Mr. WARNER. I am glad we straightened that out, too. I was, in a
friendly way, giving the Senator a draw on this debate. But if the
Senator wishes, I will go with the CBO.
Mr. EXON. I always have the highest regard for my friend from
Virginia, and he knows that. If we want to go to a draw on this, let us
call it a draw and move on----
Mr. WARNER. Splendid.
Mr. EXON. To the discussion of how we can justify this increase that
is not requested by the Pentagon.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are awaiting the distinguished Senator
from Indiana, who is quite an authority on this subject, a member of
the Armed Services Committee, as is the Presiding Officer. I shall
yield to him such time as he may require.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I now yield the balance of the time under
my control to the distinguished member of the Armed Services Committee,
Mr. Coats. Mr. President, before that, I ask the Senator how much time
is required?
Mr. COATS. Probably not more than 10 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Then the chairman of the committee will require some
additional time. How much time is remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia controls 12 minutes
30 seconds.
Mr. THURMOND. I will take 7 or 8 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Indiana
have, say, 9 minutes, and that the distinguished Senator from South
Carolina have 7 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request?
[[Page S6958]]
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. COATS. Thank you, Mr. President, I say to my colleague that I
will not take the full 9 minutes unless I need it. Otherwise, I will
yield some back.
I rise to question the Department of Defense's recent assertion that
the Senate Armed Service Committee authorization for fiscal year 1997
will create huge costs in years to come. This information has come
somewhat as a surprise, since the Congressional Budget Office recently
reviewed the committee's fiscal year 1997 authorization and found no
additional spending attributed to the committee's decision. And so we
have somewhat of a disconnect here between the assertions of the
Department and the CBO analysis of the committee's action. I know this
has been discussed on this floor, and I think it is important for
Members to hear the other side of the issue.
When Secretary Perry, Deputy Secretary White, and General
Shalikashvili met with the Armed Services Committee members last week,
Under Secretary White asserted that the funding additions the committee
made to the budget request created a $25 billion additional cost in the
Future Years Defense Program. The estimate has since been refined down
to $20 billion. But since neither Secretary White nor the Comptroller,
John Hamre, was able to explain at the time how such additional costs
might be incurred, Senator Nunn asked that a report be provided to the
committee to explain the rationale and analysis that led to their
conclusion.
Mr. President, in my opinion, the Department's analysis--and in the
opinions of many, including CBO--the Department's analysis of future
years' costs is seriously flawed. The Department made assumptions about
the effects of any funding restorations, and then did their
multiplications, without any reference to the committee's own report,
which explained the committee's intention.
The method of analyzing research and development accounts was to
multiply any committee addition by a factor of four and add up the
result. Such an analysis ignores reality. Some of the program elements
provided the Department the option to use the additional funds to close
out a program, but instead, the program was scored as having an outyear
cost of four times the add. There was no analysis, no reference to the
committee's report that outlined the committee's intentions. Simply
put, the Department assumed the worst-case scenario, assumed no future
savings, and did the multiplication, with a predictable result.
Recently, John Hamre, the DOD Comptroller has agreed that their
analysis was very mechanical and should have considered offsetting
savings.
As far as the procurement accounts are concerned, the Department's
own briefers admitted to having no consistent set of assumptions to
score procurement accounts. In fact, briefers from DOD could not
explain why they scored no future savings when old equipment was
replaced, or modified with more efficient engines. They showed only
outyear costs, but no savings in operation costs. This flies in the
face of the Department's own information papers provided during the
markup on the authorization bill. In one case, the Department's own
information paper claiming outyear savings of $1.5 billion if RC-135
aircraft were re-engined. Now, we find no savings were accounted for in
the Department's analysis of future year costs.
So, Mr. President, let me just outline this for Members. When the
committee came forward with the recommendation for purchase of new
equipment, say, engines for certain types of aircraft, which engines,
if modified, or if they replaced old engines, there would be an outyear
savings because of the efficiencies of the new engines. Yet, that was
not scored against the cost of the new equipment. That cost was taken
and multiplied into outyears and labeled as a gross cost, without a net
savings that come back from the efficiencies.
Here are a couple more examples: The comptroller's analysis of the
two major elements of the National Missile Defense Program are scored
as having a $9.3 billion outyear cost through fiscal year 2001. That is
the amount that most estimate is required to field a national missile
system. Yet, not even the most optimistic projections contemplate
deployment of a system until 2003. When asked how this was scored,
comptroller analysts had no answer, nor recourse to any consistent
assumptions to explain such an assertion.
Another example: The committee recommended an authorization of $12
million for material technology because the committee had statements
from the Army that $8 million would be used to complete one portion of
the program, and another could be finished for an additional $8
million. The committee authorized an additional $4 million for that
portion of the program, leaving an outyear tail of $4 million. The
comptroller scored the program as having $48 million outyear cost, $44
million above the actual outyear cost.
For electronics materials and the space-based infrared program, the
same scenario takes place. Space-based infrared was cut in this year's
budget request by $19 million, with no changes made to the outyear
program. When the committee restored the cut, the comptroller scored it
as an outyear add, which was erroneous.
Mr. President, real life experience does not support this kind of
cost analysis. Anyone in business knows that replacing aging equipment
provides operating savings, otherwise, why replace it? Also, anyone
with common sense knows that buying systems at economic quantities
saves money both now and later. This is what the committee did. In many
cases, the committee actually restored cuts in programs made by the
Department--cuts that drove up unit costs--and now the Department
scores the restorations as having outyear costs.
Mr. President, the notion that the committee's authorization will
drive the Department to outyear spending does not square with our
analysis or square with reality. In fiscal year 1996, the committee
authorized spending at a level above the administration's request.
This year, the administration forwarded a reduced fiscal year 1997
request to Congress. Following the Department's logic in this analysis,
the fiscal 1997 request should have increased, not decreased.
Mr. President, the $20 billion outyear tail from this authorization
does not exist. The analysis that asserts so is now in its sixth
version in the last few weeks. It is no analysis, but rather an
assertion that does not square with the facts. We would be better off
to take General Shalikashvili's words at face value because when
testifying before this year's Defense Department posture hearings, he
was asked about last year's authorization, whether it was needed
equipment, or whether it was ``congressional pork.'' He answered that:
I think that the vast majority of the money was against
things that we were going to buy later. They were brought
forward as a result of what you did, and in many, probably
all cases, in the long run will result in savings, because we
are able to get them sooner at a more advantageous price.
If you are going to buy it anyway, and you can buy it in a quantity
now, which gives you unit cost savings, then why not buy it now? You do
not score that as an extra add-on. You score that as a savings, or at
least you take the total and offset the savings you gain from buying in
quantity. I mean, that is common sense. If you are going to buy one
car, you are going to pay a different price than if you buy a fleet of
cars. If you know you are going to end up buying the fleet, and you can
do the add now and get the unit cost down, it only makes sense to do
so.
Mr. President, the analysis that says any modernization now is an
expense in years to come cannot be taken seriously. More serious
thought should be given to the Department's continuing reductions
without any changes in its stated goals or strategy. Ad hoc assertions,
such as this offering by the Department, should be cause for questions
about any underlying framework or analysis for our national security
other than what the present administration is willing to request.
Mr. President the issue at hand is this: the administration says its
strategy is sound but does not provide the resources to carry it out--
and when those resources are authorized, it complains of future costs.
This all happens while defense spending declines and operational tempo
increases. Mr. President it is time to relook at defense
[[Page S6959]]
strategy from a more thoughtful vantage point, and to take a careful
look at the relation between policy goals and resources. This so called
analysis adds nothing useful to the debate.
Mr. President, I thank you for the time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized
for up to 7 minutes.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today to oppose this amendment
offered by my good friend Senator Exon, and will make my statement
short. We have had long debates on defense spending, not only on this
bill, but during the budget resolution debate. During these debates,
some of my colleagues have argued that the money for defense is
unnecessary, and they have always found other uses for this money.
Mr. President, thankfully, this body has not agreed with these
arguments and has provided the resources necessary to meet our national
security needs. There are many risks associated with the
administration's decision to continue to underfund defense. Our
Nation's top military leaders have assessed those risks and have
explained their concerns, not only in Armed Services Committee
hearings, but in hearings in many of the other defense committees. The
Armed Services Committee has received testimony concerning defense
spending and here are just a few comments that were offered. Secretary
of Defense Perry testified:
. . . the modernization account in fiscal year 1997 will be
the lowest it has been in many years, about one third of what
it was in fiscal year 1985.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili,
testified:
We preserved our readiness and force structure at the
expense of modernization and equipment replacement . . . . So
much that our procurement accounts has actually shrunk to
just below $40 billion, the lowest level since the Korean
War. . . . This procurement hiatus . . . cannot be sustained
indefinitely.
Each of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries expressed similar
concerns, but I will not take the time to go into each of their
testimonies to the committee. We have received assurances that next
year will be better. But then again, that assurance has been rendered
since 1993 and it still has not happened. Admiral Owens highlighted
this problem when he said, ``We've got to stop promising ourselves and
start doing something about this procurement issue . . .''
The administration proposes to reduce defense again this year by
$18.6 billion from fiscal year 1996 levels in real terms. Will the
Defense Department do less next year? Will we ask less of our military
services--of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines? What will be
reduced to account for this $18.6 billion reduction? Already press
report indicate that the administration might be considering extending
United States forces in Bosnia beyond December 20, the date on which
United States forces should be withdrawn. Even without this extension,
costs for this operation have increased for the 1st quarter of fiscal
year 1997 by $184 million, and we are told these costs will increase
again. The decreases in defense spending planned by the administration
are occurring at the same time our military personnel are asked to do
more and more.
It bears repeating that providing for the national security is the
Federal Governments's first obligation to its citizens. I ask my
colleagues to remember these words by General Fogelman, Chief of Staff
of the Air Force:
When I look back to the debacles this country has gotten
itself into coming out of a period similar to what we are in
[now], in many cases it has been because we have ignored the
threats that we could not see . . . We were not sharp enough
to pick them up . . . If we do not look to the future I think
we are going to find ourselves faced with that kind of
situation.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair, and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and
ask that the time be equally divided.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I assume that all time has been used in
opposition to the Exon, et al., amendment.
I would like to inquire as to how much time is left on our side on
the Exon, et al., amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two minutes and 14 seconds the Senator from
Nebraska controls.
Mr. EXON. I thank the Chair. I yield myself such time as I might
need.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Byrd, a member of
the Armed Services Committee, Senator Feingold from Wisconsin, and
Senator Harkin from Iowa be added as cosponsors to the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, in the limited time that I have remaining I
would like to have the opportunity to recap the arguments for the Exon
amendment.
I would first like to point out for the full understanding of all
that this is the only amendment that has any chance or likelihood of
passage for making any meaningful reduction not previously contemplated
in the defense budget. I voted against the previous amendment by
Senator Wellstone that would have reduced and eliminated all of the $13
billion increase over and above what was requested in the President's
budget and not requested in the Pentagon's budget.
I simply say that all should understand that in essence the Exon
amendment sponsored by many of my colleagues is in net effect reducing
by only $2.4 billion the spending authorized by the Armed Services
Committee and the combined action with the budget resolution. That is a
far cry from the attempt by the Senator from Minnesota that--which this
Senator had some sympathy for--I voted against, an attempt to show how
reasonable and how minimal the approach is as being offered by this
Senator from Nebraska and several of my colleagues.
To put it another way, it is quite similar in its total approach to a
measure of 2 years ago commonly called the Exon-Grassley amendment that
made minor reductions in the defense authorization bill but was scorned
at that time by some as though we were trying to devastate the national
security interests of the United States. Let me explain further how
minimal this proposition is.
There has been a great deal of talk today about the fact that there
was a reasonable proposal that would follow to be offered by the
Senator from South Carolina and the Senator from Georgia which would
reduce the Defense authorization bill from the figure of $13 billion
increase over and above what the President and the Pentagon had
requested down to $11.4 billion. That would be about a $1.6 billion
decrease from what the Armed Services Committee had authorized.
The facts are, as I suspect the chairman of the committee and the
ranking member would agree, they have no alternative. The Senate has
already spoken in the budget resolution. The budget resolution reduced
the $13 billion 1-year increase, over and above what the President and
the Pentagon want, down to $11.4 billion. That was in the budget
resolution. Obviously, unless that was reduced from a $13 billion
increase over and above what the President and the Pentagon want, the
authorization bill by the Armed Services Committee would be in
violation of the Budget Act. So the fact that we are about to be
offered an opportunity to cut the fabulous increase by $1.6 billion is
a foregone conclusion because we had already acted on that previously
on the budget resolution.
Therefore, it is hard to say that that is a real cut. Likewise, the
amendment offered by the Senator from Nebraska and others takes that
$1.6 billion that we have agreed to now to be reduced and added an
additional $2.4 billion cut or decrease over and above what the
President and the Pentagon requested, for a net increase--a net
increase for 1 year, mind you--of $9 billion over and above what the
President and the Pentagon requested.
That is a pretty healthy increase. If there is anyone on this floor
who wishes to show some modest, reasonable
[[Page S6960]]
step toward balancing the budget of the United States, the thing to do
today would be to say, OK, we have to give some with regard to the
defense budget, because the defense budget, obviously, with its vast
multibillion-dollar increase, while we are reducing the real needs of
Medicare and Medicaid and education and the environment and other
programs, flies in the face of reality.
Another way to put that, Mr. President, would be to say this is a
chance for people who preach fiscal discipline, who want a balanced
budget by the year 2002, who want a constitutional amendment to
guarantee that by the year 2002, with this modest amendment offered by
the Senator from Nebraska and others to practice what they preach.
There have been some things said today in this Chamber during this
debate about Admiral Boorda, our late and dear colleague, who was very
close to this particular Senator. The statement has been made that
Admiral Boorda was asked what more money could he use as head of the
Navy if he had it.
That is like saying to a military leader, is there anything at all
that you would like to have if you had a blank check?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The Senator's 8 minutes have
expired.
Mr. EXON. Have I used up my time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
Mr. EXON. I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute to close.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. EXON. I simply say that Admiral Boorda or any other military
leader, given such an opportunity, would be derelict in his duty, it
seems to me, if he could not come up with some concept or idea. That is
the wish list that I talked about earlier.
The last time I saw Admiral Boorda was shortly before his death when
he came to my office. I said, ``What can I do for you, admiral?'' He
said, ``You can't do anything for me, Senator. I just want to thank you
for the great support that you have given the U.S. Navy all of these
years.''
So I do not propose to speak for Admiral Boorda, but I simply say
that I think Admiral Boorda, when he signed onto the real needs of the
Navy, meant just what he said. And I suspect that if Admiral Boorda
were here, he would say that you should take a close look, Senators, at
adding $9 billion over what myself and other members of the Joint
Chiefs recommended as incorporated in the President's budget.
Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment, and I ask for the
yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
Is there a sufficient second?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I second.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There appears to be.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following my
remarks there be printed in the Record a letter dated June 19, 1996, to
myself, Senator Bingaman, and Senator Kohl, from the Taxpayers for
Common $ense in support of the Exon amendment.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Taxpayers for Common $ense,
June 19, 1996.
Hon. James Exon,
Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
Hon. Herb Kohl,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Senators Exon, Bingaman and Kohl: Taxpayers for Common
$ense is pleased to support your amendments to the FY 97
defense authorization bill to cut the overall level of
defense spending by $4 billion. With Congress working to
reduce the deficit, this cut is a fair compromise on the
defense budget.
The Department of Defense (DOD) bill authorizes $13 billion
in budget authority above the President's request. It seems
questionable to offer such a large increase to the budget of
an agency whose accounting systems and practices are so weak.
In 1995, the DOD Comptroller gave up trying to find $15
billion in ``missing'' DOD funds. Government investigations
have revealed that out of 36 Pentagon agencies audited last
year, 28 of them used records ``in such terrible condition''
that their financial statements were ``utterly useless.''
Every agency is being asked to examine its own budget and
implement effective spending strategies. In light of the fact
that $4.6 billion of the Committee's $13 billion increase was
not in the Future Years Defense Plan, a $4 billion cut merely
attempts to bring the defense budget in line with all the
other agencies.
Taxpayers for Common $ense supports your efforts in working
toward a balanced budget. This amendment is the first step
toward fiscal responsibility for the Pentagon. We urge all
members of the Senate to support your amendments.
Sincerely,
Ralph DeGennaro,
Executive Director.
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Thurmond is recognized.
____________________