[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 96 (Wednesday, June 26, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6934-S6937]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Amendment No. 4266
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Wellstone
amendment be temporarily set aside for the purpose of this Senator
offering an amendment.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The objection is heard.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska still has the floor.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I had asked for unanimous consent to
temporarily set aside the Wellstone amendment for the purpose of the
Senator from Nebraska offering an amendment. That has been objected to
by the chairman of the subcommittee, which blocks my attempt to offer
the amendment. Therefore, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time is left on the
Wellstone amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 5 minutes
remaining.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from South Carolina
will yield me the 5 minutes.
Mr. THURMOND. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Indiana.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, while we are debating and straightening out
a procedural quandary we are in with a number of amendments, let me use
up the remaining time on the Wellstone amendment and speak in
opposition to it.
The assumption behind the amendment is that defense is overfunded. We
talk about the adding of additional billions of dollars to the defense
bill as if the adding was over and above what the defense ought to be
and, therefore, is surplus pork barrel, extraneous money.
I think it is important to understand that, first of all, defense has
been declining, as has been stated, for 12 straight years. Funding,
overall, for defense is down 41 percent in real terms since 1985, at
1950 levels of funding; modernization is at 1975 levels of funding, and
the budget resolution funds defense at $7.4 billion below last year's
defense level in real terms.
Maybe this chart can better illustrate what I am trying to say. In
fiscal year 1996, the Appropriations Committee appropriated $264.4
billion in spending for defense for fiscal year 1996. That represented
the 12th straight year of decline in defense spending in real terms.
Now, the Clinton administration came in and said, even though that is
a reduction from previous years, we want to reduce it even further.
They brought the level down to $254.4, an additional $10 billion cut.
Then we in the Senate brought forward legislation which would fund
defense at last year's spending level--adjust it, in other words, to
buy the same amount of defense this year that we bought last year.
Without increasing it, but just buying the same level, it would have
been, because of inflation, $273 billion.
What we have proposed in this legislation is a $267.3 billion total,
which is,
[[Page S6935]]
of course, above the President's request. But the President's request
was way below just keeping level with defense.
Now, this total increase here is $18.6 billion over the President's
request, just to buy last year's defense. We did not think we could go
that far and meet our obligations to help balance the budget, so we
took two-thirds of that and went to $267.3 billion. So the assumption
that we are somehow throwing an additional $10 billion into defense is
simply wrong.
The defense outlays have been reduced 11 percent just since 1993,
while nondefense outlays for the same period have increased 23 percent.
It is not defense that is overfunded; it is defense that is
underfunded. We are just trying to keep part of what we had, without
falling further and further behind.
The second point that we hear over and over is that the Defense
Department did not request this money, therefore implying it is all
congressional add-ons. I have two responses to that.
No. 1, since when does the Congress simply buy off on the requests
from the various departments of the administration without challenging
or looking at the requests or going a little further than what their
stated public request is? That is our job. We are elected to make the
final decision in terms of how much we spend for education, how much we
spend for the arts, how much we spend for transportation, how much we
spend for defense, and every other item in the budget. That is why we
have a Budget Committee, that is why we have Appropriations Committees,
that is why we have authorization committees, to determine how much we
ought to spend. That is what we are doing here.
Second, and probably more important, the Department of Defense--I
have 17 pages of quotes here from representatives from the Department
of Defense saying we need to spend more. Obviously, what happened here
is that the Department of Defense has been told by this administration
that ``you will not spend more than $254 billion. Now you salute and
make it work and sound like that is all you need.'' So it is false to
say that the Department of Defense did not even request the money.
I can go down through the 17 pages of the list, from the Secretary of
Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the chiefs of
the various services, and quote from every one of them, saying: We are
dangerously below where we ought to be. Modernization is dangerously
underfunded. We ought to be funding it at a $60 billion level. Instead,
we are funding it at nearly half of that, roughly $38 billion.
I do not have time to give all these quotes, Mr. President, so I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record excerpts of the quotes
from members of the Department of Defense as to why this budget of
$254.4 is too low and why we are dangerously underfunding defense needs
for the future.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Excerpts of Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, on the Defense Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1997
modernization--critical need
. . . what I am projecting for you is that we have to start
increasing the modernization program or this curve will just
keep going straight up, and we will start to have a real
problem in obsolescence of equipment in the field.--Secretary
of Defense William J. Perry, March 5, 1996.
. . . the modernization account in FY 1997 will be the
lowest it has been in many years, about one third of what it
was in FY 1985.--Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, March
5, 1996.
I am very concerned that our procurement accounts are not
where I think they ought to be . . . [We] must commit
ourselves to a sufficient procurement goal, a goal I judge to
be approximately $60 billion annually.--Chairman of the JCS,
GEN Shalikashvili, March 5, 1996. [The procurement budget
request for FY 1997 was $38.9 billion.]
We've got to stop promising ourselves and start doing
something about this procurement issue which, I think, is the
basis of our ability to recapitalize America's military, not
just the ships and tanks and airplanes, but also . . .
remarkable technologies.--Vice Chairman, JCS, ADM William
Owens, February 28, 1996.
Unless we recapitalize, we are not going to be ready to
meet the threats of the future.--Chief of Staff, Air Force,
GEN Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
If we do not modernize, we ultimately place future
readiness at risk.--Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Michael
Boorda, March 14, 1996.
Further deferral of modernization will incur significant
risk to future readiness.--Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Dennis
Reimer, March 13, 1996.
I want to talk . . . about procurement because I believe it
is the crisis in the defense budget today.--Vice Chairman,
JCS, ADM William Owens, February 28, 1996.
In the long term, our most urgent need is to modernize our
fighter force. By the time the F-22 reaches IOC in 2005, the
F-15 will be in its fourth decade of active service as our
front-line fighter.--Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Sheila
Widnall, March 14, 1996.
Procurement has continued to pay the bill for readiness and
force structure over the past decade and now hovers at a
post-World War II low of about $40 billion.--Chairman of the
JCS, Gen. Shalikashvili, March 5, 1996.
General Shalikashvili estimates the services would need
about $60 billion of annual procurement funding. The
Department of the Navy would need about $28.5 million
annually to sustain its Bottom-Up Review force structure.--
Secretary of the Navy, Hon. John Dalton, March 12, 1996.
We preserved our readiness and force structure at the
expense of modernization and equipment replacement. We still
need to keep readiness a top priority. But we have been able
to enjoy a procurement hiatus, so much so that our
procurement account has actually shrunk to just below $40
billion, the lowest since the Korean War . . . This
procurement hiatus . . . cannot be sustained indefinitely.--
Chairman of the JCS, Gen. Shalikashvili, March 5, 1996.
Investment accounts . . . have been at relatively low
levels for several years, and I have reported on that each of
the 3 years that I have come before you.--Secretary of the
Army, Hon. Togo West, March 13, 1996.
For the Marine Corps, since 1971 we have averaged about
$1.2 billion annually for procurement. This year we are at
about $556 million. You can see the concerns that we have.--
Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, March 12,
1996.
Equipment . . . permits us to remain dominant on the
battlefield . . . In order to maintain this edge, we must
continue to modernize.--Secretary of the Army, Hon. Togo
West, March 13, 1996.
Like the F-15, the F-16 will be entering its fourth decade
as the most numerous fighter in our inventory by the time its
replacement begins to arrive.--Secretary of the Air Force,
Hon. Sheila Widnall, March 14, 1996.
Procurement accounts have been at relatively low levels for
several years . . . the Army will have to once again fund
modernization more robustly.--Secretary of the Army, Hon.
Togo West, March 13, 1966.
We must modernize to protect our soldiers . . . [This makes
them] more survivable . . . [and gives] them the edge.--Chief
of Staff, Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
The greatest potential threat to Army readiness is the
medium and long term impact: of an increased operational pace
and insufficient modernization funding . . . by failing to
modernize and update our equipment, we put tomorrow's
soldiers at risk.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer,
March 13, 1996.
In the event of a conflict, a lack of modern equipment will
cost the lives of brave soldiers.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen.
Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
Further forestalling of modernization would greatly
increase risk. There are long lead times for modern equipment
and longer lead times to develop and train the leaders who
will employ it. Consequently, further deferral of
modernization could delay a modernized force beyond the
limits of our ability to anticipate future security
challenges. Creating such a window of vulnerability could
lead to a future environment where the interests of the
United States are directly threatened.--Chief of Staff, Army,
Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
30 years ago, our predecessors . . . structured the fighter
force that has served this Nation so well in the decades
since. It is now up to us to show that same foresight as we
look towards the uncertain world of tomorrow. We owe that to
this Nation and to the young people . . . who will face the
risks of combat.--Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Sheila
Widnall, March 14, 1996.
We need to think about future priorities in terms of the
range of capabilities useful for the world that is coming . .
. we need forces which are broadly useful, not just capable
on a single set of narrowly defined battlefields.--
Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, March 14,
1996.
We end up deferring programs and finding work-arounds. We
end up increasing the bill in the outyears. It is very
difficult for me to specifically point out a big problem in
that it is a lot of little slices that impact us because it
impacts the stability of our modernization programs.--Chief
of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
I ask your help to ensure that your Nation's Air Force has
the proper equipment and the best quality people to meet the
needs of the 21st Century.--Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen
Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
The issue still is that we are underfunded in
modernization.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer,
March 13, 1996.
We know that we cannot procure everything in the near-term,
so we . . . built a time-phased modernization plan . . .
[that] is
[[Page S6936]]
very delicate. And we cannot afford to see procurement
dollars slide out to the right.--Chief of Staff, Air Force,
Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
We have benefitted from the aircraft procurement of the
1980's. That is what has really sustained us.--Chief of
Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
Testimony Before the House Committee on National Security
I am sure you realize as well as we do that severely
constrained modernization resources have extended fielding
times, have delayed modernization of the total force, have
delayed deploying a next generation of systems and from a
business standpoint have resulted in some inefficient
programs.--Assistant Secretary of the Army for RD&A Gilbert
Decker, March 28, 1996.
Somewhere along the lien when you [slow procurement] you
get risk . . . then comes the risk in casualties because you
don't close with the right type of force, with the right
application, and so the prosecution of your battle just takes
longer.--Commander in Chief, United States Central Command,
Gen Binford Peay, March 28, 1996.
Our men and women don't ask you for very much and they
don't ask us for very much. They want and require ships and
weapon systems that are effective, and they need that not
only today but they need it in the future. We talk about
quality of life--that is the ultimate quality of life if you
go in harm's way.--Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen Charles
Krulak, March 13, 1996.
I [have watched] the Air Force procurement accounts
decrease by some 60 percent . . . we are living off the
procurement of the past. It has to stop.--Chief of Staff, Air
Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 13, 1996.
readiness
[The Marine Corps is] the Nation's force in readiness, and
charged [by Congress to be] most ready when the Nation is
least ready . . . they must be ready to go at a moment's
notice, and when they go they must be ready to win.
Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen Charles Krulak, March 14, 1996.
[the issue] that we face today in the Air Force is
primarily a long-range readiness issue. We are confronted
with the requirement to invest in tomorrow's readiness to
begin to recapitalize the force to modernize our Armed
Forces.--Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman,
March 14, 1996.
In our business, we need to be ready not only twenty
minutes from now, but twenty years from now as well . . . If
we do not modernize, we ultimately place future readiness at
risk.--Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael Boorda, March
14, 1996.
The Army has maintained current readiness . . . by
deferring modernization . . . Further deferral of
modernization will incur significant risk to future
readiness.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March
13, 1996.
Throughout the downsizing, our priority has been on
maintaining current readiness.--Chief of Naval Operations,
Adm Michael Boorda, March, 14, 1996.
If we work our people too hard, and by ``too hard'' I mean
being away from home, they will not stay with us . . . If we
work our equipment beyond its reasonable limits or do not
maintain it well because it is deployed, then our people have
to work harder to try to keep it up and they will not stay
with us. Those are lessons we learned the hard way not too
many years ago . . . We cannot afford to get in [that
position again].--Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael
Boorda, March 14, 1996.
I will admit to you that we have probably mortgaged the
modernization account in order to take care of our people . .
.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
Regardless of how we rationalize . . . if [the force] gets
too small it will not be ready because we will not see the
requirements go away, we will just [do] them on the backs of
our people . . . We have been down that road before . . . It
is not pretty.--Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael
Boorda, March 14, 1996.
The Army is nearing the end of an historic drawndown . . .
About 450,000 volunteer soldiers and civilians have left the
Army . . . [that is] about as many people as are employed by
Ford and Chrysler Motor Companies combined . . . Many did not
want to leave . . . It was important to us to ensure that we
took care of [these] people and to keep the remaining Army
trained and ready . . . In order to do this, the accounts for
modernization were reduced . . . there was a cost . . . We
paid a price that may not be seen for some time. We have yet
to see the drawndown's effects on leadership and retention.
In cavalry terms, our units have been ridden hard and put
away wet.--Chief of Staff, Army Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13,
1996.
Testimony Before the House Committee on National Security
We have received help from the Hill. It has been greatly
appreciated . . . But we are not where we ought to be . . . I
went with my godchild to his barracks . . . and I was
appalled at what he was living in. `Appalled' is probably a
mild word for it . . . We are building some barracks, we are
building some homes . . . but it is not to the level that I,
as Commandant, or you, as a public servant, would be very
pleased about. It is simply a matter of available money.--
Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen Charles Krulak, March 13, 1996.
on adding funds above the budget request
. . .we have to start increasing the modernization program
or this curve will just keep going straight up, and we will
start to have a real problem in obsolescence of equipment in
the field.--Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, March 5,
1996.
The issue really revolves around the fact that we do not
have enough in the modernization account.--Chief of Staff,
Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
I should point out that we do have a bow wave in the out-
years that, should the Congress choose to invest additional
funding, we think that reducing that bow wave would be
advantageous.--Secretary of the Navy, Hon. John Dalton, March
12, 1996.
Yes [We could use additional funds if Congress provided
them in fiscal year 1997]. We still have some holes in our
modernization account.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen. Dennis
Reimer, March 13, 1996.
Last year we had an authorization for three DDG-51s but not
enough funds. An average of three DDGs across every year is
the fewest we should buy, not the maximum. A long term
strategy should call for more than that.--Chief of Naval
Operations, Adm Michael Boorda, March 12, 1996.
[In response to the question of whether there is a need for
additional funding] We would be willing--we would be
delighted, actually, to work with you to give specific
programmatic examples. . .we would apply such money to. .
.acceleration of existing programs. . .upgrades of platforms.
. .[and] recapitalization.--Secretary of the Air Force, Hon.
Sheila Widnall, March 14, 1996.
If additional funds became available, we could indeed
convert two ships for [Maritime Prepositioning Force
purposes]. If Congress added funds, an additional ship could
be converted this coming year. . .I agree with the Commandant
concerning advisability of those ships.--Secretary of the
Navy, Hon. John Dalton, March 12, 1996.
We are short, still, in the Army some 40,000 trucks.--Chief
of staff, Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
Testimony Before the House Committee on National Security
I applaud the efforts of this Congress in most of the items
that were added to the 1996 bill because you did what I
requested during the discussions here with this committee,
which is that most of that add-on was not pork.--Secretary of
Defense William J. Perry, March 6, 1996.
You helped me on [procurement] last year, and I really
appreciate it. And I will tell you it made a big difference
for about 44,000 Marines.--Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen.
Charles Krulak, March 13, 1996.
I would like to thank you for your support last year, both
in your quality of life initiatives, particularly in the
MILCON [military cnstruction] area. Folks sometimes would
like to describe these plus-ups in quality of life as
unnecessary, but the fact of the matter is, the plus-ups that
we saw in MILCON last year were accelerations of things that
our people would have had to wait for, so we did not see that
as wasteful.--Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen. Ronald
Fogelman, March 13, 1996.
I want to take this opportunity to thank this committee,
particularly the Military Construction Subcommittee, for the
very good support you have given us in improving the quality
of our housing * * * I am not satisfied with the effort on
housing, as you are not satisfied with it * * * It would be a
lot easier if I simply has more money.--Secretary of Defense
William J. Perry, March 6, 1996.
We saw that the plus-ups in the procurement accounts were *
* * the kinds of things that help us with the procurement
that we see out there in the future.--Chief of Staff, Air
Force, Gen. Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
defense--general
Few people know, few people understand, few people have
spent the time to look across the spectrum of American
warfighting capabilities and technologies.--Vice Chairman,
JCS, Adm William Owens, February 28, 1996.
Past experience shows us that when you try to precisely
project yourself into the future, you are probably going to
be precisely wrong:--Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald
Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
The chaotic and uncertain strategic environment looming
just over the horizon creates an even more pressing
imperative for a military force that can remain versatile yet
act decisively . . . a force that can quickly and surely
anticipate change and adapt to a new reality.--Commandant,
Marine Corps, Gen Charles Krulak, March 14 1996.
Our heavy units are general purpose forces that not only
can win our wars but can also accomplish other missions, as
the First Armed Division has shown in Bosnia. We must
modernize their equipment to deter mid and high intensity
conflict.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13,
1996.
. . . at the end of the day, you are still going to have to
have the beans and bullets and lift . . . technology is just
simply not a panacea.--Commander in Chief, United States
Central Command, Gen Binford Peay, March 19, 1996.
. . . at the end of the day, you need combat capability in
the field.--Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic
Command and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Gen John
Sheehan, March 19, 1996.
The challenge that we face is that [in] the Army [we put
about 45% of the budget into
[[Page S6937]]
military pay] . . . another 30% . . . goes towards training .
. . so you are left with very little in terms of
procurement.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March
13, 1996.
Mr. COATS. Second, Mr. President, let me state that there are a
number of programs in the past that the Department of Defense has not
requested, which this Congress has determined are important to be added
to the Department of Defense budget. And we have done so. Looking back,
in hindsight it is a good thing that we did. Strategic sealift: Now the
Department of Defense comes and says it is one of their top priorities.
They did not require it, nor request it before, maybe because the
administration said do not do it. They are darned glad that we did not
abide by their request. Some of the C-17's, the V-22, countermine
efforts--we find that we were seriously underfunded and underprepared
in the past in terms of dealing with countermine activity. This
Congress made a decision to go forward and fund some of that. We are
darned glad they did, and the Defense Department is darned glad that
they did.
So let us be realistic on this. I urge my colleagues to vote against
the Wellstone amendment for the reasons stated. It is simply a
misstatement of what the request is from the Department of Defense. It
is more a statement of what the administration would like out of
defense, which is to cut it, to cut it, and cut it so that they can
take the money and fund their favorite programs and not provide for
adequate security for this country.
Mr. President, how much time is left?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. COATS. I regret that because I am just getting warmed up. I will
cease and desist.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I notice that the negotiations are still
going on. I am prepared to stop talking as soon as they are prepared to
go forward. In the meantime, rather than dead air, I thought I would
say one more thing about the Wellstone amendment.
I have had the opportunity in the last few years as a member of the
Senate Armed Services Committee and chairman of the Personnel
Subcommittee to examine our military housing that we provide for
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, both married personnel and
their families, as well as single personnel.
It is a shocking statistic to note that more than 60 percent of
current military housing, family and single housing, is substandard by
military standards. Military standards are generally lower than
civilian standards. The houses that you and I live in, the apartments
that the single individuals live in, are built to a far higher quality
and standard than what the military enjoys.
It is part of the nature of the military that they salute and serve
and do not complain. But it is virtually a disgrace to note the
condition of some of this housing: Deteriorating ceilings, leaking
pipes, asbestos-lined pipes in the ceilings, falling plaster, crumbling
stairways, inadequate space for families and for children.
I commend the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Defense for
recognizing this problem and taking some initiative to deal with it.
But we are a long way from solving this problem. In fact, if we stayed
at the current pace of renovation, it would take 30 years to bring
military housing up to the standard level. Of course, by that time all
housing that is standard today would be substandard.
So it is a never-ending cycle. We need to accelerate that process,
and we hope we will accelerate that process. But to suggest that
defense is overfunded when we are asking our service families to live
in substandard housing and when we are asking our service members to
live in substandard barracks and are asking them to live in the
conditions that they live I think it is misunderstanding the situation
as it currently exists in the United States military.
Just recently I was touring some barracks and housing facilities in
Georgia. I was informed by the commander of a number of units that the
soldiers were on their off time on Saturdays and Sundays and weekends
going out to Home Depot to purchase materials and voluntarily giving up
of their time to repair some of their facilities just so that they can
take showers and live in some kind of decent housing situation.
So I think it is important to recognize that this continual 12-year
decline in real terms in defense spending is not only affecting our
ability to fight future wars, to have the technology, research and
modernization necessary but it is eroding the quality of life of our
service personnel which is going to affect our ability to attract the
kind of people we want to serve in the military.
I hope my colleagues will take that into consideration in considering
the vote on the Wellstone amendment.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
____________________