[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 95 (Tuesday, June 25, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6821-S6826]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we resume
consideration of the Department of Defense authorization bill for
debate only, until I seek further recognition at approximately 3:20,
while we continue to put the final touches on our UC request involving
a number of bills.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will state the bill by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 1745) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 1997 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
Pending:
Kyl/Reid amendment No. 4049, to authorize underground
nuclear testing under limited conditions.
Kempthorne amendment No. 4089, to waive any time limitation
that is applicable to awards of the Distinguished Flying
Cross to certain persons.
Warner/Hutchison amendment No. 4090 (to amendment No.
4089), to amend title 18, United States Code, with respect to
the stalking of members of the Armed Forces of the United
States and their immediate families.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, as we begin the fourth day of consideration
of this bill, I thought it would be appropriate to give the Senate my
own view of where we have been and where I think we are going if we are
going to finish this bill, which is a very important measure.
Thus far, we have debated this bill for about 24 hours. We have
disposed of 34 amendments. I have not kept an exact count of the amount
of time consumed by consideration of three nonrelevant, nongermane
amendments thus far to our bill, but I will make a conservative
estimate, and a charitable observation, that well over half of the time
of our debate has been devoted to these three nonrelevant amendments.
While I believe the issues of reopening Pennsylvania Avenue,
pharmaceutical patents under the GATT agreement, and the stalking of
women are certainly worthy of Senate debate, none of them are in the
jurisdiction of this committee, and none of them are in the
jurisdiction of the conference when we go to conference. All of them,
even if they are passed on this bill, will require outside conferees
and are unlikely to be accepted by the House.
The simple fact is that we cannot afford the time it takes to
consider and to continue considering these nonrelevant amendments. I
may vote for all of them. But, at some point, the Senate has to decide
whether it wants to pass a defense bill. If so, then both sides of the
aisle have to cooperate and not continue putting these kinds of
amendments on the bill.
I know the leadership is now discussing a unanimous-consent agreement
on the minimum wage, which would be a big step forward, because if that
does not occur, then that will certainly come up on this bill, in which
case we will never finish this bill this week.
I know Senators have a right to offer such amendments, but--and I
know that my colleague from South Carolina, the chairman of the
committee, and I have talked about this, and he has already addressed
it--I hope that we can resist the temptation from this point on to have
amendments that are not germane to the bill, have nothing to do with
defense, are not in the jurisdiction of this committee, would not be in
the jurisdiction of the conference, and would be very unlikely to be
accepted in the conference. If we do that, we can push forward with
completion of this bill by offering those amendments that are relevant
to this bill.
Toward that end, over the past 4 days, the committee's Democratic
staff has been working hard on our side of the aisle to compile a list
of what would be considered the major defense amendments to be offered
by Democratic Senators, and time agreements for the consideration of
these amendments. We have that list, and we are working with the
leadership to finalize the list. I would not say it is final now, but
we certainly have some idea--more than we did the other day.
In addition, we will continue to urge Senators who have an amendment
to offer on this bill to notify us of their intention as soon as
possible so that we can develop a finite list of amendments that will
lead to a time of completion of the Senate consideration of S. 1745.
I know that a cloture motion has been filed on the defense bill and a
vote will occur on that tomorrow morning. I understand where the
Senator from South Carolina and the leadership is coming from in
proposing that motion. I do not intend to support cloture at this time.
Invocation of cloture would require not only relevancy, but also
germaneness. Many amendments that directly relate to defense and that
are in the jurisdiction of the committee, which would be considered by
the conference and that would not require outside conferees, are
relevant to the bill but not germane to the bill, which would be
required under cloture.
So I do not intend to support cloture tomorrow. If it is invoked,
everyone should realize that most of these amendments that I would call
nonrelevant would be ruled out.
I mentioned that considerable time has been consumed on nonrelevant
amendments. I hope that we can find ways to have time agreements. I
hope we can find a way to get a definite list of amendments and make
sure that those are the only ones that are going to be offered so we
know we can finish this bill. If we can do that on both sides, then, of
course, we will not need to invoke cloture. If we are not able to do
that on both sides in the near term, then at some point I will support
cloture. But I do not intend to do so tomorrow.
The defense bill was started last Tuesday, and one of the reasons I
will not support cloture--in addition to the relevant and germane
considerations, which are very technical but very important when people
are frozen out of amendments--is we have been interrupted over and over
again in the consideration of this bill. Although we have had the bill
before us for 4 days, we have not had many hours for debate on the bill
itself.
We have been interrupted, as I said, by nonrelevant, nongermane
amendments. We were interrupted for consideration of Federal Reserve
nominations
[[Page S6822]]
on last Thursday. I understand that. I certainly understand that we had
no choice on that.
We, also, of course, have had a day and a half of debate during this
time on the campaign finance bill which we voted on cloture on a few
minutes ago. That was on the floor both Monday and a half day Tuesday.
So we have not really had a clear shot at moving this bill forward
with genuine defense amendments. I think we ought to give that a real
try as we move forward this week. If we do not make progress in
debating major defense amendments--we keep getting these amendments
that are well-meaning and I am sure very sincerely pursued by Senators
but that have nothing to do with defense and in all likelihood would
not be part of a defense bill that went to the President. If we
continue to get those, we will simply not be able to finish this bill.
So with the continued leadership of our chairman, Senator Thurmond,
and the leaders, I am hopeful that by the end of the day today we will
begin to have a road map to lead us to the conclusion of this bill. I
urge everyone on this side of the aisle to let us know about your
amendments. Many of them can be worked and altered somewhat and
accepted. Some of them can be accepted the way they are now. But if we
are able to get those amendments, I would want to work with the Senator
from South Carolina in every way possible to have a definite list of
amendments on the Democratic side that would represent all of the
amendments that would be offered so that we could get a unanimous
consent agreement that no other amendments would be offered, and then
we would be able to see the light at the end of the tunnel.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. ROBB addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Study of Alternative Force Structures
Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I first of all commend the ranking member of
the committee for his work in attempting to reduce the number of
amendments so that we can handle this bill. I expect to follow his lead
tomorrow with respect to at least the first vote on cloture. Shortly we
will resume consideration, and it would be appropriate to offer
amendments, and at that time I believe the next amendment to be offered
will be offered by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, Senator
Lieberman, shared by the current occupant of the chair, the Senator
from Indiana, Senator Coats, and a number of us.
I would like to speak for just a few minutes on that particular
amendment in anticipation of its being offered sometime after the
majority leader opens the bill up for amendments at that time.
Mr. President, the amendment that we are going to be considering very
shortly will require a major review of the force structures of the
Armed Forces and, in my judgment, it could be the most important matter
we will address in the consideration of this year's Defense
authorization bill, or in similar authorization bills through the end
of the century, because it goes right to the heart of why we have a
military and what we can expect in terms of national security for many
years to come.
Admittedly, the Department of Defense had some reservations about our
approach initially, but we have worked out those concerns, and I really
believe this amendment is critical if we are serious about our role in
the international community and our simultaneous quest for credible
deterrence and fiscal responsibility.
Mr. President, we have to start by reexamining the basic structure of
the U.S. Armed Forces. That structure, though smaller, has changed very
little in its composition since the end of the cold war even though the
nature of the threat and the means for countering it are dramatically
different.
I believe we need to take a long, hard look at the weapons systems
that are on the drawing board and determine which are truly critical
for the 21st century. I believe we have to look for ways to leverage
our Nation's technological advantages.
By expanding the range and accuracy of our weapons and the
effectiveness of our support equipment, we may be able to reduce the
number of troops and logistics operations. We certainly need to take
greater advantage of our exceptional intelligence communications
capabilities which have the potential to dramatically affect how we
develop and deploy strategic doctrine and battlefield tactics.
Mr. President, each of these areas of endeavor ought to be explored
in a major review of our force structure. We also need to assess the
Bottom-Up Review's assumptions about our capabilities in a more
realistic fiscal context.
In particular, we need to take a much more critical look at the kinds
of threats to U.S. national security interests that we will likely face
15, 20, or even 30 years from now.
While the original Bottom-Up Review served a useful purpose, its
analysis of the personnel, weapons, and military doctrine required by a
21st century American force is simply no longer adequate.
The review that we are proposing should take a tabula rasa look at
the nature and effects of unconventional threats such as regional and
ethnic conflicts, nationalism, political extremism, and failed nation-
states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, technology
transfer, and information warfare and terrorism, both international and
domestic.
The review should, of course, look at the continuing threats of major
regional conflicts such as that of the Persian Gulf, but it should
specifically look as well at the possibility of a major peer emerging
or reemerging as a competitor on the world stage.
The obvious candidates over the 15-year horizon are Russia, and
especially China with its booming economy fueling its military
revitalization and modernization program.
Mr. President, in our long-term planning, we should also consider
anew the potential for armed conflict in broad geographic regions.
Take, for example, the tinderbox of the so-called Rising East where the
United States has fought five times in the last 100 years. In addition
to the United States presence and the armies of Russia and China there,
this vast area is home to the world's five other largest armed forces:
North and South Korea, Vietnam, and the potentially nuclear-capable
India and Pakistan. The latter may be particularly problematic.
What on its face looks like a regional conflict might require
redefinition somewhere between global and regional, if nuclear weapons
are exchanged, and affect a great many neighboring countries.
It would be incumbent on those conducting the review to detail the
specific forces--by active, reserve, and support force type--needed to
execute alternative strategies that run the gamut from global war to
two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts--or MRC's, as we call
them--to a number of contingencies smaller than an MRC.
Assumptions about Reserve readiness, allied mission sharing, warning
times, and the effect of developing technologies on the force structure
must also be addressed.
Other questions should include, at a minimum: What are the risks
under alternative force structures, if funding through 2010 and beyond
remains constant? Should forces be sized against specific enemy
threats, against national security commitments, or against available
national resources? Are the Reserves optimally trained, equipped, and
deployed? Do peacekeeping operations necessitate changes in the way we
have organized, trained, and deployed forces? How should we bring our
teeth to tail ratio back in line.
What outsourcing opportunities offer the greatest potential for
stretching the defense dollar? Are there better measures of readiness
available? Does the current structure of the unified combatant commands
make sense for the next century?
Mr. President, many defense analysts--in the Department, academia,
and industry--are asking similar questions. I have been giving each of
these matters a great deal of thought in recent months, and my staff
has done a great deal of research. When I learned that Senator
Lieberman and others, including the current occupant of the chair, were
looking at different elements of the same challenge, we joined forces
on this amendment to ask the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider all of the
matters
[[Page S6823]]
that I have just highlighted in the quadrennial defense review.
This review, recommended by the Roles and Missions Commission, is an
examination of U.S. defense strategy and force structure through 2005.
But we believe the Secretary ought to have a second opinion as well.
As such, this amendment will call for the creation of a parallel but
independent panel of private experts from the Nation's major think
tanks, academia, and the defense industry. The panel that we are going
to describe would have full access to DOD resources and analyses and
will provide its assessment of the quadrennial defense review by
Secretary of Defense by March 14, 1997.
With this input, the Secretary of Defense would finalize his
quadrennial defense review and provide his summary, an assessment by
the panel, and comments by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
the congressional defense committees by not later than May 15. It is a
safe bet, it seems to me, Mr. President, that the ensuing hearings
would be provocative and enlightening.
Once the quadrennial defense review is completed, the panel will take
the next step of pushing the envelope in long-range thinking.
Looking out to 2010 and beyond, the panel will explore a range of
threat scenarios, build force structures to meet those scenarios, and
explore the risks and costs associated with each. In the process of
conducting this forward-thinking assessment, the panel will again have
the authority to task any DOD component for data and analysis.
The panel's final product will be delivered to the Secretary of
Defense not later than December 1, and the Secretary, in turn, will
submit the panel's report to the Congress no later than December 15,
along with his comments on the report.
In the final analysis, we need to acknowledge that defense spending
has fallen to a level that simply will not meet the national military
strategy for fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major
regional conflicts.
Overall defense spending as a percentage of GDP has fallen to its
lowest level since just after World War II. It absorbed about 10
percent of the gross domestic product during the early 1960's. Today,
that number has dropped to below 4 percent, and it is projected to
continue to fall in the outyears.
I submit that we ignore the implications at our peril.
It is up to us to ensure that future generations of Americans are
afforded the strong measure of security that we have come to expect as
a Nation for the last 50 years, and the best way we can assure this is
through the judicious application of foresight and steadfastness.
Defense spending in the 5 budget years immediately after the cold war
was $350 billion less than the amount projected in the cold war budget.
Make no mistake; that was a huge peace dividend, and our country has
since cashed it on discretionary domestic spending, entitlements and
interest on the national debt. When all is said and done, the only
thing that remains of the peace dividend is the opportunity for
continued peace. And we can only achieve that through the kind of
preparedness to which this review will lead us.
It is my understanding that this amendment is now broadly acceptable
on both sides of the aisle, and when it is formally offered by my
distinguished colleague from Connecticut in a few minutes and discussed
by a number of colleagues who have been working on it, I urge that all
of my colleagues join in adopting this particular amendment.
With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kempthorne). The Senator from Indiana is
recognized.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, very briefly, I wish to add to the remarks
just made by the Senator from Virginia.
I had planned to be here when the Senator from Connecticut, Mr.
Lieberman, introduces this amendment. It is something that the Senator
from Virginia, the Senator from Connecticut, the Senator from Arizona,
the Senator from Georgia and I have worked together on. Unfortunately,
I have a schedule conflict which will take me off the floor, so I would
like to make a preliminary statement prior to our going to the
amendment.
This amendment is a natural convergence of thinking of members on the
Armed Services Committee and other Senators regarding the need for more
information with which to make assessments about future defense
spending programs and plans.
Clearly, we rely a great deal on the Department of Defense for
provision of information and guidance in terms of how the committee
operates, but I think many of us felt we needed additional information
in order to take a longer look at how we strategize, plan for, fund,
and program Department of Defense needs.
We felt it might be helpful to have an outside review panel help us
in that process. So over the past several months, a number of us have
talked about coordinating and combining our efforts into language that
we can insert in the next fiscal year's defense authorization bill.
This language will direct the Secretary of Defense to appoint and work
with an independent review panel to give us a broader, longer look at
defense strategy and defense needs.
I am pleased to join with Senator Lieberman in authoring this effort.
Senators Robb, McCain, Nunn, Inhofe, Kempthorne, Warner, Hutchison,
Santorum, Murkowski, Levin, and Ford have all joined in this effort. It
is bipartisan, and I believe you could say a nonpartisan, effort. We do
not provide for our national security as a partisan issue. We do not
view it even necessarily as a bipartisan issue. Rather, our national
security is a nonpartisan issue. We want to take as objective a look as
we can at our current situation, at future threats to our national
security and what kind of strategies, forces, and implementing needs we
will have to face in the years ahead.
This is a worthy effort. I wish to commend my colleague from
Connecticut for taking the bull by the horns and pulling this effort
together. It has been a cooperative effort among a number of us who
worked with the Department of Defense to iron out some concerns they
had, and I think we have an excellent provision which we will shortly
be adding to the Defense Department bill.
Privilege Of The Floor
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Stanley
Kaufman, a Brookings Institution fellow, and Mark Rosen, Institute for
National Securities Studies fellow assigned to my office, be permitted
the privilege of the floor for the duration of the debate on the fiscal
year 1997 defense authorization bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, before he leaves the floor, I thank my
colleague, the Senator from Indiana, for his support and his work in
preparing the amendment that he spoke of on a force structures study
for the United States and also to thank our colleague from Virginia,
Senator Robb, for the very thoughtful, forthright, and very
constructive words that he spoke on behalf of the amendment that we
hope to offer to the defense authorization bill before too long this
afternoon, after a unanimous-consent request is agreed to by the
leadership.
If I may, to expedite matters, I would like to take this opportunity
to comment on the amendment that I will be offering at the appropriate
time. I am honored to be offering it on behalf of Senators Coats, Robb,
McCain, Nunn, Inhofe, Kempthorne--the occupant of the chair--Warner,
Hutchison, Santorum, Murkowski, Levin, Ford, Bond, and, I am pleased to
say, last but not least--last but most--the distinguished majority
leader of the Senate, the Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Lott.
This amendment calls on the Secretary of Defense to conduct a
thorough study of alternative force structures for our armed services.
What are we talking about? We are really talking here about providing
the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, most of whom are
cosponsors of this amendment, and then in turn the full Congress, with
the information to help us answer fundamental questions about our
future national security. The questions are as simple as this: To the
[[Page S6824]]
best of our knowledge, to the best of the knowledge of the best
thinkers we have on these matters, both inside and outside the Pentagon
today, what are the security threats that America is likely to face in
the next century and how can we best meet those security threats? It is
as simple, and in some ways as complicated, as those simple questions
suggest.
Those of us who are sponsoring this amendment believe that such a
study is essential if the United States is going to be able to meet the
security challenges of the 21st century in light of the dramatic
changes that have occurred in the geopolitical situation, the changes
in the threats to our security which, in the view of some experts, are
even more daunting than those we faced in the cold war, and the ever-
present but increasingly more difficult problems of resource
constraints, which is to say budget pressure--limited amounts of money
to spend on the full range of governmental responsibilities;
remembering, as we approach this function of Government, that the
reason governments were formed in the first place was to provide that
underpinning of security without which we cannot then go on to secure
and provide the freedom and opportunity and benefits that Government
attempts to provide for our people.
This study that will be authorized by this amendment is also an
attempt to not just provide a road map to our future national security,
but to break out of the day-to-day momentum, the inertia of the process
of authorization and appropriation for defense needs as it exists now.
Many changes have occurred, dramatic changes responding to changes in
technology, which provide our war fighters with capability that no war
fighters in history have ever possessed. Yet the changes are so
dramatic, the world so uncertain, our fundamental responsibility to
provide for our national security so great, that what we who will put
forth the amendment are asking is that we step back from the day-to-
day, that we look out over the horizon. As one of my cosponsors said,
that we go up to 30,000 feet and we look out as far as we can see to
the future security threats we may face and how we can best meet them;
to ask the bold questions, the questions that unsettle the status quo,
that do not always, in the normal course of the process, get asked
here. That is really what this is all about.
The United States obviously is, today, the world's only true
superpower. On the other hand, there is no shortage of threats to our
national interests. We see them all around. In many real ways our
military has been operating at a greater tempo since the end of the
cold war than it did before. We face many dangers--rogue states like
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, the more profound and we hope longer range and
perhaps never-realized potential for the emergence of another
superpower peer competitor, perhaps a resurgent Russian nationalism,
perhaps China in the next century--those are factors we need to
consider and attempt to evaluate as we plan and execute our national
security programs.
Obviously, there is also the insidious and dangerous and more near-
term threat posed by terrorists who may come to possess weapons of mass
destruction, and who also, unfortunately, possess a disregard for human
life which might restrain rational actors from employing those weapons
of mass destruction and, in fact, have restrained those who possessed
those weapons in the past from doing so. Add to this the major advances
in and proliferation of ballistic missile technology, which make
possible the ability to deliver these weapons of mass destruction
cheaply, effectively, and with stealth, and we have to conclude that
the world is not only not as predictable as it once was but in many
respects it is actually more dangerous than it was during the cold war.
Our ability to deal with these changing conditions is, of course,
affected by limited defense budgets, as I have said. In moving, as we
are doing, slowly but directly, to a balanced budget, we are going to
be under increasing pressure, in meeting our defense needs and other
needs, to get the maximum bang for the buck. If we are to succeed in
making the best use of these limited defense dollars, we have to
continually ask: Are we spending our defense dollars as wisely and
efficiently as we possibly can? Are we buying the right things to
support a properly sized force structure? Are we taking maximum
advantage of technology to avoid being bested in the future, being
defeated in the future by an opponent that is now inferior but one that
may invest wisely in the next generation's technologies and take
advantage of vulnerabilities that we may have?
Again, underlying all these questions are those fundamental questions
I posed a few moments ago: What are the threats we will face in the
future and what do we need to deter and, if necessary, defeat those
threats?
We have to determine the bottom line of what is it we want our
military to do, not just in the sense of military capabilities, but
also in the broader context of what responsibilities we want the United
States to accept in the next century and what we will need our military
to be able to do in order for our country to fulfill those
responsibilities.
Once we answer those questions--those fundamental questions--we can
move on to define how we shape, size, and equip those military forces
so they can confront the wide range of challenges we will face and if
necessary, again, deter and defeat an opponent's military forces.
Mr. President, we need to generate here an informed national debate
on what our defense posture should be in the 21st century. The fact is,
that these questions of national security are too frequently discussed
and debated only by a small group of Americans, yet they are the
fundamental questions that any society faces. How do we protect our
security? How does the Government best do that?
It is the hope of those of us who will introduce this amendment a bit
later on in the afternoon that the study, the inquiry authorized by
this amendment, both within the Pentagon and by the independent,
nonpartisan commission created by the amendment, will engender what
will challenge, not just those of us here, but those outside the
building, outside Washington, to engage with us in a great debate as to
how we can continue to protect our national security in the next
century.
We cannot afford, either fiscally or strategically, to continue to
tinker at the margins of our military forces or to procure cold war
systems we have previously bought but only in diminishing quantities
and at ever-increasing prices. We need the Secretary of Defense and the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs to put their best minds to work on these
ideas and issues in a focused and comprehensive and independent way.
The amendment that we will offer does not in any way second-guess or
infringe on the duties and prerogatives of the Department of Defense.
In fact, we know that there is much thinking in the department today
along the very lines this amendment would request. We believe our
amendment will strengthen the department's hand and help it prepare in
the assessment and recommendations which will serve as the basis for
fortifying the national bipartisan, nonpartisan consensus for defense
which we must have in the years ahead.
This is not just a question of measuring by the dollars. What the
Senator from Virginia said is worth bearing in mind as we judge our
defense spending, which is that we are now committing less money to
defense as a percentage of our gross domestic product than we have
since the second world war. The pressure is on to continue to reduce
those expenditures.
We have to be devoted to eliminating waste and overlap and taking
maximum advantage of new technologies so that the dollars are not the
only measure. But it is worth noting, as we consider those broader and
deeper measures, that even this year's defense authorization bill, with
the additional money added by the Senate Armed Services Committee,
represents the 11th consecutive year in which our spending for national
defense has dropped in real dollars. That is something that all of us
here, and as many people as we can stimulate into the discussion out
there in the citizenry, ought to ponder.
Mr. President, this amendment has a unique feature which is central
to the goal of the amendment, which we hope will help in reestablishing
the kind of national debate on national security,
[[Page S6825]]
and a consensus to follow, which I think we all believe is essential.
The amendment provides for what might be called a Team B, a group of
wise men and women, recognized defense experts, to be appointed by the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Senate and House defense
authorization committees, to review the work of the Pentagon called for
in this amendment and to offer comments and suggestions on how America
can most effectively meet our defense needs in the next century.
This group would provide its proposals and ideas to the Secretary for
his consideration as he prepares to report to the Congress, required by
the amendment. The real hope here is that this nine-person, nonpartisan
commission, appointed by the Secretary of Defense, would essentially go
out of the box and ask the questions that either we have not thought of
or we have decided are unthinkable or that we should not think about,
to force us to face the tough questions about our security needs, to
help us do what we have been trying to do on the Armed Services
Committee of the Senate, which is to break out of business as usual.
For the benefit of my colleagues, I will briefly explain what the
amendment does. First, it acknowledges that the Defense Department has
been planning to do a quadrennial defense review at the beginning of
the next administration, pursuant to a recommendation made by the
Commission on Roles and Missions. And it then, in a sense, makes
statutory that quadrennial review. It requires the review to go
forward.
It would be a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy,
force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and other
elements of the defense program with a view toward determining the
defense strategy of our country as far forward as the year 2005.
Then the amendment would establish the nonpartisan, independent,
nine-person panel of recognized defense experts that I have spoken of.
We are calling it, in the amendment, the National Defense Panel. It
would be tasked, first, with assessing the Pentagon's quadrennial
defense review, as it progresses, as well as the final report upon
completion, and then would comment on the findings of the review to the
Secretary of Defense.
The amendment also requires the Panel to conduct an alternative force
structure assessment which would result in a variety of proposed force
structures that could meet anticipated threats to our national
security. In this case we take it through the year 2010, and if the
panel determines it is appropriate and rational, beyond the year 2010.
The amendment specifies, although it does not limit, a baseline of
issues which this national defense panel must address. These will
include near-term and long-term threats, including weapons of mass
destruction, terrorism, and information warfare, a whole new category
of threat to our country built on the dependence that we have developed
on information technology and the fear that many have that an enemy may
be able to disrupt our society by disrupting our information systems,
our computer systems, particularly those critical ones, not only in the
defense areas, but, for instance, in financial areas.
The National Defense Panel must also consider scenarios based on
these threats, which would include the possibility of both large and
small conflicts, recommended force structures that would permit
military responses to those scenarios, and an assessment of the funding
which would be required.
The Panel would submit its report to the Secretary of Defense, which
in turn he would add his comments before providing it to the Senate
Armed Services Committee and the House National Security Committee by
December 15, 1997. So we have the Secretary of Defense, consistent with
our belief of civilian control of the military that is so fundamental
to our democracy, overseeing the development of the in-house
quadrennial defense review.
The National Defense Panel convenes in December of this year if this
amendment passes. It begins its own work, and it works with the Defense
Department as the department is developing the quadrennial review.
It offers suggestions and responses to those working in the
department on the quadrennial defense review. That review is then
submitted to the Congress next spring. The National Defense Panel
continues its work, comments on the final product of the quadrennial
defense review, and then offers to the Secretary of Defense, by next
fall and into the early winter, its report--bold, hopefully, in some
measure unsettling and provocative, which the Secretary of Defense then
turns over to us by December of next year.
Mr. President, there have been some concerns expressed about this
schedule. Some, for instance, have said that December of next year is
too late. Others have argued that this timetable does not give the
Department of Defense adequate time to address all of these important
issues.
I believe we have struck a good middle ground here with the schedule
that is in the amendment, building on work which is underway, has been
done, or will be initiated if this legislation passes. The sooner the
Members of Congress can get these important analyses and these
recommendations, the sooner we will be able to hold hearings on them,
try to involve the public in our considerations, and begin to make the
very important decisions that will affect our national security in the
coming decades.
There is no time to waste, but, of course, these are such
complicated, fundamental, important questions that we are giving both
the Defense Department and the National Defense Panel, that we felt
they deserved a reasonable amount of time to complete their work.
There is one last very important point which I do want to emphasize.
That is that this amendment was developed in a truly bipartisan way,
such that we really consider it--those of us who are sponsoring it--to
be a nonpartisan amendment. Of course, it ought to be. When we are
dealing with our national defense, there ought not to be Democratic and
Republican positions. There ought to be American positions. That is the
spirit in which the work on this amendment has gone forward.
Members and staff from both sides of the aisle on the Armed Services
Committee were involved in writing this amendment. The process we used
resulted in lengthy, thoughtful, and spirited debates about the future
of our national security and our Armed Forces. Each of us, I think,
undertook this endeavor because we care about our national security and
have tremendous respect for the professionals who serve every day, in
and out of uniform, in the Department of Defense.
My special thanks go to Senators Coats, McCain, Robb, and their
staffs who contributed so much to this effort, as well, of course, to
Chairman Thurmond and Senator Nunn and their professional staff
members, for their encouragement and their very, very concise and
constructive support.
We also appreciate the time that was spent by personnel in the
Department of Defense, particularly Deputy Secretary of Defense John
White and his staff, who reviewed and advised us on this amendment, and
who have wanted to go forward in a spirit of cooperation not only among
the parties here but between the Congress and the executive branch.
The future of our national security is obviously far too important to
be left to business as usual at either the executive or legislative
branch. I cannot thank the Department of Defense enough for the
support, encouragement, counsel, occasional disagreement, but ultimate
consensus that is expressed in this amendment.
In summary, and finally, Mr. President, what this is all about is
becoming engaged in a very difficult, complicated, farsighted but
critical debate about how we can have the best national security
possible for America, particularly now as we, in some sense, reign
supreme, unchallenged, as the greatest superpower in the world,
understanding that history teaches us that the special position of
power and relative invulnerability is not enjoyed by nations for long
periods of time unless they plan and act to make that so. Nations rise
and nations fall over the course of history.
What this amendment is about is making sure that the United States of
America remains strong and dominant, able to deter threats to our
security and, if necessary, to defeat them far
[[Page S6826]]
into the next century. We have the resources, we have the brain power,
we have the courage and skill of our war fighters to make that happen.
This amendment is all about making sure that we use and develop those
natural strengths that America has to the best of our ability.
I come back to the final point that we have to involve the American
people more in these discussions. Sometimes, particularly when we
exist, as we do now, at a time of relative national security, it is
hard to get people to focus in on the details and on the need to
continue to commit adequate resources to our national defense. I am
convinced that if we find ways to involve more of our citizens in these
discussions, in the work of a nonpartisan panel, a national defense
panel, in the hearings that it may hold, in the hearings that will
surely be held here in Congress after we receive these reports from the
Secretary of Defense, then the American people and we, their
Representatives in Congress, will surely provide the resources
necessary to preserve our liberties and defend our national principles
and interests.
Mr. President, an informed public will always understand the wisdom
and the memorable comment made by the great British soldier and leader,
Sir John Slessor, when he said,
It is customary in democratic countries to deplore
expenditure on armaments as conflicting with the requirements
of social services. There is a tendency to forget that the
most important social service that a government can do for
its people is to keep them alive and free.
Mr. President, I hope when we introduce this amendment later in the
afternoon that other colleagues will join us in cosponsoring it and, of
course, in voting for it.
I thank the Chair for the opportunity to address the amendment. I
look forward to returning and actually introducing the amendment when
the appropriate unanimous-consent agreement is entered. I yield the
floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of this amendment to
be proposed by the able Senator from Connecticut, and I ask unanimous
consent that I be listed as a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. President, for the past 3 years the Clinton administration has
failed to articulate a sound and credible national security strategy. A
large part of this failure is the result of the President refusing to
submit a budget request which provides the necessary funds to support
the force structure required by his own strategy. In fact, it is
frequently noted that the force structure is underfunded by as much as
$150 billion. Not only has this administration failed to provide the
funds required to sustain the numerous foreign adventures in which the
President involves our military forces, but the administration has also
failed to provide the funds required to modernize our military forces
for the conflicts of the 21st century.
Mr. President, the people of the United States cannot afford to
continue down this dangerous path.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war,
the United States has conducted two substantial assessments of the
force structure necessary to protect American interests in an
increasingly chaotic world. The base force of the Bush administration
laid a credible foundation for restructuring our forces in order to
meet the realities of the post-cold war world. However, President
Clinton's Bottom-Up-Review, which replaced the base force, failed to
make any meaningful contribution because it did not outline a force
structure that would protect American interests into the next century.
As we look toward the future, it is essential that we re-examine the
world security environment and develop a military force that will be
capable of defending American interests in future conflicts.
Mr. President, the proposed amendment will set this reexamination in
motion. The amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to perform an
assessment of the national security strategy, and the force structure
necessary to support that strategy, through the year 2005. In addition,
the amendment creates an independent, nonpartisan panel of national
security experts to review the Secretary's assessment and provide a
report to the Congress which offers alternative force structures to
that which is provided by the Secretary.
The information that is provided by each of these reports will be
available to both the administration and the Congress for use in making
decisions to prepare the armed forces of the United States for the 21st
century. These reports will make a significant contribution to ensuring
that our national security strategy is sufficient to protect American
interests in the future, and that the force structure is sufficiently
funded to support that strategy. We must be sure that the strategy and
force structure are balanced and affordable.
Mr. President, now is the time that we should undertake a fundamental
re-examination of our national security requirements. The national
security strategy of the Clinton administration has failed to provide
for the future security of the United States. We cannot commit the
security of our children to this failed strategy and insufficiently
funded force structure. Therefore, I urge my fellow Senators to support
this amendment.
Now, Mr. President, in closing, I want to commend the ranking member,
Senator Nunn, for the remarks he made on this subject, about going
ahead. We need to know what the amendments are. Any Senator who has an
amendment to the defense authorization bill should come forth and
present that amendment. Time is fleeting. We want to finish this bill
by Thursday night, and we would like to know what it is.
The other thing I want to mention is that amendments should be
defense-related. If they are not defense-related, they should be
offered on some other bill and not on this particular bill.
Mr. President, this is important. We have to finish this bill in due
time, and we should waste no time in getting these amendments in. Let
the amendments be defense-related, or offer them to some other bill.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________