[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 96 (Wednesday, June 26, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6934-S6937]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                           Amendment No. 4266

  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Wellstone 
amendment be temporarily set aside for the purpose of this Senator 
offering an amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The objection is heard.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska still has the floor.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I had asked for unanimous consent to 
temporarily set aside the Wellstone amendment for the purpose of the 
Senator from Nebraska offering an amendment. That has been objected to 
by the chairman of the subcommittee, which blocks my attempt to offer 
the amendment. Therefore, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time is left on the 
Wellstone amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 5 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from South Carolina 
will yield me the 5 minutes.
  Mr. THURMOND. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, while we are debating and straightening out 
a procedural quandary we are in with a number of amendments, let me use 
up the remaining time on the Wellstone amendment and speak in 
opposition to it.
  The assumption behind the amendment is that defense is overfunded. We 
talk about the adding of additional billions of dollars to the defense 
bill as if the adding was over and above what the defense ought to be 
and, therefore, is surplus pork barrel, extraneous money.
  I think it is important to understand that, first of all, defense has 
been declining, as has been stated, for 12 straight years. Funding, 
overall, for defense is down 41 percent in real terms since 1985, at 
1950 levels of funding; modernization is at 1975 levels of funding, and 
the budget resolution funds defense at $7.4 billion below last year's 
defense level in real terms.
  Maybe this chart can better illustrate what I am trying to say. In 
fiscal year 1996, the Appropriations Committee appropriated $264.4 
billion in spending for defense for fiscal year 1996. That represented 
the 12th straight year of decline in defense spending in real terms.
  Now, the Clinton administration came in and said, even though that is 
a reduction from previous years, we want to reduce it even further. 
They brought the level down to $254.4, an additional $10 billion cut.
  Then we in the Senate brought forward legislation which would fund 
defense at last year's spending level--adjust it, in other words, to 
buy the same amount of defense this year that we bought last year. 
Without increasing it, but just buying the same level, it would have 
been, because of inflation, $273 billion.
  What we have proposed in this legislation is a $267.3 billion total, 
which is,

[[Page S6935]]

of course, above the President's request. But the President's request 
was way below just keeping level with defense.
  Now, this total increase here is $18.6 billion over the President's 
request, just to buy last year's defense. We did not think we could go 
that far and meet our obligations to help balance the budget, so we 
took two-thirds of that and went to $267.3 billion. So the assumption 
that we are somehow throwing an additional $10 billion into defense is 
simply wrong.
  The defense outlays have been reduced 11 percent just since 1993, 
while nondefense outlays for the same period have increased 23 percent. 
It is not defense that is overfunded; it is defense that is 
underfunded. We are just trying to keep part of what we had, without 
falling further and further behind.
  The second point that we hear over and over is that the Defense 
Department did not request this money, therefore implying it is all 
congressional add-ons. I have two responses to that.

  No. 1, since when does the Congress simply buy off on the requests 
from the various departments of the administration without challenging 
or looking at the requests or going a little further than what their 
stated public request is? That is our job. We are elected to make the 
final decision in terms of how much we spend for education, how much we 
spend for the arts, how much we spend for transportation, how much we 
spend for defense, and every other item in the budget. That is why we 
have a Budget Committee, that is why we have Appropriations Committees, 
that is why we have authorization committees, to determine how much we 
ought to spend. That is what we are doing here.
  Second, and probably more important, the Department of Defense--I 
have 17 pages of quotes here from representatives from the Department 
of Defense saying we need to spend more. Obviously, what happened here 
is that the Department of Defense has been told by this administration 
that ``you will not spend more than $254 billion. Now you salute and 
make it work and sound like that is all you need.'' So it is false to 
say that the Department of Defense did not even request the money.
  I can go down through the 17 pages of the list, from the Secretary of 
Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the chiefs of 
the various services, and quote from every one of them, saying: We are 
dangerously below where we ought to be. Modernization is dangerously 
underfunded. We ought to be funding it at a $60 billion level. Instead, 
we are funding it at nearly half of that, roughly $38 billion.
  I do not have time to give all these quotes, Mr. President, so I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record excerpts of the quotes 
from members of the Department of Defense as to why this budget of 
$254.4 is too low and why we are dangerously underfunding defense needs 
for the future.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Excerpts of Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 
       Senate, on the Defense Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1997


                      modernization--critical need

       . . . what I am projecting for you is that we have to start 
     increasing the modernization program or this curve will just 
     keep going straight up, and we will start to have a real 
     problem in obsolescence of equipment in the field.--Secretary 
     of Defense William J. Perry, March 5, 1996.
       . . . the modernization account in FY 1997 will be the 
     lowest it has been in many years, about one third of what it 
     was in FY 1985.--Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, March 
     5, 1996.
       I am very concerned that our procurement accounts are not 
     where I think they ought to be . . . [We] must commit 
     ourselves to a sufficient procurement goal, a goal I judge to 
     be approximately $60 billion annually.--Chairman of the JCS, 
     GEN Shalikashvili, March 5, 1996. [The procurement budget 
     request for FY 1997 was $38.9 billion.]
       We've got to stop promising ourselves and start doing 
     something about this procurement issue which, I think, is the 
     basis of our ability to recapitalize America's military, not 
     just the ships and tanks and airplanes, but also . . . 
     remarkable technologies.--Vice Chairman, JCS, ADM William 
     Owens, February 28, 1996.
       Unless we recapitalize, we are not going to be ready to 
     meet the threats of the future.--Chief of Staff, Air Force, 
     GEN Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
       If we do not modernize, we ultimately place future 
     readiness at risk.--Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Michael 
     Boorda, March 14, 1996.
       Further deferral of modernization will incur significant 
     risk to future readiness.--Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Dennis 
     Reimer, March 13, 1996.
       I want to talk . . . about procurement because I believe it 
     is the crisis in the defense budget today.--Vice Chairman, 
     JCS, ADM William Owens, February 28, 1996.
       In the long term, our most urgent need is to modernize our 
     fighter force. By the time the F-22 reaches IOC in 2005, the 
     F-15 will be in its fourth decade of active service as our 
     front-line fighter.--Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Sheila 
     Widnall, March 14, 1996.
       Procurement has continued to pay the bill for readiness and 
     force structure over the past decade and now hovers at a 
     post-World War II low of about $40 billion.--Chairman of the 
     JCS, Gen. Shalikashvili, March 5, 1996.
       General Shalikashvili estimates the services would need 
     about $60 billion of annual procurement funding. The 
     Department of the Navy would need about $28.5 million 
     annually to sustain its Bottom-Up Review force structure.--
     Secretary of the Navy, Hon. John Dalton, March 12, 1996.
       We preserved our readiness and force structure at the 
     expense of modernization and equipment replacement. We still 
     need to keep readiness a top priority. But we have been able 
     to enjoy a procurement hiatus, so much so that our 
     procurement account has actually shrunk to just below $40 
     billion, the lowest since the Korean War . . . This 
     procurement hiatus . . . cannot be sustained indefinitely.--
     Chairman of the JCS, Gen. Shalikashvili, March 5, 1996.
       Investment accounts . . . have been at relatively low 
     levels for several years, and I have reported on that each of 
     the 3 years that I have come before you.--Secretary of the 
     Army, Hon. Togo West, March 13, 1996.
       For the Marine Corps, since 1971 we have averaged about 
     $1.2 billion annually for procurement. This year we are at 
     about $556 million. You can see the concerns that we have.--
     Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, March 12, 
     1996.
       Equipment . . . permits us to remain dominant on the 
     battlefield . . . In order to maintain this edge, we must 
     continue to modernize.--Secretary of the Army, Hon. Togo 
     West, March 13, 1996.
       Like the F-15, the F-16 will be entering its fourth decade 
     as the most numerous fighter in our inventory by the time its 
     replacement begins to arrive.--Secretary of the Air Force, 
     Hon. Sheila Widnall, March 14, 1996.
       Procurement accounts have been at relatively low levels for 
     several years . . . the Army will have to once again fund 
     modernization more robustly.--Secretary of the Army, Hon. 
     Togo West, March 13, 1966.
       We must modernize to protect our soldiers . . . [This makes 
     them] more survivable . . . [and gives] them the edge.--Chief 
     of Staff, Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
       The greatest potential threat to Army readiness is the 
     medium and long term impact: of an increased operational pace 
     and insufficient modernization funding . . . by failing to 
     modernize and update our equipment, we put tomorrow's 
     soldiers at risk.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer, 
     March 13, 1996.
       In the event of a conflict, a lack of modern equipment will 
     cost the lives of brave soldiers.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen. 
     Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
       Further forestalling of modernization would greatly 
     increase risk. There are long lead times for modern equipment 
     and longer lead times to develop and train the leaders who 
     will employ it. Consequently, further deferral of 
     modernization could delay a modernized force beyond the 
     limits of our ability to anticipate future security 
     challenges. Creating such a window of vulnerability could 
     lead to a future environment where the interests of the 
     United States are directly threatened.--Chief of Staff, Army, 
     Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
       30 years ago, our predecessors . . . structured the fighter 
     force that has served this Nation so well in the decades 
     since. It is now up to us to show that same foresight as we 
     look towards the uncertain world of tomorrow. We owe that to 
     this Nation and to the young people . . . who will face the 
     risks of combat.--Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Sheila 
     Widnall, March 14, 1996.
       We need to think about future priorities in terms of the 
     range of capabilities useful for the world that is coming . . 
     . we need forces which are broadly useful, not just capable 
     on a single set of narrowly defined battlefields.--
     Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, March 14, 
     1996.
       We end up deferring programs and finding work-arounds. We 
     end up increasing the bill in the outyears. It is very 
     difficult for me to specifically point out a big problem in 
     that it is a lot of little slices that impact us because it 
     impacts the stability of our modernization programs.--Chief 
     of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
       I ask your help to ensure that your Nation's Air Force has 
     the proper equipment and the best quality people to meet the 
     needs of the 21st Century.--Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen 
     Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
       The issue still is that we are underfunded in 
     modernization.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, 
     March 13, 1996.
       We know that we cannot procure everything in the near-term, 
     so we . . . built a time-phased modernization plan . . . 
     [that] is

[[Page S6936]]

     very delicate. And we cannot afford to see procurement 
     dollars slide out to the right.--Chief of Staff, Air Force, 
     Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
       We have benefitted from the aircraft procurement of the 
     1980's. That is what has really sustained us.--Chief of 
     Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.

       Testimony Before the House Committee on National Security

       I am sure you realize as well as we do that severely 
     constrained modernization resources have extended fielding 
     times, have delayed modernization of the total force, have 
     delayed deploying a next generation of systems and from a 
     business standpoint have resulted in some inefficient 
     programs.--Assistant Secretary of the Army for RD&A Gilbert 
     Decker, March 28, 1996.
       Somewhere along the lien when you [slow procurement] you 
     get risk . . . then comes the risk in casualties because you 
     don't close with the right type of force, with the right 
     application, and so the prosecution of your battle just takes 
     longer.--Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, 
     Gen Binford Peay, March 28, 1996.
       Our men and women don't ask you for very much and they 
     don't ask us for very much. They want and require ships and 
     weapon systems that are effective, and they need that not 
     only today but they need it in the future. We talk about 
     quality of life--that is the ultimate quality of life if you 
     go in harm's way.--Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen Charles 
     Krulak, March 13, 1996.
       I [have watched] the Air Force procurement accounts 
     decrease by some 60 percent . . . we are living off the 
     procurement of the past. It has to stop.--Chief of Staff, Air 
     Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 13, 1996.


                               readiness

       [The Marine Corps is] the Nation's force in readiness, and 
     charged [by Congress to be] most ready when the Nation is 
     least ready . . . they must be ready to go at a moment's 
     notice, and when they go they must be ready to win. 
     Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen Charles Krulak, March 14, 1996.
       [the issue] that we face today in the Air Force is 
     primarily a long-range readiness issue. We are confronted 
     with the requirement to invest in tomorrow's readiness to 
     begin to recapitalize the force to modernize our Armed 
     Forces.--Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, 
     March 14, 1996.
       In our business, we need to be ready not only twenty 
     minutes from now, but twenty years from now as well . . . If 
     we do not modernize, we ultimately place future readiness at 
     risk.--Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael Boorda, March 
     14, 1996.
       The Army has maintained current readiness . . . by 
     deferring modernization . . . Further deferral of 
     modernization will incur significant risk to future 
     readiness.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March 
     13, 1996.
       Throughout the downsizing, our priority has been on 
     maintaining current readiness.--Chief of Naval Operations, 
     Adm Michael Boorda, March, 14, 1996.
       If we work our people too hard, and by ``too hard'' I mean 
     being away from home, they will not stay with us . . . If we 
     work our equipment beyond its reasonable limits or do not 
     maintain it well because it is deployed, then our people have 
     to work harder to try to keep it up and they will not stay 
     with us. Those are lessons we learned the hard way not too 
     many years ago . . . We cannot afford to get in [that 
     position again].--Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael 
     Boorda, March 14, 1996.
       I will admit to you that we have probably mortgaged the 
     modernization account in order to take care of our people . . 
     .--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
       Regardless of how we rationalize . . . if [the force] gets 
     too small it will not be ready because we will not see the 
     requirements go away, we will just [do] them on the backs of 
     our people . . . We have been down that road before . . . It 
     is not pretty.--Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael 
     Boorda, March 14, 1996.
       The Army is nearing the end of an historic drawndown . . . 
     About 450,000 volunteer soldiers and civilians have left the 
     Army . . . [that is] about as many people as are employed by 
     Ford and Chrysler Motor Companies combined . . . Many did not 
     want to leave . . . It was important to us to ensure that we 
     took care of [these] people and to keep the remaining Army 
     trained and ready . . . In order to do this, the accounts for 
     modernization were reduced . . . there was a cost . . . We 
     paid a price that may not be seen for some time. We have yet 
     to see the drawndown's effects on leadership and retention. 
     In cavalry terms, our units have been ridden hard and put 
     away wet.--Chief of Staff, Army Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13, 
     1996.

       Testimony Before the House Committee on National Security

       We have received help from the Hill. It has been greatly 
     appreciated . . . But we are not where we ought to be . . . I 
     went with my godchild to his barracks . . . and I was 
     appalled at what he was living in. `Appalled' is probably a 
     mild word for it . . . We are building some barracks, we are 
     building some homes . . . but it is not to the level that I, 
     as Commandant, or you, as a public servant, would be very 
     pleased about. It is simply a matter of available money.--
     Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen Charles Krulak, March 13, 1996.


                on adding funds above the budget request

       . . .we have to start increasing the modernization program 
     or this curve will just keep going straight up, and we will 
     start to have a real problem in obsolescence of equipment in 
     the field.--Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, March 5, 
     1996.
       The issue really revolves around the fact that we do not 
     have enough in the modernization account.--Chief of Staff, 
     Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.
       I should point out that we do have a bow wave in the out-
     years that, should the Congress choose to invest additional 
     funding, we think that reducing that bow wave would be 
     advantageous.--Secretary of the Navy, Hon. John Dalton, March 
     12, 1996.
       Yes [We could use additional funds if Congress provided 
     them in fiscal year 1997]. We still have some holes in our 
     modernization account.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen. Dennis 
     Reimer, March 13, 1996.
       Last year we had an authorization for three DDG-51s but not 
     enough funds. An average of three DDGs across every year is 
     the fewest we should buy, not the maximum. A long term 
     strategy should call for more than that.--Chief of Naval 
     Operations, Adm Michael Boorda, March 12, 1996.
       [In response to the question of whether there is a need for 
     additional funding] We would be willing--we would be 
     delighted, actually, to work with you to give specific 
     programmatic examples. . .we would apply such money to. . 
     .acceleration of existing programs. . .upgrades of platforms. 
     . .[and] recapitalization.--Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. 
     Sheila Widnall, March 14, 1996.
       If additional funds became available, we could indeed 
     convert two ships for [Maritime Prepositioning Force 
     purposes]. If Congress added funds, an additional ship could 
     be converted this coming year. . .I agree with the Commandant 
     concerning advisability of those ships.--Secretary of the 
     Navy, Hon. John Dalton, March 12, 1996.
       We are short, still, in the Army some 40,000 trucks.--Chief 
     of staff, Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

       Testimony Before the House Committee on National Security

       I applaud the efforts of this Congress in most of the items 
     that were added to the 1996 bill because you did what I 
     requested during the discussions here with this committee, 
     which is that most of that add-on was not pork.--Secretary of 
     Defense William J. Perry, March 6, 1996.
       You helped me on [procurement] last year, and I really 
     appreciate it. And I will tell you it made a big difference 
     for about 44,000 Marines.--Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen. 
     Charles Krulak, March 13, 1996.
       I would like to thank you for your support last year, both 
     in your quality of life initiatives, particularly in the 
     MILCON [military cnstruction] area. Folks sometimes would 
     like to describe these plus-ups in quality of life as 
     unnecessary, but the fact of the matter is, the plus-ups that 
     we saw in MILCON last year were accelerations of things that 
     our people would have had to wait for, so we did not see that 
     as wasteful.--Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen. Ronald 
     Fogelman, March 13, 1996.
       I want to take this opportunity to thank this committee, 
     particularly the Military Construction Subcommittee, for the 
     very good support you have given us in improving the quality 
     of our housing * * * I am not satisfied with the effort on 
     housing, as you are not satisfied with it * * * It would be a 
     lot easier if I simply has more money.--Secretary of Defense 
     William J. Perry, March 6, 1996.
       We saw that the plus-ups in the procurement accounts were * 
     * * the kinds of things that help us with the procurement 
     that we see out there in the future.--Chief of Staff, Air 
     Force, Gen. Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.


                            defense--general

       Few people know, few people understand, few people have 
     spent the time to look across the spectrum of American 
     warfighting capabilities and technologies.--Vice Chairman, 
     JCS, Adm William Owens, February 28, 1996.
       Past experience shows us that when you try to precisely 
     project yourself into the future, you are probably going to 
     be precisely wrong:--Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald 
     Fogelman, March 14, 1996.
       The chaotic and uncertain strategic environment looming 
     just over the horizon creates an even more pressing 
     imperative for a military force that can remain versatile yet 
     act decisively . . . a force that can quickly and surely 
     anticipate change and adapt to a new reality.--Commandant, 
     Marine Corps, Gen Charles Krulak, March 14 1996.
       Our heavy units are general purpose forces that not only 
     can win our wars but can also accomplish other missions, as 
     the First Armed Division has shown in Bosnia. We must 
     modernize their equipment to deter mid and high intensity 
     conflict.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13, 
     1996.
       . . . at the end of the day, you are still going to have to 
     have the beans and bullets and lift . . . technology is just 
     simply not a panacea.--Commander in Chief, United States 
     Central Command, Gen Binford Peay, March 19, 1996.
       . . . at the end of the day, you need combat capability in 
     the field.--Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic 
     Command and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Gen John 
     Sheehan, March 19, 1996.
       The challenge that we face is that [in] the Army [we put 
     about 45% of the budget into

[[Page S6937]]

     military pay] . . . another 30% . . . goes towards training . 
     . . so you are left with very little in terms of 
     procurement.--Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March 
     13, 1996.
  Mr. COATS. Second, Mr. President, let me state that there are a 
number of programs in the past that the Department of Defense has not 
requested, which this Congress has determined are important to be added 
to the Department of Defense budget. And we have done so. Looking back, 
in hindsight it is a good thing that we did. Strategic sealift: Now the 
Department of Defense comes and says it is one of their top priorities. 
They did not require it, nor request it before, maybe because the 
administration said do not do it. They are darned glad that we did not 
abide by their request. Some of the C-17's, the V-22, countermine 
efforts--we find that we were seriously underfunded and underprepared 
in the past in terms of dealing with countermine activity. This 
Congress made a decision to go forward and fund some of that. We are 
darned glad they did, and the Defense Department is darned glad that 
they did.
  So let us be realistic on this. I urge my colleagues to vote against 
the Wellstone amendment for the reasons stated. It is simply a 
misstatement of what the request is from the Department of Defense. It 
is more a statement of what the administration would like out of 
defense, which is to cut it, to cut it, and cut it so that they can 
take the money and fund their favorite programs and not provide for 
adequate security for this country.
  Mr. President, how much time is left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. COATS. I regret that because I am just getting warmed up. I will 
cease and desist.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I notice that the negotiations are still 
going on. I am prepared to stop talking as soon as they are prepared to 
go forward. In the meantime, rather than dead air, I thought I would 
say one more thing about the Wellstone amendment.
  I have had the opportunity in the last few years as a member of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee and chairman of the Personnel 
Subcommittee to examine our military housing that we provide for 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, both married personnel and 
their families, as well as single personnel.
  It is a shocking statistic to note that more than 60 percent of 
current military housing, family and single housing, is substandard by 
military standards. Military standards are generally lower than 
civilian standards. The houses that you and I live in, the apartments 
that the single individuals live in, are built to a far higher quality 
and standard than what the military enjoys.
  It is part of the nature of the military that they salute and serve 
and do not complain. But it is virtually a disgrace to note the 
condition of some of this housing: Deteriorating ceilings, leaking 
pipes, asbestos-lined pipes in the ceilings, falling plaster, crumbling 
stairways, inadequate space for families and for children.
  I commend the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Defense for 
recognizing this problem and taking some initiative to deal with it. 
But we are a long way from solving this problem. In fact, if we stayed 
at the current pace of renovation, it would take 30 years to bring 
military housing up to the standard level. Of course, by that time all 
housing that is standard today would be substandard.

  So it is a never-ending cycle. We need to accelerate that process, 
and we hope we will accelerate that process. But to suggest that 
defense is overfunded when we are asking our service families to live 
in substandard housing and when we are asking our service members to 
live in substandard barracks and are asking them to live in the 
conditions that they live I think it is misunderstanding the situation 
as it currently exists in the United States military.
  Just recently I was touring some barracks and housing facilities in 
Georgia. I was informed by the commander of a number of units that the 
soldiers were on their off time on Saturdays and Sundays and weekends 
going out to Home Depot to purchase materials and voluntarily giving up 
of their time to repair some of their facilities just so that they can 
take showers and live in some kind of decent housing situation.
  So I think it is important to recognize that this continual 12-year 
decline in real terms in defense spending is not only affecting our 
ability to fight future wars, to have the technology, research and 
modernization necessary but it is eroding the quality of life of our 
service personnel which is going to affect our ability to attract the 
kind of people we want to serve in the military.
  I hope my colleagues will take that into consideration in considering 
the vote on the Wellstone amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

                          ____________________